6.

ALCALA VS DE VERA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974

JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:p

On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, filed this present
petition for disbarment against respondent Honesto de Vera, a practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay,
who was retained by them as their counsel in civil case 2478 of the Court of First Instance of Albay,
entitled: "Ray Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala".
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice: 1) for having
maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in civil case 2478 resulting in the
deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse judgment rendered against them; and 2) for
respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of interest in petitioners' cause resulting to their
damage and prejudice.
Respondent attorney, in his answer to these charges, asserted that he notified his clients of the
decision in question and that he defended complainants' case to the best of his ability as demanded
by the circumstances and that he never showed indifference, lack of interest or disloyalty to their
cause.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report and
recommendation, substantially found the following:
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of two parcels of land (lots Nos. 1880 and
1883 covered by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed by the vendee, Ray Semenchuk,
against the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the ground that lot 1880 "could not be located or did not
exist", and for the recovery of damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent attorney, whose legal services were engaged by complainants, filed an answer denying
the material allegations of the above-mentioned complaint and setting up a counterclaim for the

balance of the purchase price of the lots sold, the expenses of notarials, internal revenue,
registration, etc. plus damages and attorney's fees.
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered judgment rescinding the contract of sale, on the ground
that the vendee Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of lot 1880 it being in the
possession of a certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers who have been occupying the land for a
number of years. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale (Exhibit A) rescinded;
(b) Directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants the possession of lot No. 1883.
(c) Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 after
deducting the amount of P250.00 which is the consideration in the deed of sale of Lot
No. 185; and
(d) Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 11, rollo)
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed to inform
his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to complainants' house to
serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately
wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his
reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy
of the decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was
taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.

On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty.
Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of
which they lost their right to appeal from said decision. The trial court that heard case 2723
found for a fact that respondent did not inform his clients of the decision rendered in case 2478;
however, it denied damages for lack of proof that the spouses Alcala suffered any damage as a
result of respondent's failure to notify them of the aforesaid decision. The judgment in case 2723
was appealed to the Court of Appeals 1 by respondent herein but the same was affirmed by said
appellate court.
Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment
against their former counsel.
1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest" of respondent in the handling of complainants' defense
in civil case 2478.
The basis of this particular charge is the alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present at the trial of case
2478 certain documents which according to the complainants could have proven that lot 1880
actually existed, to wit: a sketch of lot 1880 prepared by the vendee, Semenchuk, himself (Exh. L-

Adm. Case); technical description of lot 1880 taken from complainants' certificate of title (Exh. MAdm. Case); sketch plan of lot 1880 in relation to the adjoining lots prepared by surveyor Miguel N.
Romero (Exh. N-Adm Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued by surveyor Romero for the preparation of
the sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case) all of which documents were turned over by Jose Alcala
to respondent before the trial of case 2478.
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is no merit to this particular charge.
The records of case 2478 show that upon agreement of the parties and their attorneys, the trial court
appointed a commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and after conducting such relocation, the
commissioner reported to the Court that the lot existed, but that the same was in the possession of
other persons. Inasmuch as the existence of lot 1880 had already been verified by the
commissioner, it was therefore unnecessary for respondent attorney to introduce in evidence
Exhibits "L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of which was merely to prove the existence of said lot. If
the complaint for rescission prospered it was because of complainant Alcala's failure to comply with
his obligation of transferring the material or physical possession of lot 1880 to the vendee and for no
other reason; hence, complainants had nobody to blame but themselves. The fact that the plaintiff,
Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that respondent
attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
2. Gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his clients of the
decision in case 2478:
The matter in dispute with respect to this specific charge is whether or not respondent notified his
clients, the complainants herein, about the decision in case 2478. Respondent claims that he did
inform his clients of the decision; complainants insist the contrary.
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on hand to prove that
respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the decision in case 2478.
As stated in the Solicitor General's report, the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala when the writ of
execution in said civil case was served upon him and his wife by a sheriff was such that it betrayed a
total unawareness of the adverse decision. The evidence shows that when he was told about the
sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala immediately inquired from the trial Court the reason for the writ of
execution and it was only then that he was informed that a decision had been rendered, that his
lawyer received a copy thereof since April 19, 1963, and because no appeal was taken the judgment
became final and executory. Alcala then sought the help of his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila
and the latter wrote to respondent inquiring as to what steps were taken, if any, to prosecute an
appeal from the decision in question but respondent chose not to answer the letter. Thereafter,
Alcala instituted an action for damages and filed the instant complaint for disbarment.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:
Again, we do not think petitioner Alcala would have felt so aggrieved and embittered
by the loss of his right to appeal the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 so as to take all
these legal steps against respondent, with all the attendant trouble and expense in

doing so, if it is not true, as he alleged, that the latter indeed did not notify him of said
decision. We believe and so submit, therefore, that respondent really failed to inform
petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, and this was also the finding made
by the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No. 2723 for
damages filed by petitioners against respondent, and by the Court of Appeals in the
appeal taken by respondent from said decision. (pp. 38-39, rollo)
Is respondent's failure to notify his clients of the decision sufficient cause for his disbarment?
Complainants answer the question in the affirmative, while on the other hand, respondent prays that
he be exonerated because, according to him, granting arguendo that he failed to inform the
complainants about the decision, the truth is that said decision was fair and just and no damage was
caused to complainants by reason thereof.
On this point, We agree with the following appraisal of the evidence by the Solicitor General:
In this connection, it is indeed true that although both the Court of First Instance of
Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed by petitioners against respondent
Atty. De Vera (pp. 30-34, Exh. "D", id.), and the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No.
35267-R (the appeal taken by respondent from the decision of the trial court in C.C.
No. 2723), found that respondent actually did not inform petitioners of the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478, still both courts also held that petitioners did not sustain any
damages as a result of said decision, for which reason the trial court dismissed
petitioners' action for damages against respondent, which dismissal was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. We quote the finding of the Court of First Instance of Albay in
its decision in Civil Case No. 2723 in this regard:
The second issue that has to be passed upon by the Court is neither
the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On this issue, the Court finds
that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages from defendant Atty.
Honesto de Vera. No evidence has been presented that they
sustained damages of the decision. Neither it has been shown that
the decision is not supported by the facts and the law applicable to
the case. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages
because of the failure of Atty. Honesto de Vera to inform them of the
decision.
"An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and
skill, having reference to the character of the business
he undertakes to do. Fallible like any other human
being, he is answerable to every error or mistake, and
will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in
good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.
Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a
judgment adverse to him which became final by
reason of the alleged fault or negligence of his lawyer

must prove his loss due to the injustice of the

decision. He cannot base his action on the
unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the
injustice of the decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G.
6480)."
(Exh. "D", id.; pp. 33-34)
Significantly, petitioners did not appeal from the above decision, which is an implied
acceptance by them of the correctness of the findings therein. Instead, it was
respondent Atty. De Vera who appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.G.R. No. 35267-R), and the latter Court, although agreeing with the finding of the trial
court that respondent really did not inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case
No. 2478 (Exh. "T"), affirmed, however, the lower court's finding that petitioners were
not entitled to the damages claimed by them by reason of respondent's failure to
notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. ... While the rule of res judicata in
civil or criminal cases is not, strictly speaking, applicable in disbarment proceedings,
which is neither a civil or a criminal proceeding intended to punish a lawyer or afford
redress to private grievances but is a proceeding sui generis intended to safeguard
the administration of justice by removing from the legal profession a person who has
proved himself unfit to exercise such trust (p. 207, Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics;
Re Keenan, 86 ALR 679; De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, April 12,
1961; In re Montague & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), still we consider the findings
of the trial court as well as of the Court of Appeals in the damage, suit filed by
petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera based on the same grounds now
invoked in this disbarment case relevant and highly persuasive in this case,
especially as petitioners themselves have, as already observed, accepted and
admitted the correctness of said findings. And we may add that we ourselves agree
with respondent that petitioners had not been prejudiced or damaged in any way by
the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, but that said decision appears in fact to be more
favorable to them than could have been the case if the trial court had applied the law
strictly against them in said case, ... (pp. 17-19, Report. pp. 39-41, rollo; emphasis
supplied).
The Solicitor General's Report continues and says:
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary
damage by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his clients,
the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment" (7 C.J.S. 979). The
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need
for the client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in the dark
as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus
that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired (Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case

No. 595, July 30, 1971). As it happened in this case, because of respondent's failure
to notify petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were entirely
caught by surprise, resulting in shock and mental and emotional disturbance to them,
when the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home with a writ of execution of a
judgment that they never knew had been rendered in the case, since their lawyer, the
respondent, had totally failed to inform them about the same. ... (pp. 23-24, Report,
pp. 45-46, rollo; emphasis supplied).
We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the correctness of the decision in case
2478 is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his
liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients,
there is, nonetheless, proof of negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in
his failure to give timely notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence
did not result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We
are not disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme
penalty of disbarment. As stated in the very early case of In Re Macdougall:
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended
to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the
exercise of disbarment, and the power should be exercised with that caution which
the serious consequences of the action involves.
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a
lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal, and ability, the attorney may have
acquired a fixed means of support for himself and family of great pecuniary value,
and the deprivation of which would result in irreparable injury. (3 Phil. 70, 77-78)
In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court:
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual
and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise
it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely
that the respectability of the bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the
bench should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion, ought to reside in the Court. This discretion, ought to be exercised with
great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised. (Ex parte Burr. 9 Wheat
529; Martin, Legal & Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed. p. 213.)
Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or suspension under the
circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke from Us as we hereby rebuke and
censure him, considering that his failure to notify his clients of the decision in question manifests a
lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, and the fact that this appears to be the first misconduct of respondent in the exercise of his
legal profession, We hereby hold said respondent GUILTY only of simple negligence in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants, and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him.
Let this decision be noted in respondent's record as a member of the Bar in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra,
Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 C.A. G.R. No. 35267-R.

7. POLICARPIO VS CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94563 March 5, 1991

MEYNARDO C. POLICARPIO and LOURDES POLICARPIO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EVELYN Q. CATABAS, ROMULO Q. CATABAS and
CLEMENTE CATABAS, respondents.
Julian S. Yap for petitioners.
Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr. for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This petition asks for the setting aside of the April 30, 1990 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. Civil Case No. 16069 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof another one
is hereby entered.
(1) Ordering appellees, (1) to authorize Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIB) to release their mortgaged TCT No. 501812 upon payment by Urban
Development Bank (URBAN Bank) of their mortgage loan obligation with said PCIB;
and thereafter (2) to transfer the title in appellant's name;
(2) Ordering appellants, (1) to pay appellees a monthly rent of P2,500.00 for their use
of the subject property during the period from December 18, 1983 to the filing of the
complaint a quo on January 5, 1985 when the judicial demand was made on
appellees, or P31,250 for 125 months at 12% interestper annum; (2) to reimburse
appellees P2,812.60 for the capital gains tax, stamps and other related expenses
paid for by appellees; and (3) to pay and/or authorize Urban Bank to pay to appellees
the proceeds of the loan granted to appellants to the extent of P145,000.00 (unpaid
balance of the purchase price) less whatever amount is to be paid to PCIB for the
outstanding mortgage loan obligation of appellees with said bank. (Rollo, p. 54)
On November 25,1983, petitioners-spouses Meynardo C. Policarpio and Lourdes Policarpio and
private respondents Evelyn Romulo and Clemente, all surnamed Catabas executed a "Contract to
Sell" whereby the private respondents agreed to buy and the petitioners-spouses to sell a residential
lot of about 300 square meters with a house and other improvements located at Servillana Street,
UE Village, Cainta, Rizal. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 501812
Registry of Deeds, Province of Rizal. The agreed purchase price was the amount of P270,000
payable as follows: (1) P10,000.00 upon signing of the Contract to Sell; and (2) the balance of
P260,000.00 to be paid from the proceeds of the private respondents' PAG-IBIG loan thru its
designated bank, the Urban Bank and which they guarantee and warrant to be approved and
thereafter release on or before the first week of December 1983; and to deliver to the petitionersspouses the whole amount of P260,000.00 on or before the first week of December 1983.

The "Contract to Sell" also provides that failure on the part of the vendees to pay the balance on the
first week of December, 1983 will automatically annul the contract and the vendors shall immediately
return the downpayment and that after full payment of the purchase price the vendors shall execute
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the vendee.
The private respondents were not able to pay the balance price on the first week of December 1983.
However, the petitioners-spouses did not return the P10,000 downpayment. The private respondents
continued to make partial payments which were received by the petitioners-spouses. All in all, the
private respondents made partial payments of P75,000.00 broken down as follows: (1) P10,000.00
at the time of the execution of the Contract to Sell; (2) P50,000.00 on May 9, 1984; (3) Pl0,000.00 on
June 4, 1984 and (4) P5,000.00 on June 7, 1984.
On April 9, 1984, the parties executed a deed of absolute sale over the subject property. Thereafter,
the petitioners-spouses delivered physical possession of the property to the private respondents.
On March 1, 1985, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
a case for specific performance and damages against the petitioners-spouses. They claimed that in
view of the fact that their PAG-IBIG loan was not processed on time without fault on their part, the
parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same property. They also claimed that the
balance of P195,000.00 which is to be paid out of the proceeds of the PAG-IBIG loan was already
processed, approved and ready for availment provided all the required documents and title to the
property in the names of the private respondents are delivered to the Urban Bank. However, the
petitioners-spouses motivated by a desire to increase the contract price refused to deliver and
transfer the title of the property to the private respondents. They, therefore, prayed that the
petitioners- spouses be ordered to confirm the transfer to the private respondents of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 501812 covering the property, subject matter of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in
order that the same may be used as collateral for the approved PAG-IBIG loan; to execute all other
documents and furnish the private respondents certificate of clearance pursuant to existing laws so
as to secure TCT No. 501812 in the name of the private respondents. In addition, the private
respondents asked for damages.
On the other hand, the petitioners-spouses averred that the Contract to Sell was automatically
cancelled when the private respondents violated the terms of the contract: (1) the balance of the
purchase price was not paid on or before the first week of December 1983; (2) the capital gains tax
and documentary stamps for the sale of the property were not paid by the private respondents. They,
however, allowed the private respondents to occupy the property when the latter agreed to the
following terms:
a) The purchase price of the property shad be adjusted to P330,000.00 to cope with
the adverse effects of devaluation and full payment of the remaining balance shall be
on or before May 30, 1984.
b) That within one (1) month plaintiffs (private respondents) would secure from other
private sources at least P90,000.00 so that defendants (petitioners) could pay their
loan with the PCIB where the subject property is mortgaged to enable the plaintiffs to

pursue their PAG-IBIG loan, if they still so desire with the defendants' title as security.
(page 35, Rollo)
In accordance with the new terms, the parties allegedly executed the simulated Absolute Deed of
Sale dated April 9, 1984 and the petitioners-spouses accepted additional partial payment of
P50,000.00. The consideration stated in the deed of sale was undervalued to only P230,000.00
upon request of the private respondents in order to save on expenses related to the transactions and
also upon the private respondents' representation that P230,000.00 was the maximum amount of
loan they could obtain. However, the private respondents failed to pay the remaining balance on or
before May 30, 1984. Nevertheless, the private respondents paid on two separate occasions the
amount of P15,000.00 which the petitioners-spouses accepted when the former promised that full
payment would be made within July 1984, regardless of the outcome of their PAG-IBIG loan. The
petitioners-spouses asserted that the private respondents' failure to obtain their PAG-IBIG loan was
their own fault and that the private respondents have never acquired title or ownership of the subject
property despite the Deed of Absolute Sale. They averred that the Deed is subject to the terms and
conditions of the Contract to Sell and/or the additional agreement of the parties. They also filed a
counterclaim for damages. After due trial, the trial court found for the petitioners-spouses. The
complaint was dismissed. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, decision is hereby
rendered dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint and rendering judgment in favor of
defendants on their compulsory counterclaim, as follows:
1) The Contract to Sell which has been superseded by a simulated Deed of Absolute
Sale entered into by and between the parties are (sic) hereby declared of no further
legal force and effect, provided that the P75,000.00 which the plaintiffs paid as
downpayment for subject property shall, up to that amount, be applied to the
pecuniary awards in favor of defendants, to wit:
2) Plaintiffs are directed to vacate defendants' house and lot No. 22, Block 5
Servillana St., UE Village, Cainta, Rizal, and to pay to defendants P2,500.00 monthly
as reasonable value for the use and occupation of the same since December 18,
1983 until possession thereof shall have been restored to the defendants;
3) Plaintiffs shall reimburse defendants the sum of P6,500.00 paid by the latter as
downpayment for a lot in Mandaluyong, which was, however, forfeited, with 12%
interest thereon per annum from date said downpayment was made until the same
shall have been fully reimbursed;
4) Plaintiffs shall pay to defendants P30,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P30,000.00 for and as attorney's fees; and
5) Costs of suit. (Rollo, pp. 91-92)
As stated earlier, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. A
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

In view of the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the appellate court we have decided to
review the evidence on record in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record. (Robleza
v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 [1989]).
It is to be observed that the parties' conflicting evidence centers on the Contract to Sell and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the parties on April 9, 1984. The parties introduced conflicting testimonies
regarding the true nature of the subject documents. This, in effect results in the non-application of
the Parol Evidence Rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
The record shows that neither of the parties objected to the different testimonies. Hence, the trial
court had no option but to admit these conflicting testimonies. The issue was, therefore, reduced to
the credibility of witnesses.
After a thorough examination of the record we are constrained to reverse the findings of the
appellate court.
The appellate court's conclusion that the petitioners-spouses were at fault in the non-release of the
private respondents' PAG-IBIG loan thru Urban Bank, has no factual basis.
The subject property was mortgaged to the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). This
fact was known to the private respondents. In such a case, it may be assumed that the PCIB would
not release the title of the land without first getting paid. Consequently, the petitioners-spouses'
contention that payment of the balance price of the subject parcel of land was not dependent upon
the release of their title from the PCIB which would be used as collateral by the private respondents
to secure their PAG-IBIG loan thru Urban Bank, is more credible.
Moreover, the Urban Bank letter signed by Assistant Manager Ms. Liza M. de los Reyes to PCIB
dated July 2, 1984 (Exhibits G and G-1) shows that there is no basis for the conclusion that the
petitioner-spouses " . . . reneged on their agreement that Urban Bank would pay their mortgage loan
obligation with PCIB so that their TCT No. 501812 over the subject property could be released free
of encumbrance and transferred in appellants' name as the latter intended to use the title as
collateral for their loan from Urban Bank." (page 45, Rollo) The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
This is with reference to the real estate property of Meynardo C. Policarpio located at
Servillana St., U.E. Employees Village, Cainta, Rizal more particularly described as
Lot 22, Block 5 covered by TCT No. 501812, which is presently mortgaged in your
favor to secure his loan with you.
Please be advised that Miss Evelyn Q. Catabas, who is purchasing the abovementioned property has an approved Pag-Ibig loan with us, part of which shall be
used to settle Mr. Policarpio's loan with you.

Per the request of our client, with the conformity of Mr. Policarpio herein given, we
shall release to you the amount of NINETY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY SEVEN & 94/100 (P96,337.94) PESOS upon transfer of title under the
borrower's name, registration of mortgage in our favor and upon loan approval and
takeout of National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
Any difference between the above-mentioned amount and the outstanding obligation
shall be for the account of Miss Catabas and shall be transacted directly with you.
This letter supersedes our letter of Guaranty to Mr. Policarpio on February 01, 1984.
We trust that this is satisfactory to you. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. (Rollo, pp. 45-46)
We find no relation between the supposed agreement on the part of the petitioners-spouses to have
the payment of the balance price dependent on the release of the PAG-IBIG loan and their alleged
obligation to have the title released by PCIB. On the contrary, this letter enhances the stand of the
petitioners-spouses that they signified their conformity to the letter upon the request of the private
respondents to facilitate the release of the PAG-IBIG loan.
According to the appellate court, the letter also disproves petitioners-spouses' "claim that the
appellants (private respondents) failed or refused to pay the defendants (petitioners-spouses) the
P90,000.00 on time with which to pay the latter's PCIB loan resulting in the plaintiffs' (private
respondents') failure to secure the release of their PAG-IBIG loan of P260,000.00 which is due the
defendants (petitioner-spouses) on or before the first week of December, 1983 as stipulated in the
Contract to Sell" (Paragraph 15, Answer, Record, p. 35). (Page 46, Rollo)
We find the appellate court's conclusion unwarranted. The evidence on record shows that the private
respondents themselves did not blame the petitioners-spouses for the non-release of the PAG-IBIG
loan on December 1983 and that it was "due to time constraint the loan was not approved and
released before the deadline to pay the balance which expired the first week of December 1983."
(page 82, Rollo) In fact in their Memorandum the private respondents stated that: "private
respondents failed to meet the "First Week of December 1983" deadline so that the "Contract to Sell"
would have been cancelled as therein provided were it not for the fact that petitioners still pursued
the sale and private respondents were still willing to buy." (pp. 145-146, Rollo)
Moreover, the appellate court gave credence to the private respondents' contention that the
petitioners-spouses' main reason for reneging on the inter-bank arrangement between Urban Bank
and PCIB was due to the latter's insistence that the price of the subject property shall be increased
to P330,000.00.
On the other hand, the petitioners-spouses maintain that there was an oral agreement between them
and the private respondents as regards the increased price.

On this matter, we are inclined to give more credence to the trial court's findings as they are borne
by the evidence on record, to wit:
The Court finds credence in the defendants' claim that the parties verbally agreed to
increase the consideration to P330,000.00. The price under the Contract to Sell
which precluded transfer of possession to the plaintiffs until after full payment in
effect, was P270,000.00. The default of the plaintiffs under the said contract, the nonavailment by the defendants of the automatic cancellation clause when the plaintiffs
defaulted; the moving of the plaintiffs into the premises on December 18, 1983
invariably necessitating the defendants to transfer elsewhere, the devaluation of the
peso, the longer waiting period imposed upon the defendants, their conformity to the
letter from Urban Bank (Exh. "G") to PCIB and, finally, the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale even without plaintiffs paying for the price in full all taken together in
their entirety, swing the pendulum of credibility towards the fact of agreement of the
parties to increase the price. Besides, it is highly improbable that after all the rigors
and the hassles the defendants had been exposed to, before and after the execution
of the simulated Deed of Absolute Sale, the defendants would agree to lower the
price of P270,000.00 in the Contract to sell to P230,000.00 in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. (Rollo, p. 89)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore the mere fact that the plaintiffs offered in their letter (Exh. "L") dated
November 23, 1984 to pay P312,000.00 which the defendants rejected
reinforces the truth of defendants' claim that the parties, indeed, verbally agreed to
increase the pace to P330,000.00. This intention must prevail and the eleventh-hour
repudiation by the plaintiffs, who under the present situation would continue enriching
themselves at the expense of the defendants cannot prevent its enforcement. At any
rate, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the parties is admittedly
simulated, whereupon it cannot be a valid basis as in this case, for an action for
Specific Performance. (Rollo, p. 90)
It is to be noted that the appellate court questions the existence of Exhibit "L". The appellate court
states:
The trial court revealed the pivotal factor upon which it based its choice in reposing
greater belief in appellee Meynardo Policarpio's testimony. It is this factor, the trial
court said, that reinforced the truth of appellee's claim regarding the existence of an
oral agreement to increase the purchase price. Said the trial court:
xxx xxx xxx
Unfortunately, no such 'Exh. "L" exists in the record. The actual 'Exh. "L" included
among the documentary evidence on record is a letter dated November 7, 1985
signed jointly by Urban Bank's Assistant Vice-President Prudeno L. Natividad and

Mortgage Supervisor Marie Celine R. Gorres and addressed to appellee Evelyn

Catabas. (Rollo, pp. 48-49)
The record, however, reveals the existence of Exhibit L. In fact, the private respondents themselves
confirm the existence of the November 23, 1984 letter which they reproduced in their Memorandum,
to wit:
We are aware of our mutual endeavor to exhaust all possible means to find a
solution to our problem of finalizing our purchase of your house and lot here at
Servillana Street, U.E. Village, Cainta, Rizal, more particularly described as Lot 22
Block 5, covered by TCT No. 501812, towards maintaining our friendly relation and
avoiding a possible litigation for our mutual benefit. For our part therefore, to assuage
your feeling which obviously is influenced by the present economic situation and for a
higher price on said property, notwithstanding the agreed contract price of
P270,000.00, we are offering our hand in friendship and propose to increase the
price to a grand total of P312,000.00, no matter our difficulties, I have to confess, to
be paid as follows: (Rollo, p. 147)
The tone of the letter gives credence to the petitioners-spouses' contention that the Absolute Deed of
Sale was only simulated, its execution only to facilitate the release of the private respondents' PAGIBIG loan from Urban Bank. It also gives credence to the petitioners-spouses' contention that they
agreed to push thru with the sale provided the price would be raised to P330,000.00. For, why then,
did the respondents refer to ". . . our problem of finalizing our purchase . . ." and offer P312,000.00
which was beyond the initial price of the subject property of P270,000.00.
We rule that the findings of facts of the trial court which are at variance with those of the appellate
court are more in consonance with the evidence on record. The trial court stated:
The parties have common interests on the property. The defendants were interested
to sell it in order to settle their obligation with PCIB and to be able to buy another
property. The plaintiffs were interested to buy the property but were not ready to pay
immediately the agreed consideration. Plaintiffs were depending on the loan that they
jointly applied for with PAG-IBIG. In fact, if only to augment their resources for its
purpose, plaintiff Clemente Catabas who used to work with the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company had to prematurely retire in order to collect his
retirement benefits.
Obviously, the defendants knew and took into consideration this financial handicap of
the plaintiffs in the execution of the Contract to Sell. Hence, the grace period to pay
the balance of P260,000.00 up to the first week of December 1983. By then, the
plaintiffs were expecting the release of the loan they applied for which was being
followed up by their acquaintance at Urban Bank. The deadline came and passed but
no payment was made. The contract provided that failure to pay the balance will
"automatically cancel this contract and the vendor shall immediately return the
downpayment of P10,000.00, to the Vendees" but the transaction was not called off
nor the Pl0,000.00 returned. Evidently, the parties wanted the sale to go through.

Defendant Meynardo Policarpio testified, and it was not denied, that the plaintiffs
requested the defendants to wait a little longer as the person supposed to help
hasten the release of the loan was busy since it was Christmas time then, and to that
request, the defendants acceded. This is the logical explanation of the plaintiffs
moving into the premises on December 18, 1983. It is at this point that the Court is
impressed with the defendants' gesture of good faith and accommodation. For
although the Contract to Sell provided: "Vendees shall not take possession of the
property until aforesaid balance of P260,000.00 shall have been paid" (emphasis
supplied), the defendants, barely two (2) weeks after the contract should have been
automatically cancelled for the non-payment of the balance, allowed the plaintiffs to
move in even if they have to rent another place to stay.
Against this backdrop, there was no difficulty for the plaintiffs insuring the defendants'
cooperation to accelerate the release of the loan. Hence, when defendants were told
it was necessary for them to signify their conformity to the letter (Exhs. "G", "6") sent
by Urban Bank to PCIB, they readily obliged. The same alacrity was displayed
regarding the Deed of Absolute Sale without which Urban Bank would not release the
loan. Again, at this point, the defendants' good faith and implicit trust in the plaintiffs
were generously portrayed. Although the consideration of P230,000.00 stated in the
Deed of Absolute Sale was not fully paid (the plaintiffs had paid only P75,000.00,
with the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, being paid after April 9, 1984) the
defendants executed the document. True, there was the motivation for the
defendants to sign because of the plaintiffs' verbal conformity that the selling price
would be increased to P330,000.00; but this was still a contingency wholly
dependent on plaintiff s word of honor, while the defendants' leverage had become
a fait accompli upon affixing their signatures due to the absolute nature of the sale
and physical possession of the premises delivered to the plaintiffs.
Up to this stage, the defendants have done everything within their capability to help
the plaintiffs effect the release of their loan. At this point, too, the only impediment to
Urban Bank's release of the loan was the non-delivery of the title. It was a hitch that
was later to spell the non-release of the loan which plaintiffs impute, was due to the
fault of the defendants.
In the institution of the Complaint, the plaintiffs were of the impression that the
delivery of the title to Urban Bank was the duty of the defendants which they failed to
discharge and for which, consequently, they should be held accountable. This frame
of mind while impressive at first blush, cannot be countenanced and finds no support
from the evidence adduced.
The plaintiffs fully knew from the inception of the transaction that the defendants' title
was mortgaged with PCIB (Romulo Catabas, TSN, March 10, 1984 p. 20). Much as
they would want to, the defendants could not just get the title from PCIB without the
mortgage balance being paid. Precisely, the letter (Exh. "G", also Exh. "6") itself of
the Urban Bank bearing defendants' signatures affixed thereon, at the behest of the
plaintiffs themselves, was directed to PCIB requesting the latter for the delivery of the

title, among other things, before the former pays off the mortgage balance thereat as
a pre-condition for the release of the loan. The plaintiffs are now in estoppel to
assumejust because it is expedient to do so a posture inconsistent with this
clear narration of facts. To hold the defendants responsible for an act that PCIB alone
could do is decidedly illogical and puerile (Rollo, pp. 85-87)
Moreover, under the contract to sell, it is provided therein that failure on the part of the vendees
(private respondents) to pay the balance of the price on the first week of December 1983 will
automatically cancel the contract. The private respondents' obligation to pay was a suspensive
condition to the obligation of the petitioners-spouses to sell and deliver the subject property. Since,
admittedly, the private respondents failed on their obligation to pay, this rendered the contract to sell
ineffective and without force and effect. (See Spouses Eduardo and Ann Agustin v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 84751, June 6, 1990)
The subsequent execution of the deed of sale did not in any manner transfer ownership of the
property to the private respondents. It is clear that the deed of sale was executed merely to facilitate
the release of the private respondents' PAG-IBIG loan from the Urban Bank and not for the purpose
of actually transferring ownership.
With these findings, we rule that the private respondents are not entitled to specific performance.
The obligation in a contract of sale is reciprocal. (Cortez v. Bibao and Borromeo 41 Phil. 298
[1920]). Since, the vendees admittedly had not paid the full price of the property which was their
obligation under the subject contract they cannot now compel performance of the said contract.
Under the facts of the case, we agree with the trial court that the petitioners-spouses are entitled to
moral damages, to wit:
The defendants' claim of the trauma they suffered upon being sued by the plaintiffs
inspires belief. After doing everything in good faith within their capability to help
accelerate the release of plaintiffs' loan, their shock was understandable when the
plaintiffs, in brazen disregard of their failure to comply with their contractual
obligation, suddenly filed the instant complaint. Rather than being commended, as
should have been expected, for walking the Biblical second mile in generous
accommodation of the plaintiffs, the defendants were instead unceremoniously
brought to Court. (Rollo, p. 90)
However, we find the award of P30,000.00 as moral damages excessive. In the case of Prudenciado
v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) cited in Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), et al. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 83768 February 28,1990 we held that ". . .
moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
defendant. They are accorded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the
defendants' culpable action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted." We rule that the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the petitionersspouses would be reasonable considering the facts and circumstances of the case.

The award of P20,000.00 exemplary damages is not proper considering that there is no showing that
the private respondents acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
(Article 2232, Civil Code).

Finally, we find the award of attorney's fees in favor of the petitioners-spouses unwarranted. In the
case of Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, supra, citing the case
of Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 619 [1989] we ruled:
In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157
SCRA 57) the Court had occasion to state that '[t]he reason for the award of
attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision, otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be disallowed on
appeal. (at p. 61, citing Mirasol v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-32552, July 31, 1978, 84
SCRA 337).
Nowhere does the text of the decision of the trial court mention the reason for the award of attorney's
fees. The trial court's decision failed to justify the award of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. The award
of attorney's fees must, therefore, be deleted. (See also Spouses Eduardo and Ann Agustin v. Court
of Appeals, supra).
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby REINSTATED
except that the award for moral damages is reduced to P15,000.00 and the awards for exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

8. TOLOSA VS CARGO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March
1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in
his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal
home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May
1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had
been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view
of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his
wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the
beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former."
(Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made
a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent
had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of
complainant's wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital
everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing
respondent but that she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances
where she was living although she had no means of livelihood; and

(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and
stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings
which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent
presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12,
1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao
and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at
No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with
respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household
appliances which she could not afford to buy as she has no source of
income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU
Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn,
pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent
and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20,
1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place
involving respondent and complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh.
'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and
complainant were brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F'
and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent with the CLAO and that respondent was
suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).

Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her
difficult relationship with complainant; that Priscilla left complainant
because she suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and public
humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No.
45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the
house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former client
whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital,
as assistance in her medical expenses; that he reprimanded
complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led
to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her
in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa
Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him
at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that said incident was between
Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at
45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to
intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21,
1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez
Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and
they (complainant and Priscilla) considered respondent also their
'ninong'.

3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences

being one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice,
because of her differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45
Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of
the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former
client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in
Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed
happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1
Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying
two or three houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality
against respondent in CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and
suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the
respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of
complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair
with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner
is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in
spite of his differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents
involving complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G',
['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she
was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences
with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).

Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by
avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby
causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer
and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty.
Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely
reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that
respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply
with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and
officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming
a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or
similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 869 (1963); Toledo v. Toledo, 7 SCRA 747 (1963).

9. MAGLASANG VS PEOPLE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City
Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of
the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration,
the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision,
and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was
denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano
a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint
was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove,
Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite
For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8

In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they
are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no
more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do
by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that
they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative
Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the
scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without
bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs
to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the
undersigned with a cause for being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal
Justice to be heard by our Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court
of the Land (Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)

VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally
created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing
ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by
the undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcosappointees, whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob
from innocent Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left
in confusion and turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved
President's honest, firm and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our
Courts, for the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country
which God has given us. PHILIPPINES.13 (Emphasis ours.)

VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they
refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren
in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14

IX

. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the
Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money
reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino,
who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme
Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and
innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in
our Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is
too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein
are inconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly
violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to
give equal Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which
legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were
so strict or inhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine
justice was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as
proved by records of both cases mentioned above. 16

xxx xxx xxx

D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges
and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general
for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for
contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel
means to silence a righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with
close relation. 17

scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so
"to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that
the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and another for the
poor went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the
cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral
and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know
that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any
extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.

It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to
fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989,
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date

he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No.
1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation
given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in
our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration,
"no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance
with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it
be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander
of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing
language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division,
even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers between the
judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department
or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to
the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment
on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's
complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court
and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to
PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava,
Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of
law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with a
WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with more severely. Let notice
of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other
Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Paras and Feliciano, JJ., is on leave.

10. PLA VS AGRAVA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore,
respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in
good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants
in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not

prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or
is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many

aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the
use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business
has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this,
but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an
invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in
any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of
three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such
as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if
the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable
terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or
industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine
or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws,

legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience
for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation
of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding
in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is
not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and
whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other
qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may
require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to
submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are

already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and
scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless
he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and
assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In
order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good
moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters
must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has
served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business
before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice

before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or
guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or
who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter,
or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of
Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its
rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority
to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner
of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would
be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where
the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books
of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties,
seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients,
shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

11. IN RE: 1989 IBP ELECTIONS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held
on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were
elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:

NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members
of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting,
all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato
Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with,
and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June
17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10,
1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta
C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing
Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by
her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was
rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello
Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others
by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and
subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their
election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed
the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and
Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend,
for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and
strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is
that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates
and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the

other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine
whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before
and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the
Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called
to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the
election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the
relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the
same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall
be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso factoresigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate
for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or
indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement
of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing
an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice
to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vicepresident, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President,
Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio
City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113;
t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to

formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and
distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the
membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination
forms which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo
C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr.,
Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas,
Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel
Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR)
borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of
the passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by
Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria
is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane
to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the
IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and
Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group.
He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region
in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the
Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu)
could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty.
Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon),
Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C.
Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas),
Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern
'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera
(Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao)
(Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan
City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written

commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo
nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be
committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and
Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila
4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the
IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the
Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro,
Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla,
Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano
James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and
Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were
made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to
Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for
that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the
IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could
attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted,
however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine
Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao,
Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores,
Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera,
Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula
Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda
Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato
Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to
Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for
the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of
the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the
members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to
whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of
delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to
Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for
a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager,
credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill
amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo
P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan,
Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP ByLaws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified
that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the
Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta
Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon
being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which
included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno.
They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the
other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110
during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were
recorded as emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco
(candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila).
These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were
discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the
Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot
their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues
of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it
was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the
name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election
year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce
similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his
own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor.
Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this
year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate,
but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of
the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met
Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala
Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a
room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter
presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed
his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is
admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also
withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became
Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon
(t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in
La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed
his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to
another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant
regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the

offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a
room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates
had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine
Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of
the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses
for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of
airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food,
and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them
to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national

officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the
other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates;
the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets
and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket
to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP
but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's
esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during
the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than
candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president
has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously
perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the nonpolitical character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by
this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer,
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine

(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation

basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be
held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court
of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three
(3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer
the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to
its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

12. ZALDIVAR VS GONZALES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court
dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 8600778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987

Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against

petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September
1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan
and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R.
No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent.
That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case
No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed
against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the
argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such
criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of
that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the
second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578
were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this
Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan
instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November
1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8
December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for
an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within
which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as partyrespondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs.
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In
respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine
Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court
order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent
the progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension
over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have
been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because
the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if
they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft
cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino governmentCommissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a
trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and
that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during
election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the
voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election
time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every
citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject
to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required
respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from
notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated
Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988.
In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position,
made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's
Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ...
and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass
the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent
by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office
(i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of
said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the
metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and
variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following
Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R.
No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez
under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to
COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements

to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear
offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and
calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and
ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court
Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10)
days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily
Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and
May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position
he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him
'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to
be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass
the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and
now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements
and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also
to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served
on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of
said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion
for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988
Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still
available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be
able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed
out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to
there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in
Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately
executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition

20

dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated
4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to
respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion

27

member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent
Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering
respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges
presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was

respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called

"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court
and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice
of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons
connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due
administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that
before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power.
The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to
punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers,
both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious
conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme
Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The
power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of
the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the
task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his
part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended
party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent
Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect
asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this
proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court,

that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent
Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the
members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later
Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following
lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in
the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the
Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not
and does not involvea trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature
of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but
only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant
in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereofas well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty
it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy
demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or
prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the
exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the
members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with
which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements
give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy
and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his
statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed,
he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are
substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27
April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had
taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some
of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course,
and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution

dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the
consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free
intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not,
however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the
Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of
administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its
Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had
used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he
had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to
imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this
Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements
were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been
questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more
than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the
fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately
ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24
November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
therespondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending
before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a
reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is
that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their
"colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the
Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory
examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear,
and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said
notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge
appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of
respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the
statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and
to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting
"rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and

powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich
and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the
conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated
to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred
against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class
war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme
or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack
is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The
total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial"
institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against
its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due
process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an
institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified
in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in
support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an
insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the
statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to
inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt
and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest
prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of
the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process
in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as
it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt
and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps
passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the
entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it
extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with
unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due
process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be
the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent
sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of
judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court
as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so
to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy
tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very
difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose
that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most
solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent.
The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not
around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by
this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this
Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of
statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise
warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in
a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the
complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of
the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered
through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived.
Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the
three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit
was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the
Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the

justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari
of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the
Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted
in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion
for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this
Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco
M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justicesof the
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica,reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but
for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making
the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following
statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts
to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to
a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption
and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to
follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the

duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do
remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount
importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R
was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in
turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's
finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective
stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as
counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain
certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the
mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency

or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in
a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21
September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It
that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and
illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse
on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about
respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and
that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth
Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the aboveentitled casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will
inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on
the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez,
held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He
speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case
prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in
the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of
the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he
proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim
that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would
be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular
cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect.

He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not
only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss
of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact
and in law.The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also
asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any boardpetitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.'The absurdity
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create
an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World
Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in
ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will

inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke
'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to
the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to
more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the
case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act
has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is
the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted
was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice
committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his
Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to
him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose
the tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this

petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to
our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns
his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible
to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself
of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it
is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has
ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications,
and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one
word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of
this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no
choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely
suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this
Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this

Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a
violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this
very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and
the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the
ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and
again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall
of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times!
But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of
Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and
required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him.
Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa
and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements
contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with
that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of
his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity

of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1
4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail
for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication
of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the
wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one
of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional
sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a
constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were
the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis
supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him
to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice
Feria, saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily
to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and

an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court
which contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige
of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make
the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726;
emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty.
Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the
statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard
of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or
with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from
which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means
exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish
Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish
Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in
a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to

emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort
to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his
motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this
country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high
privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also
because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil.
at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on
this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt
or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil.
907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated
29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the
past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this
Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered
an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the
justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have
had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by
the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the
appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an
act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his
constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks
to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests
is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can
be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice,
within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated.
And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free
press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused
with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons
are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are,
first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man.
Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression
may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the
court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic
and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is
heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this
Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however,
the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re
Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other.Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court;
it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it
was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has
been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of
its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its
Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or
the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the
disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this
Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he
is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such
institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely
be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The

level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last
resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and
confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy
in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against
him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available
against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as
in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as
an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of
law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

13. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ADORABLE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8197

October 2, 1946

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
MARCELINO ADORABLE, ET AL., claimants;
MIGUEL PEARANDA, claimant-appellant;
PURIFICACION SOLINAP ET AL., claimants-appellees.
Evidente, Butalid and Pearanda for claimant-appellant.
Manuel F. Zamora for claimants-appellees.
RESOLUTION

PERFECTO, J.:
At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimant-appellant presented copies of
several papers, exhibits, pleadings, motions and orders, including copy of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, record on appeal, and the printed brief of said claimant-appellant
who, at the time he filed his motion for reconstitution on February 26, 1946, was under the
impression that the case, which was pending decision in the Court of Appeals when the war
broke out, remained unacted upon by said court until the motion for reconstitution was filed.
On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and appellees, acting
under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes a deserving
member of the bar, instead of taking advantage of claimant-appellant's ignorance of what really
happened in the Court of Appeals, informed this court that the case had been decided in favor of
said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of the decision
promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble
of waiting for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case
already decided.
Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, claimant-appellant's
attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court
that the records be declared reconstituted, together with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 9, 1942, and that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of
the decision.
lwphi1.net

The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to order that copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court
for execution. This resolution is being adopted not without making of record that the considered
as an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.

Paras, Pablo and Padilla, JJ., concur.

14. DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS ABABA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26096 February 27, 1979
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
SILVERETRA ABABA, ET AL., claimants, JUAN LARRAZABAL, MARTA C. DE LARRAZABAL,
MAXIMO ABAROQUEZ and ANASTACIA CABIGAS, petitioners-appellants, ALBERTO
FERNANDEZ, adverse claimant-appellee.
Juanito Ll. Abao for petitioners-appellants.
Alberto R Fernandez in his own behalf.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March 19, 1966
denying the petition for the cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on
the transfer certificate of title of the petitioners.
The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo
Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo
Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and
for the recovery of the land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of his lawyer on a contingent
basis, petitioner, liable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal executed a
document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to

his lawyer one-half (1/2) of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal
prosper. The contents of the document as translated are as follows:
AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, MAXIMO ABARQUEZ, Plaintiff in Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, make known through this agreement that for the services rendered
by Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez who is my lawyer in this case, if the appeal is won up to
the Supreme Court, I Promise and will guarantee that I win give to said lawyer onehalf (1/2) of what I may recover from the estate of my father in Lots No. 5600 and
5602 which are located at Bulacao Pardo, City of Cebu. That with respect to any
money which may be adjudged to me from Agripina Abarquez, except 'Attorney's
Fees', the same shall pertain to me and not to said lawyer.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumb. mark to be affixed hereto
this 10th of June, 1961, at the City of Cebu.

THUMBMARK
MAXIMO ABAR
(p. 5, Petitioner-Appellant's Brief, p. 26, rec.)
The real Property sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. R6573 was actually the share of the
petitioner in Lots 5600 and 5602, which were part of the estate of his deceased parents and which
were partitioned the heirs which included petitioner Maximo Abarquez and his elder sister Agripina
Abarquez, the defendant in said civil case.
This partition was made pursuant to a project of partition approved by the Court which provided am
other that Lots Nos. 5600 and 5602 were to be divided into three equal Parts, one third of which
shall be given to Maximo Abarquez. However, Agripina Abarquez the share of her brother stating that
the latter executed an instrument ofpacto de retro prior to the partition conveying to her any or all
rights in the estate of their parents. Petitioner discovered later that the claim of his sister over his
share was based on an instrument he was believe all along to be a mere acknowledgment of the
receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for g care of their father during the
latter's illness and never an instrument of pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the
alleged instrument of pacto de retro.
The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963 reversed the decision of the
lower court and annulled the dead of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina Abarquez filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated January 7, 1964 (p. 66, Record on
Appeal; p. 13, Rec.) and the judgment became final and executory on January 22,1964.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31841 was issued on May 19,1965 in the name of
Maximo Abarquez, married to Anastacia Cabigas, over his adjudged share in Lots Nos. 5600 and

5602 containing an area of 4,085 square meters (p. 110, ROA; p. 13, rec.). These parcels of land
later by the subject matter of the adverse claim filed by the claimant.
The case having been resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant waited
for petitioner to comply with ha obligation under the document executed by him on June 10, 1961 by
delivering the one-half () portion of the said parcels of land.
Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land
covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon
being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse t claimant immediately took stops to protect
his interest by filing with the trial court a motion to annotate Ins attorney's lien on TCT No. 31841 on
June 10, 1965 and by notifying the prospective buyers of his claim over the one-half portion of the
parcels of land.
Realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it was not within
the purview of Section 37, rule 138 of the Revised Rule of Court, but before the same was by the
trial court, adverse t by an affidavit of adverse claim on July 19, 1965 with the Register of Deeds of
Cebu (p. 14, ROA; p. 13, rec.). By virtue of the petition of mid affidavit the adverse claim for one-half
() of the lots covered by the June 10, 1961 document was annotated on TCT No. 31841.
Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouse Maximo Abarquez and
Anastacia Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale on July 29, 1965 two-thirds (2/3) of the lands
covered by TCT No. 31841 to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
When the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on
TCT No. 31841 necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim
on TCT No. 32996 became the subject of cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses
on March 7, 1966 with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (p. 2 ROA; p. 13, rec.). The adverse
claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez, filed his opposition to the petition for cancellation on March 18,
1966 (p. 20, ROA; p. 13 rec.). The trial court resolved the issue on March 19, 1966, when it declared
that:
...the petition to cancel the adverse claim should be denied. The admission by the
petitioners that the lawyers (Attys. Fernandez and Batiguin) are entitled to only onethird of the lot described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32966 is the best proof of
the authority to maintain said adverse claim (p. 57, ROA; p. 13, rec.).
Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to this Court and correspondingly filed
the notice of appeal on April 1, 1966 with the trial court. On April 2, 1966, petitioner-spouses filed the
appeal bond and subsequently filed the record on appeal on April 6, 1966. The records of the case
were forwarded to this Court through the Land Registration Commission of Manila and were
received by this Court on May 5, 1966.
Counsel for the petitioner-spouses filed the printed record on appeal on July 12, 1966. Required to
file the appellants' brief, counsel filed one on August 29, 1966 while that of the appellee was filed on
October 1, 1966 after having been granted an extension to file his brief.

The case was submitted for decision on December 1, 1966. Counsel for the petitioners filed a motion
to expunge appellees' brief on December 8, 1966 for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, but the same was denied by this Court in a resolution dated February 13, 1967.
The pivotal issue to be resolved in the instant case is the validity or nullity of the registration of the
adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of which in turn hinges on the question of whether or not
the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty. Fernandez, is prohibited by the Article
1491 of the New Civil Code and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Petitioners contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves an
assignment of a property subject of litigation. That article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the petition of another.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior and other o
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions;this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession (Emphasis supplied).
This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the
lawyer and his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. As WE have already stated. "The
prohibition in said article a only to applies stated: " The prohibition in said article applies only to a
sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the property which is the subject of litigation. In other
words, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or t of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property" (Rosario Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L26882, November 21, 1978).
Likewise, under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to "cases where after completion of
litigation the lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest the assets realized by the litigation"
(Drinker, Henry S., Legal Ethics, p. 100 [1953], citing App. A, 280; N.Y. Ciu 714). "There is a clear
distraction between such cases and one in which the lawyer speculates on the outcome of the
matter in which he is employed" (Drinker, supra, p. 100 citing A.B.A. Op. 279).
A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the tranfer or assignment of
the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant
case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo
Abarquez might recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the success of the
appeal. Hence, the payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of one-half
(1/2) of the property in litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the tranfer
actually takes effect after the finality of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the

pendency of the litigation involving the property in question. Consequently, the contract for a
contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491.
While Spanish civilists differ in their views on the above issue whether or not a contingent fee
contract (quota litis agreement) is covered by Article 1491 with Manresa advancing that it is
covered, thus:
Se ha discutido si en la incapacidad de Ion Procumdam y Abogados asta o el pecto
de quota litis. Consiste este, como es sabido, en la estipulacion de que el Abogado o
el Procurador ban de hacer suyos una parte alicuota de In cona que se li m la son es
favorable. Con es te concepto a la vista, es para nosortros que el articulo que
comentamos no menciona ese pacto; pero como la incapacidad de los Abogados y
Procuradores se extinede al acto de adquirir por cesion; y la efectividad del pacto
dequota litis implica necesariamente una cesion, estimamos que con solo el num. 5
del articulo 1459 podria con exito la nulidad de ese pacto tradicionalmente
considerado como ilicito.
xxx xxx xxx
Debe tenerse tambien en cuenta, respecto del ultimo parrafo del articulo 1459, la
sentencia del Tribunal Supreme de 25 Enero de 1902, que delcara que si bien el
procurador no puede adquirir para si los bienes, en cuanto a los cuales tiene
incapacidad, puede adquirirlos para otra persona en quien no concurra incapacidad
alguna (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, Tomo X, p. 110 [4a ed.,
1931] emphasis supplied).
Castan, maintaining that it is not covered, opines thus;
C. Prohibiciones impuestas a las personas encargadas, mas o menos directamente,
de la administracion de justicia.El mismo art. 1,459 del Codigo civil prohibe a los
Magistrados, Jueces, individuos del Minesterio fiscal, Secretarios de Tribunales y
Juzgados y Oficiales de Justicia adquirir por compra (aunque sea en subasta publica
o judicial, por si ni por persona alguna intermedia). 'Los bienes y derechos que
estuviesen en litigio ante el Tribunal en cuya jurisdicion on teritorio ejercieran sus
respectivas funciones, extendiendo se esta prohibicion al acto de adquirir por
cesion', y siendo tambien extensiva ' Alos Abogados y Procuradores respecto a los
bienes y derecho que fueran objeto del un litigio en que intervengan pos su
profession y oficio.'
El fundamento de esta prohibicion es clarismo. No solo se tratadice Manresade
quitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademas, el proposito de rodear a las
personas que intervienen en la administracion de justicia de todos los prestigios que
necesitan para ejercer su ministerio, librando los de toda sospecha, que, aunque
fuere infundada, redundaria en descredito de la institucion.

Por no dor lugar a recelos de ninguna clase, admite el Codigo (en el apartado
penutimo del art. 1.459) algunos casos en que, por excepcion, no se aplica el
pricipio prohibitivo de que venimos hablando. Tales son los de que se trate de
acciones hereditarias entre coheredero, de cesion en pago de creditos, o de garantia
de los bienes que posean los funcionarios de justicia.
Algunos autores (Goyena, Manresa, Valverde) creen que en la
prohibicion del art. 1.459 esta comprendido el pacto de quota litis (o
sea el convenio por el cual se concede al Abogado o Procurador,
para el caso de obtener sentencia favorable una parte alicuota de la
cosa o cantidad que se litiga), porque dicho pacto supone la venta o
cesion de una parte de la cosa o drecho que es objecto del litigio.
Pero Mucius Scaevola oberva, conrazon, que en el repetido pacto no
hay propiamente caso de compraventa ni de cesion de derechos, y
bastan para estimario nulo otros preceptos del Codigo como los
relativos a la ilicitud de la causa (Castan, Derecho Civil Espol, Tomo
4, pp. 68-69, [9a ed., 1956], emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its sentencia of 12 November 1917, has ruled that Article 1459 of
the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) does not apply to a contract for a contingent
fee because it is not contrary to morals or to law, holding that:
... que no es susceptible de aplicarse el precepto contenido en el num. 5 del art.
1.459 a un contrato en el que se restrigen los honorarios de un Abogado a un tanto
por ciento de lo que se obtuviera en el litigio, cosa no repudiada por la moral ni por la
ley (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V [1959]; Castan, supra;
Manresa, supra).
In the Philippines, among the Filipino commentators, only Justice Capistrano ventured to state his
view on the said issue, thus:
The incapacity to purchase or acquire by assignment, which the law also extends to
lawyers with t to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession, also covers contracts for
professional services quota litis. Such contracts, however, have been declared valid
by the Supreme Court" (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 44, Vol. IV
[1951]).
Dr. Tolentino merely restated the views of Castan and Manresa as well as the state of jurisprudence
in Spain, as follows:
Attorneys-at-lawSome writers, like Goyena, Manresa and Valverde believe that this
article covers quota litis agreements, under which a lawyer is to be given an aliquot
part of the property or amount in litigation if he should win the case for his
client. Scaevola and Castan, however, believe that such a contract does not involve
a sale or assignment of right but it may be void under other articles of the Code,

such as those referring to illicit cause- On the other hand the Spanish Supreme
Court has held that this article is not applicable to a contract which limits the fees of
a lawyer to a certain percentage of what may be recovered in litigation, as this is not
contrary to moral or to law. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 35, Vol. V
[1959]; Castan, supra, Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners her contend that a contract for a contingent fee violates the Canons of Professional
Ethics. this is likewise without merit This posture of petitioners overlooked Canon 13 of the Canons
which expressly contingent fees by way of exception to Canon 10 upon which petitioners relied. For
while Canon 10 prohibits a lawyer from purchasing ...any interest in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting", Canon 13, on the other hand, allowed a reasonable contingent fee
contract, thus: "A contract for a con. tangent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the ca including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." As pointed out by
an authority on Legal Ethics:
Every lawyer is intensely interested in the successful outcome of his case, not only
as affecting his reputation, but also his compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits
the lawyer to contract for a con tangent fee which of itself, negatives the thought that
the Canons preclude the lawyer's having a stake in his litigation. As pointed out by
Professor Cheatham on page 170 n. of his Case Book, there is an inescapable
conflict of interest between lawyer and client in the matter of fees. Nor despite some
statements to the con in Committee opinions, is it believed that, particularly in view of
Canon 13, Canon 10 precludes in every case an arrangement to make the lawyer's
fee payable only out of the results of the litigation. The distinction is between buying
an interest in the litigation as a speculation which Canon 10 condemns and agreeing,
in a case which the lawyer undertakes primarily in his professional capacity, to
accept his compensation contingent on the outcome (Drinker, Henry S Legal Ethics,
p. 99, [1953], Emphasis supplied).
These Canons of Professional Ethics have already received "judicial recognition by being cited and
applied by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in its opinion" Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p.
9 [1949]). And they have likewise been considered sources of Legal Ethics. More importantly, the
American Bar Association, through Chairman Howe of the Ethics Committee, opined that "The
Canons of Professional Ethics are legislative expressions of professional opinion ABA Op. 37
[1912])" [See footnote 25, Drinker, Legal Ethics, p. 27]. Therefore, the Canons have some binding
effect
Likewise, it must be noted that this Court has already recognized this type of a contract as early as
the case ofUlanday vs. Manila Railroad Co. (45 PhiL 540 [1923]), where WE held that "contingent
fees are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the
supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges' (Canons of
Profession 1 Ethics)". The same doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Grey vs. Insular Lumber
Co. (97 PhiL 833 [1955]) and Recto vs. Harden (100 PhiL 427 [1956]).

In the 1967 case of Albano vs. Ramos (20 SCRA 171 [19671), the attorney was allowed to recover
in a separate action her attomey's fee of one-third (1/3) of the lands and damages recovered as
stipulated in the contingent fee contract. And this Court in the recent case of Rosario Vda de Laig vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), which involved a contingent fee of one-half () of the property in
question, held than ,contingent fees are recognized in this i jurisdiction (Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the Philippine Bar association in 1917 [Appendix B, Revised Rules of
Court)), which contingent fees may be a portion of the property in litigation."
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the
lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with
which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics, p. 294 [1949],
citing Lipscomb vs. Adams 91 S.W. 1046, 1048 [1949]). Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only
means by which the poor and helpless can redress for injuries sustained and have their rights
vindicated. Thus:
The reason for allowing compensation for professional services based on contingent
fees is that if a person could not secure counsel by a promise of large fees in case of
success, to be derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would often place the
poor in such a condition as to amount to a practical denial of justice. It not
infrequently happens that person are injured through the negligence or willful
misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are unable to employ counsel to
assert their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous
service, which is rarely given, or in their ability to find some one who will conduct the
case for a contingent fee. That relations of this king are often abused by speculative
attorneys or that suits of this character are turned into a sort of commercial traffic by
the lawyer, does not destroy the beneficial result to one who is so poor to employ
counsel (id, at p. 293, citing Warvelle, Legal Ethics, p. 92, Emphasis supplied).
Justice George Malcolm, writing on contingent fees, also stated that:
... the system of contingent compensation has the merit of affording to certain
classes of persons the opportunity to procure the prosecution of their claims which
otherwise would be beyond their means. In many cases in the United States and the
Philippines, the contingent fee is socially necessary(Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, p. 55 [1949], emphasis supplied).
Stressing further the importance of contingent fees, Professor Max Radin of the University of
California, said that:
The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that vexatious and unfounded
suits will be brought. On the other hand, it makes possible the enforcement of
legitimate claims which otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty of the
claimants. Of these two possibilities, the social advantage seems clearly on the side
of the contingent fee. It may in fact be added by way of reply to the first objection that
vexations and unfounded suits have been brought by men who could and did pay

substantial attorney's fees for that purpose (Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28
Cal. L. Rev. 587, 589 [1940], emphasis supplied).
Finally, a contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the
stipulated amount and may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue
influence or fraud in the execution of the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without
remedy because the court will amply protect him. As held in the case of Grey vs. Insular Lumber
Co., supra, citing the case of Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra:
Where it is shown that the contract for a contingent fee was obtained by any undue
influence of the attorney over the client, or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is so clearly excessive as to amount to extortion, the court win in a
proper case protect the aggrieved party.
In the present case, there is no iota of proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted any undue
influence or had Perpetrated fraud on, or had in any manner taken advantage of his client, Maximo
Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of the lots in question is not excessive nor
unconscionable considering the contingent nature of the attorney's fees.
With these considerations, WE find that the contract for a contingent fee in question is not violative
of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Consequently, both under the provisions of Article 1491 and
Canons 10 and 13 of the Canons of Profession Ethics, a contract for a contingent fee is valid
In resolving now the issue of the validity or nullity for the registration of the adverse claim, Section
110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) should be considered. Under d section, an adverse claim
may be registered only by..
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the o registration ... if no other provision is
made in this Act for registering the same ...
The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty Fernandez an interest or right over the
lots in question to the extent of one-half thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez
after the case was won on appeal because only then did the assignment of the one-half () portion
of the lots in question became effective and binding. So that when he filed his affidavit of adverse
claim his interest was already an existing one. There was therefore a valid interest in the lots to be
registered in favor of Atty. Fernandez adverse to Mo Abarquez.
Moreover, the interest or claim of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question arose long after the original
petition which took place many years ago. And, there is no other provision of the Land Registration
Act under which the interest or claim may be registered except as an adverse claim under Section
110 thereof. The interest or claim cannot be registered as an attorney's charging lien. The lower
court was correct in denying the motion to annotate the attomey's lien. A charging lien under Section
37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments
for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the instant case. Said Section
provides that:

Section 37. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of
his client which have lawfully come into his oppossession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments, for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client ... (emphasis supplied).
Therefore, as an interest in registered land, the only adequate remedy open to Atty. Fernandez is to
register such interest as an adverse claim. Consequently, there being a substantial compliance with
Section 110 of Act 496, the registration of the adverse claim is held to be valid. Being valid, its
registration should not be cancelled because as WE have already stated, "it is only when such claim
is found unmeritorious that the registration thereof may be cancelled" (Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Lee
Dy Piao 103 Phil. 867 [1958]).
The one-half () interest of Atty. Fernandez in the lots in question should therefore be respected.
Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses, Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal.
They purchased their two-thirds (2/3) interest in the lots in question with the knowledge of the
adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of
title and was later annotated on the new transfer certificate of title issued to them. As held by this
Court:
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is
not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an
interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof (Sanchez, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 332 [1976]; Paz Ty Sin Tei vs. Jose Le Dy
Piao supra).
Having purchased the property with the knowledge of the adverse claim, they are therefore in bad
faith. Consequently, they are estopped from questioning the validity of the adverse claim.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ADVERSE CLAIM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DE
LARRAZABAL.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

15. BAUTISTA VS GONZALES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales
was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by
this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges
more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an
amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter
referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court
fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said
case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in
Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados,
which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q15143, while the case was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a

contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection
with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who
was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without
legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while
respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the
long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings
filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor

General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required
the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent
committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency
of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on
November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing
additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the
determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under
Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent
claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for

investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly
by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated
even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that
the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent
submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the
Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for
more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of
the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven
(11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant
who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2)
of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to
the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex
"B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2)

of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue
of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of
any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship
with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it
cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the
nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other
hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the
matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in
relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics
for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is
untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of
the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development
agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:

... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do
transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs,
successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D
of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to
be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement
was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time
the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had
already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31,
1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the
request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved
in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice
to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated
at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of
the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so
doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which
place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a
former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the
land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the
land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the
project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against
him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to
be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed
by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to
the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T.
Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the
original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their

names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original
and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado,
never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox
copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox
copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply,
pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the
addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of
the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum
was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of
his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed
by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and
Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
CONFORME
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid
by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements
are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See
Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts

violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the
same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows
that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the
Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados,
dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for
libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17;
Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and
perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering
that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that
it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is
no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to
harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law
and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29,
1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature
of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective

from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts
of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.