Reflections on the Trinity

February 17, 2009

I have been continuing to mull over the Monarchy of the Father, and its relationship to

the homoousion. In the order of explanation, Western teaching does seem to “begin” with the

divine essence and from there proceeds to a consideration of the three divine persons. This seems

to be the most reasonable course to follow. However, it seems inconsistent with the creedal data,

which begin with God the Father Almighty, i.e., the First Person of the Trinity. How can these

two approaches be reconciled? I believe the answer lies in the purpose of the different kinds of

documents. The Creeds are an example of concrete, “naïve” realism, while documents like the

Summae of St. Thomas are examples of more abstract, “critical” realism. The Creeds are a form

of direct address to God (at baptism), who exists concretely and in fact as three persons, i.e.,

there is no separate divine essence whom one addresses (unless the entire Trinity is meant). The

Summae, on the other hand, are reflections on God as perceived in manifold form by the human

intellect. The divine essence, as an item possessed in common by the three divine persons, can be

considered in abstraction from the divine persons, and is also knowable by natural reason, while

the three divine persons are not.

All of this is affirmed by the classical “Eastern” doctrine of the Trinity. The Greek

Fathers, in their catechetical lectures, always begin their expositions of the Creeds with an

affirmation of the unity of God, and then discuss the Trinity of Persons. The (later) Greek

Fathers all have a relational understanding of divine personhood, a generic understanding of the

divine essence (which according to Richard Cross is not metaphysically distinct from the

Augustinian-Western view), and hold that the Father is the productive source of the Son and the

Holy Spirit. With all these similarities between the classical Eastern and Western views, why

have modern Eastern Orthodox theologians jumped on Rahner’s bandwagon? I believe it is

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because Rahner’s criticism of the placement of the treatise De Deo uno prior to De Deo trino

(because this supposedly prioritizes the divine substance over the divine persons and thus renders

the latter irrelevant to salvation history, a gross misunderstanding) fits nicely with the Photian

argument against the filioque, i.e., that the sharing of the causal power to spirate the Holy Spirit

between the Holy Spirit makes the latter a production of the divine essence rather than a divine

person. Regardless of the philosophical arguments put forward by modern Eastern Orthodox

apologists in favor of denying the filioque, the fact is that the patristic Greek tradition universally

accepted some form of per filium view of the Spirit’s procession from the Father. Something like

Photius’s formula ek monou tou Patros would have been very far removed from their minds if it

were interpreted as excluding the Son from an active role in the Spirit’s procession (since a

passive participation would imply a dissimilarity of nature between the Father and the Son).

What one does find in the early tradition which it was left to later Fathers to correct is a

“derivation” view of the relationship between the Father on one hand and the Son and the Holy

Spirit on the other hand. In Richard Cross’s analysis, on this view the Father and the divine

essence completely “overlap,” i.e., there are no properties of the Father that are not also

properties of the divine essence, and vice versa. The metaphysical constitution of the Son is then

the divine essence + the property of filiation, and the constitution of the Holy Spirit is the divine

essence + the property of spiration. This view succeeds in making the divine essence an item

common to the three persons but fails to explain how the Son and the Holy Spirit originate from

the Father since the Father has no properties of his own. If one then adds that the Father

generates the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit, then one has all the data necessary for a

fully-fledged trinitarian theology, but at the cost of coherence, since is simultaneously affirming

and denying that the Father possesses properties other than those possessed in common by the

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three divine persons, the divine essence. It was this internal incoherence, I believe, which led in

the Fourth Century to the Arian controversy. One solution to the problem posed by the derivation

model is to assert that the Father and the Son possess no properties in common, and this is

exactly the Arian view. Or one can assert that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess all things

in common except their personal properties, and this is the generic or Western view. The original

derivation view, born as it was out of Platonic metaphysics, is thus far more likely to prioritize

the divine essence over the persons, than is the generic/Western view.

From all this it should be clear that calls from notable theologians like Walter Cardinal

Kasper and Metropolitan John Zizioulas to think of the Father as “the one God” are built upon a

straw-man: the idea that a shared divine essence somehow creates a quaternity and that this

fourth thing in God in some way “causes” God the Father! What Rahner, Kasper, and others are

really advocating is collapsing the treatises De Deo uno and De Deo trino into one treatise. But

one’s options regarding treating the relationship between God the Father and the divine essence

are the same as they are in the Thomistic method. Either God the Father includes a relational

property not shared by the other divine persons, or God the Father simply is the divine essence,

as in the derivation models. All of the theologians mentioned above adhere to some form of the

Western view (including Zizioulas) of the divine essence, so the divine essence will still have to

be treated as a shared property whether it comes before or after the treatment of God the Father.

In other words, the practical result will be the same either way the treatises are arranged: the

difference lies merely in the methodological utility of the arrangement. Nothing earth-shattering

will occur as a result of changing the arrangement of the treatises.

It is also clear to me now why the doctrine of the Trinity has intrinsic value for us:

because it shows us the divine perfection in a way that merely natural knowledge of God could

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never, and since whatever is most perfect is the final object of desire, the doctrine of the Trinity,

when properly understood, should cause in us an increase in charity.

I have also been reconsidering Newman’s theory of development.

February 18, 2009

I stayed up a little later than I should have last night, and decided to re-read Richard

Cross’s excellent book Duns Scotus on God. After reading the Introduction and the first chapter

(Medieval Theories of Causation), I re-read a portion of Walter Cardinal Kasper’s book The God

of Jesus Christ, namely, the section on “God, the Father Almighty,” in order to compare it with

Cross’s work. In my comparison, the meaning of Rahner’s thesis became that much clearer. In

their doctrine of God, both Rahner and Kasper are thinking in terms of the linkage between three

elements: (1) the Divine Nature, (2) the Three Divine Persons, and (3) the World. Their thesis is

that the relation between God and the World is established by linking 1 with 3, and bypassing 2

altogether. Their proposed solution is to move 1 “inside” 2, so that 3 is never related to God

without also being related to the divine persons. Yet is this not an admission that the Trinity, the

three-ness of God considered apart from the divine essence, has no connection with the world?

Furthermore, as stated, the thesis is simply false.

To understand this more fully, we need to analyze the portions of the treatises in

question. The most basic distinction is that between the Uncreated and the created, between God

and the World. In God, there is a (rational) distinction between God insofar as He is one, and

God insofar as He is three. For the World, we have the distinctions between the inanimate and

the animate, the irrational and the rational, angels and humans, and finally, the works of God in

relation to humans: conservation, reconciliation, redemption, and restoration (resurrection). The

relation between God and the World is also to be conceived as asymmetrical: the relation from

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the world to God is real, but the relation from God to the World is merely rational. God relates

to creatures by relating to their eternal forms as exemplars, existing in perfect identity with the

divine intellect. If this were not the case, then God would be dependent on creatures for his

knowledge of them, which is repugnant to the idea of a First Cause. The fourfold work of God

mentioned above is what is commonly meant by the “economy of salvation,” and includes the

Incarnation of the Son of God, the Crucifixion and Resurrection, and the life of grace in the

sacraments of the Church.

In his thesis, Rahner has made the illicit move of attributing all that is covered in the

treatises on Creation and Man to the treatise De Deo uno, when in fact all of these themes are

covered after the treatise De Deo trino. The relations of creatures to their creator is thus at every

step illumined by the treatise De Deo trino. We will use creation here as an example:

There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was
necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word
excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. When we say that in
Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed
them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness.
So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God
said, Let there be light," to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that it was
good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In
another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,
accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.1

Further in the Summa, St. Thomas states:

To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent
produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must
be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is,
His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one
Person, but is common to the whole Trinity. Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the
nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above
(14, 8; 19, 4), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman
works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some
object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and
through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of
the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.2

1
ST Ia Q. 32, art. 1, ad 3
2
ST Ia Q. 45, art. 6, resp.

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The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.3

As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of
order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from
both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons, belongs to them
in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to
be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of creation
from another. And of the Son it is said (John 1:3), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch
as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a
mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle." But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power
from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father
through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the
common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (39, 8, ad 3), to
the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed
to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent
acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is
appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end,
and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the
end, and goodness.4

Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the
causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a
"trace": for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the
cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue
of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of "image." Now the
processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above
(Article 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as
love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the
representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word
conceived, and the love proceeding. But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity,
inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine
Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it
is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created
substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the
Father, Who is the "principle from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it
represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman.
According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because
the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine
says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one
individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and according as it "has a certain relation
of order." And to these also are reduced those three, "number," "weight," and "measure,"
mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing
limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species, "weight" refers to the order. And to these
three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," "species,"
and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which exists; whereby it is
distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and
agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.5

3
ST Ia Q. 45, art. 6, ad 1
4
ST Ia Q. 45, art. 6, ad 2
5
ST Ia Q. 45, art. 7, resp.

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February 19, 2009

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange notes how the doctrine of the Trinity not only perfects

our natural knowledge of God as Creator, but also has intrinsic value as showing us the

perfection of the being of God:

The second reason supporting the traditional view is that the revelation of the Trinity has intrinsic
value for us and is of the greatest importance for the supernatural knowledge of God in His
intimate life and immanent operations. St. Thomas taught: "Revelation most properly defines God
inasmuch as He is the highest cause, teaching not only that which is knowable by creatures but
also communicating how He is known to Himself alone and to others in revelation."[26] This is
primarily the Godhead Himself, or the intimate life of God, which is properly made known by the
revelation of the Trinity. In the Trinity we see the infinite and eternal fecundity of the divine
nature, which is communicated by the Father to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost by the Father and
the Son. The Protestant theologians mentioned above say that the mystery of the Trinity is an
enigma without meaning for our interior life, but the traditional theologians say that in this
mystery of the Trinity we come to some knowledge of the most perfect intellectual life, that is in
the three persons, who in the same divine truth live by the same act of pure intelligence which is
subsisting intelligence itself. So also in this mystery there is some manifestation of the supreme
life of charity in the love of the three divine persons, who in the same infinite goodness live by the
same act of pure love, which is subsisting love itself. Here we have the supreme model of our
supernatural life, the love of the three divine persons, since our adoptive sonship is the image
participating in the eternal filiation of the only-begotten Son.[27] For so Christ prayed for us to the
Father: "That they may be one, as We also are" (John 17:11); and St. Paul writing to the Romans
said: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His
Son; that He might be the first-born among many brethren."[28] Christ our Lord pointed out the
importance of the mystery of the Trinity when He said: "But I have called you friends; because all
things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you, "[32] and "Father, I will
that where I am, they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me; that they may see My
glory which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before the creation of the
world."[33] These words refer primarily to the eternal generation of the Word. Indeed the act and
the fruit of charity is that rejoicing in God because God is infinitely perfect in Himself.[34] 6 This
joy, however, is greatly increased by the knowledge of God's inner life and His infinite fecundity.
This is what St. Paul meant, writing to the Colossians: "That their hearts may be comforted, being
instructed in charity, and unto all riches of fullness of understanding, unto the knowledge of the
mystery of God the Father and of Christ Jesus: in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and
knowledge."[35] When theologians abandon the contemplation of divine things, they say that the
revelation of the mystery of the Trinity is of no intrinsic value for us, that it is useful only to
prevent contradictions in the enunciation of other mysteries. And because of this trend theology
gradually became anti-contemplative. Men began to write books of theology devoid of
contemplation and piety, just as if they were to write books of piety devoid of doctrine. The
Fathers of the Church and the great doctors, on the contrary, looked on the mystery of the Trinity
as having the greatest importance for us. The tract on the Trinity, of course, was not purely
practical like the tracts on penance and matrimony, but it afforded the greatest help in attaining the
higher stages of contemplation and union with God. Amid his tribulations, St. Hilary, writing of
the Trinity, said: "The persecution of men is a small thing because the persecutors cannot touch
the divine persons nor diminish their joy." A friend rejoices in the joy of his friend, and the just
6
Cf. ST IIaIIae Q. 28, art. 1, ad 3: “There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the
Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy
is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look
forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according
to the measure of one's charity.”

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man rejoices in the beatitude of God. All the great doctors who wrote about the Trinity, from St.
Athanasius to St. Thomas, were true contemplatives, deeply concerned not only with purely
practical human affairs but also with divine things, with the divine life itself, the knowledge and
love of which is the beginning of eternal life. By the revelation of the Trinity we are given the
supernatural knowledge of God, as distinct from natural knowledge; and immediately the
distinction of the two orders of knowledge becomes clearer. This was the great argument against
Baius, who denied the essential distinction between nature and grace, as if grace were something
owing to nature.[36] This distinction between the two orders stood out so clearly in the revelation
of the dogma of the Trinity that some rationalists taught that the tract on the one God contained all
that could be said about God. Consequently the Protestant liberals, who are rationalists in a sense,
no longer mention the Trinity, speaking exclusively of the unity of God, and therefore came to be
known as Unitarians.7

St. Thomas also wrote that the love of love itself is part of the virtue of charity, and since

God is Supreme Love Itself, it follows that he is supremely lovable:

The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are
said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since
the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom
whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally
we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common
among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to
this has been to some an occasion of error.8

Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love
itself." But we love our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out
of charity.9

But the love of God, and our knowledge that God is Love, is perfected by our knowledge

of the Trinity, in which there is the Lover (the Father), the Beloved (the Son), and the Bond of

Love between Them (the Holy Spirit). This is a fair approximation of Richard of St. Victor’s

argument for the Trinity.10

To return to Rahner’s thesis, we can now see that his (unstated) assumption that the

Trinity has no significance for the economy of salvation apart from the treatise De Deo uno is

false, that the Trinity has significance for our knowledge of God as Creator (i.e., in relation to us)

and as He is in Himself. The separate treatise De Deo trino contributes positive elements both to

the doctrine of God and to the doctrine of Creation not found in De Deo uno. I would also submit

7
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. The Trinity and God the Creator.
8
ST IIaIIae Q. 23, art. 2, ad 1
9
ST IIaIIae Q. 25, art. 2, sed contra
10
Cf. The Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 2

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that collapsing the two treatises into one is liable to introduce confusion rather than clarity. If we

collapse the treatises into one, and treat of the essence of God in the treatise on God the Father,

we risk confusing what is common in God with what is proper in God. Take God’s Fatherhood,

for example. Kasper is concerned that God’s eternal Fatherhood will become disconnected from

his Fatherhood of his creatures. But, if we collapse the two treatises, as both Rahner and Kasper

advocate, do we not risk confusing the two forms of Fatherhood, one of which is essential, and

thus belong to the entire Trinity, and the other of which is personal, belonging to only one

person? Keeping the two treatises separate would seem to be a good way to prevent this type of

confusion from occurring.

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