2007-04 NHT Reformer LOPA

Layer of
Protection
Analysis
NHT Reformer Unit
TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.
Port Arthur Facility
October 2008
Project No. 07-099
R R S ENGINEERING
6455 South Shore Blvd., Suite 400
League City, Texas
TEL 281.334.4220
www.rrseng.com
77573
FAX 281.334.5809
TOTAL Petrochemicals
Port Arthur Refinery
NHT Reformer Unit

Layer of Protection Analysis
DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT

The work was prepared by Risk, Reliability, and Safety Engineering, LLC (RRS) at the request of TOTAL Petrochemicals. As
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1.
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2.
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3.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
1.0
2.0
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 1
1.1
Study Team ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.2
Study Dates ..................................................................................................................... 2
LOPA METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 2

2.1
Scenario Identification ..................................................................................................... 4
2.2
Consequence Severity Evaluation.................................................................................. 4
2.3
Initiating Cause Likelihood Evaluation ............................................................................ 5
2.4
Independent Protection Layers (IPL) Evaluation............................................................ 7
2.5
Rules for Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) .......................................................... 10

2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5
2.6
Vulnerability Factors ...................................................................................................... 12

2.6.1
2.6.2
2.7
Intermittent Hazard (Not Always Present) .................................................... 10

Mechanical Relief Devices Relief Valves .................................................. 10
Check Valves ................................................................................................. 11
BPCS ............................................................................................................. 11
Operator Response to Alarm ........................................................................ 11
Ignition Probability ......................................................................................... 12

Person Present .............................................................................................. 12
LOPA Calculation .......................................................................................................... 12
3.0
SIS EVALUATION ......................................................................................................................... 13
4.0
RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................................... 15
5.0
LOPA WORKSHEETS .................................................................................................................. 18

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LIST OF TABLES
PAGE
Table 1.
Study Team ..................................................................................................................... 1
Table 2.
Review Team................................................................................................................... 2
Table 3.
Hazard Scenario Target Frequencies............................................................................. 4
Table 4.
Initiating Causes & Likelihood (ICLs) of Failure ............................................................. 6
Table 5.
Examples of Safeguards Not Usually Considered IPLs ................................................ 8
Table 6.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) .... 9
Table 7.
Integrity Levels (SILs) for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) ..................................13
Table 8.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Determination ....................................................................13
Table 9.
Recommendations ........................................................................................................16
LIST OF FIGURES
PAGE
Figure 1.
LOPA Flowchart .............................................................................................................. 3

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LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS

NHT REFORMER UNIT
PORT ARTHUR REFINERY
TOTAL PETROCHEMICALS
1.0
INTRODUCTION
TOTAL Petrochemicals contracted Risk, Reliability and Safety Engineering, LLC (RRS) to conduct
a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) of the NHT Reformer Unit at TOTAL Petrochemicals Port
Arthur Refinery. The LOPA methodology used is defined in the TOTAL Petrochemical LOPA
Procedure 14 and follows the guidance in the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) book,
Layer of Protection Analysis, 1995. The methodology used in this study meets the requirements of
ANSI/ISA S84.00.01, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry.
The objectives of the LOPA study were to:
1.1
Review the HAZOP to determine if the safeguards identified were adequate
Determine the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for the Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
at the plant
Study Team
The LOPA Study Team is identified in Table 1.

Table 1.
Name
Study Team
Company
Job Title
Norman Borne
Instrument Supervisor
Richard Loupe
NAC Operator
Douglas Dornier
Process Engineer
Ryan Riffer
Ops Superintendent
Roger Allison
Olson Engineering
Instrument Reliability
Allen Runte
EE & Systems Supervisor
Geoffrey Kret
Rotating Equipment Engineer
David Montondon
Gulfcon, Inc.
Systems Group
John Darwin
Systems Group
Sheng-Yen Fletcher
PSI/PHA Coordination
Danny Roy
Corrosion Specialist
Dennis Ferrell
Olson Engineering
Fac. Dev. E&I

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Name
Company
Job Title
Paul Pardaen
Process Sup. Engineer
Dwayne Austin
Systems Group
Rich Hudgins
Systems Group
John Pruitt
RRS Engineering
Facilitator
John Alderman
RRS Engineering
Facilitator
Cassie Slough
RRS Engineering
Scribe
1.2
Study Dates
The LOPA was conducted onsite at the TOTAL Petrochemicals Port Arthur Refinery on May 3,
2007.
An additional meeting was held on June 21, 2007 to re-evaluate SIL, EIL, and CIL rankings. A
review team was assembled to revisit LOPA scenarios, including 39.1, 72.2, 72.9, and 73.8. The
review team determined that the commercial severity for these scenarios should be reduced from
catastrophic to major. The review team is identified in Table 2.
Table 2.
Review Team
Name
2.0
Job Title
Ed Bergmann
HSEQ
Shen-Yen Fletcher
HSEQ
Kelly Nite
Operations
Ryan Riffer
Operations
Geoff Kret
Reliability
Dwayne Austin
Systems
John Darwin
Systems
Clint Gibbs
Systems
Rich Hudgins
Systems
Allen Runte
Systems
David Montondon
Systems
LOPA METHODOLOGY
A Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology. Put

simply, the method consists of assigning a target frequency based on consequence severity and
comparing it to a simplified prediction of the actual scenario frequency. The method is based on
the AIChE CCPS Concept Book, Layer of Protection Analysis. The steps in the LOPA process are
defined in TOTAL Petrochemical Safety Procedure shown in Figure 1.

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Figure 1.

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LOPA Flowchart
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2.1
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Scenario Identification
The Study Team began by identifying scenarios of concern based on results from the previous
PHA. For an existing PHA, only those scenarios with a shutdown system were reviewed. In some
cases, further definition of the consequence was required. In a LOPA, a scenario is an initiating
cause, a description of the consequence (assuming all safeguards fail), and a list of all protection
layers in place to prevent the consequence from occurring. The LOPA consists of assigning
numerical frequency numbers to the initiating cause and each protection layer, then determining if
protection layers in place are adequate. Additionally, scenarios were added based on shutdowns
in the cause and effect charts.
Some scenarios were reviewed and identified as a moderate severity. Since these scenarios were
considered a moderate severity, they did not meet the criteria for using LOPA. These scenarios
are contained in Appendix A.
Note: A scenario has only one cause and only one consequence. If multiple causes for the same
consequence are identified in the PHAs, then each cause was analyzed separately using LOPA.
2.2
Consequence Severity Evaluation
The Study Team assigned a severity ranking to the consequences. Each consequence severity
was also assigned a Targeted Frequency (TF) based on Table 3.
Table 3.
Severity
Level
Moderate
Hazard Scenario Target Frequencies
Safety
Environmental
Commercial
Not required to
conduct LOPA
Onsite:
-
Recordable, TRIR
Medical treatment
Target
Frequency
(1/Yr)
Offsite:
Serious
No effect
Onsite:
-
Permanent injury
Lost time accident
Recordable environmental
event
< $2,000,000
Not required to
conduct LOPA
Offsite:
-

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No permanent
effects
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Severity
Level
Major
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Safety
Onsite:
-
Lethal effect on 1
person
Multiple recordable
injuries
Environmental
Commercial
Target
Frequency
(1/Yr)
Reportable environmental
event
$2,000,000$10,000,000
10-4
Reportable environmental
event with offsite impact
$10,000,000 $100,000,000
10-5
> 100,000,000
10-6
Offsite:
Catastrophic
Shelter in place
Onsite:
-
Multiple fatalities
Offsite:
Disastrous
Recordable injuries
Onsite:
-
Multiple fatalities
Offsite:
-
2.3
Multiple fatalities
Initiating Cause Likelihood Evaluation
The Study Team assigned an Initiating Cause Likelihood (ICL) based on the numerical values
defined in Table 4. These values are based on industry consensus as presented in the CCPS
Concept Book on LOPA. The CCPS Concept Book provides the following guidance on causes:
Control loop failure - includes all components of the control loop, as well as the
possibility that the control loop could be set in error to a dangerous state by the
operator
Routine human error - includes a task in the field or at the operator console that is
performed on a routine basis by the operator and that, if done improperly, could
result in the process deviation under review
Non-routine human error - tasks that are not done on a routine basis but are
possible actions by an operator for some event, such as startup or shutdown that, if
done improperly, could result in the process deviation under review
Pumps and other rotating equipment - includes any piece of equipment with
normal moving parts
Fixed equipment - involves failures in non-moving equipment that would lead to the
process condition under review; for example, tube failure on a high-pressure steam
exchanger leading to high process pressure

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Table 4.
Initiating Causes & Likelihood (ICLs) of Failure
Initiating Cause (IC)
Initiating Cause Likelihood

(ICL)
(events per year)
BPCS instrument loop failure
1 x 10-1
Regulator failure
1 x 10-1
Fixed equipment failure (exchanger tube failure, etc.)
1 x 10-2
Pumps and other rotating equipment failure
1 x 10-1
Cooling water failure (redundant CW pumps, diverse drivers, etc.)
1 x 10-1
Loss of power (redundant power supplies)
1 x 10-1
Human error - (routine task, once-per-day opportunity)
1 x 100
Human error - (routine task, once-per-month opportunity)
1 x 10-1
Human error - (non-routine task, low stress)
1 x 10-1
Human error - (non-routine task, high stress)
1 x 100
Gasket / packing blowout
1 x 10-2
Turbine / diesel engine over speed with casing breach
1 x 10-4
Third party intervention (external impact by backhoe, vehicle, etc.)
1 x 10-2
Crane load drop
1 x 10-4 per lift
Lightning strike
1 x 10-3
Safety valve opens spuriously
1 x 10-2
Pump seal failure
1 x 10-1
Unloading / loading hose failure
1 x 10-1
Misalignment of car sealed or locked valve where there is a regular

check of the alignment of the valves
1 x 10-2 per opportunity
LOTO (lock-out tag-out) procedure failure, e.g.,

overall failure of a multiple-element process
Operator failure to execute routine procedure, assuming well trained,

unstressed, not fatigued
Other initiating events
Develop using experience of

personnel
Source: Table 5.1, p 71 of the 2001 CCPS Concept Book Layers of Protection Analysis.

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2.4
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Independent Protection Layers (IPL) Evaluation
The defining characteristic of a protection layer is that it prevents the consequence from
happening. Each IPL must function such that the defined consequence will not occur. Each
protection layer counted must be independent of other protection layers. That is, there must be no
failure that can deactivate two or more protection layers. If a protection layer is believed to be
more reliable (a lower value for Probability of Failure on Demand - PFD), a quantitative method
should be used to confirm the PFD. For example, if the team desires to improve the unavailability
of risk reduction logic in the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) by adding additional sensors or
final elements, the impact event should be reviewed by a quantitative method such as fault tree.
The protection layer is:
Specifically designed to prevent or mitigate consequences of a potentially

hazardous event
Dependable and can be counted on to do what it was intended to do
Auditable and a system to audit and maintain it
The Study Team identified which protection layers meet the definition of IPLs as given in this
section. This is often the most difficult part of LOPA. Table 5 contains safeguards that are not
typically given credit as IPLs.

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Table 5.
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Examples of Safeguards Not Usually Considered IPLs
Safeguards Not Usually

Considered IPLs
Comments
Training and Certification
May be considered in assessing the PFD for operator action, but are not, of
themselves, IPLs
Procedures
May be considered in assessing the PFD for operator action, but are not, of
themselves, IPLs
Normal Testing and Inspection
Assumed to be in place for all hazard evaluations and form the basis for
judgment to determine IPLs and PFDs; normal testing and inspection
affects the PFD of certain IPLs, thus, lengthening testing and inspection
intervals may increase the PFD of an IPL
Maintenance
Assumed to be in place for all hazard evaluations and forms the basis for
judgment to determine the PFDs of IPLs.
Communications
Basic assumption that adequate communication exists in a facility; poor

communications affects the PFD of certain IPLs
Signs
Signs, by themselves, are not IPLs; signs may be unclear, obscured,

ignored, etc. and may affect the PFD of certain IPLs
Fire Protection
Active fire protection often is not considered as an IPL as it is post event for
most scenarios and its availability and effectiveness may be affected by the
fire / explosion which it is intended to contain; however, if the LOPA team
can demonstrate it meets the requirements of an IPL for a given scenario, it
may be used (e.g., if an activating system such as plastic piping or frangible
switches are used)
Note: Fire protection is identified as a mitigation IPL as it attempts to
prevent a larger consequence subsequent to an event that has already
occurred. This may be considered when assigning cost to commercial
severity levels.
Fireproof insulation can be used as an IPL for some scenarios if it meets
the requirements of API and corporate standards
Source: Table 6.1, p 79 of the 2001 CCPS Concept Book Layers of Protection Analysis

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Table 6.
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Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for

Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Independent Protection Layer (IPL)
Probability of Failure on
Demand (PFD)
Basic process control system, if not associated with the initiating event being
considered
1 x 10-1
Operator response to alarm with at least 10 minutes response time
1 x 10-1
Relief valve
1 x 10-2
Rupture disc
1 x 10-2
Flame / detonation arrestors
1 x 10-2
Tandem seals
1 x 10-1
Dike
1 x 10-2
Underground drainage system
1 x 10-2
Open vent (no valve)
1 x 10-2
Fireproofing
1 x 10-2
Blast-wall / bunker
1 x 10-3
Identical redundant equipment ( e.g., identical relief valves)
1 x 10-1 (max credit)
Diverse redundant equipment (e.g., diverse relief devices)
1 x 10-1 to 1 x 10-2
Fire and gas detection (see Table 6)
1 x 10-1 to 1 x 10-2
Other events
Use experience of
personnel
Source: Table 6.3, page 92; Table 6.4, p 96; Table 6.5, page 103 of the 2001 CCPS Concept Book Layers of Protection
Analysis.

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2.5
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Rules for Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Each protection layer counted must be truly independent of the other protection layers. This
means there must be no failure that can deactivate two or more protection layers.
If a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is initiated by more than one sensor, the consequence of
failure may be different for each sensor and therefore, each failure is considered separately. If the
consequences are different for each failure, the function is separated into more than one function
and the IPL determined for each.
If an SIS initiates more than one action, the consequences of failure may be different for each final
actuation and therefore, each failure shall be considered separately. If consequences are different
for each failure, the function is separated into more than one function and the IPL determined for
each.
2.5.1
Intermittent Hazard (Not Always Present)
There may be some hazards that are only present during certain job tasks, such as startup,
shutdown, regeneration, etc.
The following equation is used to determine the credit for this type of protection layer:
ICL = ICL x [(time at risk)/(total time)]
2.5.2
Mechanical Relief Devices Relief Valves
The following rules apply to the use of relief valves as protection layers:
Relief system is sized for all reasonably foreseeable failures of process and process
control to completely mitigate the scenario under consideration
Disposal of relieved materials is to a safe location
Relief discharge does not cause significant environmental or commercial

consequences
Operating experience indicates that the relief valves to be used are satisfactory for
the process application with the appropriate test intervals
If PSV is in dirty or plugging service, no credit is allowed
When there are two relief devices, each 100% sized for the scenarios, then an
additional credit can be taken (should be at least an order of magnitude lower than
that used for the first, generally 1x 10-1).

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2.5.3
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Check Valves
Check valves are notoriously unreliable, but can be considered a LOPA safeguard on a
case-by-case basis. Some of the considerations include:
2.5.4
Multiple check valves in series
Clean service
High differential pressure (< 100 psi) to hold valve closed and prevent leakage
Defined testing program
BPCS
The Basis Process Control System (BPCS) has several rules associated with their use as IPLs:
2.5.5
If a BPCS control loop is a cause, the alarms generated by that control loop cannot
be counted as a protection layer. Alarms separate from the control loop may be
used as protection for the failure of that control loop if the operator response time is
adequate.
A control loop in the BPCS, whose normal action would compensate for the initiating
event, can be considered as a protection layer. For example, an initiating cause for
high reactor pressure could be failure of a local upstream pressure regulator; the
normal action of the reactor pressure controller would be to close the inlet PV, thus
providing protection against the impact event.
Failure mode of the final element is to the safe state
Operator Response to Alarm
Risk reduction for Operator Response to Alarms can only be counted once. Alarms are identified
for all causes of the initiating event. The following must be confirmed as true before allowing credit
for operator response:
Alarm is independent of the cause and BPCS control loop claimed as a protection
layer
Operator always present and available at the alarm point
Alarm gives clear indication of the hazard
Operator will detect the alarm among potentially many other alarms
Operator has time to diagnose and take corrective action (within 10 minutes)
Operator is trained in the proper procedures and response associated with the alarm
state and the response steps are identified as critical in the procedure

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2.6
Vulnerability Factors
2.6.1
Ignition Probability
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There are many releases that are not ignited. Ignition probabilities used in this study are:
P ~ 0.3 for flammable liquids and gases
P ~ 0.1 -> 0.3 for volatile liquids
P < 0.1 for heavy liquids
Where P = probability of ignition

2.6.2
Person Present
To qualify as a safety related scenario, a person must be in the area where the incident occurs.
Credit is taken for time not in the hazard zone. For example, during operator rounds, if a pump
seal fire were to occur, in order for there to be an injury, the operator must be near the pump. The
operator may only be near the pump for 30 minutes out of his shift.
The following vulnerability factors should be applied when appropriate:
VFp = 1.0 if people are present in the hazard zone all the time
VFp = 0.5 if people are present in the hazard zone for less than 12 hours per day
VFp = 0.1 if people are present in the hazard zone for less than 1-2 hours per day
For environmental and commercial scenarios, the person present is not used.
2.7
LOPA Calculation
Using the numerical values identified in the preceding steps, a simple calculation is performed to
determine the LOPA ratio. LOPA is limited to evaluating a single cause-consequence pair as a
scenario. The numerator of the LOPA ratio is the Target Frequencies (TF), which is the companys
risk tolerance for that scenario. The denominator of the LOPA ratio is the product of the Initiating
Cause Likelihood (ICL), the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) of each Independent
Protection Layer (IPL) identified and the Vulnerability Factor (VF). The formula for calculating the
LOPA ratio is presented below:
LOPA Ratio ( Safety) =
TFSafety
ICL PFD1 PFD2 PFD3... VFi VFp
LOPA Ratio ( Environmen tal ) =
LOPA Ratio (Commercial ) =

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TFEnvironmen tal
ICL PFD 1 PFD 2 PFD 3...
TFCommercial
ICL PFD1 PFD 2 PFD 3... * VFi
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If the LOPA ratio is greater than or equal to one, then the scenario passes LOPA. Existing
protection layers in place are adequate.
If the LOPA ratio is less than one, then the scenario fails LOPA. Additional protection layers are
needed.
3.0
SIS EVALUATION
LOPA was used to determine the required and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for a Safety
Instrumented System (SIS). To do this, the LOPA ratio was calculated without giving any credit to
the existing SIS. The required SIL was then found by using Table 7.
Table 7.
Integrity Levels (SILs) for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

LOPA Ration
Required SIL, EIL, CIL
10-0 - 10-1
No special integrity requirements
10-1 - 10-2
10-2 - 10-3
10-3 - 10-4
The LOPA worksheets for this project are contained in Section 5. The SIL determinations derived
from the study are shown in Table 8.
Table 8.
LOPA Ref.
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Determination

SIS Number and Function
Required Integrity Level

S
2.1
LSHH-592 High high level switch that closes blanket fuel gas
valve PV-593B on high high level in the drum.
4.2
FSLL-915/918 Flow indication with low flow alarms and

interlocks that shutdown the heater on low low flow through a
heater pass.
5.8
PSLL-1389 Interlock that isolates the fuel gas from the heater
on low low fuel gas pressure.
5.11
PSLL-1379 Interlock that isolates the pilot gas from the heater
on low low pilot gas pressure.
12.2
FSLL-645/647/655 Low flow shutdown Fractionator Reboiler

(H-102).
13.8
on low low fuel gas.
13.11
PSLL-1393 Interlock that isolates the pilot gas from the heater
on low low pilot gas pressure.

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LOPA Ref.
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S
19.2
23.2
25.2
PSL-837 Interlock that stars the spare combustion air blower

fan on low combustion air pressure.
19.2
23.2
25.2
SSL-1294 Interlock that shuts down the heater on shutdown of

the induced draft fan.
19.8
on low low fuel gas pressure.
28.1
LSHH-256 Interlock that shuts down the compressors on high

high level.
29.2
FSLL-106 Interlock that isolates the fuel gas to the charge

heater and interheaters on low low recycle hydrogen flow.
30.9
PDSHH-171 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high high

differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the
first stage.
30.9
PDSHH-175 that shuts down compressor C-2B on high high

differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the
first stage.
32.1
LSHH-179 that shuts down the booster compressor on high

high level.
33.8
PDSHH-173 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high high

differential pressure between the suction and discharge lines.
33.8
PDSHH-177 that shuts down compressor C-2B on high high

differential pressure between the suction and discharge lines.
39.1
LSHH-181 that shuts down the booster compressor on high

high level.
*This scenario was revisited during the June 21st meeting.
49.2
FSLL-783/784/785/786 Interlocks that isolate the flue gas from

the charge heater, interheaters, and Depentanizer Reboiler
trim heater on low low flow.
72.2
LSLL-38 that shuts down the compressor and prevents restart

on low low level in the overhead seal oil tank.
72.2
LSL-57 that starts the auxiliary lube oil pump on low level in the
overhead seal oil tank.
72.9
PSL-40 Interlock that starts the spare pump on low lube oil
pressure.
73.8
PSL-77/78 shuts down the compressor on low lube oil

pressure.

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LOPA Ref.
4.0
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S
73.12
TSHH-107/108/109/110 shuts down the compressor and

prevents compressor restart if there is a high high gas
discharge temperature from the first stage.
80.10
FSL-394 shuts down the CDR on low low nitrogen flow.
RECOMMENDATIONS
If during the LOPA study, the LOPA analysis indicated there were not enough safeguards or an
additional SIS was needed, then the Study Team made additional recommendations. Table 9
identifies the recommendations from the LOPA Study.

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Table 9.
Recommendations
Rec.
No.
Scenario
Number
1.1
Consider adding a tested independent alarm or a SIL 1 shutdown system.
2.1
Ensure that LAH-910 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
2.1
Ensure that interlock LSHH-592 that closes blanket fuel gas valve PV-593B
on high high level in the drum is designed for EIL 1.
4.2
Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrogen and

hydrocarbon flow to Charge Heater (H-101) on each pass and ensure it is on
a routine testing schedule.
4.2
Ensure that interlocks FSLL-915 through 918 are designed for SIL 1.
5.8
Ensure PSLL-1389 is designed for SIL 2.
5.11
Ensure that PSLL-1379 is designed for SIL 2.
12.2
Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrocarbon flow to

Fractionator Reboiler (H-102) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine
testing schedule.
12.2
Ensure that interlocks FSLL-645/647/655 are designed for SIL 1.
10
13.8
Ensure that Interlock PSLL-1399 is designed for SIL 2.
11
13.11
Review the revalidation from MOC to change pilot gas to Purchased Natural
Gas.
12
19.2
Ensure that interlock PSL-837 or SSL-1294 are designed for SIL 1.
13
19.8
Ensure that pressure indication PI-868 with low pressure alarm is on a

routine testing schedule.
14
28.1
Ensure that high level alarm LH-257 is on a routine testing schedule.
15
28.1
Ensure that Interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the compressors on high
high level is designed for SIL 1.
16
28.1
Evaluate if Interlock LSHH-256 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2

and Commercial CIL 3.
17
29.2
Ensure that interlock FSLL-106 is designed for SIL 1.
18
30.9
Ensure that Interlock PDSHH-171 that shuts down compressor C-2A on

high-high differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the firststage and/or Interlock PDSHH-175 that shuts down compressor C2-B on
high high differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the first
stage are designed for SIL 1.
19
32.1
Ensure that LH-178 is on a routine testing schedule.
20
32.1
Ensure that LSHH-179 that shuts down the booster compressor on high-high
level is designed for SIL 1.
21
32.1
Evaluate if Interlock LSHH-179 should be designed for an Environmental EIL

2 and/or Commercial CIL 3.

October 31, 2008
Recommendation
Page 16
Project No. 07-099

Revision No. 2
NHT Reformer Unit

Rec.
No.
Scenario
Number
Recommendation
22
33.8
Ensure that PDSHH-173 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high-high

differential pressure between the suction and discharge lines and/or PDSHH177 that shuts down compressor C-2B on high-high differential pressure
between the suction and discharge lines is designed for SIL 1.
23
39.1
Confirm the level alarm for the Unibon Compressor Suction Drum (13C1A/B)
is independent of the level control valve and is on a routine testing schedule.
24
39.1
Ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
25
39.1
Confirm the level alarm for the TDP Compressor Suction Drum is
independent of the level control valve and is on a routine testing schedule.
26
39.1
Ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
27
49.2
Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrogen and

hydrocarbon flow to (H-5) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine testing
schedule.
28
49.2
Ensure that interlocks FSLL-783/784/785/786 are designed for SIL 1.
29
72.2
Consider bringing a low seal oil level alarm into DCS (independent of LV1437).
30
72.2
Ensure that Interlock LSLL-38 that shuts down the compressor and prevents
restart on low-low level in the overhead seal oil tank and/or Interlock LSL-57
that starts the auxiliary lube oil pump on low level in the overhead seal oil
tank are designed for SIL 2.
31
72.2
Evaluate if Interlock LSLL-38 and/or LSL-57 should be designed for

Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL 3.
32
72.9
Ensure that PAL-33 low pressure alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
33
72.9
Ensure that Interlock Interlock PSLL-32 shuts down compressor on low lube
oil pressure is designed for SIL 1.
34
72.9
Evaluate if Interlock PSL-40 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2 and

Commercial CIL3.
35
73.8
Ensure that low lube oil pressure alarm PAL-77/78 is on a routine testing
schedule.
36
73.8
Ensure Interlock PSL-79/80 that shuts down Compressor is designed for SIL
1.
37
73.8
Evaluate if PSL-77 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2 and

Commercial CIL 2.
38
73.12
Ensure that jacket water discharge temperature alarms TAH85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92 (local compressor panel and TDC) located on the
first-stage compressor are on a routine testing schedule.
39
73.12
Evaluate if TSHH-107/108/109/110 that shut down the compressor and

prevent compressor restart if there is a high-high gas discharge temperature
from the second-stage should be designed for EIL 1 and CIL 1.

October 31, 2008
Page 17
Project No. 07-099

Revision No. 2
5.0
NHT Reformer Unit

LOPA WORKSHEETS

October 31, 2008
Page 18
Project No. 07-099

Revision No. 2
TOTAL Petrochemicals - LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS (LOPA)

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential hydrocarbons into process sewer, potential fire/explosion,

potential personnel injury.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-03
Com:
Initiating Cause
Failure of raffinate splitter water boot level 1 1.00E-01

control valve.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-023
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
1.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
Safety:
0.010
1.00E-04
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.00
1. Consider adding a tested independent alarm or a SIL 1 shutdown system.
SIS No:
SIS Function:
Required SIL Level: 1
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
2.1
Overflow of liquid hydrocarbon to the unit flare header, potentially

resulting in a high level in the Flare Gas KO Drum.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
0.00E+00
Env:
1.00E-04
High flow, naphtha feed from the Crude

Unit or Naphtha Stabilizer. (upstream
flow control failure)
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
None
Process Design
BPCS
LC-592 opens level control valve.
1.00E-01
None
PSV
Op Response
None
LAH-910 high level alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.010
Com:
2. Ensure that LAH-910 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.

3. Ensure that interlock LSHH-592 that closes blanket fuel gas valve PV-593B on high
high level in the drum is designed for EIL 1.
SIS No:
LSHH-592
SIS Function:
High high level switch LSHH-592 that closes blanket fuel gas valve PV-593B on
high high level in the drum.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
High level in feed surge drum. Tube failure in Charge Heater (H-101)
resulting in release of hydrocarbon that could cause (a) a fire and/or
explosion that may injure personnel in a medium-sized area and (b)
environmental impact in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Operator error, manual valve closed.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-002
Loop: F-0915, F-0916, F-0917, F-0918
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
4.2
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Flow indication FC-595 with low flow
alarm.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
4. Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrogen and hydrocarbon

flow to Charge Heater (H-101) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine testing
schedule.
5. Ensure that interlocks FSLL-915 through 918 are designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-915-918
SIS Function:
Flow indication FI-915-918 with low flow alarms and interlocks FSLL-915-918 that
shuts down the heater on low low flow through a heater pass.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Control valve FV-595 closing too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-002
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
4.2
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
alarm.
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 4 to consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss

of hydrogen and hydrocarbon flow to Charge Heater (H-101) on each pass and ensure
it is on a routine testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 5 to ensure that interlocks FSLL-915 through 918 are
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FI-915-918
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Pump tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-002
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
alarm.
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
4.2
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FI-915-918
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Low level, feed surge drum.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-002
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
alarm.
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
4.2
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FI-915-918
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Plugged strainer in the pump suction line. 1 1.00E-01

None
P&ID: 3165-1-50-002
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

alarm.
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
4.2
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FI-915-918
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential flameout, potential firebox explosion, potential injury to

personnel in a medium-sized area and environmental impact in a
small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Louver control valve PV-616 closing too 1 1.00E-01

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055A
Loop: F-0890
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blowout doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
Flue gas analyzer AI-601 with low alarm.
1.00E-01
Pressure indication PC-616 with low

pressure alarm on preheated air duct to
heater.
pressure alarm on the flue gas duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-890
SIS Function:
Interlock FSLL-890 that switches the heater to natural draft operation on low low
combustion air flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Stack damper closing too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055A
Loop: F-0890
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.2
1.00E-01

heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-890
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Combustion air fan tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055A
Loop: F-0890
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.2
1.00E-01

heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-890
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Induced draft fan tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055A
Loop: F-0890
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.2
1.00E-01

heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
SSL-1042
SIS Function:
Interlock SSL-1042 that opens the stack damper on shutdown of the induced draft
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055A
Loop: F-0890
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
1.00E-01

heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-890
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Burner/pilot flameout, inability to ignite the burners following a

flameout, resulting in a high concentration of combustibles in the
firebox, potential for an explosion that could result in (a) injury to
personnel in a medium-sized area and (b) environmental impacts in
a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure in fuel gas header.
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.8
1 Present all the Time
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
6. Ensure PSLL-1389 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1389
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1389 that isolates the fuel gas from the heater on low low fuel gas
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.8
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 6 to ensure PSLL-1389 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1389
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.8
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1389
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Isolation valve XV-1382A or B is closed. 1 1.00E-01

None
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.8
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1389
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Inability to ignite the burners following a flameout, resulting in a high

concentration of combustibles in the firebox, potential for an
explosion that could result in (a) injury to personnel in a mediumsized area and (b) environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure.
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
7. Ensure that PSLL-1379 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1379 that isolates the pilot gas from the heater on low low pilot gas
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Carryover of liquid as a result of high level 1 1.00E-01

in fuel gas KO drum.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 7 to ensure that PSLL-1379 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1379
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Total loss of combustion air.
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1379
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Manual valve closed.
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1379
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Local control valve PCV-298 closing too 1 1.00E-01

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1379
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See Recommendation 7 to ensure that PSLL-1379 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
High pressure transient from the fuel gas 1 1.00E-01

supply header.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
5.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1379
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Release of hydrocarbon resulting in (a) a fire in the firebox,

potentially causing structural damage (e.g., collapse of the heater
stack) that may injure personnel and rupture process equipment in a
medium-sized area around the heater, (b) a fire and/or explosion
outside the heater that may injure personnel in a medium-sized area,
and (c) environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
P-103A/B stops.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-007
Loop: F-0645, F-0647, F-0655
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
12.2
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
8. Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrocarbon flow to

Fractionator Reboiler (H-102) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine testing
schedule.
9. Ensure that interlocks FSLL-645/647/655 are designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-645/647/655
SIS Function:
Low flow shutdowns FSLL-645/647/655 shuts down Fractionator Reboiler (H-102).
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Release of hydrocarbon resulting in (a) a fire in the firebox,

potentially causing structural damage (e.g., collapse of the heater
stack) that may injure personnel and rupture process equipment in a
medium-sized area around the heater, (b) a fire and/or explosion
outside the heater that may injure personnel in a medium-sized area,
and (c) environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Control valve or manual valve closed.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-007
Loop: F-0645, F-0647, F-0655
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
12.2
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

of hydrocarbon flow to Fractionator Reboiler (H-102) on each pass and ensure it is on
a routine testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 9 to ensure that interlocks FSLL-645/647/655 are
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-645/647/655
SIS Function:
Low flow shutdowns FSLL-645/647/655 shuts down Fractionator Reboiler (H-102).
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055B
Loop: F-0898
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.2
Flue gas oxygen analyzer AI-664 with

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
pressure alarm located on the flue gas
duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-898
SIS Function:
Interlock FSLL-898 that switches the heater to natural draft on low low combustion
air flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055B
Loop: F-0898
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-898
SIS Function:
air flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Combustion air fan tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055B
Loop: F-0898
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast Doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-898 or SSL-1042
SIS Function:
air flow.
Interlock SSL-1042 that opens the stack damper on shutdown of the induced draft
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Louver control valve PC-616 closing too 1 1.00E-01

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-055B
Loop: F-0898
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast Doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-898
SIS Function:
air flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast Doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
duct.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSLL-898
SIS Function:
air flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure in fuel gas header.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.8
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
10. Ensure that Interlock PSLL-1399 is designed for SIL 2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1399
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.8
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 10 to ensure that Interlock PSLL-1399 is designed for SIL
2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1399
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.8
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1399
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.8
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
2.
SIS No:
PSLL-1399
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

explosion that could result in potential injury to personnel in a
medium-sized area and potential environmental impacts in a small
area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure from fuel gas supply

(OSBL).
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.11
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Pilots are fueled by Purchased Natural
Gas.
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
None
0.100
Com:
0.10
11. Review the revalidation from MOC to change pilot gas to Purchased Natural Gas.
SIS No:
PSLL-1393
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1393 that isolates the pilot gas from the heater on low-low pilot gas
pressure
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Carryover of liquid as a result of high

1 1.00E-01
level- fuel gas KO drum that could result
in liquid hydrocarbon pooling and fire in
the bottom of the firebox for the reformer
charge heater.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.11
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Pressure indication PI-893 with low

pressure alarm
1.00E-01
Other

Gas.
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
See LOPA Recommendation 11 to review the revalidation from MOC to change pilot
gas to Purchased Natural Gas.
SIS No:
PSLL-1393
SIS Function:
pressure
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.11
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm.
None
Other

Gas.
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
SIS No:
PSLL-1393
SIS Function:
pressure
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
1.00E-01
Other

Gas.
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.11
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1393
SIS Function:
pressure
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

supply header (OSBL)
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
13.11
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other

Gas.
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
SIS No:
PSLL-1393
SIS Function:
pressure
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential flameout H-1, potential firebox explosion, potential injury to

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0862
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm on the preheated air duct
to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
12. Ensure that interlock PSL-837 or SSL-1294 are designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-837 that start the spare combustion air blower fan on low
combustion air pressure.
Interlock SSL-1294 that shuts down the heater on shutdown of the induced draft
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Combustion air blower fan tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0862
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
See LOPA Recommendation 12 to ensure that interlock PSL-837 or SSL-1294 are

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Control valve FV-862A/B closing too far. 1 1.00E-01

P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
None
Loop: F-0862
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Louver control valve PV-834A/B closing 1 1.00E-01

too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0862
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0858
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-837 starts the spare combustion air blower fan on low combustion
air pressure.
Interlock SSL-1294 shuts down the heater on shutdown of the induced draft fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Burner/pilot flameout, potential inability to ignite the burners following

a flameout, resulting in a high concentration of combustibles in the
firebox, potential for an explosion that could result in potential injury
to personnel in medium-sized area and potential environmental
impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
13. Ensure that pressure indication PI-868 with low pressure alarm is on a routine
testing schedule.
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1732 that isolates the fuel gas from the heater on low-low fuel gas
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure from fuel gas supply

(OSBL).
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
None
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 13 to ensure that pressure indication PI-868 with low
pressure alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.8
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
See LOPA Recommendation 13 to ensure that pressure indication PI-868 with low
pressure alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

explosion that could result in potential injury to personnel in mediumsized area and potential environmental impacts in a small area
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Carryover of a liquid as a result of high 1 1.00E-01

level-fuel gas KO drum that could result in
liquid hydrocarbon pooling and fire in the
bottom of the firebox for the reformer
charge heater.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Pilot gas pressure indication PI-869 with

low pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm and local pressure
indication PI-866A.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to control valve FV- 1 1.00E-01

866 closing too far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to low pressure

fuel gas header.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to isolation valve

XV-1347A or B is closed.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
19.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1732
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential flameout H-1, potential firebox explosion, potential injury

to personnel in a medium-sized area and environmental impact in a
small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0862
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Control valves FV-858A/B closing too far. 1 1.00E-01

P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
None
Loop: F-0858
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0858
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0858
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0862
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

firebox, potential for an explosion that could result in injury to
personnel in a medium-sized area and potential environmental
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0858
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm located on the preheated
air duct to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-837 that starts the spare combustion air blower fan on low
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Burner/pilot flameout, potential inability to ignite the burners flowing a

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-052A
Loop: F-0858
None
None
Process Design
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-837 and SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
fan.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1731
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low pressure from fuel gas supply (OSBL)1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.8

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

concentration of the combustibles in the firebox, potential for an
explosion that could result in injury to personnel in a medium-sized
area and potential environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

level- fuel gas KO drum.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Isolation valve XV01346A or B is closed 1 1.00E-01

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.11
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

supply header
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
21.11
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential high firebox pressure if the induced draft fan trips or the
stack damper is closed. Burner/pilot flameout.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051B
Loop: F-0840
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

the heater.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
air pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure- fuel gas header (OSBL)
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1729
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.8

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure- fuel gas header
Intermittent Hazard
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Pilot gas indication PI-849 with low

pressure alarm
Other
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
LOPA Ratio
Com:
None
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.11
1.00E-01
None
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1724 that isolates the pilot gas form the heater on low-low pilot gas
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

level- fuel gas KO drum
Intermittent Hazard
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
1.00E-01
None
Other
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
LOPA Ratio
Com:
None
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.11
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.11
1.00E-01
None
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
23.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

pressure alarm on air duct to the heater.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-837 starts the spare combustion air blower on low combustion air
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Louver control valves PV-834A/B closing 1 1.00E-01

too far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Louver control valve PC-829 closing too 1 1.00E-01

far.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-04

low alarm.
1.00E-01

None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:

low alarm.
1.00E-01

None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-051-B
Loop: F-0850
None
None
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.2

low alarm.
1.00E-01

None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01

designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PSL-837 & SSL-1294
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure- fuel gas header (OSBL)
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1730
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-1730 that isolates the fuel gas from the heaters on low-low fuel gas
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Control valve FV-851 closing too far
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1730
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
1.00E-02
Blast doors.
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low alarm.
1.00E-01
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.8
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1730
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

level- fuel gas KO drum.
Intermittent Hazard
1 1.00E-01
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
1.00E-01
None
Other
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
LOPA Ratio
Com:
None
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to control valve FV- 1 1.00E-01

851 closing to far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
1.00E-01
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
PSLL-1724
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
1.00E-01
None
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

supply header.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Recommendation
None
Safety:
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

XV-1347A or B being closed.
Intermittent Hazard
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

low pressure alarm
1.00E-01
None
Other
Recommendation
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
LOPA Ratio
Com:
None
Independent
Protection
Layers
25.11
Safety:
0.010
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
SIS No:
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Overflow of liquid to the booster and/or recycle compressors,

resulting in mechanical damage, potentially leading to a release of
hydrogen and hydrocarbon at the compressors that could cause a
fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a large area and
potential environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-05
Low/no flow- naphtha from the product 1 1.00E-01

separator to the chloride scrubber due to
control valve LV-122 closing too far and/or
the pump tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
28.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
High level alarm LH-257.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
14. Ensure that high level alarm LH-257 is on a routine testing schedule.
15. Ensure that Interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the compressors on high high
level is designed for SIL 1.
16. Evaluate if Interlock LSHH-256 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2 and
Commercial CIL 3.
SIS No:
LSHH-256
SIS Function:
Interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the compressors on high high level.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Low/no flow- chloride scrubber.
Com:
1.00E-05
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
28.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 14 to ensure that high level alarm LH-257 is on a routine
testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 15 ensure that Interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the
compressors on high high level is designed for SIL 2.
See LOPA Recommendation 16 to evaluate if Interlock LSHH-256 should be designed
for Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL 2.
SIS No:
LHH-256; LSHH-256
SIS Function:
High-high level alarm LHH-256 and interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the
compressors on high-high level.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
28.1

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-05
Reverse flow- naphtha from the product 1 None

separator to the chloride scrubber due to
the pump tripping off.
(This consequence was evaluated and
Team agreed that it was not a credible
scenario)
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.000
Env:
0.000
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 14 to ensure that high level alarm LH-257 is on a routine
testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 15 ensure that Interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the
compressors on high high level is designed for SIL 2.
See LOPA Recommendation 16 to evaluate if Interlock LSHH-256 should be designed
for Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL 2.
SIS No:
LSHH-256
SIS Function:
High-high level alarm LHH-256 and interlock LSHH-256 that shuts down the
compressors on high-high level.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Release of hydrocarbon and/or hydrogen resulting in (a) a fire in the

firebox, potentially causing structural damage (e.g., collapse of the
heater stack) that may injure personnel and rupture process
equipment in a medium-sized area around the heater, (b) a fire
and/or explosion outside the heater that may injure personnel in a
medium-sized area, and (c) environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Compressor tripping off.
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-013B
Loop: F-0106
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
29.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
17. Ensure that interlock FSLL-106 is designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-106
SIS Function:
Interlock FSLL-106 that isolates the fuel gas to the charge heater and interheaters
on low low recycle hydrogen flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-013B
Loop: F-0106
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
29.2
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 17 to ensure that interlock FSLL-106 is designed for SIL
1.
SIS No:
FSLL-106
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Misdirected flow to the flare through

emergency dump valve HV-258.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID: 3165-1-50-013B
Loop: F-0106
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
29.2
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 17 to ensure that interlock FSLL-106 is designed for SIL
1.
SIS No:
FSLL-106
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential loss of containment if the pressure exceeds the pressure

rating of the equipment with a potential release of hydrogen that
could result in a potential fire and/or explosion that may injure
personnel in a large area and potential environmental impacts in a
small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-05
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
30.9
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV-1157 or PSV-1150.
PSV
1.00E-02
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.01
18. Ensure that Interlock PDSHH-171 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high-high
differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the first-stage and/or
Interlock PDSHH-175 that shuts down compressor C2-B on high high differential
pressure between the suction and discharge of the first stage are designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PHH-171; PDSHH-171
SIS Function:
High-high differential pressure alarm PHH-171 with Interlock PDSHH-171 that

shuts down compressor C-2A on high-high differential pressure between the
suction and discharge of the first-stage.
High differential pressure alarm PH-174, high high differential pressure alarm PHH175 with Interlock PDSHH-175 that shuts down compressor C2-B on high high
differential pressure between the suction and discharge of the first stage.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Overflow of liquid hydrocarbon to the second-stage of the booster

compressor, potentially resulting in mechanical damage and release
of hydrogen and hydrocarbon that could cause a fire and/or
explosion that may injure personnel in a large area and potential
environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-05
Bottoms line from the interstage KO drum 1 1.00E-01

to the depentanizer due to operator
error -- manual valve closed.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
32.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
LH-178 high level alarm.
None
Level indication LC-723 with high level

alarm.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
19. Ensure that LH-178 is on a routine testing schedule.

20. Ensure that LSHH-179 that shuts down the booster compressor on high-high level
is designed for SIL 1.
21. Evaluate if Interlock LSHH-179 should be designed for an Environmental EIL 2
and/or Commercial CIL 3.
SIS No:
LSHH-179
SIS Function:
LSHH-179 that shuts down the booster compressor on high-high level.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential loss of containment if the pressure exceeds the pressure

rating of the equipment, potential release of hydrogen that could
result in potential fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a
large area and potential environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Manual valve closed
Com:
1.00E-05
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
33.8
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
1.00E-02
PSV-1156R or PSV-1149R.
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.100
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.01
22. Ensure that PDSHH-173 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high-high
differential pressure between the suction and discharge lines and/or PDSHH-177 that
shuts down compressor C-2B on high-high differential pressure between the suction
and discharge lines is designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
PDSHH-173/177
SIS Function:
PDSHH-173 that shuts down compressor C-2A on high-high differential pressure

between the suction and discharge lines; PDSHH-177 that shuts down
compressor C-2B on high-high differential pressure between the suction and
discharge lines.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Carryover of liquid hydrocarbon to the TDP Unit, potentially resulting

in high level in the compressor suction drum (OSBL).
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Reverse flow due to booster compressor 1 1.00E-01

tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
This scenario was revisited during the

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
39.1
1 1.00E-01
None
Process Design
TDP Compressor Suction Drum (50C101) Level Control.
BPCS
1.00E-04
PSV
None
None
Op Response
None
LSH-180 high level alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 25 to confirm the level alarm for the TDP Compressor
Suction Drum is independent of the level control valve and is on a routine testing
schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 26 to ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a
SIS No:
LSHH-181
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Carryover of liquid hydrocarbon to the TDP Unit, potentially resulting

in high level in the compressor suction drum (OSBL).
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Low/no flow - bottoms from the high

1 1.00E-01
pressure separator to the interstage KO
drum due to operator error -- manual
valve closed.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
39.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
TDP Compressor Suction Drum (50C101) Level Control.
BPCS
1.00E-04
None
None
PSV
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
25. Confirm the level alarm for the TDP Compressor Suction Drum is independent of
the level control valve and is on a routine testing schedule.
26. Ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
SIS No:
LSHH-181
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Carryover of liquid hydrocarbon to the Unibon Unit, potentially

resulting in high level in the compressor suction drum (OSBL).
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Reverse flow due to booster compressor 1 1.00E-01

tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
39.1
1 1.00E-01
None
Process Design
Unibon Compressor Suction Drum
(13C1A/B) Level Control.
BPCS
1.00E-04
PSV
None
None
Op Response
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 23 to confirm the level alarm for the Unibon Compressor
Suction Drum (13C1A/B) is independent of the level control valve and is on a routine
testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 24 to ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a
SIS No:
LSHH-181
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Carryover of liquid hydrocarbon to the Unibon Unit, potentially

resulting in high level in the compressor suction drum (OSBL).
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Control valve LV-150 closing too far.
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
39.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
Unibon Compressor Suction Drum
(13C1A/B) Level Control.
BPCS
1.00E-04
None
None
PSV
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
23. Confirm the level alarm for the Unibon Compressor Suction Drum (13C1A/B) is
independent of the level control valve and is on a routine testing schedule.
24. Ensure that LSH-180 high level alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
SIS No:
LSHH-181
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Tube failure in depentanizer reboiler trim heater (H-5) resulting in

release of hydrocarbon that could result in (a) fire and/or explosion
that may injure personnel in a medium-sized area and (b)
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Low level, depentanizer.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID:3165-1-50-021
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
27. Consider adding an additional alarm to indicate loss of hydrogen and hydrocarbon
flow to (H-5) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine testing schedule.
28. Ensure that interlocks FSLL-783/784/785/786 are designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/786
SIS Function:
Interlocks FSLL-783/784/785/786 isolate the flue gas from the charge heater,
interheaters, and depentanizer reboiler trim heater on low low flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID:3165-1-50-021
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

of hydrogen and hydrocarbon flow to (H-5) on each pass and ensure it is on a routine
testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 28 to ensure that interlocks FSLL-783/784/785/786 are
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/786
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Misdirected flow to the raffinate splitter

bottom pump discharge line.
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID:3165-1-50-021
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

testing schedule.
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Control valves FV-783-786 closing too far. 1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID:3165-1-50-021
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

testing schedule.
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Pump tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard
P&ID:3165-1-50-021
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
LOPA Ratio
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

testing schedule.
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Plugged strainer in the pump suction line. 1 1.00E-01

P&ID:3165-1-50-021
None
Loop: F-0783, F-0784, F-0785, F-0786
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
49.2
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00

testing schedule.
designed for SIL 1.
SIS No:
FSLL-783/784/785/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1350
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1350
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure - fuel gas header
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1350
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.8
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1350
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

level- fuel gas KO drum due to operator
error -- failure to drain liquids from the
drum when needed
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Total loss of combustion air due to stack 1 1.00E-01

damper closing too far. Total loss of
combustion air due to combustion air
registers closed too far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

supply header
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to control valve FV-1 1.00E-01

Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

XV-1360A or B is closed.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
50.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1351
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

to personnel in a medium-sized area and potential environmental
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Manual valve closed
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1361
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Control valve FV-822 closing too far
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01

pressure alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1361
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Low pressure - fuel gas header
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.8
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1361
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Intermittent Hazard

None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
Blast doors.
1.00E-02
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.8
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSLL-1361
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

level - fuel gas KO drum failure to drain
liquids from the drum when needed.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to operator error -- 1 1.00E-01

manual valve closed.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Total loss of combustion air due to stack 1 1.00E-01

damper closing too far.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Isolation valve XV-1367A or B is closed
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04

supply header
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
1.00E-04
Low fuel pressure due to control valve FV-1 1.00E-01

Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04

XV- 1372A or B is closed.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Total loss of combustion air due to

combustion air registers closed too far.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
60.11
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

pressure alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSLL-1362
SIS Function:
pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Low/no seal oil flow to the compressor, damage to the compressor,

potentially leading to a release of hydrogen that could result in
potential fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a large
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Control valve LV-1437 closing too far.
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
72.2
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
0.001
1.00E-04
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
29. Consider bringing a low seal oil level alarm into DCS (independent of LV-1437).
30. Ensure that Interlock LSLL-38 that shuts down the compressor and prevents
restart on low-low level in the overhead seal oil tank and/or Interlock LSL-57 that starts
the auxiliary lube oil pump on low level in the overhead seal oil tank are designed for
SIL 2.
31. Evaluate if Interlock LSLL-38 and/or LSL-57 should be designed for Environmental
EIL 2 and Commercial CIL 3.
SIS No:
LSLL-38; LSL-57
SIS Function:
Interlock LSLL-38 that shuts down the compressor and prevents restart on low-low
level in the overhead seal oil tank. Interlock LSL-57 that starts the auxiliary lube
oil pump on low level in the overhead seal oil tank.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Low/no seal oil flow to the compressor, damage to the compressor,

potentially leading to a release of hydrogen that could result in
potential fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a large
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-05
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Local low level alarms LAL-57/58.
Local low-low level alarm LALL-38
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
None
Safety:
Recommendation
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
72.2
0.010
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
See Recommendation 29 to consider bringing a low seal oil level alarm into DCS
(independent of LV-1437).
See Recommendation 30 to ensure that Interlock LSLL-38 that shuts down the
compressor and prevents restart on low-low level in the overhead seal oil tank and/or
Interlock LSL-57 that starts the auxiliary lube oil pump on low level in the overhead seal
oil tank are designed for SIL 2.
See Recommendation 31 to evaluate if Interlock LSLL-38 and/or LSL-57 should be
designed for Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL 3.
SIS No:
LSLL-38; LSL-57
SIS Function:
Interlock LSLL-38 that shuts down the compressor and prevents restart on low-low
level in the overhead seal oil tank. Interlock LSL-57 that starts the auxiliary lube
oil pump on low level in the overhead seal oil tank.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Damage to the compressor, potentially leading to a release of

hydrogen that could result in potential fire and/or explosion that may
injure personnel in a large area and potential environmental impacts
in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Filter plugging.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
None
PAL-33 low pressure alarm.
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
72.9
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
32. Ensure that PAL-33 low pressure alarm is on a routine testing schedule.
33. Ensure that Interlock Interlock PSLL-32 shuts down compressor on low lube oil
pressure is designed for SIL 1.
34. Evaluate if Interlock PSL-40 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2 and
Commercial CIL3.
SIS No:
PSL-40
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-40 that starts the spare pump on low lube oil pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
72.9
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See Recommendation 32 to ensure that PAL-33 low pressure alarm is on a routine

testing schedule.
See Recommendation 33 to ensure that Interlock Interlock PSLL-32 shuts down
compressor on low lube oil pressure is designed for SIL 1.
See Recommendation 34 evaluate if Interlock PSL-40 should be designed for
Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL3.
SIS No:
PSLL-32
SIS Function:
Interlock PSLL-32 shuts down compressor on low lube oil pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Lube/seal oil pump tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
Recommendation
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
72.9
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See Recommendation 32 to ensure that PAL-33 low pressure alarm is on a routine

testing schedule.
See Recommendation 33 to ensure that Interlock Interlock PSLL-32 shuts down
compressor on low lube oil pressure is designed for SIL 1.
See Recommendation 34 evaluate if Interlock PSL-40 should be designed for
Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial CIL3.
SIS No:
PSL-40
SIS Function:
Interlock PSL-40 that starts the spare pump on low lube oil pressure.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Com:
Initiating Cause
Low level in the lube oil reservoir -- failure 1 1.00E-01

to fill the lube oil tank
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.8
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Low lube oil pressure alarm PAL-77/78.
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
See LOPA Recommendation 35 to ensure that low lube oil pressure alarm PAL-77/78
is on a routine testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 36 ensure Interlock PSL-79/80 that shuts down
Compressor is designed for SIL 1.
See LOPA Recommendation 37 to evaluate if PSL-77 should be designed for
SIS No:
PSL-77/78
SIS Function:
Low lube oil pressure alarm PAL-77/78 (local compressor panel and TDC) located
on C-2B with interlock PSL-79/80 that shuts down the Compressor.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Auxiliary lube oil pumps tripping off.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.8
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSL-77/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Filters plugging.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-03
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.8
None
None
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.01
35. Ensure that low lube oil pressure alarm PAL-77/78 is on a routine testing schedule.
36. Ensure Interlock PSL-79/80 that shuts down Compressor is designed for SIL 1.
37. Evaluate if PSL-77 should be designed for Environmental EIL 2 and Commercial
CIL 2.
SIS No:
PSL-77/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
1.00E-04
Env:
1.00E-04
Initiating Cause
Lube oil pump stops.
Intermittent Hazard

June 21 meeting.
None
None
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-04
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.8
Safety:
Recommendation
0.010
Env:
0.001
Com:
0.00
SIS No:
PSL-77/78
SIS Function:
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
0.00E+00
Env:
1.00E-03
Low level in the jacket water reservoir
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-03
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.12
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Low pressure alarm PAL-143 (local

compressor panel and TDC).
None
High jacket water discharge temperature

alarms TAH-85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92
(local compressor panel and TDC)
located on the first-stage compressor.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
38. Ensure that jacket water discharge temperature alarms TAH85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92 (local compressor panel and TDC) located on the first-stage
compressor are on a routine testing schedule.
39. Evaluate if TSHH-107/108/109/110 that shut down the compressor and prevent
compressor restart if there is a high-high gas discharge temperature from the secondstage should be designed for EIL 1 and CIL 1.
SIS No:
TSHH-107/108/109/110
SIS Function:
TSHH-107/108/109/110 that shut down the compressor and prevent compressor

restart if there is a high-high gas discharge temperature from the first-stage
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Damage to the compressor, potential flaring.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
0.00E+00
Env:
1.00E-03
Pump tripping off.
Com:
1.00E-03
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
73.12
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Low pressure alarm PAL-143 (local

compressor panel and TDC).
None
High jacket water discharge temperature

alarms TAH-85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92
(local compressor panel and TDC)
located on the first-stage compressor.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
Recommendation
1.000
Env:
0.010
Com:
0.01
See LOPA Recommendation 38 to ensure that jacket water discharge temperature

alarms TAH-85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92 (local compressor panel and TDC) located on the
first-stage compressor are on a routine testing schedule.
See LOPA Recommendation 39 to evaluate if TSHH-107/108/109/110 that shut down
the compressor and prevent compressor restart if there is a high-high gas discharge
temperature from the second-stage should be designed for EIL 1 and CIL 1.
SIS No:
TSHH-107/108/109/110
SIS Function:
TSHH-107/108/109/110 that shut down the compressor and prevent compressor

restart if there is a high-high gas discharge temperature from the second-stage.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
High level in vent drum No. 3 or 4, potentially leading to plugging of

the flow orifice in the off-gas line, resulting in high pressure - vent
drum, potential loss of containment if the pressure exceeds the
pressure rating of the equipment, potential release of catalyst,
nitrogen, and/or hydrogen that could result in potential fire and/or
explosion and thermal burn hazard that may injure personnel in a
medium-sized area, potential environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-03
Env:
1.00E-02
Sequence valves BV-4 or 15 opens too

soon or inadvertently opened.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
76.3
1 1.00E-01
None
Process Design
Master controller verifies valve positions
and shuts down the CCR if verification is
not obtained.
BPCS
1.00E-01
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
1.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSH-318; FSH-308
SIS Function:
FSH-318 that shuts down the CCR on high off-gas flow from vent drum No. 3;
FSH-308 that shuts down the CCR on high off-gas flow from vent drum No. 4
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential hydrogen carry through into the regenerator, resulting in

formation of an explosive mixture that could cause a fire and/or
explosion that may injure personnel in a medium-sized area,
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Nitrogen purging in lock hopper No. 1 is

inadequate.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
76.24
Process Design
1 1.00E-01
3 separate nitrogen purge cycles are

included in the PLC logic.
1.00E-01
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Master verify alarm.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSH-305-1/305-2
SIS Function:
FSL-304 that stops the purge cycle timer on low nitrogen flow to lock hopper No.
1; PSH-305-1/305-2 that shutdown the CCR if purge pressure permissives are not
net.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential backflow of hot combustion products into the Disengaging

Hopper from the regenerator, resulting in high temperature in the
Disengaging Hopper.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Low catalyst level occurs in the

Disengaging Hopper.
Com:
1.00E-03
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
77.3
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.01
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSL-354
SIS Function:
PSL-354 that shuts down the regenerator on low differential pressure between the
disengaging hopper and the regenerator.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential backflow of hot combustion products into the disengaging

hopper from the regenerator, resulting in high temperature in the
disengaging hopper, potential loss of containment if the temperature
exceeds the temperature limit of the equipment, potential release of
nitrogen and/or catalyst that could result in a thermal burn hazard
that may injure personnel in a small area, potential environmental
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Loss of nitrogen flow from the lift gas

blower occurs.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-03
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
77.4
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Temperature indication TI-370 with high

temperature alarm will give an early
indication if there is an uncontrolled burn
in the hopper.
1.00E-01
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-396
SIS Function:
FSL-396 that shuts down the regenerator on low nitrogen flow from the fines
remover blower.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential loss of containment if the temperature exceeds the

temperature limit of the equipment.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
High temperature occurs in the

regeneration zone of the regenerator.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.1
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Temperature indication TI-552-554 with

high temperature alarms
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
TSHH-371; TSHL-365
SIS Function:
TSHH-371 that shuts down the regenerator on high-high regeneration vapor

temperature; TSHL-365 that shuts down the regenerator on high chlorination gas
temperature.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Failure to burn coke off of the catalyst in the regeneration zone,

potentially leading to a high concentration of coke on the catalyst in
the chlorination zone, which may cause an explosion that may injure
personnel in a medium-sized area, potential environmental impacts
in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Com:
1.00E-03
Low/no flow of regeneration vapor occurs. 1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.6
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response

alarm located on the air line to the
regeneration blower.
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.00E-01
Safety:
10.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-384
SIS Function:
FSL-384 located on the outlet of the regenerator heater that shuts down the
regenerator on low regeneration vapor flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential high temperature in the regenerator due to localized hot

spots, potential loss of containment if the temperature exceeds the
temperature limit f the equipment, potential release of combustion
gases, nitrogen, and/or catalyst that could result in a thermal burn
hazard that may injure personnel in a small area, potential
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
The chlorination blower trips off.
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.8
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-363
SIS Function:
FSL-363 that shuts down the regenerator on low flow from the chlorination blower.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential high temperature in the regenerator due to localized hot

spots, potential loss of containment if the temperature exceeds the
temperature limit f the equipment, potential release of combustion
gases, nitrogen, and/or catalyst that could result in a thermal burn
hazard that may injure personnel in a small area, potential
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
The regeneration cooler blower trips off
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.9
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
XSL-385
SIS Function:
XSL-385 that shuts down the CCR if the blower trips.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential high temperature in the regenerator chlorination zone due

to localized hot spots, potential loss of containment if the
temperature exceeds the temperature limit f the equipment, potential
release of combustion gases, nitrogen, and/or catalyst that could
result in a thermal burn hazard that may injure personnel in a small
area, potential environmental impacts in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Low level occurs in the regenerator.
Intermittent Hazard
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.10
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
PDSL-354
SIS Function:
PDSL-354 that shuts down the regenerator on low differential pressure between
the disengaging hopper and the regenerator
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Formation of an explosive mixture in the regenerator, leading to an

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-02
Env:
1.00E-02
Com:
1.00E-03
Loss of nitrogen purge occurs during the 1 1.00E-01

black burn mode.
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
78.17
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
None
Safety:
1.000
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.01
Recommendation
SIS No:
TSH-377; FSL-341
SIS Function:
TSH-377 that shuts down the air heaters on high temperature; FSL-341 that shuts
down the CCR on low nitrogen purge gas flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
No credible causes identified.
Com:
0.00E+00
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
80.9
Process Design
1 1.00E-01

included in the PLC logic.
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
1.000
Safety:
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
PSH-345-1/345-2; FSL-304
SIS Function:
PSH-345-1/345-2 that shutdown the CCR if purge pressure permissives are not
met; FSL-304 that stops the purge cycle timer on low nitrogen flow to lock hopper
No. 1
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description

Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
1.00E-03
Env:
1.00E-02
Loss of nitrogen purge occurs to vent

drum No. 2 off-gas line.
Com:
1.00E-02
1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
80.10
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
None
Other
None
LOPA Ratio
Safety:
0.100
Env:
0.100
Com:
0.10
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-394
SIS Function:
FSL-394 that shuts down the CDR on low-low nitrogen flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
80.11
Reverse flow occurs in the reduction zone, high temperature,

potentially leading to release of hydrogen and catalyst if the
temperature exceeds the temperature limit of the equipment, which
may result in a fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a
Team agrees there is no credible consequences identified.
Target Frequency
Safety:
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
Initiating Cause
Loss of hydrogen lift gas occurs.
Intermittent Hazard
The Team did not feel that this was a

credible scenario.
None
None
Process Design
1 1.00E-01

included in the PLC logic
1.00E-01
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
1.00E-01
Master verify alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
0.00E+00
1 1.00E-01
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
Com:
Safety:
1.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-346
SIS Function:
FSL-346 that shuts down the CCR on low hydrogen lift gas flow.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
80.21
Reverse flow occurs in the reduction zone, high temperature,

potentially leading to release of hydrogen and catalyst if the
temperature exceeds the temperature limit of the equipment, which
may result in a fire and/or explosion that may injure personnel in a
Target Frequency
Safety:
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
Initiating Cause
Low level occurs in reactor No. 1

reduction zone.
Intermittent Hazard

credible scenario.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
1 1.00E-01
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Level indication LI-309 with low level
alarm
1.00E-01
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
0.00E+00
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
Op Response
Com:
Safety:
1.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
LSL-309
SIS Function:
LSL-309 that shuts down the CCR on low level in the reduction zone of reactor
No. 1
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
80.22
Potential oxygen carry through from lock hopper No. 2 into the
reduction zone of reactor No. 1, resulting in formation of an explosive
mixture in the regenerator, leading to an explosion that may injure
personnel in a medium-sized area, potential environmental impacts
in a small area.
Target Frequency
Safety:
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
Initiating Cause
Nitrogen purging in lock hopper No. 2 is

inadequate.
Intermittent Hazard

credible scenario.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
Process Design
1 1.00E-01

included in the PLC logic
1.00E-01
None
PSV
None
1.00E-01
Master verify alarm
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
0.00E+00
1 1.00E-01
BPCS
Op Response
Com:
1.000
Safety:
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-304; PSH-305-1/305-2
SIS Function:
FSL-304 that stops the purge cycle timer on low nitrogen flow to lock hopper No.1;
PSH-305-1/305-2 that shutdown the CCR if purge pressure permissives are not
met
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
80.29
High temperature, potentially leading to release of hydrogen and

catalyst if the temperature exceeds the temperature limit of the
equipment, which may result in a fire and/or explosion that may
injure personnel in a medium-sized area, potential environmental
Target Frequency
Safety:
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
Com:
Initiating Cause
Reverse flow occurs in the reduction zone.1 1.00E-01
Intermittent Hazard

credible scenario.
None
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Temperature indication TI-500 with high

temperature alarm
Other
LOPA Ratio
0.00E+00
1.00E-01
None
Safety:
1.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
TSH-311
SIS Function:
TSH-311 that shuts down the CCR on high reduction zone temperature.
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

PHAName
PHA Ref.
TOTAL NHT REVAL
Consequence
Description
Potential backflow of hydrogen into the nitrogen system from the

nitrogen supply line to lock hopper No. 2, resulting in an explosion
that may injure personnel in a small-sized area, potential
Target Frequency
Safety:
Initiating Cause
0.00E+00
Env:
0.00E+00
Com:
Intermittent Hazard
Loss of nitrogen supply pressure occurs. 1 1.00E-01

This event requires multiple failures and is None
not credible.
1 1.00E-01
Process Design
None
BPCS
None
PSV
None
Op Response
Low nitrogen flow switch FSL-341 that

alarms and shuts down the CCR
1.00E-01
None
Other
LOPA Ratio
0.00E+00
None
Person Present
Independent
Protection
Layers
80.30
Safety:
1.000
Env:
1.000
Com:
1.00
Recommendation
SIS No:
FSL-344
SIS Function:
Low nitrogen flow switch FSL-344 that alarms and shuts down the CCR
EIL Level:
CIL Level:

2007-04 NHT Reformer LOPA

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Layer of

NHT Reformer Unit

DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

Study Team ..................................................................................................................... 1

Study Dates ..................................................................................................................... 2

LOPA METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 2

Scenario Identification ..................................................................................................... 4

Consequence Severity Evaluation.................................................................................. 4

Initiating Cause Likelihood Evaluation ............................................................................ 5

Independent Protection Layers (IPL) Evaluation............................................................ 7

Rules for Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) .......................................................... 10

Vulnerability Factors ...................................................................................................... 12

Intermittent Hazard (Not Always Present) .................................................... 10

Ignition Probability ......................................................................................... 12

LOPA Calculation .......................................................................................................... 12

SIS EVALUATION ......................................................................................................................... 13

LOPA WORKSHEETS .................................................................................................................. 18

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

Study Team ..................................................................................................................... 1

Hazard Scenario Target Frequencies............................................................................. 4

Initiating Causes & Likelihood (ICLs) of Failure ............................................................. 6

Examples of Safeguards Not Usually Considered IPLs ................................................ 8

Integrity Levels (SILs) for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) ..................................13

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Determination ....................................................................13

LOPA Flowchart .............................................................................................................. 3

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Review the HAZOP to determine if the safeguards identified were adequate

The LOPA Study Team is identified in Table 1.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

EE & Systems Supervisor

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

Rotating Equipment Engineer

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

Fac. Dev. E&I

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

Process Sup. Engineer

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

TOTAL Petrochemicals USA, Inc.

A Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology. Put

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

RRS Engineering, LLC

Project No. 07-099

NHT Reformer Unit

Consequence Severity Evaluation