same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions.

RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec.
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) the law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families."
Custodial investigation "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436)

INCLUDES an instance where both accused went

voluntarily to the police station and the investigating
officer started asking questions to elicit information from
them; belated presence of lawyer 5 days later. P. v.
ORDONO, GR 132154, 6/29/00

FACTS: The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of

rape with homicide attended with conspiracy on the bases of their
extra judicial confession. An interview with a radio announcer was
also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for the crime.
They now assail their conviction as their confession was attended by
infirmities i.e. mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during
custodial investigation.
HELD:The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession
inadmissible. The presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the
family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect.
However, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news
reporter on televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein
accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible.
The interview was not in the nature of an investigation, and thus, the
uncounselled confession did not violate accuseds constitutional
rights.

SCOPE:
Not confined to period prior to filing of
informationPeople v. Maqueda, 3/22/95 (abrogating P. V. Ayson,
175 SCRA 216[1989] )
Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB)
was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the
occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims
identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and
Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the
two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that

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Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken

to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to
SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights
before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the
Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda
filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the
robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the
Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.
Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was
in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he
was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already
facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain
silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness
and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had
already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have
to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to
such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a
warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable.
The exerciseof the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not
confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extrajudicial admission is inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and
Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon
only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of theadmission because such testimony was objected to as
hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with
Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission(Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore
admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been
made by the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.

Includes formal or non formal investigations- P. V.

BRAVO, 11/22/99
RULING: The mantle of protection under this constitutional
provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into
custody for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody The
exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory
procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and

psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime

under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused
from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but
to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit
although untrue. Law enforcement agencies are required to
effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation
and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right. Courts are not
allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and
custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody
which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the
competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission
made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered
by the exclusionary rule.
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the
form of a written extra-judicial confession; the admission was
allegedly made to the arresting officer during an informal talk at
the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and
killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that the
appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of
January 12, 1994, the probable time of the commission of the crime
and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to
remember what subsequently happened. The arresting policeman
admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged
admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the
company of the victim at the time the crime was probably
committed.The exclusionary rule applies.

Confession was made outside of custodial investigation,

but accused was already charged in court and in the
process of critical pre-trial stage, the right applies. People
vs. ESPANOLA, 271 SCRA 689 (1997)-waley sa net
Before the Bantay Bayan or Barangay Tanods. People v.
LAUGA, GR 186228, 3/15/10

RULING: In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the

occasion to mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group
of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary
of the x x x PNP.
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to
Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987,
as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be
organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal
Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of
the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a BarangayTanod; and (5) at
least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or
neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization
Representative well-known in his community.
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case
of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by MoisesBoy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes

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has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the

entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of
appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.
Includes:
Receipt of Seized property-People v. Morico, 246 SCRA
214; -WALEY
Signature on seized property-People v. Wong Chuen
Ming, 256 SCRA 182; People v. Salazar, 266 SCRA 607;
P vs WONG CHUEN
RULING: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION; VIOLATION THEREOF RENDERS THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED INADMISSIBLE. - At the outset, the Court
holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the
plastic bags containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A
careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed
of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were
under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to
counsel and any statement they might make could be used against
them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of
Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic
bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By
affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime
charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These
signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
(Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore,
inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused
in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.
MARCELO V. SANDIGAN, 302 SCRA 102;
-

BUT in P. V. LINSANGAN, 195 SCRA 784 (1991),

although the accused was not assisted by counsel when
he initialed the P10 bills the police found tucked in his
waist, it was held that the right against self incrimination
or his Miranda rights are not violated, because the
possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime,
the subject of prosecution being his act of selling
marijuana cigarettes. Note: more of search incidental to a
valid arrest.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision dated April 26, 1988, of
the Regional Trial Court , finding theaccused guilty of the crime of
Violation of Section 4 of Article II in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of
Republic Act 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Law), as amended,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000
plus costs.It was established during the trial that in early November,
1987, police operatives of the DrugEnforcement Unit, Police Station
No. 3 of the Western Police District were informed that there
wasrampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo,
Manila. The pusher was described to themas a boy of about 20 years,
5'5" in height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold marijuana to
anybody,regardless of age.In light of these reports, Police Lieutenant
Manuel Caeg and the other members of the unitorganized a "buybust" operation , to effect the arrest of the notorious drug pusher. On
November 13,1987 at 10 o'clock in the morning, before the group left
the office for the area of operation, two (2) ten-peso bills were given to

Pat. Corpuz who had marked them with his initials "T.C." He gave
one of themarked bills to the informer. The said marked bills was
then found tucked in the waist of the accusedafter he was frisked and
arrested by the police for handing over to the informer and police
poseur-buyerten
(10)
cigarette
sticks
of
hand
rolled
marijuana.Linsangan denied the charge. He alleged that at around
10:30 in the morning of November 13,1987, he was in the vendor's
stand of his neighbor Emeterio Balboa, alias Rey Galunggong, on
DinalupihanStreet to buy his breakfast, for he had just awakened. He
lived with his widowed mother, Erlinda, on theground floor of a twostorey house on the alley at 1284 Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila.
The upperfloor was occupied by his mother's brother, Geosito Diaz,
who is engaged in the second-hand tirebusiness. Although once in a
while, his uncle helped them financially, he earned his living by
driving atricycle on a 5 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift. He admitted that he
had witnessed some men in Dinalupihanengaged in drinking sprees
and smoking marijuana.ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court erred
in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial
theP10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to
remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial
investigation.HELD:The appeal has no merit. The appellant was not
denied due process during the custodial investigation.Although he
was not assisted by counsel when he initialled the P10-bills that the
police found tucked inhis waist, his right against self-incrimination
was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did
notconstitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of
selling marijuana cigarettes. Hisconviction was not based on the
presence of his initials on the P10 bills, but on the fact that the trial
courtbelieved the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him
while he was actually engaged in sellingmarijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to
theircategorical declarations than to the appellant's denials. That is as
it should be for as law enforcers, theyare presumed to have
performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of
apprehendingpersons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult
enough without legal and procedural technicalities tomake it doubly
so.
THERE IS NO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
1.

Spontaneous statements-the right does not exist if the

accused gives a spontaneous statement before he could be
advised. Aballe v. People, 183 SCRA 196 (1990); or
confessed before taken in custody-People v. Evangelista,
256 SCRA 611; People v. Tobias, 266 SCRA 229; P. V.
BARRIENTOS, 285 SCRA 221

ABALLE
RULING: Whereupon, an information was filed against Aballe,
charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. 8 At his arraignment on April 13, 1981, he
pleaded not guilty. 9 He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession
on the ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the
absence of counsel.
Aballe's repudiation of his earlier confession notwithstanding, the
trial court convicted the accused of the crime of homicide. 10
In this petition for review on certiorari, Aballe contends that the trial
court erred in giving full weight to his extrajudicial confession taken
during custodial investigation and in imposing a penalty which was
not in accordance with law.
The argument that Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been
disregarded by the lower court for having been obtained in violation
of Aballe's constitutional rights is well taken. Throughout the
custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were
almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it
shown that the youthful offender was ever represented by counsel.

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Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement 11was admittedly

made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and the
waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel as
mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the
lower court. 12
Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife 13 recovered from
Aballe after his capture and after the police had started to question
him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is
but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must
consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt, 14 however, is
admissible, being in the nature of an evidence in plain view 15 which
an arresting officer may take and introduce in evidence. The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found
upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with
the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used
in evidence in the trial of the cause . . ." 16

2. Investigations by: private parties

-confession to newsman. People v. Andan, 269
SCRA 95; or admission to the employer- People v. Ayson,
supra; or to a public officer who is not a law enforcer.
Office of Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271 SCRA
316
PEOPLE V ANDAN
Facts: Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape
with homicide. The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in
Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2
nd
year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.On said day, victim left
her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way,
appellant invited her to hishouse. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed
to do so as the oldwoman was her distant relative. She did not know
that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen,brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time,
Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to
theirbackyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to
transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved,
promptingappellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No
longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At
11amher body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of
"traumatic injuries."Marianne's gruesome death drew public
attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an
investigationteam. The investigation pointed to the appellant.
Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On
February 24, apolice team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in
his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police
headquarterswhere he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted himwith evidence, appellant relented but implicated two
of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon
werelikewise brought there by the police. The following day a
physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that
appellanthas multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.By that
time, people and media representatives were already at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of theinvestigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and
whispered that they talk privately.The mayor led him to the office of
the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell youthe truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public

and media representativeswitness the confession. Since no lawyer

was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. In the presenceof the mayor, the police, representatives of
the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his
guilt. He asked forforgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He
also said thatthe devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his
confession,appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to
help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by
themedia nationwide.On arraignment, however, appellant entered a
plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his
parent'shouse for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and
son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the
nextday. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police
on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and
killedMarianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.The
trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He
was found guilty of the crime charged in theInformation (Rape with
Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in
violation of the constitution, and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence against him.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible.It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the
local police and may arguably be deemed a lawenforcement officer
for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confessionto the mayor was not
made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor
did not question appellant at all. Nopolice authority ordered
appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily soughtthe mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When appellanttalked with the mayor as a confidant
and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to
him did not violate hisconstitutional rights. Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to aspontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellantorally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts
orconfessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead theaccused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant'sconfession to the
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.Appellant's
confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response toquestions by news reporters,
not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that
statements spontaneouslymade by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence.The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan
guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide
PEOPLE V AYSON (NOTE: already abrogated by Maqueda case )
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines, assigned at itsBaguio City station. It was alleged that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos

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stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of

the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling
said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not
ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution
contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those
stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed
by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible
as evidence the admission and statement of accused.
Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against
self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what
is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at
bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal,
or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right
can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or
should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona:
the rights of the accused include:
1)
2)
3)

he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be

informed of such right.
nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial,
no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
3. Police Line-up- not part of any custodial inquest. People v.
Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471
4. Signing a booking sheet-People v. Morico, 246 SCRA 214
5.

Removal of personal items-People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA

615, including hair evidence from the accused-P. V.
RONDERO, 12/9/9

RULING: Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a
recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of
custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is
inherently coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in
the case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals Compulsion does not necessarily

connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional

statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational
judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. Needless to say, the
above-mentioned provisions are an affirmation that coercion can be
mental as well as physical and that the blood of the accused is not the only
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.
It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions,
what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the
mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against
himConsequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under
duress
Preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, not
part of custodial investigation. Ladiana v. People GR 144293,
12/4/02
RULING: Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly
on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavi submitted by petitioner
during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was
present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his
argument, he cites the Constitution,SEC. 12 It is well-settled that the
foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the
land apply only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained
during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the
constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or incustody interrogation of accused persons. Custodial interrogation is
the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements
were made during the preliminary investigation, not during the
custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to
competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary
investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before
the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial
investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a
defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. It explained as follows:His [accused]
interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have
been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or
the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in
a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutors
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
custodial interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent
sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now

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Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason
that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the
admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not
violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed
facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody
or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor -unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These
include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to
have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3)
the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination
by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to
answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some
crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans
characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as
follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an
admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving
an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement
by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against
him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an
admission, not a confession.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

In People v. Mahinay, GR No. 122485, 2/1/99,

FACTS: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12
year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending that
his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an
extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his
constitutional rights on custodial interrogation. Mahinay was
apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The
police officers allegedly brought him to a big house
somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police
officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was
the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed
an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted

by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the

9.

That the person arrested must be INFORMED that he

may indicate in any manner at any time or state of the process
that he does not wish to be questioned with the warning that
once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate
him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation
has begun;

10.

the person arrested must be INFORMED that his initial

waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of rights does not bar him from invoking it at any other time
during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some information or
statements;

11.

He must be INFORMED that any statement or evidence,

as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

extra-judicial confession. Is there violation of right?

RULING: None. The extrajudicial confession taken from the

accused was within the requirement of Miranda rights and
within lawful means where his confession was taken in the
presence of his lawyer. The Court, as guardian of the rights of
the people, laid down the PROCEDURE, GUIDELINES AND
DUTIES

which

the

arresting,

detaining,

inviting

or

investigating officer or his companions must observe at the

time of making the arrest and again at and during the
custodial investigation or interrogation in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and RA 7438 (1992), to wit:
(MEMORIZE)

1.

The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial

investigation MUST INFORMED in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;

2.

He must be WARNED that he has the right to remain

silent and that any statement he makes may be suedused as
evidence against him.

3.

He must be INFORMED that he has the right to be

assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent
and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4.

He must be INFORMED that if he has no lawyer or

cannot afford the services of lawyer, one will be provided for
him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of
the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5.

That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he

must be INFORMED that no custodial investigation in any form
shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after
a valid waiver has been made;

6.

The person arrested must be INFORMED that, at any

time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means. Telephone, radio, letter or messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of
his immediate family; or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by
his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-governmental organization. It
shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;

7.

He must BE INFORMED that he has the right to waive

any of aid rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

8.

In addition, if the person arrested waives his right a

lawyer, he must be INFORMED that it must be done in writing
AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and
chooses to speak;

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(The ruling summarizes the safeguards provided under P. V. Duero,

104 SCRA 379, citing Miranda); People v. Deniega, 12/29/95 citing
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,-RIGHT TO BAIL NAMAN ANG TOPIC NA
NAHANAP KO DITO, KC NMN WALANG DATE WALANG GR O
SCRA # HAHA reiterated in 1985 case of People vs. Galit and
requirements under RA 7438)
PEOPLE VS DENIEGA:
Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide.
The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial
confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a
counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the
prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of
the crime and the basis of the lower courts conviction to the accused
was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the
appellants based on their extrajudicial confession.
Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution
and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible
must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession
must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the
accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the
constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were
not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs
Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of
the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given. Thus, because of these defects in observing the
proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial
investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.
PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985
FACTS:The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the
occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,
something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to

torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The
prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure
the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will
had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of
his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should
be several short and clear questions and every right explained in
simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was
not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend.
In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks
after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to
visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one.
At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
The modifiers competent and independentwere terms
absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their
addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the
primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the
uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by
according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing
individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices
given to him by a competent and independent lawyer."
There is denial of the right to counsel if the accused was not asked
whether he wishes and can afford to retain his own lawyer. He was
not made aware that he could choose his own lawyer. Furthermore,
the PAO lawyer who assisted him did not dutifully and faithfully
assisted the accused during the course of the investigation.

The

standards of competent counsel were not met. People vs. Alberto,

173 SCAD 472, Aug. 22, 2002

A.

"TO BE INFORMED"
SCOPE:
1. the right includes the right of the accused
to be informed of his right to counsel, but also that he has
the right to have counsel of his own choice and must be
afforded the opportunity to exercise it. People v.
Binamira, 277 SCRA 232.
the accused was not told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice. He
was not asked if he had any such counsel in mind, and if
he could not afford to hire the services of such lawyer,

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and if he could not, if he would agree to be assisted by the

lawyer provided for him. He was not informed that he
could waive his right and that the waiver must be in
writing and n the presence of his counsel.
People v. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541
Facts: Dr. Bayquen and his family, while cruising Malvar St. Baguio
City, were shot. 2 of them died. Accused Quiao, an alleged former
military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities,
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal
Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He
implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a
fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During
the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City
Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and
was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano.
Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement
at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although
he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private
prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin,
and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in
English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands.
The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push
through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him,
since conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements
admissible as evidence.
Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while
an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the
issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes
admissions, not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the
appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him
and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the
transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed
by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the
stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a
farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its
contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully
and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not explicitly
told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his
choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if
so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not,
whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him.
He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to
remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to
remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of
such right appears in the transcript and no other independent
evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City
fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that
Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not
independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.

2. accused was not informed that if he could

not afford the services of a lawyer, he would be provided
with one. People v. dela Cruz, 9/17/97

3. the right is available even if the accused is

in a foreign land, People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432
4. the burden of proof as to whether the right
has been given is on the prosecution . People v. Camat,
257 SCRA 52
People vs. Camat
FACTS:Amboy Camat and Willie Del Rosario were accused of roberry
with homicide on a certain Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver.
Camat divested Penalver of a black leather clutch bag containing an
electric tester valued at P150 and stabbed the victim. Del Rosario on
the other hand stabbed Sinoy which caused the latters death,
Penalver survived with serious injuries.
Both accused admitted to Pat. Odeo Carino their involvement in the
crime upon invitation in the police station.
At their arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. After due hearing, the lower court rendered judgment 2 on
June 19, 1987 finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
Appellants assigning in their brief a single error submitting that the
court gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
In support of their lone assignment of error, appellants insist that the
trial court cannot rely on the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Camat as a basis for their conviction because such confession was
obtained during custodial investigation in violation of their
constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in relying on the extrajudicial confessions
of the accused as basis for their conviction because such confession
was obtained in custodial investigation in violation of their
constitutional rights.
HELD: Yes. Absent any showing that appellants were duly advised of
the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of rights, their confessions
made before Pat. Carino are inadmissible against them, and cannot be
used in support of their conviction. However, SC still affirmed their
guilt.
REMEDIAL
LAW;
EVIDENCE;
PRESUMPTIONS;
PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OFFICIAL ACTS
DOES NOT APPLY TO IN CUSTODY INVESTIGATION. - As we
have heretofore held, it is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during the trial that, prior to questioning, the confessant was
warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the
presumption of regularity of official acts does not apply during incustody investigation. Trial courts should further keep in mind that
even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
INSUFFICIENT WARNING:
inadequate explanation-[P. V. Ramos, 39 SCRA 236] (Grade six grad)
in a language known to him- [P. V. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2] (visayan;
answers in monosyllabic opo

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1. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Procedure that must be followed by

the officer during custodial interrogations.In the language of Chief Justice Warren: Our holding will be spelled
out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated,
it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercuse it, the
following measures are quired. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.
2. Constitutional Law; Evidence; There is no bar to waiver of ones
right to counsel if made intelligently and voluntarily, with full
understanding of its consequences. No such waiver was made in this
case.Testated by such a clear unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver
falls far short. It is ed by a certain Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the
Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na
ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong
ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw may
karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka
rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring
mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng
ayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba? Then came the
monosyllabic answer Opo. That was all. Even the very annex
submitted to the petition merely stated that there were signatures of
private respondent Yupo, the aforesaid Roca, and a certain Roberto
Sales. The day when it was subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before
Municipal Judge Mariano Mendieta, was not even specified. Again,
there was a statement that it was a certified true copy by a certain
Teresita M. Tecson, whose connection with the case or with the court
was not even shown. There was no signature. There were only
illegible letters, perhaps indicating that they were the initials. The
doubt that must have occurred to the police officials of Meycauayan is
evident from their submitting a one-page statement, presumably
signed by the same people and certified by the same Tecson, reading
in full as follows: [Sa sinumang Kinauukulan]: lpinabasa, ipinaalam
at naintindihan ni [Paquito Yupo y Gonzales], 19 na taong gulang,
binata tubo sa San Policarpio, Eastern Samar ang nasa ibaba nito:
[Ikaw ay sinisiyasat ngayon dahilan sa paglabag sa batas. Karapatan
mo ang huwag magsalita. Anumang iyong sasabihin ay maaaring
gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo. At ikaw ay may karapatan sa tulong
at sa pagharap ng abogado na iyong napipisil]. Sa kabila ng
kabatiran ni [Paquito Yupo] ng mga nilalaman ng nasa itaas nito, siya
ay nagbigay pa rin ng salaysay. Could it be their way of trying to
impress on a court the fact that there was an intelligent waiver? If so,
it did not cure the fatal infirmity. Rather the contrary.

3. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Care must be exercised in

propounding questions in Tagalog to a Visayan during custodial
interrogations.In this case, the private respondent, a Visayan, was asked a kilometric
question in Tagalog, and the interrogator was satisfied with the
monosyllabic Opo. Also, the failure to submit to this Court the
alleged signature of private respondent may be indicative of the fear
on the part of counsel for petitioner that the absence of education of
the nineteen year old private respondent would be apparent. At any
rate, it cannot be denied that to predicate a waiver under the
circumstances disclosed would be to nullify the plain command of
the constitutional provision requiring that a confession to be
admissible must be given only if the accused were informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel; otherwise, it is inadmissible in
character. The lower court, therefore, acted in accordance with the
plain dictate of the Constitution. To quote from that eminent civil
libertarian, Justice Douglas: Formulas of respect for constitutional
safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them.
They may not become a cloak for inquisitorial practices and make an
empty form of [constitutional rights].
4. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Merely informing the accused of his
constitutional rights and then taking his statements do not suffice to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.On my part, I agree with the Chief Justice that merely informing a
person under custody of his constitutional rights under the
circumstances hereinunder to be stated and thereafter taking down
his statement does not sufficiently safeguard those rights.
5. Constitutional Law; Evidence; The accused must not only be told
of his rights, he must be asked whether or not he wants to exercise
them.It is thus emphasized that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense does not only have the right to remain
silent and to have assistance of counsel, he must in addition be
informed of such rights. And it is my considered view that it is not
enough that he be told he has those rights. To give meaning and
substance to the manifest spirit and intent of the constitutional
mandate, he must perforce be asked pointedly and unequivocally
whether or not he wants to exercise them. Not every ordinary person,
particularly the unschooled or one who is addressed in a language or
dialect he does not sufficiently command, would readily comprehend
to the extent intended by the fundamental law of the land the exact
import of the bare information that he owns a right. To dispel any
doubt, which is what I am certain the Constitution contemplates, and
to best serve the ends of justice as it is understood by the common
man, it is imperative that the investigator should go one step further,
as I have just indicated. What would be lost doing it anyway? I may
have a right and may be reminded thereof, but if in my inadequate
circumstances of education and means of intelligent communication,
and because of the obvious anxiety and apprehension usually felt by
one under questioning about his possible participation in a criminal
offense, I am not made clearly aware when and how I can avail of
such right, of what use would such right reminder be to me? In my
humble opinion, it behooves every police investigator who conducts a
custodial investigation to possess definite knowledge of the
constitutional rights of all persons being subjected by him to any
inquiry relative to the commission of any offense, and what is more,
he must see to it that the person being interrogated by him is not only
informed of such rights but that he is specifically asked in the
language the latter adequately understands whether or not he desires
to exercise them, and only when such person definitely, categorically
and freely answers affirmatively may the investigator proceed to
conduct his inquiry and take the statement of the person detained,
with the implicit understanding yet that even such initial waiver is
not definitely final, for the person under investigation may still invoke
at his option the same rights at any further stage of the interrogation.

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6. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Criminal Procedure; Before any

confession is marked, the court must hold a separate solely to satisfy
itself that due regard was accorded the accused relative to the
exercise of his rights.Accordingly, it is my view that before any confession is ever marked
or identified, upon timely objection of the accused, the court must
first hold a separate proceeding solely for the purpose of satisfying
itself that the same was taken with due regard to the constitutional
rights of the accused discussed earlier in this opinion. The advantage
of this procedure is that the court may not even see the incriminatory
parts, if any, of the purported confession until after it is satisfied of
the legality of its taking, hence any possible danger of the mind of the
court being poisoned factually by illegal evidence, human as the
judge is, is thereby eliminated, should the confession be denied entry
into the records. But, of course, what has just been stated does not
mean that failure to timely object at the stage just indicated already
precludes the accused from questioning the legality of the confession
in any other later stage of the proceeding.
7. Constitutional Law; Evidence; Respondent judge made a
premature ruling on the admissibility of the confession which was
only being worked in evidence.Respondent Judge made a premature ruling on the admissibility of
the confession. It was merely being identified. It was not yet being
formally offered in evidence. The time to object to the admissibility of
the confession. Exhibit C, is when it is formally offered in evidence
and that is when the prosecution is at the stage of closing its case.
That is the well-known practice.
8. Constitutional Law; Evidence; The defense may yet rebut the
testimony of the police that the confession was taken properly.
Moreover, the police interrogation endeavored to adhere strictly to
the guidelines laid down in the Miranda case.Corporal Roca was placed on the witness stand to testify on the
voluntariness of the confession and to show that a sufficient notice
was given to the accused as to his constitutional rights and that he
waived those rights voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Roca
would declare that the requisites of Section 20, Article VI of the
Constitution were complied with or that the confession is admissible
in evidence. His testimony should be allowed. To reject his testimony
outright would prevent the prosecution from showing that the
confession is admissible. The accused may rebut Rocas testimony. On
the basis of Rocas testimony and the testimony of the accused, when
the confession is offered in evidence, that it is inadmissible because
there was no compliance with the constitutional provisions. I believe
that Roca is taking the confession and waiver of Yupo endeavored to
adhere strictly to the guidelines laid down in the Miranda case.

long question followed by monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the

constitutional requirements- [P. V. Galit, 135 SCRA 465]
FACTS:
1. Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the
occasion of a robbery.
2. He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days.
3. He consistently maintained his innocence.
4. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
5. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him
physically.
6. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of
human waste.
7. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to
admit.
8. He then signed the confession they prepared.
9. The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and

D. "RIGHT TO BE SILENT"

sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death.

10. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the confession is admissible in evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants

while under police custody, in the face of statements of Melecio Cudillan
implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be
considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.

HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases,

meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against
him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. 5 It has
also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be
taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his
right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v.
Arizona 7 held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an
individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in
the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to
Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a
statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in
custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he
acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his
constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to
pursue and the best way out of his predicament. 8 Other courts have held
that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the
evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply
even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the
circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he
chooses. 9

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there
is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his
arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after
he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute grave violations of his rights.

We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under
custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a
crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession
of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would
appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against selfincrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against
self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for
liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of
aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear
that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment
and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life."

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to
law.

meaningful transmission of information- [.P V.

Camalog, 1/31/89]
The second error submitted by the appellants is that the extra-judicial
confessions offered in evidence were obtained in violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the fundamental law in force and effect
at the time of their arrest. Even assuming that the accused were informed of
their right to remain silent, there is no showing that the appellants fully
understood the same.

P. V. Arciaga, 99 SCRA 1]
No inference of guilt may also be drawn against an accused upon his failure
to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 21 Most
importantly, both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, an accused has
the right to remain silent. 22 Such silence cannot be used as presumption of
his guilt. Only recently, in People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282, this Court
held, citing People vs. Esmundo, 27 Phil. 554, that an accused has the right
to decline to testify at the trial without having any inference of guilt drawn
from his failure to go on the witness stand. We likewise held therein that a
verdict of conviction on the basis solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal of
the accused to take the witness stand to deny the charges against him is a
judicial heresy which cannot be countenanced. Moreover, the foregoing is in
consonance with the rule that an accused should be convicted on the strength
of the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the weakness of his
defense.

The assertion made by the police investigators to the effect that the appellants
were informed of their fundamental rights will not overthrow the fact that
appellants were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation
even if they had waived the right. The fact that the appellants were never
assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is confirmed in the
testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero.
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the Tanza, Cavite police
investigators informed the accused-appellants Ferdinand Camalog and
Novelito Sotto about their constitutional rights in a rather sloopy manner.
The type of questions and answers recited in their extra-judicial confessions
is Identical to that of their co-accused Armando de los Reyes. There was not
even a semblance of conformity with the fundamental law.

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no inference of guilt on silence of the accused.

[P. V. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109;

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With more reason, the accused in this case cannot be faulted merely for
failure to give any statement before trial. Besides, the rules do not make it a
condition precedent for a witness to give his affidavit before g the witness
stand. The procedure is simply adopt to safeguard the parties from
recalcitrant witnesses.

the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the
holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. Besides, there is a ruling
that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid
Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for
reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).
The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule
that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom
when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The
court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every
person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution
and defense.

during the trial, it is counsel not the court who should

apprise the accused.[P. V. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624]

FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso
Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to
the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. The accused, Jose
Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him.
Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the
toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives.
They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The
officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report
submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated
that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado
when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to
Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck Two days after
the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and
Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted
that they assaulted Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary at
the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the
murder of Saminado.
In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises
the following issues:

"RIGHT TO COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,

PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE."
A. Available at the START of Custodial Investigation. Gamboa v.
Cruz, 162 SCRA 642,en banc);
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a
line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a
complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the
line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said
motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to
remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and
when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even
an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus
and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the
crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they
revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous
statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and
at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on
the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right
to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was
confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in
court. Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to
rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona
regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain
silent during custodial interrogation. It should be stressed that, even without
taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty
and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a
counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead
opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

INCLUDES an instance where both accused went voluntarily to the

police station and the investigating officer started asking questions to
elicit information from them. P. v. ORDONO, GR 132154, 6/29/00
FACTS: The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide attended with conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial
confession. An interview with a radio announcer was also done where the 2
accused accepted responsibility for the crime. They now assail their
conviction as their confession was attended by infirmities i.e. mainly the
lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an

extrajudicial confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he
has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right
for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand,
then he waives that right

HELD: The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession

inadmissible. The presence of the mayor, municipal judge and the family of
the accused during the confession did not cure the defect. However,
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news reporter on televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be
held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation,

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from

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through a jalousie window[40] while Capt. Flores testified that the persons in
the police line-up were in full view of Corazon. [41] This and other
contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses weaken the
reliability of the out-of-court identification of appellant. We are now
constrained to agree that the in-court identification of the appellant made by
private complainant and her sister could have been tainted by the out-ofcourt (police line-up) procedure, even if we grant, arguendo, that such lineup did take place. Jk

and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violate accuseds

constitutional rights.
police line-up not part of custodial in-quest (Ibid) ; but in P. V.
Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 2nd div.),
Facts: Usman Hassan, 15 yrs. Old of Samal Tribe in Zambo City was
convicted of murder of Pichel. Pichel was stabbed to death at fruit paradise
while sitting at his red honda motorcycle, waiting for friend Jose Samson
who was buying fruits.

Burden of Proofthe prosecution should present proof of

competence, independence of, a lawyer of choice of the accused.
People v. Santos, 12/22/97

Issue: WON conviction is valid

Held: No. Conviction reversed. Acquitted. The Medico Legal found two stab
wounds from front but the Samson claimed that Pichel was stabbed once
from behind. Procedure followed was also improper. The accused was
presented to the witness alone and in confrontation, not police line up. He
was also denied right to counsel, particularly when identification took place
this qualifies for uncounselled confession. The witness was also questioned
2 days after incident and sworn 4 days after. The fruit vendor as well as the
companion of the accused was not investigated. In fact, they did not pursue
other suspect. Also, the knife was not tested. Further notable are the facts
that the age of the accused was observed without medical basis, that the
accused did not run away and that he had no motive, which, in People vs.
Verzo was considered important when there is doubt in the identity of
culprit and reiterated in People vs. Pervelo which stated that identification is
tenuous.

INDEPENDENT:
provided by the investigator and agreed to by the
accused People v. Calvo, 269 SCA 676
Having been cleared of any irregularity, we therefore uphold the
admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is
sufficient basis for his conviction. A confession, to recall, constitutes
evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. This presumption of
spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. [9]
Even if the extrajudicial confession be ignored by assuming, for argument's
sake, that the alleged "irregularities" indeed marred its execution, there is
nonetheless other evidence particularly the identification made by
prosecution witnesses Beatriz Bido and Lucila Gorospe upon which
appellant's guilt was duly established. Witness Bido identified appellant as
one of the two (2) men (the other was Bobby Gaspar) who went out of
deceased Ignacia Mauleon's room and who angrily told her not to shout
otherwise she will be shot. She further testified that after appellant and
Bobby Gaspar left the room and went downstairs already carrying a bag, she
went inside the room which was already in disarray and saw the bloodied,
lifeless body of Ignacia Mauleon sprawled on the floor. [10] Witness Gorospe
corroborated Bido's identification of appellant when she testified that from
her vantage point (in front of her own store which is just seven (7) meters
away from deceased Ignacia Mauleon's bakery), she identified appellant who
was carrying a shoulder bag, as one of the two (2) men coming down from
the stairs of deceased Mauleon's bakery and who thereafter ran away at a
very fast pace, with one Henry Jordas giving chase. Henry Jordas, according
to Gorospe, nonetheless gave up his pursuit when appellant pointed a gun at
him. Witness Gorospe also stated that she was familiar with appellant,
having seen the latter in front of deceased Mauleon's bakery on three (3)
previous occasions.[

the confrontation at the funeral parlor was tainted police line-up

wherein the right should have been available OR the identification of
the uncounselled accused in a police line-up AFTER the START of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible. Peoplev s. Escordial, 373
SCRA 585
It may be made in a "show-up" (where the accused is brought face to face
with the witness for identification), or in a "police line-up" (where the
suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose). During custodial investigation, these types of identification have
been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused,
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." Thus, any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up/show-up
after the start of custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence against
him. (PEOPLE vs. ESCORDIAL 2002
People vs. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660Totality of Circumstances Test in police line-up

People v. Hernandez, 12/4/97

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from
any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as
news reporters when they interviewed appellant. [44] They were not acting
under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check
appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant
them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. [45] In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on
separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his
confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by
the news reporters.

The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as
compliance with constitutional requirements of due process in regard to outof-court identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent the
contamination of the integrity of in-court identifications better. In this case,
the carnapping happened at 8:30 p.m., and the evidence does not disclose
whether the locus criminis was sufficiently lighted for purposes of
identification. In fact, while Corazon testified that the jeep was not lighted at
the time of the incident, [37] her sister claimed that the jeep was in fact lighted,
which enabled her to recognize appellant herein as one of the carnappers.
[38]
Although Corazon reported the incident to the Porac Police the following
day, she did not furnish said policemen a description of the perpetrators of
the crime.[39] Hence, the authenticity as well as accuracy of the present and
future descriptions of the suspected assailants has been placed in doubt for
lack of basis. Furthermore, the crime occurred some two (2) years and (8)
months prior to the arrest of appellant. Because of this lapse of time, certain
physical changes might have occurred in his physical appearance and other
attributes already. Corazon also claimed that she viewed the police line-up

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We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered
by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual.[46] It governs the relationship between the individual and

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the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
[47]
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies

competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
2. Political Law; Rights of Accused; Waiver of the right to remain silent,
and to counsel and to be informed of such rights, must not only be
voluntary,but must also be made knowingly and intelligentlyMoreover, the answer of the accused (Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya
hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado) is a palpable indication that she did not
fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The rule espoused in People
v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, [1986], bears repeating: x x x Like other
constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the
right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of
the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and
intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is
being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been
adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he
answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.

P. V. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393, deemed agreed when no

objection is interposed.
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred
lawyer is unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the formers appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer. [11] Thus, once the prosecution has
shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on preinterrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A
confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was
given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency.[12]

3. Political Law; Rights of Accused; Presumption of Innocence;

The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, i.e. that degree of proof which produces moral
certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the appellants culpability.Considering the paucity of the States evidence, we are not satisfied that the
constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to the accused-appellant
has been overthrown. The constitutional presumption of innocence can be
overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is the degree of proof
that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the appellants culpability. (People v. Dramayo, 42
SCRA 59 [1971]) The prosecution failed to produce such proof. This Court,
therefore, has no other recourse but to acquit the accused-appellant.

Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made
under duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the
same. In People v. Villanueva, this Court declared that voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its language such that if upon its face the
confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could possibly be
supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaniety and coherence which
psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary. [13] A scrutiny of
the sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the
commission of the offense charged which the accused himself could only have
known.

Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a
Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9,
14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when
they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of
counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,'
even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically." 13

The Court, therefore, finds that appellants constitutional right to counsel

was not breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.

With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is stated

therein that this Office had just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO
VELAR NAVARRO of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Department of
Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you wining to accept the legal assistance
of Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case, 14 the same nonetheless call for a
similar rejection. There is nothing there that would show that Atty. Navarro
was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the appellant
Romulo Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder)

PROVIDED BUT NOT INDEPENDENT:

P. V. Matos-Viduya, 9/11/90- "nandiyan na po si fiscal

kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado".

1. Political Law; Rights of Accused; A fiscal or prosecutor cannot act as

defense counsel even during custodial investigation.-

Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and
is fully applicable to this case. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or
Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the same time. In his
testimony, Assistant Fiscal Mendoza stated that his main functions as
Assistant Fiscal in the City of Manila are to prosecute cases and to render
duties as an inquest fiscal. Whether or not the subsequent trial of a
confessants case will be assigned to him as prosecutor is immaterial. He
cannot pretend to act as defense counsel. An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for
that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during
custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory
the protection given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the
Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of

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P. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 (NBI provided counsel, not valid)

P. V. Januario,et.al., 2/7/97-lawyer an NBI applicant;

In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the
conviction of appellants were their own extrajudicial confessions
which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with
the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the
NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be considered independent
because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police
agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later, he in fact was
admitted into its work force. For this violation of their constitutional
right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After the
exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible
evidence remains in the Courts records to overturn another

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constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime

until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustins
defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the
Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer,
Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for
his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from
only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not
push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since
conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.

P. V. Alegria, 9/28/90,

The Court is familiar with such statements and has consistently found them
invalid. They do not persuade that the accused was fully and fairly informed
of his rights in the sense that they were each painstakingly explained to him
and he was apprised of the effects of their waiver or forfeiture. Such
statements are especially unacceptable where they are made by persons of
limited education, and more so if no counsel was at hand to assist and advise
him.

Issue: Whether or Not

admissible as evidence.

In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly literate, not even having finished Grade
1, and, like Buenaflor and Alegria, was not represented by counsel. While
there was a lawyer who was allegedly called to be present at their
interrogation, he did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely
to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. There is nothing in the
record to show that the lawyer made a single manifestation or representation
on behalf of the person he was supposed to protect against any possible abuse
of the investigators.

Facts: Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony;

Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a
family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's
residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along
Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the
right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man
approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and
fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman
immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away. All those in
the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.
Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store
where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her mother brought her
father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought
to the Hospital for treatment. Accused Quiao, an alleged former military
agent who had been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during the
investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office
that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to
kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain
"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
investigation as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed,
with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal
Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was

OF

RIGHTS.

N E T.

statements

P. Sahagun, 274 SCRA 208- the assisting lawyer is following up a case

with NBI

P. V. Agustin, 1/25/95 (foisted upon him, not valid)

BILL

extrajudicial

Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a

confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an
admission is a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The
rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in
twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for
reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which
consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court
cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected
that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to
read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his
rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was
not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not
explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of
his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so,
whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he
would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to
counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his
counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be
investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript
and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In
short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the
City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that
Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not
independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.

The right to the assistance of counsel is one of the basic rights of the person
under investigation for the commission of an offense. Lawyers are supposed
to be well-versed in the intricacies of criminal proceedings with which the
ordinary layman, not to mention the uneducated suspect, is not familiar.
Without a lawyer's advice and active representation, the suspect is likely to
be ensnared into making damaging admissions the legal significance of
which he may not understand or realize. The lawyer is required to be there to
prevent the suspect from making rash statements that may later be used
against him at the trial. The lawyer is required to be there to see to it that the
investigation is conducted in accordance with the Constitution, without the
employment of violence, force, intimidation or threat, or any other means
vitiating the free will. So vital is this right that where the suspect cannot
afford the services of counsel, he will be provided with one for free. Any
confession obtained from a suspect in the absence of counsel and without his
assistance shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The only exception
is where the right to counsel is categorically waived and such waiver is made
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

14 |

accused-appellants

GLAD.

We rule that the counseling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not
sufficiently protective of Villareal's rights as an accused as contemplated by
the Constitution. To start with, Atty. Dizon is not really known to
Villareal. He was requested to act as counsel because he happened to be at
the NBI following-up a client's case. Given that circumstance, it cannot be
expected that Atty. Dizon would give an advice to Villareal that would
offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus, it appears that Atty.
Dizon did no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional rights. He
made no independent effort to determine whether Villareal's confessions
were free and voluntary. He swallowed hook, line and sinker, Villareal's
story that he was ready to confess oblivious of the fact that they were then
inside the NBI office and before an agent or in an atmosphere hostile to a
crime suspect. He did not inquire from Villareal how he was treated in the
last 24-hours. He did not seek any of Villareal's relatives or friends to find
out if he has any defense which Villareal was not free to disclose due to his
confinement. He did not even assist Villareal when the latter was made to
re-enact the crime at bar.

ABI

case of municipal attorney-People v. Culala, 10/13/99;

his constitutional rights.

47,56)

On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accusedappellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was
assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula,[26] it was held that a Municipal
Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.
[27]
As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It
is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no
better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigations.[28] Consequently, for being violative of the
Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is
inadmissible.

(P. V. Bacamante, 248 SCR

SEC. 2(a) of RA 7438 provides: any person under

custodial investigation shall at ALL TIMES be assisted by
counsel.

The right to counsel is not met if the lawyer was called in

only at the time the accused is about to put his
confession in writing. Hence, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 12(3) of the Constitution, the confession is
inadmissible not only against the confessant, but even
against his co-accused as well. People vs. Delmo, 175
SCAD 873, [Oct. 4, 2002]

EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT

or the Municipal Mayor even if a lawyer-People vs.

Velarde, GR 139333, 7/18/02

In custodial investigation, the right counsel attaches from the moment

the investigation starts. A confession given when the accused was
unprotected cannot be used in court. People v. Lucero, 249 SCRA 425.

A
municipal
mayor
cannot
be
considered
a
competent
and independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial
investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused
with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this
confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of
moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is inevitable.

Facts: Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe,

Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide.
The prosecution:

He cannot be Special Counsel, Public or Private

Prosecutor, Counsel of the Police, or a Municipal
Attorney People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 565

Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun,

blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz
passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry
away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold
Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one
solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO
Z. MADRID. Accused shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver
of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which
resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.

Facts:
The
accused
was
charged of robbery
with
homicide.
During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial
confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2
weeks later that he was provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena,
amunicipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement
admitting the shooting of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process
of custodial investigation.

Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.

Held: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since
the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he
was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel.
Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is
impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused cannot afford to
have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one.
Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel would be
prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty
of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure
to meet the requisites of due process for conductingcustodial investigation.

When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado
Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional
rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta
gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty.
Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was
accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial
statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero.

COMPETENT
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.

People v. COMPIL, 244 SCRA 125, the court said: The belated
arrival of the lawyer before the actual signing of the confession does
not cure the defect, because the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from the accused.

15 |

Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in

Caloocan City.
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while
he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and
blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was blindfolded the whole
night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police
officers.

must be present and be able to advise and assist his

client from the time he answers the first questions asked
by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confession.
The lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and the that the person
under investigation fully understands the nature and
consequence of his extra-judicial confession in relation to

BILL

OF

RIGHTS.

N E T.

GLAD.

ABI

P. V. LABTAN, 12/8/99-counsel failed to explain the legal

consequence of confession to the accused.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was
tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being
investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant.

PREFERABLY OF HIS OWN CHOICE

Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other
accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office
during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr.
Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.

People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450

It does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise,
then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. (PEOPLE vs. BARASINA 1994)

Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He

denied engaging the services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that
Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial interrogation.
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient
evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as
principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

WAIVERPrior to 1987 Constitution-Morales v. Enrile, supra (obiter) ;

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accusedappellant.

Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail

In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor
vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion
punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without
any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among
them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy
and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group
of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were
arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.

Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial

confession.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission
of a crime should be provided with counsel. The Court have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility against the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.

The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of
appellant. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from
appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. More
so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled
confession.

HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But

because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with
respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and
offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the natural consequence is that
the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the
suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested
is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are
filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof
or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.
Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so
does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial
those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the States
very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there
is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the
filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes
protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in
character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this
case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang
Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.

Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty.
Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is
hereby reversed.
P. V. Paule, 261 SCRA 649
It cannot be gainsaid that Lt. Esteban was not in a position to give relevant
and reliable information on whether Atty. Dela Cruz provided appellant
effective and vigilant counsel in the course of appellant's custodial
investigation. He only overhead snatches of conversation between Atty. Dela
Cruz and appellant. He admitted he was ". . . going out of my office for
personal necessity" in the course of appellant's custodial interrogation.
Thus, the records do not show whether Atty. Dela Cruz effectively counseled
appellant during the crucial aspects of his custodial interrogation. During
these times, Atty. Dela Cruz could have been out of sight and out of hearing
distance. Given the circumstances of the case, Atty. Dela Cruz was the best
witness to establish the critical fact that he gave effective and vigilant
counsel to the appellant. Unfortunately, the prosecution did not present him
for reasons difficult to divine. By this lapse, he prosecution failed to discharge
the state's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that
appellant enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially
admitted his guilt to the police authorities. Consequently, the extrajudicial
confession of appellant cannot be given any probative value.

16 |

BILL

OF

RIGHTS.

N E T.

GLAD.

P v. Galit, supra (lis mota)- PRIOR CASE ; R

REQUIREMENT OF WAIVER APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY-from
APRIL 26, 1983, when MORALES case was promulgated. (FILOTEO
vs. SANDIGAN, 263 SCRA 222

ABI

The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel and to

remain silent is not to be given any legal effect was initially a judge-made
one and was first announced on April 26, 1983 in Morlaes vs

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it

accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court
simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It
did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him,
how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically
examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts
trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.

Enrile and reiterated on March 20, 1985, in P V Galit. While this doctrine
eventually becomes part of Sec12 (1), Art 3, the requirements and
restrictions therein have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made
prior to Apr. 26, 83, the date of promulgation of Morales.
to be valid, there should be proof (prosecutions
burden) that the lawyer assisted the accused during the
interrogation, and that he to the accused explained the
contents and purpose of the document. People v. Pagaura, 267
SCRA 17

Under RA 7438, to be admissible, an extrajudicial

confession in general must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made
with assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3) confession must be express; 4) in writing.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was

raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and
the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its
bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order.
They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the
victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were
gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of
custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the
crime without the benefit of counsel.

Recount of the confession by the investigating officer on

the stand is not admissible. People vs. LOZADA, 406
SCRA 494 [July 2003]

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Any evidence derived from admissions obtained in
violation of the right also inadmissible:

PEOPLE V. ALICANDO, 251 SCRA 293; People v.

Sequino, 264 SCRA 79;

It is not material that appellant's confession came in

verbal form. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does
not distinguish between verbal and non-verbal confessions. So
long as they are uncounselled, they are inadmissible in evidence.
[41]
What is sought to be avoided is "the evil of extorting from the
very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute
and thereafter convict him."[42]

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape

with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age,
choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after
appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the
victims body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant
was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from
Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3
Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from
appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of
which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was
arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an
automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.

In the case at bar, the need for counsel is more

pronounced. Appellant was nineteen (19) years old when
arrested. He was unschooled, barely literate. He was a stranger to
the niceties of the law, ignorant of the rituals of police
investigation. It is difficult to believe he made an intelligent waiver
of his right to counsel.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the
Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect
known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in
the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows
the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood
by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information
couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect
before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116,
the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It
also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It
is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant
was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on
this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The
court must be sure.

17 |

BILL

OF

RIGHTS.

N E T.

GLAD.

Verbal and non-verbal : applies to both verbal and nonverbal confession/admission People v. Bonola, 274
sCRA 238.

BUT SEE. People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167- the

violation of the rights of the accused rendered
inadmissible the extra-judicial confession made during
the custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence if they are relevant to the issue and in not
otherwise excluded by law or the rule, is not affected
even if they were taken in the course of custodial
investigation

MALIMIT: robbery with homicide The right against selfincrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the accuseds own lips, against his ill, admission of his guilt. It
does NOT apply when the evidence sought is NOT an incriminating
statement but an object evidence; Miranda rights
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet,
keys, etc) is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation.

ABI

But failure to object to confession given without assistance of counsel,

renders it admissible. People v. Gonzales, GR 142932, 5/29/02

Accused in custody even if not yet charged Teehankee v. Rovira, 42 OG 717

RIGHT TO BAIL

Even in capital offense or offense punishable with

reclusion perpetrua, if the evidence of guilt is not strong

"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

When bail is authorized, it should be granted before arraignment and

cannot require arraignment as condition for the approval of the bail,
otherwise, the accused may be precluded from filing motion to
quash. LAVIDES vs. CA, GR 129670, 2/1/00

See: Sec. 10 Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

A. AvailableEven if the bail is a matter of right- but the fiscal
should be notified (Chin v. Gustillo, 8/11/95

Not as a matter of right; NEITHER its a matter of

discretion-upon conviction but before finality in
capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment (P. V. FORTES, 223 SCRA
619)

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,

Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to
the police station of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was
apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to
RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused
assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue
denial
of
his constitutional right
to
bail.

Thus, notice to the fiscal was required only in cases in which bail was a
matter of discretion. The rule was changed effective October 1, 1988,
however, so that, as it now stands, Rule 114, 15 makes no distinction
whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion. In all instances, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least
he must be asked for his recommendation. Respondent judge says that Girao
was brought before him after the close of office hours. It may be assumed that
there was an inquest fiscal available to whom the judge could have referred
the motion for bail recommendation.
The prosecutor must be heard even in cases where bail is a matter of right
because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into
account a number of factors, such as the applicant's character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds, or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
(Rule 114, 6) Had the prosecutor been heard on the bail application, he
could possibly have informed the court that the gun used was unlicensed if
this was the case.

Issue: Whether

or

GLAD.

bail

violated.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is entitled to right to bail pending

appeal as a matter of right
RULING:
The Purpose of Bail

N E T.

to

FACTS: Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and
slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime Ferrer
and his driver Jesus Calderon. However, he was only convicted of two counts
of homicide by the trial court. Obosa applied for bail with the trial court.
While this is pending, he appealed the case to the CA, which found strong
evidence of guilt. Meanwhile, the trial court approved Obosas bail bond,
prompting the prosecution to request the CA to cancel the bail bond
approved by the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Even if the privilege of the writ is suspended

RIGHTS.

right

upon conviction pending appeal in other offenses-Obosa vs. CA., 266

SCRA 281

While respondent was in error in believing that notice to the prosecutor is

required only where bail is a matter of discretion, nonetheless, we find that
his error was not due to any conscious and deliberate intent to commit an
injustice. In cases such as this, we have adhered to the view that, as a matter
of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous. (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980];
Abad v. Bleza, 145 SCRA 1 [1986])

OF

accuseds

where the penalty is 22 years imprisonment, it is classified as

reclusion perpetua. P. v. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402

Of course the prosecutor's recommendation, although persuasive, is in no

way binding upon the court. (Amaya vs. Ordoez, G.R. No. 80906,
resolution of September 5, 1988) But he has to be heard as a matter of due
process to the state in the same way that even in cases involving capital
offenses it has been held that there must be a hearing even though the
prosecutor interposes no objection to the grant of bail. (Tucay v. Domagas,
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995)

BILL

the

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that
before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged
is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion
islimited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once
it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court.

In stressing that in the case before him bail was a matter of right, respondent
judge apparently confuses the right to bail with the right not to be arbitrarily
detained. The latter merely means that the person detained should not be
held beyond the periods prescribed by law (i.e., Revised Penal Code, Art.
125) without charging him in court. It does not mean he has a right to be
released on bail within the same period, much less without giving the fiscal
or prosecutor the opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, should the
prosecutor fail to file the corresponding information, then the person
detained should be released. In such a case, the person detained is released
not because he has a right to bail but because he has a right not to be
arbitrarily detained beyond the period prescribed by law.

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In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, we analyzed the purpose of bail and
why it should be denied to one charged with a capital offense when evidence
of guilt is strong:

of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to preemptorychallenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

"x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with

capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of
liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond
the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime,
especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself
scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of
Cooley, a 'mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused' for the subsequent trial. Nor
is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a
capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong. as the likelihood is, rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence,
an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great
to be resisted." (Underscoring supplied).

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings. This is withoutmerit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant who,

though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital
offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction
(and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not
insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead
being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an
instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely tempted to flee.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements
of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved
in
the
failed
coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack ofmerit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.

-not available to the military (COMENDADOR v. DE

VILLA, 200 SCRA 80)

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9,
1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was
denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process.

Charged for murder but found guilty of homicide, bail (applied for
before conviction) may be granted. People v. Plaza, GR 176933,
10/2/09
B. Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312
Facts:A criminal case filed at the CFI of Marinduque for the murder of Boac
police sergeant AlfonsoMadia, lodged by the Provincial Fiscal against
petitioner. Petitioner, on motion, was admitted to aP60,000.00-bail. The
amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of Petitioners
wife,reduced to P40,000.00. Petitioner posted a property bond, was set at
provisional
liberty.
Beforearraignment on the murder charge, however, respondent Provincial Fis
cal amended theinformation. This time he accused petitioner with Direct
Assault
Upon
an
Agent
of
a
Person
inAuthority with Murder. Respondent judge sua sponte cancelled petitioner
s bond, ordered hisimmediate arrest. On petitioners motion to reconsider,
respondent judge, after hearing, resolved toadmit him to bail provided he
puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00. On petitioners motion that theoriginal
bond previously given be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix the
bond anew inreal property in the amount of P60,000.00, but to be posted
only
by
residents
of
the
province
of Marinduque actually staying therein with properties which must be in the
possession andownership of said residents for five years. Petitioner came to
this Court on certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction. He seeks
to set aside respondent judges orders; to reinstate the bail bond
theretofore approved by earlier by respondent judge.Issue: WON respondent
judge acted without any or in excess of his jurisdiction and with graveabuse
of discretion, and with violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted theprovisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition
forhabeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp
Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1)

Whether

or

Not

there

was

denial

of due

process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities
to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion

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GLAD.

ABI

opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00 (P840,000.00 for the 14 counts of multiple murder plus
P355,200.00 for the 12 counts of multiple frustrated murder.) There was a
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Enage however remained
adamant. De la Camara then files a petition for certiorari assailing Enages
order and prays for its nullification.
March 5, 1971- Enage answers that set forth the circumstances concerning
the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to
his mind, would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find
support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this
Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
March 31, 1971- both De la Camara and Enage did not appear at the hearing
with De la Camara, upon written motion was given 30 days to submit a
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, Enage in turn having 30 days from
receipt of memorandum to file his reply. De la Camara submitted the
memorandum on April 6, 1971.
May 26, 1971-Enage, instead of a reply, submitted a supplemental answer
wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April
28, 1971 and had since been remained at large. There was a reiteration then
of the dismissal of his petition for lack of merit, to which petitioner countered
in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with
this plea: The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose
opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondents prayer for dismissal of the
present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the
fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that
calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless
other Ricardo de la Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut definition
and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail.
* While the facts of this case is moot and academic, it did not preclude the SC
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
ISSUE: WAS THE AMOUNT OF BAIL ORDERED BY ENAGE
EXCESSIVE?
HELD: Yes yes yo kabayo! Sayang lang at pumuga/tumakas si mayor, kaya
nga moot (court) & academic ang petition
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and
academic. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SCs rationale for requirement of non-excessive bail:
1.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the lass of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not beyond the
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and the
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such
an intent would be thwarted. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying
this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding
against him with a death sentence, an ever present threat, temptation to flee
the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the
right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. Nothing
can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged,
the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department
of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
3.
There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what,
on its face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v.

in issuing thedisputed orders.Held:Along with the courts power to grant

bail in bailable eases is its discretion to fix the amountthereof, and, as stated,
to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is excessivelays
with the court to determine. In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are
to be guided at alltimes by the purpose for which bail is required. The
definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114,Rules of Court, gives this purpose
the security required and given for the release of a person who isin the
custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may berequired
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. So it is, that experience has
brought forthcertain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized as
follows: (1) ability of the accused togive bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3)
penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputationof the accused;
(5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)
probabilityof the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused was afugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial inother cases. Here, petitioner
is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of
a person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the impo
sition of capital punishment. Exacting serious consideration is that portion
of the disputed order of September 15,1964, where respondent judge requires
of the property bond be posted only by residents of the province
of Marinduque actually staying
therein. Section
9, Rule 114, Rules of Court, which in part recites: SEC. 9.
Qualification of sureties.
The
necessary
qualifications
of
sureties
to
a
bail bond shall be as follows: Each of them must
be a resident householder or freeholder within thePhilippines.
Where
the respondent Judge required that
the property bond
be posted only byresidents of the province of Marinduque actually staying
therein, in apparent collision with Sec. 9
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides that each of the sureties
must be a residenthouseholder or freeholder within the Philippines, we read
this directive to mean that it is but aminimum requirement. It is not
intended to tie up the hands of a Judge to approve bail so long as itis offered
by a resident householder or freeholder within the Philippines. It is to be
treated ascumulative, rather than exclusive, of the inherent power of the
courts
to
determine
whether
bail proffered should be accepted,
for, in principle, a court has broad powers
essential to its judicialfunction.
And where petitioner failed to aver that the requirement that his bondsmen
be actualresidents of the province would cause him prejudice, such failure
weighs heavily against him as itis not shown that, if error there was on the
part of the respondent Judge, it was a prejudicial error calling for correction.
1. financial ability

Dela Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1-excessive; P1,195,200 for

multiple murder.

November 7, 1968 Then Magsaysay Misamis Oriental Mayor de la

Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve
other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., on August 21, 1968. 18 days later,
the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the CFI a cases of multiple
frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused
Tagunan and Galgo.
January 14, 1969- An application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower
court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with
such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise maintained his
innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24,
1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the
filing of the petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
August 10, 1970- Judge Enage issued an order granting petitioners
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the

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ABI

Abao case. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and
reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases. Enage ignored the decisive consideration appearing at the
end of the above opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon
to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. Nor is there any justification then for imputing his
inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision
of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear misreading of the
Abao opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine
refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be to reduce the right to bail
to a barren form of words.

with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very
nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the
prisoner can be delivered. 6 And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to
deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This is
clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. At any time after the amount of bail is
fixed by order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the
nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court a
proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money
thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which
judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be returned to the
defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist
that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.

2. penalty for the offense

Chu v. Dolalas, 260 SCRA 309
We agree with the foregoing observations of the OCA. In imposing the
unreasonable excessive amount of bail on the accused, respondent judge
disregarded the guidelines laid down in Section 9 (formerly Section 6), Rule
114 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure. Obviously, she failed to
take into consideration the penalty for the offense charged, the financial
ability of the accused to give bail, the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged and the weight of evidence against them. From the records, it is
evident that respondent judge herself was cognizant of the facts surrounding
Criminal Case No. 6255, in that, Robert Roble, one of the accused in said
robbery case, is the son of Mrs. Emma Vda. de Roble who was one of the
claimants and who was in actual possession of the fishpond in question. In
fact, respondent judge even wrote to the chief of Police of Kabasalan,
Zamboanga del Sur sometime November, 1992 asking the latter to assist
Mrs. Emma Vda. de Roble in entering the fishpond in question. [5] It appears
that as a consequence of the harvesting of fish from the fishpond by Emma
Vda. de Roble and her workers that the case for Robbery with Violence
Against or Intimidation was filed against the accused in Criminal Case No.
6255. If Mrs. Roble was a claimant of the fishpond, this fact might negate
unlawful taking, which is an element of the crime charged. Therefore, the
weight of evidence against the accused, which is one of the factors to be
considered in the fixing of the amount of bail, should have been considered in
their favor. Notably, the maximum imposable penalty for the crime charged
is only 8 years and 21 days to 10 years. Following Department of Justice
guidelines that the amount of bail must be computed at P1,000.00 for every
year of the imposable maximum penalty, the amount of bail in the case at bar
should not exceed P10,000.00. Finally, the records bear no allegations of
other circumstances adverse to the accused that would warrant a higher bail
bond, i.e., character and reputation of the accused, the probability of their
appearing in court, their being fugitives from justice when arrested, and
pendency of other cases against them also under bond.

Almeda v. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 - demanding cash

Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge
has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's
attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty, and second, whether
the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was
properly allowed in both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 1
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to
conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, 2 and may
not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, 3 or
by reason of his prior absconding. 4 In order to safeguard the right of an
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall
not be required." This is logical cause the imposition of an unreasonable bail
may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof
and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." 5
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if
considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if
demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an
actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner,
and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused
upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or
credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to
his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond
would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its
procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to
have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have
provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the
nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of
bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court,
and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor
revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu
of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly
provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash

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3. character and reputation of the accused

4. age and health
5. weight of the evidence
6. probability of appearance
7. forfeiture of other bonds
8. fugitive from justice when arrested
9. pendency of other cases
C. Miscellaneous

ABI

As a rule, the right to bail is not available in extradition

proceedings as they are not in the nature of criminal
proceedings. Govt. Of USA vs. Purganan, 9/24/02

a person on bail cannot leave the country without the

consent of the court-Manotoc v. CA 5/30/86

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed
before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to
leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9
and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief
of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity
for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions
cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

OF

RIGHTS.

N E T.

GLAD.

A warrant of arrest issued without recommendation for

bail after cancellation of the bail bond of the accused on
his failure to appear is a violation of the right to bail. The
offense (Estafa) is not punishable with reclusion perpetua.
Parada v. Veneracion, 269 SCRA 371

BANTUAS v. Pangadapun 292 SCRA 622

Respondent Judge Pangadapuns explanation that his unwarranted

and unprocedural grant of bail was timely remedied by his
subsequent issuance of an order revoking and setting aside the
former cannot be countenanced. It is well worth noting that the
revocatory order was made only on July 19, 1995 or three months
after the initially erroneous order of April 7, 1995 which was sought
to be corrected. That he realized his fallacious granting of bail only
after the lapse of three months is unfathomable. Fundamental
knowledge of the law and a reasonable understanding of recent
jurisprudence ought to have guarded respondent judge against the
precipitate and unjustified granting of bail or should have at least
prompted him to invalidate the same immediately thereafter.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

BILL

prosecution should be allowed full opportunity to prove

that the evidence of guilt is strong - P. Vs. San Diego , 26
SCRA 522

Although the Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to

the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have set the
petition for bail for hearing.[14] If the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
and clarificatory questions.[15] For even the failure of the prosecution
to interpose an objection to the grant of bail to the accused will not
justify such grant without hearing.[16]

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,

neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him
from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

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