G.R. No.

175788
June 30, 2009

ENRIQUITA ANGAT and the LEGAL HEIRS OF FEDERICO ANGAT vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
In February 1999, Federico and Enriquita (sister of Federico) filed before
the RTC a verified Petition5 for the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT
No. T-4399 covering a 3,033,846-square meter parcel of land located in
Sapang, Ternate, Cavite (subject property), presenting the owners
duplicate copy of said TCT in their possession. Federico and Enriquita
claimed that the subject property has been registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite in their names, as the true and absolute owners thereof,
under TCT No. T-4399, covered by a certain plan PSU-91002. In 959, the
old Provincial Capitol Building housing the former office of the Register of
Deeds of Cavite was burned to ashes, totally destroying all the titles and
documents kept inside the office, including the original copy of TCT No. T4399.
According to Federico and Enriquita, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
T-4399 was intact and has been in their possession since the time of its
issuance and up to the present. The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T4399 has not been delivered to any other person or entity to secure
payment or performance of any obligation nor was any transaction or
agreement relative to said TCT presented or pending before the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite when its former office was burned. No other lien or
encumbrance affecting TCT No. T-4399 exists, except the right of Federico
and Enriquita therein.

Federico and Enriquita attached to their Petition for Reconstitution a

photocopy of their owners duplicate certificate of TCT No. T-4399. They
also appended to the Petition, however, a Certificationissued by the
Register of Deeds of Cavite stating that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T4399, registered in the names of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat,
3,033,846, more or less, are not existing and does not form part of their
records. Based on the fact that all records and titles were burned during the
fire which razed to the ground the Old Capitol Building of Cavite City
housing the Office of the Register of Deeds we could not now find OCT No.
391 and TCT No. T-4399 or any trace thereof and their supporting papers
for its issuance including the Entry Book on which the pertinent documents
were inscribed.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued
an Order dated 16 February 1999, setting the initial hearing in LRC Case
No. 1331 on 10 June 1999 at 8:30 in the morning. Publication, posting, and
mailing requirements are complied with. However, all the notices to the
adjoining owners were returned unserved for the following reasons:
Ambrocio Arca: unlocated, no such name; heirs of Mariano Angat:
deceased; Santiago de Guia: unlocated, no such name; and the Office of
the Provincial Governor, representing Palikpikan Creek: refused to receive.
The petitioners submitted to the LRA the survey plan of the subject
property, PSU-91002, the tracing cloth plan with two blueprint copies
thereof; the technical description of the subject property; and the
Certification dated 25 March 1998 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
On motion of the counsel of Federico and Enriquita, there being no
oppositor nor written opposition, the RTC declared a general default
against the public and proceeded with the ex parte hearing. However,
Ternate Development Corporation (TDC) filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and a Complaint-in-Intervention, questioning the authenticity and
genuineness of TCT No. T-4399. It claimed that a portion of the subject
property covered by TCT No. T-4399, with an area of 1,783,084 square

meters, is owned by and already registered in the name of TDC under TCT
No. (T-97541) RT-19915 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
Federico and Enriquita opposed the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC.
The RTC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC reasoning that
TDC could not challenge the validity of TCT No. T-4399 in the
reconstitution proceedings since it would constitute a collateral attack on
the title of Federico and Enriquita. The RTC declared that the reconstitution
proceedings in LRC Case No. 1331 was not the proper forum to resolve
the issue of authenticity/genuineness of title sought to be reconstituted, nor
a remedy to confirm or adjudicate ownership.It concluded that a separate
civil action must be instituted to assail the validity of or seek the annulment
of the certificate of title since the same cannot be done in the reconstitution
proceedings where the issuance of the reconstituted title is ministerial on
the part of the court after a factual finding that the original was indeed
existing but was lost or destroyed.
After trial and consideration of the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by Federico and Enriquita, RTC proceeded to rule on the merits
of the Petition for Reconstitution and granted the Petition and ordered that
Register of Deeds of Cavite Province to reconstitute the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399 as shown on plan Psu-91002 in the
name of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, subject to existing liens
and encumbrances with annotation at the back thereof and that said title
was reconstituted and issued in lieu of the lost one which is hereby
declared null and void for all legal intents and purposes.
The Republic appealed the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals, claiming
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings
on the following grounds: (a) no showing that the owners of the adjacent
properties were duly notified according to Sections 12 and 13 of Republic
Act No. 26; and (b) failure of Federico and Enriquita to prove their valid
interest in the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399. The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72740.

The Court of Appeals issued a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic
and reversing the RTC because RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
Petition for Reconstitution because the notices of the hearing sent to the
owners of the adjoining properties via registered mail were returned without
having been served on them. The names of the owners of the adjoining
properties were taken from the survey plan made in 1930, and it was not
surprising that by the time the notices were sent in 1999, 69 years later,
these persons could no longer be located. The Court of Appeals also found
that Federico and Enriquita failed to prove that at the time the original copy
of TCT No. T-4399 was lost; they were the only lawful owners of the subject
property.
The Court of Appeals declared the Decision final and executory for the
reason that no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed.
Only after the Court of Appeals issued the aforementioned Resolution did
Federico and Enriquita file a Motion for Reconsideration, however, CA
denied the Motion for Reconsideration decision become final and
executory.
Petitioners insist that the Petition for Reconstitution of the original copy of
TCT No. T-4399 filed by Federico and Enriquita complied with all the legal
requirements therefor. They claim that the Court of Appeals committed
serious error in requiring notice to adjoining property owners. Petitioners
cite Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., in which the Court
ruled that notice to adjoining property owners is not necessary where the
basis for reconstitution is the owners duplicate, following Section 10, in
relation to Section 9, of Republic Act No. 26. Assuming arguendo that such
notice is mandatory, petitioners contend that they were able to substantially
comply with the same, only that the notices they sent to the adjoining
property owners were returned unserved.
According to the OSG, the RTC gravely erred when it assumed jurisdiction
over the Petition for Reconstitution despite failure by Federico and
Enriquita to comply with the notice requirements under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 26. It should be recalled that notices to the adjoining

property owners were returned unserved for various reasons. The OSG is
adamant in its stance that nothing but strict compliance with the
requirements of the law will do, and failure to do the same prevents the
RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution and
voids the whole reconstitution proceedings. Likewise, the OSG maintains
that Federico and Enriquita were not able to show that they were the only
owners of the subject property at the time of the loss of TCT No. T-4399.
Finally, the OSG asserts that the Petition at bar deserves outright dismissal
considering that the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals had already
become final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals also erred in requiring the
petitioners to notify the adjoining owners, although the petitioners also
substantially complied with the additional requirements imposed by the trial
court

certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v.

Velasco, failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a
petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in
obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No.
26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the
danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or
unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of
title proceedings.
Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26 identify the sources for
reconstitution of title. Section 2 enumerates the sources for reconstitution
of OCTs:
Section 2. Original Certificates of Title shall be reconstituted from such of
the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

Ruling:
We find that there is no merit in the present Petition.
One of the reasons why the Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the
Petition for Reconstitution of Federico and Enriquita was the lack of notice
to the adjoining property owners, which supposedly deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction over the said Petition.
The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under
Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a
restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed, in its original form and condition. The purpose of such an action
is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper
proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction
occurred.The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met
for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a

(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the

certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as
the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title
was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is

sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
TCTs, on the other hand, may be reconstituted from the sources
recognized under Section 3, as may be available, and in the order they are
presented:
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the
sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the
certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of
deeds, containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been
registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the
property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
It is worth stressing that Federico and Enriquita sought the reconstitution of
the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 based on the owners duplicate of said

TCT, a source named under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. The
publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are
governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
Section 10 provides:
Sec.10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner
or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this
Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources
enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:
Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner
stated in section nine hereof: and, provided, further, That certificates of title
reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the
encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act
In relation to the foregoing, the provisions of Section 9 on the publication of
the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution reads:
Section 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to
be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after
hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice
and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the
number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the
names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of
title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having
an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may
have. x x x.
It is evident from a perusal of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26, as quoted
above, that it does not mandate that notice be specifically sent to adjoining
property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice
of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the same
Act.

Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26, requiring notice to adjoining

property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution
filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these provisions apply
particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under
Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No.
26.
In Puzon, we explained that when the reconstitution is based on an extant
owners duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and
genuineness of the certificate, which could best be determined or
contested by the government agencies or offices concerned. The adjoining
owners or actual occupants of the property covered by the TCT are hardly
in a position to determine the genuineness of the certificate; hence, their
participation in the reconstitution proceedings is not indispensable and
notice to them is not jurisdictional.
TheDecision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and
absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors therein. And even if it were
otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice
requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to
petitioners.
The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately seek the reconstitution
of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before
actually filing their Petition, had allowed laches to attach. Laches is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 5 December 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72740 dismissing the Petition for
Reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, filed by Federico A. Angat and Enriquita
A. Angat, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143573

January 30, 2009

ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE, ALFREDO RUFLOE and RODRIGO
RUFLOE, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONARDA BURGOS, ANITA BURGOS, ANGELITO BURGOS, AMY
BURGOS, ELVIRA DELOS REYES and JULIAN C. TUBIG, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased,
while co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the
marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel
of land located at Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa, which is the subject of
the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes
forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated to
make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses
Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in
obtaining a title in her name. IThe Rufloes filed a complaint for damages
against Delos Reyes alleging that Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was
four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes.
During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to
respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelito and Amy (Burgos siblings). A
new title was then issued in their names. The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold
the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However, the sale in
favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in her
name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings
who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon.
The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor
of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had
been forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire
ownership over the subject property. Said decision had become final and
executory. Respondents interposed an appeal to the CA. In their appeal,
respondents maintained that they bought the property in good faith after

they were shown a genuine copy of the title of the disputed property by
Delos Reyes. They also insisted that they were innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the
trial court, declaring in the process that respondents were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos
siblings and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid
and binding; and (2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor
Delos Reyes.
RULING:
It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and
conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one
does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one
owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than
what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos
Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey
to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale
between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including
the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this
case, may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an
unchallenged exception: The circumstances surrounding this case point to
the absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence
shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated
on the title of Delos Reyes and a action for damages and criminal case for
estafa, filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending before
the court. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to

the validity of Delos Reyes title and her authority and legal right to sell the
property. Equally significant is the fact that Delos Reyes was not in
possession of the subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos
siblings. There was no showing that Amado or any of the Burgos siblings
exerted any effort to personally verify with the Register of Deeds if Delos
Reyes certificate of title was clean and authentic. Although it is a
recognized principle that a person dealing with registered land need not go
beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where
circumstances exist which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him
to investigate further. without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as a buyer in good faith. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility
of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of
a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the
registry must have been made in good faith. A holder in bad faith of a
certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law
cannot be used as a shield for fraud.

Decision could not possibly have any effect on them, as they were not
parties to said case. RTC dismissed the petition for quieting of title.
Petitioner appealed to the CA and the decision of the RTC was affirmed.
Issue: was dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title despite the lack of
trial on the merits, hence, allegedly depriving petitioners of the opportunity
to prove their allegations that respondents' aforementioned TCTs were null
and void
Held: petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of
land in question and have been ordered to vacate the same. The gist of
their claim in the action for quieting of title is that the Decision in the
ejectment case against them should not be implemented, because
respondents' TCTs are spurious, having emanated from OCT No. 614,
which has been declared null and void in a Partial Decision rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners' main prayer is for the nullification of
respondents' TCTs.
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a certificate of
title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified
or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
SOTERO ROY LEONERO, RODOLFO LIM, ISIDORO A. PADILLA, JR.,
AMY ROSE FISMA, and NORMA CABUYO, vs.
SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA and FORTUNA MARCOS-BARBA,
represented by IMELDA N. FORONDO, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for Quieting of Title

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216.praying
that Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and
59727, be declared null and void. Petitioners alleged that this had been
declared void in a Partial Decision. Respondents maintaining that all in
their names in the tile were all genuine. They further argued that the Partial

In Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, the Court held that the validity of a certificate of
title cannot be assailed in an action for quieting of title; an action for
annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the cancellation
of a certificate of title
Clearly, petitioners' complaint is unfounded and the RTC acted properly in
dismissing the same for petitioners' failure to establish the factual basis for
it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.

patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee

shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only
as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of
registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.

RABAJA RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. AFP

RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177181 July 7, 2009]

The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.
Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to deceive
and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be
specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and
the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden. Petitioner did not
show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed
spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took
part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966.
Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by
the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus,
relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud
consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are.
Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land
Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103
of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration
is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant,

The Supreme Court also reiterated the rule that, where innocent third
persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and
order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright
cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The
sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone
dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in
every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly
issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Thus, every person
dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to
go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation is a domestic
corporation and a holder of TCT No. T-88513 covering the subject property
located at Barangay Conrazon, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro.
Respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a government corporation, which manages
the pension fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and a
holder of TCT No. T-51382 covering the same subject property.
On September 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title
and/or Removal of Cloud from Title before the RTC. It averred that on
September 6, 1955, a Free Patent was issued in the name of Jose
Castromero, and on June 1, 1982, the Free Patent was registered, and an
OCT covering the subject property was issued in the name of the latter.
Sometime in 1982, Jose sold the subject property to Spouses Sigfriedo and

Josephine Veloso and TCT No. T-17104 was issued in favor of the
spouses. On January 17, 1997, Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold the subject
property to petitioner for the sum of P634,116.00 and TCT No. T-88513
was issued in petitioners name. Petitioner alleged that it was the lawful
owner and possessor of the subject property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the
lower court. It held that Charles's Homestead Patent was earlier registered
than Jose's Free Patent. The CA held that Jose slept on his rights, and
thus, respondent had a better right over the subject property. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

In its Answer, respondent claimed that its title over the subject property was
protected by the Torrens system, as it was a buyer in good faith and for
value, and that it had been in continuous possession of the subject
property since November 1989, way ahead of petitioner's alleged
possession in February 1997.

ISSUES:

Respondent stated that on April 30, 1966, a Homestead Patent was issued
in the name of Charles Soguilon, and upon registration, an OCT was
issued in Charles's name, covering the same property. On October 18,
1982, Charles sold the subject property to JMC Farm Incorporated, which
was then issued TCT No. 18529. On August 30, 1985, JMC obtained a
loan from respondent in the amount of P7,000,000.00, with real estate
mortgage over several parcels of land including the subject property. JMC
failed to pay, hence, after extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale,
respondent, being the highest bidder, acquired the subject property and
was issued TCT No. T-51382 in its name. Respondent contended that from
the time it was issued a title, it took possession of the subject property until
petitioner disturbed respondent's possession thereof sometime in 1997.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner's title
emanated from a title older than that of the respondent. Moreover, the RTC
held that there were substantial and numerous infirmities in the Homestead
Patent of Charles. The RTC found that there was no record in the Bureau
of Lands that Charles was a homestead applicant or a grantee of the
Homestead Patent. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's Homestead Patent
was fraudulent and spurious, and respondent could not invoke the
protection of the Torrens system, because the system does not protect one
who committed fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in bad faith.

a. Whether or not respondent's title which originated from a fake and

spurious homestead patent, is superior to petitioner's title which originated
from a valid and existing free patent.
b. Who, between the petitioner and respondent, has a better right over the
subject property?
RULINGS:
a.
The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never
presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to
deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him
must be specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on
petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden.
Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles
Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that
respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as
1966. Therefore, the petition was denied.
b.
The Supreme Court held that respondent is an innocent purchaser
in good faith and for value. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, TCT
No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw or defect that could
give rise to any iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it was
derived from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise, respondent
was not under any obligation to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself
when, significantly, a foreclosure sale was conducted and respondent
emerged as the highest bidder.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the

certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court
cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in
the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under
the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had
been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the
law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no
way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of
the property.
Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land
Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103
of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration
is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant,
patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee
shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only
as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of
authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of
registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No.

168848
HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No.
169019
June 30, 2009

FACTS:
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of the Bacolod
Cadastre.Petitioners filed an Application for the Registration of Title before
the RTC. In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524,
AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City
of Bacolod, Island of Negros. The survey plan duly approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional
Office, Iloilo City; and the technical description of the subject lot were
submitted to the RTC.
The application was amended to stating that the parcel of land in question
be ordered registered and that an original Certificate of Title be issued in
the name of the late Jose R. [De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No.
22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as
against respondent Republic of the Philippines, which entered its due
appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which, in
turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to
represent the OSG at the trial.
Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of
Decree No. 22752[8] dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land
Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in the cadastral case
confirming and granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership
of Lot No. 1524.
By Decision dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general
default and judicially confirmed the incomplete title of the late De
Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree No. 22752.The OSG,
for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but
opted not to file an appeal. Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod
Registry issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58 in the name of
De Luzuriaga, Sr.
Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO)
filed a Complaint against petitioners before the RTC for Quieting of Title,

Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58 with prayer for injunctive
relief and damages. DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest,
Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No.
1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Register
of Deeds (RD) of Bacolod City on February 8, 1939.
On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision,
the Republic through the OSG, however, sought the annulment
thereof via an unverified Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the
RTC. The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment because it is
not sufficient in form and substance and filed out of time.
The Republic moved for reconsideration of the above denial order arguing
that its procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. Moreover, the OSG
alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No.
97-583 inasmuch as the corresponding amended application for
registration dated May 5, 1998 was not published and a copy of which the
Republic was not served. Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument
on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application of
land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.The
Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration)
reiterating the merits of its case.

The RTC denied the Republics motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
Republic elevated the case before the CA.
The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari and
ordered the remand of the instant case to the trial court for reception of
evidence to determine whether the RTCs Decision confirming the title of
the late Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot 1524 will result in a double titling of the
subject lot. Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the CA
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a cadastral case and Quieting of Title case can proceed
independently?
2. Whether or not the contention of the OSG that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 due to non-publication of the
amended application for registration is tenable.?
RULING:
1. Yes, they can proceed independently. The Supreme Court ruled that
petitioners contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the
special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without
solid basis. Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for quieting of title in Civil
Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed
independently. The cause of action of the Republics petition for relief from
judgment of double titling of the subject lot is different from DAALCOs
quest for quieting of title. From another perspective, DAALCO basically
seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De
Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republics petition assails the grant of ownership
to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly registered under OCT No.
2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs
or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a
consolidation of both cases would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.
2. No. As the Supreme Court held that the Republic, after participating in
the proceedings below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction, drawing
attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration
during the trial of Cad. Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way
clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic. As it were, the
Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by
prosecutor Bayona. The petitioners in that case appeared to have complied
with the essential jurisdictional requirement of publication. The required
survey plan, technical description, and original tracing cloth have been duly
presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona obviously found
the cadastral proceedings to have been in order, else, he would have duly
protested and assailed the same.

We hardly can subscribe to the Republics argument that the publication of

the amendment in petitioners application is a condition sine qua non for
the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of Act No.
2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the
publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial
hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary
administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules
of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give
notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property that
will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the
claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without
new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity and area of
the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral
matters, a new publication is not needed.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made
for Lot No. 1524, its identity and area. The amendment in petitioners
application in the relief portion neither altered the area and identity of the
subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is
required. Besides, the Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been
duly notified of such amendment. Consequently, the Republic could not
plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in court.

Republic v. Lee Tsai

G.R. No. 168184. June 22, 2009.
FACTS: Respondent filed an application for the confirmation and
registration of the subject property under Presidential Decree No. 1529.
She (alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the
improvements thereon. She also declared that she and her predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than
30 years. The trial court granted respondents application for registration.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that respondent
need not prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because
Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942
(RA 1942), which provides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is required for respondent to prove her open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
HELD: YES. Note that respondent did not specify under what paragraph of
Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. But it appeared that
respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529. There are
three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of PD 1529:
(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June1945 or earlier. The
right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of
ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of the
claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

There were various amendments to PD 1529. In Republic v. Doldol, the

Court provided a summary of these amendments:
"The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided
for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As the law now stands, a mere showing
of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25
January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and
occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself
or through his predecessors-in interest, started on 12 June
1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with
Section 14(1) of PD 1529."
In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and
occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA
141. Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax
declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the
year 1948. In view of the lack of
sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since
12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be
denied.
The same ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Javier (G.R. No. 179905, 19
August 2009).