SHMUEL SAMBURSKY

PLACE AND SPACE IN LATE NEOPLATONISM*

THREE basic notions characterize the physical world, namely space, time and
matter, the first of which is usually held by scientists to be simpler than the
other two. The history of physics and philosophy has shown, however, that
even the concept of space abounds with difficulties, to which the doctrines of
the later Neoplatonic philosophers form an impressive witness. It is proposed
to give here a brief survey of the theories of topos, meaning variously place
or space, from Iamblichus at the beginning of the fourth century to
Simplicius in the middle of the sixth. Although most of their treatises were
clad in the modest garb of commentaries on works by Plato or Aristotle, the
ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly represent one of the peaks of sophistication
and metaphysical acumen in the whole history of philosophy.
The deliberations and inquiries of these philosophers on the concept of
topos took place against a long historical background, spanning nearly a
thousand years from the Presocratics to Plotinus. A short synopsis, however
condensed, of the earlier developments of the concept will serve as a useful
introduction, leading up to the period in which Iamblichus and his successors
started to elaborate their ideas on topos. This summary will be concerned with
merely the conceptual aspects of the subject and thus will not adhere to a
strict chronological order.
First, the two opposed conceptions of Democritus and Aristotle must be
mentioned. For Democritus, space was the infinite extension of the void,
making possible the free movement of the atoms of matter and their various
collisions. While collisions were characteristic of the very nature of matter as
sheer resistance, the void, and thus space, was the embodiment of the sheer
lack of resistance.
Aristotle, on the other hand, who had many weighty
reasons for rejecting the existence of a void, regarded the world as the sum
total of the places of adjacent bodies, which constitute, in their totality, a
three-dimensional material continuum. As a result of their movement, the
relative positions of all of these bodies change with time. Since a place and the
body occupying that place are intrinsically linked with each other, Aristotle
rejected the definition of place as the volume occupied by a body. For, since
the body itself has a volume, i.e. is three-dimensionally
extended, this
definition would lead to the idea that one material volume could coincide with
another, in other words, that two places could simultaneously be in the same
*The Neoplatonic texts discussed in this paper form part of a forthcoming collection of texts
and translations on this topic.
H. Diels, Die Fragmenteder Vorsokratikep. 68A, 40.
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 8 (1977). No. 3. Printed in Great Britain.
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place, an obvious absurdity. This led to Aristotles definition of place as the

inner boundary of all the bodies encompassing a body situated in that place.2
An important corollary of this definition, one which follows from the finite
extent of Aristotles universe, was drawn by Aristotle himself: no place can be
assigned to the universe as a whole, since there does not exist a body
encompassing it.3
Despite the extreme antithesis between Democritus theory of the void and
Aristotles theory of place, they have one common feature - the conception
of space or place as a merely passive entity. With Democritus this passivity
appears when he defines the void as a complete lack of resistance, while
Aristotles purely geometrical definition of place as the encompassing boundary
also has an outspokenly passive character. In contrast, the notion of
encompassing
has a definite tinge of activity in the utterances of some
Presocratic philosophers. Anaximenes, who regarded air as the first principle
of all things, said: As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so do breath
and air encompass the whole universe. Some of Heraclitus statements
emphasize the superiority of that which encompasses,
such as: That
which encompasses us is rational and wise. Elsewhere he expressly states
that the origin of mans reason is to be found in the rational nature of what
encompasses.G One may also add what Aristotle himself said about the
relation between the encompassing and encompassed: The encompassing is
like form, while the encompassed is like matter.
In the context of this paper, Platos conception of space or room (chore) is
obviously of special importance. In spite of the difficulties inherent in his
allegorical language, the active character of Platos space cannot be denied.
To be sure, space ranks on a level of reality lower than that of Being, of the
realm of Forms, but it ranks on a higher level than Becoming, i.e. the physical
world. Inasmuch as space cannot be grasped by the senses, it has an affinity to
the intelligible Forms, although inasmuch as it is the receptacle of all their
copies, i.e. of changing particulars, it is similar to Becoming. Nor is space a
merely passive receptacle of Becoming, but rather the nurse of all Becoming;
in other words, it has a definitely active function in giving shape to everything
contained in it, so that in Platos conception of space, matter and space merge
into one another. Incidentally, one should not overlook the lack of symmetry
between Platos conceptions of space and time. Time is the moving image of
eternity,g and thus its level is that of things becoming, while that of space is
Aristotle, Phys. 212a, 6.
Ibid. 212b, 22.

Diels, 13B, 2.
5Sextus, Adv. moth. VII, 127.
Ibid. VIII, 286.
Aristotle, De Caelo 312a, 12.
Plato, Timaeus 47e-52d; choru is introduced at 52a.
Ibid. 37a.

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intermediate between Being and Becoming. We shall come back to this

asymmetry later on.
The developments which took place in the notion of fopos during the
Hellenistic period threw into relief the active aspect of fopos and of what
encompasses. They had various origins, but their interaction brought about
a crystallization of ideas which prepared the ground for the Neoplatonic
doctrines. Admittedly, in the physics of the early Stoics the notion of place
was restricted in meaning to signifying a region which is fully or partly occupied
by matter, thus making place merely secondary to bodies in place.O However,
another aspect of the Stoic doctrine, as well as of the Neopythagorean
philosophy following in the wake of the Stoics, did further the tendency to
see place as an active entity, and at the same time gave rise to an association
between the notions of place and the universe.
In broad outline, the following is the picture which emerges from the few
fragments which have survived from the two or three hundred years of this
critical period. The pantheism of the Stoics led to the identification of the
universe with God. This is confirmed by various sources, and it suffices to
quote Cicero: Chrysippus said that the universe itself is God. Sextus
quotes Zeno: The rational is superior to the irrational, and the ensouled
superior to the soulless. However, nothing is superior to the universe, and
thus it is endowed with reason and soul. This parallelism had originally a
definitely materialistic tinge, for the world-soul, the divine logos, was the active
pneumu, the total mixture of fire and air, which completely penetrated the
whole material universe and thereby endowed it with coherence and prevented
its dispersion in the infinite surrounding void; the latter and the material
cosmos together made up the space of Stoic physics. In the consciousness of
later generations of Hellenism, however, a gradual change in the significance
of pneuma took place. From having originally been a tenuous stuff or corporeal
breath, it was transformed into abstract and incorporeal spirit, as can also be
shown by many quotations from the Old and New Testaments.
Two important fragments ascribed to Archytas, but in fact deriving from
an unknown Neophythagorean philosopher, give some indication as to how
the connection between topos and the universe as a whole was established.
The first fragment emphasizes the superiority of place for the reason that
without it bodies are unable to move. The association of place and movement
points to the wider significance of the former as that in which the latter occurs:
Since all things in motion are moved in some place, it is obvious that one has
to attribute superiority to the place in which things are moving or being acted
Cf. von Amim, Stoic. vef. fr. II. 504, 505 (Aetius,
K 3).
Cicero, De not. deor. I, 39.
Sextus, Adv. mafh. IX, 104.

Depfuc.Phil. I, 20, 1; Sextus, Adv. math.

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upon. Thus, perhaps, it is the first of all things, since all existing things are
either in place or not without place.13
In the second fragment, topos clearly alludes to the pan, the whole material
universe of the Stoics: It is peculiar to place that everything is contained in it,
while place is contained in nothing. For were it in another place, this place
would itself again be in another one, and this will go on ad infinitum. For that
very reason, it is necessary for everything to be in place and for place to be in
nothing. Thus its relation to existing things is always that of the boundaries to
things bounded. For the place of the whole universe is the boundary of all
existing things.
Apart from this development in the conception of the divine Stoic universe,
we have to take into account the old significance of place in the religions
of the Middle East, as a holy site or the dwelling place of a god, where he
happens to reveal himself to man. Such places were often hills or trees,15 as is
amply documented in the Bible and occasionally also in Greek literature. Thus
Socrates says to Phaedrus, while they are sitting under the plane tree near the
Ilissus: This place seems to be a holy place. As to the Bible (where such a
holy site is called maqom, or topos in the Septuagint), two examples will
suffice. Firstly: Abram passed through the land unto the place of Sichem,
unto the plane of Moreh... And the Lord appeared unto Abram...
Secondly, the story of Jacob? dream: He lighted upon a certain place and
tarried there all night;* later on Jacob exclaimed: Surely the Lord is in this
place, and 1 knew it not.. .this is none other but the house of God.19
Simplicius tells us that Atargatis, the goddess of fertility, and Isis, the
Egyptian goddess, were called the place of gods, because they comprise
the specific properties of many gods.O As Jewish monotheism became
gradually purified from anthropomorphic elements and increasingly abstract,
the place of the God of Israel as well as God Himself were identified with the
whole universe, that entity identified in Stoic pantheism with the Supreme Being.
The various components of this development are reflected in Philos
commentary on Jacobs dream. Here he ascribes three meanings to place:
(1) place is the room filled by a body; (2) place is the divine logos, which God
Himself has totally filled with incorporeal powers; (3) God Himself is called
place, for He encompasses the universe, but is not encompassed by anything.
Simplicius, Cuteg. 361.21-24.
Ibid.

363.22-24.

Jeremiah iii, 6.
Plato, Phuedrus 238~.
Genesis xii, 6-7.
Ibid. xxviii, 11. The AV obsoletely spells plain(e).
Ibid. xxviii, 17-18.
OSimplicius, Phys. 641, 33.
Philo, DeSomniis 1,61-64 (ed. Cohn and Wendland. III, 218, 10-24).

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A few centuries later the same figure of speech, reminiscent of the second
fragment of Pseudo-Archytas,
is to be found in Jewish exegetic literature:
Why is God called place? Because He is the place of the world, while the world
is not His place.22 Place as a synonym for God became a generally accepted
expression in the Hebrew language from the first centuries of the Christian era
onwards.
This brief survey must also take note of one more important development.
The asymmetry in the levels of reality of space and time, mentioned above in
connection with Platos cosmology, was finally eliminated by Plotinus. He
expressly distinguished between physical space, which is the receptacle of
matter and thus has a lower rank than the matter and bodies in it,2 and
intelligible space, which is the very source of Soul and Intellect.2 Thus a
hypostatic equality was established between intelligible space and intelligible
time, later the main pillar of Iamblichus ontology of time.25 Since every
hypostatic level participates to some extent in that above it, it follows that
physical space is endowed with some of the properties of intelligible space,
though to a restricted degree only.
It is on this conception that the intellectual theory of space of Iarnblichus
is based, as Simplicius terms it, who also quotes from Iamblichus commentaries on the Timaeus as follows: . . .Space came into existence naturally united
with bodies [...I And therefore the Timaeus reasonably introduces space
primarily along with the beginning of the existence of bodies. For they who
do not make space akin to cause, but drag it down to the boundaries of surfaces
or to empty receptacles, or indeed to extensions of what kind soever, introduce
foreign notions as well as miss the whole purpose of the Timaeus, which
always associates nature with creation. Thus, in the same way as Plato primarily
introduced bodies as akin to cause, one must also regard space as linked to the
cause to which the Timaeus has guided us. And in the same way as we tried to
interpret time as being of the same nature as the creation, one has to explain
space to0.27
Iamblichus here emphasizes the inseparable bond between space and
matter, as well as the superiority of space to matter, since space is the active
cause of the coherence of bodies. In this connection Iamblichus uses figures
of speech which appear in the Old and New Testaments in contexts related to
the attributes or actions of God: What notion gives a definition of space
which is perfect and akin to its essence? That which assumes it to be like a
See e.g. Genesis Rabba Lxviii.9.
Plotinus, Em. II, 4, 12, 11.
&id. II, 5,3,39.
Cf. S. Sambursky, The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism, Proc. IV. Acud. of
und Hum. II (1%8), 153-67.
Simplicius, Cureg. 362.7-364.6.
I7Simplicius. Phys. 639.25-36.

Sci.

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corporeal power sustaining and supporting bodies, raising the falling ones
and gathering together the scattered ones, completing them as well as
encompassing them on every side.28
It emerges from Simplicius ample statements about Iamblichus intellectual
theory of space that this theory was a synthesis of Stoic, Jewish and Neopythagorean ideas. In view, however, of its detailed and systematic account of
the superiority of space to matter, we may regard it as the intellectual property
of Iamblichus. The central conception of this theory is that the encompassed
is supported by the encompassing, that secondary entities are always contained
in primary ones and have their place in them. Thus the physical world is
encompassed by the superior reality of the Soul, and the Soul by the Intellect,
which constitutes a still higher reality. Just as we speak about our soul as the
seat or the place of our thoughts, space, being a non-corporeal entity, is a
cause superior to bodies or matter, which are encompassed by it. For space is
not the geometrical boundary of mathematical solids, but the physical
boundary of real bodies; indeed, the forces acting in space do not merely
encompass bodies, but totally penetrate them. Finally, Iamblichus reaches the
peak of his adulation of space by likening it to a divine entity. Space is the
supreme cause, which we have to identify with God, because it has the form
of unity, holds all things together and accomplishes the whole world according
to one measure.26
At the root of Iamblichus theory of space one can discern some age-old
ideas; only two should be mentioned here. One is the conception of matter as a
passive, lifeless entity, which became more pronounced and finally culminated
in some eastern religions as the representation of evil. The other is the
cosmological principle that the higher layers of the universe are more tenuous
than the lower, that grosser and more passive entities are enveloped by finer
and more active ones. In Aristotles cosmology, for instance, earth, the solid
element, is at the centre of the universe, surrounded by water, which again is
surrounded by air, while above this there is the highest layer of the sublunar
world - fire. The higher the layer, the greater its activity and subtlety. This is
the doctrine of the hierarchy of worlds, according to which what is higher
from a topographical point of view is also superior from a conceptual point
of view.
In this picture of the cosmological hierarchy, the archetypal number seven
was of particular importance long before Neoplatonism. In later Neoplatonic
sources the seven firmaments begin with three physical regions: the sublunar
sphere, that of the planets and that of the fixed stars. Above them there are
three aetherial regions, and finally the seventh region of fire, the empyrean.
Allusions to this can be found in the Orphic hymns and the Chaldean Oracles
Ibid. 640.2. C_ Psalm cxlv, 10; Isaiah xi, 12; John xi, 52.

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of the second century. Analogous views prevailed among the Jews of the same
period; an account of the seven firmaments is given, for instance, in the
Talmud.
Iamblichus doctrine influenced the philosophy of space in modern times.
Henry More (1614-1687), the leading Platonist of Cambridge, postulated the
existence of two kinds of extension, physical and metaphysical. Physical
extension, like that assumed by Descartes, is material. Metaphysical extension,
on the other hand, is pure space, it is eternal and infinite like God, and the
manifestation of the essence of God, His omnipresence which cannot be
directly perceived by man. Newton, influenced by More, called space the
sensorium dei, the medium by which God unifies all the separate movements
of the various bodies and makes them parts of one absolute and well-ordered
motion.30
Newton established a connection between the divine character of absolute
space and the movements of bodies in space. A similar connection had formed
the point of departure for Syrianus doctrine, a hundred years after Iamblichus.
In contradistinction to Iarnblichus, who emphasized the connection between
space and matter, Syrianus central idea associates space and motion. In
accordance with the Neoplatonic doctrine of hypostases, he assumes the
properties of physical extension to be derived from the different thoughts of the
Soul and the irradiation of the creative Forms. By virtue of these, extension
appropriates the various bodies and makes itself the proper domain of the
elements fire, earth, etc., and thus everything moves naturally towards its natural
place or remains in it. The nature of the various bodies is thus subjected to that
of extension, is secondary to that of extension.
From here Syrianus arrives at an analysis of the connection between place
and movement, an analysis which passes from place in the restricted sense to
place in the broader sense, and from there to the cosmic extension, to absolute
space. He argues as follows: How, could one say, are bodies in motion moved
in space? They certainly move from one place to another, for generally things
in a place seem to rest, whereas things in motion are in place as well as not in
place. They are not in their own primary and, so to say, proper place, except
when they rest; however, they are in the broadly defined place, in the sense in
which we say that the sun is in the sign of the Lion when the breadth of the
Lion contains her, and that the flying eagle is in the air, or that the sailing ship
is in the sea. All these have a place within a certain range, and when they are in
motion they do not occupy their primary and proper place.32 Again and
again, Syrianus emphasizes the essential difference between the proper place
CJ Hagiga 12b.
aONewton. Opticks, Queries 28 and 3 1.
Simplicius, Phys. 618,29-619,2.
Ibid, 628.26-34.

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180

of a body, which in fact is identical with its volume, and common place, place
in the broader sense, in which movement occurs. This latter belongs to a
more universal body and is inseparable from it.l There is little doubt that
the term universal body refers to the universe, i.e. absolute space, in
contrast to relative space, i.e. the place of a body relative to other bodies,
which is subject to change.
Striking evidence for this view of Syrianus can be found in his commentary
on Aristotles Metaphysics. He agrees with those who assume that extension
goes through the whole universe and receives in itself the whole nature of the
body, and who say that it neither cuts the air nor is cut and divided together
by it and other bodies, but that it is placed steady and firm and immobile,
and detached from all change through the whole universe, conferring room
and receptacle and boundary and outline and all suchlike upon all that fills the
sensible universe. Those who hold this view say openly that this kind of space
and extension is not a mathematical body, though like a mathematical body in
respect of immateriality and immobility and impalpability and freedom from
resistance and altogether from every quality subject to influence.3
While discussing the nature of absolute space, Syrianus seems to disavow
the Stoic doctrine of the total penetration of two bodies, which caused so much
commotion in the Hellenistic world. In fact, however, he accepts this doctrine
with some qualifications. He argues that two immaterial bodies, i.e. very
tenuous ones, can co-exist in the same place, and the same holds for the
interpenetration of a material body and an immaterial one. He gives a very
instructive illustration: Immaterial bodies are like lights emitted from
different lamps and propagated throughout the same room, penetrating each
other unmingled and undivided. These lights, though one would call them
incorporeal; are yet extending together with the bodies and spreading like
them in three dimensions, and there is nothing to hinder them and the bodies
from occupying the same place, for the very reason that they are elementary
and immaterial and are not split up when divided.35 To these explanations
Syrianus characteristically adds the following words: This we say in order
that some of the strange doctrines of the physicists should not frighten us,
who transfer to the whole of extended nature the properties of material and
resistant bodies that are subject to influence.
Syrianus illustration of the interpenetrating lightbeams apparently induced
some association of ideas in his pupil Proclus, who based his systematic
doctrine of absolute space on the concept of light. Proclus exposition is
quoted in detail by Simplicius, who enters into a lengthy polemic with him.3
Ibid. 637,

26-28.
Syrianus, Met. 84; 31-85, 3. Here and below room translates choru.
5/hid. 85, 19-25.
6/bid. 85,28-3

1.

Simplicius, fhys. 611, 10-614.7.

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181

Proclus, like his predecessors, rejects Aristotles concept of place. He declares

the primary place of a body to be the spatial extension between the
boundaries of its receptacle; it has to be regarded as a reality, for otherwise
the concept of locomotion, of movement from one place to another, would lose
its meaning. Furthermore, the level of reality of this specific extension does
not differ essentially from that of the extension of the whole universe.
Iamblichus had emphasized the incorporeal character of space for two
reasons - the superiority of the encompassing to the material encompassed,
and the comparison of space with divinity. In contradistinction
to this,
Pro&s, like Syrianus, regarded space as a corporeal entity, in conformity with
the Platonic tradition according to which interaction is possible only between
entities of the same kind. By analogy with the well-known thesis that the
human eye could not perceive the light of the sun were it not itself a luminous
object, it stands to reason that space could not exert any influence on bodies in
space were it not itself of a corporeal nature. This is the first link in Proclus
logical chain of arguments, which continues as follows: space must be a body
at rest, for were it in motion, there would need to exist another space in order
to define this motion, and this would lead to an infinite sequence of spaces. If,
however, space is at rest, it follows that it must be indivisible. For every
divisible body moves along the sides of the body dividing it, air, for instance,
along the sides of a missile, or water along those of a sailing boat. Consequently,
the concept a divisible body at rest contains a contradiction in terms, and
thus space must be an indivisible body. If this is the case, it is either a material
body or an immaterial body. Proclus defines a material body as a body which
reacts on another body because of its susceptibility to influences, and what
characterizes such influences is precisely the property of divisibility. Space
must thus be an immateriaI body, i.e. a passive non-reacting body without any
resistive power whatsoever. The final result is that space is an indivisible,
immaterial body in the state of rest.
Here Proclus introduces light as the most elementary and immaterial of
bodies in order to explain the total interpenetration of space and body, which
are both of a corporeal nature. Plato himself, he says, had declared light to be
a kind of fire, less corporeal than a flame, fire itself being the most tenuous of
all the elements.38 Space is thus nothing but light, the purest of all bodies. And
Proclus continues: Let us now suppose two spheres, one made of light and
the other of many bodies, both equal in volume. One of them is placed at the
centre of the universe, and the other immersed in the first sphere. The whole
universe will thus be seen in its place in the immobile light. As a whole it will
be immobile, so as to imitate space, but each of its parts will be moving, so
that in this respect the universe will be inferior to space.Jg
Plato, Timaeus 58~.
%mplicius, Phys. 612,29-35.

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Proclus sphere of light constitutes an ancient version of absolute space,

or, in modern terminology, the general reference system whose absolute rest
furnishes a constant coordinate system to which one can refer the various
movements of bodies in the physical world. As is well known, in the 19th
century physicists were still looking for a concrete representation of Newtons
absolute space. Some thought to have discovered it in the hypothetical aether,
others even postulated the existence of a body in a state of absolute rest, as
did Carl Neumann in 1875, who gave this body the name the body Alpha.
What is the nature of the sphere of light which represents absolute space? It
cannot be the light of the sun, for the sun is a part of the physical world, one of
the partial worlds immersed in that sphere. This light must rather be of a
primary character, and Proclus recalls the myth at the end of the Republic,
where the wanderers could see a line of light, like a column let down from
above, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in
colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer.O
In this connection Proclus also quotes the Chaldean Oracles, which say of
the primal Soul that on high it animates light, fire, aether, the worlds, the
inference being that this kind of light is above the empyrean, aetherial and
material regions. It is the light which received first the eternal allotments of
the gods and manifested in itself revelatory visions to those who deserve it.
It is not altogether out of the question that these words were influenced by the
Jewish literature of two or three centuries before Proclus, in which the nature
of the light created on the first day of Creation was discussed; this light, it
was said,2 had been concealed by God because of the wickedness of the early
generations of man, but He would reveal it to the righteous in days to come.
Proclus adds another remarkable comment to his explanation: in this light,
the shapeless things acquire shape and it causes unextended things to be
extended; it thus may well be said that topos hints at space as being a certain
typos (shape, matrix) of the whole cosmic body.43 We shall see presently that
this play upon words acquired an even deeper significance in Damascius theory
of space.
Darnascius was the last head of the Platonic Academy; on its closure by
Justinian in 529, he left Athens for exile in Persia with his pupil Simplicius and
a few other scholars. They returned to Athens after a short time, where, from
about 535 on, Simplicius continued his commentaries on Aristotles writings.
A considerable part of Simplicius Corrolarium de loco in his commentary on
Aristotles Physica contains critical comments of his own on the subject.
His exposition amounts to a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of the
@Plato,Republic 616b.
Simplicius, Ph_w.~613,3-7.
*Genesis Rabba iii, 6; Hagiga 12a
Simplicius, Phys. 613,7-10.
Ibid. 601-645.

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notion of absolute space, finally resulting in a complete rejection of Aristotles

conception of place. It is worth mentioning that his conclusions are almost
identical with those of his contemporary and sworn enemy John Philoponus,
the Christian Neoplatonic who held the chair of philosophy in Alexandria.
Some of Simplicius words may be quoted here in full: There exists one
single extension which penetrates into all things and receives with its different
parts all the various bodies. For the wine jar is in a certain extension penetrating
that of the body of the jar as well as the body of the wine, and when it is shifted,
the extension will not be carried along with the jar, but the jar is translated
from one part of the extension to another. This extension, since it is of a
separate nature, is fixed and immobile.5
Simplicius compares this extension, i.e. absolute space, to a receptacie at
rest: . ..the whole extension with every part of it, which always receives the
bodies that happen to be in it, is immobile; it is like the immobile channels
through which water flows, whereby at different times the water is contained
by another part of the channel without carrying with itself the former part of
that charmel.4B Simplicius also clearly polemizes against Aristotle: There is
nothing absurd about two lumps of matter being in one and the same place,
for matter does not exclude mutual interpenetration. Nor is it absurd for two
extensions to co-exist in the same place, if one of them is corporeal, the other
void, one a kind of room, the other something in the room. For its seems that
extension has four meanings: (1) one that does not include a spatial dimension,
such as the boundary of the extension; (2) extension as an idea, such as the
mathematical body; (3) material extension possessing physical qualities and
resistances, for instance, the body; (4) material extension, but without qualities
in any respect, and incorporeal [...I Space is not plain extension, but it is an
extended room. Let us compare this with one sentence from Philoponus
elaborate and devastating polemic against Aristotle: We do not maintain that
extension is a body, but that it is the room of a body and mere empty
dimensions without any substance and matter.
Whereas Simplicius analysis is in the main a summary of a conceptual
crystallization extending over many generations, Damascius theory contains
an important innovation insofar as his concept of place implies the elucidation
of its connection with that of position. Damascius theory of space is part of
a comprehensive theory of entities which in the intelligible wor!d are unextended,
but which acquire extension when they descend into the physical world.4g The
three unextended and indivisible magnitudes in the intelligible world are the
45Ibid.578,4-g.
OIbid.621.20-24.
Ibid. 623, 12-20.
Philoponus, Phys. 577,15-16.
Simplicius, Phys. 624.37-625,24;

644, 10-645, 14.

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numerical monad, the now and the spatial point. In our world the numerical
monad is transformed into the plurality of numbers, and the sequence of
integers clearly exhibits a definite order, for instance, the alternation of odd
and even numbers, or the interval between square numbers, which each time
increases by two. This well-ordered arrangement of the series of integers is
based on the significance of the position of every term in that series. In the case
of the transition from the pointlike now to the linear extension of time, one
can also apprehend that the flux of physical time is marked by the fixed
position of each of its events. Finally, through the transformation
of the
intelligible spatial point into a section of finite length, the spatial extension of
the physical world is created, which has three dimensions and is the measure
of the position of body as a whole as well as the position of its parts relative to
that whole and to each other.
Damascius theory of space centres around this idea of his that space
measures the position of bodies and thus endows everything in it with its
specific structure. Space is the cause of the structure of bodies, the cause of the
structural differentiations and the symmetrical or asymmetrical ramifications
of bodies and their parts, which are the sum total of their relative positions.
Space forces a definite length upon every extended thing, a length which falls
to its share within the frame of the Whole. It also forces a definite structure
upon every body, a structure in consequence of which its left side differs from
its right side; for instance, the heart of an animal being on the left and its liver
on the right, the head of a man being up and his feet down.
In Damascius conception, the full significance of that play upon words
mentioned before comes into its own: topos is typos. Space is, so to say, a
kind of outline of position as a whole and of its parts, and, as it were, a matrix
into which the thing situated must fit, should it be suitably situated and not be
confounded
and behave contrary to nature.5 The shaping power of
Damascius space can be recognized by the structure of bodies in space,
precisely as the divine power of Iamblichus space can be recognized by the
coherence of the bodies encompassed by it.
This space of Damascius is an absolute space; it is nothing other than
Proclus primary and extended light, as is shown by a passage of his treatise
De primis principiis: Space has three meanings, (1) an entity inferior to its
content, as the light of the sun is said to be in the air; (2) an entity equal to its
content, like the sun when we locate her in her own sphere as being in her
place; (3) an entity superior to that contained in it, as the sun itself, which is
contained in the extended light. This latter kind of space is space in the absolute
sense, while the others are relative spaces.
It may be worth drawing attention here to a certain similarity between
Ibid. 645.7-10.
Damascius, Lkprimisprincipiis

(ed. Ruelle) II, 219,21-220.2.

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185

Damascius doctrine and Einsteins theory of general relativity, according to

which the metric of space determines the movement, and generally the
behaviour, of bodies. However, one should not forget that in modern physics
the superiority of the encompassing over the encompassed does not hold, but
it is rather maintained that there exists a mutual influence between both. Today
we are far from regarding matter as passive; on the contrary, it represents an
enormous concentration of energy, and by virtue of this it imposes a definite
metric upon the spatial (and temporal) surroundings of bodies, a metric which
for its own part imposes upon bodies a definite dynamical behaviour in the
neighbourhood of large concentrations of matter.
Simplicius, following in the footsteps of his teacher Damascius, expounds in
detail the notions of position and space and their relative and absolute
significance; in this connection, he clarifies the relation between the whole and
its parts. By means of striking illustrations, he succeeds in analyzing cases
where the relative positions of the parts are conserved while the position of the
whole changes. He uses a bold ideal experiment: If somebody should displace
the earth from its position around the centre of the universe, it would still
keep the well-ordered arrangement of its proper parts within its proper whole,
but then it would not occupy its position as a part of the universe. Therefore,
were it set free as a whole, it would be carried towards the centre, although
its parts would preserve their relative configuration, even if the earth itself
happened to be outside the centre. Similarly, a man raised high in the air will
keep the correct order of his proper parts, but no longer their order relative
to the whole.
In the course of his analysis, Simplicius emphasizes that everything must
preserve its due place within the universe for as long as it continues to exist
as an organic part of the whole; this is a statement conforming to the Stoic
notion of universal harmony: A specific thing everywhere is dead and lifeless
if it is separated from the common whole and deprived from the union due to
it with the whole; plants, for instance, even if one tears them up by their roots
together with all their parts, will immediately wither away, having been
separated from the common whole. For all things live through the one cosmic
living Being. Thus, as long as each thing is rooted in the universe through the
appropriate whole, it will live and be preserved, but if it is separated from
the appropriate whole, it will be separated also from the common one.53
Most instructive is the parallel which Simplicius draws between intellectual
time, as conceived by Iamblichus and his followers,5 and absolute space,
which he regards also as a kind of intelligible reality. He says: As was
explained, space has a twofold meaning: intrinsic space, existing absolutely for
Simplicius,
Phys. 627, 32-628, 2.
Ibid. 628.7-14.
Cf. Sambursky, op cit. note 25, pp. 16Of.

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every body whether at rest or in motion, and that of becoming different at

different times in the changes of place relative to the position of the universal
system of the world. Intrinsic space, inasmuch as it is naturally united with
Being, is hardly distinguishable from Being, whereas that which becomes
different at different times, while Being remains the same, is easily noticeable
and excites our faculty of discernment as to its otherness relative to Being.
This is just like time, which also has a twofold nature: on the one hand
measuring the intrinsic motion, on the other hand the external and active
motion [...I And while the intrinsic motion is unknowable, the active is
obvious.55
Simplicius wants to regard absolute space as an intelligible entity out of
which there evolves relative and changing space. He adopts a simile which had
been employed by his teacher Damascius, one which likens Becoming, i.e. the
flux of time, to a kind of unfolding, unwinding out of Being.56 Admittedly,
this mode of expression does not fit space quite as well as time; still, Simplicius
repeats it in the following passage: The intrinsic outline of the position of
the Whole always remains the same, whether all the world moves or rests; and
the multitude of the various changes of positions of this abiding Whole will be,
so to say, a kind of unfolding.57 And Simplicius goes on to elaborate the
analogy between space and time. Precisely as time is on the one hand intelligible,
i.e. perpetual and abiding in the same position, and on the other hand physical,
i.e. having its reality in generation and corruption, so space too measures on
the one hand the intrinsic extension or position, and is of a permanent nature,
and on the other hand the changing position, which has its existence in
Becoming. 58
Damascius, however, went still farther in his theory of time and declared the
totality of changing time, the river of becoming whose waters are flowing
from the beginning of creation till the end of days, to be a single reality
existing as a simultaneous oneness .58Man cannot be aware of this simultaneity,
for his consciousness transforms the side-by-side of the parts of intelligible
time into the one-after-the-other
of the parts of physical time, consisting of
past, present and future. In his Corollurium de tempore Simplicius makes one
of the rare observations of a personal nature to be found in the literature of
that period: However, these words of Damascius [that becoming is a kind of
unfolding of being] have not worried me so much as those he used to say to me,
without convincing me, when he was still alive, namely, that time as a whole
simultaneously exists in reality.60
Simplicius. Phys. 638.23-35.

Ibid. 775,30.
Ibid. 632.29-3 1.
Ibid. 632.33-633.8.
*Cf. Sambursky, op. cit. note 25, p. 165.
*OSimplicius, Phys. 775, 32-34.

Place and Space in Late Neoplatonism

187

Although Simplicius was not convinced by Damascius, he still arrived at an

analogous formulation of the connection between relative and absolute space,
which in its abstractness does not fall short of what Damascius said about time.
Simplicius declares that the single intrinsic position encompasses ah the
positions of the whole universe.61 In other words: even if we are unable to
attain an immediate and direct perception of absolute space, we can still
perceive it indirectly as the sum total of all the varying positions in physical
space. Behind all these relative positions which ever happened to be realized in
the past or are yet to be realized in the future, there is hidden the position of
absolute space, as the permanent and unchangeable mean. This definition of
Simplicius doubtless constitutes the pinnacle of his doctrine of space.
The lesson which can be drawn from the story of the concepts of space in the
doctrines of the late Neoplatonists - a story which could be told here only
in a rather cursory way - is that even the historical development of this
notion alone is fraught with problems which transcend physical and epistemological considerations and enter into the realm of metaphysical reflections.
Porphyry formulated it very strikingly: It is not the business of the physicist
to inquire whether there exist principles of physical things, but this is the
business of him who ascends to a higher level of knowledge. For the physicist
makes use of them as given data. And still more it could be said that it is the
business of the man on the higher level to inquire of what kind these principles
are [. . . ] for the cognition of the causes of his own principles transcends the
capacities of the physicist and belongs to a domain of higher knowledge - that
of metaphysics.62
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem

Ibid. 632.31-32.
fbid. 9, 11-13; 15.32-34.