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This paper points out the importance of adequate valving in providing water
distribution system reliability and the problems in assessing the reliability of a
water distribution system, using a link-node representation commonly found
in pipe network models. The paper suggests using an approach involving
'segments' of a distribution system that can be isolated with valves as the basic
unit for assessing reliability, and illustrates the use of a graphical approach to
analyze the adequacy of valving.
Simple intersection
I
Consider the intersection of pipes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Fig. I I
I I
1. If one of the pipes connected at that intersection
should fail and must be shut down, the link-node
B It--><-~-I
representation would only be accurate in case A in
which each link had an operable valve at each end. As
demonstrated above, this is generally not the case.
+, +,
In practice, most design engineers would not place
four valves at a cross-type intersection as shown in
Fig. 1. Two or three valves at such an intersection are I- I I I I
about all that are usually included, as shown in case B
where a failure in pipe 1 will take portions of links 2, 3 A B
or 4 out of service. In case B, a failure in pipe 1 would C I I I-~t I I
also take the intersection of the four pipes out of
service.
Another way of connecting pipes in an intersection i i I 1
Now consider a more common situation of a gridded desirable situation, but does occur regularly, espe-
pipe network shown in Fig. 2(A). As shown in Fig. cially in systems without regular valve maintenance.
2(B), a pipe failure at point X would remove four Figure 2(C) shows that if valves are installed and
links and three nodes from the pipe network. An operable at points A and B, then the failure would
eight-valve shutoff for a single pipe repair is not a only take one link and no nodes out of service.
8"
S 36" PIPE
8" 36" i"
AJ y 6" PIPE
+~ 6"
S VALVE
12"
MODEL HYDRANT
SYSTEM
'
distribution grid would have little impact on the 36 in their cost, valves are used very sparingly in large
pipe. For convenience, though, many modelers would transmission mains; e.g. a 36 in gate valve costs in the
represent each intersection as a single node as shown order of $40 000). Reliability analysis needs to account
in the model representation on the right of the figure for the chance of an outage in laterals and service
(or might even eliminate the 8in north-south pipe lines that cannot be isolated from the large main.
because its carrying capacity is negligible when
compared with the 36 in).
Hydraulically, the model representation in Fig. 3 ALTERNATIVE TOPOLOGY
would work very well. Now suppose that a break
occurred at point A as shown in the smaller The preceding section demonstrated that the location
illustration. The model would need to be broken as and condition of isolating valves significantly impact
shown. A link and node would need to be removed. the extent of an outage due to a pipe failure or other
The implication is that the topology of the system maintenance event which may require taking a pipe
changes with each pipe outage and the traditional way out of service. Simply removing a link from a
of representing this interaction is inaccurate. hydraulic model does not capture the effect of a pipe
The above examples illustrate that the key factor in outage in most instances.
analyzing the hydraulics of a distribution system
during an outage is knowing the location of operable Distribution system segments
valves and reorganizing the system to reflect the
extent of the shutdown due to the outage. Simply What is needed is a way of describing the portion of a
removing a pipe link from a model is misleading. water distribution system that can be isolated by
closing valves. This author has used the word
Importance of laterals 'segment' to describe such a pipe or collection of
pipes 5 and to highlight the difference between a
Another problem is that, in determining the reliability segment and a network model link. Figure 5 shows the
of an individual pipe link, most investigators assume network for Fig. 2 broken into segments.
that a pipe has a failure rate associated with a single Segments provide a way for a water utility to assess
diameter and is made of a uniform material. The 36 in quickly the susceptibility of a system to a single pipe
pipe in Fig. 3 would have a very low break rate break. Figure 5 shows that a break in segment 2 would
associated with it because of the low break rate require turning a large number of valves to achieve a
generally associated with large mains. shutout and would leave a fairly large number of
However, many large transmission mains often have customers without water.
drain hydrants at low points so that the pipe can be If the segments could be shown in color on a map or
drained for maintenance. A typical such installation is a computer monitor, it would be very easy to identify
shown in Fig. 4. The reliability of the entire 36 in segments that are likely to magnify a small pipe break
(91.4 cm) pipe is reduced by the fact that a failure in into a major shutdown. A color graphics display of
the 6in (15.2cm) hydrant lateral can take a large segments would be helpful to a utility in determining
section of the 36 in line out of service. (Because of if the distribution system has adequate valving.
24 Thomas M. Walski
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--4!. ..... L{_
!6
,
i
:
t
~4-
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,
_:
bl
t_,t
~1
1
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............
. . . . . . . . . .
1
2
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Fig. 5. Distribution segments in example.
the probability that one of the valves not working is and the age of the system. Work is needed to quantify
high. these relationships.
Until software is developed to automate valve Cullinane7 summarized data from the Environmen-
graphs, design engineers will be required to draw tal Protection Agency on valve availability and found
segments manually and use old rules of thumb such as gate valves in wastewater treatment plants to have
'no more than four valves should be needed to isolate reliability in excess of 0.999. These data are not
any pipe break' and 'no single pipe outage should be consistent with the author's experience of water
capable of wiping out all feeds to a given area'. distribution valves. This is due to (1) the treatment
plant valves being used routinely, and (2) the relative
Identifying critical segments newness of treatment plant valves in comparison with
many distribution systems. Wastewater treatment
Once the graph has been constructed, it is not too plant valves tend to be less than 20 years old, while
difficult to examine manually the graph for critical distribution system valves are often older than 50
nodes. In addition, algorithms from graph theory can years old.
be applied to find critical segments quickly. Data presented by Cullinane7 showed a mean time
One, approach to determine if a node is critical is to between failures for gate valves of the order of 1 year
conduct a 'breath-first' search 6 of each tree emanating and a mean time to repair of the order of 4 h. While
from a segment (node). If one of the trees located these numbers are not unreasonable for above ground
during these searches is disjoint (i.e. has no nodes in valves, they do not include the time to locate and
common with other trees from this node), then that identify inoperable valves which can be many hours in
node is a critical node. This can easily be extended to most water distribution systems. There are no data on
pairs of nodes that are connected by combining them the inability to locate valves.
into one node to simulate the case where a valve is
unavailable (i.e. exists but is not operable).
LARGE SCALE EXAMPLE
Design implications
There is no rigid rule that says a distribution segment To determine if the concepts presented above are
should be able to be isolated with the turning of four applicable to real water distribution systems, a graph
valves or less. Instead, it is simply a case that the of valves and segments was prepared for a roughly
probability of being unable to isolate a segment one square mile (2-59 km 2) portion of Austin, Texas,
increases with the number of valves in that segment. water distribution system, as shown in Fig. 9. (The
The tradeoffs between the cost of valves and the actual distribution system map (Sheet F-37) is too
increase in reliability they provide should prove to be complicated to show in this paper.)
a good research topic. This portion of the system is made up primarily of 6
The fewer valves that need to be turned, the more and 8 in (150 and 200 mm) pipes, which are fed from a
likely a segment will be isolated successfully. If a valve few loops of 12 in (300 mm) pipe. (The 12 in valves
cannot be operated, the size of the area that must be are the arcs with the heavy line thickness.) Flow
shutdown grows and the probability that another reaches this area from the bottom and right side of the
inoperable valve will be encountered means that a figure. The example illustrates several good features
shutdown for a single maintenance event can involve of this approach to assessing the adequacy of valves.
many customers. The first point is that segments 1, 100 and 101 are
For example, if the probability that a valve cannot the only way to serve the nodes in the 100s. This is
be found or used is 0-1, the probability of not being because the segments in the 100s are part of a
able to operate both valves for a two-valve shutdown municipal utility district that purchases its water from
is 0.19. The probability of not being able to operate Austin through a master meter located in segment
four valves for a shutdown is 0-34 and the probability 100. From the map of the system, this feature is not
of not being able to operate eight valves is 0.57. obvious, but from the graph in Fig. 9, it can readily be
identified. In this case, having all of the flow pass
Component reliability through a single segment is intentional. Usually,
having all the flow to an area pass through a single
Unfortunately, not many data exist on the availability segment is highly undesirable, but often missed.
of distribution system valves. This author has worked The next interesting segments are segments 33 and
with numerous systems and would estimate that this 34. Segment 33 is a fairly important pipe while
value can range from 0.02 (2% unavailable) to 0.33 segment 34 is a small circle off the main street. The
(one-third of valves unavailable). These availabilities map of the actual piping in that area is shown in Fig.
are inversely related to the extent of valve 10(A). Having two feeds to segment 34 is not helpful
maintenance and exercising practiced by the utility if segment 33 should be taken out of service. A better
26 Thomas M. Walski
12 IN, VALVES
arrangement is shown in Fig. 10(B) where a valve is connected by more than one valve is a poor use of
installed, breaking segment 33 into two segments so valves.
that 34 could be fed even if there is a shutdown for Figure 9 shows a number of segments with only a
one portion of 33. In general, having two segments single source. In general, this is not good design, but
in this case it is acceptable in that these represent
small cul-de-sac type streets. For example, segments
47 and 48 have a total of 12 homes served by the
~ (a)
33
segments. Cul-de-sacs and dead ends are a result of
modern development patterns which shy away from
grid layouts. While this may be esthetically pleasing, it
reduces the reliability of the water supply to
customers living on these dead ends.
The most interesting feature of Fig. 9 is segment 1,
which shows that there are nine valves connected to
this segment. Actually it would require operation of
eight of the valves to be shut to isolate this segment
because there are no sources in the area beyond
33B
34•_
segment 100.
However, eight valves is too many to have to
33A operate to shut off such an important segment.
Segment 1 is also a half mile (0-8 km) long which
means there is a high probability of a pipe break. To
(b)
make matters worse, a few of the fire hydrants along
Fig. 10. Map of the actual piping. segment 100 do not have isolating valves, so that a car
Water distribution valve topology 27