State v.

Lane
Notes
On the evening of 17 September 1990, a nineteen-year-old defendant and his
two cousins, Steve Coor and Rodney Coor, left defendants home and walked around
the corner to a Jet Service Station to purchase some beer. On their way home,
defendant and Steve Coor turned around to observe Rodney walking with and talking
to a highly intoxicated white male, who was staggering along Grantham St, a fourlane highway otherwise known as Business Route 70. Steve Coor testified that he told
the man with Rodney to be careful in the street. The man responded by swearing and
making gestures. Steve and Rodney saw defendant swing at the man, and saw the man
fall on the cement on the edge of Grantham Street. Defendant, Rodney and Steve
continued to walk home. At 9:48 PM, Sgt. M.A. Cruthirds of the Goldsboro Police
Dpt. responded to a call regarding a white male lying in the road at one corner of
Grantham St. Sgt. Cruthirds discovered Gregory Linton lying in the road, three feet
from the curb. Rescue personnel arrived at the scene. Cruthirds applied pressure
behind Linton's ear to which Linton responded by trying to remove Cruthirds' hand.
After determining that there was no sign of injury, and that Linton was only
intoxicated, the rescue team left, and Sgt. Cruthirds took Linton into custody and
placed him in the Wayne County jail for public drunkenness. Linton was taken to the
hospital the following day around 4:30 PM. He was unconscious. He had a BAC of
0.34% on the Breathalyzer scale at the approximate time of his arrival at the hospital.
Linton died at 6:30 PM. An autopsy revealed no external injuries, but did reveal a
subdural hematoma on the right side of the brain, a swollen brain, brain contusions or
bruises, pneumonia on the lungs, and fatty change of the liver, which is most
commonly caused by alcohol abuse. In the medical examiner's opinion, Linton died as
a result of blunt force injury to the head. Defendant was indicted and tried for
involuntary manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. After finding the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, defendant received the
maximum sentence of ten years.
*Involuntary manslaughter is "the unintentional killing of a human being without
malice, proximately caused by (1) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or
naturally dangerous to human life, or (2) a culpably negligent act of omission."
Issues
#1. Whether the State's evidence was sufficient to show that defendant's act of hitting
Gregory Linton was both the actual and legal cause of Linton's death.
#2. Whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the offense exists.
Reasoning
Defendant believes the State failed to present substantial evidence that his
punch was the cause-in-fact of Linton's death, because there was no prove that the
punch or the fall produced the blunt force injury to the head and there is also no way
to prove that the punch was the trigger and not some event before or after.
However, contrary to defendants argument, there is evidence in the record,
which a reasonable jury could find that the defendant's punch was the actual cause of
the blunt force injury to the head, leading directly to Linton's death. Steve Coor, the
cousin of the defendant, also testified that he saw defendant swing at Linton "around
the head." The medical examiner also testified that the victim's swollen brain could
have been a response to either a blow to the head or a response to the head striking
some object. To the second portion of the argument, there is no evidence in the record
to substantiate the defendant's suggestion that another tragic event occurred to the

victim before or after the encounter with the defendant. The court also found that
there was sufficient evidence of proximate cause and upheld the conviction.
Holding
The defendant was tried, proven, and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter
of Gregory Linton.

Oxendine v. State
Facts
On the mornings of January 18, 1984, Leotha Tyree, Oxendine's girlfriend,
who lived with him, pushing Jeffrey into a bathtub caused microscopic tears in his
intestines, which led to peritonitis. During a break at work that evening, Oxendine
telephoned home and talked to Jeffrey, who complained of stomach pains. When
Oxendine returned home from work, he saw bruises on Jeffrey and knew that Tyree
had beaten the child during the day. Although Jeffrey continued to complain of a
stomachache, he apparently did not tell his father how or when he received the
bruises. The next morning at approximately 7:30 AM, Oxendine went into Jeffrey's
bedroom and began screaming at him to get up. A neighbor in the same apartment
building testified to hearing sounds coming from the room of blows being struck,
obscenities uttered by a male voice, and cries from a child saying, "Please stop,
Daddy, it hurts." After hearing these sounds continue for what seemed like five to ten
minutes, the witness heard a final noise consisting of a loud thump, as if someone had
been kicked or punched "with a great blow." Later that day, Jeffrey's abdomen became
swollen. When Oxendine arrived home from work at about 5:00 PM, Tyree told him
Jeffrey's condition and urged him to take Jeffrey to the hospital. Oxendine, apparently
believing that Jeffrey was exaggerating his discomfort, went out, bought a newspaper,
and returned home to read it. Upon his return, Tyree had prepared to take Jeffrey to
the hospital. En route, Jeffrey stopped breathing; and was pronounced dead shorty
after his arrival at the hospital. During its case-in-chief, the State called medical
examiners Dr. Inguito and Dr. Hameli, who both testified that Jeffrey's death was
caused by intra-abdominal hemorrhage and acute peritonitis, occurring as a result of
blunt force trauma to the front of the abdomen.
Issues
#1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that Oxendine's conduct caused
Jeffrey's death.
#2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that Oxendine's conduct or his
infliction of the second injury sped up or accelerated Jeffrey's death.
#3. Whether there is a degree of medical certainty that the second injury or
Oxendine's conduct contributed to the death of the child.
Reasoning
The ultimate and only theory of causation on which the jury was charged was
based on "acceleration." The Trial Court instructed the jury that "a defendant who
causes the death of another...is not relieved of responsibility for causing the death if
another later injury accelerates, that is, hastens the death of another person.
Contribution with acceleration is not sufficient...to establish causation." So, in terms
of section 261, the relevant question is: but for his infliction of the second injury,
would the victim have died when he died? If the second injury caused his son to die
any sooner, then defendant, who inflicted the second injury would be deemed to have
caused his son's death within the definition of section 261. Both the State's expert
witness, Dr. Inguito and Dr. Haneli, were unable to state with any degree of medical
certainty that the second injury contributed to the death of the child.

Holding
There wasn't sufficient evidence to prove that the second infliction caused the
acceleration of Jeffrey's death, causing Oxendine's conviction of manslaughter to be
set aside. Furthermore, even if the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain its
original theories of causation, we could not affirm Oxendine's conviction because the
jury was not instructed on either of these theories. The ultimate and only theory
("acceleration") on which the court instructed the jury was different and not
compatible with the State's original theories of causation. Acceleration is not
synonymous with either aggravation or the combined effects of two injuries. Thus
when the State was unable to establish at the end of its case-in-chief a prima facie
case for acceleration, its case for manslaughter failed. The case was remanded to the
Supreme Court.

State v. Lamprey
Facts
The defendant operated a child daycare center in her home. For a number of
years, she cared for pre-school age children during the day and provided after-school
care to school-age children. The defendant would meet the school-age children in the
afternoon at the bus stop where the school bus dropped them off, sometimes walking
to the bus stop and other times driving her pickup truck. When the defendant drove
the truck, the children routinely rode back to her house in the truck bed. According to
testimony at trial, on one occasion not long before the accident, a parent saw children
riding in the bed of the defendant's truck and complained to her. On September 14,
2000, the defendant drover he truck to the bus stop and picked up six children. Three
of the children were six years old and three were ten years old. At the bus stop, she
opened the gate to the bed of the truck and all six children climbed into the bed. No
child seats or safety belts were in place in the truck bed. On the drive to the
defendant's home, the truck left the road and struck a tree. All six children suffered
injuries, and one of the children, Katie Silva, died. According to the State, the
accident occurred while the defendant was driving so called "swervies" to entertain
the children. When performing swervies, the defendant would steer the truck back and
forth in a zigzag pattern. The State introduced testimony from three children that the
defendant was doing swervies just before the accident, as well as testimony by the
police officers about the tire marks they observed on the road leading to the site of the
accident. According to expert testimony for the State, no mechanical problem with the
truck contributed to the accident. The defendant stated she did not remember doing
swervies on the day of the accident but, if she did so, it was because there was a dog
in the road. She contended that a mechanical defect in the truck caused the
unexpected acceleration resulting in the accident. She also argued that the tire tracks
were too contaminated by other vehicles for the State's witnesses to have drawn
reliable conclusions.
Issues
#1. Whether the trial court's jury instruction on causation conflicts with New
Hampshire law by defining to restrictively the circumstances in which an intervening
cause warrants acquittal.
#2. Whether the State can provide sufficient evidence to prove that the actions of the
defendant directly caused Katie Silvia's death and serious bodily injuries to the other
children.
#3. Whether there is prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts of the defendant
remained the substantial cause of the death and/or injuries.
#4. Whether the "sole substantial cause" standard used by the trial court is the correct
standard for legal causation under New Hampshire law in cases involving
coincidental intervening cause.
Reasoning
To establish causation, the State needed to prove not only that the prohibited
result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant, but also that the
defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the prohibited result. A legal cause of death
and/or serious bodily injuries is a cause that is direct and substantial factor in bringing
about that death and/or injuries.
Defendant brought up a contention that the language was not presented and
instructed to the jury as accord with Seymour. However, the instruction that

prohibited the result must be the "direct result" of the defendant's actions is
substantially the same as the "natural, direct, and immediate consequence" instructed
in Seymour.
The Defendant also brought up two examples of tests that could be applied in
cases of coincidental intervening causes, both of which incorporate some form of
foreseeability test. However, the jury instruction proposed by the defendant at trail
contained no such foreseeability test. As she states in her brief, the defendant "asked
the court to instruct the jury that the intervening cause in this case-the mechanical
defect producing unintended acceleration-would defeat the element of causation if the
jury believed that the mechanical defect 'contributed to' the accident." However, the
instruction proposed by the defendant before the trial court is substantially different.
Moreover, we believe that the defendant's proposed instruction makes an
unwarranted distinction in degrees of criminal culpability. Often the risk of a
particular kind of contributing coincidental intervening cause is the very risk that
made the conduct reckless in the first place. For example, if one were to pick up a
loaded handgun, ensure that the safety is engaged, and aim and fire at a bystander, it
does not follow that a mechanical failure of the safety should exculpate the defendant
if he kills the bystander.
Holding
We hold that the "sole substantial case" instruction given by the trial court, and
set forth in Soucy, is the correct standard under New Hampshire law as applied to the
facts of this case. Superior Court finds her guilty of one count of manslaughter, one
count of misdemeanor reckless conduct, and four counts of first-degree assault.

State v. Pelham
Facts
On the evening of December 29, 1995, William Patrick, a sixty six year old
lawyer, was driving his Chrysler LeBaron in the right lane of northbound Route 1 in
South Brunswick. At approximately 11:42 PM, a 1993 Toyota Camry driven by
defendant struck the LeBaron from behind. The LeBaron sailed over the curb and slid
along the guardrail, crashing into a utility pole before it ultimately came to rest 152
feet from the site of the impact. The Camry traveled over a cub and came to rest in a
grass area on the side of the highway.
Two nearby police officers heard the collision and rushed to the scene. The
officers found Patrick, still wearing his seatbelt, unconscious and slumped forward in
the driver's seat. The rear of the LeBaron was crumpled through to the rear tire and
the backseat, and the convertible top was crushed. Patrick was making "gurgling" and
"wheezing" sounds, and appeared to have difficulty breathing. At the accident scene,
Officer Heistand smelled an odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, and noted that he
was swaying from side to side and front to back. He had no injuries, but was
"belligerent". Heistand believed defendant was intoxicated. Three field sobreity tests
were conducted. Defendant failed all three. He was placed under arrest for driving
while intoxicated, transported to the police station, and later taken to the Robert Wood
Johnson for a BAC test. Experts assessed his BAC between 0.19 and 0.22 at the time
of the accident. Patrick's condition was critical on his arrival.
The catastrophic injuries Patrick experienced made it virtually impossible for
him to breathe on his own. He was placed under a ventilator. Within five days of the
accident, Patrick experienced "Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome" a diagnose
indicating that his lungs were beginning to fail. On March 13, 1996 Patrick was
transferred to the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation. When he arrived, Patrick was
unable to breathe on his own, and was suffering from multi-organ system failure.
While at Kessler, Patrick also was monitored by psychiatric staff. The staff
determined that he was "significantly" brain injured. During lucid moments, he
expressed his unhappiness with his situation, and on occasions tried to remove his
ventilator. His conditions were starting to get better, but rapidly regressed. By early
may, sever infections returned, as well as pneumonia. Patrick had expressed to his
family a preference not to be kept alive on life support. Patrick's family decided to
support and respect his wishes and removed the ventilator. After two hours of the
ventilator removal on May 30th, 1996, he was pronounced dead.
Issues
#1. Whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the removal of life support
was not an intervening causation of Patrick's death.
#2. Whether the removal of the victim's life support may constitute, as a matter of law,
an "independent intervening cause," the significance of which a jury may evaluate as
part of a culpability analysis.
Reasoning
This State recognizes the constitutional, common-law, and now statutorily
based right of an individual to accept, reject, or discontinue medical treatment in the
form of life supporting devices or techniques. An ill or injured person has that
personal right and is free to exercise it, at his or her discretion, directly or through a
family member or guardian acting in accordance with the person's wishes. In other
words, a person's choice to have himself or herself removed from life support cannot

be viewed as unexpected or extraordinary. Because the exercise of the right does not
break unexpectedly, or in any extraordinary way, the chain of causation that a
defendant initiated and that led to the need for life support, it is not an intervening
cause that may be advanced by the defendant.
Holding
The jury acquitted defendant of aggravated manslaughter, but convicted him
of the lesser-included offense of a second-degree vehicular homicide. He was
sentenced to a custodial term of seven years with a mandatory parole ineligibility
period of three years.

Case Problem #14

Although what Ali did was wrong, because Ali did run through a red light,
Bernie was still the proximate cause of Ali's death. Bernie shouldn't have been
drinking and driving in the first place. Second, the point of a yellow light means that
the driver should slow down, not speed up to 77 mph. That speed is even a high speed
for most high ways, but for an average intersection, that is beyond the limit. Because
Bernie was driving while intoxicated, he couldn't perceive and react to danger, like a
non intoxicated person. Bernie reacted to danger to late because he wasn't in the
proper mental state one should be, when behind the wheel. Although Ali was wrong
when Ali passed through the red light, Bernie's high speed and his intoxication level
were major contributors to the death of Ali.