Beruflich Dokumente
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1. ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in
the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose
AlmieAltiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of
San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Respondentss Contention:
a.) He is not a Filipino citizen
b.) He made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy.
c.) They contend that petitioner was a holder of
a permanent U.S. resident visa.
Petitioners Contention:
a.) He did not commit false representation in his
application for candidacy as mayor.
b.) As early as December 17, 1997, he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation
by the Special Committee on Naturalization,
after he filed a petition for repatriation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
c.) Petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship
was already restored.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required
to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner
did not file one within the required period.
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials are found in
Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications.
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
(b) a
registered
voter
in
the
barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of
member of the sangguniangpanlalawigan,
sangguniangpanlungsod,
or
sangguniangbayan, the district where he
intends to be elected;
(c) a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vicemayor of independent component cities,
component cities or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
It is required that an elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual
citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a
foreign country or must not have acquired the right to
reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear
and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of
the United States of America. Such fact is proven by
his Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration
Certificate of Residence.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation
as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17
December 1997, this did not restore to
respondent his Filipino citizenship because he
failed to register such as required by the law.
It appears from the records of this case that
respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied
with requirements of the Section 2 of Republic Act
submitted
the
necessary
documents
proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only
during his motion for reconsideration, when the
COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said
evidence.
Assuming however that the new evidence of the
respondent are admitted, with more reason should
the court cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act
of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has
not yet perfected the process of repatriation.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has
committed false representation in his certificate of
candidacy. Such false representation constitutes
a material misrepresentation as it relates to his
qualification as a candidate.
On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside
the Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC.
The cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy
was
never
implemented.
The
petitioner however did not win the election.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said
supervening event has rendered the instant petition
moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
The petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He
claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him
from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely
affected his candidacy, since his supporters were
made to believe that his votes would not be counted.
Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions
cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Since this case is capable of repetition, yet evading
review, thecourts decidedto take it.
Issues:
(1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with
the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a
prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First
Division.
Held:
1.) Yes.The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration."
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on
December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation
was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only
after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the
Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner,
therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only
after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty
position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate
for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that
the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying
to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term."
It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
May 7, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents.
On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country.
On June 5, 1990, Cruz was naturalized as a U.S. citizen
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections.
He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner Bengzonfiled a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RULING:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63) enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
Respondent Cruzlost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Mr. Ong is a citizen of the PH?
YES.
HELD:
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power? The
Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given
an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions
of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds
of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution;
2.
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and
4.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those
who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in
Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women. To make
the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes
material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent
to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The
reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him
5. MAQUILING VS COMELEC
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1.
is allowed
in
2.
3.
HELD 1:
Yes. Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when there has not yet
been any proclamation of the winner.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
HELD 2:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary
steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under
the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself
HELD 3:
Yes. Since, legally speaking, Arnado
a candidate from the very beginning,
obtained the highest number of votes
qualified candidates, it follows that he
winner in the election held.
was disqualified as
Maquiling having
from among the
is but the lawful
6. MERCADO VS MANZANO
the
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring
this suit considering that he was not an original party
in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril
nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.
2. Whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
HELD:
1. Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has
neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate
7. REPUBLIC VS LIM
FACTS:
should
be
ISSUE:
WON CA was correct in upholding the decision of the
lower court.
HELD:
1. Yes, the CA was correct in finding for the
respondent. The constitutional and statutory requirements
apply only to legitimate child. By being an illegitimate child of
her Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino citizen upon birth and need not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
2. CA did not allow the use of the father's surname; it
merely granted the petition for correction in the entries of the
father's surname. Furthermore, Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act 142 allows a person to use the name by which he has
been known since childhood. The respondent is now 47 years
old. Changing her surname would just create confusion. It
was not also shown that her relatives in China would be
prejudiced by her use of such surname. While judicial
authority is required for a change of name or surname, there
is no such requirement for the continued use of surname
which a person had already been using since childhood.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo had earned majority of the votes as public
servant ( Governor) in Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
9. TECSON VS COMELEC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
FACTS:
COMELECs decision:
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04003 for lack of merit. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R.