G.R. No.

147589
June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court.

1.
2.
3.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.

Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the
case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine
proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation
to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court.
The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party
lists.

BANAT VS COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

shall

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2%
of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled
to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat,
must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further,
the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of partylists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there
shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to PartyList Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists
which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets
a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation
will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes
cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it
is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for partylists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats.
The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list
but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the
voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was
not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties
cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under
the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from
the party-list representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for partylist solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional
seats for concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented
in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold
is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the
elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party
is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties
with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue
of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495 (September 3, 1998)

Posted on October 4, 2012
G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157
September 3, 1998
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992.
On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he
ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
re-elected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja,
Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would
already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible
to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution
and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official
was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the
elections against Borja.
Issue:
Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the
term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the official concerned was
elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor
and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On
the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative
serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full (when he
succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection
would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish
to govern them. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order
was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by
herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in
violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive
suspension can pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself
disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification to
run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus has its
complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the
Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of
the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth
term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent against
an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third
term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought
about by certain events or causes.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed
a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in
their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that
the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted
that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies
for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections

Background of the case
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an
effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the
May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December
of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners
application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll
bodys denial to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the
disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a
mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
THE RULING
In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpios ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54
petitions and remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the
41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make it to the
2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body
merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but
may not participate in the May 2013 elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings
(Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings
enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system.
New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May 2013 party-list race and
subsequent party-list elections
The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate
in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized or underrepresented sector.'
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and
no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are
not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or
party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an independent sectoral party linked
to a political party through a coalition.
The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented sectors come in?
The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system.

The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political constituencies. The high court went
on to enumerate marginalized and underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only to the
sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that [a] majority of the members of the
sectoral parties or organizations must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent.' The same is true for those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they must
either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.
Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified,
the party or organization itself will not be disqualified provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
The party-list system, according to the Decision
Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not intend to leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to
sectoral groups.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system In
fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal
to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list
system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list
System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector
Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that
they are not one and the same.
Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum

As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v.
Comelec (http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/147589_decision.htm) and BANAT v. Comelec
(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/179271.htm).
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states that while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that there was an inherent
inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties
should represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified these
major parties from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections even if through their allied sectoral organizations.

Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections.
Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system
wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or over represented.

Issues:
a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
b.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors and
organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court
directed the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.

a.Yes
b.No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and
RA 7941, private respondents cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that
they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list
system of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section
3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and
RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-listsystem is not self-executory. It
is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus
up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet
to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs Law
Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was
the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelecs
reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of
the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941
that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications
defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees
of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that
the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections
and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named
in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution;
and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for
certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be

decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the
evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of
R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on
the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest
are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no
national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate
demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.

Tolentino vs comelec

41 SCRA 702 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Doctrine of Proper Submission
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to lower
the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision)
had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people. Such
is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire
constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a
proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the
rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed
amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the
same time, NOT piecemeal.

David v COMELEC
FACTS:
David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa
Pilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second
Monday of May 1997. Meanwhile, Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition to
seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2)
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on
May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; and, (3) The budgetary appropriation of P400 million
contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997) intended to defray the costs
and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections.
Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although the
LGC reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not
apply to barangay officials.
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.
ISSUES & HELD:
Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 7160 3 years)
Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional? (YES)
Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
RATIO:
Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between
two laws, the later enactment prevails. (Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.)
During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and directly
elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads (as in the Code).
In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million
to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189,
Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the barangay
elections in 1997. These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997. This judicial
decision is part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8).
RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and
definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three years.
It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the
second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials.
It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay officials is: As may be determined by
law; more precisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their term to 3
years).

Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms

Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were
elected to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC. Petitioners
belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable
because under NCC 3, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.