Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Professor Heyman
May 7th, 2007
By
Jeremy White
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Terrorists have long been fascinated with attacking commercial airlines as they
represent symbols of what they perceive to be the opulent modernization of the western
world. However, beyond the theatrical value of downing planes, the airline industry also
accounts for a large part of the American economy. Travel and tourism are now the
largest industry in the world with US commercial airlines and their related businesses
bringing in over $150 billion in revenue last year and employing nearly 1.1 million
people.i Air travel is part of the backbone of American business with passengers in the
year 2000 taking over 600 million trips.ii Although it was short, the three-day air travel
suspension following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a significant impact upon
the airline industry as well as the US economy as whole from which it took over a year to
fully recover. While a considerable amount money has been invested to ensure the
internal security of planes, they remain incredibly vulnerable to external attacks from
shoulder fired missiles. More correctly known as MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense
systems), these missiles are widely available on the black market and are known to be in
the possession of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.
Currently, no commercial aircraft in the United States are equipped with
countermeasures to defend against MANPAD attacks. Over the forty-year history of their
use, these weapons have an alarmingly high probability of kill percentage upward of 70%
when fired at unprotected aircraft.iii It is no wonder then that while addressing the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned
that “no threat is more serious to aviation” than MANPADS.iv The probability of such an
attack is extremely high with at least 27 terrorist groups having confirmed or suspected
possession of MANPADS. There have been at least ten attacks since 1994 targeting
commercial aircraft with four planes being downed including one in which the Presidents
of Rwanda and Burundi were traveling.v With the hardening of airport security and
terrorists’ lingering obsession with high profile attacks on airplanes, the chances of a
MANPAD attack being attempted in the near future is extremely high.
MANPAD Systems
MANPADS are very popular among terrorists because they are relatively cheap,
easily portable, simple to use, and inflict large amounts of damage. In its most basic form,
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Proliferation of MANPADS
According to the US State Department there are around twenty countries that over
the past forty years have produced around one million MANPADS.x The US Air Force
Counterproliferation Center conservatively estimates that around 6,000 of these weapons
are currently outside of the control of governments worldwide. The majority of the
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versions available on the black-market are low-tech first generation weapons that sell for
around $5,000 a piece.xi However, more sophisticated later generation models are known
to have sold for up to $250,000. Terrorists acquire these weapons through international
arms merchants such as Hemant Lakhani, a British citizen with Al-Qaeda connections
who was arrested in February 2003 for attempting to smuggle 50 MANPADS from
Russia into the United States.xii Three other arms dealers were similarly caught in 2005
trying to import 200 Russian SA-18 missiles into the US.xiii These examples serve as
undeniable proof that terrorists are actively and aggressively attempting to use MANPAD
technology to down aircraft on US soil.
Many sophisticated MANPADS have also ended up in terrorists’ hands as a result
of decades of US and Soviet involvement with rebel movements in their efforts to gain
the upper hand in the Cold War. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA is
known to have provided Mujahideen fighters with approximately 1,000 Stinger missiles
in the mid-1980’s. The Mujahideen used the Stingers very effectively against Soviet
helicopters and have likely recently turned the leftover munitions against US forces
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, the US government was initially hesitant to
provide the Afghani’s with such dangerous weapons out of fear that they would one day
be turned against American forces. The CIA is also known to have delivered FIM-92A
Stingers to the UNITA rebels in Angola in order to aid in their overthrow of their pro-
communist government.xiv According to a recent report issued by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense (DOD) has failed to keep
accurate records of the quantity and destination of Stinger missiles sold oversees.xv A
similar event occurred in November, 2002 when the Russian government officially
admitted that “tens of thousands” of MANPADS had been stolen from its arsenal over the
years.xvi
that terrorists are in possession of later generation MANPADS but that the
countermeasure systems currently used by the military are capable of defending against
high-tech missiles.
day suspension of air travel would be approximately $500 million. The net loss to the US
economy gets exponentially higher the longer the airline shutdown continues with
estimated losses of $3.4 billion for a one week suspension of air travel and $14 billion for
one month suspension.xxvi
If the American people’s reaction to a future attack on the airline industry mirrors
their behavior following 9/11, we can expect that a shutdown of one day will likely
reduce the number of people flying by 10% over the following two weeks. RAND
predicted that a one week suspension would likely lead to a decrease in air travel by 15%
for the subsequent six month period following the attack. A month long shut down is
predicted to reduce the airlines’ business by nearly 25% over an 18-month period.xxvii
9/11 taught us that despite additional security measures being put in place to counter the
threat, the memory of the attack still lingered in the public’s mind causing air travel to
decline by 8% over the following year and resulting in 14% of airline workers losing
their jobs.xxviii RAND estimates that if the government were made fully aware of the
potential damage that a MANPAD attack could have on the America economy that it
would be more willing to pay $12 billion to avoid an incident that would negatively
impact the airline industry for over 6 months and $50 billion to avoid an attack that
would reduce air travel for over a year and a half.xxix
Countermeasure Systems
There are essentially three main categories of countermeasures to MANPADS:
flares, laser jammers, and high-energy lasers (HELs). The first two of these
countermeasures act to confuse the seeker heads on missiles in order to cause them to
miss their target. These systems are currently deployed on a limited number of military
aircraft. Various countermeasure systems employing high-energy lasers are currently
under development, but none have yet to be deployed in the field. These sophisticated
systems hope to surpass other countermeasures by actually destroying missiles in flight.
Flares:
Flares are the most basic type of MANPAD countermeasure. The different types
of flares are broken down into three categories based on their level of sophistication:
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Laser Jammers:
Newly available for deployment, laser jammers have proven effective against both
first and second generation MANPADS. Formally known as directed infrared
countermeasures (DIRCM), laser jammers work by overloading the signal emitted by a
missile’s seeker head and then replaces that signal with a modulated one that diverts the
missile off course and away from its target.xxxiii These systems are mounted on a
moveable turret located on the hull of the aircraft. After a missile launch is detected by
the plane’s onboard tracking system, optical sensors are used to direct the laser mounted
turret so that it may quickly make contact with the missile’s seeker head. Some of the
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more advanced systems are “threat adaptive” meaning that they can identify the type of
incoming missile and reprogram the codes contained within their laser beams to
specifically target that model missile. Laser jamming systems are now deployed on
approximately 300 military aircraft flying in hazardous airspace, such as Baghdad.
Northrop Grumman and BAE systems are currently the top developers of DIRCM
technology in the United States.xxxiv
Laser jammers are however not without their downsides. Just like with flares,
DIRCM systems are ineffective against laser beam riders, radio frequency guided
missiles and focal plane imaging IR seekers.xxxv There is also a potential for false alarms,
which can be triggered by a few natural and manmade sources such as “high-intensity
lamps, aircraft afterburners, corona discharges, and lightening.”xxxvi While not very
likely, there is also a slight chance that the system could fire its laser at other objects
besides MANPADS and possibly blind people on the ground. However, it is important to
note that while there is a potential risk of blindness that the US Air Force has not
experienced any eye safety malfunctions with the laser jamming systems currently in
use.xxxvii The high cost of installing and maintaining these systems on board all
commercial aircraft is another potential downside that will be addressed later in detail.
High-Energy Lasers:
High-Energy lasers (HELs) are ground-based systems that seek to destroy all
incoming artillery ranging from shells to missiles. Northrop Grumman’s Hornet system is
the first HEL system to be designed to protect commercial airports. The system has
essentially three components: a radar system to establish vectors currently occupied by
friendly aircraft, an infrared search and track system (IRST), and a megawatt-class
deuterium fluoride chemical laser weapon.”xxxviii Northrop Grumman claims that its
Hornet system has the capability to defend a designated area from up to three missiles at
once at a range of up to five kilometers. In order to cover the area of a large airport such
as Reagan National, up to three of these systems would be required.xxxix Perhaps the
greatest advantage of employing high-energy lasers to defend airports is that once the
system is properly developed, it will be capable of countering every current and future
model of MANPAD. However, the best estimates claim that the start of HEL production
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$400 million across the airline industry over the course of a year.xlv
system will accidentally fire at a friendly target. In addition to its proven field
effectiveness and superior safety, Vigilant Eagle is considerably cheaper to install and
maintain than many other countermeasure systems. The US Air Force estimates that if
Vigilant Eagle were installed at 53 of the nation’s busiest airports that it would be capable
of protecting 84% of aircraft in the United States. Raytheon estimated that each system
would cost $25 million to install, which would come to $1.325 billion for their initial
installation.l According to RAND, this is only slightly more than the immediate costs
($880 million) associated with the downing of one large aircraft.li
The other system under consideration is known as Project Chloe, named after a
character on the popular television thriller, 24. The Chloe system is composed of a
combination of proven technologies incorporating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
retrofitted with Northrop Grumman’s Guardian anti-missile system. The Guardian system
is currently in its third phase of testing for use on commercial aircraft. The Nemesis
system upon which Guardian is based is currently operationally deployed on U.S. Air
Force and Special Operation Forces aircraft.lii Guardian is a laser jamming system that is
comprised of an external pod attached to the underbelly of an aircraft that scans in all
directions for incoming missiles. Once an incoming missile is detected, the system’s
turret quickly fires a laser at the munitions guidance system, forcing it off course.liii The
Chloe system would have the advantage of being able to protect an area much larger than
that of a ground-based system. The idea behind using UAV’s as a MANPAD
countermeasure involves them patrolling the airfield from an altitude of 60,000 to 65,000
feet, which will allow them to protect aircraft during all stages of landing and takeoff,
while remaining well above the flight deck of commercial aircraft.liv According to the
DHS Undersecretary for Science & Technology, Jay Cohen, a higher powered laser will
likely be needed for the UAV mounted systems than what was envisioned for use by
commercial aircraft because of the high altitude at which they operate.lv
According to project manager, Kerry Wilson, testing of UAV’s for missile defense
is slated to begin late this summer and finish in the early fall. If the Chloe system proves
successful, it would represent the most cost-effective countermeasure. The UAV platform
that will be used has yet to be determined, but the choice is between General Atomics
Predator B drone and Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The cost of equipping a UAV
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with a Guardian laser system will be about $1 million per unit. While the Global Hawk is
capable of flying at higher altitudes (60,000 feet), they carry an expensive price tag
starting at $20.3 million. The Predator B is comparatively cheaper at $9 million each. If
the Predator B can be modified to fly above its current maximum altitude of 50,000 feet,
it is likely to be chosen as the favored platform.lvi If the Chloe system were selected to
protect the same 53 busiest airports that Northrop Grumman recommended its Vigilant
Eagle be used in, then the total cost of installation would come to $1.06 billion. This
calculation assumes that the Guardian is attached to a Predator B and that each airport
purchases two UAV’s to be used one at time. The cost of installing the Chloe system
would thus be $265 million less than Vigilant Eagle.
Consequence Mitigation
In the event that terrorists do successfully perpetrate a MANPAD attack against a
US aircraft, the government’s main priority should be restoring the public’s confidence in
the security of air travel. As was demonstrated earlier, the airline industry is an integral
part of the US economy representing billions of dollars in annual revenue and employing
over a million people. The US government must act as it did after the 9/11 attacks and be
seen taking visible steps to improve airport security. While external countermeasures
such as Chloe and Vigilant Eagle are capable of providing the necessary protection
against MANPADS, they are not visible enough to the public. Passengers need to be able
to see the heightened level of security as they do now during TSA screenings. This paper
thus recommends that in the immediate aftermath of a MANPAD attack that the US
government begin installing Guardian laser jammers on the hulls of all commercial
aircraft. Since the mass installation of these systems would likely take an extensive
amount of time to complete, aircraft waiting to be retrofitted should be provided with
decoy systems. This will be a necessary measure in order to offset the negative economic
ramifications of a long-term air travel shut down. It does not necessarily matter if it is
publicly known that some of the systems are decoys as their presence is still likely to
have a deterring effect as terrorists will not be able to spot which aircraft are vulnerable.
They will then likely try to find a different weakness in our security to exploit.
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Bibliography
Bolkom, C., Elias, B., Feickert, A., Congressional Research Service Report for Congress:
Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, 2003
Chow, James, Chiesa, James, Dreyer, Paul, Eisman, Paul, Karasik, Theodore, Kvitky,
Joel, Lingel, Sherrill, Ochmanek, David, Shirly, Chad, RAND Corporation, “Protecting
Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” 2005
Fisher, Alan, “Raytheon to Demonstrate Aircraft Protection System Under DHS
Contract,” on GlobalSecurity.org, October 2006
Johnson, Mathew, “Cost an Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in
Congressional Quarterly, April 20th, 2007
Raytheon, “Vigilant Eagle Airport Security System”
Raytheon, Directory of US Military Rockets and Missiles: FIM-92 Stinger,
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-92.html
Scheid, Bob, “Chloe Takes Flight Over US Airports,” in Aeronautica, April 3rd, 2007
Schroeder, Matt, “MANPADS Proliferation,” January 2004
US State Department, “The MANPADS Menace: Combating the Threat to Global
Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems,”
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/53558.htm
Weinberger, Sharon, “Drones vs. Missiles,” in Wired Magazine, March 7th, 2007
Whitmire, James, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial
Aviation,” in The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No.37, USAF
Counterproliferation Center, Air University, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama)
16
i
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.1
ii
Ibid.
iii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.3
iv
Matt Schroeder, “MANPADS Proliferation,” p.1
v
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.4
vi
Ibid., p.11
vii
Ibid., p.11-12
viii
Ibid., p.13
ix
Ibid., p.14
x
US State Department, “The MANPADS Menace: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems,” http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/53558.htm
xi
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.11
xii
Ibid., p.9
xiii
Ibid., p.30
xiv
Ibid., p.19
xv
GAO, “Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense,” May 13th,
2004
xvi
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.19
xvii
C. Bolkom, B. Elias, and A. Feickert, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Homeland Security:
Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, 2003
xviii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5
xix
Ibid., p.6
xx
Ibid.
xxi
Ibid., p.5-6
xxii
Raytheon, Directory of US Military Rockets and Missiles: FIM-92 Stinger, http://www.designation-
systems.net/dusrm/m-92.html
xxiii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5
xxiv
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7
xxv
Ibid.
xxvi
Ibid., p.9
xxvii
Ibid.
xxviii
Ibid.
xxix
Ibid.
xxx
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.40
xxxi
Ibid., p.41
xxxii
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.18
xxxiii
Ibid., p.19
xxxiv
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.42
xxxv
Ibid.
xxxvi
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.20
xxxvii
Ibid., p.19
xxxviii
Ibid., p.21
xxxix
Ibid.
xl
Ibid., p.22
xli
Ibid.
xlii
Ibid., p.23
xliii
Ibid., p.25
xliv
Ibid., p.26
xlv
Ibid., p.27
xlvi
Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1
xlvii
GlobalSecurity.org, “Raytheon to Demonstrate Aircraft Protection System Under DHS Contract, October 23rd, 2006
xlviii
Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1
xlix
Ibid., p.1-2
l
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.49-50
li
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7
lii
Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April
20th, 2007
liii
Ibid.
liv
Ibid.
lv
Sharon Weinberger, “Drones vs. Missiles,” in Wired Magazine, March 7th, 2007
lvi
Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April
20th, 2007