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Leibniz and Schelling

Author(s): EDWARD BOOTH O. P.


Source: Studia Leibnitiana, Bd. 32, H. 1 (2000), pp. 86-104
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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Leibniz and Schelling


By
EDWARD BOOTH . . (CAMBRIDGE)

Zusammenfassung
Leibniz wie Schelling entwickeltenim Laufe ihres Lebens sich vernderndephilosophische
berzeugungen- im folgendensind Leibniz' jeweilige Positionen an Schellings Zeitachse
verankert:Er hielt Leibniz zunchst frKants ,enantiomorphes'Bild - einen empirischen
Idealistenund objektiven/transzendentalen
nichtfrden Verstand',
Realisten(frdie Vernunft,
A 11-12, 293-298, 25, 349-355), Dogmatikerim Kantschen
vgl. Kritikder reinenVernunft:
Sinne. Indemer sich aufLeibniz' Monadologie bezog undderenwesentlichenKern- da alles
absolut in seiner Singularittund singularals Absolutes ist - zuspitzte,gestalteteSchelling
diesen Gedanken zum Schlssel nichtnurhinsichtlichdes Zugangs zur Philosophie absoluter
Identitt,sondernauch frmanche Aspekte seiner Naturphilosophie:Schellings metaphysische Deutungenvon Gravitationund Kohsion, Licht,Raum und Zeit berhrtenhierLeibnizsche Positionen.Nach Hegels schonungslosemAngriffauf ihn und dem erforderlich
gewordenenNeubeginntratdie Monadologie frSchellingals ,lusus ingenii' - die Monaden und deren
und er wandte
Krperwarenso geistig4wie ihreVorstellungen- strkerin den Hintergrund,
sich nun eher Leibnizens Thodice zu. BestimmteStellen in Schellings spterenArbeiten
zeigen, da ihm Leibniz' Denken stndig gegenwrtigblieb: Noch seine letzte Schrift,die
Abhandlungber die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten,behandelteein Problem aus Leibnizens
Thodice.

To relatethephilosophyof Leibniz to thatof Schellingcannotbe to relate


one fixedpositionto another,because thepositionsof bothevolved. Here we
relatethepositionofLeibnizto thechronologyof Schelling,whichcontuineda
majorchangein relationto Leibniz. Leibniz's small treatisesand correspondence are reallyessays, withparticularends in view; Schelling's workswere
longerand, even in his earlyphilosophiesof nature,wereconsciouslyartistic
productionswhich,even when chronologicallyclose, varied considerablyin
form,even while the contentswere cognate.When handlingthe thoughtof
othershe reliedon insightand artistry
to reduceit to an overallcharacteristic,
about whichhe was oftenstronglycritical.He was certainlyverycriticalof
intoaccountfromthebeginningto the
Leibniz,buttookhis thought
continually
end of his career.He was preparedto give a greateruniversalityto matters
whichLeibniz had expressedbrieflyin his treatises,and forthatreason,unlike
manysince,was notquerulousaboutthefragmentary
qualityofthoseworks:he
also had too muchrespectforthe thoughtitself.Withthe example of Kant
beforehim,he fellin at firstwiththetradition
thatregardedLeibniz's Monadologie as his keywork,and presumedthatthepositionthattherealityof things
aresimplesubstances,ormonads,in comparisonwithwhichmaterialthingsare
reallyphenomena,was Leibniz's final,unequivocaland thereforetrueposi-

Studia
BandXXXII/1
Leibnitiana,
(2000)
Franz
Steiner
Wiesbaden
SitzStuttgart
GmbH,
Verlag

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LeibnizandSchelling

87

tion1.But neitherKant2(whose view he tookseriously)norhe agreedwithit.


To upholdhis consistency,Leibniz was, and even now is, presumedto have
sanctioneda retrospective
of materialand bodies, as pure
re-interpretation
now
as
some
feel
then,
phenomena;though,
uneasyaboutthis.
Schelling'searliestclassificationof Leibniz's thought
he had made
Schelling's philosophywas bornwithintheinterrelationships
fromwithinhis overall characterisations
of the othergreatphilosophers.His
ber die MglichkeiteinerFormder Philosophieberhaupt(1794) and Vom
Ich als PrincipderPhilosophie(1795) wereI-centredphilosophies,notfollowhimand goingmuchfurther
ingFichte(as is normallysupposed),butcorrecting
thanhim,and, in thelightof thatreinterpretation,
withit a more
synthesising
essentialsystematicreinterpretation
of Kant's transcendental
aesthetic.In the
latterwork the I is absolute and unconditional;all otherrealitytakes up a
to theI as absolute,and takesfromit "eine bergetrapositionin relationship

1 It emergedthrough
publicationof his latercorrespondence,
especiallyin Recueilde
diversespices,sur la philosophie,
la religionnaturelle,
l'histoire,les mathmatiques,
etc.,par Mrs. Leibniz,Clarke,Newtonet autresauteursclbres.Publipar P. Deswithinnumerable
Maizeaux,2 vols.,Amsterdam
11720,21740,andcontrasted
previous
textswhichsaw bodiesas havingphysicalproperties.
In thesearchforconsistency
one
accountofvision.Evenwithin
hisphenomenaltheory
supposesthathe givesa scientific
ismthereare discrepancies.
Theirrealityis "in percipientium
secumipsis"(letterto de
mais
Voider,30 June1704;GP II, 270). To othercorrespondents
theywere"phnomnes,
bienfonds"(lettertoRemond,10Jan1714;GP III, 605-608,here606 (firstpublishedin
DesMaizeaux);theAbbConti,6 Dec 1715,in:C. I. Gerhardt
(Hrsg.):Der Briefwechsel
vonGottfried
Wilhelm
LeibnizmitMathematikern
, Bd. 1 (vol. 2 neverappeared),Berlin
1899, pp. 263-267,here265 (firstpublishedin DesMaizeaux). Yet in adjustinghis
monadictheory
to transsubstantiation
he wroteto predes Bosses S. J.thatwithout
the
monadsas a "substantiale
vinculum"
therewouldbe "nihilaliud[...] quam"well-founded
becamemoreinsistant
(letterof5 Feb 1712;GP II, 435). Thatthishypothesis
phenomena
justbeforeandafterhisMonadologieandPrincipesde la natureetde la grace,fondsen
raison(bothof 1714) suggeststhatitwas a counterpart
to reducing
realityto monadsas
ofmuchearlierpersonalpaperswith
However,therecentpublication
simplesubstances.
suchexpressions
(H. Breger)suggestsit hadlongbeena personalesotericposition:(a)
cohaerentes"
"Corporasuntapparitiones
("Calculusratiocinator"
(early1679?); A VI,
4A, 279); (b) "[...] corpusomneforetantum
reale,quleestIris"("Divisio
phaenomenon
terminorum
ac enumeratio
attributorum"
(between1683and 1685?);A VI, 4A, 559).
2 WithLeibniz'sfinalpositionin mind,Kanthad interpreted
himas makingsubstances
"einfacheSubjecte,mitVorstellungskrften
begabt,miteinemWorteMonaden"{Kritik
der reinenVernunft:
A 266, 322; cf.A 283-284, 339-340),which"denGrundstoff
des ganzenUniversum
ausmachensollen"(A 274, 330). Kantconsideredwhether
the
monadcouldbe the'Ding an sich',anddecidedagainstit.Kantretained
Leibniz'sterm
'substantianoumen'forit, butdetachedit fromtheunacceptablemonad-reality.
The
otherelementof Leibniz's finalposition:matteras 'substantiaphenomenon',
which
becameKant's'Phenomena',
derivesfromLeibniz'sdescription
ofmatter.

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88

Edward Booth . .

gene(gleichsamgeliehene)Substantialitt"3.
Onlynow,he says,"nachdemder
von
Nicht-Ich
im
das
absoluteIch bestimmbar
ist",is
Begriff
Gegensatzgegen
it possible to give idealism and realismtheirpropermeaning4.And in this
context,and witha reference(basically) to Kant's contrastbetweencriticism
anddogmatism,
andhisdivisionbetweenempiricalandtranscendental
idealism
and realism5,he imposeda compositeclassificationon Leibniz's thoughtin
contrastto thecorresponding
self-characterisation
of Kant's
(enantiomorphic)
own: a logical pairing,but both surpassedby referenceto the realityof an
absoluteI - "[...] indemer das Daseyn der uernGegenstndeals Krper
leugnete,dagegenaberdas DaseyneinesNicht-Ichsberhaupt
unabhngigvom
Ich annahm,in Rcksichtaufjenes empirischer
Idealist,in Rcksichtaufdieses
reiner,objektiverRealist"6.Indeed, said Schelling,Leibniz was, in Kant's
sense, a 'dogmatist',because "[er] siehtdie Erscheinungenals ebenso viele
derunendlichen
Realittdes Nicht-Ichsan"7.For Kant,'DogEinschrnkungen
matismus'was "[die] Anmaung,miteinerreinenErkenntni
aus Begriffen
(der philosophischen)nach Principien,so wie sie die Vernunft
lngstim Gebrauchhat,ohneErkundigung
derArtunddes Rechts,womitsie dazu gelangt
allein
fortzukommen"8.
In
ist,
perfectconsistencywiththis view, Schelling
that
Leibniz
had
done
thought
just thiswiththe conceptionof God, and had
an
incorrect
orientation
to itsultimateend:
brought
"Ich glaube, da mitLeibniz eigentlichdas Mittelalterder Philosophiebegonnenhat (obgleich
die Scholastikerschon den Weg dazu gebahnthatten),da man nmlichauch in der Philosophie
anfing,das Absolute zu einem bloen Wesen der Abstraktionzu machen, und Gott nichtals
das Wesen aller Wesen, sondern(populrerWeise) als Wesen ausser allen Wesen zu betrachten.Die ltesteund heiligsteIdee der Philosophiewar ohne Zweifel das allem Existirendenzu
Grunde liegende unwandelbareSein. Erst als Spinozas vermeinterAtheism Theologie und
Philosophie aufschreckte,nahmman in der Philosophie seine Zufluchtzu einem Gottausser
allem Existirenden,dessen Idee nun nichtsmehrals ein CompositumallgemeinerAbstraktionen war"9.

In so faras Leibniz's supposedtranscendental


realismattributed
realityto
the monads,his positionstill lacked authenticrealism,even by Schelling's
measureofthederivationofrealand ideal fromtheI as absolutereality;and his
3
4
5
6

7
8
y

"Vom Ich als Principder Philosophie oder ber das Unbedingteim menschlichenWissen" (1795), in: FriedrichWilhelmJosephvon SchellingsSmmtlicheWerke(SW), Bd. I,
- Augsburg 1856, pp. 149-244, here 194.
1, Stuttgart
211.
Ibid., p.
Kritikder reinen Vernunft,
in his critiqueof thefourthparalogism:A 366-380.
"Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie" (see note 3), pp. 212-213. Kant in fact treats
transcendentalrealism as objective realism (contraryto his normal practice): "[...] der
transcendentaleRealismus [sieht] die Gegenstnde uerer Sinne fr etwas von den
Sinnen selbst Unterschiedenesund bloe ErscheinungenfrselbstndigeWesen an[...],
die sich auer uns befinden[...]" (Kritikder reinen Vernunft:
A 371).
"Vom Ich als Principder Philosophie" (see note 3), p. 215.
Kritikder reinen Vernunft:
XXXV.
urartletterto uoereit or Maren, l /yo,in: . L. Flitt(Hrsg.): Aus chellings Leben. In
Briefen,Bd. I (1775-1803), Leipzig 1869, p. 88. The latterpartcontainsa themeto which
Schelling always returned.

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LeibnizandSchelling

89

faultin separatingGod fromall other'Wesen', and treatingHis realityas an


could be alignedwiththisposition.
abstraction,
Yet Schellingexploiteda facilitytakenfromtheMonadologieat thenodal
pointof his philosophiesof natureand absoluteidentity
whichhe foundin
Schellingalignedtheprincipleof multiplicity-in-unity,
the articulationand structuring
of Leibniz's Monadologie, with the ancient
principleof ,recentlygiven new life by Lessing, and took it far
and dualities-in-unity
of Plato and
beyondthat:farbeyondalso multiplicitiestheneo-Platonists.
The mustbe identified
witheveryrealitywithinthe,
and thecollectivity
of themustbe identified
withthe. He treatedit as a
generalprinciple,whichcould be appliedto realand ideal,or bothtogether.He
this to Leibniz in his Fernere Darstellungen,withinan appeal to
attributed
philosophicaltradition:
originallyunited,thenbrokenup intoseparatedthemes
whichhe was reuniting.
and implicitlyin his
Specificallyin his philosophiesof absoluteidentity,
he 'constructed'all thingsin theabsolute,in a mode
philosophiesof nature10,
whichitselfis absolute11.Philosophy,he said,does notgo outsidetheabsolute,
whichis the -sich' of everything.
That entailednot merelythatauthentic
to the absolute,but it should primarily
philosophyshould relateeverything
and withinthis its
express its "Einheit und ungetheilteVollkommenheit",
presencein things,whichare determined
by it12.But thatdoes not forgetthe
enormousvariety,evenactualchaos,whichexistsamongsttheapparently
realnicht
in
alles
einer
vor
dir?"13
It
makes
[...]
"liegt
gttlichenVerwirrung
up a
on
which
the
of
divisions
and
distinctions
unity,
imposition
thoughtup by the
human "Verstand"is in vain. However, a constructionwhich grasped the
and its
totalityin its unity,whichsaw everything
togetherin its particularity
absoluteness,would reveal "die absoluteHarmoniedes Universumsund die
Gttlichkeitaller Wesen14".It had always been his intentionto make this
intelligible,
byrelatingitto theabsoluteprinciplesfromwhichitderives15.The
principlethemesof a selectseriesof philosophersreflectan originalsystemof
wisdom,whichare broughtback intounityin his philosophy:
"Die vortrefflichsten
allerErkenntnisse
werdetihrleichtunterdenBruchstcken
derltesten
Weisheitentdecken;
undsinddochin wenigenzur
[...]. Diese Quellenflieenfrjedermann,
Erkenntni
weildiesenuraus innerer
FormundimTriebeignerKunst
geworden,
lebendiger
wird.[Diese sind]nichtsanderes[...] als nachverschiedenen
verschobene
geboren
Richtungen
10 Worksofbothkindsarelistedin note19.
11 See "Fernere
aus demSystemderPhilosophie"
(1802),in:SW I, 4, Stuttgart
Darstellungen
- Augsburg1859,pp. 333-510,here409.
12 Ibid.,p. 407; cf.pp. 397,409.
13 Ibid.,p. 400.
14 Ibid..d. 402.
15 See ibid.,p. 400.

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90

EdwardBooth. .

Bilderdeseinzigwahren
das,wiedieewigeNatur,wederjungnochalt,undnichtder
Systems,
derNaturnachdas Ersteist16".
Zeit,sondern

These are the teachingon ideas in Pythagorasand Plato, Heraclitus's


teachingon unityin opposition,Leibniz's teachingon monads,and Spinoza's
and he claims
teachingon unity.Whathe says aboutLeibnizis mostimportant,
to expressitsdeepestessence:
"Die gedoppelteEinheitaller Dinge, und wie jedes ursprnglich
in seinerBesonderheit
absolutundin seinerAbsolutheit
besondersey,werdetihrleichtin derMonadenlehre
des
Leibnizerblicken,
derenUrsprung
ihrselbstwiederin eine unbestimmbare
Ferneverfolgen
knnt[...]"17.

- everymonad and
By Leibniz's principleof indeterminables,
everything
and thereby(absolutely)particular,
and Schellingignores
body- is different,
boththeimperfection
of themonads' representation
of thetotalityof monads,
and the influencefromthe physicalplenumon each body, to attainto the
thateverything
as particularis identicalwiththe
corresponding
enantiomorph,
absolute. Absolute philosophising(not a philosophyof the absolute) is the
of thisdoubleidentity:
discernment
Einheiten
habenals verschieden
keineWesenheit
an sich,sondern
sind
"[...] dieverschiedenen
nurideelleFormenundBilder,unterwelchenim absolutenErkennen
das Ganze ausgeprgt
sie in diesemsind,sindsie die ganzeWeltselbst,undhabennichtsauer
wird,undinsofern
- Das ganze
oderdem sie entgegengesetzt
werdenknnten.
sich,mitdem sie verglichen
Universum
istimAbsoluten
als Pflanze,als Thier,als Mensch,aberweilinjedemdas Ganze
ist,so istes nichtals Pflanze,nichtals Thier,nichtals Menschoderals die besondere
Einheit,
sondern
als absoluteEinheitdarin;erstinderErscheinung,
wo es aufhrt
das Ganzezu seyn,
die Formetwasfrsichseynwillundaus derIndifferenz
mitdemWesentritt,
wirdjedes das
Besondereunddie bestimmte
Einheit.- Mit demBesonderenalso, auch der Artnach,ist
nichtsimAbsoluten:
es gibtkeinePflanzean sichoderThieran sich;was wirPflanzenennen,
ist[nichtdas Wesen,die Substanz,sondern]
bloBegriff,
bloideelleBestimmung,
undalle
Formenerlangen
Realittnur,insofern
sie das gttliche
BildderEinheitempfangen;
dadurch
aberwerdensie selbstUniversa,
undheienIdeenundhrenjede aufeinebesonderezu seyn,
indemsie sichjenergedoppelten
Einheiterfreuen,
aufweicher
die Absolutheit
beruht"18.

He safeguardedthe dynamismof thewhole by fractionally


displacing,in
different
withtheabsolute.So
ways,thedeepestprinciplesfroma totalidentity
fromone direction,thepowerbehindtheplurification
of thoseprinciplesleft
the absoluteas absolutein itself,and fromthe otherdirectionthe principles
manifested
theirpowerin theiremulationof thesimplicityof theabsolute.An
authentic
of Schellingdemandsa stereoscopicgraspof thisunity
understanding
and fractionaldisplacement,in what is primarilyidentical19.But the single
16
17
18
19

Ibid.,p. 401.
Ibid.
Ibid.,p. 394.
Tracesofthisdisplacement
allusionstothisLeibniz(*)) inthefollowing
appear(marked
forminhis"Einleitung"
to"Ideenzu
(1) Philosophies
facility.
ofnature:In anembryonic
einerPhilosophie
derNaturals Einleitung
in das StudiumdieserWissenschaft"
(1797),
- Augsburg
in:SWI, 2, Stuttgart
1857,pp. 1-343(givesiheZustzeof21803withthefirst
editiontext,withalterations
in nn.;the"Einleitung"
is sometimes
separatedfromthe

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Leibniz and Schelling

91

main text,as in Schrter's reprintand rearrangement


of SW: Schellings Werke.Nach der
Original-Ausgabe in neuer Anordnunghrsg. von M. Schrter,Mnchen 1927-1929,
1956-1960 (6 Bnde und 6 Zusatzbnde), here 54: "[...] das Einzelne konnteweder ohne
das Ganze, noch das Ganze ohne das Einzelne wirklichwerden". In "Von der Weltseele,
eine Hypotheseder hherenPhysikzur Erklrungdes allgemeinenOrganismus" (1798),
in: SWl, 2, pp. 345-583, each separateportionof matteris "frsich Abdruckdes ganzen
Universum",in which "die reine Wesentlichkeitselbst" can be recognised; withoutthe
correspondingfinitude,the 'Wesentliche' could not be the 'Wesentliche'; there is an
eternalunion of infiniteand finite,which he calls "das absolute Band, oder die Copula"
(pp. 359-360). In "Allgemeine Deduktiondes dynamischenProcesses oder der Kategorien der Physik" (1800), in: SW I, 4, pp. 1-78 he expects that"die Natur,nachdem wir
diesen allgemeinenSchlssel gefundenhaben, uns allmhlichauch das Geheimni ihrer
einzelnenOperationenunddereinzelnenErscheinungen,welche den dynamischenProce
begleiten,und welche doch alle nur ModificationenEiner Grunderscheinungsind, aufschlieen werde" (p. 49). (2) Workswhichsee a reciprocal workingbetween ideal and
real: In "System des transcendentalenIdealismus" (1800), in: SW I, 3, StuttgartAugsburg 1858, pp. 327-634 the process is: ideal->real, but it posits also a process
real- ideal. This posits an original absolute act of human self-consciousness(pp. 388389): outside time (pp. 396, 482), which precedes, and persists in, all individual acts:
knowing (pp. 481-482), willing (p. 573), and acting: all men come togetherin (one)
species; the act recapitulateseverythinginto one absolute reality,constitutingit. The all
in one-ness and one in all-ness is trueforeach man (pp. 597-600; cf. "Zur Geschichteder
neuerenPhilosophie" (1827?), in: SWl, 10, Stuttgart- Augsburg 1861, pp. 1-200, here
94). (3) Completesystemsof theabsolute identityof real and ideal: Schelling's use of the
facilityis heremoreextensive;thematerialof a philosophyof natureis moresuccessfully
broughtwithincategories common to both (except in "Darstellung meines Systems der
Philosophie" (1801), in: SW h 4, pp. 105-212, whose partin a philosophyof naturewas
truncated,and which, like Fernere Darstellungen (see note 1 1), lacks a corresponding
ideal section). In the otherworksSchelling explained thedata of space, timeand gravity
(having in mind Kepler, Newton and Leibniz) fromhis philosophyof absolute identity.
His "Darstellungmeines Systemsder Philosophie" positedtheabsolute as the single,true
and totalreality,in whicheverythingexisted in identity.Whilst it remainedone itself,it
was - in -fashion- plurifiedwithinitself,by a branchingout fromits original
division into ideal and real: "Das Wesender absoluten Identittist untheilbar"( 34 1,
p. 130), but the ultimatedivision appears in its distinctionbetweenthe 'Wesen' as under
theformsof subjectivereal and objective ideal. Yet he wantstheirdifferencein all finite
realities (expressed as A=B) to be (*) simultaneouslyan absolute equality (as A=A)
( 41 z, p. 133), and yetbe relativisedto the absolute - depicted as a line ( 46, pp. 137139). Here, in consequence of this finitudereduced to equality, the full identityof
absolute and particularcannot be allowed: "Jedes einzelne Seyn ist als solches eine
bestimmteForm des Seynsder absoluten Identitt,nichtaber ihrSeynselbst,welches nur
in der Totalitt ist" ( 38, p. 131). However, he attributesthis full identityto the
potencies: "Die absolute Identittist nur unterder Form aller Potenzen" ( 43-44, p.
135). Leibniz had posited a less rigorousidentitythanSchelling; yetforhigherpurposes,
he and Hegel posited an identityof identityand non-identity.
Because of the incompatibilityof so many real factors,the task of establishinga convincingrelationshipwas far
greaterthan the classical theodicean task of identifyingthe multiplicityof compatible
ideas in God. The essential passages forthe rigorousidentityof absolute and particulars
in the elegant and comprehensiveFernere Darstellungen are given in the textitself;the
Darstellung meines Systemsder Philosophie, as also the "System der gesammtenPhilosophie und der Naturphilosophieinsbesondere"(1804), in: SWl, 6, Stuttgart- Augsburg
1860, pp. 131-576, were open forthe absolute at least to be thoughtin separation.The
latter(his Wrzburg1804-1805 course) is themostcomprehensiveof the three.Given as
lectures,and bringingdata fromnature,thought,moralityand art,intounity,demanded a

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92

EdwardBooth. .

realityof theabsolutehad replacedtheindividualmonads,theirlimitedone-inallnessin knowingreplacedby an unlimitedone-in-allnessin being.


Otherthemesof Leibniz in Schelling'sphilosophyof nature
Alreadyin the parton the philosophyof naturein the completefigures,
otherthemeshad arisenwhichtouchedon Leibniz's positions,and especiallyin
of gravityand cohesion,light,space
Schelling's metaphysicalinterpretations
and time,in relationto absolute identity20.
While he agreed withLeibniz's
positionthat "[die] Trgheitder Materie das Beispiel einer ursprnglichen
Unvollkommenheit
Privationin den geschaffenen
[ist],einerursprnglichen
thantheothertwo.Besidestheprinted
simplicity
greater
version,thereis a MS version
UB MS M
(less polished)takendownbya listener
("Gesammte
Philosophie";
Wrzburg
ch q. 306), whichhas morereferences
to Leibnizthantheprinted,
polishedversion,
whichhe used:"Im Universum
istnichtsleer,ungekannt
thoughonlyone to thefacility
odertodt.JedemTheil der Materieist die Totalitteingebildet;
jeder ist ein ganzes,
Leibnizsagt"(f.46v).FollowingtheSWtext,God is "kraft
derSelbstaffirmation
seiner
IdeeabsolutesAll"( 24,p. 174),andthecourseis a sustained
meditation
on itsmonistic
initself,
"dasAll"is theimmediate
(*) yetwitha displacement:
reality,
consequence"der
Idee Gottes";theideal andtherealAll mustnotbe as A=A, forthen"beide[A=A and
A=B] lsen sich [...] in der absolutenIdentittund eben damitauch wechselseitig
ineinander
of unequalpotenciesof dynamic'Affirauf; theyare an enantiomorph
mierendes'
(A) andstatic'Affirmirtes'
(B): therealbeingB=A, andtheidealA=B, with
theaffirmed
in thereal,andtheaffirming
in theideal ( 51-52,p. 208).
preponderant
The enantiomorph
existsin a thirdpotencywhereA and "sich durchdringen
und
andarereduced"zumquantitativen
multipliciren"
( 55 Erl.,p. 210). The
Gleichgewicht"
to theappearanceworld,where,without
absoluteidentity,
potenciesbelongexclusively
Wesen"( 57, p. 211). Nevertheless
thereis a Leibniz-derived
element
theyare "Nichtexpressedas: "In der Allheitsind [...] alle Formen[...], der Idee nach,in gleicher
Absolutheit
gesetzt"( 60, p. 212),eventhoughthingshavediffering
degreesof approximation
toit( 61, ibid.).Finally,thisWrzburg
MS includes(atthebeginning)
noteson
a short,unpublished
course(probably
givenbeforeGesammte
Philosophie):"Einleitung
in Naturphilosophie"
aloneis thescienceoftheOne,andalikeof
(ff.3r-6v):Philosophy
theAll (f.3r-v);
andhe expresses
thefacility
givenbyLeibniz'smonadsinan equivalent
form
ofancient
"Das Centrum
wiederholt
sichinallemEinzelnen"
provenance:
(f.5r).
20 Gravity
as absoluteidentity
oftheforcesofattraction
andexpansion(A andB): "DarstellungmeinesSystemsderPhilosophie"(see note19) 54, p. 146. As suchit conserves
in its"Seyn",butthisproduct
needslight(whoserealityis
everyrelative(A=B) product
absoluteidentity:
ibid. 93, pp. 162-165)as thedeterminant
to bringforth
therelative
des Lichtsin die Schwer(ibid. 63 zz 1,2,p. 151; with"das ersteEinschlagen
totality
kraft
aufempirischen
als dasersteEinschlagen
des ideellenPrincipsin
Wegedarzustellen
das reelleberhaupt":
as a line,at every
145 3, p. 205); cohesioncan be represented
andexpansionareinrelativeidentity
pointofwhichA and as forcesofattraction
(ibid.
67,p. 153),havingtheformofmagnetism
Darstellun(ibid. 68,p. 153).His "Fernere
ofits(finite)form
gen"(see note11) sees theabsoluteas thereciprocal
"Ineinsbildung"
in(infinite)
"Wesen"(as ideal)and"Wesen"in form(as real;p. 417), withtimederived
fromtheformer,
and space fromthelatter;yetwhollyundivided(p. 422). Theycome
intounionthrough
together
gravity(Schwere),whichpositsthemtogether:
"[...] das

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LeibnizandSchelling

93

to restor movement,
Dingen",thatwas onlymatteras mass: in itselfindifferent
and "blo Passives": thesphereof dead mechanism.But all movementderives
fromthe dilationof the absoluteinto space and time21:time as "die Offenbarungdes All an dem besonderenLeben der Dinge", "die Formdes BeseeltseynsderDinge frihrbesonderesLeben". The ideal of physicists- inevitably
includingLeibniz - to regardtheuniversalorderas reducibleto passive determinationsalone was "unmglich"22.
He was convincedthat,to explaingravity,
neitherNewton'sconceptionof attraction
(Anziehung)as a "qualitasocculta",
norKant's of theopposed forcesof attraction
and repulsion,norLeibniz's of
'impulsivethrust':"Sto",wereadequateto reversethemerelycommon-sense
For Schellingthewhole of space was
principleof 'actio in distansrpugnt'23.
with
the
dilation
of
the
absolute
substance,
occupied
mediatingtheforceswhich
uniteitscontents,which,in it,are notdistantfromeach other24;
and each thing
in relationship
totheAll bygravitating
in relationship
to theOne, and
gravitates
in relationship
to theOne bygravitating
in relationship
to theAll25.Gravitycan
be attributed
to "keinemeinseitigenCausalverhltnieiner Masse zu einer
andernMasse"26; it arises from"die unerforschliche
Tiefe der Naturselbst,

21
22

23

24
r>

26

SetzendederdrittenDimension,worin,als dem IdentischenderbeidenEinheiten,die beiden


erstensynthesirt
im Raum" (ibid.,p. 428).
werden,demnachdas Realitts-Bestimmende
Cf. nn. 33, 35.
"System der gesammtenPhilosophie" (see note 19) 86-89, pp. 242-249; MS version
(see note 19) lOV^o corrig.)-108,ff.49r-5Or.In MS, Schelling refers("Bemerkungen" after 79, ff. 40v-41r (no SW parallel)) to Leibniz's use of Kepler's (and
Descartes') "parfaiteimage" of inertia,being slowed down by "des imperfectionset des
inconveniens[...] dans la substance" ("Thodice" 30; GP VI, 119). He inferreda) the
correctnessof the scholastics' privation:'causa ... deficiens' as thecause of physical and
moral evil, and thathere (at least!: cf. at and in note 9) b) "Gott das unendlichein allen
Dingen ist [...]. Das reelle in allen Dingen wahr [sic!:=war] ihmGott,das nichtreelle die
Begrnzung" - anotherreason "Leibniz nichtvon Spinoza loszureien": see note 41, at
and in note 48; cf. "Thodice" 380; GP VI, 341.
Whereas Leibniz denied the principle ("Specimen inventorumde admirandis naturae
generalis arcanis" (c. 1686); GP VII, 309-318, here 317-318), Schelling's conception of
the omnipresenceof absolute identityrenderedit irrelevantand superfluous.Schelling
regardedit as "ein Schande der wahrenPhilosophie" (MS "Gesammte Philosophie" (see
note 19) 115, f. 53r); what takes place in the universe in a divine fashion cannot be
understoodmechanically ("System der gesammtenPhilosophie" (see note 19) 95, p.
255). "Sto" sees materialas purelypassive, withoutsoul (cf. ibid. 89 end, p. 249; MS
version 109 end, ff.51r-v;"Sto" and Leibniz: ibid. 115, p. 52v, cf. "System der
gesammtenPhilosophie" 95, d. 254).
Ibid. 95, pp. 253-255. Leibniz is only mentionedby name in the MS version: 115, ff.
52v-53r.
"System der gesammtenPhilosophie" (see note 19) 95, p. 253; MS version 115, f.
52v: a mathematicalrelationshipinvolvingthesquare of thedistance is irrelevant;MS
118, f. 53 v, quotes Leibniz as saying thatgravityvaries according to the square of the
distance; "System der gesammtenPhilosophie" 98, pp. 257-258, correctsthis to the
inverseproportionof the square of the distance,attributing
thisto Newton.
Ibid. 93 Folg., p. 252: attributedto Newton; MS version 112-113, f. 52r: attributed
to Leibniz.

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94

EdwardBooth. .

[which is] das mtterliche


Principder Dinge"27.Schelling's conceptionof
absolute identitydemandedthe presence,in some way, of 'everythingin
and he did notflinchfromassertingin thisworktheconsequence
everything',
that"Alles im Universumist beseelt"28.Accordingly,
he is interested
in Leibniz's approximations
to this:everypartof natureis a totality,
like a garden29;
"Leibniz mitRechtden Zustandderunorganischen
Materieals den SchlafzustandderMateriebezeichnet":thisentaileda continuity
withotherrealities30;
"die groeMenge Lichtes,die nach Leibniz wie eine Chateracktauf die Erde
indicatesitsmaterialnature31.
a unityoftimeand
strzt",
Schellingconstructed
of
which
these
were
in
and
one
cannotsay that
dimensions,
space,
consequence
theuniverseis eitherfiniteor infinite
in time;timeenvisagesthingsas abstracted fromtheAll, in whicheach thingis eternal;theconceptionof "Dauer" sees
themas belongingto a line: seeingthemin "der [Dauer] einerWeltuhr",the
"Urheber"is to acceptthatit will wearoutand thathe "selbstverbeern,
selbst
to Leibniz32.For Schelling,time
mte",whichSchellingattributes
repariren
andspace areconjointdilationsoftheidentity
andtotality
oftheabsolute:space
of itselfcould notbe a vacuum33;thingsare a metamorphosis34
of theabsolute,

27 Ibid. 97 z, pp. 256-257;MS version 117z, f.53v.


28 Ibid. 65, p. 217; MS version 84, f.42r.Buthisconception
ofsoulin natureincludes
sound,light,heatandfire:ibid. 181.o. 370: MS version 205. f.77v.
29 See "Monadologie" 64-67;GP VI, 607-623,here618: see MS "Gesammte
Philosophie"(see note19) 99,f.46v;"Systemdergesammten
(see note19) 79,
Philosophie"
without
reference
toLeibniz).
pp. 231-232(briefer,
30 Ibid.,before 118 ("ObersteGrundstze
oderAxiomederNaturphilosophie"
VIII), p.
"Die
280; theMS version:AxiomVIII (following
142,f.62r)hasa variant
expression:
Naturals Einheitdes uernundinnern
Lebenstrumt
imSchlafe,wieLeibniz
gleichsam
wie derMenschTrumehat".A wholeofwhichthisis a part(butcf.
sagt,so ungefhr,
note51) is in "ZurGeschichtederneuerenPhilosophie"(see note 19), p. 54: bodies:
rationalsoul:awake.
sleepingmonadworld;soulsofplantsandanimals:dreaming;
3 1 MS "Gesammte
andreference
(see note19) 124,2,f.55v;thecomparison
Philosophie"
aredroppedin"Systemdergesammten
(see note19) 103:cf.penultimate
Philosophie"
couldbe
paragraph,
p. 264. H. Scheperssuggeststhat"Lichtes[...] wieeineChaterackt"
- and,ifso,a materialist
an impromptu
translation
of"Fulgurations
continuelles"
correction("Monadologie" 47; GP VI, 614: cf.at andinnn.48, 49).
32 In MS "Gesammte
alone: 142,f.61r(cf.(also 141 with)"Systemder
Philosophie"
117,pp.276-277).
gesammten
Philosophie"
33 Leibniz'sposition:see, e. g., 'Correspondence
withClarke'(1715-1716);GP VII, 345440, hereLeibniz's fourthletter 7-11, pp. 372-373. Schellingarguedthat"Die
es gibtkeineLeere im Universum";because
[absolute]Substanzist allgegenwrtig,
"AllesistMittelpunkt",
itis theuniversal
mediator
ofactivity
and"Seyn","dieIdentitt
in
derTotalitt
unddieTotalitt
inderIdentitt":
dergesammten
95
"System
Philosophie"
Weit.Erl.,pp.254-255;MS version 115,f.52v."DerRaumist[...] eineTotalitt
ohne
wie die ZeiteineIdentitt
ohneTotalitt,
aberebendehalb,weilnmlichalle
Identitt,
wahreTotalitt
Identitt
ist,auchkeineTotalitt":
"Systemdergesammten
Philosophie"
83,p. 239; MS version 103,f.48r.
34 "Systemdergesammten
133 3, p. 299; MS version 158 3, f.66v.
Philosophie"

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LeibnizandSchelling

95

by whichtheytook on theirown space and theirown time35:the contraryto


Leibniz's 'each thingdoes nothave its own time,and it does notkeep its own
about,and correctionsto,
space'36.Schellingalso made some generalisations
Leibniz's position,as he understoodit.He had re-activated
Plato's teachingon
ideas withan identity
of God and every'monas', and an allness of individual
monadsin pre-established
This pre-established
harmony37.
harmonyis an interwouldmakeitidenticalwith
mediarybetweensubjectand object;theiridentity
his own position:"Die Realittaller Erkentniberuhtdarauf,da es abs. Ein
und dasselbe ist welches erkennt,
und welcheserkanntwird.Nehmenwir ein
drittesan, das Subj. und Obj. vermittelte,
so mtenwir mitLeibniz unsere
Zufluchtzur praestabilirten
Harmonienehmen"38.
But Leibniz gave theobjectivethe same natureas the subjective;theconsequentdisappearanceof their
distinctionmade of the whole "ein bewutlosVorstellendes,blind Percepof subjectandobject.This was theabsolute
tives",whichhad lostitsdistinction
oppositeof Descartes' dualityof thoughtand extension,whose completedistinctionrenderedmechanicalthefunctioning
of thewhole. That this"Perceptives"was effectedin a subject-objectmade it cognateto his own position,but
in fact more like the subject-objectin animal perception,on which instinct
followedmechanically39.
35 "Systemdergesammten
of
83 ,pp.239-240:spaceis nota determination
Philosophie"
theuniverse;
dimensions
areonlya pureappearanceoftheabsoluteidentity
ina particularthing;MS version 103andz, ff.47v-48r.
On time:ibid. 109Allg.RefL,f.51r:
"[...] die Zeit ist in den Dingenselbst,oder diese habensie in sich"; "Systemder
und
gesammten
Philosophie" 89, pp. 246-249.cf.also "Brunooderberdas gttliche
natrliche
PrincipderDinge.Ein Gesprch"(1802), in: SWl, 4, pp. 213-332,here251,
283; "FernereDarstellungen"
in die Philo(see note11),p. 389. Especially"Einleitung
MSS 108
sophie"(Munich1830course;partly
repeated1836);Schelling:Berlin-Nachla
I-VI, 109I, II (quiteunlikethetextusedforW. E. Ehrhardt
(Hrsg.):F. W.J.Schelling:
- Bad Cannstatt
in die Philosophie(= Schellingiana1), Stuttgart
1989: also
Einleitung
dated1830,butclearlyfromSchelling'
s faultymemory,
as thistranscription
has many
hereMS 109I, f. 135,immo:"AlleshatseineZeitundnur
signsofgreater
authenticity),
die Zeit,derjeglichesDingangehrt".
36 'Correspondence
withClarke'(hereLeibniz'sfifth
letter 46); GP VII, 399. Leibniz's
distinction
betweentheextension
ofthings
andtheirspace,andtheduration
ofthingsand
theirtime,accordingto whicheach has itsownextension
andduration,
butnotitsown
timeand space,was notnecessaryforSchelling.Each thingwas essentiallyidentified
withthetimelessandspacelessabsolute,andtimeandspace wereconstituted
byextensionandduration
as itsdilations.
37 See "Geschichte
derIdeenlehre",
in: MS "Gesammte
Philosophie"(see note19),placed
after 47, f.29v(no SWparallel).Platonicideasas in the ofPlotinus's:
Enn.V 1,8, especiallyVI 2, 20.
38 Fromthefirstofa supplementary
formulation
of 37 "HauptstzeberSchelling's Natur
vonihmselbstendictirt",
inMS "Gesammte
itself(f. 1lr);but
Philosophie
Philosophie"
to 1 neither
in it,norin "Systemdergesammten
corresponding
Philosophie"(see note
19).
39 Ibid. 235,especially
allthisto
261,ff.91v-92r
pp.458-459;MS version
(whichattributes
is blindbecauseofthesupposedspiritual
ofthepresenting
Leibniz).The knowing
identity
monad'snature
anditspresentations;
a contrast
is neededoutsidethisidentity.
Thisexplanationanticipates
whathewilllatersayaboutLeibniz'smonads:cf.atnn.48,49.

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96

EdwardBooth. .

of figuresof the absolute


However, Schelling's confidentproliferation
of
real
and
ideal
came
to
an
end
withits lampooningby
identity
unexpected
his
in
collaborator
and
friend
his
Hegel
Phnomenologiedes
supposed
Geistesin 180740.Deeply wounded,he made a freshstart;he publishedlittle
morein his lifetime,thoughhe lecturedceaselessly.His interestin thefacility
fromLeibniz's Monadologieceased therewith.
Schelling'sallusionsto Leibniz afterhis new beginning
Fromhis Freiheit-Schrift
onwards,Leibniz appearsto Schellingoftenas
theanti-dualist,
who consideredtheessence of bodies to be a confusionin the
The logic of Leibniz's
power of presentationof the monads themselves41.
rationalorderingofthemonadswas consistent
withhisconceptionofGod, seen
frominsidea theodicyas fallingundernecessity,postulatedfroman axiomatic
innerconsistencyof his action42.ThoughLeibniz's name is not always mentioned,Schellingproposed,againsta philosophywiththislogical necessity,an
'historical'philosophy43.
Hence his interestin Leibniz's debatewithBayle on
40 Cf. "Philosophieder Offenbarung"
(1841 ff.),in: SW Bd. II, 3 (= XIII), Stuttgart
- Augsburg1858,pp. 1-334
Augsburg1858,pp. 1-530(I), SW II, 4 (= XIV), Stuttgart
(II); hereI, pp. 14-15.
41 See "Philosophische
berdas Wesendermenschlichen
Freiheit
unddie
Untersuchungen
- Augsburg1860,
damitzusammenhngenden
(1809),in:SW1,7, Stuttgart
Gegenstnde"
withSpinoza'ssystem,
"nichteinenlebendigen
Realispp. 331-416,here356 (together
muszurBasis erhlt");"Stuttgarter
(1810),in: SWl, 7, pp. 417-484,
Privatvorlesungen"
here443-444;"Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythologie"
(1842-1852?),in: SWII, 1
- Augsburg1856, herepp. 425-426; "Zur Geschichteder neueren
(= XI), Stuttgart
Philosophie"(see note19), pp. 48-54(theprinciple
place): "Leibnizsagt:Sowohldas,
- beidesist an sich nur
was wirdas Ausgedehnte
als das, was wirDenkendenennen,
Substanz"
geistige
(p. 48).
4z b. g. ot uod s necessity:// existepoint,parcequ il veutexister,
maispar la ncessit
de sa natureinfinie"
("Thodice" 183; GP VI, 224); and"AinsiDieu seul (ou l'Etre
Necessaire)a ce privilege,
qu'il fautqu'il existe,s'il estpossible"("Monadologie" 45;
GP VI, 614); cf. "Specimeninventorum
de admirandis
naturaegeneralisarcanis"(see
note23): "Ens necessarium,
si modopossibileest,utiqueexistit"(GP VII, 310). Of the
stateof theworld:"Mundusenimpraesensphysiceseu hypothetice,
nonveroabsolute
seu Metaphysiceest necessarius.[Sed] ultimaradixdbetesse in aliquo, quod sit
necessitatis
radicali"(1697); GP VII, 302[...]" ("De rerumoriginatione
Metaphysicae
308, here303). ForSchelling,God's "a se esse" entailedno innernecessity,
becauseit
was 'sponte':"ohneGrund"("Grundlegung
derpositivenPhilosophie,
Mnchner
VorlesungWS 1832/33undSS 1833",in: H. Fuhrmans
(Hrsg.):Philosophicavariaindita
velrariora3.1 (3.2: notes,neverpublished),
Torino1972,p. 127).
43 Geschichtlich
: ofwhatis "geschehen".
Schelling:a pure"Denknotwendigkeit"
produces a "nichtwissendes
Wissen":ibid.,pp.95-96(cf.ibid.,p. 96: Wolff'ssystmatisation
of
Leibniz'sfragmented
hadonly"die geistvolleLeibnizischePhilosophieentphilosophy
andpreceded"die objekgeistet").The searchfora "geschichtliches"
systemis ancient,
fora higherpositivescience(ibid.,p.
tiv-logischen
Systeme",and is partof a striving
I (see note40), p. 317): "Ich
100). See especiallyhis "PhilosophiederOffenbarung"

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LeibnizandSchelling

97

God's freedomand thesourceof evil in his Thodice(1710); hence,too, his


owndifferent
positions,thatGod willsfreelywithoutchoosing,and,elsewhere,
an
finding impregnableconditionfora trulyfreewill, in a will which wills
and finallywithina philosophywhich began with the
absolutelynothing44,
historicalprocessesof theogonyand cosmogony,interpreted
as theoutcomeof
thefreeinterplayof thesame potenciesof universalefficacy45
presidingover
theemergenceof (even evil) possibilities46.
In his Munichlectures,entitledby his editorZur Geschichteder neueren
Philosophie(circa 1827), whichcountsas his verdicton philosopherssince
werdebrigens
in dernunfolgenden
nichtblodie philosophische
Auseinandersetzung
Nothwendigkeit
zeigen,sonderndas aufdemWeg derphilosophischen
FolgerungGefundene
immer
auchsogleichgeschichtlich,
undzwarurkundlich,
nmlich
indenUrkunden
derOffenbarung,
nachweisen".
44 "Ansichistnurdas Ewige,aufsichselbstBeruhende,
Wille,Freiheit.
[...] nurdas Freie,
undsoweites freiist,inGottist[...]" ("Philosophische
berdas Wesen
Untersuchungen
dermenschlichen
Freiheit"
(see note41), p. 347). (Cf. pp. 396-398:"In dernurzu sehr
vomGeistderAbstraktion
beherrschten
Leibnizischen
Philosophieistdie Anerkennung
derNaturgesetze
als sittlich-,
nichtabergeometrisch-nothwendiger,
undebensowenig
willkrlicher
Seiten".He quotes(and translates)
Gesetze,eine dererfreulichsten
Leibniz's "Thodice" 345; GP VI, 319: "Daher sind diese Gesetzeder Beweis eines
undfreien
Wesensgegendas Systemabsoluter
hchsten,
intelligenten
Nothwendigkeit".)
God wills withoutchoicebecauseHis absolutefreedomis at thesame timeabsolute
IfGod weretochoosefromamongan infinite
number
ofpossibilities
tomake
necessity.
thebestofall possibleworlds(as Leibnizhadsupposed),hewouldhavethelowestdegree
offreedom:
"Stuttgarter
(see note41),p. 429. Non-willingas thestate
Privatvorlesungen"
of eternity,
also a humanaspiration:
"Die Weltalter"
(1811?), in: SW I, 8, Stuttgart
Augsburg1861,pp. 195-344,here235-236;"Ein solcherWilleistnichtsundistAlles"
("Die Weltalter"
(DruckI, 1811),in: SchellingsWerke.Nach derOriginalAusgabein
neuerAnordnung
hrsg.von M. Schrter(see note 19), Nachlaband{Die Weltalter,
Mnchen1966,p. 15); "einlauterer
Willeberhaupt
Fragmente),
[...] seyderWilleder
nichtswill"("Die Weltalter"
(DruckII, 1813),in:ibid.,p. 132(thisvolumecontainsfour
of otherversions,of whichDruckI and II are printer'sproofsoriginally
fragments
inMunich,1946- inDruckI andII, thiswillis pairedwithanother
published
bySchrter
will).Leibnizhadconceivedofsuch:"Unesimplevolontsansaucunmotif{a merewill)
estunefiction[...]" ('Correspondence
withClarke'(hereLeibniz'sfourth
letter 2); GP
VII, 371).
45 "[D]erabsoluteProce"amongthepotencies:"Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythoarethesameas in
logie"(see note41), p. 217. Thatthepotencies'processesinmythology
of mythology
nature,and of his philosophy
as a valid exampleforall sciences,see
- Augsburg1857,
derMythologie"
"Philosophie
( 1842 ff.),in:SWII, 2 (= XII), Stuttgart
it retainsits forceand
pp. 1-674,here670-674.PotencyA is 'reinSeynknnendes':
positionso longas itdoes notrealiseitselfas (deviant,evil) B. If itdoes,A reemerges
statebeingdesignatedA1) to reduce back to this(in a free,
(now as A2, its former
undetermined
as A3: seentogether
as A*A2A3;
contest),withtheirultimate
equilibrium
A1canbe expressed
as (-B). Thebasicinterplay
is between-A: 'nichtSeyendes'
though
and puresubject;+A its objectification
as 'reinSeyendes';A theirequilibrium:
seen
as -A+AA.See "Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythologie",
together
pp. 390-391.
46 Cf. PhilosophiederMythologie"
then
(see note45), p. 439: researchthepossibilities,
see whether
thereis a corresponding
reality;andibid.,p. 526: the'Weltgeist'fulfilsall
truepossibilities.

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98

Edward Booth . .

Leibniz'smonadoloso greatbetween
Descartes,
Schellingfoundthecontrast
not
the
but
the
evidence
from
hiscorrespondence
itself,
gy: only Monadologie
abouthischaracterisation
ofmatter
as phenomenon47,
andhisotherwritings,
s
and especiallyhis Thodice,as to need a new interpretation.
Schelling'
reacted
realism
whichhehadbrought
intoa simplicagainstLeibniz'sposition,
s privately
ityandunitywhichwentbeyondthelatter'
expressed
phenomenalofbodyand"Geist".Notonlywerethe'Vorstellunism,as todenyanyduality
buttheiraccompanying
bodiesas
gen'ofLeibniz'smonadsspiritual
(geistig),
well:therefore
"NurdasjenigeIst,was vorstellt";
Leibnizwas "einabsoluter
Unitarier
no advanceon
[...]. Er kenntnichtsals Geist".He was therefore
because
as
the
is
a
theother
God,
Spinoza48,
primalmonad, singlesubstance,
monadsbeingits fulgurations,
as
were
emanations
for
just things
logical
Leibniz'sThodicewas a reviewof discussions
on thejusticeof
Spinoza49.
Godinrelationship
tothefreedom
ofman,andon theoriginofevil,whichhe
had discussedin earliershorter
He displayedhimselfthereas an
writings.
ofa coherent
anda judiciousanalysisof
solution,
expertscholar:a proponent
others'.
Thefigure
ofnatural
within
itwasthatofmaterial
substancphilosophy
es andpredication,
withan incompletely
soulandbodyrelatedbya
separated
Withall ofthisSchellingfeltmoreat ease, andhe
predetermined
harmony50.
not
that
Leibniz
had
beeninconsistent,
that
but,morecomplementarily,
judged
hismonadology
hadbeena genialpastime51:
47
48

See note 1.
"Zur Geschichteder neuerenPhilosophie" (see note 19), pp. 49-50; repeated in "Einleitungin die Philosophieder Mythologie"(see note41), p. 425, togetherwithechoes of the
same idea: "'Ein Krnerist ...1ein zusammengeronnenesaeistiaes Wesen'"
49 "Zur Geschichteder neuerenPhilosophie" (see note 19), p. 51.
50 Cf. "Thodice" 59; GP VI, 135: He accepted a metaphysicalcommunicationwhich
"fait,que ame et le corps composentun mme suppt". He acknowledged the realityof
appearances ( 124; GP VI, 178-179), that"Aussitost qu'il y a un melange de penses
confuses,voil les sens, voil la matire[...] il n'y a pointde Creatureraisonnable sans
quelque corps organique,et qu'il n'y a pointd'espritcre qui soit entirementdtach de
la matire".Cf., also, "Thodice" 64, 130, 291, 300; GP VI, 137-138, 182-183, 289290, 295-296.
51 He has good words to say about "Principesde la natureet de la grace, fondsen raison";
GP VI, 598-606: see "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie" (see note 19), p. 54,
to it underthe titleTheses in gratiamprincipisEugenii. The descriptionof the
referring
world of inorganic bodies as a sleeping-monad-world,that of plants and animals as
dreaming,and the reasonable soul as awake, (*) was "der ersteAnfang,das Eine Wesen
der Natur in der notwendigen Stufenfolgeseines zu-sich-selbst-Kommenszu betrachten, und kann insoferngelten als der erste Keim spterer,lebendigererEntwicklung.
Diese Seite ist noch die schnste und beste der Leibnizischen Lehre; von dieser Seite
vorzglichist sie dargestelltin den bekanntenThesibus" (ibid.). Schelling does not here
thematerialworldas "Vorstellkraft"
as he does in thesame passage, drawingon
interpret
the Monadologie. - (*) The originof thisprecise formulationdoes not come to light,so
we must provisionally conclude that it is a reformulationin a traditionof Leibniz
interpretation,
possibly based on "Monadologie" 19-24; GP VI, 610-611 (H. Breger
and H. Schepers).

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LeibnizandSchelling

99

"Sollteichdarber
eineMeinunguern,so wreichehergeneigtanzunehmen,
da Leibniz
seineMonadologieals einenbloenlususingeniibetrachtet
habe,dieernurdenVorstellungen
anderer
oderihmvorangegangener
unddaes ihm
gleichzeitiger
Philosophen
entgegenstellte,
vielmehr
mitderTheodiceeErnstgewesen.Leibnizwarein vielzu erfahrener
vondereinen
undeinzu genialerMannaufderandernSeite,als daerselbstseineMonadenlehre
fretwas
mehrals eineblovorbergehende
httehaltenknnen"52.
Vorstellung

But Leibniz himselfhad added thecross-references


fromthe Thodiceto
of his Monadologie53,whichdemonstrates
thatit
paragraphsin a manuscript
Thereare otherthemesin the
was, in part,an extensionof hispreviousthought.
Thodice which are relatableto deeper speculativethemesin Schelling,of
whichhe musthave takennote;we listsome of thesein a note54.
52 "ZurGeschichte
derneuerenPhilosophie"
(see note19),p. 56. A positionsubsequently
reversed
inhis"Einleitung
indiePhilosophie
derMythologie"
(see note41), pp.278-279.
By thenSchellinghad changedhis mindabouta letterin whichLeibnizsaid thatthe
Thodicewas written
"de toutdiriger
l'dification",
whichhe hadpreviously
consideredto be unreliable,
from"ein,freilich
stemming
wegenseinergroenEitelkeitwenig
Mann"("ZurGeschichte
derneuerenPhilosophie",
glaubwrdiger
p. 56). Thisrefersto
theletterto Remond(see note1; see "Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythologie",
p.
s takingthisas laterself-criticism
279,. 1). ButSchelling'
("das darinenthaltene
System
einenso allbefhigten
Geistallerdings
nichtbefriedigen")
is exaggerated.
Leib[konnte]
nizintended
"edification"
initsoriginal,
nota trivializing,
sense:"Outrequej'ay eu soin
de toutdiriger l'dification,
et de reunirla vritensevelieet
j'ay tachde dterrer
Sectesdes Philosophes[...]" (lettertoRemond;
dissipesousles opinionsdes diffrentes
GP III, 606).
53 He didthishimself
on a faircopyoftheoriginalmuchcorrected
MS, madebysomeone
else: H. Breger.
54 Leibniz's reference
to "la grandeQuestiondu Libreet du Necessaire"("Thodice",
an allusionto RalphCudworth's,
Preface;GP VI, 29) in thatformis probably
TheTrue
Intellectual
(London1678;cf."Thodice",Preface;GP VI, 40).
System
oftheUniverse
Cf. Cudworth's"Preface"(beginning:
A3.1r):"[...] I intended
onelya DiscourseconandNecessity[...],AgainsttheFatallNecessity
ofall ActionsandEvents
cerning
Liberty
of Cudworth;
see Leibniz,GP III,
[...]". BothLeibnizand Schellingwereappreciative
336-343;cf.GruaI, 327. In Schelling,besidestwodirectallusionsto Mosheim'sLatin
translation
in die PhilosophiederMythologie"
("Einleitung
(see note41), pp. 27, 85),
thereare innumerable
pointsof contactwithhis laterthought.His "Geschichtedes
Gnosticismus"
theanony(1795 (-1796?)) (*) listsit(f. 168) in his basic bibliography;
mousGreektranscription
De hide etOsiride
(ibid.,ff.170-171),actuallyfromPlutarch's
fromMosheim'sLatintranslation
( 45-46,369B-E),was transcribed
(evidencefroma
For Schellinga 'logical' philosophy
hapax),showinghe studiedit carefully.
subjected
God to an unwarranted
a 'geschichtliche'
necessity;
philosophy
respectedhis freedom.
Leibniz's"Vrits[...] Positives"whichwe knowa posteriori("Thodice",Discours
2; GP VI, 50) allude to whatSchellingtookup in his laterpositive
prliminaire
Leibnizwas radicalindescribing
freedom
as "combattue
philosophy.
(en apparence)par
la determination
ou parla certitude,
quellequ'elle soit"("Thodice" 2; GP VI, 102;cf.
LH IV, 8, 74-77(pitresurla libert,
c. 1689)); a solutionofSchelling,equallyradical,
wastoidentify
itwitha totalabsenceofwilling(see atandinnote44). Leibnizspeculated
on theoriginof evil: "[...] il y a une imperfection
originaledans la creatureavantle
estlimiteessentiellement"
pch,parcequela creature
("Thodice" 20; GP VI, 115);
s laterpotencytheories
histranscripSchelling'
gavea placeforitintheirfreeinterplay;

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100

EdwardBooth. .

andespeciallyhispositivephilosophy56,
provided,
Schelling'slaterwork55,
in isolated passages, a metaphysicalscale to what could not be allowed to
remainpurelyformal.Thathe alwayskeptLeibnizin mindis manifestfromthe
factthatin whatwas virtuallyhis last work,Abhandlungberdie Quelle der
(a lecturegivenin Berlinin 1850),he tookup a problematic
ewigenWahrheiten
ofLeibniz,alludingin thetitleto thecontextin his Thodice.Leibniz,he said,
had distinguished
betweenthedivinewill as thecause ofreality,and thedivine
"Verstand"as thecause of possibility,whichis to say theirideality;thelatter
tionof Plutarch
(cf.supra)locatedthecause ofevil in natureitself.Leibnizlocatedall
thanKant's
inGod("Thodice"21, 52; GP VI, 115,131)-morerealistic
possibilities
of
ofSchelling'slaterconception
allerMglichkeiten',
andthiswas a feature
"Inbegriff
LeibnizsaidthatGod willsconsequenter
"le meilleur"("Thodice"
'Seynknnende'.
23; GP VI, 116), and Schellingfoundthesamein Plato,addingthatthis"zugleichein
berwundenes
[Or,as causeofthegoodalone,]Gottselbsthatweiter
Gegentheil
begreift.
nichtszu thun"("Darstellung
des philosophischen
(1830), in: SW I, 10,
Empirismus"
- Augsburg1861,pp. 225-286,here254-255). Withhis latertriadicity
of
Stuttgart
to Leibniz's remark("Thoprinciples,
Schellingwouldhave been verysympathetic
dice" 145;GP VI, 195-196)thatnature
notbyoneprinciple,
butby
mustbe explained,
etsa Volont")areprecededbya third,
"la
two;andthattheseinGod("sonEntendement
"les trois
puissance"("Thodice" 149; GP VI, 198-199),whichhe namedtogether
("Thodice" 150; GP VI, 199). But Schellingset himselfagainst
primordialits"
Leibniz'sprinciple,
"Le vrayDieu esttousjoursle mme"("Thodice" 177; GP VI,
withcompletefreedom,
tothehighest,
butnotwithina process
220): Godraiseshimself,
whichwouldimport
an alienlogicalelement("Grundlegung
derpositivenPhilosophie"
(see note42), p. 215); bypurewillingto be "reinSeyende"as identicalwiththe"seyn
Knnende"
derOffenbarung"
I (see note40), pp.221-222).As also against
("Philosophie
God's actingundermoralnecessity("Thodice" 201; GP VI, 236-237: cf. "Zur
Geschichteder neuerenPhilosophie"(see note 19), p. 58). He wouldhave foundthe
interaction
of thepotenciesadumbrated
in Leibniz's"aussitostque Dieu a dcernde
crerquelquechose,il ya uncombatentretouslespossibles,
touspretendans
l'existence"
("Thodice" 201; GP VI, 236). WhereLeibnizsaid thattheoriginofevil is "dansla
libertdes creatures"("Thodice" 273; GP VI, 280), Schellingasserted,withmore
Christian
thatitlayinAdam'swillingtousurpGod's place("Philosophie
der
orthodoxy,
I, pp. 348-354).Here,thatSchellingquotesthesametwotextstogether
(2
Offenbarung"
Peter2, 4 andJude5, 6) in his"Philosophie
II (see note40), pp. 288derOffenbarung"
290, as Leibniz("Thodice" 273; GP VI, 280), underthesametopic,thattheangels
didnotkeeptheirplace,cannotbe a coincidence.
MS 28,
(*) Schelling:Berlin-Nachla
- I numbered
ff.166-306(unpublished)
v
thefoliosconsecutively
(as pages,ignoring
and r) fromtheinsideof thefront
as 1. Schellinghad
cover,in itspresentcondition,
inverted
thenote-book,
thiswork.
alreadyused,beforebeginning
55 Fromthisgeneralisation
of 'later' we excepttheconceptualframework
of his early
dergesammten
withitspositivecategorisations
of'Affirmierendes'
"System
Philosophie",
and 'Affirmirtes'
(see note19). In it( 305 Ansicht,
p. 545; MS version 336,f. 104r,
does not reach so far) he quotes the Thodice:"Gottnurdas Positiveder Dinge
la creature,
et
emanire";cf."Thodice" 31; GP VI, 121: "[...] Dieu donnetousjours
continuellement
ce qu'il y a en elle de positif,
de bonetde parfait
[...]".
produit
56 Positivephilosophy
started
fromtheprimary
of being;negative
communication
dynamic
thesubsequent
structures
forit.ForSchelling,
mostphilosophilosophy
provided
conceptual
tookplaceinthelatter,
ofitsdependence
oblivious
ontheformer;
cf.note62.
phising

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LeibnizandSchelling

101

includedevil, not imputableto the divine will57.But his conceptionneeded


and withoutpotency,"das All der
expansion.If God is "reine Wirklichkeif'
Weise"
in
Him
will
not
be capable of being 'selbst-Seyn';
Mglichkeitewiger
God is 'selbst-Seyendes';He is "actuspurus"
possibilitiesare "nicht-Seyende",
to it: as pure "Da" (= that(it is)) corresponding
to its universal"Was" (=
what):yetalso needingto be "Etwas" in orderto be, and hereto be the 'allesSeyende', as also to be relatedto thinking(Denken): "[...] nichtzu einem
aber zum Begriffaller Begriffe,
zur Idee. Hier ist die wahreStelle fr
Begriff,
Einheit
des Seynsunddes Denkens[...]", in which"das Seynistdas Erste,
jene
das Denkenerstdas ZweiteoderFolgende"58.In hisdeviatereflections,
Leibniz
had consistently
a
to
or
its
given priority thought
analogues.
To givebrieflySchelling's finalpositionin moredetail:he saw God as "das
withit; yet he also wantedGod to be more
Seyende",in -unity
fromit: notonly"aus der Vernunft[...]
exactlyunderstoodas distinguishable
57

"Abhandlungber die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten"(1850), in: SW II, 1 (= XI), pp.
573-590, here581-584. This is in thefirstpartof a quotationfrom"Thodice" 184; GP
VI, 226-227, of which these words are filledout withthe substancefromotherplaces (e.
g. 7, 20, 149, 186, 205, 309, 335-336, 381; GP VI, 106-107, 114-115, 198-199, 227228, 239-240, 299-300, 313-314, 341-342) in orderto make thecontrast,and the separation of divine will fromintelligence("Abhandlung ber die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten",pp. 581-582). He intendedto break up any simple,deceptive and untrue,identities betweenthe single 'Wesen' and the many.The contextwas the relationshipbetween
timeless truthand contingency,and the relateddifferencebetween the universalityand
necessity in things,and theirsimultaneouscontingencyand reality,and thereforethe
natureof possibility(ibid., pp. 584-585). He thenrefers(p. 582) to Leibniz's "De rerum
originationeradicali" (see note 42), p. 305, whichpreceded his Thodice: "Ultima ratio
tarnessentiarumquam existentiarumin Uno [...]" (slightlyadapted by Schelling); from
the composite quotation fromhis Thodice, some sciences (though not philosophy)
could be unaware of this origin. So Schelling proposed a middle way between a total
independenceof thingsfromGod, and theirtotal subjection to an arbitrarydivine will,
which would not,like Leibniz, locate the source of evil in the ideal natureof things.He
also avoided Leibniz's use of an old distinctionbetween God's antecedentand consequent willing (cf. note 58).
58 "Abhandlung ber die Quelle der ewigen Wahrheiten" (see note 57), pp. 584-589.
Schelling had implicitlyreferred(from p. 521 onwards) to Leibniz's solution which
distinguishesbetween God's antecedentand consequent willing ("Thodice" 22; GP
VI, 115-116). (The distinctionis in Thomas Aquinas (Summ.Th. 1 19, 6 ad 1), drawnfrom
John Damascene ("De orthodoxa fide" II 29; Patrologia Graeca 94, 968).) Note the
referencethereto the "vritsternelles[...] cetteRegion immense" ("Thodice" 21;
GP VI, 1 15), which occasioned Schelling's title(cf., also, "Monadologie" 43-46; GP
VI, 614). His concern was the relationshipbetween the timeless,eternaltruthsand the
emergenceof contingentrealities which had been no more thanpossibilities,but which
would constitutethe 'alles-Seyende'. The postulationof two willings in God created the
impressionthat,in orderto preserveGod's freedom,theconsequentwilling overrodethe
antecedent.For Schelling, God was the activatorof the -reality,which, in
itself,was thesingle realisationof an infinitudeof possibilities;yetHe was so unitedwith
it that it was the being, withoutwhich - per impossibile - He would be incomplete.
Basically there was only one activatorin one activation,to understandWhom, as the
'Wesen' withinall 'Wesen', needed no humandistinctionbetweentwo willings.

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102

EdwardBooth. .

befreit,aus der Idee ausgestoen",but as now "was das Seyendeist",though


notto thepointof beingdividedfromit,with"das Seyende":"[...] nichtmehr
ihmvorausgehen,es mu ihmalso nachfolgen[...]"59.Fromwithinthe 'Verbutonlyoutside
nunft',God is theculminating
pointof rationalphilosophy60;
of it,as "Herrdes Seyns" and attainedby an act of will61,can He be correctly
appreciated,and become the principleof an historicalphilosophywhich is
to
positive62.On thisground,he could not agree withthe opinionattributed
Leibniz (perhaps on the groundsof the monad's knowledgeof God, and
throughGod of all theothers),thatGod is thesingle,immediateobject of the
theconcepsoul's knowledge63.
Of thisknowledge,Schellinghad formulated
in an aesthetic
tionthat"die Seele weinicht,sondernsie istdie Wissenschaft"

59 "[ ..] eine Umkehrung


des bisherigen
Verhltnisses
zwischendemwas das Seyendeist
(A) unddemSeyenden(-A+AA)" (cf.note45). As the"letzteKrisisder VernunftwisA's aus derVernunft
[...]
"[e]inWillemues seyn,vondemdie Ausstoung
senschaft'",
da GottnichtbloeIdee
ausgeht,ein Wille,dermitinnerer
verlangt,
Nothwendigkeit
in die Philosophie
derMythologie"
(see note41), p. 565). "A [...] als
sey"("Einleitung
das ganz Idee-Freieist [...] reinesDa [...]. Dieses aberistdie Stellung,die es in der
Wirklichkeit
habenmu. Denn A ist nicht,weil -A+AA ist, sondernumgekehrt,
-A+AAist,weilA ist(wiewohldiesesnichtIst,ohnedas Seyendezu seyn)"(ibid.p.
It had
, as an objectification.
570). A hadthecapacityof becoming["seynknnend"]
also a subjectivefreedom,
in thatit couldtakeon theformof a seriesof "alternative
A!A2A3.Attheendofa process,A,nowappearing
as reestabGlieder",i. e. potencies,
lishedanddesignated
as (A)' doesnotwilltobe realisedas "+A (das nichtfreye)":the
whichhas lostitspreviouspotentiality
andthereby
itsfreedom;
butto
'Seynknnende'
returnto whatit was: "+A als das freyeund an nichtsgebundneals A=A1,A2,A3"
einerAbhandlung
zurStrukturtheorie
des Absoluten"
(after1832/33),in: B.
("Fragment
Loer:Das Absoluteunddie Wirklichkeit
in SchellingsPhilosophie.MitderErstedition
einerHandschrift
aus dem BerlinerSchelling-N
achla (= Quellen und Studienzur
Philosophie7), Berlin1974,pp.29-69,here50-52).
60 "Einleitung
in die Philosophie
derMythologie"
(see note41), p. 565. Cf. also "PhilosoI (see note40), p. 156: Leibnizhad soughtby irrefutable
phiederOffenbarung"
sylloexistentia";
gismstoarriveatGod,conceivedas "Deus estEns,ex cujusessentiasequitur
buthereachesnofurther
than"Gott,wennerexistirt,
das a priori,
Existirende
seynmu".
61 Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythologie(see note41), pp. 566-567: [...] das Ich
ihnzu gewinnen,
Gottmumitseiner
[kann]sich nichtselbstden Berufzuschreiben
Hlfeentgegenkommen^
durchihneinerSeligkeit
'-1,aberes kannihnwollen,undhoffen,
zu werden[...]".
theilhaftig
62 Ct. ibid.,p. 571. 1heend rational
is a conceptorGod,butone
(= negative)philosophy
cannotgo fromthisconceptto proveGod's existence:theconceptmustbe abandoned.
But one can go fromthe being(Seyn) of God to his conceivedreality(Wesen),as
- ina positivephilosophy
- as fromsomething
His potencies
containing
incontrovertibly
andundoubtedly
certain:"Philosophie
derOffenbarung"
I (see note40), p. 159.Cf.note
56.
63 "Einleitung
indie Philosophie
derMythologie"
(see note41), p. 516: itwas possiblefor
thesoulinitsoriginalrelationship
toGod,butnotinitspresent
condition:
(Urverhltnis)
"mitins Reich des Physisch-materiellen
gezogene[r]Seele". Perhapsan extensionof
whatLeibnizsaysofGodas thesourceofthemonads'knowledge:
"Monadologie" 4347; GP VI, 614.

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LeibnizandSchelling

103

and foundit later,not in Aristotle'spassive intellect,but in what


context64,
Aristotlecalled "eine andere Art von Seele" ' in any case, unlike Leibniz's
monad65.By comparison,theintellect(Verstand)is "freithtig"66,
and, "blo
materiellgenommenschonganz in derSeele"67.Because thesoul has undisputed anteriorknowledge,Leibniz's positionthattheintellectwas outsideit,was
"ganz unpassend"68.Schelling's conceptionof thesoul as itselfbeingscience,
witha naturalinitialcontinuity
and familiarity
withthe'Seyende', was critical
of Leibniz's ideal of explainingwhat it must stand outside of69,in purely
rationalterms(yet it was superiorto Wolff'sdevelopmentof it70).In consewhosesubjectivismshowed
quence,hispositionwas a subjectiverationalism71,
itselfin itstempering
thenecessityof God's actionto a moralnecessity.It was
also "derletzteHalt des Rationalismus";andbecause of itssubjectivismand its
contradictory
logicism,"er sichblo demPositivendergeoffenbarten
Religion
entgegenstellt,
eigentlichallem Positivenauch in der Philosophieentgegen
ist"72.
In passing, Schelling also touchedcriticallyon otherunconnectedmatters73.
He made a numberof generaljudgementson Leibniz74,whichneed care

64 "Einleitungin die Philosophieder Mythologie"(see note41), p. 519 (cf. Friedrich


Wilhelm
JosephSchelling.Das Tagebuch1848. RationalePhilosophieunddemokratischeRevolution.
Mit. . Pechmann
undM. Schravenaus demBerliner
Nachlahrsg.
von H. J.Sandkhler
Bibliothek
(= Philosophische
367), Hamburg1990,p. 201: "[...]
vonAristoteles
to "berdas Verhltnis
derbildendenKn[...]"): referring
unabhngig
- Augsburg1860,pp. 289-329,here312.
stezu derNatur"(1807), in: SW I, 7, Stuttgart
Butnotethequalification:
"Die Seele ist[...] beschftigt
[...] nurmitdemGeist,als dem
LebenderDinge"(ibid.).
65 "Einleitung
indiePhilosophie
derMythologie"
(see note4 1), p. 453-455. He cametothis
conclusionfromanother
distinction
of Aristotle,
theintellectual
that,as firstentelechy,
soulis "wieWissenschaft",
butnot"wie[...] Wissenschaft-erzeugend
[...] ()"(.
453). Thiswas auiteunlikeLeibniz's"'dominirendeFrl'
Monade"(. 454V
66 Ibid.,p. 453.
67 Ibid.,p. 519.
68 He referstoLeibniz'sexclusionofit:"exceptoipsointellectu"
(ibid.).
69 "Grundlegung
derpositiven
(see note42), p. 161.
Philosophie"
70 Ibid.,p. 160.
71 I. e. without
theconstruction
ofa corresponding
object;ibid.,p. 162: "JenePhilosophie
kannnichteine dogmatische,
sondernnureine subjektiv-rationalistische
Philosophie
heien:Denndas Wort'Dogma' setzteinepositiveBedeutung
voraus".
72 Ibid.,p. 158.
73 See hiscritiqueofLeibniz'suse ofa Socinian'sconception
oftheTrinity
(see "Defensio
GP IV, 111-125,here123-124):"PhilosophiederOffenbarung"
I (see note
trinitatis";
ofthepassagefromtherealmofnature,
"wieLeibnizsagt,
40), p. 315; hisinterpretation
d. h. vomReichderNotwendigkeit",
to therealmof grace("PhilosophiederOffenof God as
barung"II (see note40), p. 17). He muchapprovedof Leibnizforwriting
"l'Etre absolu", ratherthan"das vollkommenste,
oder gar: das unendlicheWesen"
in die Philosophie
derMythologie"
("Einleitung
(see note41), p. 279 andn. 2).
74 E. g. "Spinoza[hat]reinerdie Idee derPhilosophie
als Leibniz"("Einleitung
in
gehalten
was 'geistvoll'(butWolff's
(see note19),f.6r);Leibniz'sphilosophy
Naturphilosophie"

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104

Booth. .
Edward

in quoting,because Schellingcould be, in thesame passage, incisivelycritical


in detail,and magnanimousin general.
R. P. Edward Booth O. P., Blackfriars,Buckingham Road, GB - Cambridge CB3 ODD,
e.booth@ntlworld.com

of it had destroyedthatquality;"Grundlegungder positivenPhilosophie"


systmatisation
(see note 43), p. 96); Spinoza was too objective, Leibniz too subjective, resultingin
Kant's 'unerklrtemDualismus' (ibid., pp. 173-174). The longest is the section on
Leibniz (seen withthe sections on Spinoza and Wolff) in "Zur Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie" (see note 19), especially pp. 58-59: "Es mag scheinen, da unser Urtheil
ber Leibniz im ganzen nicht sehr gnstig gelautet. Dieses Urtheil kann jedoch dem
wahrenGeiste des Mannes keinenEintragthun";and pp. 59-60: Leibniz 'beschwichtigt'
post-Descartesrevolutionaryphilosophy,and opposed Spinoza's objective with subjective rationalism.

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