Law and Sacrifice: Bataille, Lacan, and the Critique of the Subject

Author(s): Carolyn Dean

Source: Representations, No. 13 (Winter, 1986), pp. 42-62
Published by: University of California Press
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CAROLYN

DEAN

Law and Sacrifice:

Bataille, Lacan, and
the Critiqueof the Subject
Ilfaut se rangera lavis de Fleschetexigerque la societW,
si ellecontinuea
condamner
a mort,a toutle moinsessaied'utiliser
la sanctioncapitaleegalement
a
desfinsde recherche
etdeprophylaxie.
a unefamilleun de ses membres
Si l'on enheve
a qui on separe,a titredepunition,la tWedu tronc,il estd'unesentimentalite
peu
a cette
adequatede reconnaitre
famillecommeun droitsacreceluide disposer
des
deuxtronfons:
le cerveaudu dkapitM
appartient
nona lafamille,maisau
criminologists.

-Paul Schiff,
"Les Anormauxdevantla refontedu Code Penal,"
L'Evolutionpsychiatrique
4 (1934)

Le manuscrit
de "WC."a brute,ce n'estpas dommage
etantdonnema tristesse
actuelle:c'etaitun crid'horreur
(horreur
de moi,nonde ma debauche,maisde la tWte
dephilosophe
ou depuis. . . commec'esttriste!).
-Georges Bataille,Le Petit(1943)1

corporal dismemberment,and mutilation have been common metaphors used by practitionersof contemporary
antihumanistliterarycriticism,such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva,to
disarticulatethe Enlightenmentconcept of the rational,stable self. Such metaphors are ofteninspiredby psychoanalysis,and frompsychoanalytictheorythey
often derive their "authority"as representationsof an alternativeconcept of a
subjectivityin flux. Derrida, in his discussion of Phillipe Sollers, for example,
claims that "the operation of reading/writing
goes by way of the blade of a red
knife."2Reading and writingare formsof decapitationand/orcastration,forms
of a "cut" in which the "presence" of the text paradoxically establishesitself.
There is, he goes on, a "relationbetween a certain brandished erection and a
certainhead or speech thatis cut off,the brand or the pole ... unable to present
themselvesotherwisethanin the play... of thecut."3Decapitationand castration,
linked by Freud in his essayMedusas Head, are thus,for Derrida, "decentering"
operations in which an anatomical mutilation-a "cut"-symbolizes a mutilated
The presence of reading and writing-the presence,in otherwords,
subjectivity.
of civilizationitself-requires, paradoxically,an absence, a wound. Textual productiondepends on a mutilatedauthor,on a process of cuttingratherthan on a
IMAGES

42

REPRESENTATIONS

OF DECAPITATION,

13 * Winter1986?

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

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more conventionallyconceived process of healing: "to be presented,that is, to

standupright.Uprightnessalwayspronouncesthata singlemurderis in progress'4
Whilethisessayis necessarilytoo briefto describethe theoreticallinksbetween
psychoanalysisand contemporaryFrench literarytheory,it will tryto describe
the social origins of just such a specific"critiqueof the subject" as it was first
developed in varyingwaysby Georges Bataille and Jacques Lacan. It will do so
by reconstructingthe discursiveconfigurationthatproduced a specificproblematizationof the self,one thatfound an importantexpressionin the earlyFrench
psychoanalyticmovement,born in 1926. In contrastto other European movements,French psychoanalysiscontributedto the dissolutionof the concept of
the subjectbecause itsreceptionwas framedby a broad, systematicscientificand
and eroticism.Within the
philosophical investigationof madness, criminality,
contextof a psychoanalyticinterrogationof such phenomena, these forms of
often"inexplicable"violencecame to functionas a metaphorfora disarticulated
and even structuredthatdisarticulationitself.5
subjectivity
In the course of investigatingrationallyinexplicable-"useless" or "unmotivated"-violence, both Bataille and Lacan drew a structuralanalogy between
theseformsof violenceand the destructionof a Cartesianconceptof subjectivity.
Whereasin Cartesianthoughtreason confirmsthe existenceof the self,in Bataille
is constitutedin the space of a slippage-of a "cut"and Lacan's worksubjectivity
is renin which reason, paradoxically,can never be sure of its own rationality,
dered blind and speechless the momentit triesto see or speak, likea "visagesans
vie" as Bataille put it or, to invoke an image that fascinatedthem both, like a
decapitated head.
How and why the notion of inexplicable violence spawned and structured
can onlybe explained by reference
thisspecificcritiqueof Cartesian subjectivity
and legal discourse.
to a broader problematizationof theselfin Frenchpsychiatry
a
literarydiscourse
as
well
social
as
France
a
in
years
the
interwar
during
For
evoked the image of the severed head. In the early 1930s the functionof capital
punishmentand the punishmentof delinquency in general became the matrix
of a seriesof politicaland philosophicaldiscussionsthatquestioned the meaning
and psychoanDebates takingplace withinlegislative,psychiatric,
of "normality."
alyticcirclesabout what sorts of criteriawere needed to determinea criminal's
responsibilityfor his or her crime became a natural forum for a more general,
philosophical questioning of traditional,Cartesian notions of rationality,since
the probleminvolvedredefiningjust whatappropriateor "rational"behaviorwas
in differentcontexts.Thus, while Paul Schiff'simage of decapitation,cited in
the epigraph above, suggeststhe utilitarianappropriationof the victim'shead by
science in the name of crime prevention,and while Bataille'sis the metaphorof
a nonresolution,of an ambiguous repudiation of reason, both in factrepresent
related aspects of the same socioculturaldiscourse about the self. French psychoanalysts"extended:' so to speak, the metaphorof the decapitated head from
Law and Sacrifice

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43

its symbolicfunctionas the triumph of social justice to represent as well an

unconscious, individuallymotivatedform of self-punishmentin which decapitation permits,paradoxically,a return to the scene of the crime. In so doing,
theyprovided the theoreticalties that linked the social problem of criminality,
of
one specificexpressionof a general anxietyconcerningthe relativeinstability
theself,to a particularphilosophicalcritiqueof thesubjectin avant-gardeliterary
circlesin whichreason, followingBataille'simplicitlystateddirectiveforliterary
success,loses its head.
Bataille and Lacan were in directand indirectwayslinkedto the earlyFrench
psychoanalyticmovement.Lacan, obviously,was directlyengaged with French
psychoanalysis,while Bataille was drawn to its discussion of certain problems,
formed close ties withthe more unorthodox membersof the Societe psychanalytiquede Paris,and was himselfanalyzed by Adrien Borel, one of itsfounders.6
The two men, it should be noted, were also at differenttimes married to the
same woman and were friends.Both, moreover,shared a general fascination
with violence and the irrationalcharacteristicof European thinkersafter the
FirstWorldWar,a fascinationgiven a particularculturalexpression in France.

I
forhis or her crimehad
Determininga criminal'sactual responsibility
been a controversialissue withinthe psychiatricprofession since 1907, when
were asked to take a greater role in judicial decision making-to
psychiatrists
translatecomplex medical terminologyintoa comprehensiblelegal vocabularyat the same timethatmedical indecisionhad created what Robert Nye has called
a "crisis"in public and judicial confidence in expert medical testimony.7The
and
contradictionbetween the increasingdemands being made on psychiatrists
can
be
explained by the
the increasing lack of confidence in their expertise
expanding categoriesof mental illness,which had become more complex since
Jean Etienne Esquirol's"monomaniacs"-one-time criminalswho wereotherwise
in 1820. By the earlytwentieth
perfectlyrational-had confounded psychiatrists
so
had
become
complex that psychiatristswere
century,psychiatricnosology
required to clarifyits categories forjuries tryingto decide whether or not a
criminalcould be held responsibleforhis or her crimeat the same timethatthis
themselves.
verycomplexitywas overwhelmingpsychiatrists
the 1838 law,whichestabconcerning
reforms
Firstproposed in 1907, penal
lished under which conditions an individual could be interned in an asylum,
attemptedto make legal definitionsof responsibilitycorrespond to advances in
psychiatryand criminologyat the same timethattheymaintaineda French traand
ditioncombiningpositivistideas about punishmentwithmoral responsibility
free will. In this"tradition"punishmentwas seen as a means of rehabilitationif
44

REPRESENTATIONS

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adapted to the special needs of the individualin question. While the

scientifically
extensivereformwas passed onlyby the Chamber of Deputies and was forgotten
in 1914 withthe coming of the war,it was pulled out again forconsiderationin
1931. Important amendments were added to it, and an attemptwas made to
revise article 64 of the Napoleonic penal code, which used the criterionof
"dementia"-outmoded as a psychiatriccategoryby 1931 -to establishtheextent
forhis or her actions.Yet these reforms,in contrast
of a criminal'sresponsibility
to the earlier ones, were discussed more exclusivelywithinpsychiatricand psychoanalyticcircles,and theycreated considerablyless of a popular stir.While this
may have been because the interwaryears were a period of relative popular
indifferenceto questions about crime,in psychiatrycrime and criminalresponsibilitybecame the focus of a particularlyheated debate.8 The revived interest
movementaimed
in the reformswas relatedto the contemporaneousprophylactic
at "humanizing"the treatmentof the mentallyill,a movementsponsored by the
Ligue francaised'hygienementale and founded, in 1920, by an eminentpsychidisatrist,Edouard Toulouse. This movementreiterateda nineteenth-century
course of social defensethroughpreventivemedicine,a social theorythe reforms
could have helped to institute.However,thebirthof thismovementalone cannot
when criminalstatistics
showed
explainwhy-in an atmosphereof relativesecurity,
crime decreasing and in which there was a general "shrivelingof interestin
manifesteda new interestin penal reform.
questions"9-psychiatrists
criminological
The phenomenon can onlybe explained by developmentsinternalto psychiatry
itself,namelythe failureof a traditionalempiricalmodel to explain the relationship betweenthe symptomsand causes of mental illness.
The question of penal reformhad been put on the back burner since 1924
when the trial of psychiatristRoger Dupouy resuscitatedand impassioned a
discussion about the statusof mental patientsthat had been takingplace since
the end of the war. Dupouy had been accused by the Tribunal of the Seine of
violatingthe law of 1838 by admittinginto his open-serviceclinicat Chateau de
Fontenaya patient who should have been placed in an asylum. He was finally
called in tojudge the patient'smental
acquittedbecause the "expert"psychiatrists
statecould not agree on whethershe required internmentor not. The tribunal
consequentlydefined an aliene-in the absence of any specificdefinitionin the
1838 law-as someone who could "compromisepublic order and who presents
tasks
a danger to himselfor to others,'clarifyingthe law but makingpsychiatrists'
job, after all, was to figureout if Mme. H. was
no easier.10The psychiatrists'
dangerous or not, a decision that was becoming increasinglydifficultto make
withanyconfidence.As Dupouy himselfput it: "Clinically,mentalillnessis imposof
sible to define. It is not an autonomous malady,characterizedby an ensemble
determinantcauses, of objectivesymptomsthatcan be easilyperceivedand controlledbyany observer.It is constitutedbyan infiniteseriesof the mostdifferent,
the most opposed and the most contradictorypsychopathicstates."11
Law and Sacrifice

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45

The rathersurprisingrationalebehind Dupouy's acquittal-the "confusion"

among psychiatrists
over how to definementalillness-was in factonly a symptom of a much more general dissolutionwithinpsychiatricdiscourse of a clearly
recognizableboundary between the normal and the pathological.This dissolution was representedby a conceptual problem thatdeveloped withinpsychiatry
as a consequence of a general shiftaway fromorganic explanations of mental
illness toward a new emphasis on the psychologicalmeaning of symptoms,a
problem thatcrystallizedaround the issue of criminalbehavior.
The empiricalnotationand categorizationof symptomsemployedby traditional psychiatryassumed an implicitconnection between the symptomsand
causes of psychopathologythatthestudyof psychopathsand criminalswas calling
into question.12A criminalact could eitherbe explained as dementia (i.e., the
totalirresponsibility
of the criminal);as theeconomic and corollarypsychological
situation of the subject; or finally,as a moment of temporaryinsanityin an
otherwise"normal" individual,provokedto commita crimeby a friend'streacheryor a lover'sinfidelity.
had envisionedall the possibleorganic,
Thus, psychiatry
social, and psychic(i.e., emotional) causes behind a crime,and it took these into
considerationwhen asked to determine a criminal'sjuridical responsibilityfor
his or her crime. Yet it remained baffledbefore crimes that offered no such
rationallyexplicable motivation.
As Paul Guiraud wrotein a 1931 articlein L'Evolutionpsychiatrique:
Scienceis onlypossibleifitadmits,at leastas a postulate,
therigorousdetermination
of
thephenomenathatitstudies.Psychiatrists
mustthusbe convincedthatall psychopathic
acts,as extravagant
and unexpectedas theyare,havecausesas preciseas themostnormal
kindsofbehavior.Howeveruncertain
and hesitant,
thestudyofapparently
unmotivated
murderscan raiseinteresting
problems.Whileconserving
myentireindependencefrom
orthodoxpsychoanalysis,
I thinkincasesofthistypeitis necessary
toadmitthepossibility
ofunconscious
motivating
factors.13
of psychiatriccategories to explain "inexplicable"
Because of the insufficiency
criminal behavior, Guiraud, obviously no great proponent of psychoanalytic
method,insistedon the necessityof at least consideringunconsciousmotivation.
realized that if science could
He was not alone in his frustration:psychiatrists
not establisha correlationbetween a criminalact and a specificcontextappropriate to the execution of that act, then the entire psychiatricenterprise,as
Guiraud had pointed out, was seriouslythreatened.Henri Claude, forexample,
wrote in 1932 that more and more psychiatrists
were having trouble deciding
who was lucid at the momentof a crimeand who was not."4Withouta relatively
clear definitionof normality,of what kind of behaviorcould be expected within
a given context,it was impossibletojudge to what extentthe criminalcould be
held responsibleforthe crimecommitted.Along theselines anotherpsychiatrist,
Paul Courbon, soughtto redefinethe concept of mentallucidity(in referenceto
the criminalact) as mental "validity"(validitg)since, according to him, lucidity
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REPRESENTATIONS

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was alwaysonlythe appearance of validity(i.e., the abilityto reason).'5 He claimed

thatthereoftenexisteda discrepancybetweena criminal'swords and acts,his or
her words often showing no signs of pathology.He was corroborated in this
opinion by several other psychiatrists:Marie-Therese Lacroix-Dupouy warned
thatone mustneverjudge a patienton the basis of speech alone as thereexisted
a great discrepancybetween speech and action, as well as between speech and
writing.'6It was, furthermore,preciselythis discrepancybetween speech and
writingthat fascinatedthe young Lacan.'7
The penal reformsproposed duringtheearly1930s can be seen as an attempt
to "resolve"the problem of reconcilingsymptomsand causes withinthe context
of a new emphasis on clinical medicine,which stressedabove all the empirical
studyof the individual. Consistentwith Michel Foucault'sargumentabout the
changingconceptionof disciplinesincethelate eighteenthcentury,thesereforms
were represented as "humanizing" punishmentbecause they insisted on the
attemptedrehabilitationof the criminalthroughscientificmeans.'8 And, reproducing anotherfamiliar"Foucauldian" motif,theywere to be orientedaccording
to a principle of an "individualisationde la peine," a principle found often in
positivistdiscussionsof criminologythatimplieda shiftin focusfromthecriminal
act to the study of the criminalhimself.Though there were several reforms
the most
proposed, the ones thatstimulatedthe mostdebate and had, potentially,
in
far-reachingeffectswere: 1) the creation of psychiatricannexes prisons for
the psychiatricstudyof criminalsto facilitatecrimepreventionand to determine
by
whichof them could be reeducated; 2) the replacementof the word dementia
as an
in article64 of the penal code; 3) the institution,
pathologiques
etatsmentaux
alternativeto the asylum,of several"open-service"clinicsformentalpatientsnot
necessarilyrequiringinternment.
In a plea forthe creationof psychiatricannexes, Rene Charpentier,an emiclaimed that,given the much more nuanced understandingof
nent psychiatrist,
the conceptionof criminalresponsibility
psychopathologyby modern psychiatry,
as defined by the penal code had become obsolete.'9 Furthermore,he argued,
since the traditionalconcept of moral libertyhad not proven demonstrable,sciNew psyence had to find a new criterionforjudging criminalresponsibility.
chiatricdiscoverieshad shownthatold notionsof dementiausuallyused to excuse
criminalshad givenwayto a panoplyof diversementalstatesunder the influence
of whichan individualcould be held at least partiallyresponsiblefor his or her
crime.These "discoveries"were the motivationbehind the wordchange in article
64, whichrepresentedan attemptto modernizethe conceptualizationof criminal
in keepingwiththe recognitionthatdementia
was erroneouslyused
responsibility
to characterizea whole range of pathologiesnot necessarilydemential.
The constructionof new annexes was itselfjustifiedby the relativedifficulty
of discerning the relationshipsbetween motiYeand act, word and deed, and
realityand appearance, a relationshipthatlong periods of individualizedobserLaw and Sacrifice

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47

vationsin annexes would clarify.Similarly,the rationalebehind the open-services

of "real" alienesfrompsyreformwas to permitthe institutionaldifferentiation
a differentiainternment),
who
did
not
necessarilyrequire
chopaths (i.e., those
tion that represented an attemptto work out on an institutionallevel all the
confusionin psychiatryabout how to definean alieneand thatwould allow psyunthreatening
chiatriststo studypatientsover long periods of timein a friendly,
atmosphere.
What was new here was not so much the claim thatthe criminalact was not
sufficientin itselfto judge the criminalresponsibleor irresponsible,rationalor
irrational,but rather the total impenetrabilityof the criminalcharacter itself.
Whilean analysisof thereformsconfirmsFoucault'sargumentthattheincreasing
psychologizationand internalizationof disciplinethroughoutthe modern period
is linked to social controland the needs of the state,it also suggestsan anxiety
particularto the beginningsof a conceptual breakdown of normalityindependent of purelyinstitutionaldevelopments.20During the 1920s and 1930s there
even though in fact"major" crimes-homincrease in criminality
was a perceived
icide, forexample-actually decreased in number.However,the reformimpetus
came fromwithinpsychiatryitself,not in response to the demands of the general
fear of losing social power vis "avis the
public or the state. Nor can psychiatrists'
stateand the legal profession-as Nye has argued forthe period up to the First
certainly
WorldWar-be invoked to explain the reformproposals. Psychiatrists
exploited every opportunityto assert theirmedical expertise,yettheirservices
werebeing increasinglydemanded regardlessof theirown self-promotion.Their
obsession withthe criminalcharacter,however,expressed in part by the reform
proposals, is explicable primarilyin termsof the loss of a theoreticalfoundation
withinpsychiatry.For the criteriaused to define the rational human subject,
based on a scientificconstructionof what was and was not "normal,"were being
seriouslycalled into question by the studyof the criminalhimself.
ofjudicial verdictsinto
supported the gradual transformation
Psychoanalysts
vehicles permittingmore thorough scientificstudies of criminals.Yet for them
the penal reformsofferedless a resolutionto the epistemologicalproblemraised
in psychiatryvia criminologythan a recognitionthatthose problemsdid indeed
exist.The psychoanalystRene Allendyargued thata "medicalized"formof punishmentmightlead to diminishingcrimestatisticsbut thatonly a psychoanalytic
studyof criminalbehaviorcould resolvethe problemscriminologyhad raised.2'
In thisway,the scientificinexplicabilityof crimebecame the point of departure
fora psychoanalyticreconceptualizationof psychiatricdiscourseabout criminalityand madness that made inroads into French criminologyeven when it was
neglectedin virtuallyeveryother area of psychiatricstudy.22
The studyof the madman and the criminalled psychoanalyststo question
not onlythe epistemologicalfoundationsof empiricalanalysisbut eventuallythe

48

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explanatorypower of science-rational explanation and demonstration-itself.

Psychoanalystsclaimed that the study of unconscious processes was the only
means by whichto establisha relationshipbetweenthe symptomsand causes of
would
pathologicalbehavior.This meantthatthe notionof criminalresponsibility
and
of
in the
to
the
mode
the
ego's
participation
degree
be redefinedaccording
criminalact. Crime would become symptomaticof a particularstructuralrelationshipbetweenid, ego, and superego.23
As Paul Guiraud's statementabout the necessityof consideringunconscious
formsof motivationwhen studyingcriminalbehavior indicates,such an explanation had a great deal of power given the relativefailureof an empiricalmethRecognitionof a psychoanalyticstudyof crimiodology to decipher criminality.
nalitywas noteasilygiven,but itsexplanatorypoweris demonstratedbythevigor
withwhich it was attacked.When psychoanalystsproposed basing criminology
believed theywere tryingto "takeover"
on psychologicalcategories,psychiatrists
the entirejudicial process and reorientit along psychoanalyticlines. Such a perceptionwas totallyout of proportionwithactual psychoanalyticproposals,which
were actually quite restrained.Genil-Perrin,doctor-in-chiefof the asylums of
the Seine, expended a tremendousamount of energycombattingthe perceived
threatof psychoanalyticinterventionin criminology.He wrote a book that followed in the footstepsof the seventeenthCongres de medecine legale de langue
franpaise,held in 1932 on the topic of "Psychanalyseen medecine legale."24The
psychiatrist
Dide's opinion that "psychoanalysishas a tendencyto challenge the
social order" was not an isolated one, and it is only surprisingbecause French
had never beforebothered to take itsassertionsso seriously.25
psychiatrists
Genil-Perrinwas most alarmed by what he perceived as the surreptitious
of psychoanalysisinto areas where,in his opinion, it had no business
infiltration
being. One of those areas was the legislature.He cites a report presentedby a
legislatorto the Chamber of Deputies about the creationof psychiatricannexes
in prisonsthatdemonstratesa surprisinglysophisticatedgrasp of psychoanalysis,
includinga referenceto a psychoanalyticstudyof criminals,well known at the
etsesjuges.26While Genil-Perrinwas absolutelyoutraged
time,entitledLe Criminel
thatpsychoanalysisshould be takenseriouslyenough to guide politiciansin draftwerereluctantly
recognizingthatFreud's
ing criminallegislation,otherpsychiatrists
workat least had the meritof havingdrawnattentionto the psychologicalaspect
and thatit
a tendencyalready markedwithinFrench criminology,
of criminality,
had recoiled.
dared to confrontthe conceptualproblemsbeforewhichpsychiatrists
According to the criminologistPaul Provent,the concept of the unconscious,if
used judiciously,could help psychiatryto distinguishmore accuratelybetween
the normal and the pathological and to systematizeits knowledge of criminal
behavior.27

But the most influentialpsychoanalyticstudy of any criminal was Marie

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49

Bonaparte's analysisof Mme. Lefebvre,whose trialwas to become a causecelebre.

in 1927, creatinga big stirboth
It appeared in the Revuefranfaisedepsychanalyse
withinthe psychiatricprofessionand among the general public.
Mme. Lefebvre had killed her pregnant daughter-in-lawfor no apparent
reason, and Bonaparte's attemptto make sense of her incomprehensiblegesture
was seen as tantamountto excusingitsgravity.As Bonaparte herselfrecognized,
"Mme. Lefebvre belongs to that categoryof 'fous' whom the public refuses to
consider as such because theyhave fullyconserved theirlucidity,theirmemory,
and their reason." The public, she claimed, erroneously held these criminals
responsible only because they appear to be in control of themselves,whereas
froma psychoanalyticpoint of view controlwas alwaysonly a matterof appearance, the "reality"of unconscious motivesbehind a crime most often hidden
fromthe criminalhimself.Bonaparte feltthatthe progressof science depended
entirelyon doing away with the "archaic" notion of criminalresponsibilityby
replacing verdictswith psychoanalyticdiagnoses that would penetratebeyond
mere anatomicalsurfaces.Instead, then,of demandingwhetheror nota criminal
was responsiblefor his or her act,judges should be asking whetherhe or she is
imprisonableor internable.However,even Bonaparte conceded thatthistypeof
legal innovationpresentedan irresolvableproblemfroma practicalpointof view:
Mme. Lefebvre should not be imprisonedbut placed in an asylum,she argued,
and yetshe could notjustifiablybe retained in any asylum for verylong given
While the penal systemshould be reformed
her apparent psychologicalstability.
in the directionof an "individualisationde la peine" thatwould do awaywithan
outmoded concept of punishment,such a reformneverthelesscould not accommodate the factthat,according to Marie Bonaparte, Mme. Lefebvrehad killed
her daughter-in-lawin orderto bepunishedin the firstplace. Such a diagnosis in
factprecluded any conceptualizablelegal resolution.28
to unconsciousprocesses,
theobjectof studyfromclinicalsymptoms
By shifting
psychoanalysisreversed the psychiatricconceptionof the penal reforms:crime
was no longer the problem that needed to be explained but was itselfthe resolutionto a deeper, usuallyunconscious problem-the need forself-punishment.
French psychoanalyststhoughttheyhad found a
In the concept of autopunition
verifiable
to
establish
a
relationshipbetweenpsychicmotivation
scientifically
way
and clinical(or the lack of clinical)symptoms,and, in so doing, had resolved the
mysterysurroundingcriminalbehavior.Furthermore,sincetheentiretheoretical
"crisis"facingofficialpsychiatryhad crystallizedaround the problem of incomprehensible crime, that problematicframed the questions asked and answers
elaborated in the course of a psychoanalyticinvestigationof psychopathologyin
general. Crime eventuallylost its status as the primaryobject of investigation,
and yetautopunition
became centralto an explanationof all formsof pathological
behavior.

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in 1930-31,
In an article published in the Revuefranfaisede psychanalyse
Angelo Hesnard and Rene Laforgue wrote:
importance
... of
itis theincontestable
ofpsychoanalysis,
Amongtherecentacquisitions
comon our psychological
reverberated
in humanlifethathasmostseriously
autopunition
The study[ofautoattitudein particular.
in generaland on our therapeutic
prehension
punition]has evenappearedso capitalto someof us thatwe expectof it ... a veritable
modifythe
... of our youngscience,of a naturethatwillprofoundly
transformation
and of pathology
ofcriminology,
of neuroses,of psychiatry,
teachings
of thepsychology
in general.29
among
This attitudeis representativeof a widespread interestin autopunition
French psychoanalysts.Hesnard and Laforgue published a long articlethatlater
in 1931. AllendywroteLa
de l'autopunition
became a book entitledLes Mecanismes
on the same subject; a whole issue of the Revuefranfaisede psyJusticeinterieure
chanalysewas devoted to explaining human societyin termsof the paradoxical
and numerous other articlescontributedto
psychicmovementsof autopunition;
itsgeneral diffusion.It is no coincidence thatMarie Bonaparte diagnosed Mme.
Lefebvre'scrimeas motivatedby the need to punish herself,and Lacan himself,
afterFreud'swritingson paranoia, explained the inexplicablemurdercommitted
necessitatedby the
by the von Papin sistersin 1931 as a formof self-punishment
irrepressibleguiltyfeelingsattached to theirlatenthomosexuality.30
itselfwas originallyconceived by Freud in his
The concept of autopunition
attemptto understandthe dynamicconnectionbetweenthesatisfactionof desires
thathe feltoftenmotivatedcriminalbehavior.
and the need forself-punishment
He had distinguishedbetween crimescomprehensibleto normal psychologyof vengeance, of passion, of economic desperation-and crimesconditionedby
neurosis,characterizedby a conflictbetween the id and the superego of which
the main consequence was the individual'sneed to punish himself.Many French
to explain the "unmotipsychoanalystsused Freud's conception of autopunition
vated" crime.31 Incomprehensiblecrimes,theyargued, were actuallythe result
of unconscious desires to be punished, and hence theirmotivationswere to be
sought in unconscious mental processes often difficultto detect or recognize.
The criminal,according to Freud, unconsciouslysought society'swrath. This
desire to be punished derived from the guilt provoked by the satisfactionof
forbiddendesires that,even when it took place on a symboliclevel veilingthe
real fulfillment
obtained,awakened in theego a fearof thesuperego.Autopunition
was thus the unconscious fearof the conscience. However,it simultaneouslysuspended the inhibitinganxiety derived from fear of the superego: ultimately,
justifiedthe injusticeperpetratedbythe ego and so eliminatedguilty
autopunition
feelings,permittingdesires to be satisfiedunaccompanied by a sense of guilt.In
is a symbolictranspositionof desire thatneutralizesculpability
short,autopunition

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51

at the same timethatit renders the originaldesire unrecognizable.In so doing,

when in factthe desire to be punished
it perpetratesan illusionof self-sacrifice
desire withouthavingto accommodate the
is, paradoxically,a means of fulfilling
entails.32
unbearable culpabilitysuch fulfillment
likeHesnard, Laforgue,
Whatwas mostimportantforFrenchpsychoanalysts
all
answered the questions raised by the psyand Allendy was thatautopunition
chiatricstudyof crimethatframedtheconceptualcontextof theirpsychoanalytic
investigation:it often manifesteditselfwithoutclinical symptomsand was only
recognizable as remorse,or in slightlyabnormal formsof behavior that could
not be designatedas being "crazy."Psychopathologyitself,accordingto Hesnard
and Laforgue, was determinedby the degree to whichan individualwas driven
were unleashed by
to punish himself,the degree to whichforcesof autopunition
culpabilityderived from the oedipal complex or by the destructivetendencies
became the explanthatthe death instinctawakened.33In thisway,autopunition
atorymechanismfor a whole range of mental illnessesfromhysteriato schizophrenia and paranoia, all conceived as varied formsof self-punishment.Crime
was distinguishedfromthese other psychopathologicalformsbecause it was an
attemptto resolve interiorconflictssymbolicallyor imaginativelynonresolvable:
was a symptomof a selfthe "passage 'a l'acte,"as it was called by psychoanalysts,
destructivedrive thatcould not be representedin symbolicformlikehysteriaor
obsessions,both of whichsymbolicallyrealized the need for self-punishment.34
In other words, most mental illnessestransposed repressed desire into various formsof consistentlyunusual behavior thatobliquelyexpressed the "primitive"desire. For example, a youngman who rode taxisforlong distanceswithout
ever being able to pay the fare was diagnosed by Franz Alexander and Hugo
Staub as fleeingsymbolicallyfromthe desire he feltforhis mother.His consistent
inabilityto pay was a means of punishingthatdesire bybringinglegal retribution
decoded
on himself.His obsessionwithaimlesstaxirideswas thuspsychoanalytically
linked to an unresolved oedipal complex.35
as a formof autopunition
Crime, however,was "nonsymbolic"because it was no longer a transposed
formof repressionbut an actingout of an autopunitivedrive thatboth liberated
its perpetratorfromguilt-effected, as it were,a "cure"-at the same timeas it
that is, as it sustained the desire to be
paradoxicallyrealized the autopunition,
of desire
guilty.Since crime,in psychoanalyticterms,was at once the fulfillment
and the punishmentof that satisfaction,its raisond'etrewas consequentlya paradox of desire and culpabilitysans fond, because one would eternallybe the
conditionforthe realizationof the other.The dynamic,paradoxical movements
because desire-the motivebehind
of crimethusescaped symbolicrepresentation
the crime-became transparentonly at the moment the guillotineblade fell;
that is, its "reason" could only be understood when the patient,paradoxically,
lost his head.
If crimewas such a nonsymbolicresolution,ifit could not be representedin
52

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adequate scientificterms,then the conceptual problem confrontingboth psyinterestedin discoveringitsorigins-its raisond'&reand psychoanalysts
chiatrists
in order to make punishmentmore efficaciouscould not be resolved on a practical (e.g., legal) or theoretical(i.e., epistemological)level. Since crimewas not a
symbolictranspositionof autodestructiveforces,the existence of those forces
could not be verifiedby a psychoanalyticdecoding of symbolicmeaning,and the
originsof incomprehensiblecrime remained essentiallyspeculativeand incomprehensible.If a diagnosiswas impossible,no cure could be administered.Crime,
like Mme. Lefebvre'sact of murder,could not be accommodated by any legal
discourse or legal solutions.
II
paranoiaquedans ses rapportsavec la
Lacan's 1932 these,De la psychose
personalit,was an effortto understand what motivateda young woman in full
possession of her intellectualfaculties,and withno explicable rationale,to tryto
murderan actresswithwhom she had never had any personal contact.His 1933
articleentitled"Le Crime paranoiaque" similarlyconcerned the incomprehensiblecrimeof the celebratedvon Papin sisters,who had killedand mutilatedtheir
and her daughter.By analyzingthequestionsposed byapparentlyunmopatronne
tivatedcrime,Lacan triedto approach themore generalepistemologicalproblem
in psychiatricstudycreated by the absence of a necessarycorrelationbetween
whatlie called a specific"characterology"(i.e., clinicalsymptoms)and thesubject's
"personality"(his broader psychologicalmakeup). He argued thatall psychiatric
discourse concerningparanoia had been primarilydescriptive,classifyingparanoid deliriumaccording to clinicalsymptomsand explaining its actual causes in
termsof a particular"constitution"that marked an individual'sorganic predispositionto paranoia.36
While the notion of a constitutioncorresponded to a clinicalreality,it only
described the form of the delirium withoutexplaining the organization of its
content.For example, Aimee, the subjectof Lacan's case study,had no clinically
observablememoryproblems,and yetmemoryloss was an importantcomponent
of her delirium. As long as the notion of a constitutioncould not explain the
discrepancybetweenclinicallyobservable symptomsand the actual structureof
the delirium,it would be impossible to designate a specificset of symptomsas
paranoid except on a superficial,descriptivebasis lacking empirical rigor.The
idea of a constitution,in short,could not explain what motivatedthe apparently
fortuitouscrimes of paranoids because it conceived them as secondary,as the
of organic factorsprovokingpsychological"errors."37
consequences
Lacan claimed thatwhile constitutionalfactorshad to be takeninto account
onlypsychoanalysis,which
in understandingthe originsof any psychopathology,
understood the delirium as a form of significant,autonomous representation
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53

(instead of as an impoverishedformof normality),could demonstratethe relationship between the causes and symptomsof paranoia. Psychoanalysisalone
could contributeto the psychiatricstudy of paranoia because it explored the
deliriumas a representationalstructure,as a complex of psychicresistancesto a
specificsocial and psychologicalcontext.The crimes of Aimee and of the von
Papin sisters,Lacan argued in thisvein, were caused by theirspecificrelationto
a particularset of circumstancesthat was expressed in a delirium realizing an
The conceptof autopunition
was the only
unconsciousdesire forself-punishment.
wayto explain Aimee's "cure" and Christineand Lea von Papin'stranquilityafter
havingcommittedtheircrimes.These cures were not possible accordingto constitutionalist
theories,whichclaimed thatorganicand psychologicaldefectscould
be remedied but never eliminated. Furthermore,such crimes did not fall into
the categoryof "crimes passionels" because neither Aimee nor the von Papin
sisterswere plagued by the remorse thatweighed so heavilyon the perpetrator
of a "one-time"passionatecrime.Psychoanalysis,however,byshowinghow crime
could resolvethecause-and-effect
problem
functionedas a formof self-punishment,
raised by supposedly inexplicablecrimes: "What seems originaland precious in
is that it permitsus to establisha determinism
such a theory[i.e., autopunition]
in certain phenomena of psychologicalorigin and of social signification,those
we defineas phenomena of the personality.... Such an hypothesis... explains
the sensof the delirium.The tendencytoward self-punishmentexpresses itself
The criminalbothstrikesin hisor her victim
somewhatdirectlyin thedelirium."38
an ideal of him or herselfthat has been exteriorizedand brings upon himself
society'swrath.Using in thiswaythe psychoanalyticconcept of self-punishment,
Lacan reconceptualizedthe relationshipbetweencause and effectin psychiatry.
Armed withpsychoanalytictheory,he supported the penal reformsbeing proposed at the timeas remedyingoverzealous and oftenmisappliedpunishment.39
In his essay "La Causalite psychique,"Lacan statesthat"loin que la foliesoit
le faitcontingentdes fragilitesde son organisme,elle est la virtualitepermanente
d'une faille ouverte dans son essence" (Madness, far from being an accident
of a rift
befallingan organism due to its frailties,is the permanentLvirtuality
is
a
rift"
in
Madness
because
its
its
"opening
very
essence).40
perpetually
opened
reason-its causalityor purpose-constantly slips into the permanent discordance between realityand an ideal to which the madman aspires. Madness seeks
an impossiblereconciliationbetween the real and the ideal. It is thisattempted
reconciliationthatconstitutesthe motivebehind "unmotivated"or "inexplicable"
crime,one that liberatesthe criminalfrom his madness at the same time as it
perpetuatesthe discrepancybetweenwho he is and who he wantsto be thatis at
the originof hisfoliein the firstplace. For the crime,in fact,markswhat Lacan
calls interchangeablythe limitsof resistance(in the case of Aimee) or the limits
of signification:4'itis thepassagea l'actebywhichthecriminalmovesfrompathology to "cure"-from the delirium,which is a mode of psychicresistance(dene54

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gation)to a specificsocial and psychologicalcontext,to the reliefeffectedby the

self-punishmentthe crime permits.The crime representsas well a movement
fromthe symbolicto the unrepresentablebecause it designatesthe limitsof the
symbolic;itis the momentwhen culpabilityoverflowsthe symbolictranspositions
constitutingthe deliriumand overwhelmsthe individualwitha desire he can no
longer resist.The execution of the crime effectswhat has been called in a differentcontext(in the case of Bataille and Artaud) a "desublimation":42the criminal act,byshreddingthe veilof the symbolic,becomes a sortof tragedy,a theater
in whichit is the hero's downfallthatreveals the essence of his
of self-revelation
character.As Lacan remarked:"The nature of the cure demonstratesthe nature
of the malady."43
This movement,throughthe passagea l'acte,frompathologyto cure, from
thesymbolicto an unconscious"desublimated,"is partof a paradoxical movement
towardlibertythat,because itselfa formof madness,is "alwaysalready"a prison.
For Lacan, madness is simultaneouslya formof libertyand the limitsof liberty:
the subject sees in his ideal his liberty,a confirmationof his unique subjectivity
or identityvis 'a vis others, and yet this ideal representsan impossible liberty
because it is in fact unattainable.44Lacan's conception of madness, that of a
permanentdiscordancebetweenthe ego or ideal self(moi)and social reality(etre)
fromwhich the subject is alienated, is derived fromhis reconceptualizationof
paranoia according to psychoanalytictheory.The megalomania symptomaticof
and selfparanoid behavior is actually part of a dialectic of self-glorification
punishment:it is a form of compensation for real feelingsof inadequacy vis 'a
vis expected social roles. Aimee, for example, feltinadequate as a motherand
wife,and Lea and Christinevon Papin sufferedfromrepressed homosexuality.
The paranoid triesto "resolve"the discrepancybetweenhis ideal and real selves
by constructingan illusoryideal thatis only a symbolicinversionof his feelings
of guiltand inadequacy,a psychicoperationthatliberateshimfromthosefeelings
(by functioningas a formof resistanceto them)at the same timeas itdriveshim,
paradoxically,to crime in order to sustainhis illusion.
The paranoid's pursuit of perfectionjustifiesthe crime by situatingit in a
contextwithinwhichitbecomes coherent,in whichit representsthe culmination
of his quest for an ideal self,while thisculminationis simultaneouslythe point
at whichhis illusoryworld is shattered.The paranoid, Lacan claims,imprisoned
withina vicious circle in which his libertyis his madness, can only escape the
paradox by means of a crime through which he symbolicallystrikeshimself,
realizingan unconscious desire for self-punishment
thatis actuallyat the origin
of his paranoia. His pursuitof an ideal self is at base a formof self-destruction
thatis paradoxicallya cure: crime,because it functionsas a formof self-punishment, permitshim to escape fromthe circle of his madness because it relieves
him of his guilt: "Aimee strikesin her victimher-idealexteriorized.... But the
object thatAimee achieves in so doing has onlya symbolicvalue, and her gesture
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55

brings her no relief. Nevertheless,with the same blow that makes her guilty
beforethe law,Aimee strikesherselfand feelsthe satisfactionof an accomplished
desire: the delirium,havingbecome useless, vanishes."45
The criminalact, therefore because it is a formof self-punishment,
necessarilvfailsto reconcile the paranoid withhis ideal, though thatreconciliationis
its "purpose" withinthe psychologicalstructureof paranoia. The crime, parabetweenthe real and
doxically,renderspermanentlyimpossibletheidentification
the ideal because, while it liberatesthe paranoid fromthe unconscious guilt at
the originof his delirium,while it "cures" him,it revealsthe absence at the heart
is only a continuous
of the ego thatconstituteshis subjectivity,
since subjectivity
series of failed attemptsto identifywithan ideal.46 His subjectivityis a fundamental emptinessperpetuallyreplenished by the delirium-by a symbolicrepresentation-that triesto deny thatemptiness.47
Crime functionsas a "cure" by "desublimating"the unconscious desire for
self-punishment;thus crime designates the "limitsof signification"-thelimits,
that is, of the various representationalstructuresthat constitutethe self. The
cause of crime is consequentlyan attemptedcure that is alwaysalready a form
of pathology,always already a slippage of subjectivityinto the "open rift"of
madness,which,in itsendless attemptto reconcilerealityand an ideal, endlessly
"re-presents"a subjectivity
sans fond. This madness to create a presence when in
factno originarypresenceexistsformsthecrux of an epistemologythatquestions
the very possibilityof epistemology:an incurable madness paradoxicallyconstitutes the rationale behind human action. The criminalact marks the limitsof
knowledge,of signification.Causalityis located on the edge of those limits,the
purpose of crime being an impossible identificationbetween real and idealbeing,in fact,purposeless.This is whycrimecannot be explained in a traditional
vocabulary of utility:"The thought of penologists hesitatesbefore the crime
where appears the instinctsof which the nature escapes a utilitarianregister.'48
Crime marks the limitsof human subjectivityat the same time as it represents
its dissimulation.

III
Chezlesobsedks,
lesobsedes
la signification
surtout
revet
genitaux,
[automutilation]
d'uneauto-punition,
surtout
chezlessujetstourmentes
pardesscruples
religieux;
elle
devient
alorsungesteauto-punitif
deculpabilitg.
-A. Porot,"Auto-mutilation;"
in Manuelalphabetique
depsychiatrie
(Paris,1952)
II estexactquelemasochisme
desinstincts
lajouissance
sociauxarrivea transfirer
de
lafautedesiree
subie.
a la punition
-Rene Allendy,La Justiceintgrieure
(Paris, 193 1)

56

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The purposiveness of murder as a form of self-punishmentis thus

preciselyits purposelessness;thatis, by virtueof itsown paradoxical movement
it renders itselfsans but. Similarly,Bataille offersan image of writingas the
paradoxical movementof a decapitationthat precipitatesa returnto the scene
of the crime, a movement in which the utilitarianand moral purpose of the
that actually
or a self-mutilation
guillotineis reconceptualizedas a self-sacrifice
does
Bataille,
the
guillotine
to
According
possible.
makes crime and literature
not representthe finalityofjustice so much as an "eternalreturn"of culpability,
the self-punitivedrive of a masochismever unsatisfied:"The eye of the conscience and the wood of justice incarnatingthe eternal return,is there a more
desperate image of remorse?"49It is this masochismthatcan never be fulfilled
is the necesby decapitation,even though, paradoxically,such a self-mutilation
sary preconditionfor any literaryundertaking.Bataille's "philosopher'shead"
(we recall from the opening epigraph) was responsible for the failure of WC.
The purposelessness,then,of a decapitationthatfacilitatesa crimeis at the same
timeitspurposiveness:it is the purposiveness,paradoxically,of the crimeand of
the oeuvre.Remember Derrida: "Uprightnessalways pronounces that a single
murderis in progress."
It is not surprisingthat Bataille chose the name Troppmann, that of the
celebrated criminaldecapitated in 1870, as the pseudonym of WC., or that the
"hero" of Le Bleu du ciel,a masochistand a necrophiliac,bears the same name.
The analogy Bataille drawsbetweenthe writerand the criminal,betweenwriting
was in part structuredby the concept of autopunition.
and self-mutilation,
In response to his brother'sdistressover Bataille's supposed misrepresentation of his parents in an interviewwithL'Expressin 1961, Bataille begged forgivenesson the grounds thathe had long sufferedfroma depression:
yearsago
I wantto tellyouthis[he wrotehisbrother]:whathappenedto me nearlyfifty
and I'm notsurprisedthatat thattimeI wasnotable to
stillmakesme wantto tremble,
I wascaredfor
thanexpressing
anonymously.
myself
findanotherwayof helpingmyself
AdrienBorel](mystatebeingserious)whotoldme that
bya doctor[thepsychoanalyst
in spiteof everything,
werethebestI couldfind.50
themeansthatI employed,
The firsttwo of Bataille's books-WC., which he burned, and L'Histoirede l'oeil
(and many later ones as well)-were indeed writtenpseudonymously,the first
under the name Troppmann, the second under the name Lord Auch. Pseudonymity,he later claimed, "is the transgressionof all language,"5' and it is this
transgression,this paradoxical movementin which the author silences himself,
thatstructuresall of Bataille'soeuvre.Because writtenpseudonymously,such an
oeuvreparadoxicallyconstitutesthe presence of an authorwho is absent,loses its
pointof referenceand unravels,occupyinga space betweenpresenceand absenceand silence(intowhichthe authorhimbetweenwriting(authorialintentionality)
a slipself has slipped). Writing,in thissense, becomes a formof automutilation,
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57

page of the pen in which the author effaces himselfwhile remainingpresent.

And insofaras the author remains an ever elusive presence he becomes a submutilated.
jectivityin flux: a subjectivity
The notion thatwritingpseudonymouslycould functionas a psychoanalytic
cure seems, from this point of view,odd. For the cure and the pathologythat
needs to be explained become confounded. Yet, as Bataille's interpretationof
Van Gogh suggests,automutilationfunctionsto empowerratherthanto diminish
creation; it is the gesturethatseparates the painterwho makes a contributionto
art historyfroma painterwho,likeVan Gogh, paints"thebloody mythof human
Thus Van Gogh's automutilationcorresponded to an "explosion"of
existence."52
sunlightin his paintings,a mesmerizinglightof such intensitythat,accordingto
Bataille,itburned itselfup. Van Gogh himself,mesmerizedbythesun,was driven
to such an intolerable psychologicalstate that he mutilatedand finallykilled
himself,in a gesturereproducingthe inextricablemetaphoricallinkagebetween
his suns and his witheredsunflowers:Van Gogh's paintingbecomes the metaphorical equivalent of his automutilationinsofaras it is driven toward its own
by an inexplicableexteriorforcerepresentedby the sun, which
self-destruction
both inspires it and burns it up. The sun, like Van Gogh, like art, must "die,"
transposedintoa witheredsunflowerat thesame timeas itretainsitsinspirational
force.
When Bataille began to writeabout Van Gogh's automutilation,his psychoanalystAdrien Borel referred him to a clinical study of another automutilator,
in 1924.
Gaston F, that Borel had writtenfor the Annalesmedico-psychologiques
of Van Gogh:
BatailleclaimsthatBorel'scase onlyconfirmshisown interpretation
Gaston F's automutilation-he had bittenoffhis finger-similarlyhad no explicable motive, and the young man was confirmed,after extensive psychiatric
examination,to have been in fullpossession of his intellectualfaculties.Instead,
his automutilationseems to have been a form of self-sacrificethat would cure
him,thatwould enable him to "vanquish a feelingof inner powerlessness."As it
had been for Bataille himself,Gaston F.'sact was a way,as he put it, of "getting
out of this state" (fais quelque chose, sors de cet etat), and Borel and Gilbert
Robin, the authorsof the case study,conclude thatsuch apparentlypathological
behavior was reallyGaston'sway of "readapting to the environment,"reflecting
a struggle between the pull of an interior,affectivelife and the necessityof
adjustingto the exigenciesof the externalworld.53
Such a potentially"useful suicide" as Gaston himselfcalled it,54this pathological gestureconceptualizedas a cure, suggestsa paradoxical notionof "utility"
in which uselessness becomes useful, in which a mutilatedhand leads to the
discoveryof a new inner power-for Gaston,the renewal of his artistictalentsin an endless playof normalityand pathologyin whichtheirboundaries dissolve
into one single meaninglessmovementtoward a cure that is "alwaysalready" a
form of pathology.It is preciselybecause the "cure"-the purposeof automuti58

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lation-sought by Gaston F, by Van Gogh, and by Bataille himselfdoes not

and is in factpurposeless from
conformto any conventionalnotion of "utility,"
the standpointof any rationalor utilitarianeconomy,thatthe disease cannot be
diagnosed nor its motivationexplained in traditionalpsychiatric(i.e., rational)
terms.Self-destructionas such remains outside the limitsof scientificexplanation, which needs to establish some verifiablerelationshipbetween cause and
effect,whereas automutilationis a formof violence withoutany apparent cause:
its origins perpetuallyelude rational explicationbecause theyare to be found,
as withcriminality,
neitherin culpabilitynor in desire but at once in the desire
to be culpable, in the culpabilityof desire. One cannot functionas a cause or
effectof the other since both are part of the same paradoxical movementin
whichtheeffectis alwaysalreadya cause. Automutilationas such escapes rational
conceptualizationand representation.
Decapitation itselfcomes to functionas a purposeless purpose because, like
the sun, and likesubjectivity
itself,itonlyrepresentsa simulationof self-sacrifice:
as pseudonymsare simulacraof authors,and as the sun is a witheredsunflower,
alwaysonlythe appearance of the sun, crimeis onlythe simulacrumof a cure, an
incurable cure. Neither the writernor the criminalcan be "cured" by psychois not a rationalor irrational
analysisbecause the originof his or her self-sacrifice
motive, a normal or a pathological constitution,but is instead a paradoxical
tension between self-destructionand survival,between culpabilityand desire,
that relativizesall such oppositions.Crime, like writingpseudonymously,transgressesrationalconceptualizationand psychoanalyticexplicationbecause it constitutesa paradoxical logic that is meaningless,inexplicable in causal terms.As
Bataille remarked,"Neurosis is the timorousapprehension in the depths of the
impossibleto whichone attributessome accidentalcause instead of acceptingits
ineluctablenature."55Writing,likecrime,is thesimulationof a foreverineluctable
cure, structuredby the inexplicableviolence of an automutilationthatwounds in
order to heal in the same way as reason, according to both Bataille and Lacan,
mustperpetuallydestroyitselfin order to make any sense.
While Bataille and Lacan's thoughtis veryrich and complex and cannot, of
the particularconceptualicourse, be reduced to a discussionabout criminality,
zation of criminalitythatdeveloped during the 1920s and 1930s withinthe psychiatricand psychoanalyticmilieuxcan serve as a symbolicmatrixthroughwhich
theyfilteredother ideas and other influences.What unites the two thinkersis
theirsimilarappropriationof a metaphor-that of the criminalwhose behavior
subverted scientificexplanation-a metaphor supplied by a psychoanalytic
reconceptualizationof the causes behind "unmotivated"crime.The criminalwas
the
a metaphor for a realm beyond human understanding.More importantly,
propsychologicalstructureof criminalbehavior as explained by autopunition
vided the frameworkfor a rethinkingof the -Surrealistaestheticsand politics
dominatingmuch of the Frenchintellectualcommunityat the time.While Bataille
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59

and Lacan shared the Surrealists'valorizationand defense of criminality,

they
rejected theirsimple confrontationof rationalityor "science" withthe "irrationality"of the criminalact, conceptualizingthe latterin a more philosophicalvein
in which criminalityrepresented not just Man's irrationality(i.e., his "deeper"
being) but was a metaphor,paradoxically,of thatwhichis impossibleto symbolize,
of that which,because it escapes rational or scientificexplication,escapes representationin general. The dialecticof autopunition
suggesteda particularstructure of human action that,in the work of Bataille and Lacan, came to redefine
in flux,withno original,observablecontours
human subjectivity
as a subjectivity
or foundations.Subjectivitybecame a representationresistingthe absence at its
origins,and it was crime,precisely,thatmarked thatabsence.

Notes
I would like to thankProfessorsMartinJay,Denis Hollier,Sarah Maza, and especially
Lynn Hunt for theiruseful criticismsof earlier versionsof thisarticle.
1. In Georges Bataille, Oeuvrescompletes,9 vols. (Paris, 1971), 3:59; hereaftercited as
oC.
(Chicago, 1981), 301.
2. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination
4. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 302.
5. Elisabeth Roudinesco, in her pioneering studyof the French psychoanalyticmovement,labels the more unorthodox members withinthe Societe psychanalytiquede
Paris (SPP) as "minoritaires"because of their"spiritualtendencies."In general, they
repudiated Freudian orthodoxy.While she representsaccuratelytheirposition,she
does not analyze the contentof theirwork. Consequently,she claims it was perhaps
not a coincidence that Adrien Borel, one of the SPP's foundersand a "minoritaire'
wrotean articleabout the strugglebetweentheJansenistsand theJesuits.However,
in 1935, was an
the article in question, which appeared in L'Evolutionpsychiatrique
articleabout collectivehysteriaof whichthe"convulsionnaires"(who became an object
of focus forJesuitshostileto Jansenism)were only a case study.The articleis not so
muchabout religionas itis about collectivepsychology(hardlya "spiritualist"subject).
Borel's articleinstead reflectsa general interestwithinthe SPP in unusual collective
behavior,an interestthat manifesteditselfin a linkage between psychoanalysisand
French ethnography,the exploration of which would require another article. See
en France,vol.
Elisabeth Roudinesco, La Bataille de centans: Histoirede la psychanalyse
1, 1885-1939 (Paris, 1982), 358-60.
6. Along withBorel, Schiff,and Rene Allendyamong other psychoanalystsand anthropologists,Bataille and Michel Leiris formed a Societe de psychologiecollectivein
April 1937. This group published an articleon circumcisionthatappeared in L'Hygiene mentalein 1938, a journal that,after 1925, had become a supplement to L'Encphale, the most receptive of all established medical journals to psychoanalysisin
France. Allendy,who had writtenseveral articleson the death instinctas well as on
was a regular at Bataille'sconferencesat the College de
criminalityand autopunition,
sociologie,founded by Bataille, Leiris,and Roger Caillois in 1937. There is, further-

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more, strong reason to believe that Bataille attended the conferencesgiven at the
Groupe d'6tudes philosophiques et scientifiquespour l'examen des tendances nouvelles formed by Allendy in 1920, a group thatacted as an importantorgan of diffusionfor psychoanalyticideas.
7. Robert Nye, Crime,Madness,and Politicsin ModernFrance (Princeton, N.J., 1984),
230-33.
and Liberty(Oxford, 1983), 175.
8. Gordon Wright,BetweentheGuillotine
9. Ibid., 176.
des alienisteset des
10. Edouard Toulouse, "A propos d'un proces recent,"L'Informateur
neurologistes
7 (July-August 1924): 168-69.
11. Roger Dupouy, "L'Internabilit6des malades mentaux et l'internementdes alienes,"
La Consultation
(December 1924), 234.
12. A criminalact was considered to be a psychopathicact.
2 (March 1931): 265.
L'Evolution
psychiatrique
13. Paul Guiraud, "Les Meurtresimmotives,"
14. Henri Claude, Psychiatrie
medico-legale
(Paris, 1932), 43-44.
(July
15. Paul Courbon, "La Lucidit6 et la validit6mentales,"Annalesmedico-psychologiques
1924), 111-14. Hereaftercited as AMP
16. Marie-Therese Lacroix-Dupouy,"Les Services ouverts dans les asiles,"Thesede Paris
(1926), 25, 88-100.
17. Jacques Lacan, J. Levy-Valensi,and Pierre Migault,"Ecrits'inspires':Schizographie,
AMP (December 1931).
18. Michel Foucault,Disciplineand Punish(New York, 1977).
19. Rene Charpentier,"A propos de la reformedu Code Penal,"AMP 2 (October 1933):
354.
20. The reformscan in part be seen as an attemptto controlmarginalcriminalsneither
internablenor imprisonable,such as alcoholics. It is preciselythiscategoryof "criminals" thatwas becoming increasinglyproblematicat thattime,reflectedby criminal
statisticsshowingan increase in "minor"crimes-theft, etc.-committed byjust such
men and women.
21. Rene Allendy,"Le Crimeet les perversionsinstinctives,"
(May 1938), 11-12.
Crapouillet
22. In France, psychoanalysiswas so marginalizedthat,as Jean-PierreMordier claims,a
psychoanalyticperspectivewas not even considered in the postwardiscussionabout
war neuroses and shell shock. In England, however,it was preciselythe debate about
shell shock that opened the door of the medical profession to psychoanalysis.
en France,1895-1926 (Paris,
See Jean-PierreMordier,Les Debutsde la psychanalyse
1981), 132.
23. See Rene Allendy,La Justiceinterieure
(Paris, 1931); Henri Codet and Rene Laforgue,
"Echecs sociaux et besoin inconscientd'autopunition' Revuefranfaisede psychanalyse
3 (1929; hereaftercitedas RFP); Angelo Hesnard and Rene Laforgue,"Les Processus
d'auto-punitionen psychologiedes nevroses et des psychoses,en psychologiecriminelle et en pathologie generale,"RFP 1 (1930): 3-80; Rene Laforgue, "Sur la psychologie de l'angoisse,"Le Medecind'Alsaceet de Lorraine7 (April 1930); Paul Schiff,
"Psychanalyseet paranoia,"RFP (1935); Hugo Staub, "Psychanalyseet criminalite',"
RFP 3 (1934). These are only among the most relevant.
24. Genil-Perrin,"La Psychanalyseen medecine legale,"Annalesde medecine
legalede crietde policescientifique
(May 1932), 274 - 371.
minologie
25. "Psychanalyseet criminalite' reviewarticle,Paris medical(July-August 1932), 41.
26. Hugo Staub and Franz Alexander,Le Crimineletsesjuges(Paris, 1934); Genil-Perrin,
"La Psychanalyseen medecine legale,"274-75.
Law and Sacrifice

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61

3 (May-June 1927):
Etudescriminologiques
27. Paul Provent,"Freudismeet criminologie,"
71.
28. Marie Bonaparte, "Le Cas de Mme. Lefebvre,'RFP 1 (1927): 194 - 98. For a discussion
of the case fromanotherpointof viewthan Bonaparte's,see Paul Voivenel,Les BellesMerestragiques(Paris, 1927): Voivenel'sbook traces the disagreementamong psychiatristsover whetherMme. Lefebvre was responsible for her crime or not fromthe
beginningto the end of the trial.He was himselfa psychiatric"expert"in the case.
29. Hesnard and Laforgue, "Les Processus d'auto-punition,"4.
30. Jacques Lacan, "Motifsdu crime paranoiaque,' Minotaure3 -4 (1933): 25-28.
31. See note 23.
appliquee (Paris, 1952), 112-36.
32. Sigmund Freud, Essais depsychanalyse
33. Hesnard and Laforgue, "Les Processus d'auto-punition,"84.
34. Ibid., 70 - 84.
35. Alexander and Staub,Le Crimineletsesjuges,209.
avecla personalite
(Paris,1980),
paranoiaquedanssesrapports
36. Jacques Lacan, De la psychose
53.
38. Ibid., 252.
39. Ibid., 303.
37. Ibid., 74-75.
40. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits(Paris, 1966), 176.
paranoiaque,168.
41. Lacan, De la psychose
42. Denis Hollier,"La Tragedie de Gilles de Rais,"L'Arc44 (1971): 85.
43. Lacan, De la psychose
paranoiaque,253.
44. Lacan,Ecrits, 172-73.
paranoiaque,253.
45. Ibid., 175; and De la psychose
48. Ibid., 134.
47. Ibid., 188.
46. Ibid.,Ecrits,187.
49. Bataille, OC, 3:60.
51. Ibid., 3:493.
50. Ibid., 1:644.
52. Ibid., 1:500.
53. Ibid., 259. See also Henri Claude, Adrien Borel, and Gilbert Robin, "Une Automutilationrevelatriced'un etatschizomaniaque, AMP 1 (March 1924): 334, 336, 338.
334. It should be remarked that
54. Claude, Borel, and Robin, "Une Auto-mutilation,"
these threeauthorswere primarilyresponsiblefora critiqueof Eugen Bleuler's conceptionof schizophreniaas itwas diffusedin France. As such,theybecame theauthors
of one of the main sources of continuitybetweenFrench psychiatryand psychoanalysis (i.e., througha discussionabout schizophrenia).
55. Bataille, OC, 3:41. For an interestingdiscussionof crimein Bataille'sworksee Denis
Hollier,"La Tragedie de Gilles de Rais,"77-86.

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