Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Stanislao Maldonado
PhD Student,University
, y of California at
Berkeley
smaldonadoz@berkeley.edu
J
January, 15 2010
1
Motivation
y Corruption is a critical issue in the developing world.
world
y There is little empirical evidence about the causal
relationshipp between corruption
p and economic pperformance.
y Current literature is mainly based on subjective measures and
macro-level data, which suffer of omitted bias, measurement
error and reverse causality problems.
y Even recent studies based on micro-data do not have national
representativeness,
t ti affecting
ff ti external
t l validity.
lidit
2
Motivation
5
Literature
Review
Firm Data:
y Sevensson’s (2003): High ability to pay/low refusal power->
Larger bribes
y Gamboa-Cavazos
G b C et all (2007)
(2007): Larger
L bbribes
b paidd to
politicians with short or larger horizons
Individual Data:
y Olken and Barron (2007): Decrease in police check post->
Larger
g average g bribe ppaid
y Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2007): Bribes indirectly
measured by observed wage gap between private and public
employees(24% to 32%)
6
Literature
Review
7
Theoretical Background and
Preliminary Hypotheses
y Theoretical models of corruption based in demand-supply
fframework:k
-Demand remains unchanged , hence we focus on supply side
of the market for corruption
p opportunities
pp .
-Single good provided monopolistically by public official.
-Labor market and income not affected by the rise of
internationall prices
y Economic Factors:
Becker and Stigler model: the decision of a public official to
become corrupt depends on her wage and the probability of
being audited.
audited
8
Theoretical
background
y Political factors:
Characteristics of political system determines likelihood of
permanency on office of public officials
-More
M Political
P liti l competition
titi leads
l d tto shorter
h t terms
t
-Medium to Longer terms -> less incentives to receive
bribes
-Shorter terms -> higher incentive to receive bribes
9
POTENTIAL CHANNELS
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Higher wages
Increase Lower corruption
in local More effective
revenues audit technologies
POLITICAL FACTORS
10
Research design and Identification
f Strategy
S
y Exploit an interaction between a fiscal rule (Canon Law) and
a positive shock in international prices of the mineral
resources:
o Cross-sectional
Cross sectional variation:
Various minerals across districts (districts with and
without minerals/districts with different minerals). )
o Time variation:
Movement of international prices of different minerals
over time.
y Huge increase of transfers to “mining districts” starting 2004.
11
Research design
Increase of the
Increase Increase
Shock fiscal revenues
of value of of income
pprices of rich-mineral
exports tax
governments
y Identification:
Compare the bribery behavior of public servants from
mineral-rich and non mineral-rich local governments, before
and after the rise of transfers.
12
Research design
14
Research design
Commodity prices as a source of exogeneity
15
Research design
Commodity prices as a source of exogeneity
16
Research design
Commodity prices as a source of exogeneity
17
Pjt
Research design
Empirical strategy and econometric
specification
y The empirical specification:
where:
Rijt : revenues allocated to the district j in period t
Pijt : index of international commodity prices for district j
in the pperiod t
X ijt' γ : individual and district level characteristics.
vijt : error term
18
Research design
Empirical strategy and econometric specification
19
Research design
Empirical strategy and econometric specification
20
Research design
Empirical strategy and econometric specification
21
Research design
I t
Internal
l validity
lidit issues
i
y There are several alternative causal pathways that can
explain any expected sign of the causal relationship.
y This is mainly due to the fact that the exogenous increase
off revenues can affect
ff bribery-based
b b b d corruption in
different ways.
y My
M identification
id tifi ti strategy
t t will ill nott allow
ll me tto iisolate
lt
the role played by any specific factor.
y To explore the role of different causal channels
channels, I will use
the RENAMU dataset, but I will not be able of
completing
p g rule out alternative explanations
p for myy
results.
22
Data
y Annual repeated cross-section of household survey (The
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares -ENAHO): 2002-2006.
o Includes a detailed module on payment of bribes by households.
o No serious concerns about under-reporting or non-response
(Herrera 2005).
y Annual data about transfers from central to local
governments (Ministry of Finance): 2001-2006 .
o Transfers from Canon Law: 50% of taxes paid by mining
companies are allocated to local and regional governments where
the resources are extracted.
o 242 “mining districts” out of 1831.
23
y Panel data of local governments’ characteristics (The
Registro Nacional de Municipalidades-RENAMU): 2004-
2008.
24
The ENAHO’s Governance Module
25
Progress report
y Building the dataset
y Exploring potential causal channels doing some fieldwork in
rich-mineral areas
26
Mil gracias!!
27