Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.
HI
XEW
SERIES.
VOL.
XV.
520928
PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAMS
14,
HENRIETTA STREET,
AND NOKGATE,
COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.
1915.
nett.
a
M
CONTENTS.
PAGE
I.
II.
III.
SYMPOSIUM
INSTINCT
BY_BBiiABiL-JkiSANQUET
AND
V.
"VI.
...
NOTE ON MR.
...
BY
...
...
G. D. H. CQJLE_
BY BERNARD BOSANQUET
BENEDETTO CROCE. BY ALBERT
COLE'S PAPER.
THE "^ESTHETIC" OF
COCK
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XII.
XIII.
22
loo
140
160
164
BY
C. D.
BY W. TUDOR JONES
...
BROAD
199
227
252
271
COSTELLOE)
XI.
WILLIAM
...
McDouGALL, A. F. SHAND, AND G. F. STOUT
NOTES ON BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE OF ESSE. BY C. LLOYD
MORGAN
IV.
BY
EMOTION.
...
BY
F.
AVELING
BY
...
304
G. F. STOUT
332
SYMPOSIUM-
SCHILLER
353
...
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND
THE MIND ASSOCIATION
...
...
428
431
432
FINANCIAL STATEMENT..
433
RULES
LIST
434
OF OFFICERS AND
SESSION, 1915-1916
I
19141915.
SCIENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY.
By BERNAKD BOSANQUET.
THE main
the
is
concrete
The importance
fact.
of this
problem
view
of
of
an External World."
There
is
am
whole
for our
me anew by some
On our Knowledge
and I
treatise,
to confine myself, in
principle, to
it.
com-
little
But
to
do so
I should hope,
indicated.
view of
that of the
work
referred to.
philosophy.
my own mind
One simple
to be
modern
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
and
true
and can
advancement
of
a product
of its
of the
essence
if
we
I take it
to
But
sciences
"
;
be true of
propositions which
"
the other
abstractly possible
worlds, and
among which
as the question of
and not
philosophy. Nevertheless, in
respect of ethical neutrality and the philosophical temper of
mind, it is the ideal of the special physical sciences which he
to special sciences
to
no
I speak
from memory.
which
in
intelligent beings.
produce
Philosophy, in the words cited above, deals with nothing but
general and a priori propositions, such as state properties
objects
in
which
all
satisfaction
abstractly possible
The
worlds agree.
typical
as
dealing
logical
forms
common
to
every
possible universe.
all possible theory.
In contrast with
charged
whether or no there
a future
is
life, or,
at all
and
evil,
and therefore
are,
Here, in
my judgment,
a fundamental issue
is
But
is
raised as to
by no means
altogether groundless.
it
is
not going to
First, it
is
Two
A 2
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
is
it
their own.
when we
of
And
is
from
originates diverge
of
so,
it
secondly,
what nature
by
mean by
is
know.
am
asked what I
The more
tatingly that the investigation itself must decide.
an enquiry burrows into its own hole, neither depending on a
general view of what we experience, nor contributing to one,
the more nearly it is a special science, and the less it belongs to
And once more, positively, what enquiries belong
philosophy.
to philosophy, only the investigation itself can show.
It is not
go forward
is
discriminated as
we
is distinct.
philosophy
is
purely
be theory and
it
theorises
Thus philosophy
its objects.
must
confined
number and
forms of being
is
the rest
which
There are great worlds of human interest, embodied in strucand experiences which prima facie have as good a claim
tures
as anything else to
Such
sideration.
aesthetic experience
for
worlds,
instance,
interests
human
interests of finite
minds
They
And
there
is
them
no reason that
world of science,
in a sense, not
nature of philosophy
of
in a concrete form.
theoretical
why
world
the
They
They are themselves human
are,
interests.
are
of disinterested con-
among
its objects.
which
it
involves,
proves that
then
is
in
it is
not necessarily
is
whether
it is
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
much
But he con-
siders, if I follow
him
it
world.
is
march of a
science.
seems to
now seems
Logic
me
to
am
and I
will explain
When
me
all-
who unwarily
where
it
I wrote about
I
it, that Logic was the whole of philosophy.
thus
to
is
the
connected
of
argued
myself Philosophy
system
the form or ultimate universal essence of all objects, including,
loudly proclaim
of course,
all
systems of objects.
of objects, the
Now
about
pure
systems
be sought for in the sciences and not elsewhere.
it
were possible
objects or
all
sciences
Therefore,
if
and exhibit in
and their
now seem
sight of all
to myself to see that the common oversuch argumentation is just this: Philosophy no
doubt
theory and
But
is
presumption
arises
its
interest
its
is
theoretical.
object-matter
is
Its object,
activities
and values,
But no
in turn
through
which
Such an
and
prima
problem of
satisfactori-
in so far as its
form
answer
is
of a question can
only be determined
known.
Thus
it
its
objects,
is
not the
whole
of
Philosophy.
There
is
no
less
itself as
beforehand.
theoretical,
But to
also
is
liable to be described as
satisfaction,
satisfactoriness.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
may be, it is
common character will afford the
more general mode of consideration, which
object-matter for a
what
experienced as such.
is
from
It will differ
logic in
case
what
is
will find in
experienced.
it
and
its
The
result
querably to
would
common
the
objects
among
all
the principle
in all provinces of
all equally.
be, as
indeed recommends
sense, that
itself
uncon-
all
forms of plurality.
For of plurality, as of other possible characters which might
be selected to push forward against our suggested account of
philosophy, one can say in a preface or general study only that
their claims must be referred to the investigation itself.
So,
again,
if
it
should be said
essay anything
may
be said
why
not take
and
"
like
in a preface or introductory
You
them
evil, disorder,
clues and
of
same recognition
from whatever isolated phenomena we may make our start. The difference between good
and bad, for instanqe, resolves itself into a fundamental
of structure,
which
tion
starts
it
falls
within
it.
in the latter.
Now we
reality as such
may
begin anywhere
and
it is
problems
are
to
of
the
problems
to bring.
arbitrary superficiality.
to
happen
is this
aim
of the theory
the completeness
or
it is
incompleteness of
kind to
split in two.
The
The
problems
of this
significance of such a
The problem
indicates in
universe.
the
is for
it
problem being
as one of particular
BERNARD BOSAXQUET.
10
fact
may
methods
or
may
of science.
it
On
hardly before.
living beings,
We
it
at
all.
how
by the actual
But we seldom
investigation.
is
promoted
possible
soul,
and how
this perfection
It is in
be held
would be
Now
that
would deny
we have
to philosophy
we
we
shall find,
and
for
them.
It
is
not true,
we
shall find,
and for
which
is
necessarily
and
essentially
different
from making
of particular fact,
the
less
fulfil
and
ideal of science.
in statements of law.
classes of truths to
it,
whole body
of
what
what
known
is
action,
in
realise
them, the
compelled
is
given in feeling, in
valuation,
appetite
make
to
what
for
theoretical
affirmations.
demonstrated, these
affirmations,
understanding is
As analysis has amply
which
things,
is
particular fact,
with
it
nection,
its
final
characteristic object.
no rational connection.
which
Truths of
reality,
can give
persistent or actual,
The
and
possibilities.
sort of reality
their
basis,
arid
ment, as steps in
its
approach to these.
categorical judgments,
So far I have
the
philosophy
qua being.
is
avoided
traditional
expression
that
is
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
12
what we
should
make some
to
effort
which characterise
us, in its
it
feasibility of the
we
we
a priori the
who
if
not, not.
It is
If
an old and
possibility of
his
supposes
find it
own
to us.
and width
for there
at
all,
else that
is
only by those of other thinking, and any issue between the two
is simply a, theoretical conflict, like another, to be decided by
theoretical considerations.
it
As
it
is,
we
makes no
reservation, so
it
isolates
no problem and
13
the moral of
among
doctrines
and need
reconciliation.
usually mere
place in philosophy.
a priori
is
Now
is
affects the
of
this subject,
in
to say,
prima facie.
this characteristic
philosophy.
may
That
a priori, which
the
of
problem
to say, it
is
of progress in
reported, with
reference to people
censure
of
unprogressiveness.
What
distinction
between
science
said.
The
You may
theory of Impressionism.
must never
And
the valuation
as true in philosophy
is
contributory.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
14
The
immediate argument
is
twofold.
Philo-
It
as,
for all I
civilisation to another,
It
universe to another.
And
which
it
is
cannot
to be progressive.
readily revolutionised
progressive.
one takes
fail
whole way of
But the
its place.
A limited
itself.
it
It
technique,
vision of reality,
which embodies
and knowledge, while retaining the singleness of its first impressions, must necessarily progress so long as
It must progress, because it incorporates
thought survives.
the changes of
life
progress.
What
referring
to
what
judgments of great
do not believe it
philosophy, with
may
be
that
think, be admitted
commonly,
and those some of the greatest, on which the
will
men
are of especially
to be true
its
that
permanent value.
the acquired
is
content of
second in im-
It
is
It
dogmas.
and appreciation
of
is
structural worlds.
great
15
The apparent
Hume
The
relation
is
who rank as
Of course I know
thinkers
polar antagonists.
upon things
it
in general guided
nothing at
by their
likings.
am
allowing
any
Now I have been endeavouring this evening to be positive
rather than negative, and to explain as frankly as possible what
my
But
I will
answer in principle
There
as that
to
the
essence
is,
which
am
is
categorical
is
to be tenable only
which
Isolation,
is
Only the
method, is here
can
be
isolated
the
hypothetical
in the
universe of
refractory element.
and
is
false
if it
anywhere
me that, where the method of working hypothesis is introduced into philosophical reasoning, there does appear to result
an extraordinary want of precision. To me this seems natural.
with
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
16
to obtain a result.
to say,
is
if
make
to
use of special
If
of
view are
you follow a
fall
demanded by philosophy.
The whole treatment
work which I began by referring
verification
ad
all.
seems to
many
us
of
to
rest
so
entirely
on
fictions
hoc, that
it
perception.
I can illustrate this contrast of total attitude, without
going
statement
agreement
tells
may
against
my
view, in order to
and impartiality.
is
more
very subtle argument, than in so patent a fact as the iuterrelatedness of things in the world.
And then mention is made
of
a priori
all
witli
me
not in any
it is approaching
near to his mind at all.
it,
17
the absoluteness
of the critic's
dogma
say,
impeaching.
Now my
modest contribution
is
merely
this
Whatever,
throughout
construed,
but
is
is
life
the
critic's attitude.
interrelatedness
In
common
of
things,
experience
if
strictly
of view,
The
fact.
is
that,
by the ordinary
We
unit.
maps
or diagrams,
and
set
down
another.
strictly
we
strict sense
portable objects,
when we
of
are handling
"
"
things
is,
in the
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
18
main, derived.
kinsmen come
do
not know
the leading
is
exactly
how
one's
common
An
it
may
is
life.
schema to represent them a sort of line or thread, which presupposes terms removed from each other by spatial boundaries like
islands on a map.
they need not be spatial, and they may include any kind of
combination or meeting point or reaction or common frontier.
this
Very well
tedness which
it is
is
shown,
on a
e.g.,
map
of a countryside, as
this, it
is
not to say
all or
any unity
not
interrelatedness, are
is
but with
it falls all
We
we
are
If so,
attempt to represent
you disregard
relations that makes them
relationally,
of
it
ad
suspect to
common
sense.
Let
me
19
Two
stated
take
does
it
it, e.g.
But plain
servant?
such relation
is
fact
as master
and
them except
does exclude,
but
It is a
it is
good point of
no solid fact and no
;
complaint of
all
and
unity, some
is
them
strictly
Thus
of
so.
suffice to
injuria.
unsatisfactory to the
if
human
thought
strictly understood,
completely.
Let us think of a familiar
may
taken
be
in ordinary life
eyes
is
may
face.
things at all
The pupils
of the
it
human
face, still
a pair of spectacles to
it
some
more
B 2
20
BERNAKD BOSANQUET.
I
at this
kind
of
false,
not a patent
is
fao.t.
falsify.
am
But
am
not
'
be rejoined as before
That
your fault
there are plenty more relations of the eyes to each other and
to the rest of the face, relations of all kinds, not merely spatial.
But,
it.
it
may
is
If
you took in
relations.
In
of experience.
The interrelatedness
it
in terms of
impression
with
interrelatedness
is
any
of
categorical view of the world does not bear out the idea.
My
21
common
position
doubt
is
own to
demand
of
traditional
lie
in discoveries that
whether
raised
reveal
it
And, while
philosophy.
revolutionise
it,
its
if
to thought, I point
to the
and
its
simple
facts.
valuations are
a
its
Its
drawn
becomes a game
am
thinking of Scheler's
I do not
remarks
know Mach
this
as
would now;
it
22
II.
By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL,
By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
I.
IN
this article
am
concerned to
some points in
book I will
criticise
Of the merits
of the
many and
great.
I wish to bring
up
am
my
not convinced of
from
differ
Social Psychology
my
error,
those
which
points in respect of
have
which
psychology of character.
In order to define the differences between
first to state
us, it is
necessary
We
organisation, in one
more
(2) that
and action ;t
degrees of complexity
number
are
of
very
different
that each of
them
is
* The Foundations
of Character, London, 1914.
t Mr. Shand recognises the importance of the distinction between, on
the one hand, dispositions as facts of mental structure and, on the other
hand, emotions, desires, thoughts, as mental activities, but unfortunately
he does not carefully observe the distinction. I cannot but think that, if
he had done so, he would have avoided some obscurities and have
recognised more fully the difficulties in the way of his views that I have
to point out.
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
innate
disposition
emotion
is
disposition
(i.e.,
each of
these
23
primary qualities
of
and
disgust, as
modes
"
of experience or activity.
and
action.
namely
(1) sentiments, of
chief
nancej
are, in his
the chief)
two members
and self-abasement)
(5) a large
number
of instincts
The
dispositions of
comprise so
that
many
they are
the
first
The
no
real differences of
I can recognise
complexity.
24
it
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
them
is
exposition.
their feelings
and anger
fear
"
intensity
Nevertheless
(p. 29).
we
may
feelings
"
We may therefore
(p. 28).
second, third,
and fourth
emotional
primary
emotions, of the appetites, and of the two impulses of selfdisplay and self-abasement) as essentially similar in nature and
function
we may
We
name.
bring
might agree
to
common
into
all of
but there
"
the substantive " affect
and
The advantages
technical term
word are
this
of
(2) that
it
speak
an
"
"
form
its adjectival
affective."
a purely
(1)
covers both the feeling aspect and
that
affective disposition,"
it
is
now coming
a term
is
my
Social
Psychology
described
conative
and
and
In
emotional
I still
think
"
affective disposition."
distinguish
conative
from
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
25
common head
of
"
affective dispositions."
we have
to
The fundamental
instincts.
difference
In
difference.
are
dispositions
my
essentially
affective dispositions
view, all
the
"
they are
"
emotions
most complex
that
is
innate conative
nature
similar
of
between us
of these dispositions.
And
all
are merely
some
of the
an instinct consists in
What,
in
between the
is
affective dispositions
him
kind
possible,
nothing to consciousness
which he speaks somewhat confusingly
;
especially
passages in
* "
emotion
is
part which
is
in consciousness
and
is
(2)
that
26
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
explicitly repudiates
the
of
identification
instinctive
with
impulses.
nowhere attempts
to
define
his
own view
an
instinct,
to
describe
concisely.
may
Still,
spring from
we
conative disposition.
affective
dispositions
is
regarded
Both kinds
by Mr. Shand
to be
There
is
but
it
as
real
as
the conative
them
conative dispositions. The
compelled, to regard
from the
on his
part which is organised in the body (3) that part which is present in
Now assuming
our behaviour and accessible to external observation.
that 'there is some instinct present in the system of an emotion, this
instinct will include so much of the second or bodily part of the system
;
as
and the
27
we may
facts that
learn
(b) to
this
alike, then, in
in
of
being innately
hension of
certain
objects
gives
conative reactions
to
rise
They
we
call
"
emotional
excitement
whereas,
in
Mr. Shand's
we
call
view, the
or conation.
differ
from the
conative only.
It
seems to
me
impulse
is
is
always accompanied by
qualities of feeling
which we
feeling,
call the
a group
fore of
containing
qualities of
there-
This
is
admitted
ment
I submit, further,
that,
he attributes to instincts.
if
this difference
were an absolute
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
28
if
one,
of feeling, it
all
accompaniment
Mr. Shand himself has
emotion
"
"
Only, then,
if
from which
springs, will
it
"
it
affective dispositions."
He
between them.
mode
of bodily
But is it
If this were true it would be important.
true either in fact or in principle ?
Let us note first that of one of his primary emotions, namely
activity.
curiosity,
instinct.
Mr. Shand
conception.
express
Why,
if this
itself in a single
mode
bodily action
out long ago with an obscure belief that emotions are mental
facts and instincts are bodily facts that the emotion, as he puts
that therefore,
it, is in the mind and the instinct in the body
;
without the instinct organised within it, the affect (the emotion
or appetite) could do nothing to guide bodily activity. He seems
in fact to be influenced here by a crude psycho-physical dualism,
and
means
in
fact
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
29
suited to
its
mechanism
any
have
seen,
he repudiates this
body.
It
is
its
partly in the
emotion and
might have at
and consistency. But, as we
view of instinct in his own
his
view
mind and
is
partly in the
the
mind and
fact of bodily
am
is
movement.
is
dualism
"
for accepting
affective dis-
to
instinct
has only one kind of behaviour connected with it, and when the
appropriate stimulus excites it, must tend to respond with this
is
assumption and
is
is
an arbitrary
contradicted
by a
facts.
Every instance
of the operation of
what
is
well
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
30
named
wasp
it kills
it
it to its
means
nest by
of
in turn
halting,
left,
rather
true
modes
of
sniffing,
movement involved
bodily
vocalisation,
and
doubling, and
on
so
Is
it
not
that,
in locomotion, seizing,
corre-
many
as
emotion
"
or
by an
appetite, within
an array of instincts
way
work
of
intelligence
it is
in
instinctively
prescribed
conative system
is
so
action.
organised that
its
excitement tends,
kind of movement,
or,
more
usually, in
some
train of
some
move-
more
intelligent (and
defined,
and much
is
INSTINCT
man
of
movements
31
bination
AND EMOTION.
is
external stimulation,"
"
is
the
and
feeling
impulse
which
of
is
two matters
me
false in respect
of fact.
between the
That
the
It
two
is
lips,
movement
this
is,
first
new
infant's
first
links.
less
random movements
of the limbs,
of locomotion in search of
Mr. Shand
in
the nipple.
distinguishing
the
If
we
appetite
are to follow
from
instincts
and
for
movement
of each leg
tail.
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
32
appetites,
of
an emotion
number
may
birds
may
fear,
and
of anger,
are found also in a modified form in connection with the enjoyment of play, as we see when dogs pla}' at biting one another
to flight.
not enter the system of this wonderful emotion of play ? (p. 191).
"
Of the reference to the " emotion of play I will only say
Does
that I do not think it is meant to be taken seriously.
Mr. Shand
really
mean
to maintain that
we have
to regard all
are
"
"
we
that responds to
movement
is
a disposition
and
itself in two or
only,
more kinds
that,
of bodily
We
shall
entirely the nomenclature of animal psychology.
have tq attribute the nest-building of a bird to such a system
instincts
twittering, and
of all
of
flying,
the varied
hopping,
perching,
pecking,
in the
movements involved
Or consider a
par
excellence,
hunting wasp
33
reception of her egg and of the prey which she stores with it
nourishment of the grub and the burrow is of a form
for the
and
size
is
Are we
one of
to
and each
instinct.
That
is
to say,
if
there
is
is
intelligent choice
It is of the
and mechanically determined response.
is
a
essence
of
that
it
conative
mental, and
very
process
every
therefore a more or less intelligently self-adapting, process.
rigidly
conclude, then,
(1) the
multiplicity
system, (2) the organisation of the same instincts in different
emotional systems to support his view of the difference
between the emotional disposition and the instinct, Mr. Shand
mechanical reflex
action,
he
has
continued
of
to
allow this
the foundations of
character.
In
combating
my
view that
all
the
innate
conative
34
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
dispositions
are
which we
feeling
are
nature,
call
or
distinct
vidually
similar
of essentially
"affective dispositions,"
emotions
highly
"
alike
qualities of
most indi-
but the
are
differentiated
all
of
qualities
the
all
"
:
An
instinct
may
characteristic
is
of
without
it,
"
exciting a particular emotion (p. 188) therefore any instinctive behaviour and the emotion which usually accompanies it
;
are dependent
he writes
opponent
(p.
the
movements
that our
instinct
189).
am
Again
tempted
skill
to
meant
we
may
is
may
of the
In support of this
emotion of
distinct dispositions.
anger.
there
upon
We
"
:
The
fact that a
the
man may
strike
mock combats
down another
of the stage)
movements
holding
working
in dissociation
these
foresight of
are
is
the
from emotions.
work
Such
of
instincts
facts
merely
clear
simulate
may
he
in cold blood,
that
its
of
more
even by experienced actors, in perfectly simulating in cold blood the bodily movements and expressions of
In order to prove his point, Mr. Shand must
the emotions
difficulty found,
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
35
behaviour
instinctive
may
and
fighting
and of
its
visceral
symptoms
But
this is
be strongly in
not the fact. The
The
essentials.
several
movements employed
are, according to
The movements
the
place of
rigid,
of
different.
erect,
In
of
fighting, the playing dog approaches his fellow with free bounds,
scampers about him in the most incautious manner, spreads
out his fore paws and depresses his body almost to the ground
in a way that the fighting dog never does and could not afford
mumbles
essentially different
is
his fellow's
skin or
in
the one
paws with
his
cases the
same
the two
are at
work
in the
two cases
may
c2
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
36
though somewhat
similar series of movements accompanied by an impulse and a
feeling or emotion of a different quality (which perhaps deserves
which employs a
play-fighting)
name
the
different
of
shown
think,
against
my
Let us
now
how
his
instinct.
is fear,
the consideration
of
it.
He
itself to
man
modes
of
conduct
own
its
specific
are:
"
(1)
''
(2)
movements"
(3) that
which
"
which
"
"
;
"
itself
(4) that
is
characterised
to
by clinging
someone or
"
"
;
which
is
"characterised
by paralysis or immo-
an animal at bay."
By
number
of emotional states
which
I fear I
have
and
"), but which are of quite different nature
my
are more properly called states of anxiety, Mr. Shand attempts
lost
umbrella
make
to
still
larger
number
The emotion
37
still
whichever
of these instincts is
as a
means
of
"
be
to
to
'
'
'
'
tendencies organised in
its
finds
system.
it
should of
lead us
itself
is
a fact which
some
serious flaw.
I
man
may
be more properly
stated as follows.
or
of fear
instinct of
It
is
two links
end commonly
and
our cover,
if
one
is
as, for
in bed.
the
when
in the open, to
us, if
silent, or at the
first
most
to
to perfect
is
accompanies the
first
flight, is
In this way
all of
Mr. Shand's
first
numbers
(1)
and
and
(6) are
(5)
and
numbers
(7)
(2),
38
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
cover.
Surely
it is
little
instincts
separate
The eighth
mode
of
behaviour,
movements
the
of
flight.
is
If it could
tail, will
field.
out fear
know
the
at
first
same time.
Further,
it
is
an indisputable
"
that
fact,
which
impulses when
all
"
and again in
(p. 509)
anger
"
it
down
Shand
that
Fear tends to
Mr.
connexion
another
lays
"
elicit anger in support of its end when its impulse is obstructed
obstructed
(p.
261).
tend
to
arouse
If this is admitted,
explanation of the
fact that
why
is
apt to
turn,
unaccompanied by anger as a
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
39
of his
from the
As
instincts.
the
regards
crucial
upon
my
my
view
and
same infusion
seem
to
of fear with
that
way
distinct instincts
anger,
namely
(1) that
the
;
which seeks
attitude
which seeks
to
(5) that
"
subordination
is
inflict
punishment
which
is
"
;
(6) disinterested
anger
that
or
"
which
subserves
"the
of anger, in
each of which
we
The
seems to
to arouse
anger"
(p.
509).
The most
of
40
WILLIAM MGDOUGALL.
is
disposition
organised
may
condition
similar outbursts
of
anger.
The
third variety
claimed that
it
is
expresses
in
itself
any
it is
or can be
peculiar attitudes or
movements;
it
is
therefore the
hood
of the cobra,
and the
excitement of
fear.
(1) a
group
of
instincts
of
ejection
"
vomiting, choking,
including
(p.
spitting,
from the
and
mouth,
blowing
out
"
381);
(2) a group of
contact of
surface of
instincts
"
;
"
(3)
lastly,
hands or
*
Cf.
instincts
feet,
figs.
9 and 15
disgust."
"
instincts of
41
attempt
Psychology
(p.
56, a
to
deal
admit
of
alleged
suggestion
accepts),
we commonly confuse under the one name " disgust " two somewhat similar instincts having emotional qualities not easily
I draw attention to the case of disgust,
distinguishable.
because, in connexion with
it,
Mr. Shand
raises
explicitly a
it?"
The
phrase refers to his view that the emotion of dissomehow been developed from this array of instincts
which are now organised within its system. In relation to the
last
gust has
"
away
emotion
of the
If
we went
common
may
is
organisa-
...
to turn
no longer be a
farther
we should be more
would be
fully exercised."
"
Again,
to
which no one
42
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
original
these
of
but
instincts,
itself,
the
previous
may become
We
on
intercon-
effect that
But
it is
and controlling
presides, selecting
own
affective tone
and
when
that,
whole
to
of the
(as
But even
he
if
we
of
it
is
not,
to the
43
function of intelligently controlling the operations of the subordinated emotions yet that is the conception of the relation
;
of the
of its
to accept.
Lastly,
may
"
to
"
But,
if
we "
in
can find
it
scientific opinion.
"
"
instinctive
in the widest
and
loosest possible
implying so
of the
little
"
"
the
instinct
manner
"
and
and
term instinctive as
"
view
of the relation of
my
of
emotion to instinct
the
for
is
distinguishing
true
of
is
it
the
ment which
was
from the
emotions of
me
primary emotions.
But there
is
a group of
I did
of
the
of
"prospective
following
six
emotions
of
emotional
desire,"
states,
44
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
confidence,
hope, anxiety,
"
despair.
Desire," he tells
process
And
And
they spring
and although he does not give any reasons for not doing so, I
have no doubt that he would repudiate any such suggestion
for
he
is,
to class
I think,
it
aware that
the
this
its
end.
And
he recognises that
certainly
any strong
We
INSTINCT
has organised within
emotions of desire.
The emergence
it
AND EMOTION.
45
of this
is
something
radically
wrong with
his
exposition.
If
selves.
we
accept
Firstly,
it,
what becomes
of
how
we
are
to
it
attains this
it
we take
affective disposition,
we
shall
an emotional or
prospective emotions of desire do not spring from specific dispositions, that they are not independent forces, that they have no
impulses, ends, or tendencies distinct from the desire,
i.e.,
from
appointment
(because
it
life-history
46
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
and
our
reinforces
strengthened by
thus
Desire
efforts.
the anticipated
we
"
and
qualified
satisfaction
or
pleasure of
of success, is
what
call
confidence."
of
for
to hope,
i.e.,
satisfaction of success,
is
still
qualified
moments
at
by the anticipated
qualified
by the
also
of
to the
to try or to
directs
contem-
As
still
more
our
desire
Lastly,
when
anxiety
it
then
passes
The
possible line
our conation
desire
of
is
into
despondency.
despair.
over
is
action
still
is
is
that can
lead to
success;
no longer
impossible of achievement,
The
resolute
we
see no
therefore
still lies
man
we
in the
confronted
INSTINCT
with
difficulties
him the
and
AND EMOTION.
by an
47
his
anticipation
effort of volition
of
and thus
it
fidence to despair
now
In
success,
this
all
now
change
failure,
now
of feeling
the
difficulties
from confidence
in
his
path.
to despair there
are operative only three forces the desire itself, the pleasure
of anticipated attainment, the pain of anticipated failure
and
all
influence
in
varying proportion
have no time to show
desire.
of these chapters of
of
by the
and
pleasure
pain upon
any reader
principle of explanation,
adequate
if
he
admits the
fundamental
propositions
that
diverts
it
destroys
itself,
"
Hope succeeds
and the new emotion
if we
Quite true
If
hope cannot exist without anxiety, clearly show that they are
not distinct emotions springing from distinct dispositions ? Is
it
proposition
is
To present
facts dealt
48
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
almost as
I
many pages
desire,
and
of the retrospective
emotions of
group.
That
all
is
him
persists
and governs
we
can only look back and regret that we did not do this or that
or the other thing
baffled desire.
If
all
we
we can
find
no reason
to
blame our-
is
sentiment.
The name
"
"
Sorrow
own
it
distinct
from that
of the
sentiment
The impulse
impulse
sentiment of love.
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
49
his toy.
and
and involves
tears,
common
must be ascribed
an innate
to
to all
members
the species,
of
it
typical
of
impulse
is first
still
if
any strong
the impulse thus re-enforced
fails
The
result
That
is
to say,
we
are
endowed with
The
;
it
biological value
and function
life
them
wholly transitory.
The two emotions of anger and distress occupy, then, a
position unlike any others.
They spring from innate affective
dispositions
and expressions
This
recognise
affect,
in
properly called
Social
"
Psychology),
distress
must
"
(which I failed to
be ranked with the
50
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
beloved person, and this fact leads to the
error of confusing sorrow with distress.
They are
the death of a
common
different in feeling
sorrow has
its
sweetness.
The
of love.
distress
baffling of
but sorrow
desires of love,
is
is
wholly painful
distress is to cry
he wrote
it
"
:
Who
ever heard of
"*
it ?
Sentiments.
When
writing
my
had
am
more useful
my own conception
am concerned to
and therefore I
is
truer and
state
clearly
"
on
this
topic.
and desires."f
together the dispositions to a great many emotions
of the
relation
of
the
view
And at that time he accepted my
* Article on " Mr. Eibot's Theory of the Passions," Mind, N.S.
vol. xvi, p. 492.
+ Op.
cit., p.
497.
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
51
In
my
view a sentiment
is
essentially a
system consisting
of
How
whole.
by me
then does
it
differ
the instinct
the connexion between the cognitive and the affective dispositions which are its essential constituents is innate, in the
If all or
is
upon the
show fear
in fear
perception of dogs
was
we should
instinctive, or
But
if
at first
and
(or,
more
thereafter he
(or of
would be one
of
case might
be).
This sentiment
it
would
Op.
cit., p.
503. \
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
52
and in
repeatedly excite his anger as well as his fear
that case the habitual attitude of the small boy towards the
may
one cognitive disposition linked with the two affective dispositions of fear
and anger
respectively.
object, its
essential modification
is
innately given,
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
53
is
a fact of
as I conceive
it,
For the
directly, but only indirectly through the object, or, more strictly,
by their common connexion with the one cognitive disposition.
This
is
Why
of a sentiment.
The emotion
is
said to control
Here we
have
it,
him seems
and
if it
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
54
sentiment of love.
we accept
If
we
and more
How
are
we
to
its
directed
Mr.
creature)
more numerous
it solves.
child
Shand's answer
dog,
(or
is
that
become
or
other
the object,
when
or cat,
apprehended,
joy, being a member of the
of the system to this
directs
the
other
members
of
love,
system
excites joy
and
Why
object.
say
because
shall
we
say,
it
is
with Bain,
serve.
we take the
former,
we
Or
warm
there
is
joy.
are, it
seems
to
assigned to
me, two serious objections to the
is
us pleasure
Mr. Shand says "
love it, because it
Whereas the truth seems to be that, when we
gives us joy."
derive joy from our relations with a loved object, it is because
gives
we
love it
We
the love
is
Mr. Shand's
INSTINCT
derive
it
AND EMOTION.
of
55
sensation, as,
e.g.,
who
Bain,
how we come by
all loves.
Again, the modus
sentiment of love upon its object
Joy, we are rightly told, may be
incidental to hate.
then, do
hate
Why,
we not
we
Hate
is
is
and
joy,
sorrow,
first
anger,
fear,
still
four emotional
dispositions in duplicate
ment
inherit these
more
if
may give, we
Mr. Shand
difficult question
How, then, does
both consist of the same four emotional
:
directly connected
For the
Presumably
it
is
due to some
what
I
is
this
difference
cannot conceive
how
But
his hypothesis is to
meet
if
us,
so,
and
this difficulty.
fear,
and
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
56
Is there
On my
view
arise,
and the
facts
on which
manner.
First,
any
affective
disposition,
though
is
the direct
its
character to a similar
and
then,
these
objections
how
are
of
we
must prevent
our
of
the
the structure
accepting
sentiment
on which
he chiefly
relies in
arriving at
it
another to
Let us consider the instance Mr. Shand has chosen for the
how we may
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
57
linked.
Mr. Shand says that in the mother the infant excites joy
though why this should be the case he does not attempt to
;
explain
My view
is
most serious
child
and especially
protect
it,
to cherish
satisfaction
which
is
is
is
of the
it
to her
bosom and
accompanied by a feeling
and
impulse accomplishes
which
the impulse.
primarily to hug
of specific quality
that, as this
it,
form
If it is impossible for
it
gives strength
from
emotions of desire
is
it differs
is
from confidence in
The
desire of the
mother
soon as
it
for
;
as
58
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
Mr. Shand himself recognises three, kinds of joy (1) of attainment, (2) of anticipation, (3) of retrospect (p. 511) and in
doing so, he implicitly admits that joy is a state of feeling that
:
of
is
to
alleged impulse
is
is
it,
to
felt
some
cases,
of
we
If
"
we
find that in
one class of
That is exactly my
impulse or desire" (p. 283).
In the special case of maternal love, the impulse
or desire whose fulfilment is the cause of joy is the protective
of
that
contention.
impulse
effect
is
support
which
it
end
its
calls
tendency
force or
It
is
to degrade language
by using a stronger
common
word than
is
in a state of anxiety is
"
"
"
to a condition
fear, by giving
anxiety neurosis
characterised by abnormal liability to fear. As Dr. Ernest Jones has
pointed out (" Pathology of Morbid Anxiety," in volume of papers on
with
the
name
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
59
Her
child.
fearlessness
when
this
impulse
is
awakened
is
proverbial.
That anger
is
when
aroused
this
protective impulse
is
"
all
is merely a special case of the general law that
arouse
to
which
are
interfered
tend
with,
impulses,
abruptly
obstructed
"
anger
(p. 488).
The sorrow
it
is
If the object is
regret.
when
dispositions have
of joy
The
any
relation is peculiar
sentiment of love
and hopelessness
of this confusion
intoler-
The extent
"
In some impulses
there is the thought of a result or
end.
Such impulses in agreement with ordinary usage
.
we
But
desire is
"
more than an
60
WILLIAM MCDOUGALL.
"
"
It is essentially an organisation
of those emotional dispositions which are characteristic of its
of constituents
(p. 493).
"
process
(p.
dispositions
463),
of
i.e.,
it
is
its
and
its
several
retrospective emotions.
represent desire as
it
sentiments"
(p.
519).
These
statements (each of
explicit
which
is
But
clear
still
more impossible
of acceptance is the
sentiment
is
following
an
innately organised
of
emotional
each
of
which
comprises, besides
system
systems,
an affective disposition, an array of instincts. Each of these
is
implication:
occasion
and
may become
desire
sufficient foresight
of ends.
of obstruc-
Hence each
of
these
complex system
emotional dispositions, and so in an infinite regress of
systems within systems, all innately organised.
of
and
this
I submit, a return to
the
from this
of escape
and confusion
is,
infinite regress
the
principles with which I set out as guiding hypotheses
emotions
each
of
the
that
springs
primary
principles, namely,
;
from an
from the
only
important
tion is that
most
distinction
of
them
in
respect
of
innate organisa-
61
upon
special
incidents
of
the course of
activity
of
other
only
primary emotions or affects are
properly to be regarded as conative forces springing from
conative dispositions
that all other emotional states are
the
that
conations;
blendings
of
of
feeling,
or feelings
ment
of the intellect.
now
figures
For
so largely in this
is
essentially of the
and
"
essentially morbid,
is
the functional
"
*'
complex
and the
"
by entirely independent
may hope
lines
of
mutual helpful-
is
62
A.
is
SHAND.
F.
but that one which Mr. Shand has ignored and implicitly
rejected.
A. F. SHAND.
By
II.
It
elaborate attack on
had
had very
it
it
It is true
different objects.
emotion to instinct.
Mr. McDougall, as far as I knew, was the only writer who had
formulated a clear theory of this relation. That was, to my
We
difficult
when
came
to apply
it
But
favourably impressed me :
to the facts it seemed to me incon-
first
was confined
The subsequent chapters
on the primary emotions, which seem to support my theory,
sistent
with them.
my
direct criticism of it
facts
which
his
was obliged
For the
tentatively.
that
his,
to ignore.
is
My own
all.
because
it
theory
could accept
I only put
it
forward
He is as full of
character impresses us so differently.
Where I can only reach a proconfidence as I am of doubt.
of
visional solution of
my
of a long chapter,
my
The
theories.
first
summarise
my
opinions.
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
page of
This
it.
is
63
is
in
own
reassert his
it is
opinions,
These eight pages are full of them and even in the rest of
his paper, where he supplies some quotations from my book,
they are still numerous.
;
between them.
differences
I
to
attempted
make
number
If
plain in
method
my
able here to
make
stood was
the
my
book, at least, as
of enquiry
and
object
to formulate
by means of
it,
may be
the
of
subject
symposium.
It
at
alone
will
cannot therefore
occupy
space
my disposal.
deal with Mr. McDougall's accounts of my theories
the
all
Desire
of
and Sentiment.
Mr. McDougall's theory
of the relation of
a general statement of
"
of
behaviour, some
same
in
He
leads
up
to it
by
instinctive behaviour.
"
In every case," he
tion
the nature of
primary emotion-
all
"
says,
movement
individuals
or train of
of
movements which
on
all
is
the
similar
Yet, in the
opinion of naturalists, which, like him, I adopt.
he
that
he
has
made
this
admission
in
present paper,
forgets
"
"
his Social Psychology about the
perfectly definite behaviour
of instincts
"
the same in
all
64
SHAND.
A. F.
that stereotyped
and
which we usually
he goes on to ask me
definite character to
"
And
restrict the term
instinctive."
'
"
'
"
" what
I
have
for
justification
using the pronoun we in
"
this large collective sense, implying a consensus of opinion
'
(p. 43).
We
We
called instincts.
have
of
The
"
"
sense-impression
must have
I answer that it
is
given to
show that
"
doubtless, in
in others
it is
many
it
as
more than
but no evidence
sensation.
That
"
this sensation is
with
it
is so,
"
it
"
"
INSTINCT
know
AND EMOTION.
is
affective,
cognitive
and conative
He
C5
does not
know
hut he gives us
by an emotion that
own words
panied in
all cases
instinct.
is
accom-
Instinctive behaviour
always attended by some such emotional excitement, however faint, which in each case is specific or peculiar to that kind
is
of
behaviour
"
(op.
of this necessary
behaviour
"
cit.,
Now,
p. 28).
if
we ask
any evidence
for
"
"
instinctive
emotional excitement,"
we
find
"
that
it is
"
we seem
so in all cases.
This
is
and
We
thesis.
it is
a good hypo-
thesis.
of the
ground
This
with
a "disposition" which,
instinct.
It
mines
possessor to perceive
its
is
is
among other
effects,
"deter-
"
Each
of emotional excitement,
whose quality
is specific
or peculiar to
66
it
A.
SHAND.
F.
affective aspect
of the operation of
"
instincts
We
emotional excitement
excited
is
its
It
is
"
'
with
felt
"
it
one, the
principal
affective aspect
"
<;
and
"
which
a primary emotion.
must be at least as
call
follows
instinct
emotional excitement
what we
is
when the
(2)
"
"
instincts
and
recognised by
him
"
building instincts
principal
definite"
"
emotional
"
if
is
of these instincts.
which we have
behaviour
affect."
Are
the
nest-
not,
why
not
first
instinctive behaviour
fectly
and
affective aspect
peculiar
the
is
instincts
ones
What
to
We
return to
remember
is
of
"perthe
determine
the
a curious
that
theory is this
an emotional excite-
quality
of
:
Why
cession
of
sensations.
movements
Is
it
gives
rise
to
the peculiarity of
succession
these
of
motor
sensations
that
a peculiar quality ?
with other kinds
connected
sensations
If it is, then the peculiar
of definite and complex behaviour, not innately determined but
it
When
I take
it
my
watch
up, lay
it
at night out of
my
waist-
67
sensations.
definite
of
These,
therefore,
But there
a particular emotion.
are
concerned
sensations
far
as
these
so
give rise to
at all
is
should
no emotion
is
and
my mind
my
Why
may
what we are
ment'
doing,
doing,
it
writers
on
is
is
and
if
we do not attend
to
"
condition an emotional excite-
But
of a particular quality?
perfection which
instincts, and it
older
we are
how can
it
is
this
mechanical
so often insisted
on as characteristic of
this absence
intelligence
instinct
of
emphasised.
This
which the
antithesis
of
least, as
require
intelligent supervision
instinct
is
this
make
and what
"
What
emotional excitement
"
difference will
must there be
what
want
at the
moment with
less
68
SHAND.
A. F.
Here
heretofore.
some
like
is
complex and
definite
of time
behaviour, which,
do
it
amount
thought-
fully
"
"
gives rise to its
specific
quality, then there should
definite
of
behaviour"
The
it.
be a
"
kind
is
less
peculiar to
the individual
it
For the
first.
is
more
first
action.
If,
"
then,
"
instinctive behaviour
emotional excitement
"
which
is
"
"
specific or peculiar
"
to
it,
this
and we can
find
no
"
emotional excitement,"
accompanied by different
In my chapter on
emotions. Now apply this to the facts.
Fear I have drawn attention to the many different types of
behaviour that
are
two
may
The
first is
as
any
There
varieties
of
young
and immobility
bird,
pecking
its
69.
ing cry and arrests its action, or as when men hear the approach
of an enemy in the dark, and remain motionless and silent.
The second
is
man
is
capable.
whether they
what
of fear.
Now,
that
it
this
seems to
me
as convincing a proof as
"
we can
instinctive behaviour
"
find
that
we
its
essential character.
The
primary emotion.
I have hitherto dealt with Mr. McDougall's theory from a
different point of view from that which I took up in my book.
There criticism
of it
and subordinated
to
had
to be
my
When
came
and anger, I saw clearly that there was not only one
instinctive behaviour of fear for a given species of the higher
fear
animals that feels the emotion, but more than one. I shall
not repeat the detailed evidence I furnished in my chapter
on fear in evidence of this, but, assuming it to be true, I shall
ask whether
it
70
A. F.
each one of
"
what
of
recasting
that, according to
first recollect
when
excitement
the
also
it
Let us
of that theory.
SHAND.
be
may
him,
excited, conditions
called
primary
emotion."
this
emotion,
occurs
plurality
it
is
"
affective aspect
Yet he had
"
of
the
in
sufficient if it is
Now, according
one.
case
of
every primary
to
is
"
the
"
also recognised
without a precedent
fear,
I tried to
flight.
number of cases of flight without concealment and of concealment without flight. Very disingenuously, it seems to me,
Mr. McDougall in his present paper attempts to force the
"
I submit," he says,
facts into agreement with his theory.
"
that
the
follows: It
nature of fear
is
to seek cover
of
"
"
and there
two links"
37).
(p.
flight," in his
may
lie
hid.
It is thus a
Notice that
in
place
chain-instinct
of
term
to seek cover."
For
in relation to fear,
''
flight," if it
means a succession
of rapid
movements
Now,
means
the
fear,
of
wings
lie
or,
moving
71
are, or,
"
phrase
"
cover
seeking
means
concealment, and
seeking
In such cases,
flight.
We
two
links.
on such
particularly concerning
in his book,
of
We
fear.
are
that
employ
different
modes
Now, we know
danger.
of rapid
that there
to the
rise
very apt, in
this general
may
which, at least
primary emotion
be as
"
speaking in
an instinct
by
of flight in
But
emotion of fear,
of
of flight is
spoken
We may
of flight modified.
may
run
may
to attack
the
When, therefore,
of as proper to fear it
not impel
it
to a flight as rapid
What seems
direction
acquired by experience.
the instinct
this
instinct
A soldier
which the
fleeing
instincts
must be
is
animal takes.
either instinctive or
of flight connected
This
of the
attainment of
its
end in
different situations, so
my
second was
72
A.
that
Upon
this fact.
my
may
SHAND.
subserve the ends of different
emotions.
to be,
F.
them
theory of
emotion
is
based.
We
ment
show were
them
there
the
is
clinging of the
them
death-shamming instinct
young
to the
Now
parent animal.
there
How
is
of
the
will he deal
it is
and concealment
to
to
form a
chain-instinct;
say that whenever
the child clings to his mother from fear he must simulate
death and run away and hide would be too absurd. What
more complex
still
for to
him
if
he
is
He
"
By
under
including
fear,"
he says,
"
number
of
called states of
impulses, or instincts
still
larger
number
of tendencies,
"
add
need
I will
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
73
would be inconvenient
it
sorrow.
of
which
For there
is
is
The name
"
'
Sorrow,'
is
"
so
he
"
(p. 49).
which
is
requisite
if
we
are
sentiment of love
"
own
is
"
theory,
namely that
(Ibid.)
but one of
tion.
He
charges
me
one of
"
is
"
same emotion
* In reference to
Disgust, Mr. McDougall remarks that I accept his
view that there are " two original varieties ... a tactile and a gusta"
tory (p. 41). I certainly hold this theory, since it is my own. If I had
adopted it from him, I should have acknowledged my debt. In one of
several conversations I had with him during the writing of his book
I mentioned the theory, which was in
my MS., though I had never
published it. Mr. McDougall must have forgotten this. There are other
resemblances between our books that have a similar origin, as for instance
that there are three kinds of Sentiments, Love, Hate, and Bespect, and
that Surprise is not a primary emotion in the same sense as are other
emotions.
74
A. F.
SHAND.
"
"
system an instinct, and the emotion the affective aspect
of it, as Mr. McDougall has done, because of the
variety of
this
mode
emotions,
the term
the
'
instinct
'
system
affective
less
'
be attached to different
of the emotion,'
phase
may
'
and
to confine
which Shand
'
"*
present in consciousness.'
behaviour
of
none the
"
emotion
"
the
emotion
Now
'
calls
to the
I certainly
side of the
system
may be
to
This, I think, I
system
of
an emotion
system
some
instincts at least
of the emotion.
were parts
I regarded instincts as
drawn
of
the
movers of
all
human
"
of
p. 5.
ingredients,
and though
still
75
life itself.
"
faint,"
it to-
must
to
me
a fact of introspection
for
that,
elicited
people have had this experience, sometimes feeling the fear after their danger has passed
when they reflect on it, but not feeling it at the time, that
So
it.
many
can be gainsaid.
In the first
I have now dealt with Mr. McDougall's theory.
in the
show
that
is only an assumption
I
tried
to
it
have
place
I
do not think
it
my own
prominent features of
the
principal
facts
to
It
theory clear.
which I have
referred,
interprets
with which
it
make
theories clear
undefined at others,
facts
at
certain
points,
to interpret,
have not yet got the facts. By this method theories become
flexible and progressive, and adaptable to the new facts which
our research may bring to light.
We
now
try to
make
clearer
Primary emotion
is
my own
at first
76
A.
F.
SHAND.
of instincts
"
feeling,"
which
it is.
primary emotion
an intense feeling it is some-
It is not necessarily
times a very faint one, but it always has this quality so long as
The quality of its feeling, that
it remains the same emotion.
which makes us
feel it to
for instance,
much more
is
it
that
accompany
which it initiates.
of
its
force
directed
end
to
but
its
by a
it
is
original
number
of
man,
supplemented
-acquired ends, and by them his freedom and progress are
When we compare the original biological end with
assured.
biological
at least,
in
is
is
its
common
instincts
which
it
to
make
them
is
It has
cognitive aspect.
stand
to all of
characteristic of the
is,
so far as I under-
is
that I
affective dispositions
its
end
is
attained,
7T
apparently based on
my
denial
conceive
the
that
same
that,
must be
when one
felt
of
these
it,
since
with
evoke
own
its
anything more
appropriate
in the
How much
proceeds to
make
means
says
that
processes"
ground
am
We
have
all
there
is
separation
He
psycho-physical
behaviour without
behaviour.
interpretation.
instinct
there
here
of a
Yet he
most fanciful
"
influenced by a
I
being
to achieve that
crude
he thinks, is
my Tertiurn Quid. But I did not need one, and if I did I
should answer that Mr. McDougall, in requiring me to justify
Instinct,
it,
mechanism
of the
that
I
still
by
admit that impulses spring from the excitement of instincts.
But he says I do not think it worth while noting that an
reflexes
may
impulse
is
To him
it
be accompanied
"
sensations
78
SHAND.
A. F.
I,
"Of
1.
the Difference
statement
feelings
of
what
(p.
is
"
(p.
Again neither
27).
If we cannot
say
regard the appetites merely as conation, neither can we so
regard the impulses." They possess feeling, are "pleasant or
anger" (B.
1,
Ch. III).
Again on
p.
459
"
(Ibid.).
The
distinction
an exceedingly
facts,"
difficult one.
we might be tempted
"
(p.
former as
"
"
is
statical
undiffer-
to sit
;
if
down
if
is
a striking
fact, as is
am
am uncomfortable, an
tired I feel
an
an impulse
for
impulse to vary
my position.
impulse to
warmth
feel
many
some
as Prof. Stout
On
other.
would
"
say,
cases, spring
state of the
state into
79
body
an impulse
is
from them.
short cuts
It
get
is
up
when
change
cannot always
my position, when
these
sort
of
present in the
we have no
minds
knowledge of what
So also with regard to
direct
of animals.
grasp.
Without, then, in
opinion as to
functional
relation
emotion there
between them.
In the system
of
an
is
will
number
of different impulses in
concluded that impulses bore
& relation to emotions similar to the relation which emotions
different situations.
bear to sentiments.
relation.
I therefore
That was
my
80
A.
Now
while
on
p.
28,
SHAND.
F.
and again at
the
top of p.
34,
also
have ends,
yet,
is its
tendency
"
specific
(p. 28), and that impulses
when he comes to discuss Desire, which he
to
end
of its
remarking that I
"
sentiments, he goes on to say that he thinks I am aware that
this would be just as improper as to class it with the emotions.'*
after
(P- 44.)
more
me
"
"
instinct."
He
accuses
"
I considered a
what
in
"
is
my
"
"
"
chain-instincts."*
'
IV
81
and
the unqualified
employment
of the
term
"
"
instinct
to limit
them.
to
It
with it"
had
"
the
the
out
pointed
these
to
consider the
since
192),
(p.
behaviour
involved in
parental instinct."
referred
variety
of
chain-instincts
(pp.
30, 31),
now
shall
most com-
of the
plex of them.
We may
select the
kill
draw
it
to their nests,
it in,
of the
kinds of
instinctive behaviour,
we may regard
as proceeding
this
end
animal belongs
not
cated chain-instinct
own
which the
its
is,
preservation.
Now
Mr. McDougall
some
conditions
.
whose quality
is specific
"
says,
one
Each
kind of emotional
excitement
we
call this
and
that,
excitement a
the
"
parental instinct
as that instinct
"
is
no ambiguity
he includes
its
affective
82
A.
SHAND.
F.
"
"
He
a true primary
This he regards as
(Ch. III).
has never appreciated the evidence which I brought forward*
aspect.
to
"
show that
tender emotion
emotions, as
different
"
is
the
name
gratitude,
pity,
of a class of very
reverence,
aspiration,
difficult to
it
We
pass.
will
solitary
"
instincts.
if
touched,
"
"
"
"
stinging
"
cit.,
(op.
p.
method
particular
294).
movements well
(2)
...
abdomen
directed
"
an instinctive
is
"
the
attack
of
in
securing its
examples of the methods practised by different species (ibid.).
"
The mode of carrying their booty is a true instinct.
(3)
species
it
hold hers tightly against the under side of her thorax. Each
works after her own fashion, and in a way that is uniform for
each species
"
(p. 296).
"
illustration of that
Here, we
* Ch.
Psychology.
"
may remark
Tender Emotion,"
in
(4)
"
in passing, is
which
The fourth
Professor
Stout's
an
I alleged to
instinct
which
Groundicork
of
83
the
"
of the food
no
and others
in
"
an
is
secured
which some
nest
is
made "
is
"
"
:
preparing
as in
Ammophila
The "way
"
(p. 296).
(6)
of these
"
One
instinct.
There
it
in
"
(ibid.}.
instinct
upon
(7)
The
"
is
(ibid.}.
seven instincts,
if
general style of
"
which
all is
these observa-
i:
chain-instinct,"
It
would not be
an instinctive
act, so is
Thus Ammophila
sometimes
as to be almost indistinguishable
Now
"
(p. 32).
"
"
principal
interpret
them on
instincts, or he
less
numerous,
his theory
would have
They
to find a
"
affective aspect."
what
of
"
If,
principal instincts
"
self-preservation
and
"
parental instinct
"
;
for
all
only two primary emotions. But let this pass. These instincts
we will assume are subordinate, still, have they not all their own
"
instinctive behaviour
specific emotions, for, according to him,
is
always
attended by
"
84
A.
(Ch. II)
from
follows
It
SHA.ND.
F.
this
We
in this
closer
"one kind
"
"
we
principal
find that
The
of
first is
Pugnacity
first
is
of
is
them
if
we
list of
look
prin-
the second
gives rise to
all
two
There
cipal instincts.
its
of
is
it
or, as he calls
it,
The
instinct
The
For although in
hid."
The excitement of
this
"
principal instinct
"
is
then accom-
of
it,
important chain-instinct on
my own
theory.
Let us
first,
for
complexity,
present
case,
In the
of complexity.
first class,
the instinct
the instinct of attack and destruction of prey
or
its
flies
with
to
the
the
nest and
wasp drags
prey
by which
;
is finally closed.
INSTINCT
If
we examine
members
the
AND EMOTION.
of this
second
85
class,
we
find other
method
its
of
its
For
its stinging
This wasp seizes its caterpillar from above, and
having firm hold of it bends its abdomen under the body of the
insect and stings it in one of its segments.
But this is not
only
seizing
prey,
instinct.
sufficient
"
malaxation
"
is
Again
in its nest-building
There are
its
and of walking,
both of which are required for the building of its nest. How
many others should we not find if we studied this question
minutely ?
In the third class
by which
as,
the instincts
same
class.
mere
to the
reflexes
specific
"
(p. 30), so as to
It
"
are
would be convenient
for
escape
awkward questions
as
but changing
theory, must be connected with each of them
names
will
He
can
no more
their
not alter their nature.
;
86
A. F.
SHAND.
wherever there
again to what
impulse.
aroused an impulse
Now
of this instinct.
when
it
is felt
may
foresight of
it is
complex,
as in nest-building,
the laying of twigs to form the nest. The impulse, then, to find
a twig, to return with it, and put it into position, may
is
attained,
some
of the prospective
emotions,
In stating, as I
hope, anxiety, and despondency, etc.
have done in my book, that these emotions belong to Desire,
as
of instincts
before
the
were
am
to be the facts.
desires,
desired
end
If,
attained,
sufficiently
we should
INSTINCT
AND EMOTION.
87
of each instinct
own
rise to its
would give
same monotonous
rise to the
fact of desire,
with
its
ment
Peckhams' observations.
how some
are slovenly
What
"
in
into
humming
a wasp
it,
"
was
"
cheerful
after
much
with
"
and
Peckhams,
away the
had
(op.
cit.,
p.
they remark
accompanied by a loud and
On another occasion
36).
energy,"
during
contents.
"When we
returned
to
the
garden,
about half an hour after we had done the deed, we heard her
loud and anxious humming from the distance.
She was
searching far and near for her treasure-house, returning every
few minutes to the right spot, although the upturned earth had
entirely changed its appearance.
her eyes
"
(op.
cit.,
accompanied at
p. 68).
first
Now
to believe
and desire
if
for a long
time from
its
do not
know
case where a
wasp
nest, I
nest apparently in
"
:
In
88
SHAND.
A. F.
cil.,
p. 62).
In another
case, in
which they
uncommon
"
also destroyed
"
building of the nest, the search for prey, and the return to the
On the contrary,
nest are connected with specific emotions.
their instinctive behaviour appears to be
for the result
situation
to
which
it
is
directed,
accompanied by desire
and according to the
now by disappointment or
and
other emotions.
by hope
have seen that the same emotions may accompany
is
now by
affected
anxiety,
We
different instincts,
and
same
We
shall
now
instinct,
There I
problem from the point of view adopted in my book.
started from primary emotion, and had to consider the varieties
of behaviour which in different situations are selected for the
attainment
of its end.
it
has
man
adopts, nor
how much
this
affected
behaviour
end
will be
he
is
We
becomes desire
which
Every primary
may
give rise
If it is anger,
it
nation as
it
moves
and backward,
of
is
moves forward
prospective emotions,
from
being
89
I have
reply to Mr. McDougail.
because
of
his
not
been disappointed with his criticism,
disagreement with my opinions. I thought that he would have first
I
mastered
my
before criticising
me
my
what was
But
false or useless.
it,
in attacking
Confident in his
of his paper.
own
theory, he has
shown scant
So
respect for mine, and, therefore, has dealt with it carelessly.
determined is he upon attack that he even attacks the theory
sentiments of which he
of the
much use
from me, now he
made
so
in his book.
finds that he
He had thought he had learnt it
"
" had
and
the theory
failed to grasp
(p. 50) my conception,
If I have
that he so much praised turns out to be his own.
my
developed
still,
in
my
of
not
view,
Mr.
We
which
I
thought
have given other instances, which he does not detect in himself.
He now puts forward his conception as " truer and more useful "
than mine.
it is.
object
that
(Ch. V,
man
"
p.
122).
loves
hates
or
"
meant," he says, by saying
another is that he is liable to
What
is
upon the
paper, his
change
of attitude
is
"
(ibid., p. 123).
shown
In his present
at the first
mention
of
consisting
of
several
emotional
dispositions
directly
linked
90
A. F.
have to
together (a conception I
What,
(p. 42).
"
the
is
then,
SHAND.
criticise
..."
presently)
"
view," he says, a sentiment is essentially a
system consisting of a cognitive disposition linked with an
formed
In
my
He
is
knowing
it.
called a sentiment
regards as accidental.
it
and
its
stimuli
"
has been
now
reverting to
a sentiment of fear
anger
so far as
offspring,
it
would
What
is
new
experience of
conception, an emotion,
first
this instance to
show
to
what lengths
evidence
confidence
in
forceful
enunciating opinions
the pleasure of using
;
my opinions.
without
a certainty of misconceptions
Antagonism
of this
first
of all sympathetic.
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
III.
91
G. F. STOUT.
By
The application
or Biology
of this
word
and inconsistent;
main direction
suggest the
Unfortunately,
It is
way.
it
it
in
is
must,
loose, fluc-
which a
definition is to be sought.
instinct except
inquire
Psychology
in
some kind
what kind
of
of congenital
original
endowment.
endowment
called
is
But
if
we
necessary and
is
guidance.
of the
There
term which
is,
is
relatively definite
and
precise, because it
is
as determined
lessons
of
of
human
beings as deter-
experience.
is
taken
Here, an
to
be the
more
or less
of
movements con-
human
beings, are
aimed at with
regarded as a mystery.
It is
from
this
scientific purposes,
92
G.
and the
reason
so
fact that
why
long as
embody
For him
must
false
same
course,
principles or
a false view of
movements, directed
movements
ends
to
of
are, at
a very strong
is
Now Shand
relevant facts.
of instinct
is
unserviceable or
determined
STOUT.
of tradition.
F.
He
He
admits
and continuation
and distinctively
animals.
in varying
intelligence, another
account
its
complex
trains of
He even regards it as
be developed without the co-operation
motor behaviour.
may
and even
in this case
he would
still call
them
'
instincts.
At
this point
justify, in part,
movements
of a certain
of departure
AND EMOTION.
INSTINCT
nature
special
them,
it
the
of
psychical
which
conditions
is,
kind of movements
special
process
93
or trains of
movement
what
meant,
is
definition of
defensible.
a natural unity.
its
of the
word
It takes
There
Biology.
which require
tion.
the
to
He finds
dualism
"
are,
be noticed before proceeding to his own definiMr. Shand for a " crude psycho-physical
fault with
mind and
am
There
dualism."
Now, without
"
partly in
asserting that
regard an instinct as
to
is
is
it
can be
truly said that the congenital dispositions entering into the constitution of an instinct are partly in the mind as well as in the
An instinctive process
body, and partly in the body only.
involves psychical activity of an intelligent kind which is
innately
determined.
disposition.
associated,
either
in
the
way
of
But
parallelism
or interaction,
neural arrangement is
of
the
innate
organisation required for the execution
only part
of a train of instinctive movements, as congenitally pre-
determined.
The
rest
is
this
purely
prearrange HI en t
In Mr. Shand's language,
bodily
selectively
directed to
the
its interest
grain
is
due
and attention
to
a psycho-
94
G.
STOUT.
But
physiological disposition.
logical,
F.
it
is
the grain
of
"
"
fact
arise
if
we do
it, it
or
principle.
see,
involve any
I think, rightly
of such a train.
This usage
It
is,
at
movements, but
activity, instinctive
instincts.
existence
and
movements con-
mark
the
of
psychical dispositions
This course has two disadvantages as compared with
Mr. Shand's. The first is that it starts from a comparatively
relates.
bill.
proposed definition is
by
Psychology
have,
in
this
new
edition of
matter, though
my Manual
of
with misgiving,
95
followed
now
definition as
disposition with
affective
first
his
"
the innate
cognitive
"
of an
conjunction
Here
disposition."
This term
affective."
I
is,
"
affective
of
marking
affective
"
terms
"
affect
The reason
conative.*
"
is
The terms
obvious.
"
"
and
purpose
from the
affect
"
and
Where
tendency involved in conation.
Mr. McDougall speaks of an affective disposition, I should rather
"
"
conative-affective disposition
or, if one word is
speak of a
with
the
active
required, of an
This
"
interest disposition
of course, .a
is,
"
purely verbal
or
"
dispositional interest."
It is
question.
me
other-
to be
very
clearly
This
shown
that
if
it
had been
we could assume
fronted with
a nut,
its
that
when
young squirrel
innate constitution
is
is
con-
such that
it
96
G.
STOUT.
F.
But
definition of instinct.
that
all instincts
it
In most
for any.
cases, at
any
rate,
it
holds good
to
instinct, leaving
special
as
dispositions
question
is
to the existence
general as constituting
it
cognitive
Thus
it
still
units
However
dispositions.
be answered,
to
structural
distinct
this
activities
We may
may
it
does
of
to formulate distinctly
and
to
Neither side
is
same
himself holds
emotions.
that
Here
his
the
same
incline to
instinct
Shand's side
view.
involve various
may
The
if
he has rightly
issue
is,
however,
opponent's
"
instinct "obscured by Mr. Shand's double use of the word
(1) for the congenital basis of the total instinctive activity,
interpreted
to the several
(2) for the congenital disposition corresponding
behaviour which enter into its compartial modes of motor
McDougall wrongly takes for granted that Shand
position.
INSTINCT
word exclusively
uses the
AND EMOTION.
97
and he argues
movements leading up
to a certain end.
But
it
is
clear that
we choose
even
if
There
is,
of congenital dispositions.
of
It
is
for
him the
vital issue.
He
and only one, kind of emotion which is congenitally deterOther emotions emerging in the course of the instinctive
mined.
psychological laws,
e.g.
and intercon-
The theory
way
is
to accepting
interesting
it.
modes
of emotional
excitement are
Again,
it
seems to
me
that Mr.
McDougall
is
too hasty in
98
G.
F.
STOUT.
the
emotions
prospective
despondency, and
confidence,
hope,
For instance, he
despair.
tells
anxiety,
us
that
This
For, if
is true,
we
but
inquire
anticipation
it is
by no means a complete
inversely.
first.
Some
In particular
logical conditions.
McDougall
am
At any
rate, the
discussion.
the
same
instinctive
.connected
with
different
and also
INSTINCT
am
inclined to agree
AND EMOTION.
99
is
McDougall
motor behaviour varies the emotion does not remain just the
for emotions which are
same. This can scarcely be denied
;
variation in
difference
in
is
a corresponding degree of
I do not think that
connected emotions.
the
in
emotions
is
where there
possible
is
great and
now
false
and untenable.
I confess that I
me
to give the
same analysis
he seems to
me
to hold
now, as
at
first,
of
what
In particular,
that a sentiment
organised in relation to a
to
loved
or hated.
which
is
said
be
The only
object
cognised
of
criticism
here
with
Mr.
which
I am
part
McDougall's
is
due mainly
than to general
this really is Mr. Shand's
psychological laws.
view, I think
That
him wrong.
is to
But
say, if
am
G 2
100
III.
By
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
I.
1.
LET
and
its
ER T.
Here
a formula, charming in
apparent simplicity, briefly expressive of the extraordinarily
formula in cognition
is
so-called.
2.
relatedness
known
We
3.
thing, as
known,
implies
ER
(cf.
may
we
(Perry).
Translating
is percipi.
What
cases,
"
ego-centric predicament
Berkeleyan phraseology, we
treatment.
all
in this relation.
is
"
Every known T
this into
is
of the esse of
E?
of
in Berkeley's
is
denned in terms
defined (by
of percipi, so is the esse of
"
consists in
existence
in
of
Its
terms
percipere.
implication)
"
mind.
6.
and speaks
"
"
in
mind
my
"
is
ambiguous.
Self, that
is,
"
my own mind
this
and other
and
if
the
like passages,
how can
is
percipi
It is clearly not in
fore be in
in
mark
101
mind
mind
in
mind in
some other
ER T expresses."
C
Thus,
must there-
sense.
means
"
"
it
It
this sense.
the formula
of
(P.
mind
49).
is
of as in
spoken
mind.
8.
But what,
if
any,
is
the status of
T when
it is
not within
?
Berkeley's answer is
formula.
It is no
non-existent
within
that
only
But it may be within
longer, or not yet, within my mind.
(a) other finite minds, or (b) some supposed mind and (c) it has
the formula
that
Is it then non-existent
is
it
If
none the
relatedness
"
to
Spirit.
There
is,
p.
447).
in so far as continuous,
is dependent on
known.
it
11.
But
like nature
is
?
the
is
independent of
relatedness.
relatedness in
ER T. None
Its
ER T
C
being
is
and that in
the less
in being
GR T
C
of
And
is primarily sense-perception.
Sensible things do really exist and, if
The former
when Berkeley
"
says
102
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
"
"
His ideas are
and, again, that
nothing by sense as we do
not conveyed to Him by sense as ours are" (D. iii, p. 459).
So far, therefore, the R c in the formula ER C T and that in
;
GR T are
C
"
"
cf.
II.
We
14.
have seen
that
(.10)
ER
GR
by
So far as
is
independent
That
is
determined
concerned, therefore,
It is from this
determined by the ER C
"
conclude the being of a God, because
basis that he proceeds to
all sensible
16.
basis
of
things
Let
is
must be perceived by
from which he
iii,
17.
p.
starts
p.
ii,
425).
it is
that a
perceived or perceivable
451).
cognition
(D.
Him "
exist
in
the
of relatedness
perceivable
world
than that of
not
May
two
and may
things, T and T', be in some other relation, say,
not TR&T' (e.g., the gravitative relatedness of earth and sun)
have being independently of being known by us ?
Rs
18.
Assume that
is
may.
Seemingly
predicament?
known,
it
ER (TR
C
T').
Do we then
not.
For
every known
case,
as
103
C
X
every knowable case, as knowable, is ER (TR T ),
where 'E stands for someone who might know. if he were in
19.
And
"
that if we were
meaning thereby, as Berkeley says,
in
and
such
and
such
a
....
distance, both
placed
position
from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move
among
20.
is
58).
TR
X T' is
Grant
none the
less
C
independent of either EE or 'ER
c
dependent on R relatedness ?
C
is
Now
is,
(P.
"
within the
determine
field of
cognitive relatedness,
(or relation) as
as neither
22.
We
we cannot
directly
term
is,
or
is not,
in
some or
by
its
ad hoc natures
the reply
is
I take it that
in the affirmative.
may
prior to, and (&) subsequent to, their entry into this or
other specific
chemical combination.
of
True
but
physical terms
it
may
any
be
is
always
determined by their relatedness in this respect to other physical
terms.
25. Again, it
a room
may
And
is
104
LLOYD
C.
The problem
26.
ad rem
is
in respect of their
no doubt, a
is,
difficult one.
But there
is,
much to
their then
184).
(cf.
Now, in
27.
are
Their
nature
nature
otherwise
is
is
relatedness.
28.
The cognitive
relation
or possible knowledge
is
mode
its
terms
and
of relatedness
wise relatedness
is
May we
concerned.
is
is
if it
supposed knower.
31. No doubt both science and
the existence of
TE X T'
cognitive relatedness
much
common
doctrine
is
it is
105
And
that such
further
postulates a real
a doctrine
be
may
on
dependent
the
relation
knowledge
whereas
of existence in
mind,
i.e.,
"
34.
The question between the materialists and me," he
"
is not, whether things have a real existence out of the
says,
mind
III.
35.
ER T
C
at
any
We
with the
started
drastically
simplified
formula
"
"
formula expresses."
to
"
equivalent
Let us now
within
in
that
consider
mind
which
as,
this
what T
further
Primarily
it
But what
is
the con-
is,
presented to sense, or
is
not, so presented,
(D.
i,
p.
37.
(/3)
i.e.
"
re-presentative of
what
is
what may
be,
but
"
415).
of the qualities
which
are, or
may
be,
is
a collection
presented as ideas.
"
As
thing.
Thus a certain
tence, having
and consis-
other collections of
106
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
and the
book,
like sensible
"
things
38.
(P.
1).
When,
therefore,
and part
thing, part,
sented to sense
we
this
may
presentation.
so
is,
be
it
noted,
many
sensa-
there
But supplementary
in
to
what
is
immediately presented
"
is
suggested from
that which
all
perception,
Let us call this perceptual fringe, which suppleexperience."
ments the presentation, meaning, and let us symbolise it by " m."
is,
Then what
is
in
mind
at the
moment
of perception is
We may
ER T
C
Pm
therefore in this
meaning is a re-presentative
fringe of sensory derivation which qualifies the presentation,
and that it may profitably be distinguished from the higher
41. It
order of meaning to be
this
spoken
of
as
significance
below
(Section VI).
42. It
must
may
relatively constant.
"
"
to the
or
thing
"
Furthermore,
(D.
iii,
Pm
therefore,
we apply
463).
"
'"
object
we
it
feel
neither
is
the word
ceived
If,
43.
the thing
call
is
107
much more
relatedness
or
it
may
of us, it
it, is
collection of ideas
supposed
and
(a)
object
comprising
but
is
distinguish
On
(b).
"
thing
this
it,
as
"
"
thing
perceivable, from
Now
in
this sense
the
physical
more convenient
in Berkeley's doctrine
The thing
not
It will be
39, 89).
is
that
all
It
(a).
'E.
"
word
Pm
"
45.
(b),
will
is
It is that quality, or
some
is
in the direct
None the
perceivable qualities (D. i, p. 384).
things are, for Berkeley, in some manner, intermediaries,
The thing
less,
is
is its
hand
to
some E, and on
God
Men
of
substitute for
108
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
ways
But the physical object
;
is
knovvable in different
as such is
of per-
ception.
Ee verting now
50.
to the perceptual
"
m,"
perceptual cognition.
51. But we are wont to regard the suggested meaning as in
mind in a rather more intimate sense.
say that the perceivable thing supplies the presentation but does not supply,
We
then and there, the meaning. That, we commonly say, is supDo we here mean supplied by the ego ?
plied by the mind.
note
103
ff.)
{Of.
IV.
to the
in
are
primary qualities
the
things
qualities
53.
themselves
are only
"
"
"
the secondary
Bk.
ii, Ch. 30).
(Essay,
as
constant
effects, not
qualities
;
while
constant effects
Berkeley regarded
all
others
"
Of both
(or
'EK
54.
is
percipi.
few notes
may
ER
slate.
100
55.
seems
hill
tion,
hill
(ef.
note 42).
56.
As
"
"
owns
"
an indefinite number
Nunn would
all
fire
in one's grate
X,
owns
about
"
it
p. 205).
between
"
owns
"
T and
one.
"
"
all its perceivable
owns
say that a thing
hotnesses or shapes, none the less any one of them, like any
58. If
we
59. There
is
where
the
iii,
occurs in virtue of
the oar
problem
of
perception,
especially
in
connexion with
place
reference.
60. This is
However
it
may
be
110
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
thing
coloured;
mean
in the
it
retino-cerebral
will be
it
means that
it
This, of course,
is itself
system arise
appears to be coloured.
our formula.
we
is
not only the
T' stands for the
hill
T,
but
the
TR X T",
complex
where
to
the
organism.
63.
Extend
T"
also as
Introduce
<TE T)
as conditioned ly
is
X T".
not, however, be
the
R T"
X
these
we
is
if
65.
But
in so far as the
R X T"
To
just coloured
Are they
subjective,
of our
how-
formula
Ill
it.
66.
For perception
it is
Mars that
the planet
red, not-
is
we
normal embodiment.
68.
(which, I take
is subject
is
it,
always
to a supposal of that
may be asked
Spirit, is
Mars
But
sense)
fully con-
incidentally
If
is
common
which the
Now, a
physicist
is
K X T"
may
of the
human formula
urge that
what
is
really present
not colour but what he describes in
must
He
If it
between electromagnetic
waves starting forth from out there and electromagnetic or
is
"
71.
is
is
a perceivable term.
112
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
72. It
issue
if
we
As
were primary
73.
if
they
qualities.
it
how
may
is
74.
We
is,
tion of ideas, that these ideas are perceivable, and that their
But what
esse is percipi.
If that
It is
Since, then,
we
and
are
since
"
excluded from the category of ideas, it is evident
that there is not any other substance than spirit or that which
substance
is
"
(P.
7).
"
attributes,
its
"
exist in
minds or
In what sense do
"
?
Do
is in.
spiritual substances
we
perceivable qualities, as
supported by substance.
are
these qualities
Grant that
mind
this-
ambiguous expression.
76. In so far as we have knowledge of the substance of
quartz, we are in some sort of cognitive relation to that of
which we have
this knowledge.
But what
is this
substance to
What
sensory acquaintance
on the tradition of that
"
From
will, I
difficult
material substance
if
for science
it
is
question
this,
113
"
which
carries
against which
discuss.
the answers
we
may
idea.
towards relations
is
somewhat uncertain.
According to P.
of relation.
(P.
58,
cf.
27,
But he
7,
50,
a notion
an
"
(P.
112).
"
80. All relations, however, are also spoken of as
including
"
act of the mind
The word " notion," indeed,
(P.
142).
of substance
esse of
percipere.
81.
In what sense
is
the
ordered
in,
let
perceived by God.
114
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
terialism
contention
lay in his
may
which
order of nature
man
the
is
phenomena.
83. In the case
of
is
God and
it
is
substance
world as all-known
"
the
affirmative.
doctrine of esse
doctrine
(cf.
is,
as
we
supplemented by a causative
shall see,
137).
VI.
86.
which
ceptual cognition and that higher order of knowledge
Contrast, for example, his state-
ment
that
"
experience
sound
a coach (D.
i,
"
from
hearing suggests
"
415), with his reference to the
presented
p.
of
to
science
"
which
"
are
universal
"
(D.
i,
p.
382,
cf. p.
how
461).
this distinction
may be
may
aid
115
88.
relatedness
low-level
"
"
was there
Meaning
meaning characterised
by unexplained expectation
from previous perceptual experience, and normally
Thus a child throws
closely related to practical behaviour.
them
to
float.
There may be
sticks into the water and expects
derived
little
89.
to the proposition
"
is
beginning to
The
to
"
"
word
significance
level of
is
(in
to
There
is,
meaning and
fast line
of
"
by s."
division between
symbolise
it
significance.
When
91.
to understand
why
made
of steel
which
is
heavier than water, can none the less rest on the surface with-
him a
significance
absent.
92.
A boy
or girl
who
from
by meaning, but also conceptually qualified by significance for his system of natural knowledge.
may symbolise
qualified
We
by Pms.
questionable whether for us, after infancy, any
presentations fail to carry with them some fringe of significance.
At any rate, in so far as the mental attitude is in any measure
93. It
is
116
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
We
in relation to be
which
some term
I shall
(often very complex) within the sphere of our thought
call this a supposal
(2) that, since our thought is primarily
derived from and applicable to the order of nature, something
;
which
is
relational order
that
which may
which gives unity and coherence to a supposal or system of
Thus a purely imaginary supposal, such as that
supposals.
well be
regarded as
their
truth-structure
we
scientific supposals or
And when we
we
say that
supposal corresponds to the truthstructure of that order of nature from which the supposal is
derived and to which it is applicable. It is in this last sense
truth-structure
of the
word and,
of
the
is
antithetical to error.
An
117
Why
99.
a
panoramic
in the
so
"
embryo.
ideal construction
development.
an apple
is
in
mind
at once.
At best there
an outline sketch of
And
salient features.
is
in
mind only
Only
is
When
noted.
seen, there
is
But
is
there
Hence what
is
the egg
is
a sensory presentation
may
is
Pms.
have an
thus " in
mind in cognitive
mind " is Ims.
sented.
I take it that it
may
118
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
relation to a supposal
is
"
mind
in
"
in a yet
more intimate
way. It is
bare facts while the
mind
first
(94).
supplies
That,
it
would
None the
104.
less,
to
know
due season.
in
am
doubt, but
my own
less ultimately
for
what
it is
But
worth.
my
it
is
none the
ideal construction
if
the mind,
why
not,
it
?
is
so intimately in
may
Why
ego what
is
present I
something
am
For the
is
it
where
reference.
ER (SR W),
c
119
VII.
109. In the Introduction to the Principles,
Berkeley
is
chiefly
something an idea.
110. Take (b)
It
is,
What
first.
No
by
this
connexion
complex presentation
As
such, therefore,
it
is
definition, particular.
He
an idea in
or less
an image as re-presented.
to sense, or
111.
is
more
man
in the abstract, or
dog in
to say,
is
sees, or
We
of triangle, since
mind
existing in
113. So
any given
triangle, as idea,
just thus
say, a scalenon
much, in
brief, for
we must concur
in
this,
or a that
is
drawn on paper.
If
we accept
what he here
his definition
urges.
In so far as the
name
triangle
indifferently applicable, within its appropriate range,
it has reference, he
says, to any one of many particular ideas.
is
Hume
Hence, as
"
approval,
annexed
all
put
it,
mind
"
;
to a certain
and something
must be
120
"
"
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
"
make
to
name
keep a
constantly to
It is
one
it
is
"
general by being
signification
all
made the
sign which
ideas.
to its
"
represents
"
(Int.
12).
two right
to
equal
angles,
demonstration extends
what
to
118.
be
may
other
all
conform
one
that
is,
that
certain
rectilinear
triangles
the
of
which
Now, the
must be some-
how
in mind,
But
predicted.
it is
119.
itself
an idea
as a relation
And
notions.
of ideas is not
it falls
an act
as a relation it includes
of the
mind
142).
(P.
120.
as acting
is
the ego.
"
Hence, similarity
To discern the
agree-
22).
Many
esse of all
why
(Int.
"
spirits, relations,
and acts
"
121
them
asserted that
it is
"
we cannot
At any
so properly be said to
have
"
(P.
rate,
by the
work
the
is
of
spiritual activity.
123. Eevert
The P
to
now
to the expressions
any given
triangle
similarity in the
mind
is
of
that
applicable
while
the
him who
"
(92, 102).
"
is,
us say, for
let
asserts
"
are similar."
124.
come we
to
to
have significant
similarity in
the
triangles
Berkeley distinctly
ideas
They are
is of
"
or
"
"
etc.
infinite
127.
of the
knowable world,
much
We
facts.
part of
seem
to
its
come
back, then, to the formula given at the end of the last section
have in mind a supposal which has reference to a
(108).
We
122
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
may
be
its source,
now
consider a
little
made
truths.
being
has a structure of
becomes general by
any one
of
which
it
indifferently sug-
gests to the
129.
tells
the
us,
name
is
in itself
our expressions
is
the name,
Pms
may
be substituted for P or I in
P or I.
for P or I
The mere
130.
it
substitution of
name, as such,
express
for
"
"
do
so.
it ?
131.
Now
Berkeley asks
"
proposi-
He here
tion to be true of all particular triangles "( 16).
"
"
"
so and
that
from
the
a
slides
name triangle to proposition
so holds good for all triangles," just as he habitually slides from
132.
The clue
to our
cant proposition
is
in relation.
Ims.
How
question
close is
for
"pr"
is
may
refer to
be,
and
123
of
perhaps are not, existent as part of the relational structure
the knowable order of nature.
How
135.
scheme
sistent
far these
of
In any
here be discussed.
case,
even
if
relation
of which
the truth-structure
And
much
he would say,
appreciation of their value. They
"
on the most trifling speculations which in practice are of no
"
use, but serve only for amusement
120).
(P.
set a price,"
VIII.
We
further doctrine
is percipi,
by
"
There
whose
is nothing
All change
"
26).
(P.
Ideas,
of
is
esse
power
caused
spirit.
we perceive a continual
some cause thereof
succession of ideas
(2) there
is,
therefore,
is
no material substance
or Spirit (P.
We
139.
spirit
is
remains, there-
27).
causare
it
2),
namely,
esse est
causari
if
is
124
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
Thus the
In the case
them, we produce
minds, or
human
at pleasure
souls
which
"
(P.
36).
real
is
cause
is
clearly not
and chimerical.
we not
"There are
them.
And
esse of ideas
ex hypothesi,
is,
only perceive
substances,
spiritual
them
"
29).
My
142.
my
But how
will.
"
They are
senses
"
(P.
On the
1).
dependent on
my
will.
"
i.e.,
other hand,
my real
me
In relation to
their esse
is
percipi
ideas.
We
on the manner
144.
my
for
production of chimerical
of their, production
Here Berkeley
is
apt to
He
says, for
"
example,
all objects
are
of causari.
of creation runs
thus
"
:
When
146. Here we
(b)
have
(a)
minds
the
"
prior
(D.
iii,
p. 472).
existence
of
(c)
things,
the exist-
325
of
"
in
difficulty there
any
may
of causari, are
be in bringing
and
to the esse
somewhat puzzling.
we are referred back
not
It
God rendered
in some other
"
"
mind
(P.
99).
"
How
"
is
the trans-
this is effected
of his doctrine,
implication, all
caused,
is
that
is
however,
known,
all
is
that all
knowing and,
and
all that is
causing,
IX.
150. Berkeley claims that his doctrine of spiritual causation
own
is,
field,
wholly unaf-
with
"
the visible
"
(P.
150).
not
phenomena
1,
is
Sect.
itself
Hand
151
unperceivable (P.
cf.
should therefore,
8).
VII, par.
"
We
126
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
purview
beyond the
is
and
tion.
When TK X T'
154.
complex may
is
known
unchanged, or
(b)
undergo
change.
being
in
reciprocally
space-relation only.
if
Kx
Similarly,
be time-relatedness per
when
se,
that
155.
method
If,
as here understood.
e.g.,
ambiguous phrase
virtue
in
of
"
to
of relatedness, such
to occur.
terms and
That
is
change
to say, as a
may
be
antici-
pated.
157.
We
change or what
is
its
source.
It
127
and
amount
change
and T' respectively.
;
the
ascertain
(6) to
nature of the
Ex
to
we
is
"
"
the cause of
in the sense in
a given change
"
"
produces
an explosion
the explosion, or
what
is
"
of
which
gunpowder, or
makes
"
the gun-
powder explode.
159.
What we have
here
is
with by science. The so-called "releasing cause" is a condition under which the situation is changed from that of the
existence
which
is
of
160. Proceed
now
with
to deal
TE
Then Eis
X T'.
assume that
in cognitive relatedness
which
situation.
is
characterised
Bat what
by just
this
is
events.
161.
As
no change
awareness of the situation
154),
is
relation, as such,
162. There
is
TE
T',
(cf.
spatial only in
relatedness.
There
non-effective.
may
be,
OE b (TE X T').
If so, it is
163.
Now
of
bionomic situation
relatedness, in so far as
change occurs within the complex in virtue of that relatedIn very simple cases the change may be merely that
ness.
128
LLOYD MORGAN.
C.
seen in attraction
or
repulsion
(cf.
But
tropisms).
in
the
and integrated
differentiated
consider.
164.
we
The
is
own case,
we are in
that, in our
relatedness to situations
and aversion,
qua psychical,
contributory to
but
not
affective
effective.
a relatedness that
only
167. Of these two alternative supposals, the latter seems
is
best
to
and
introspection,
interpretation.
We
relation
to
give
will
to
the
the
whole
is
is
term, in
not only in
situation,
psychical
cognitive but also in some effective relation thereto.
168. This, be it noted, is in flat contradiction
of
to
the
effective,
in virtue of
its
presence.
For
scientific
treatment, however,
we do not
seek to
know what
when
know
That, in
is
its source.
is
strict
and
of a specific character,
amount
nature
terms and
of
relatedness.
in
129
the
is
of the
of
and
cognitive
effective
determinate, as grounded
constitution of the total complex, but it is not, for
the
is
science,
170. So far
171.
EE (SE W).
r
able,
we
But
to the
in so far as
SE r
EE
further supposal.
We
have
is itself
Under
this
we may
it
bring
regard as practice, the
accord with S.
172.
is
and
(&) in
is
modified so as to
modified so as to bring
it
into
and concipient
entity, but
an entity which
is
conative in
than this
173. I
the
is,
cardinal
for scientific
130
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
If
and
of their then
these are
solved for
is
scientific interpretation.
my
some
formula-
must
as
of
He
their source.
implies,
itself
Hume
it
failed to
all
con-
siderations of source.
What
denial of Source.
is
merely an attempt to
X.
177. For his assured knowledge of the esse of the substance
of
"
The being
of
my
Self, that
principle, I evidently
we have
is
what he regards
my own
know by reflexion
soul,
"
(D.
as obvious.
mind, or thinking
iii,
Thus
p. 449).
as understanding
178.
The
Shall
and willing
(P.
mind
27).
c
.
contemplated,
we
is,
say
ER E'
C
of course, terribly
complex
and
it is,
I take
131
understand
his
own
Alexander,
is
it
if
rightly
at the
as
since
is
minded.
Still
the E'
it is
self as
E', as
contemplated in supposal
it is
a percipient entity.
must be a
The
180.
that,
own
of
knowing
on his own
reflecting
its
his
soul,
imperfections (D.
181.
But even
its
p. 448).
iii,
we
existence
the less
heightening
if
is
The
irrespective of its
pose,
knowable
from
being
cognitive
known.
orderm^ by some
source,
completely
relatedness
But
we must sup-
is,
in
known.
and
That
of all
terms this
is
through which
term.
and
it
so
is
interpretation, the
far
method of science.
must crave indulgence if I lead up to a tentative
and provisional supposal through some preliminary considera183. I
some
under analysis,
further assume that it
terms in relation.
science
is
always
is
resolved into
is
the relation
132
C.
that, if a given
nature
is
185.
term
LLOYD MORGAN.
is
some
in
relation, its
specific
whole
186.
for
I
theory,
abstract
know
treatment
how
not
are,
to define
such
points if, indeed, they are definable apart from their modes
And I confess that I have no supposal to offer
of relatedness.
"
in themselves."
with reference to what they are
Granted,
a
in
terms
that
relatedness
relation,
however,
point, as
implies
is
view
of
my
space.
spatially
and
ideal construction.
We
in
many
Take
first
perceptually with
start
the relational
things
related
We
reach
188.
spatial
only,
are
positions.
Such
is
in
The system
spoken
positions
189.
occupy a
is
of
positions
of collectively
as
thus
space.
a continuum of related
It
cannot
fail to find
may
mode
of related-
of material points is
133
Those modes
of
of relateduess
above (155) as
192.
effective.
of positions in succession,
an
spoken
The system
in relatedness.
Points in time-
time-relatedness.
or order of instants,
of collectively as time.
continuum
of instants.
But
just as
and
embryo
so, too,
more
are these
to,
relation.
in space
and
of instants in
The more
fruitful supposal
may
A material
or one point
is
relational systems.
196.
comment.
The
stress is
on the
several relations
or, to
is
systems.
134
To proceed.
197.
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
system
such it
is
is
As
physico-spatially related
order.
like
is
se.
"
The
"
substance
of
such a body
198.
An
is
organic
body, or organism,
is
also a system of
points, or
some
of them.
reference to Life
as
source.
Such
whole complex
And
of relations of
which
it
is
common
Now
the
201.
an organism
may
term.
is
if
in
physico-spatial
relatedness
And may
vital
relatedness,
and psychical
be
the
the 'physico-spatial.
reverse order.
in the
of relatedness does
135
not always imply the co-presence of the vital nor does the
vital necessarily pre-suppose the psychical.
Such a mode of
;
203.
spatial
relatedness
alone
obtains,
certain
spatial
obtain
the
of
presence
the
relatedness also, a
outcome
changes
vital
that
alone
when both
are
when
is
is
in
difference
in the
physicoevidence,
and physico-
vital
different
in
virtue
further
of its presence.
or
is
of
the
psychical
changes
is
the
any
case, it is part
of
study and to interpret the relations which the several suborders of relatedness bear to each other and, if possible, to
assign to each
And
205.
system
its
in
any
case,
of related points
is
provided
Such
as to the
manner
templated
for.
from the
standpoint of
term,
scientific
may
be con-
interpretation.
arises: Will
negative.
207. The man of science, they will say, may be able to give
a somewhat lame and very hypothetical account of the business
from his restricted point of view. But in talking of sub-orders of
relatedness,
136
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
of
to be essential to
be
said, is
among
and
it is
all of
is
here
named
source.
209. If
first
the
ER
of
mode
of
ence of activity.
210. This expression, however,
may mean
of the
somewhat ambiguous. It
change itself which occurs
is
(a) experience
within the complex system of related E-points or it may mean
(5) experience of oneself as the agency which is the source
;
of
that change
the
true ego.
211. Opinions in favour of (a)
and
what method
of the other
am
and
unable to see by
one party or that
can be established.
212. Secondly,
claim
may be granted, it
is
is
here
I find it
very
difficult to
is
137
supplemented by direct
conviction
ineradicable
much on
itself,
it,
phenomena
216.
of
human
unmistakeably pronounces.
a quo
and
of the universe,
we must
is,
a con-
but as a terminus
up
start
phenomena
ad quern
if
the existence of
is to
How
we
as a complex term
phenomena
which
ordered,
are impelled,
noumenal term
The world as
this
we
cannot leave
it
which
in
it
postulate
is
Ed G
unrelated.
We
the relation
of
if it
we
dependence.
into U,
phenomena
Given U, we
UK d G
the universe
be preferred, on Vdan
vital.
phenomena
dependence on human
volition,
we
postulate
dependent on the transcendental ego as their source. Symbolising changes wrought through our volition as V, we complete
the formula VE d E.
219.
Something
of
this
sort
was,
think, implicit
in
138
C.
LLOYD MORGAN.
we
and
of the
mental
And in
of human
221.
must be
esse.
this doctrine
what
is
essential is (1)
due recog-
Universal Principle of
order and
world."
222. I see no reason why the acceptance of a scientific
account of the physical world, of life, and of mind, should
preclude the acceptance, within its appropriate universe of
But I am of opinion
that scientific interpretation in terms of the one should not
explanation in terms of
the
other.
nature,
relatedness of the
must be
inter se
logically prior
and when
to
any
said that
phenomena
some source of the conscious order,
entelechy or Vdan vital I think that there is some con;
it is
such as
139
manifestations.
left to science, as
pursue
its
he understood
investigation of
it,
phenomena on
its
own
special lines.
140
IV.
By
G. D. H. COLE.
rule of
"
what
is
just or unjust."
Every
but those
political
societies
external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in
the State all individuals who are united by a common interest compose
;
as
many
The
manners.
by
The will of these particular societies has always twomembers of the association it is a general will for the
great society it is a particular will, and it is often right with regard to
the first object, and wrong as to the second. An individual may be a
devout priest, a brave soldier, or a zealous senator, and yet a bad citizen.
public will.
relations
for the
A particular resolution
that the most general will is always the most just also, and that the voice
of the people is in fact the voice of God."
ROUSSEAU
Political
Economy.
HAVE
set these
have no
is
closely
This problem,
we
141
under
that,
likely
it
theorists,
from
it
now seems
and
religious
industrial
no
less decisive.
problem
pressure
It is the
may
manifest
together, a
Wherever two
common
it
or
itself.
The
breaks
effect of this
down a
hard and
fast
theory on philosophy
distinction
and creates
distinction
one.
is
two-fold
It breaks
it
both
down
politics
the
which
comes
of treating the
side
of both ethics
and
politics in
terms
mistake that
142
G.
H. COLE.
D.
whole theory.
State,
he assures
will
is
supposed to reside.
any
association
is
the
first
And
members,
it is
purely
elsewhere, especially in
the Social
of
Contract
M. Dreyfus-Brisac) he expressly
if
possible, to banish
would inevitably
the
He
admitted, however,
prove conspiracies against
public.
that there must be one important exception to this rule, since
the people must appoint a government, and this government
will inevitably use its corporate will in order to usurp
This is, in
Sovereignty, which belongs to the people.
Eousseau's phrase, the inevitable tendency of the body politic
to deteriorate.
minimum
the
number
and only admits the intrusion of any will other than those of
the body politic and of the individuals composing it as a necessary imperfection of
tendency
human
societies.
Similarly, the
was
whole
to regard the
necessary imperfection, to be
beyond those
of expediency,
by
statute.
more on grounds
of
philosophic theory.
143
practical
necessity than on
We
still
are
basis,
too
apt
and
to
grounds of
take a view
to
admit exceptions
What,
then,
sentation of
As
soon as
we make
if
it
as the
also
government
members
of size, extent,
membership.
Just
whom
are
he seems to think of
and
fears
seems
to
face,
is
implication.
The corporate
will
the
government, or executive,
is
is
of
conflicts
government
with
why
this is so,
we
merely because it
and of the same kind.
it is
Rousseau, in
it will
is
fact, as
we can
Rousseau that
it is
both smaller
famous
He
144
G. D.
H. COLE.
and
When
loi
grounds of mere expediency, for the general abolition of assoBut, as all students of French history know, the
ciations.
began to
fight their
way back
by the
State.
to toleration and, at a
against
spiracies
with a
If,
the
public,
but
natural
human
groupings
associations
its privileges
no sense
is
in
is
privileged, it
defining
associations
my
terms a
and
little
the
more
State
exactly.
Let
By
me
begin by
State I mean
or no
it
by Community
opinions, traditions,
still,
the
possibilities
145
whole mass
which
are, for
of
desires,
the moment,
The State
is
thus
itself
a complex of institutions of a
may
more
take into
geographical grouping.
tions,
one
Community,
as I
is
the
sum
or
values,
organised
unorganised, capable
organisation, within the national area.
"
I say
and
total of social
or
is
of
incapable
necessarily a
less
still
The
fact that
some
may immensely
State
is
it
respective
associations
of
rights
;
and
I shall, therefore,
am
governmental
bodies,
What
is
non-governmental
and
area, completely
how oughb
the
from
its
Either
is
or, thirdly,
146
G.
In the
first case,
an ad
H. COLE.
D.
is
regarded as
an ad
earliest in
hoc, or at
any
rate
action peculiarly
differed in
many
respects
it is
it be property,
or
and
not as the
religion,
morality,
common
modern
social conditions.
Such a theory,
will.
exceptional survival
men who
it
in
in its
face of
wish to safeguard or to
pamphlets
protector of property.
its
exclusion of what
"
begin with a
it is
bill of rights,"
"
humanity and
citizenship,"
it
is
is
is
In any case,
sovereign except where
not concerned.
it
accepts the
it
is
specially
attempt an inclusive
The further
definition, and it excludes only by limitation.
this theory removes itself from the ad hoc theory of the
indicated
not
to
be:
it
does
not
147
State,
nearer
State Sovereignty,
have
been
forced
it
comes
into
by
to
the
of
acceptance
breakdown
of
of
its
their
universal
adherents
attempted
distinctions.
accept.
if
it
eyes to any
Sovereign
herein
not
lies
final.
who wished
"
questions
of
practical
policy,
and
The
"
to save
were trying
of State
limitation
is
men
to conserve
individualists."
"
arise in
of the State
In such a
sistency
K 2
148
G. D. H.
COLE.
of The Philo-
"
of the Charity
sophical Theory of the State (or should it be
"
a
with
theory that amounts
Organisation Society ?) coupling
to State Sovereignty a note of solemn warning to the State
led
men who
so in practice to
differ
and
we
is,
why men
while
they
we
Modern
answer
if
and
is
ditions
throughout both a reflection of existing political conand an attempt to justify various political opinions.
When men
human
studied in
societies,
what
not so
much
primarily interested
the basis of
human
basis of
Eousseau's Social
and even
to himself,
The
current
political
controversies
turned
social
it is
We
to Rousseau,
modern
all
no
life,
back
149
less
than individual
Rousseau
is
human
life,
society
based
is
But
and general.
occupations of
theory
of
if at all.
State
practical.
and
against the
therefore
to
"
"
privileged
the
support
association
"
"
democratic
State
immense
and nineteenth
centuries,
all
To-day,
when most
belief in political
an inevitable democratic
hope
to reach a
more
political progress,
we may reasonably
The key
to Rousseau's
whole
social theory is to be
General Will.
Nay more
must be found
in
found in
some conception
of a
150
G.
General Will.
Social science
What
D.
COLE.
II.
is
phenomena
of collective personality.
monopoly
of such
personality
tions a sufficient proof that the State cannot fully express the
associative
will
man
of
work
them
crediting
of
with
if
all
the
that
fact
these
sufficient reason
attributes
of
collective
Finally,
personality
the affirmative, what superior claim has the State to the
allegiance of the individual as against some particular association
which he belongs ?
The General Will has been called an abstraction, and has
been rejected as a guiding principle precisely by those who have
to
felt
They have
"
always in search of a determinate human superior," and the
General Will has not seemed to form a natural attribute of any
it is,
Yet what
too
much
The discoverers
for itself?
felt that in it
whole
democracy
faith in
Their
ardent
but
infallible,
omnipotent.
in
an
absolutely
democracy led them to an absolute trust
would
democratic
believed,
machine,
which,
they
generalised
might
be.
the State of
it
At
all
common
knowledge
will
of distinctions of class
at its worst,
151
general principles were nearly always far more true than his
It makes no difference that the
ways of applying them.
General
universal
which
will
expresses.
social
all
The degree
in
which
expression at
all
associations,
and in
all
its conflicts, is
he
is
allegiance,
to
decide
and how
is
between
conflicting
claims
to
his
The State
is
the
by a general vote
area, split
up
into
may seem
desirable.
In so far as any
is
in the
modern
rights
must be founded on
152
G. D.
If
we assume
H. COLE.
express
those
approximation
purposes
to
which
equality
are
among
distributed
all
the
with
citizens.
some
If
last
we
resort,
government.
The
State, national
common
is
sovereign.
The case
is
altogether
different
ways.
common
The power
men
when we come
to those
unequally, or in different
work.
is
same way.
153
man
government
affects different
men
has an equal
of different religions in the
men
Similarly, industry
and would do
in different ways,
so
even
its
own which no
geographical
In both cases, a broad
adequately represent.
functional difference is manifest which justifies the consti-
group can
to,
domination
There
which do not
whom
them
affect
all,
Strong as these
ears unless those
charge of
who
seemed the
easiest,
if
not
the
only,
it,
way
but because
it
has
another
class.
It
154
is
G. D. H. COLE.
social purpose.
we can keep
this
social
element recognised
we may hope
to avoid
have,
is,
of course, universally
as a rule, a social
element.
both in contrast
wholly
social.
State
to
It
is
my
which
action,
is
and
to set
supposed to be
The associative
are wholly social, but that State acts are not.
act has two relations it is, as Eousseau says, general in relation
:
to the association
may
still
State, I contend,
association
even
among
if
it
it is
The
only an
cannot include the whole
includes everybody,
others, because it
may
is
still
of everybody.
The
object, then, of
my
argument
is
Rousseau, thinking,
association, but to particularise the State.
as we saw, always in terms of local, and not of functional,
association, always conceived
the
faded.
But
as soon as
we make
difficulty
its
to recognise or
for it
may
well,
outlaw
all
other
155
or from bhe
which
it
Even, however,
if
is
it
to
anarchy.
Would not
conflicts
and
have been
How
far will
which
number
of the conflicts
due to an
change.
failure of
modern
politics is in the
sphere
Inhumanity, arising from
legislation.
a lack of understanding, is the mark of the State in its dealings
with man in his religious aspect, and in his capacity as worker.
of
industrial
division of spheres
to-day,
but, as
their relations to
men
still
of the conflicts of
bility of conflict
We
Where, in
156
G. D. H. COLE.
in
machinery at
any
of a
or else
all,
it
kinds.
tends
various.
and
is
acting
for the
as soon as he
makes
for his
and purity
essentially unique.
make such
trust his
aim
at
may
judgment
each situation as
making
most
cases,
is
He
it arises.
can only
and machine-made as
be.
All associative
must
of
in
will,
act
therefore
necessarily
imperfect.
all
But
if
associative will
in
the
case
this
is
is
made
confine
to
perfect, the
it
at
once
it
becomes something
less
and formulae
can cover.
consists
of
function,
all
of
number
of
lesser
wills,
differentiated
by
fullest
possible
with the
its
expression.
On
ultimate
is,
type of will.
The quest
for a true
the community.
We
are,
expresses itself in a
last
court
mechanism or
157
With
Society, the
complex
this tribute,
We
three
theories
State
of
cannot
over to a body of
We
is
the
reject
it
must,
Sovereignty,
Society to
fit
is to
man
is
It is
to
make
mainly the
often
then, objection
If,
"
for
Sovereign determinate.
It
his
of
of
business:
it
which
to-day,
are
is
permeated
by
the
idea
of
State
made
has
man
it
great,
made the
something more fitted
has
to exercise a final
Sovereignty, or at
The demand,
demand
demand
the
rest.
if
you
This, I take
will,
it,
158
G.
demand
D.
H. COLE.
Church and
equality between
for
would rather
say,
religion
and
State
This
politics.
or,
is
as
certainly
of convincing them.
is
Yet we know
at stake.
a con-
settle
Yet
discontent.
passive
not active
if
this
"
the
is
Attempts
one of the
of
conflict, at least
"
State
Sovereignty
admit
We
the
name
of
our Sovereign.
of the State
and
mechanism able
When,
of the chief
to speak in
by means
of the
Union
is
is
in him,
if
Church or
he
tries to
his
Trade
"
good
of
the
community
none
as a whole,
is
which
is
159
nor the Church, nor the Trade Union, nor even quite the complex I have called Society, but something greater than all these.
He
has to decide, in
fact,
by
falling
by general precepts.
But if he has to make
racket.
If a
be devised to
various
his choice,
finally
determined,
functional
authorities, that
is
no doubt
all
to the
if
an omnipotent
democracy, of a functional
The unit of self-government should be a functional
political
democracy.
whatever a mass vote
unit
a geographical basis
is
may
160
V.
MR
NOTE ON
COLE'S PAPER.
By BERNAKD BOSANQUET.
I think that written notes by people who are not going to
be present at the discussion can only be admitted on sufferance
but I shall be glad if I am permitted to make a brief contribution, as I am much interested in Mr. Cole's paper, and I cannot
;
possibly
of
come up
to the meeting.
slight criticisms I
to be
more
to let
me
in
may
desire to
make.
But
my
main
I think
object
is
he desires
be.
His interest is
is it
not
in the question
association,
and the
On
this plan
thing greater, or
appeal
at all
at
least
more
be a
some-
final court of
is
"
in relation
turn on this
?
At
to,"
assume
fitted to
"
I note
if
associations, then between other associations themselves, the necessary "in relation to," does there, of course,
and other
16 L
of course, I desire to
been clone on
my
meetings.
Now
"
"
captured
very much
State.
limited in
it as
area,
and therefore
as,
compared with society and the community (pp. 144, 145, 151,
This follows for Rousseau from the well-known defect
159).
of his formulation of the
On
General Will.
all,
BEKNARD BOSANQUET.
162
is
sovereignty,
"
"
of all parts of the
by definition the
ideality
community, trade and religious corporations being expressly
and
this is
"
"
intended.
Ideality
itself
beyond
what I tried
is
thing
in a greater thing.
to pass
This
is
and sovereignty
is
Phil, of State, p.
it)
on
p. 156,
What
is
"
top
(Sovereignty)
is
"
the relation
"
to"
(p.
153) or
as, or in
place
of,
"
constiour answer worth hearing. We say what arises is a
"
tution and that no inhabitants of an area form a State without
that.
And we
remarks on the
is
with
us.
By a constitution we mean
is
cum
in so far as
it
solves conflicts
And
it
by authority, though
in a civilised
primarily a way of co-living and coIt might come to be a very loose bond, as in many
constitution
operating.
163
is
i.e.,
Mr. Cole
says,
some Court
of Appeal.
And
believe that
may become, we
its
and
display
to be impracticable.
L 2
164
A. COCK.
EXPOSITOEY.
1.
Intuition.
summar-
and
is
knowledge
of the individual,
relations,
and
is
productive of concepts.
"
is
essentially independent
The impression
of a
moonlight
Nor
is
an
is
intuition
intuition.
forms of intuition
is
"
We may
have
* Esthetic as Science
of Expression and General Linguistic, translated
Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie.
(Macmillaii
from the
1909.)
t Op.
cit., p. 2.
| Ibid., p. 7.
165
which
is
intuition
mechanism and
passivity
Nor
is spiritual activity.
or even representation.
is
(cp.
Bergson), whereas
intuition
"
mere
association,
"
an equivocal term
Kepresentation
and Croce will only apply it to intuition when it means " something detached and standing out from the psychic base of sen-
What
sations."
true intuition
then,
is
intuition
"
replies,
spirit does
Every
not obtain
possesses
activity
expresses them."*
Croce
The
also expression.
is
is
is
Expression
to
the
extent that
Init
and musician
as well as those
of the poet
phony was
Symphony.
his
own
The
artist, then,
How
and
his intuition
then do
we
ordinary people.
appreciate them
a little
intuition
not merely that the poet is born, not made. Man is himself
born a poet and even the Aristotelian Society is full of them.
"Intuitive knowledge," Croce concludes, "is expressive
knowledge, autonomous in respect to intellectual function
;
* P.
13.
and empirical,
to reality
ALBERT
166
COCK.
A.
and unreality,
to space
and time
distinguished
as form
from what
intuition or representation
is
felt
expression.
is
is
or suffered, or from
of,
but nothing
is
less)
than to express.' *
1
2.
Art.
no
is
knowledge.
between
difference
specific
Art
art
and
intuitive
is
the
is
intuition is not
of
aesthetic
greater
is
intuition
one,
the
and another
science
of
of
intuitive
the
or
less,
but
expressive
Because art
is
it
is
only
is
for Croce
is
"
:>
The mimetic
that art
is
theory, therefore,
intuitive
is right,
in so far as it
18.
t P. 22.
1
P. 24.
P. 25.
is
means
right
photographer's work
the
of
art in so far as
is
167
The
process.
expresses his
it
own
The true
artist
must vary
his data,
even remove
"
"
details,
and
"
bound
to
do so."*
hypothetical
man
deprived of
all
his
senses and then suddenly given sight only could make nothing
of a picture.
Apperceptive experience must operate, although
this is inconsistent
"
He
"
in
which
merely
is
"
is
indivisible.
is
Expression
unique,
as unity
But what
is
associative, not
this if not
intellective,
to
deliverer just
them.
This
because
it
catharsis.
is
drives
away
passivity.''^
artist
is
"Activity
is
the
In thus
himself Croce
is
of the poet,
we
* P.
30.
t P. 33.
P. 35.
ALBERT
168
without
it.
A.
COCK.
Conceptual knowledge
is
knowledge
of things,
and
purely empirical.
for it is
a rule because
though
it
we
are intent
upon the
intellectual content
and
is
also sentiment
"
intuitive
the expression, which can exist without the second, viz., the
Expresconcept, but the concept cannot live without the first.
sion and concept thus completely exhaust the forms of the
cognitive intellect.
it
it
is
non ad demonstrandum.
The
is
neither
* P.
42.
t P.
44ff.
act,
169
"
'
What
these
'
deeds
the
sophist
asks
'
while
still
world, the
Spirit."!
concrete.
remaining
"
we may observe
The
intuition
the
noumenon, the
gives the
in
gives
that History
is
and even
certainty
not because
is
it
Philosophy.
Even
Dr.
is,
of course,
not
Bosanquet regards
uncommon
History
as
Erroneous Doctrines.
classification of styles
* P. 49.
t P. 52.
| I
ALBERT
170
"objective."
His point
is
A.
COCK.
that "it
is
impossible to separate, in
from the
epic,
the image
of
"
"
Every true work of art," he says, has violated some established class and has upset the ideas of the critics."*
Classification has an empirical utility only and establishes neither
in
terms.
first
logical fact
prime
which that fact
is
made
manifest.
be examined aesthetically,
of contradiction itself
is
principle of coherence."!
aesthetic experience
of coherence.
is
the
This
i.e.
at
grammatically."
"
"
The
principle
becomes aware
is
Qud forms,
of,
tell
us
aesthetic
how
the
significant.
To the
tion
is
theoretic
form
and intuition
is
to be
of intellec-
and
two forms
^Esthetic, p. 61.
t Ibid,
p. 74.
He
theory.
man
dark.
He
sciously.
conduct
when he
stops
171
is
fails.
But while
value.
useful because
useless
we
actions,
desire them."*
but
outsider's adjectives.
disposes
of
imaginary,"
judgments
and " there
of
is
these
perhaps
At any
Nothing
value
exist
no
they are
normative
"altogether
sciences
in
to
be
aesthetic
If
anyone supposes
judgments
value-judgments we are recommended not to apply Logic to
Esthetic, nor aesthetic forms to Logic.
general."
says,
There
externalise
it,
is
born and
is
com-
aesthetic fact, not strictly the artistic fact, despite the estab-
We
must anticipate
"
fuller criticism to
"
completed within, there can be no ^Esthetics, for the externalised result is an affair of practical activity, of will, of
is
economic.
In
fact,
* P. 81.
ALBEKT
172
that
it
is
also erroneous to
there be selection
it
A.
COCK.
If
how
he
feels
cannot will
it
the
moment
birth drawing
of
near,
but he
and
Logic.
Practical
activity
is
similarly
exhausted
in
(i)
moral.
is
"
To will economically is to
The
will
first
an end
is
to will morally
first.
Examples
As
aesthetic intuition
philosophic intuition
formula of morality.
tion of
* P.
84.
for
173
Each implies
the others and Croce's strength lies largely in the sanity with
its
of spiritual activity.
Hence
it
is
Thus, religion
is
by further progress. Nevertheless, philogradually withdrawing from religion all reason for
being resuscitated
sophy
is
existing, because
it
"
regards religion as
a transitory
Why
fact,
it
a psychic
Philosophy
phenomenon
and
datum
metaphysic
accordingly
declared
is
to
be an
impossibility.
"
"
ultra-metaphysical
and defines the function of philosophy to be the auto-consciousness of the spirit as opposed to the classificatory function of
Did not
of things.
sophy to be the
the spectator of
all
auto-consciousness of the
time and of
all existence,
"
spirit
however, Plato
As
kind,
of
most
the
Armed
with these four modes, Croce argues that descriptions of aesthetic qualities such as unity in variety, truth,
sincerity, individuality,
and verbal
doctrines.
expressive
facts
are
always
them
are
capable
etc., is
of
nil,
altogether negative.
satisfactory
* P. 104.
definition.
None
of
Expressions
ALBERT
174
COCK.
A.
The only
is
It
impossible.
is
quite
right and apposite in Croce to protest against an exaggerated
estimate of the terminology of criticism, but logically he ought
undiscussable.
Croce,
silence
is
The very
all,
including
know-
possibility of conceptual
we
common body
of validating a
Croce
us
leaves
of
knowledge
the miasmatic
in
swamp
In short,
of
Protagorean
relativity.
The Definition of
4.
cleared, Croce
the
of
the Beautiful.
nature
of
the
beautiful.
^Esthetic
question
activity is not to be identified with feeling, he not untruly
says, for "feeling is nothing but a fundamental practical
any moral
hedonism,
He
determination."
therefore, although
accompaniment
to
aesthetic
will
there
is
activity.
always
finally,
is
they
may
it
will
useless
itself freely
aesthetic
hedonistic
or
These
disvalue
feeling
may
also
activity unfolding
Earlier,
the
The economic
have
is
its
"
Value
contrary."*
rejected.
The Beautiful
But
is
now
* P.
127.
175
as intellectual
the
Psalmist
The
expression at
all."
may
The
Beautiful
does
not
possess
degrees,
since
there
each
is
expression
contra, does
unique
and
incomparable.
Ugliness,
per
possess degrees, from the rather ugly or
almost beautiful to the extremely ugly. " If the ugly were
complete, i.e.. without any element of beauty, it would, ipso
facto, cease to be ugly, because in it the contradiction which
is
the reason of
its
The disvalue
the
Neither
must
The beautiful
other theories.
merely pleasant,
of
all
is
go),
it
nor
it
is
an inebriation
is
it
didactic
it is
is
not the
merely sympathetic.
go).
"
truly
pure.
"
Croce
does
he alludes to
not
here
make
clear
which
and asserted
to
have
no meaning
* P. 129.
t P. 130.
P. 131.
since
it
is
the
non-
ALBERT
176
expressive.
This
is
certainly
A.
COCK.
an easy way
of getting rid of
the problem.
The sublime
is
"
everything that
those
or shall
is
or will be called so
employ
by
All
this term."
But
to psychology.
Adequation to truth
brought forward for this new
beauty.
No
reason
end
definition at the
"
what
truth
"
in
is
is
We
of a chapter.
this
connection.
should like to
Is
truth
And what
know
logical,
is
adequation
"
the
sublime
is
while
?
to truth
expression,"
beauty
Again,
Is this a tacit assent to the
is spoken of as "impression."
Kantian view of the double subjectivity of the sublime ?
sesthetic,
5.
The
precisely.
"
now
of the
.
identification of intuition
more
Impressions
viz.
(sesthetic pleasure)
S.
Translation
sesthetic
fact
into
physical
[This is not
affair of the will.
media.
but an economic, an
* P. 152.
+ P. 156.
an
It
17T
is
optional and
is
"
expres-
sion."]
Anyone can
real
and truly
Translation
is
economics or
on
treatises
synthesis.
beautiful
non-communicable,
But we pass
Granted that as an
only to
pertinent
ethics.
truly
is
non-sesthetic,
naturalistic,
is
we may
d'etre for
any
spiritual
inexpressible,
on.
"
aid to
memory
"
(!)
He
is
The physical
colours,
etc.
way :*
object or stimulus
of
Perceptions
/8.
These
physical
"
sounds,
facts,
tones,
aesthetic
lines,
synthesis
"
already produced
7. The hedonistic accompaniment which
;
is
is
is
also reproduced.
identified with or
The
spiritual synthesis,
memory.
colours, tones
is
and the
rest
How,
Ex
then, can
nihilo
energy
is,
which the
it
We
nihil
since
it
beautiful, intuition,
Beauty being
of
may
etc.,
from
arise.
no need
ALBERT
178
A.
COCK.
beauty.
in Nature,
The
abiding in
the
dis-
synthesis
spiritual
an
esthetic synthesis.
mind
Now
if
this
Matterhorn
may
and beautiful
well.
An
if
be
On
we may ask
so,
in
whose
Matterhorn
instantly exclaims
"
How
beautiful
for the
"
This
first
is
time and
because the
In whose
creations."
But
for
Croce
beauty
is
not
"
"
given
in
Nature.
He
human body
* P. 163.
t P. 167.
J P. 168.
is
a mere abstraction.
To each man
"
fair."
Sunt
179
man
his
sunt quos,
The
We
vain.
we
then, are
aesthetic
irretrievable subjectivity
6.
possible.!
is
"Space and
false.
we know
is
medium
your own,
may
Your
rest in peace.
of course.
and adequation
ever, then
This
call
is
"
we
to truth.
When
De
art
means external
Profundis
insincere
if
and the
we
may
criticised.
art,
how-
criticise
* P.
it.
We may
176.
t P. 188.
no
ALBERT
180
COCK.
A.
employed
take
Again,
precautions
to
He
we
prevent
cannot have
we may
from
art
it
being
both ways.
is
By
reproducing
in
it
the
oneself, is
answer.
We
the
productive.
"
stantially identical.
The
judicial
must
of
and go
activity
is
raise ourselves
"
little souls
the
in the universality of
spirit.
"
;
it is
of expressive activity
"
"
which
is
so really will be
The reproduction which is requisite to our judgment means that all the conditions must be reproduced, and
explanation.
* P.
193.
t P. 199.
The
rendered impossible.
181
By
this
much judgment
would seem
logical conclusion
to
arts
effects
It
is
may
be a
and
is
is
not true of
never repeated.
infancy of
Italian
art,
which
is
uniquely individual
art
in
Giotto.
logical deduction
The savage
is
intellect, religion,
and morality
in
practical activity.
Linguistic
final
and Esthetic.
chapter to a general
summary and
We
significant
sound
is
expression.
Hence
* P. 206.
aesthetic
There
and
are
no
linguistic are
182
ALBERT
COCK.
A.
to
"
Why,
there
it
had
wonder worth
Had I written the same, made verse, still, effect proceeds from
Ye know why the forms are fair, ye hear how the tale is told
cause,
is all
But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
Existent behind all laws, that made them and, lo they are
And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man,
That out of three sounds he frame not a fourth sound, but a
Consider it well each tone of our scale in itself is nought
It is everywhere in. the world
loud, soft, and all is said
!
star.
Give it to me to use
I mix it with two in my thought,
Ye have heard and seen consider and bow the head
And, there
!
:>
!
grammar
are
as
is
expression
semi-physical,
is
non-aesthetic
continuous creation.
Literature
Much
insisted
likewise
is
Language
Every one speaks
things arouse
in
his
soul";
literary appreciation is of
We
But when
we
are
still
others ugly.
is
facts.
language in action."
left
"
of the special
helpful.
of
the
arts
is
the denial
much more
"
The term
II.
CRITICAL.
1.
Intuition.
183
It occupies a
Croce.
is
is
un differentiated unity
intuition,
and
of the
"
or the
it
what
it
is
to
impression, for
impression)
objectify
Croce carefully
is
an
is
sensations, different
conception.
perception or image
some
is
Indeed,
"
tint of sky
meaningless to
me and
"
except as
in either case
"
spatiality
at
least
intuition."
But we are
known in
of
an
an intuition
activity.
is
that
Intuition
it is
also
is
only
184
ALBERT
A.
COCK.
We
the intuitions of us
all
poet, painter, musician, linguist.
be
able
to
extract
an answer to the question what
may perhaps
does intuition mean in Croce if, therefore, we ask instead, (i)
What
have
In what
art.
Now
the
is it
terms
(ii)
that
logical,
we
intuit
must be a
We
try again.
We
respect of content.
The form
which
or spiritual activity
differentiates
constant.
is
mechanism, passivity.
produced by the spirit of man.* But
formless,
is
if
It is the
matter
This matter
is
"
is
likewise intuited,
i.e.
may
and
Croce's
etc.,
but
may
include tints of
moment
is
^Esthetic, p. 9.
We
is
185
to be called intuition
evidence.
But
is.
his
is
and expression.
of intuition
"
"
and
is frequently
expression
emphatically used to denote the spiritual aesthetic synthesis.
Elsewhere, expression means art works, the product of practical,
(ii)
In the
first
place,
And
although
But
communicable.
if
if
externalised,
case
it
intuits.
what
is
expressed
an act or expression
is
He
is
an act of
will
of
will.
Moreover,
In that
the
same expression
or
.spiritual synthesis,
they must
also
expression.
ship
if
becomes
the
of
expression
have a
the artist's
uniqueness
first
What
then
intuition
Furthermore, tints
us
be alike.
is
of
of
sky are
to
spiritual synthesis
the
They are
The Matterhorn
expressions.
Whose
If a picture or a
poem
is
is
the Matterhorn or a
tint
of
sky
ALBERT
186
originally
intuition
of
the
COCK.
the
If
A.
beautiful,
it
must be
because
it
already
an independent expression as
Macbeth is originally Shakespeare's
to be regarded as
"
Macbeth."
Whose
intuition
"
Hamlet
intuition,
or
and
intuition
"
and
leads to
2.
(interior).
We speak a
And what
And, again, in
"
Carmen Genesis
"
:
" Poet
still, still, thou dost rehearse,
In the great fiat of thy verse,
!
And what
whole
"
THE
ESTHETIC
"
OF BENEDETTO CROCE.
187
'
And
its
height
its
common-
It is a
gestatory periods.
place of
Croce
laying stress
is
of the
moment
essentially
of
is
Take
selective.
an
from
example
first
hand
introversion.
silence.
"
I do, Francis,"
was
said
this
was the
was the
"
every morning."
reply,
No more
and shortly
however, he
afterwards he departed.
sent a beautiful poem to
day
Mrs.
or
two
later,
Meynell,
"
called
Orison
Tryst," in
Now
this,
case
is
by Croce's
which the
place.
in nescience
pass,
during
is
essentially selective.
It
is
ALBERT
188
the
intuition-expression),
A.
COCK.
though an
the
of
affair
practical
This poem
yet faithfully represents the inner synthesis.
not
construction
of
the
selective
bears
witness
throughout
will,
name beneath
My
its
wing
light
my
lids, I
'
Image
And
thine
"
"
The co-ordination of " intuitions here, of his lady and of
Her conceived Immaculate," could not be more convincingly
displayed,
and
We
poem.
Thompson makes
pureness
"
names
of
kindred
is
weary
fill
with
it
fierce forayers
Before the iterate echoing recoil
In armed watches when my preparate soul
(A war-cry in the alarums of the Night)
Conjoins thy name with Hers, Auxiliatrix."
;
Wordsworth*
is
and
genius.
thriving of
189
due place
its
amongst a variety
discursive
It is
control.
beyond
the
to
essential.
of data,
"
"
whether
already or
expressions
otherwise.
An
In limiting the
of
We
"
all
embracing
We
"
merely by what
But
it is
Cloud
Shelley's
"
owes everything
"
knowledge
to his
Thompson's
of its
Ode
to its
to the Setting
secular history
and
Sun
scientific
"
everything
In
knowledge
no poetry or art could be created either upon the basis of
a mere will to express or upon crude emotion or upon a
"
all embracing
Kant's own phrase,
sensuous basis alone.
significance.
fact,
"
all
"
that
is
word
to be embraced,
"
all
"
:
and Croce's
is no such
thing
but
form
devoid of all
nothing
In both cases the matter is essential. The " matter,
all
content
as aesthetic activity,
content.
which
"
mechanism, passivity
of
is
Croce
is
nothing
less
and experience,
* The
Critique of Judgment (Bernard's translation,
p.
137
f.).
ALBERT
190
A.
which
COCK.
to
me to
and
Stout's doctrine of
noetic
apperceptive knowledge.
is
a
much
truer
account
of
the
of
aesthetic
process
synthesis
It is directed
construction.
"
....
the
special
association
which has
idea
is
operative
far as it is
in so far as
it is
determined by the
Does
"
Orison Tryst
"
far better
determined by
last
development
is
operative."*
of a
poem
like
(B).
upon
reach,
it
Logically,
is
is
optional,
and Croce's
an economic not an
matter of aesthetics
aesthetic
5) that
I,
is
beyond our
like the
Croce's
idealism.
contempt
for
the
external
may have
this
result
medium,
is
p. 3.
sounds.
191
adapted
We
poetry, and
^pressed in
the
is
Croce's
eye.
linguistic leads
him
of
dreams,
"
We are the
And we
Words
music makers,
by a poet like Tennyson upon the order and form of his words
represents as caressing a care for his plastic material as ever
the
sculptor
We may
bestows.
any guild.
Music appears
to
an accumulated body
here there
has been worked up by generations
material which
of plastic
is
of musicians
and
is
still
powerless, as without
Externalisation,
essential,
and
medium which
him music
then,
inevitable.
is
is
is
"
all
not
dumb."
but
optional,
art
Every
has
its
necessary,
appropriate
The
understand what
where
it is
says, there is in
each of us a
make
music.
If,
little of
compel
makes
as Croce else-
his
it
mother tongue
perfect,
it
makes
ALBERT
192
real.
The external
called expression
COCK.
it is
A.
made
the expression
manifest,
3.
(i)
fiat
Fiat
est.
Although Croce
Luxfacta
how
are
we
If,
to recognise it except
i.e.
by intuiting
by making a judgment of
is
Very well.
An impression or intuition
is
spiritually synthesised
be-filled
are beautiful.
(iii)
We
all
may
these
?
"
further claim that pure intuition is essentially lyrical,
landa
and
of
soul
be
a
state
is
contained
in
great poem may
scape
an exclamation."
critiques
of
conjectural exclamations,
* The
Theory of Beauty,
appreciations
sighs.
p. 287.
And
of
apo-
all of these,
193
hended by
little to
criticism.
be comprewith
of criticism is
(iv)
possess unity
multiplicity
ugly.
Unity
of
what
What
of parts
whole organism,
it is
but how do we
The recognition
True,
parts
of the
but
it
must then be an
and
absolute,
upon the
Croce's insistence
of
be an
it
judgment
We
must judge
';
sesthetic values
transcendentally ideal
(vi)
Beauty
expression
is
is
of
Beauty
"
?
not expression.
Then why
Unsuccessful
labelling
by Croce as ugly.
court at
yet he says
all,
it
194
ALBERT
No wonder
beautiful
is
COCK.
A.
much more
some cases
autumn
and illuminating.
helpful
of apparent ugliness
may upon
He
suggests that
(i.e.
Croce's doctrine
is
is
therefore
rejected).
e.g.
I venture to
will develop
and publish
problem of
ugliness.
other claimant
can be
this is not
left
What
else it
enables us to recognise
undetermined)
it has no degrees, is unique, adequate,
and cannot be more adequate and in another claimant that
it is an expression, albeit unsuccessful, that it has degrees, is
is
is
Since beauty
is
expres-
how can we
tell
degree
question
still
remains,
* This
paragraph
lecture.
is
how can we
is
THE
"
ESTHETIC
"
OF BENEDETTO CROCK.
195
not
assure
me
and
its
an
and valid
intelligible
raise ourselves
criterion.
supply us with
fails to
How
do
we know we
are to
Comedy
We
are to
Even
reproduce, ideally, the given conditions and then judge.
if we do so, the act of judgment is different from the deed of
Croce says that the
Thus he who has repudiated the
Why
not
'*
no Heaven.
"
recog-
Was
anything more
to its purpose than
lie
intended to deceive, a
constructed,
recognised as
In
if
it
succeeds in
"
adequation
to
lie
its
carefully
purpose
and therefore
* P.
and elaborately
is
beautiful.
his synthesis,
202.
196
and
ALBERT
A.
COCK.
if
recognise
(ix)
we reproduced
if
Croce
is,
works
we should
sin.
limitations imposed
historical
the
of art,
of
Indeed,
it
consoles Keats
fair."
the
through
through Endymion.
Croce
fails to
We
others grow.
in his
own
Beethoven
lifetime
is
owing
suppress the "Letter from a Girl to Her Own Old Age," but
not because it is no longer a successful expression, no longer
Life has been happier
beautiful, but because it seems too sad.
It
for
comes then
sympathy
Conclusion.
to this, that
in the
is
by no means new.
Pain,
and
it is
Pleasure,
ami
great
^Esthetics
as posed
197
ment
"
a mystical supple-
"
to describe
his
tive, relative
own
is
it
difficult
and Emersonian.
Art, he says, belongs not to the world but to the superIt is not the Kantian
world, not to time but to eternity.
"
the
bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal it is
dream of the life of knowledge," its complement is the concept,
the judgment.
Art is ever a child. Thought must not be
;
upon
His elaborate
him
too sharply
tive.
Had
upon that
Judgment.
For
if
of the Critique of
if
we
we may
is
is
is
expression,
is
the child of
Lastly,
aesthetic is
"
Poetry
is
"
?
when we remember
that
Histwy of ^Esthetic,
p. 5.
198
however,
it
seems to
and inconsistencies
prospecting of the
dicta.
me
works
his
to
book
to be anything
field,
though
it
is
rank as beautiful.
is
too full
Here,
of ambiguities
stimulating obiter
199
VII
By W. TUDOR
1.
Introduction.
JONES.
of this subject
subject of
thinkers.
of
it
is
English and
American
the subject, but with one or two exceptions they have used the
term Values as something which did not imply a problem at
attempts made
their origin
to
of
various
their
relation
degrees,
over-individual characteristics.
to
significance of Values,
Professor
Urban's work on
It is for
this reason that I venture to think that the time has arrived
when
and that
and synthetic
manner.
Of course, dealing with a subject which covers so
vast a field, nothing more than an outline can be presented
in a co-ordinating
Lebensan-
W. TUDOR JONES.
200
the Present.
Though
it
true
is
that the
subject
Values
of
literature
over Values
battle
Italy as
is
reference
the works
of
is
sufficient to
The reason
of
for this
and
seemed
to
more than
to
fill
up gaps concerning
many
factors
It has discovered
knowledge proved
finding
the
But many
to be of great use.
Science have not been satisfied with
itself
advocates of Natural
terminus of
their
work
there,
They
is
meaning
to confine
201
lowest
life.
know where
what
am
can
human
is
we
find in the
human
world.
We
are not
now what we
ivere, because something has become a selfconscious centre where external and internal factors meet and
obtain a meaning other than that which they could ever get
by leaving man's potentiality out of account. It is unnecessary
to prove the existence of such a centre
is
rising
it is
evident that
man
is
capable of
level.
Whenever such
a self-consciousness
operates (and
is
to
replica of
what happened
is
the
In so
mere
a material
202
W. TUDOR JONES.
is
capable
of giving
is
Evidently
self-
In order to
it.
is
and
and
we take
is
is
into
capable of
becoming,
is
and
of the material
In this manner
man
will
choose or discard
and
this
is
life.
is
but
initial,
If
Natural Science
fails to
in man's nature
answer
is,
isolated.
is
203
move from
reality as that
and
brought to
own
life
objects that
moment.
to
Such
general concepts cannot grant us the actual reality, for they are
built up by a process of abstraction.
If such concepts cannot
it.
in
by overlooking
Natural Science.
of
It is
There were
natural scientists into the domain of Philosophy.
such
a
was
that
chaos
to
be
signs
dispersed, and that
beginning
men
of science
provinces,
but
the
evil
philosophers themselves.
begins
of
again
Mr. Russell
is
appear
amongst
offering us
anew the
adopted.
He would
to
rise,
have
We
Scientific
"
we
are to seek
"
to
first place,
3, 4.
204
W. TUDOR JONES.
throughout the whole of his paper, the fact that the conclusions
of Natural Science itself are mental constructions concerning
the physical universe, and in fact constitute a kind of second
indispensable for man in
order to describe and explain the phenomena of the physical
world (mental in
its
structure) which
is
of handling
material, and though the methods may be the same the material
is different.
We are bound to take a stand in the mental
the physical
is different.
End
its
presence no mental
things
and feeling
such
in
differentiate
Subject
relation
"
the Subject
to the feeling
and decision
"
neutral
of
"-
Philosophy
may
is
its
present as
the
subject-matter of
we
it
as
of material
And,
The presence
which do not
Time
and do not
conceived as a perpetual
The individual, it is true, has material
Time
shall
is
of Things,
and
in so far as this
205
and
feelings
and volition
is
different,
though
it
Space, from the material which the scientist takes into account
"
The
an abstract way in a so-called " objective
space.
material which the philosopher handles, even when it proceeds
in
to
come
and when
and
significance.
The thinking-feeling-willing
"
"
other than the
Subject also comes into contact with worlds
into
contact
with his
He
comes
world.
perpetual
physical
own
other personalities,
of history, and of the social atmosphere which surrounds him.
The
In all these worlds Totalities or Wholes are present.
material presented to the individual is made up of the thoughts
and actions of his own life, of other lives, of the life of the
human
world.
There
of his experience.
is
Had
it
"
whole
of things
"
as
it,
at least for
most
of its time,
to
make
of things.
to
us believe
it
It is sufficient
be concerned with a
is
W. TUDOR JONES.
206
world of the Ideal to the world of Fact have broken down one
Even
if
we grant
We
with the
"theoretical view
"
of the
World
it
more
who
Human
"
Life either left out altogether or reduced to a
of a
mechanical process.
mere
The reason which Mr.
flowering"
Eussell gives for the failure of Philosophy ought to be heeded
by all who have much to say of the Universe and little to say
"
of
Man.
"
progress
(p. 30).
the
phenomena
They
they
deal with
come
If
such a norm of
how can
it
207
at lowering
it is
some
Natural Science,
is to
fruitful results.
constantly to bear in
mind that
it is
For we have
View of Life that
Life.
only out of a
is
is
more
quite
of
different
from
those
of
Psychology.
It
is,
think,
To extend
it
and
New
208
W. TUDOR JONES.
Philosophy which
ness as this
all
is
of
the relations of
But the
Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Metaphysics, and Keligion.
mental sciences as now divided do not make an equal contribuIt is for this reason that
tion to such a system of Values.
Philosophy
may
attempted
to
satisfy
two needs.
On
the
one hand,
it
has
powers
or
include
Man
in a
as well as the
Universe has
Universe
to
manner
left
Man
a being whose
forces
as
life
outside
any number
of individuals
Man
what
life
of
of
Thus alongside
man
in order to
become some-
209
Philosophy is
thing more than a mere play of physical forces.
thus on its two sides a wisdom of the Universe and of Life.
its
become a kind
furnishes
turn,
of
norm
new
"
creative
synthesis."
simultaneously,
still
successively,
to be found.
is
we
Thus
find Philosophy
and in early
a
of
of
the
the
life of man.
Christianity
redemption
Philosophy
When we come down to the period of the Eenaissance theo-
retical interests
and
culture.
In
Aufklarung
Kant the two aspects find an intimate union Philosophy with
him becomes a view of the Universe and a view of Life. The
two Critiques
of
Pure and
of Practical
Kant perceived
of
man was
such a union.
that
man
continually that
to know, for
It is
activity
W. TUDOR JONES.
210
method
partially different
from those
The
of the latter.
field of
is
As Windelband
two
arise within
whom
(to
am
include an act of
high that
degrees
all
The
distinction
is
problems
and Eeligion.
^Esthetics,
subject to some
End
or Value.
It
is
like
Logic
consist
of
life.
But
is
before
we must
life,
man.
What
inquire for a
little
work
in the creation
211
of
fourfold content.
4.
Values.
Psychology of
By
this
is
not
meant
that
The
a need.
It
is
difficult
to
But
As
it
is
is
certain
this
rule,
consciousness
is
and
which
of
But
it
to build a closed
is
the
Kantian in
best
its
The truth
psychologists.
its
it
acts as a
three
amount
of Feeling,
amount
of Will, if not
to persist
same
is
and
is
always some
else.
And
the
Still,
is
W. TUDOR JONES.
212
may
When we
Will.
denned as a
This
tion.
of Will.
true
is
when
But, besides
the subject
this,
way
and pain as
is
pleasure
is
its dissatisfac-
is
observation
has
grown
and impulse.
On
present in sensuous
smell, taste, etc.
Will-element.
It
seems true
to
primary
pleasurable
or
painful.
much
viewed at
of the
primacy
of its priority.
of the
Will has
its source,
what started
in
merely a being
of
End
of pleasure
will
its
culminating
point.
them throughout
life,
life.
We
is
213
reciprocity
between
is
realise its
need
is
But when the End has been reached and the Value
obtained, what is the satisfaction of such a Value but another
Thus Feeling transformed
feeling on the pleasurable side ?
reaching.
itself into
its
turn transformed itself into Feeling. This kind of transference takes place right through life, so that, until much more
its
light is cast
nature.
But
the
all
How
elemental forms.
We
cess.
and their
moral
indeed, with
the
How
in
its
What
differentiates
the
cultivated,
man more
ancestor
the
But there
is
background
of
his consciousness
instincts
and impulses
214
W. TUDOR JONES.
There comes
life.
to
be a
why some
growth
should be found.
life
in the presence
and
of finding the
meaning of
and in
whether he
man
need for
this.
Indeed, as soon as
Thus a
conflict of
Values
to arise in order to
arises,
measure each
human
somewhat progressed
Standard has
of
The
is
operative.
joint
life.
Psychology with
individual
its
Values, and
are
consequently led
into
another
Custom,
Groups of Values.
we
of
is
hand,
it is
Custom
is
in the
mind
as
much
as the objects
of
The
215
so
it,
framed as
to be obliged to
make
it.
And
mind
the
a distinction between
what
is
else.
The Custom
Value would
as a
persist,
greater complexity.
But
if
"
"
of
incarnation
there had been no
oral
them
there was
are
quite
this
as
different
it
is
in
the
the
But how
country.
susceptible
to
men
need of
any group
India
The
conflict of
New
before
we went
renders
it
there,
and
necessary for us
this
helps
them
to
persist,
and
of our
own
"
incarnation
"
W. TUDOR JOXES.
216
the tangible
out,
points
Conscience
is
to
is
in
be
that
this
discovered.
psychological nature
the
Conscience
is
therefore
of
the
the
consciousness of the total group in the individual consciousness, which acts as a norm for the individual
voice
of
consciousness.
Of
course,
over-individual
this
over-individual
this is so,
level
When
of
not remain
does
Custom
but
applies
to
at
the
our four
If
groups of Values.
we find a valuing of Values which exists partly
levels
of
in tangible expressions
of the
Conscience
community.
But an important
total consciousness
command which
forces
itself
satisfied
else
him.
with what
And
it is
We
signifies
problems
Where
We
the individual to
feeling of pleasure.
is
offers
of practical or
every Value
or gives
rise to
217
We
have to
necessary by the individual.
bear in mind here that often what seems good and is even felt as a
is felt
Good may be an evil. The Maoris, for instance, have not gained
by all the Customs they have copied from Britishers. But they
felt the need for these
things and many of them sold their lands
so as to be able to live in the
be often good.
may
They
exercise a
into existence
But
subsidiary place.
its
though
"
"
ghost
can get
new
him
as
of his nature
can be
intellectual
now appear
and
to
spiritual needs
satisfied.
late Otto
Liebmann
"
man
finds himself
is
Liebmann's triad we
its
ideal
is
the Good."
whose
it
brings to man.
It is to these
by means
of
Values
This
\ve
is
now
To
Miinsterberg's
which
satisfaction
termed God.
turn, to see
of
some
of the
ways
find satisfaction.
6.
Logical
Values.
The
Truth
218
W. TUDOR JONES.
human mind
its
judgments distinguish
and other respects
It deals in this
error.
with the conceptions of the natural and the mental sciences, and
its influence is felt even within the provinces of ^Esthetics, Ethics,
said that
it is
the determining
of the greatest
necessities of
Thought
is
Even
if
value because
it
would
still
it
would
still
Judgments
own
possess great
who
follows the
to construct
consciousness.
some
Such a
at least in Thought.
side.
To
Universe or
of Life into
However impersonal
to
the material
because
it
may
material
seem,
is
it is
of
importance
it
is
individuals.
importance
is of
219
The individual
all.
is
Truth a combatant
possession of
true
thus in his
an over-
in
Truth
to, all
if it is
moment.
The
reason.
satisfaction of
demand
this
nature
of
him.
in
change
does that
the intellectual
of
mean than
Or,
as
that
we
grasp the elements, the parts, the groups, perhaps the whole of
this chaos, and hold every bit of our experience before us as
only, but
something which
And
to be itself.
is
our experience to be
to last, that
it is
itself,
is
yet what
not to be experience
else can it
than to impart to
it
mean
to tell
a will that
it is
experience; that
is
it
to
of its
as
itself
preserved,
is
to last
is
to
means
"
:
In the
field
of
the
logical
values
of
reality
it
we have
causal, historical,
and
logical
knowledge/'^
* Science and
Idealism, pp.
t Ibid., p. 50.
38, 39.
The demand
for
220
W. TUDOR JONES.
Truth
shall
is
thus a
persist.
The conclusions
and the
of the natural
therefore independent
of
any "personal
sciences
logical
are
But although
setting."
individual
in
sense
this
that
the logical
values
still
of
form
still
which the
to
It
further.
is
Truth become of
importance to man they demand from him an acknowledgment of a world of Truth which is independent of his own
If there were opportunity, it could be
particular truth.
many
ways.
The material
of the
two
that of
is
the
different
the latter
of
world
and
it
The
is
this over-individual
that
sided
The values
it
is
they cannot be
of
Truth
of
satisfied
in
one
many-
direction
nature
at
only.
least
though the
cognition which remains in the foreground
and conative aspects are also affected. But they,
affective
too, in their
they come
we
shall
see
that
and conative
sides.
Esthetic Values.
to
the
foreground, and
other aspects
when
of reality will
it
is
221
them.
created
of
the
mind
the
to
move in the groove marked out for it. But man, much as
he needs such truth, needs also something, however small it
may be, which is more his own. It is not given to every man
Truth as far as to be able to construct an open
systematic view of the Universe, and it is not given to any
to follow
man
men
to be expressed in words.
feelings,
and
Faust
Icli
Now,
which
is
to be itself
Nameu
habe keinen
Dafiir.
in a
Truth
be designated as absolute
may
it
own
its
in himself
in a
form
at least in a part of
of
self-subsistence.
addition,
fulfilling
"
all
is
desires
through
to us in
or
himself."
perfect fulfilment
Even
claims,
becoming inde-
dependent
of
what
need
his
The individual
immediacy.
and
its
Miinsterberg, Idealism
From
material
and
from the
Life, p. 54.
social
222
W. TUDOR JONES.
different ways.
me
sea,
and sky.
own
give
him strength
his
week
crowded part
effect and from
in a
cause to
to pick out
on
of
his laborious
it
work
for the
next
London.
effect to
to carry
of the
And
may
be handled analytically and synthetically from a logical standpoint, and it may be viewed in its totality, as a complete picture
is
viewed.
enjoyment.
difficult
How much
to detect, but
is
it is
has to be
it
it
summer and
the early
autumn.
./Esthetic values of sculpture, painting, poetry,
music have
all
had
drama, and
in
but
nature,
the
in
immediacy
to the soul.
over-
intellectual
individual
that
from
differ
they
223
the
form
of
They
View
attain to a
of the Universe,
and where
rest
What
the recipient.
which
question, into
But there
Values of
effort
is
-life.
and
rest
is
is
upon
quite another
effort
in the realm of
rest
This
and enjoyment
overcome some
in
the Beautiful.
moral realm,
As pointed out
above,
sides.
ment
of the
Consciousness
to it
is
We
to the
Wherever
Mhical Values.
in
life
we
look
we
find,
over against the ordinary daily life and its values, a command
that has to be obeyed and whose value consists in its realisation.
Everywhere such a command is presupposed, however
much the individual may fail to understand the nature of it.
This command is termed Duty or Moral Law. This Moral Law
is differentiated from the multiplicity of relations in which man
from day
finds himself
higher levels
qualities.
It
by means
has
difference exists
elements in
to day.
of
already been
hinted
that
a fundamental
human
nature.
life
of the
individual
in its nature.
The
history, necessity,
and value
224
W. TUDOR JONES.
munity,
the
for
superiority of
preservation
the
the
of
Community,
as a whole to
Community
Com-
for
the
any individual,
of
also differentiated
because
Will,
it
and
attained,
cannot
also
and
without an
be attained
because
is
it
not, as on the
activity of
which
something
aesthetic
level,
is
to
the
be
something which
is
make an
of the
effort to travel
It is conscious that
one
main values
individual,
The
the distance.
self
is
of
persisting
Such a reality
is
independent of
it
"
beautifully
thing
am
free
it
consciousness of which I
is
easy
in
to
225
emphasised in Ethics
also
its
is
imperative.
is
intellectual
human
race,
make
to
and Metaphysical
Religious
Values.
Neither of the
work
It
his per-
if
sonality
the
material
become
into
unity,
convictions
final
in
so
these
which the
If
we
come
of our convictions.
transcend the
to
God
if
to immortality
if
final,
unities
may
absolute Values
As Miinsterberg puts
three
similar
way)
it
(and
"
That
outer world
by
of
our
convictions
we
Miinsterberg, Science
and
Idealism, p. 61.
226
it
things and of
which the
in
men and
of duties is
logical, sesthetical,
and
of
ethical
demands
are unified,
and
ethical
from man
completely, would
of
its
demands,
identical
is
conclusion
be
perfectly
eternal
to
the
and
harmonious in the
absolute."*
subject
totality
practically
Ibid., p. 65.
227
VIII.
PHENOMENALISM.
By
C.
D. BKOAD.
meant
by Phenomenalism and to state how it is related to Idealism.
I shall consider the main motives and arguments that have led
I PEOPOSE in the present paper to try
is
Knowledge
is
of the External
present position
which he sets before himself.
much
World.
Mr. Eussell's
is
the ideal
I shall try
is
question of the validity of the arguments for and against Phenono one at present claims to have worked out in
menalism
even a
it
we must be
of
is
meant by Pheno-
some phenomenalists,
viz.,
e.g.,
some sense
to dispense
This is as
physical objects.
Mr. Eussell, are at present
P2
228
D.
C.
BROAD.
prepared to go. But others believe that they can also dispense in
some way with one of the remaining two. Thus Mach seems to
American
data.
am saying
I am overlooking the fact that Mach
It
is
and again
am
tions
and sense-data
what
and James
to do without sensations.
leaving
it
quite vague in
I believe that
any careful
as
(such as is certainly
I
think
the
American
Eussell
and
realists) to hold
by
possessed by
terms
that one or more of the distinct
corresponds, not to a new
clear recognition of these distinctions
We
in
and whether
whether he
is justified
any
special
Ordinary common
between mental acts and their
sense
that
we
unquestionably
objects.
perceive
But
it
so.
distinguishes
wants to hold
any
rate parts of
a part of
it
at a time.
I do not,
e.g.,
that other people who say that they perceive the same penny
may be directly aware only of different parts from ourselves.
But there is no special difficulty about this if the part that
:
you
see
I see
fit
together to
PHENOMENALISM.
229
of us could
separately.
seems
sense in which
we can say
When
I look at a
object.
have known
be inconsistent.
to
There
(2)
that
we
penny
however, a different
is,
I see
am no longer aware of
the colour but I do become aware of coldness and of some other
Common
qualities.
some
that
when
I only feel it I
may
only be aware of
may
my
failure to
moment
which I
of qualities of
and
difficulty of
quality of a
physical object does not prove that it is not there, and so is quite
compatible with the fact that someone else can become aware of it.
Once more
his information
will tell
me more
about the whole physical object than my own by itself could, unless
there be some positive incompatibility between his and mine.
to
it.
that
fact that
we sometimes
is
perceive
no proof that
it
it
and
exists
belief
here does not rest on arguments, though that is not the same as
to say that no arguments can be produced for and against it.
and
it
here again common sense has a perfectly good ground for keeping
its belief unless some strong argument be brought against it.
230
We may
BROAD.
D.
C.
objects of the
we from time
to time
i.e.,
they have
But we
qualities and parts and they can change and move.
add to this that they exist and keep their qualities in the main
unchanged when they are not objects
of
any mind.
Common
sense tends to hold (a) that there are such objects, and (6) that
we
at different times,
and qualities
information
know
at
is
compatible
that what
we
and the
in
is
could hold
fact that
we only certainly
we perceive it is
common
it
at various times
that
an
it
it
it.
may
and these
it
is
difficulty.
will not
there were
Common
one.
elliptical
the
movement
of
my
when
stand at the
testimony
of
other
side.
people,
But,
this
if
we
are
explanation
body
it
is
really
elliptical
to accept the
will
not
do.
whom
Another man
PHENOMENALISM.
231
What
while I move.
same object
"
part."
in
What
both closed curves, they are not just fragments which, when
taken together, will make up a closed curve. The conclusion at
which we arrive
something
is
is
(a) that
that of which I
am
not identical with the penny which I say that I see nor with
it in any sense of that word which has yet been used,
i.e., it is not a part which fits in geometrically with what I see
is
a part of
at other times
penny.
Lastly
we
which I
am
does not
to
distinguish
come
common
We
directly aware.
for believing in
would happen,
proportion as
of
which
e.g., if
it
did
the
so).
I approached it in
These immediate objects by means
exist,
to
Two
(1) Is there
any reason
to
objects,
and,
if
is
it
necessary to
it is
practically a
mere matter
of definition.
In
my
example
232
C.
am
moment
about.
move
as I
BROAD.
P.
aware
directly
And
it
is
an object at each
of
But are
them.
parts of
is
them
that
at
all or
This
any
rate
any
is
commonly
they are
denied.
What
seems certain
neither identical
with
nor
common
it
pointed out to
is
us
that
to
have
little
when we
to believe that
continues to exist.
we
when we
all
these
objects
Common
penny.
are sometimes aware of a part
This something we
call the
look straight
down on
it.
But
this
is
it differs
Now
we have been
forced
is
it
needs some
We
233
PHENOMENALISM.
existence of
the
object exists
data,
we
many
we
sense-data,
one
could regard
We
as
it
as a function or
it
with
it
change, and
we must be
of
many
we must
vice versd
the sense-data
connected
all
that
is
The motive to
persistent physical things would be preserved.
such a construction is perfectly clear, and may be put as
follows.
The ordinary view about physical objects makes
them
logically very
much
data.
qualities
and
relations,
that,
is
red.
But we
objects
or
not, at
mind.
ascribing
to
difficulty is
;
qualities.
234
C.
BROAD.
D.
it
The
how we can
and
difficulty is to see
satisfactorily pass
aware
and relations
of
some
Psychology.
as
distinct
for
the philosopher,
we come
not how
is
to
point
is
whether we
are
logically
The
justified
in
and such
on the basis
qualities
particular
facts
phenomenalist
can
show
us
that
(a)
the
causes
If
the
which
which
our beliefs
shall in the
denned by him,
e.g.,
strong innate
beliefs
as
makes them
makes them
much
positive
innate
belief
in
of a different logical
and
physical objects
it
that
may
be a part of our
they are
particular
235
PHENOMENALISM.
our strongest beliefs are often very vague e.g., we all believe
that in some sense 2 + 2 = 4, but very few people could tell us
precisely what they mean by 2 and 4 and -f and when they
;
us
tell
If
the
fulfil
the
are
conditions of being
common and
and
persistent
of being con-
little
for
ground
complaint
merely
from that
other objections
and does
One argument
Phenomenalism appears
to
me
of
Mr. Eussell's
these
is
and
in favour of
to
it
Abstraction in
Razor
esse
the
much
according
entia prceter
Phenomenalism
and
multiplicaiida,"
"
that
Ockham's
mathematics.
philosophy of
the principle
is
necessitatem
plumes
itself
non
on
am
but
it
in
favour
kind which
not to be multiplied, or
form.
making
(b)
The Principle
Instead of
common and
as
its
is
to
number
all
It
known
is
might
all
either
of the classes,
mean
of
assuming
peculiar
this the
it
Phenomenalism.
of
(a) entities of a
multiplied.
stands
it
which of
perfectly clear in
members.
Now
viz.,
the class of
it
can
236
D.
C.
BROAD.
datum
to be
commonly supposed
is
it
entities to
seen, is
that
certain
fulfil
multiplies kinds of
we have
physical object, as
like a sense-
something very
exist, and
sense-data
a set of sense-data
it
is
the
only
whenever
to hold that
there will
of these
sense-data, but
differing
in that (a)
whilst
it is
still
no one
any
them and only
aware of it, and
closely resembling
ever directly
(b) that,
uncertain but not impossible that sense-data exist
unperceived,
it
is
is
exists unperceived.
The mere
if
exists at all,
it
Pheno-
But Mr.
in its favour.
Eussell's
own
seem
to
minds and
one
is
bodies.
aware,
can be aware
and
is
one
is
of
economy,
connexion with living
It does not assume sensibilia of which no
still less
:
does
it
assume
sensibilia of
it
which no one
and
my
ellipse of
there are
/At
spective space.
to be
i.e.
that there
PHENOMENALISM.
are groups
237
of
intermediate
eccentricity.
is
When
of them.
(as
we put
it)
not those which were in this perspective, but are the different
ones which are determined by this different medium. /Mr.
Eussell
of
may
medium, but I
physics
agree that
it is
a good ground.
But
it is
circular,
much
less
we
in
the
say
is
238
D.
C.
BROAD.
is
way supported by
of
argument
The argument is
Phenomenalism.
as follows.
The laws of physics start from observations on our
sense-data and must ultimately be verified by such observations.
For a law is only directly verified by its predicting that some-
that
we can be
quite certain
we can
directly observe, and these are our sensedata and the changes in them while they remain our sense-data.
Laws are hypothetical propositions of the form If an event of
:
is
the kind
q,
must be possible
in theory
terms of
latter.
our
own
sense-data, or at
it
most in terms
of
our
own and
of those
in
as intermediate
start
and
be theoretically soluble.
This argument has always seemed to
it
be true or
false, it
common
The
view.
moon
is
sometimes
to
this general
But
argument on
its
best
way
it
we can
to
meet
will be well
own
merits.
In ordinary
life
we
PHENOMENALISM.
239
make
constantly
mind and
of
their
but we also
objects,
There
in
of
which we believe
we
call adjusting
i.e.,
If
them.
of
argument
So
contemporary
sensations.
must be
relations
all
will ultimately
follows
It
precisely the
same
that
their
temporal
what seems reasonable, that we have a different sensation whenever there is any difference in the sense-data before
if
we
say,
our minds.
they can be
of physics, if
and sense-data
will
in
reasonable and
atheistic
is
solipsism,
be successfully reached,
that,
from
Berkeleianism.
essentially
if
it
it
tried to
will
not
show
differ
240
C.
D.
of
BROAD.
those
people call the adjustment of the body and the directing of the
object has an important logical bearing on Pheno-
mind on some
Why
aware
are directly
We
(1)
i.e.,
we
may
actually
be
identical
with some
of
For
than a
cold one, and again that a bar at which no one is looking may,
by its expansion, cause a railway accident. I must add to my
law something
of the following
sense-data.
kind
If I
use a micrometer
Then
my
micrometer
that I
am
whether
not,
it
phenomenal interpretation
method
of the fact
It is clear that,
in
practice.
We
241
PHENOMENALISM.
therefore
the
analyse
several parts.
One
verifiable
directly
is
part
hypothetical into
supposed to go
on regardless
of
alters
rails
off,
and only at
only occasionally
fulfilled, will
certain sense-data in
human
minds.
As
this is
on the whole
time we refer to
it
these
parts, one of
which
at least goes
on whether we perceive
it
or
they can judge that the first process has taken place.
Let us just recapitulate the results that we have at present
reached.
We have seen (a) that all physical laws do contain
sufficient
is
directly verified
number
verify.
A hypothetical
in
and more-
the
sense-data,
muscular sensations,
etc.,
which on
the
for,
we
shall not
242
C.
D.
BROAD.
mind
of
certain sense-data
and
of
We
place our laws would have been too complex and unwieldy
remember in the second place there would have
to use or
Still, of
So
it
is
if
our
a felix
useful
that a complex but limited law would hold if two simpler and
more general ones held. The complex one can be directly verified,
that all inductive
i.e., it only has the amount of uncertainty
243
PHENOMENALISM.
even
if
together imply
it
increased.
ground
(3)
Typhoid fever
is
caused
Now typhoid
by certain microscopic germs in the blood.
of
at
no
one
is
aware
exists
times
when
any sense-data
certainly
But the phenomenalist will say
What this law
of this kind.
:
means
is
could, after
symptoms
of typhoid I
making
and tactual sensations (which process people who believe in
matter call looking at the man's blood through a microscope),
become aware
caused
do
or
certain
by
things
volitions,
if
but
you
not
done
not
told
muscular sensations,
did
had
You have
did.
done
also
etc.,
accompanied
in the patient's
the cause of
some other
my
And
wanted
to
know
patient's doctor.
Now
the
common view
gives to
it is
244
C. D.
BROAD.
true,
other event
my
i.e.,
my
typhoid had
"
But, if you had examined
Suppose you go on to say
the oysters, you would have had certain sense-data, and these
no cause.
"
not
itself
the attack.
And, of
"
It is
you say
become aware of these
course,
if
law
it
?
I expect
takes too conventional a view
useful to science.
I therefore
want
to
If the
phenomenalist says
but in some
scientific sense,
I have nowhere
mystical or metaphysical one, he is wrong.
introduced into my argument the notion of activity, or of the
(b) I
my actual argument
245
PHENOMENALISM.
phenomenalist view
sympathy)
of causation
seem
because on the
effect in time,
(with which
effect I
make
am
largely in
To people who
to be necessary.
On
causes.
He
ought to say
has no cause
my
meaning
of the word,
i.e.,
it
is
visual sense-data.
it.
What
mean
is this.
All causal laws must deal with more or less abstract events,
would be undiscoverable, and, if per impossibile discoverwould be useless. And there is no general principle to tell
or they
able,
us
how
Now
it
p happens q always
happens within'a definite interval. It does therefore seem to me
quite likely that some events have no causes in the sense of
cause which I agree with the phenomenalists in using.
But,
although I believe that this is so in general, I certainly do not
believe, as I should have to do if I were a phenomenalist, that
246
C.
which
sensations
of
D.
BKOAD.
my
attribute to
them which
adjustments
common view calls the cause has any cause at all. The fact is
that the phenomenalist theory cannot distinguish between those
where
events in
include
its
all
common theory
connects merely with the act of deciding to look for a cause and
adjusting the body or using an instrument with that end in view.
people would regard this as a conclusive argument against
phenomenalism. I do not go so far. But I think we are entitled
Many
to say that
when
to look
many
of the
common
laws
stated in purely
for
it is
phenomenal terms) or
unless
we had habitually
them,
directly
verifiable
the
validity
Phenomenalism
of
The mere
what
?
The
detail.
is its
logical
imagine
it
bearing on
phenomenalist will
a certain
hypothetical
was necessary
doubtless
say:
fact
that
for
duced in
this
way.
This
is
it.
PHENOMENALISM.
The
first
point to notice
is
that,
247
when we say
that a certain
law would not have been discovered unless people had believed
a certain physical theory, the connexion between the law and
the theory
important
"
different according as
is
to state the
law
we do
or do not think
it
When
It is a
been noticed
if it
law
in nature,
none
of
phenomenal law
among
its
at all
antecedents
all
the phenomenal
those muscular,
visual,
phenomenalist must say that the fact that the man sees that
this result follows from the wave theory and that he desires to
test the theory is the condition, not
nature at
all.
any instances
is
of its operation in
logical importance.
" If
p happens q always follows,"
we can
actually observe
p and
If we can do this often enough the phenorendered highly probable by induction by simple
enumeration. The probability of the corresponding physical
law is necessarily smaller on the same evidence for it is equal
then observe
menal law
q.
is
to the probability of
248
C.
BROAD.
D.
a proper fraction.
between a great
are all implied
many phenomenal
by a certain
many
of the particular
which
is
laws
is
For example,
light,
each of
e.g.,
We
number
of times
connexion with the other laws about light which we can render
highly probable by repeated direct verification.
Yet, in spite of this, we do regard such laws as but
little less
verify.
The
of
the following.
The
<f>
only logical justification for this
phenomenal laws which I can make highly probable by direct
set
is
laws.
all
phenomenal laws
<j> ;
n\ favourable instances
law
<j)i,
will be of the
form
"
have experienced
have experienced
of
the
249
PHENOMENALISM.
unfavourable instances of the law
laws in the
any proposition p
the
all
= ty or ty', where
= -ty/h l/tyh + ty'/h
l/h
I
.-.
on for
so
set."
following results
and
fa,
-fy'
is
the contradictory of
Ij^r'h (by a
ty.
well-known law of
probability).
'/h
(For,
l/ty'h.
since
-^
implies
I,
1.)
1.)
'h.
(Since
^/h + ^'/h
The
last
we had no
same evidence.
and
<
ll/^'h
is
It follows that
to the exclusion of
t/r
if
I confine
my
attention to
such laws as
There are in fact a great many purely phenowhich we firmly believe which we can have no
than the
logical ground for thinking appreciably more probable
We can put the whole matter in a
set of physical laws ty.
actually do so.
menal laws
in
will
have
very little probability unless the set of physical laws xjr has
great probability, but the mere fact that -fr implies the highly
probable set of phenomenal laws </> will not suffice to make ty
250
D.
C.
probable unless ^r
highly
BROAD.
itself
has considerable
intrinsic
probability.
I
if
we
who
call
this a
possibly
conclusive
we do
argument
Once more
against
cannot
Phenomenalism
On
we
have said
is
a moment what
physical science
But if you
phenomenal laws which are constantly verified.
of
more
about
the
nature
the
private
hypothetical
say anything
entities over and above the fact that they are the sort of
that obey these laws your statements are in no way
rendered more probable by the success of the physical theory,
however great that may be. Your beliefs about the private
entities
should
strike
another
generation.
These
analogies
have
251
PHENOMENALISM.
undoubtedly
been
in
helpful
practice,
we ought to
on them are in an
but
and much
entirely different
to
the
hypothetical laws.
apply.
that
The nature
ipso facto
data of
imply
which
of the functions
all
We
as
if
me
to be compatible.
of physics
it is
be of very
little use.
is (a)
that the
252
IX.
By ARTHUR
EVEN
in his
fairly be said to be
is
his due,
THE
KOBINSON.
almost unknown.
To most
of those
may
who
are acquainted with his writings this fate appears not only
unmerited but even, to a large extent, inexplicable. It is true
of
his
and the
time
these
life,
remove
it.
may appear
to say,
In extenuation I
of
the other.
is
incapable of
this
tendency
"il faut
The resemblance
is
is
obvious.
Further,
influence of
from the
253
De Fhabitude.*
"
"
origins
of the bits
is
In a sense,
mosaic
to treat it as a
But
merely stupid.
movement
it is
includes
Bergson
sait tout ce
Qui
que peut
n'y a pas un nouveau monde
s'il
de*couvert
un
par
jour
la reflexion concentre'e, et
inte"rieur
quelque
Colomb
mdtapliysicien
(Pens&s, p. 213.)
his
Again, de Biran was a psychologist by constitution
works abound in subtle observations and interesting suggestions.
The problems with which he wrestles so patiently are
:
still
the
problems
If psychology, as
self.
past and a short history, that short history has certainly not
M. Ernest
Biran
de
Navillej*
into
three
Philosophy of Sensation
periods
Philosophy
periods
are
of Eeligion
marked
(N.
is
paper
i,
vi).
simply to
career
philosophical
The
the
divides
this
first
the second
the third
by distinctive
of
the
characteristics,
These
and
the
is
movement
the
of thought thinned
of a "spatialized time."
and tortured
to
fit
the plan
The
254
that
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
we
now concerned
are
spectacle of a sincere
to be
an ideologist
To
movement
outline this
is
which
is
if
This
is
of value in his
suggestiveness,
M. Ernest Naville
states that
philosophy.
guard
of
solitude,
the
ideologists
What
Louis XVI,
know
(N.
for
more," says M.
whom
i,
Naville,
x.)
Even
in 1803
et
him
the
"
whole of
could a Life-
"
?
were
Psychologie,
we
find
him com-
of
passive
sensations.*
Memory
is
thus a weakened
dominant sensation; to have two sensathe same time is to compare and judge.
In his famous
sensation, attention a
tions at
awakened one
and then
own motor
activity that
we know
of the existence
255
the
the intellectual faculties supervene upon or rather are
transformed sensations. Such was iii the main the psychological stock-in-trade
But he wa&
faculte de faire
knowledge
du mouvement
"
La
nous
1ST.
i,
"
1'univers
xxii).
sensible
by an
illusion
passive factors,
Tracy reduced
a
sensation
of
it i&
will
Cabanis
also
had
Conscience du moi
reached
senti,
similar
du moi, reconnu
voulu
en un mot,
le
conclusion.
"La
ARTHUK ROBINSON.
256
"
...
Dire que
le
cerveau
absurdite, la plus
"
grande
de langage qu'on puisse imaginer
(N.
filtre
grande impropriety
xi).
Cabanis, in short,
much
i,
fact
des pensees,
depends on
Thus
it
Condillac.
It is quite clear
which was
his
mind
du dehors
agite'e,
ou
eleve'e, triste
selon la temperature de
Je voudrais,
digestion.
chose de suivi,
1'air,
ou joyeuse, caline ou
ma bonne ou mauvaise
selon
si
leur donne;
attention
"
Des
"
(Penstes de
1'enfance, je
exister
p.
113).
me
j'e'tais de'ja
chacune de nos
des
memes
1'effet
faculte's intellectuelles la
operations."
frequente repetition
first set
in 1799.
The
for
of
Maine de
to
Biran.
competition in
was awarded
submitted received
of the treatises
honourable
him unanimously,
it
257
1801.
once more.
The same
Maine de
The
prize
submitted
is still
in existence.*
is
"
Un
this
down which we
glide,
is
to
remove
not knowing.
a slope
look into our
all resistance, it is
The
first
all
influence
of
habit
makes
it
258
"
tant
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
est vrai
il
la
que
se
The labours
made the study
of
(e.g.,
Condillac
therefore, to observe
these
its
The study
repetition.
of
own nature
knowledge
of
standing.
Since
sensation
it
which we
sense.
is
preliminary
to
effects
of
a necessary
habit.
"
Its
object
up the ambiguity of the term sensation,'*
which played so many roles in the system of Condillac.
The first and most general of the faculties manifested by
first
is to
clear
259
Maine de
a living organism is that of receiving impressions.
"
"
Biran adopted the word impression to mean the result of
Tims it had for him
the action of an object on a living part.
"
in its ordinary
same meaning as that of " sensation
acceptance, and he avoided in this way the ambiguous use of
"
sensation," which was applied to either a simple feeling of
the
and
passive.
by the
There
e.g.,
We
Que
je
meuve en
effet
je
me
tion, je puis la
commencer,
les manieres, et la
la suspendre, la varier
conscience que
a,
j'ai
de
mon
la modification
de toutes
activite, est
pour
me'me.
affectives
point, le
temps
compare rien
ne distingue, je ne
"
(C.
i,
22-23).
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
260
we have
"
unusual
of
"Lorsque
le
1'individu
passive.
le
n'en
point
conscience, et
Je conserverai a toutes
mouvement prend le
meme, s'il est avec
Si le
sensations.
sorte 1'initiative, ou
demeure
1'impression
celles
de ce genre le nom de
dessus, et en quelque
la sensibilit^
dans un
la distingue
i,
"
25).
What,
then,
is
movement
For instance,
if
to
my
surface
or diminish or suspend.
This
is
if it
To such
These
is
left
on
my
My
hand.
experience
then different.
is
is
"
self
which
my
force
feel
opposed
to
my
my
hand
own.
to elevate or
acts to
261
keep
it
keep
my arm
in position,
in position or to elevate
it.
Quand
continues,
"
je distingue,
je saurais qu'il
que
is
sophismes de
1'idealiste
"
(C.
26).
i,
effort, there
is
always a per-
is
no
effort,
without
effort
no
An effortless being
knowledge, no perception of any sort.
would not suspect any existence, not even his own. In short, it
is
when he begins
move
to
first
relation of existence.
movement apply
If
it
In the
fine
i,
that
is
and mobility in
animal
development
of
262
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
sense,
because of
its
perceive,
"
It is
so intimately related
is
Comment
dire
ils
would only receive passive impressions, can acquire activity by association and correspondence
with a more mobile organ.
mobility,
which by
This principle
is
itself
in itself
its
them
is
movements towards
parler,
e'coute
"
En
entendant chanter on
"
L'individu qui
39).
So in the
case of hearing
it
is
The
touch.
sense
If
impressions,
the
of
less mobile.
taste
seems
sensibility
motor-activity
takes
closely
the
becomes
related
to
that
of
proportion.
movements
of perceptions.
of the
et
Wildon Carr,
somewhat
less
263
of liquids.
Smell
is
among our
It
may
vanish as
movement
disappears.
its
sensibility.
depend on
that
sensibility but
own
perceived or sensed.
fits
it
to be either
time that we sense the heat, but we cannot say that we perceive
In short, sensation has been made a generic term
the latter.
and wrongly applied to include both sensations and perceptions.
The
theory
operations
that
(i.e.,
sensation
memory,
transforms
attention,
etc.)
itself
is
into
untrue,
various
for
no
two
This
is
There are
two
classes of
movement.
of the
ARTHUK ROBINSON.
264
is
is
which
is
in propor-
up
in the organ.
less affective.
To perceive
must
some
difference.
own
He
when they
whether
it is
possible
intrinsic characters
answers, no.
we able
to recognise
them if they
re-appear.
This
its
is
is
to
which
modifications.
It
is
is
distinguer
le souvenir
il
faudrait que le
qu'il sentit
vivement ce
faiblement
'
qu'il est
ce qu'il
&te,
en merne temps
la
a eta?
qu'il sent
une relation de temps dans cette seule circonstance d'affaiblissement ? Est-ce que la sensation faible n'est pas pre"sente comme
la sensation vive
"
?
(C.
i,
49.)
A motor-disposition
is
a tendency preserved
The agent
renewed
an
effort,
effort,
however,
less
is
265
by the organ to
conscious of a
than before.
This can
la
mSme
un
disposition qu'elle
globe, 1'individu se
absent.
comme une
telle se refere
j'appelle idde."
The agent
But the idea
is
because,
imaginary
the
ball,
when
if
And
voice reproduces
the reflected
determination motrice
niidees"(C.
The
tions
i,
nuances
"),
(origiriaire)
il
"En un
n'y a ni
rnot,
sans
reminiscence
52).
feeling of effort,
and our
sounds.
which
ideas, admits
of
is
many
Bur,
though
activity.
Visual dispositions
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
266
And
most
illusions of sight
and fewest
of touch.
first,
more or
tion, is
has to do in particular
The means of recall are the voluntary
of
signs
ment ou
active impressions.
They
1'effort
tend a figurer le
resistance
exte'rieure
(0.
i,
55-56).
Similarly
with
vocal
movements.
"
"
Natural signs
"
or
first
"
signs
are
movements which
There
more
or
conventional.
them,
i.e.,
formation (C.
i,
that
is
"
signs
for
into their
57, note).
"
"
Signs are thus 1'unique soutien de la memoire (Ibid., 57).
For a being limited to sensation or passive impressions, there
The imagination
the brain,
memory
two faculties
Such
is
more
to its
are, in
It
motor
force, so the
is,
products of these
from perception.
how they
tion on sensations
drawn
so
deep a distinction.
them,
becomes
clear.
fades
267
Compare,
with
a sight-impression.
when
as perceptions clearer,
feebler,
Habit then
repeated.
by
but the
bringing in products
it
of
movement
is
quite other.
make
effect
and distinctness
movements on
priate
which
its
active
movements which
many
cause
it
marks
signs as appropriate
when
to be recognised
it
of the appro-
character
it,
and serve
to distinguish
recurs.
depends
determines, or
it
like
and
it,
to
is
true
in
ment weakens
and ease
in the
increase,
same
and
by
its
ease,
products.
the
in
So perception tends
so called.
by
in consciousness
its
promptitude,
268
ARTHUR ROBINSON.
In the Mdmoire sur
I'
habitude, it is easy to detect the
guiding ideas which characterise the philosophy of Maine de
The
which
is
knowledge
mind by
abstract
essential
to
sensations
all
these
are
up the
as
thoroughly
they are vitally
repugnant to the tenets of the school of which he believed
himself to be a disciple.
This cleavage was soon to be
as
widened.
Institute
decomposer
elementaires
la faculte*
doit
qu'on
a clear rupture with the school of
their
adversary
published in the lifetime of
infinite
disciple.
its
author
credit,
honoured
an
not
Psychology was de Biran's point of interest, a deep diswith the state to which ideology had reduced
satisfaction
psychology was the force which drove him forward. The very
core of the matter seemed to him to have dropped out, and
In natural science
force
it is
?
a class of phenomena.
or is it a real cause,
an
But
efficient
269
"
Bacon
a positive science
human
in a word,
the
faculties
track of
overboard
So
etc.
of
its
questions,
first
The science
or
operations
first
Following in
essences
division
of the soul
faculties,
of the
or ideology threw
causes,
the
disappeared
Baconian psychology.
science
became ideology.
it
and
itself into
ontological
substances,
which
and
of
the
became
disappeared
in its place
we
of its environment.
The mind in
was
start,
left
out at the
and
its
and
so naturally is
wanting at the
There
is
no transformation
of sensations,
instruments organiques,
vue
"
(N.
i,
xlii).
tout.
Telles sont,
du moins,
les
bornes de
ma
270
The
how
be traced through the 700 pages of his Essai sur les fondements
de la psychologic, the purpose of which was to focus and revise
the results of his previous labours.
271
X.
one point, at
viz.,
"
datum
"
for
is
We
and memory
we almost always think we are actually
acquainted with what we know we could perceive under
we tend to fill in the picture from
different circumstances
(i)
how much we
find
it
how much we
ourselves
added.
(ii)
We
existence
them.
objects
also
we
granted.
is
the
same
for
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
272
all,
thetical)
we each
connection
by
common
assuming
them.
No
be.
common
ceives this
common
we
explain their
which
object
what
It is clear that
is
stands
true of
Now
versd.
distinction
the connection of our data with each other and with those of
other people.
Finally, even
(iii)
memory,
inferences,
difficulty in deciding
we
if
or
avoid
We
we
physical objects
what they
always
them.
still
have
amount
to
which we attend
to
It is
hard to
fix
datum
at
all,
and in
own
end.
For
all
it is
so difficult to
know what
In spite
of the difficulties,
however,
it
is
really are.
It is universally
d a ta
all
examining
We
others,
Some
and we
data,
will
however,
begin by
these.
commonly assume
that
we always
perceive change as
273
M.
done a
service to
'after.
philosophy by
pointing out that our data of change are not all of the same
kind.
An unbiassed introspection shows us that our data of
change
fall
classes.
do appear
(i) Sometimes when we perceive change our data
to form a series of distinct terms in relations of before and
after.
(ii)
We
though they
last
are
other
data which,
and not simply one constant term, yet do not appear to form a
We
series of distinct terms in relations of before and after.
will call such data syntheses.
Syntheses are much less familiar
than complexes and some people deny that we are really
Later we shall consider
acquainted with such data at all.
we
arguments offered
to
show
into the
which we distinguished,
classes
to fall roughly
viz.,
complexes and
syntheses.
" It
is
External
is
devoid of divisions
Suppose, for
....
have no wish to
changes gradually
is
contrary to
'
interpenetration,' of transition
which
is
not a matter of
discrete units."
s
274
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
In
occupy the visual field, and we have just seen that he admits
that that does not appear complex.
Again, he should say
"
"
because
his
is
that
appears
argument
introspection is not to
be relied on to show what data really are. By introspection we
can only find out what they appear to be. On p. 145 he says,
From what has just been said it follows that the nature of
"
the
other hand,
specially
that
necessitates
We
it
is
held,
must be held
to
M. Bergson
syntheses.
he says
p. 98,
"
.
(i.e.,
saisir sans
en
a synthesis).
to us in
"
two
the other
confused, in perpetual
Again
La perception du
275
"
meme
fait
de la melodie et
nous
sur
cette
impression."
["
When we
to
listen
impression of succession
[" If
'
d'
'
avant
called a
Si nous la decoupons en
on,
'
et
d" apres
'
nous
qu'il
."
we break
it
'
'
'
befores and
afters
up into
as
we
like
distinct
.
notes,
into
as
many
."]
series of distinct
datum would be
We
a complex.
will take it as
to be of these
two kinds.
essential point in
differ.
The
difference
logical relations
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
276
definition,
e.g.,
What
fall
then to say that some data are logical and some are not, as
appears to be the case ?
Neither Mr. Eussell nor
Mr.- Eussell
units
is
mean
When we
connection
"
may
(viz., to
difference
between them."
"
of
p.
If
when we cannot
this
be true
141,
(i.e.,
it
is
is
perceive any
follows
that
perfectly reasonable
such as weights or
"
really form a
series."
be,
it
and must
"
change)
sometimes
compact
colours
be)
277
It will
We
we compare o and y,
if we compare o and
it
o,
y, r.
may
From
We may
Y and R
If
Again,
r.
But
r.
must
this
Let us ignore, for the present, the fact that we know that
y, o, r, depend on three different physical causes.
the data
What we
y and r do look
If
we could assume a
like
like
two
like
two
different colours.
different colours.
proved.
278
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
we should then be
physical objects,
sure that y, o,
r,
were different
we have made
is,
Arguments, then,
them
perceive
to be,
to
The
y and
From
Y, 0, E,
these data
it
we
to say that
and
Of
can both be
like
is
perceived
different
relations;
that,
i.e.,
e.g.,
must
also be true of
looking like
anything
is
and looking
symmetry
and
of likeness
In
logic to
be
like everything
like o
279
else
y and r look
either
Whence it
alike).
be different
relation
transitiveness
in this
likeness
of
is
must sometimes
really
to be.
"real," while
the perceived
which
relation
"
be oval.
it is to
We
"
"
"
Confusion creeps in with the use of the words reality and
appearance." When we contrast physical objects with our
data
we
"
certain to be real, at
"
"
What
is
mere
known
for
the particular
true of the physical object will be false of the data from which
it
is
inferred
e.g.,
may remain
inferred may vary.
it is
the same,
We
are
really
is,"
be."
It
may sometimes
be convenient,
if
we want
to
speak
of the
280
MISS
COSTELLOE.
K.
do speak
what
then, similarly,
so,
is
The
is
what
may
which
it
is
inferred from
may
is
is
what
is
true of the
datum
it.
we keep
of the
Now
just as
acquaintance, so
between these
"
objects.
the plausibility of
that
inferred
must
relations
"really be"
true
is
of
true
the
relations
That there
o
and r
is
is
no real relation
of likeness
between
and y and
This
"
oval, we are
appears
describing the physical object in terms of the data.
I maintain that the case of relations is parallel to that of
express this
physical objects.
Just
it,
the
so I maintain
common
as, in
we have
we have two
may
and
Just as what
is
what
common
true of the
is
relation
281
may
relation-datum.*
y and
that o and
be
y,
and
"
"
and
appear
r,
alike but
and
and
y,
really
and
From
y, o,
we
r,
we
must
find,
different either
from
The
y,
"
but
and
o, r,
is
r,
we must say
"
really
Y and R
If
first alternative.
data
is
"
"
we admit
It
may
y,
and Y,
is
logical properties
nonsense because,
we
really are
it
more nonsensical
It
from
comes
to decide
to
supposed
different
absurd.
Is
different
same
shall be admitting
and R,
which are we
this
to
and
is
now we want
to be like
appears
is
are alike.
that
different.
what
are different.
objective
or from K, or else
relation-
data of difference.
if
"
different.
data of likeness.
must
"
to say
?
If
i.e., the extent of applied logic.
"
"
be
logic applies to all data, then data must sometimes
really
"
different from what they " appear
to be.
logic
* This
theory was, I believe,
apply
first
282
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
in applied
term ....
we must deny
Such a case
may
as Stumpf's experiment
is,
therefore,
y,
must be
logical terms.
If,
is
must be
logical
terms, arguments such as this one based on Stumpf's experiment will not be conclusive.
We
have seen, so
far,
We
on the
data.
tacit
What
by a priori
logical
arguments
is
really to
283
anything for certain as to what our data really are, but the
evidence of Stumpf s experiment is certainly against him.
M. Bergson sees no reason to suppose that logic must apply
to all data
to
experiments as Stumpf s
He
holds that
"
"
term
and
"
relation."
La
Perception
takes, as illustration,
move.
"
J'ai la
hand
main au point A.
My
interval AB
["
it is,
we
We
how
A vers B
is
still,
we
leave
au point
la transporte
Si
at point A.
If
Je
AB
B, parcourant 1'mtervalle
mouvement de
logical
nous
sentous indiviseV'
move it to point B
our movement from
across the
to
as
it is
difficulty
came
in in explaining
two kinds
of data,
one of which
is logical
and one
not.
One
of
We
these data
must now try to
explain the relation between them.
Both Mr. Russell and M. Bergson would agree that these
two different kinds of data may sometimes give us knowledge
is
of
"
By
this is
differences
of data
284
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
would agree
closer attention
complex.
The question
We
is,
what
own
make ?
is
of the
called a synthesis
(i.e.
We
complex datum
from a synthesis
according to
The
datum
all
may
We
"
there must
sense-data differences so slight as to be imperceptible," by assuming that all sense-data must consist of logical
be
among
was against
show,
on
The evidence
this assumption,
the
contrary,
and
that
if
of
Stumpfs experiment
it, went to
we do not make
the
very
sense-data
which
285
"
Mr. Russell says have differences so slight as to be impercepat all, in
tible," really have not parts or relations of difference
"
"
of
definition
parts
any sense which would satisfy the logical
"
and
relations of difference."
They appear
to be non-logical
data.
datum
the
of attention itself
He
is
M. Bergson's
be a complex we could
which
substituted
position.
is
really are
we began by attending
He
is
the exact
La
In
"
Les
Perception
faits
["
he says
la vie
effort
psychological
wear
p. 12,
psychologique
constant de 1'esprit pour limiter son horizon
la vie exige que nous nous mettions des oeilleres."
The facts reveal a constant effort of the mind, in normal
normale, un
....
....
du Cliangement,
life,
....
life forces
us to
blinkers."]
So
We
have seen, however, that Mr. Russell denies that the data
286
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
with the
question of
datum a complex
datum with much of it
datum which
left
If attention
out.
He
"
compared with the actual knowledge," i.e., the object
of attention which is actual when we attend so as to analyse.
ledge," as
loin
Dans
le
champ
pour en
faire
une
Changement,
reste."
(La Perception du
p. 12.)
Our knowledge,
extended
far
action upon
knowledge.
field of
we have
neglected."]
It
appear at
fair criticism.
287
we must,
Now
choose, further,
On
them.
this
how we
acquainted with
shall be
this will
point
is
so,
closely as possible,
Paradoxical though
tion that
it
an analysis of
seems,
given.
Analysis
is
simplification, but at
That a thoughtful
is
the
way
man
to increase
M. Bergson
which
know
of
attention, one
of
intuition.
"
can do with
it
and what
it
can do to
us.
The
analysis
is
not
the same object as the original datum, but it does not make
any difference to us practically what the datum really was
288
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
originally, provided
It
presence.
If it
itself.
of rules of behaviour,
we
datum
is
what
moment, and
real at the
is
some
to talk of
"
and
some
other
thing-in-itself
with
which
acquainted
would not be
from
valid.
we
are
not
Such an
it.
This case
is
not
really stand
for
we had
When we
chosen.
we could
still
acquaintance.
still
analysis.
more
field of consciousness.
few
one or more of the senses, but these stand out clearly from a
background which confusedly contains much more. The more
we
all
But
if
you destroyed the background you would destroy also the few
distinct qualities of which the clear analysis consists.
said
We
This
is
"
substituted for
"
it
only
289
The
what
is
result of analysis
given, so that
The
terms in relations.
This
disregarded.
the
is
is
we have
whole
of
way
we
in which
ordinarily try to
making haste
in fact to
points.
its
own
Our
object,
on the contrary,
sake, should be to
make
we want knowledge
if
for
we
Quelle cluree
il
en
est ainsi
champ de mon
compas
phrases ante'rieures
la lec,on,
de la le^on, et
et
les
precedes
de ce que nous appelons notre passe. La distinction que nous
faisons entre notre present et notre passe est done, si non
arbitraire, du moins relative a I'^tendue du champ que peut
la vie.
Le
'
'
present
occupe juste
T
290
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
de
la
non
personne consciente,
midst of
moment,
pronouncing. But
my
rather a shifting
is
My
affair.
am
the
in
Attention
itself is
it
that
came before
it
in the
on the
field
which
is
both
because
a sufficient
effort of attention to
We
beings cannot)
make
of it in
one
291
we
music, so that
lasts
performance
grasp
many
If the
together as a whole.
will
not
minutes the whole sound
it
all
one act
attention due
unbroken act
It
of attention
is
two ways:
it
(1)
of
maintain one
by narrowing
its object
this is
may
be
how we
made
in
arrive at
include
analyses of our data ; (2) by widening its object so as to
the
we
more of the past. In this way
scope of our.
enlarge
knowledge.
There, however,
still
seems to remain a
difficulty in putting
Even
mere
"
si
que
la conservation
....
Mais
si
du
souveni'r,
["
mais de
1'oubli."
itself
automatically.
Of course
if
we
shut our eyes to the indivisibility of change, to the fact that our
past, no matter how far back, is joined to our present and makes
T 2
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
292
up one
the past
it, it
seems to us that
is
is
something
But if
extraordinary in the preservation of the past.
we take into account the continuity of our inner life, and so
its indivisibility, we shall not have to explain the preservation
.
forget."]
M. Bergson's view
due simply
is
is
present
the field of our knowledge by attention.
Theoretically there
need be no such distinction the specious present might be
indefinitely extended to include the
On
past.
29 he says
p.
effort
"
Le
"
(i.e.
whole
'
'
present
of
what we
call
the
"
Des que
dans
le
attention lets
of
'
'
actuel."
(i.e.
which
present
To
there
is
abandonne du present
notre present tombe
En un mot
it
anything
slip
"
from
As soon
its
inte'ret
"
field of this effort
falls into
un
In short, our
"
"
and " the past is misleading
no inherent distinction between them and theoretically
talk of
we might be
"
the present
life
little
as
of
293
have seen
more than
descriptions.
His grounds
there
really
is
such
a whole to be
distinction
considered.
M. Bergson
starts
In Intuition philosopliiqiie,
''
Eessaisissons nous
tels
en plus loin
which we
can
expand
backwards
indefinitely
by pushing
further and further back the screen which hides us from ourselves."]
By
294
to
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
fill
somewhat more
in the gaps
M. Bergson
practical purposes.
fully
us that
tells
we might, by an
whole of our
self,
content.
leaves out.
it
is
the
data
of
our ordinary
according as we do or
do not analyse them.
What is given before analysis is the
material which we use in analysis, and is different from our
It
analysis
is
differ
completed.
our datum does not appear to contain parts such as are contained in the
Now
datum
which assumes
in
its
parts.
In spite of appearances
it
would nevertheless
still
be
perfectly reasonable
be
logical,
discover
them.
in
Now
the
if
original
we admit
all
data must
to
is
not the
can
"
We
why
still
but this
correlated,"
above
295
difficulties,
explanation.
If, on the other hand, while admitting that there were not
pre-existing parts in the original datum, we suppose that an
analysis contains
easy to see
how
less
Suppose what
is
divided
to
is
analysed,
how
it
is
the analysis
be analysed really is a
into logical terms and
of this kind).
of this succession.
what
is
left,
of analysis
and the
original
and
its
original,
original
of
is
no amount
of
less
than the
that
we
really are
Further,
that,
by an
effort,
we
introspection
According
to
field of
shows)
tendency towards
analysis.
If we could widen
the field
of our acquaintance
so as
to
296
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
and attend
analysing
"be
it,
and
possible,
we should arrive
This
is
whole without
the
a synthesis
to the
le
knowledge
acquainted would
We may
it is
based.
First there
We
is
are not
is
all
an
If
If,
analysis
more
contains
than what
is
analysed,
difficulties
original
of explanation arise
datum
than
the
datum
with
which
we were
originally
is empirical again.
a fact that, by an effort of attention,
we can enlarge
the field of our immediate acquaintance so as to contain in it
more and more of the specious present.
Now whatever is
It
is
is
the
distinction
between past
and present.
This is, in fact, the distinction between all that
we can embrace in one act of attention, and the rest which
we cannot
retain.
The very
fact
of
attending to some of
297
duration and leaving out the rest constitutes the first analysis
our successive acts of attention divide
of perceived duration
which there
in
is
If,
We
perfect knowledge
would be
On
This
perfect
would
be,
the
to
show that
of duration)
The
analyses.
M. Bergson
can
We
relations
calls
left
it
it
again
out.
will
we
But
if
fill
in again for
we have never
298
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
In Evolution Cicatrice,
"
Nous
p.
342,
y a plus
les formes traverses tour & tour
disions qu'il
M. Bergson
.
says
du second
le
premier
du
c'est
premier que
la
1'ordre
We
["
is
more ....
in
becoming than in
....
the
second
through
on the
first.
But the
make
to
is
work
the Introduction
to
M. Bergson thinks
Analysis is the method of science
philosophy should proceed in a different way. The world of
ordinary experience has already been analysed by our senses
:
intellect.
According to
of this analysis.
M. Bergson, the
made.
In L' intuition philosophique,
"
11
p.
188, he says
299
side
side
by
"
as a complex)
(i.e.,
"
.... on
"
These
original
the
two kinds
of experience
datum which we
analysis
is
analyse.
"
Science
is
and the
concerned with
M. Bergson, should
philosophy, according to
on
all
of
immediate acquaint-
our knowledge.
Nevertheless
the data of analysis are real knowledge, though less and less
complete, the further the analysis is pushed!
The
between an
relations
original
datum
of
immediate
acquaintance and
If
we
it
again by
filling in
what
the analysis left out. Intuition is direct and complete knowledge, but it has the disadvantage that it requires a great effort
of attention, and one which we certainly cannot maintain
An
indefinitely.
analysis
it
its
data
when we
We
may, however,
itself will
of attention
datum.
If this
of duration as its
(intuitions),
them
since
to
make
we
should
always
be
directly
300
MISS
acquainted with
the
K.
"
79),
The main
This
themselves.
originals
COSTELLOE.
says (Introduction
object of metaphysics
to
to
is
what
is
Metaphysics,
do away with
symbols."
Direct knowledge
be the ideal of
in
philosophy
practice, however, philosophy cannot possibly get on without
the help of constant analysis.
It is as much as we can do to
make the effort needed to get back from the analyses, to which
we
may
data,
and
The
maintained.
first
task of philosophy
best
we can
in an analysis.
We
may
be to get the
and preserve
it
as
the
process of analysis is
once knew.
function,
we may regard
the
original
sophy.
It is
both.
two
different
ways
of attending to data,
it
original datum.
When
the original
M. Bergson
"
less
is
and
259
reliable.
As
301
le m6me effort par lequel on lie des ide*es a des ide"es, fait
eVanouir 1'intuition que les ide"es se proposaient d'emmagasiner.
Le philosophe est oblige d'abandonner 1'intuition une fois
qu'il
en a
reQii 1'elan, et
lemouvement
de Tin tuition
Par
de se
fier
la dialectique
L'intuitiou
si
elle
pouvait se
prolonger au dela de quelques instants n'assurerait pas seulement 1'accord du philosophe avec sa propre pensee, mais encore
celui de tons les philosophes entre eux."
["
To
tell
we
The philosopher
received
continue the
is
impulse from
the
movement
it,
.
and
trust
to
to
himself
to
one truth.
If
internal
of
attitude
to
the
knowing, then
correcting our former
other,
again and
first
analysis.
when
ne"cessaire
"
qu'il a fait
new
["
his footing
So,
he will
then,
intuition
302
MISS K. COSTELLOE.
either.
and
is
no use
is
Analysis is.
us to fix our intuitions, so that by using their analyses as
speculatively.
contains
it
We
(if
less
is
We
If
an analysis contains
is
less
than
its original,
it
need
the
then
be.
By
them
so as to be acquainted
Entrez
dans
comprendrez que
It
way
1'eau,
la
celui de la marche.
Le premier prolonge
le
le second,
premier.
mais le
Ainsi vous
....
II
et,
elle."
303
(Evolution Crtatrice,
p. 211).
["
you
Plunge into the water, and, when you know how to swim,
swimming is connected
You
the intellect, that will never get you beyond it ....
must take the matter into your own hands, and, by an act of
will, shake the intellect out of its habitual routine."]
304
Dr. F. AVELING.
THERE is perhaps no topic with regard to which more disagreement obtains between philosophers than that of theory of
knowledge. So voluminous a literature, treating its problems
from different points of view and with apparently irreconcilable
has grown up that the task of dealing with it has
become almost as great as that of dealing with the questions
results,
with which
it
present to do
which appear
is
concerned.
I shall, therefore,
to
me
work
not attempt at
my
of issues,
and
this
In treating
indebtedness
of
to
less philo-
theory of
of
the
We
amount
tion.
of
We
* Theories
of Knowledge, Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1910.
305
our facts
to deal with
action, to
find,
is
examine
of
of
service to
practical
it critically,
which must to
us.
to
solution
in its regard,
any
some extent modify our previous naive
problems emerge
we hold
some propositions,
outlook will be the measure
at least
reasserting, in one
is
on the
other,
constitute
is
itself
making
claim to
it
fulfil
we have
reason
why
felt.
or
they
one of
be substantiated,
them
should be
accepted.
But there
to
is
of knowledge.
which goes
back,
Absolute, to Criticism.
Because
of its inherent
weakness and
the
heard.
shape in Pragmatism.
apparently
conflict.
irreconcilable
Here,
revolt;
then, were
systems,
in
of the
306
F.
AVELING.
God and
"
"
lie
An
is
a higher synthesis
to retort that
right
Absolute which
And
the devil."
can lead
itself
Amid
is
for
it
seems
to
me
that the
many
centuries.
But
and
its
interests
with
artificiality
it
of
provided which
I
old
Up
which ought
*
all
to be
Arist.
307
common
theory of
knowledge
emphasise the
The
one
from
of principles
community
and constructive
the
other,
which they
nature
aprioristic
of
all
of
only to
embody.
mind,
for
insisted
origin in
ground
to
presentations of Pragmatism
is
individual and
than
social
intellectualistic,
u 2
308
F.
AVELING.
Pragmatism.
PAKT
I.
any sense
in
my
necessary for
and
to
or
critically
purpose.
adequately
and
not
is
it
me
theories; for
sidering
must not be
it
these
lost
sight of that
Now
What
explain
The
theory
or less complete,
primary and
we
are con-
is
they
nothing
more or
and the
less
fact is
of
essential importance.
the
is
fact
which theory
of
knowledge seeks to
fact, doubtless, of
knowledge.
The
first
carefully
Even
and
in this initial
succeeded in reaching a
fact,
"
"
to
have
a matter of
agreement.
"
for
data of experience
in this connection, and say that the former are
many would
knowledge
As
common
substitute
"
the
ence be understood in
its strictly
classical sense,
which
is
not
or pain,
usually the case ; for static mental states, as pleasure
are experiences, but they do not appear to be knowledge.
They may of course become objects of knowledge, but they are
talis,
to
309
fact
for
any
to be alto-
Is it
be immediately classed in some way or another.
would
?
It
to
the
from
discriminate
event
the
possible
classing
seem that it is not so in regard, at any rate, to normal adult
to
consciousness.
The data of experience, then, would appear to
be of the nature of an abstraction practised upon the de facto
We
given object.
may, however, provisionally at any rate,
"
"
the
other
the data of experience
view, and allow
accept
"
right of citizenship as
knowledge." But at once the further
question arises
What
Are they
experience
pure experience data
"
"
afforded by that finite centre of experience which is
myself ;
or of some further abstraction practised upon this or of the
the
data
of
my
or
of
Absolute
Absolutism
contact.
and
its
Punkt,
while Absolutism
an
experience.
But,
we may
enquire,
is
An
may
be met
is
Of pure experience
310
I
F.
may
AVELING.
experience, to construct
my
means
whether
of ascertaining
is
representative or not.
Pure
is a purely theoretical one.
the starting point and final touchstone of all
experience, as
knows anything,
or in
an x about which
is
sense, save as
any
what we
nobody
an abstraction
do, as a
matter of
fact, experience.
Pure experience, as a conclusion drawn with much metaphysical subtlety from the premisses of experience, is another
matter.
But
Absolute
Idealist.
how can
unique,
by an
it
"
For
if
the Cosmos
is
in reality one
and
other," possibly
And
come about?
if
the distinction
are
left,
then,
ignore
it,
and the
the distinction
must
is
is
given.
Idealist, if
right to
ultimately invalid
for
it
occurs in
experience.
it
it.
As
"
"
"The
He
is
311
Is the subject
So far as the
'
something
it is
')
(3) a relation of
conscious
of.
...
No
'
we
are aware,
i.e.,
the contents of
states of
the conscious
attention upon
also Professor
it,
Dawes Hicks,
is
my
in a paper
consciousness."
communicated
So
to this
object.
'
it is
immediate
'
be used in reference to
of things that
we
are immediately
But
is
act of cognition, or
It
would seem
is it
Truth,
he points out,
is
term
was noted by
known by
"
the
St.
is
given
Thomas.
understanding in
312
F.
reflection.*
act in intro(retro)spectiou.
their cognitive relation.
Thomas bases
St.
AVELING.
or
is
acquainted with,
It intuits subject
this -fact
Upon
own
its
and object in
of
introspection
The
proportion in
But
St.
that the
hending an object.
but through its act.
as
an individual
it
also
knows
it
its
acts
"
"
In the
is
necessary before
further distinction
is
it
its
essence
a twofold
itself,
But
hie et nunc.
minding
essence, or nature,
its acts.
through
apprehends, or intuits
it
by
reflecting
upon
have knowledge
ipsa mentis prsesentia."
first case, to
as
various acts
own
itself
itself in act in
itself
"
know
knows
merely as an x
its
the character of
But
And
In every one of
way.
of
It does not
can
made
itself
be characterised." J
affecting the
"
"
of
priority
* De
Secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra
Veritate, Q. 1, a 9.
actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suuni, sed
secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem.
t Ibid. Quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius
actus quae cognosci non potest nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi,
unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem
quod est ipse intellectus
intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.
Non enim per
| Summa Theologica, Pars la, Q. LXXXVII, a 1, c.
essentiam suam sed per actum suum, se cognoscit intellectus noster et
hoc dupliciter uno quidem modo particulariter, secundum quod Socrates
;
duas cognitiones.
Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam
ipsa mentis prsesentia, quae est principium actus, ex quo mens
et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam prsesentiam.
percipit seipsam
Sed ad secundum cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit ejus
sufficit
suum
of object
and
Knowledge
subject.
but
may
it
313
of the former is
an intellectual determinant
and
individuals
require
by means
of the sensibilia
of
qualities
determinants to actuate
sensorial
them.
acts as
diligent
it
of
We
distinction of object
and subject
which obtrudes
itself
upon
and
his theory of
little
the
of
that
Thomistic
of
Eealism, at
the immediate
consciousness,
and
any
datum
although
rate,
while
(subject-object
it
rei.
Et
in
may
it
essentise,
ideo id
quod
et
primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est hujusmodi objectum
secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum et per actum
cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est perfectio ipsum intelligere.
;
314
F.
AVELING.
of Absolutism
reality,
of the
asserts
knowledge Pragmatism
The former
reality,
such as
it
is,
only
in,
and in relation
the whole.
it is
and
it
is
which are connected with the concepts. The latter insists upon
another point which seems equally to be a characteristic of
certain other data of consciousness, viz.: the temporal, changeable
objects.
As applied
the same
distinction, it
to the
same
"
reals
"
in
"
"
315
means
of a psychical
be allowed.
used to explain and reconcile
sometimes apparently contradictory facts but theory
facts
should attempt to take account of all the facts. Idealism does
not account satisfactorily for the transient and contingent,
Theory, I
may
reiterate, is
whether
Pragma-
fails to
PART
We
now to a second
pass
or experience
knowledge
the
II.
all
is
If a careful
examination
no
less important,
once the crude facts of knowledge have been ascertained, to
discuss the ontological conditions in accordance with which such
region
of
theory
it is
provisionally
In this
knowledge
least,
of
knowledge.
of
the
facts.
316
F.
AVELING.
is possible.
appear that
the
only
But,
if it
be true,
it
would
data of
experience
unity amid
difference,
to the Absolute.
immanence
like
The consequence
immanence, unity,
alone.
those of the
and the
etc.,
of
knowledge,
finite centre of
is
or has,
is
term
mind
and that
at all
"
"
individual."
is
an
rate, in the
are
rendered invalid."*
for
shall be
an Absolute in which
the
"
eternal intelligence
itself in
possible
all
truth
and
duces
of reality
nature and in us
"
;
p. 293.
the
reconciled
317
appear in the
certainly
of
of explaining facts
itself in
the facts
of
But
experience.
it
loses
where
obscures
does
it
not
denaturise
by metaphysical
am
not quarrelling
with metaphysic.
Metaphysical spider-webs are useful, but
only when they are able to catch the flies of fact and fix each
in its appropriate place within the web.
The web of
it
was spun.
On
have as
little
a claim
to
always
recommend
tacit,
physical in character
it
as has Absolutism.
it
It
makes
not to be meta-
to be true
of
may
human knowledge
tendency to regard
Pragmatism
as
falsification
by
"
"
knowing
and know
it
by the way
Professor James,
is
of
make
"
postulation."
human knowledge,
of
who
of
\ve
in
a spokesman of the
system
Pragmatic school, while admitting a plurality of minds which
know a world common to them all, seems to take away with
one hand what he offers with the other
for his theory of the
;
self as a collection
of
is
It has not
it
seem possible
to
show,
318
AVELING.
F.
how
differentiated
supposed to
arise,
nor
how such
notions
unity and
the
as
Indeed
it
would appear, on
human
since no
experience could not be at all, or ever come to be
valid reason is assigned for the eruption of spots of personal
And
consciousness upon the dead level of pure experience.
;
if
we
for
tion
postulate
of reality (as
object
no
than
less
it is
how
is
it
Postula-
postulates
We
framed
is
for
the result
is
verification of
something
which
to be a presupposition
is
admitted
all
as
There
"
self,"
"
a relation of
"
something,"
epistemological
"
It
character.
or
is
"
a process
which knowledge
"
arises.
means of comparison
the
"
"
having
hension;
means
or
"
"
giving
Here there
are
by
two problems
of the analytic
reality
we
more
319
considered.
"
knowing
knower (or
"
self ")
should be possible
analysis seems to
It
facts.
What must
are involved.
of the
known
in order that
knowledge
With
me
of
is,
and
of the relation of
of
a complete
and
inte-
at least,
worth while
outline
to
it
in
the
present paper.
The
that
"
self"
knowable
"
should be
and that
"
"
things
should be
classification
hence
"
"
things
must be analysable.
They must
of
quality, in
independence, as individual
"
And
similar,
and
itself,
no
it,
less
than
necessitates
its
own
possi-
things
as
well
make
it
as of
320
F.
AVELING.
human knowledge
of
them.
to
"
"
known and that is
knowledge on the part of the
things
"
"
that the
themselves
should exhibit such distinctions
things
;
Now
systematised
knowledge
consists
mainly
of
Stress
is
generally laid
scholastic expositions.
known.
is,
less
important
there
is
the
now
of,
Thus a man,
it
as it actually exists in
is
(and
is
known
reality.
as) entity,
and
321
full of as yet
as
tall,
whom
"
on
co-ordination," or
epistemological
"
"
things
to
"
"
things
by causal action ?
and " self," and so
knower.
The
that
holds
scholastic
the
relation
the
at
basis
of
immanent
teleology
as so conceived.
But
"
"
"
natures
"
for
them
"
self
in knowledge is considered to
things and
"
"
"
"
be univocal with that of
thing and thing in relations of
relation of
made
when applied
of
concept
causality
because of this distinction and
to
think
that
its
"
epistemological
in
the
two
implications I
co-ordination
"
in
am
and
the
And
cases.
inclined
''
corn-
"
322
AVELING.
F.
We
pass
now from
conditions of knowledge.
knower
whatever
"
"
"
sensible
Hence, though
knowledge is validly distinguished
from intellectual, or conceptual, knowledge, both forms are
knower.
no more than
which he
of
objectively
determined
by the object
of the
term
ontological
of
knowledge
cognitional
itself.
relation
must
be an
Though
it
intellectual processes
distinguished merit
must not be forgotten that we
is
of sensibilia
it
may
unaccompanied de
apprehended by sense
is
has
many
means
of the understanding.
For
of simple apprehension issue, shows this to be the case.
'
"
when
I
This
spherical, golden, odorous, thing
example,
judge
'
is
pleasant to taste," I
am
number
323
and
Theory as
which such
to
is
when
of
it.
As
far as sense is
concerned
The former
qualities of things.
the
sentient
by the
organism
"
object,
"
according to one or more of its aspects."
conscious organism is the species expressa.
object of sensory
"
knowledge."
an immutation
consists in
naturally
acting
The reaction of the
But
by means
of
immutation
which knowledge
It is the ontological
of
"
The
species is
an accidental determination
character
and by
co-ordinated
sum
As
to
confusion
the
it
object
occasionally
of
intellectual
cognition,
some
appears in expositions of
small
Scholastic
It
of this
x 2
324
AVELING.
F.
Colour
by the understanding
know
things,"
and
by means of
reality, we can
alone,
"
of
The
work
so far as the
should be apprehended
reality.
and how
is
it
elaborate
this
The
point.
psychical mechanism by means of which we are able to apprehend them is complex. It consists mainly in a passive power
and an active power dual aspects of one faculty together
memory image)
is
of the concrete
cognised.
world of
The
reality.
stripping from
it
sensible
must be made
intelligible
and
by the
this is the
"
active understanding."
Once more it is not
the species (intelligibilis) which is understood, but the quiddity,
or quality, of the concrete individual (one or other of its real
function of the
"
visu,"
visus
"
est
quo
corpore.
quod
quantum
intelligit est
intellectus
in rebus;
est
non autem
species
325
quidditas (whatness)
intelligibilis,
nisi
in
It is in reflection
and theory as
to
mind
The theory
misunderstood
of
if
it is
is
profoundly
conceived as furnishing objects of know-
"
illuminating the phantasm
only potentially intelligible by
in such fashion that its individualising notes are obscured while
its
which
prominence.
capable of determining
"
"
the essence
the understanding in such wise that we know
"
This is the intellectual
or quality in question, is
generated."
species,
is
determinant.
est similitude.''^
be reached
Hence the
by
Aquinas
to
known
is
by
reflection.!
actually
"
Similitude
incorp.
Similitude
logically determinant
intellectus."^
forma
* Com. de
Anima, III, Lect. 3.
+ Summa Theologica, Pars la, Q.
LXXXV,
a. 11,
rei intellects, quse est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam
Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur,
intellectus intelligit.
would follow
as well
326
AVELING.
F.
Finally, there
mechanisms
of
knowledge, this
more than
is
conspire in
this, for
by the
mind
is
"
the
to itself."
formation
its
In the scholastic
is
and
it
is
verbally expressed as a
definition or meaning.
gibilis,
and
this issues in
the concept.
may
regarded
something other than the concrete
individual in which those aspects are seen to exist. The verbum
further be
is
as
of intuition
spoken word.*
It
order to facilitate
is
its
to
"
exterior,"
i.e.,
"
real,
things."
PART
It is generally
is
expressed, in judgments,
of that
which
is
III.
signified
and that
it
is
to be found, or
subject expresses.
But on the
is
something
Summa
autem
intelligit,
a. 1, in corp.
Quit-unique
procedit aliquid intra ipsum,
ex ejus notitia procedens.
Quam
XXVII,
intelligit,
nomen,
est definitio
intellectus.
Non
327
But
primarily interested, or
Human
for a criterion.
and
its
criterion
final.
knowledge
is
difficult,
not to
as
it
any system),
it is liable to
intrinsic
advance in knowledge
is
must adapt
and
affected,
and which
in turn
it affects.
it is
conditioned
Thus no statement,
if
The
rate,
human
final.
truth, at
At most
it
any
could
be applied to determine the greater probability of one cognitional system when several were in question
and even this
;
application of it
would be a matter
practically impossible.
absolute
knowledge
coherence
is
perfect
It
and
may
of so great nicety as to
be
truth
But
this in
no way
truth of which
we
We
are
met by inconclusiveness
also in
the
Pragmatic
328
F.
criterion of utility
so
AVELENG.
in
many
they are useful because in accord with fact, and therefore true,
than that they are true precisely because they are discovered,
by
trial, to
The mental
be useful.
Both
utility
and
satisfaction as results of
which
it
itself
might be
value.
seen,
of utility
We
thing.
which
is
reality
is
verified
may
to
which the
criteria of utility
and
satis-
be equally well employed in Realism and PragI think, say little or nothing as to the meaning
matism, we can,
seems to be totally
other than that which is recognised by Realists. For this
reason I shall confine myself to the brief remarks already made
and turn at once to the criterion offered by Realism.
of truth in the latter system, save that
There
is
it
329
possible connections
sense
is
identified
or
their
various
as
universal relation
the
some such
or
principle of contradiction,
the
mathematical proof, it is
of
the
evidence
objective coherence and
of a chain of abstract
following up
objective evidence
sensed
epistemological justification.
an examination
of the nature
perhaps
its
recommends
very simplicity
it,
since
it
has
to
which
the character
is
Still,
:
and
most
be applied in a variety of
number
of characteristically
which complicated
criteria
might
distinction
must
depend genetically and ultimately for its truth upon the truth
of intuition, whether sensible or intellectual.
The distinction
to
which reference
is
made
is
that
to sense.
similar
Conceptual
330
F.
AVELTNG.
And
much
of
may
be
false.
That we
they
may
be seen in intuition
is
All ideal or
to create error.
verification
intuition.
They can
only be
accepted
that
is to
as
made
shown
to be true,
"
"
of intuition.*
and
or, better, of
"
"
things
ideal construction
we
and
which we use
it is
to intuition,
mind
for
verification.
How
far
But
it
of
the
331
utility,
may
is
it
and
it
and
includes
comprehensive than
either.
332
THEORY OF JUDGMENT.
MR. KUSSELL'S
XII.
By
G. F. STOUT.
by acquaintance."
of
and
universals,
"
error
for it
the mind.
It
is
only
is
datum,
is
red I
may
as possible alterna-
applicable.
there
and falsehood
Thus
being before
things that the
itself
knowledge about
in
in
it.
something
is
of likeness
like
is
something
may
else,
a predicate.
which
is
an
ments if and
The
so far as they
it
I call black,
for instance,
333
on seeing a piece
the visual
it, I may analyse
contains a part which I call white
round the
is
black.
relations
seem
which
would
own
in their
There
false.
nothing in their
own
constitution to necessitate
what
is
We have to enquire
is
down
The
theory.
first is
must be
satisfactory
The second
is
that no account
what
it also
by any
fulfilled
three
is
show that
own
in its
We
must account
or falsehood of a belief
something which
lies
must be recognised
"
is
as depending
upon
If I believe
itself.
any
intrinsic quality of
my
belief,
vividness in
no degree
of
prevents
it
it,
334
G.
STOUT.
F.
from being false, again because of what happened long ago, and
not because of any intrinsic property of my belief." The something outside the belief which makes
it
true or false
is,
according
Mr. Russell, some real existence or " actual fact." Truth, then,
consists in some relation of correspondence between belief and
to
In what precise
way such correspondence is to be defined remains to be investiIt is the central problem with which we have to deal.
gated.
In any case, the actual fact which makes the belief true or false
cannot as such be present to the mind of the believer in the
act of believing as the object of belief, i.e., that which he means
For
to assert.
if
this
were
so
is of
But
generally accepted.
I,
It
is,
my part, find
for
it
quite undeniable.
We
in
mind as the object of the belief. This being underwe may agree that any satisfactory theory of belief must
believing
stood,
fulfil
requisites.
fulfils
But
it
by no means follows
is
therefore
company
by reference to
But
the three requirements which he himself has formulated.
there seem to me to be at least three others, equally indispensable, of which he takes no account.
satisfactory.
with Russell.
is
tests his
own theory
solely
In the
which
He
THEORY OF JUDGMENT.
MR. RUSSELL'S
335
the believing
mind
is
is
Whatever
mind
as such,
When
constituents of belief.
"
that
loves
believe "that
loves B,"
strictly
interpreted, their
him
my
statement
is
right
wrong only by raising the question whether the
"
"
meaning conveyed by the words A loves B does or does not
agree with what really exists. To this extent the old definition
or
of truth as the
That
justified.
me
agreement
of
is
It is
clearly
seems to
admitted
not
itself
of at all
If
anyone
common
is
prepared
basis of discussion
can be no
*
Except, of course, the existence of the believing attitude itself considered as purely subjective in distinction from its object. But this
cannot correspond with fact, except in so far as its object does so.
336
STOUT.
G. F.
when we
false.
instead of
the relation
is
loves
that loves, or
instead of
that
is
mind
loved, or
it
is
is
false.
if
that
It
kind of being
any other
is false.
what has
is
fact.
It does
All that
tion that
it
may
or
may
not be actual
fact.
On
assump-
is
"
formal
"
mean by
a precondition of
is
I
this
shall
mode
presently
of being
in
337
discussing
fulfilled
by
the
that
is
actual fact
to be real.
We
belief.
But
new
if
may
statement
my
forms, such as
fact that
variants do
statement.
"
loves B,"
questioned, I
A really
"
am
loves B."
likely to repeat
"
by saying
is
it
it
in
an actual
is
These
a reality."
or "if I were
between
thought
At
belief
that in
is
what
belief
is
point
we encounter
mind
How
difficulty.
fact, if
But
in
can
the actual
mere
belief it
judgment.
this paper,
with mine.
my own
theory of
None
the
less, for
must
Y
338
G.
how
briefly indicate
STOUT.
F.
difficulty
which
have
just raised.
it is
the reference
is
Hence
capable of being false as well as true.
only to those precise and specific features of
is in
On
it
and
the belief
believer
It
true or false.
is
of the
Further,
mind
before- the
the object of
as
alternative answers.
must be
make
example.
present to my mind. Plainly this does not make it necessary
that all its actual features in their specific detail must be
present to my mind. In particular I need not know whether
the box is empty or has contents, and if it has contents, what
None the less I may know as actual fact that,
these are.
not actual
is
forth.
fact,
know
that
if
am
What
am
not aware of
is
content which
box.
it.
is
some
and that
it
339
is
think of
bility is
it
that
is
But
in belief
involved.
possible alternative
is
may
is
to
all possi-
this is all
considered as such.
We
We
tives
and proceed
in thought
and action as
if
actual fact.
belief is
matter
is
But
do claim for
it
that
which
it
one were
otherwise our
account of the
clumsy.
this
it illustrates
I recog-
stated
is
it is
the kind of
Mr. Eussell's doctrine consists (1) in the thesis that judgment is a complex unity, constituted not by a dual but by
a multiple relation.
multiple relation
is
a single relation
involved in believing
is
On this assumption
a single
relation
Why
must be multiple
find
none
He
can't it be dual
contention.
cannot be dual.
But why
one of
its
terms
340
G.
when someone
mind
believes
"
F.
STOUT.
as its object.
that
We
"
loves
"
3$
it
in believing,
therefore be impossible.
It is solely in order to
is introduced.
We
judgment
must be very careful to realise exactly what is logically implied
The implication is that it' such expressions as
in this position.
of
"
B"
and
loves
falsity.
On
this view,
when
I believe that
A loves
B, though
B.
fortiori, I
Otherwise
A.
it
cannot think of
it is
who
loves
would be possible
it
as relating
them
rather than
B who
in the
loves
and
this
way.
what he
calls
"
actual fact."
either be an object
341
He
ment
itself.
But this judgment-complex contains more than
two constituents, the mind and at least three objects apprehended by it. Hence its relating relation must be a multiple
It
relation.
is
multiple relations at
refers to
all.
It
consists, he
tells
fact
in
us,
in the
mind.
mind and
It does
arid
loving.
"
"
loving
to
"
B"
from
"B"
to
"A."*
order
is
variable.
the
However
this
may
be,
the
belief,
is an
according
actual complex comprising all the constituents of the judgmentcomplex except the mind, and unified, not by the judgment-
to
belief
"
that
loves
B"
is false.
is
342
G. F.
STOUT.
between what
first
called the
is
complex and
actual
The
judgment-relation.
Mr.
Russell's exposition
false suggestion
some
and are
am
the
inclined
owes much of
or
is
may
by
that
its plausibility to
sense, unreal
think
to
the
be, in
"
mind.
the
is
Loving
not a constituent
the
of
actual
the relating relation which knits its conIf we choose to say that the relating
together.
relation may be regarded as a constituent we get the same
It
complex.
is
stituents
difficulty in
another form.
the
factual
This
complex.
another.
entails
inaccuracy
of
same order
in both.
is
from
judgment-relation
"
B " but in the factual complex loving is the relating
to
relation and not one of the terms related
hence in it the
;
"
"
Same order must therefore
directly from A to B.
be taken to mean an order which is so far similar that it is
order
is
not reversed.
himself
explicitly
recognises.
In
particular,
which
it
liussell
certainly
343
correspondence which it
not a correspondence between
actual fact and anything which is present to thought in the
which
act of
The
have formulated.
It
believing.
is
is
supposed to
consist
in
relation
We
question whether
itself is
ever
we
it,
believe
we
and
of the
mind
as a constituent
judgment-complex
This would imply that whenmust at the same time be aware of the
always apprehended.
the
But even
judgment-complex should
What
if
we could grant
this
It is not
existence.
judgment-complex
being aware of it.
is
required
itself
If,
must
is
that
it
aware at
that
it
we
follows that
of the actual
we
complex.
Hence
it
would seem
that, according to
between
344
G. F.
think of at
It
all.
all
may
a believing mind,
it does not
rate, in so far as it is
STOUT.
and something
which
else
by the relation
answer in the
first
of
judgment
place that,
needed
if
becomes super-
fluous.
is
is
loves A."
A and
untenable.
is
made
certain kind of
being actually united in
the mind does not think of them as united in a
items
separate
complex.
As
to consist in the
at
Does
what
is
differ
before the
mind
from actual
fact
is
except in not
before the
being actual
mind
is
must not
?
If
we
complex.
If
apprehended,
relations of the
are
are
further
two constituents
of
differences.
different in
The
relating
which
As
is
a relation.
wholly
fails
it.
345
or intend something to
them.
It
criticism
that
it
affirms
My
to
it is
simply
to be false.
It
"
my
between
and B,
Otherwise
belief, if
the
it is
who
loves
actual complex
A and B
and related
less as a relation
still
were
riot
that loves A.
my
in fact related
But
B and
in
this order.
is
it
"
own mind."
"
Note on " Knowledge by Acquaintance and
Russell's
"
Knowledge About."
"
acquaintas
follows
To be
about
is
knowledge
essentially
with
itself
is
to
the
have
acquainted
directly
thing
anything
before the mind.
To know about it is to have cognisance of it
ance
"
and
as being
"
"
"
"
or
"
so
and
so."
In other words, in
it
we
attribute to
it
certain attributes.
it
exists.
That
to
346
G.
belong
on
the thing
is
itself,
STOUT.
F.
"
acquaintance."
According to Russell
unless
we
many
cases,
we appear
to
know
impossible to
it is
about a thing
But he recognises
it.
that, in
things with
box
is inside
the box.
which
is
may mentally
the box
inside
phrase."
But
is
it
a
is
know by
may
be.
am
What
description.
"
"
then, in
is
a " denoting
descriptive phrase
impossible for Eussell to admit the
or
possibility of
is
He
is,
therefore,
bound
to explain
"
distinction
between
only be known,
if it
can be known at
all,
as that to
which the
In other words,
it
known
persist in asking
what
only by description.
If
we
can be
it is
"
"
in the special case of the " I
as subject,
the I
347
But
acquainted with sense-data.'
there is the same difficulty in the case of all subjects, as such.
It is true that knowledge by description seems to involve
'
is
But
itself.
when
this distinction,
it
is
accurately
in certain relations
it is
in this way.
that
is
related
can be answered
It is not answered
only by assigning attributes to a subject.
by any revelation of the bare subject itself denuded of the
whatever
"
it.
We
what."
If
"
is
But
contents.
its
previously
knew
is
itself
as a bare subject.
We
may
"
In such judgments we
intuitive judgment of perception."
are directly acquainted with a sense-datum, and we simply
which we
whether,
find in
judgments
it.
The question
is
The sense-datum
its
extent
of white.
am
is,
let
round
us say, extended
it is
black throughout
348
G.
F.
STOUT.
apprehension of a subject or
of subject and attribute
only in
we
judgment
is
thing," as such.
The
that
distinction
It is
are and
what
of it are in
member
and
sense-data,"
other hand
"
the class
of
it is
all
of the class
sense-data,"
"
all
of the class
coloured sense-data."
particular, inasmuch as it
is
a particular
all
red
On
the
member
To say that
it is
is
complex are
what we
forms of unity.
call the
members
The constituents
of the
datum
iu the intuitive
110
this.
generality except
am
When I
assert
mean
which
to consist in
because there
is
is
red, I
no other belonging to
349
Similarly
mean
when
to assert of
difference
member
is
of course, different
mine.
it is
is,
is
indeed, that
tenable at
sense-data
or,
from
all.
It
judgment
view,
it
of
perception which
must be
not an attribute.
In any case
and a subject
or "thing"
is
What
of
"
universals
"
But even
seems
if
we
to
particulars
of
are
them.
in reality
350
"
G.
universals
and
"
STOUT.
F.
in varying combinations.
But the
quite indefensible.
What
then
attributes
to it
objections
which
are
myself
ultimately
reject.
in being that to
is
which
attributes belong.
its
whole being of anything consist in its being related to something else ? There must be an answer to the question, What
is
that
it
so
is
related
It
is
doubtless
for
reason
this
that Mr. Eussell insists on regarding the subject as something distinct from all its attributes and capable of being
present to the mind independently of them. There is, howThere is
ever, another alternative which avoids the difficulty.
from the
total
complex
What we
of its characters.
call the
which
have ascribed
what we
constituted
is
the subject
is to
subject
as
attributes.
be a
to a class
member
such we need
The other
The complex
To be an attribute
or kind.
of
To know the
more of its
of this complex.
only
so
know one or
known by
This
knowledge by acquaintance.*
The
be
as
ultimate as
possibility of it rests
for
* This
point is of immense importance. The opposite view is fundamental in the systematic structure of Mr. Russell's philosophy, and more
or less determines his attitude to all special problems.
me
entities, at least,
351
must be
condition,
of
specific
has, at least in
most
But
its.
cases, to
be
otherwise ascertained.
ultimate.
to give
of it
to
sufficient
Mr.
Eussell,
that
say
in
stumble
attempting
description in terms of
what
to
is
on
stir
a step without
it.
threshold.
knowledge by
not knowledge
the very
account for
If,
by description,
"
the variable and he
known by
description
and
is
something determined as
whatever
other,"
fall
some kind
its
of being.
"
being
is
certainly descriptive.
It is equivalent to
"
all things,'*
352
we be acquainted with
"
propositional function
"
?
It is con-
cannot mean
to say
we
is
the form.
judgments of
We can know
them
353
XIII.
E. E.
By
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
I.
THE Import
By
CONSTANCE JONES.
E. E.
was one
of Propositions
discussion.
view of
Man
It is
good, but only Man is man, Good is good.
that
conclusion
is
the
same
reached
Hermann
interesting
by
say
is
certainly one of
Lotze
nineteenth
the
ablest
After
century logicians.
an
that S
is
is
an
"
"
impossible
is S,
is
P, S
is
form
S is P*
he concludes
of proposition
not P.
of
elaborate enquiry
that
we can
It is hardly necessary to
only say
note that this conclusion results from a strictly conceptualist
view of Logic, and is, in fact, the only conclusion which can be
:
As Locke
one
Humanity
Mortality
is
is
concept
with
another
Mortality, but
We
Mortality.
only
e.g.,
we can never
we cannot
Humanity
is
say
Humanity,
Man
is
Mortal.
is
points out,
the Alternative
Form
e.g.,
is
or
is
not
for the
themselves of S
is
P
*
form.
Logic,
Book
I,
Chapter
II.
"354
E.
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
his Logic
("
Of the Import
of Propositions
What
").
he
is it,
The question
as he deals with
it
2 of Chapter
in, e.g.,
concerns general import, the import of all affirmative proposiof the form $ is P, that is.
tions of Categorical form
Of
He
Predicate.
that
attributes connoted
these in
tions,"
and
it
"
is
are, in
He
refers to
by far the most numerous class of proposithese propositions which in his view are of
by the Predicate.
his
real
logical
"
laws of nature," of " the
importance, being the expression of
"
order existing among phenomena
are come.g., Diamonds
bustible.
(It is to
is
on Import
we know,
i.e.,
in
What
are
the
made
in affirmative Categoricals.
He
355
relations
relations
the
of
which
Consciousness
of
he had
He
gives,
e.g.,
as
examples of
Co-existence and Sequence (1)
Eesemblance
(2)
the following
"A
(1)
generous person
"
The sensation
"
Prudence
(2)
(3)
is
is
1 feel
worthy
is
of
honour";
one of tightness
"
;
a virtue."
It is clear that
that (1)
is
"
asserts
account,
failure to
of (1)
e.g.,
keep
is
spoiled
by a
of the
import of propositions of
"
calls an
enumeration of ultimate predicates."*
This abortive classification is from my point of view the
more
an account
amended
of
to
have
"
upon
Connotation
"
"
the
importance of
my
the
distinction
Elements of Logic.
Z 2
356
E.
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
make any
and he wanders
and intensional
Chapter
III,
off
use of
p. 37.
it.
sameness.
See,
of
Principles
e.g.,
"
of Science,
of
"
is
known
of its
own examples
is
apparent at
in illustration,
e.g.
(1)
and
of the
is,
in fact, substitution
first
The Speaker
is
(1),
House
of
Lords
(2).
but
If
and
this, of
WHATEVER
it
Kant
says Yes.
The tyros
way
of the Sophistes
Lotze says
No
limited to affirmations of
Lotze's
e.g.,
357
"
to be
is
even precluded
Thus Mill and Kant are among those who accept proposiLotze is among those who
tions of the form S is P.
But
if they could be really and
them.
(theoretically) reject
would be abolished, and
record and communication.
of
is
it is
found
seem
difficult to
of repute
me
these writers
(All
Terms
also
in an assertion
e.g.,
confuse
and
P,
if
it
logical
form
Some
As
"
understand, he allows a
equations, but does not allow S
I
Affirmative Categoricals.
reject S is P.
(Of course,
be accepted as general.)
=
is
as
if
S is P
is
form
as a general
also,
accepted at
this view.
general
is
for
form for
it
seems,
all, it
must
358
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
is
Affirmative
different
calling
kinds.
Categorical
Quite so
them Affirmative
Propositions
of
many
which induces us
this refusal
are
to
class
them
as
call them S is
propositions is not, to my mind,
in
direction
of generalisation, of ignoring
further
the
going any
To
such.
differences,
than to
call
them Affirmative
Oategoricals.
we
If
S is
as symbolising any Affirmative Cateb as
should
we
not
gorical, why
equally refuse to use, say, a
a formula for equations, or the general name Quadruped for
refuse to accept
use
do
ask
fashion) with
What meaning
it
it ?
my
seems relevant to
I
own)
am
of
not saying
the import
is
e.g.,
possible.
The analysis
of
all
logical
if
we knew
the others
all
about the
as Tennyson
first,
we
should also
suggests
in his
know
all
invocation
about
to
the
"
and by which
it
qud form,
to
expound the
359
I do not see
how
it is
S is P
unless
we accept S
is
P as
a form applicable to
it
form
S is
P, and though I
may be
unable to
to
offer
it
later
on in certain special
to
it
cases.
regard
of
my
absolutely
be in any particular
it would be an
case
to
say that
it
is
figure
is,
that
S is P
is
P which
thing referred
to
is
(
S P
and
"
E-ff->
"
r-
is
the
Star
same
Evening Star
as that of
Evening
Star.
360
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
In such propositions as
1)
"All
v-
(
k.
/?
"
(2)
there
is
"
whole intension
(2) N.C.O.'s]
the
of
Predicate-name
to
is
assigned
otherwise we
denotation,
Lions,
Tigers,
It
porals, etc.
is
should be
with
Sergeants
etc.,
Men
Corporals,
Lance-Cor-
that
is
the bond,
Subject and
Predicate.
"
with
different
bond,"
say
because this denotational unity which is indispensable and
never absent, is in many cases recognisable as conditioning
the manifestation
and
it
is
of
possible
to
cannot
import.
All
isosceles
triangles
have the angles at the base equal, All men are mortal, All
arsenic is poisonous, All crows are black, All daffodils are
yellow, This umbrella
How
e.g.
All
are
men
we
is
is
found.
are mortal
Some
sort of
something.
361
and unless
it
another
does
it
name will
not matter which we use.
serve as well as
If it is objected that in
square
is
"
"
denotation, I would point out that denotation
is
required not
which
is
one object or thing (in which case roundness and squareness are
supposed to have identical denotation), what is there that is selfcontradictory,
what
there to deny,
is
thought or to assertion
tion,
Even
is
there to
is
what hindrance
is
is squareness, that
the definition of squareness to
also square, that the square thing
;
go.
and
to
reject
And we have
even to recognise
to
its
it.
Self-contradictoriness
All
Men
To return
to the interpretation of
are Mortal
hold that in this proposition there are two intensions, and one
denotation (common to Subject and Predicate) to which both
intensions belong.
The meaning (the intension) of men is not
the meaning of mortal, nor can the extension of men BE the
intension of mortal.
The only
possibility
seems
or are of the affirmative Categorical imports identity of denotation between Subject and Predicate if not, the Copula would
is
And
unless
it is
362
how
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
E.
is
Why
"
though no doubt many other things are blanc."
are dealing with Assertion
with the Terms as they occur
are ces
We
roses,
and are
cate
i.e.,
its
Compare
which
of Predication, to the
deno-
as
Mill's statement:
it
is,
of Intension is a condition of
cannot be escaped.
of
"
Synthetic
affirmation which
intensions are asserted to belong to one and the same thing (and
in many cases we recognise that they occur together because
What happens
or Adjective, that
is
by the denotation
of the
become Predicates
of Propositions.
If it
were not
is
so, it
would
propositions
363
way
in
which
far as the
significant
symbols
go,
words are
In Sis
liable.
no ambiguity.
All that
P there
is,
as
that
is signified is
use
distinguished
from
(I
be
of Euler's circles,
circles as appropriate
to (I) or (3),
I,
and
Predicate in
categorical affirmatives.
All
is
Q may
and
be
(3)
All
Similarly with
Men
are
I.
Eational
Animals
364
And
or
Some
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
E.
is
Term which
in Conversion has
All
It is expressly to
and
possibilities (1)
and
(4) in
I,
are Animals.
are
Men.
(3) in A,
that stress
Terms, when we
Men
Some Animals
are
is
and the
laid
on attention to distribution of
dealing
with
mediate
inferences,
or
immediate.
no right
to use it
use
it
why
does
he
What it
If he says he does mean something, I ask further
that in his opinion it does mean ?
Pragmatists ought to accept my doctrine of categorical
:
is
import, as
impose
"
That
it
it
will apply
everywhere
it
does
"
work."
"
P does
Denotations
is
is
365
Predicate in Denotation.
No coherent explanation can be got
Intensions of both Terms and
out of these suggestions.
Denotations of both Terms must all four go to the make-up
of a Significant Assertion, even of the artificially simplified
Difference of
Intension.
It
form
in
in
is related to
Intension, thus
Queen Eleanor
as
and
Edward
and
Moon
Compare
E.g.,
this rubric,
as Planet
A=B
A
is
and
Satellite
)>
equal-to-B
Reference to System is
Relatives, and they cannot be
P form
we
366
E.
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
a plurality-in-unity definitely con-
of illimitable application
nected
is
us
gives
which
P-ness
not-P
both S and
is
(S
is
stand for
is
corresponding eductions.
S
may
is
Law
be called the
of
Categorical, Subject
This
of the form
whether we
S is
Law
we
P, which
wish to do so or not, a
Synthetic assertion
logical science
is
Laws
of
which
Logic.
The necessary
throughout
depends
on
is
make an
heroic
unsuccessful
it
and did
though
supply the
has
I
been
This
not,
think,
deficiency,
sufficiently appreciated.
same Law of Significant Assertion provides also, as I will try
effort
to
367
is
In
a system-formula.
Suppose that
whom
to
I,
this fact
traveller
who
next station
same
"
place.
accepted
synthesis
my
know
did not
and
My
it
Cambridge
the
at a
fellow-
to
"
the
and the
hearer,
assertion,
reached
it
"
"
am
well known,
is
communicating
my
In my own mind
before.
has
by
a very
construction
simple
process
from which
of
started
This
Station
The same
sort of thing
am
If I
understand the
my own
some great
some student
Compare
by an
Bach by
picture, or of a fugue of J. S.
of music.
is
is
essentially
P, in this case
again the hearer puts together the material given, and reaches
the construction
MP
>
and
him in
368
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
Then instead
is
P.
is
P, I
struction
This
is
MP
my
M, S
is
Suppose
If
We
is P.
say
If
and
if
we
CABD
it is
agreed that,
get
completely
which
>
e.g.,
is
articulated
B,
D.
is
the assertion
justifies
in
living
and
Y Tom Brown
a wooden hut,
troops quartered at
all
Epsom
If this station is
Cambridge,
will be Cambridge.
This
is
elliptical.
D, by adding
thus
is
is
D.
E.g., If
the
Tom Brown
is
is
construction,
R.F.,
is
clearly elliptical.
But
these
of setting out
full
The next
station is
there
i.e.,
is
the conclusion
is
next Cambridge
Foxton
is
Cam-
bridge.
"
"
Hypothetical
likely
For further
than Categorical arguments to be elliptical.
illustration of relations between Hypotheticals and Categoricals
I
may
refer to a couple of
Thought, and
"
to the solution
Logical Paradox."
(1)
I had
369
would
be
deserving of sympathy.
Strafford
would have
it is
If
(2)
This
may
If the
be expanded into
work goes
made
If great noise
If
he
If
he does not
is
is
it
The conclusion he
sleep,
he will
die.
from a
series of supposi-
What
the
denotation
identities
and (5) as
of
(1),
following from
is
the
identical with
denotational
intensional
con-
nexions.
The
analysis
seen than in
its
application to Hypotheticals,
370
E.
which we
sort
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
so
which
of
the
that
Allen
is
Allen
(i) If
out,
is
is
out,
if
the case
And
in (1).
has been
(1)
and
ill
(2)
Allen
is
Brown
out
is
"
system," which
by reference
follows
if
to this
"
"
system
of the
is
in
Paradox
may
If
But
/.
/.
When C
(i)
(ii)
and
are out-,
,.. %
B
_.
B
is
.
(2).
out,
.
is in.
because
together (1).
Syllogism
If
(i)
and
(ii)
is
actually
C and
But
consequents
inferrible
/.
is
(i),
both out
and in
(i),
(ii)
and
in
(ii)
out.
Just because
contradictory,
371
when Carr
out
is out.
"
resolved by application of
Paradox
"
that
r
if
and
Allen
is
is
out,"
And we
proposition.
What
above
the
for
"
quite simply
Putting
Brown
is
"
for
pro-
Carr
is
out," he says
any
If
means
principle
are
is
as
False Propositions
If
and r
q [simply
false,
"
is
True,
all
are
is,
every
true, q is false.
is
suppose,
are
Propositions
that
True.
For
All
are
But T
or T.
are T,
and
Hence,
True.
If
if
If this
interpretation
T and F
are T.
is
is
seems indisputable.
ness of Truth.
As we have
seen, in
If
Allen
If
Carr
is
out,
is out, If
Brown
Brown
is
stated
conditions
in and
Brown
Allen
is
and
(1)
is
out
(2)
out
is
out,
follow
Brown
is
in
respectively
of
from the
they are
in
proposition
all
shifted
propositions
different
region
Brown
to
follow,
is
in and
Brown
is
out
are
both be true
of its truth
is
reference
if
Allen
any
to
is
out
is false,
given conditions, to
the
It
Allen-Brown-Carr
2
A 2
372
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
"
B
to
out
is
and
If q is seen
in would be implied by any false proposition.
be false from a consideration of the Carr-Allen-Brown
is
"
it,
how do we
M P
apprehends M
tion
is
way
The hearer,
P and S is M,
and makes
"
S is
M may
reader, or seeker
his
mental construc-
accordingly.
And would
inference,"
is
found to
is
P.
It is
a sufficient account of If
combination
true
Some recent
it
MP
justifies.
C false.
logicians
then
e.g.,
(e.g.,
If
is
Dr.
P and
M
and
is
P and S
P
is
.-.
is
If
is
P, then
is
/.
is S,
instead of
is S.
of Inference
"
(whether
may
373
A
B
is
is
B,
is
C and C
is
elliptical, or it
is
is
incoherent.
If
we add
connexion
reference
case of
is
made,
e.g.,
"
"
to
system
of
which
In the
is
which we
is
of
"
What
Game "
for dealing
If
is
P,
is
If
If
As
elliptical
Mediate
between S and
is
form
was
we
red,
e.g.,
shall
ellipticalness of so
If
is
is
only
If this
B,
D,
have rain before night.
is
known
in an
morning's sunrise
Perhaps it is the
which
has masked their
many Hypotheticals
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
374
would be easy
It
and
to
it
apply
II.
1.
and
to carry
The Import
on the
and
to Eelatives,
list to
complicated cases,
By BERNARD BOSANQUET.
of Propositions is a
it
considering
to
bring
them
under a general
all
doctrine.
I refer to p.
359
"
:
Put
as briefly as possible
"
down
to
to "-is the
do not find
assertion
'
'
or
is
'
is
'
and
we must be speaking
same man who was at
the
"
that
"
A. B.
is
the
Star
two
different intensions.
of these.
is
not quite so
strict, as I
gather from
375
"
[=
Denotation
?]
"
which
is
prominent
desires
propositions by which
So
we
(G.L., p. 29).
at least
desire to
to
Miss Jones
"
persons or things.
Now
is
"
first
another
individuals
Do we
by an attribute
surely lies in
as
"
"
qualify
the individuals
I
it,
50 years ago."
"
He
Compare the
slightly
must
insist,
not in any
now
for the
school with
different proposition
In
just what he always was."
the latter we are surely predicating a quality, an attribute,
which interests us and we hope will interest our listeners.
is
And, I think, we must say the same of the former also. In all
S P propositions the application of S and P is, of course, the
same.
to
only (cit. supra from General Logic; cf. pp. 364 and 365
cannot read a proposition in Denotation merely).
you
So I have a
what
"
identity of denotation,
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
376
Still,
the import of
satisfied by this account.
I
think,
We
law.
is
may be not the bond, but only the sign of the bond,
between S and P (p. 360). It may " condition the manifestation
tional identity
an inseparable connection
of
the import
lie
of attributes."
in the
I will return to
360).
cf.
it.
361,
p.
"The
between S and P
read
the
"
;
proposition
imports identity of
maintained ? There
all
is
such identity,
There
it
fully admitted, in
is
is
But
is
is
the
of.
same
import even of
You can insist
the
"
In Caesar is sick,' the same person is
appears to me to say.
And in Dogs are Mammals
said to be sick as well as Caesar.
'
'
'
things
saw that
it
it
plete
reading.
And
Even in
on, we saw,
to the
view that
is
to
be
both"
possible, but
we
it is
it
is
an incom-
natural to take
in
subject
377
Intension
105),
p.
"
"
qualification
(Essays, p. 324).
as without intension,
itself or to
This
is
to
regarded for
its
is
of
own
qualification
Miss
Jones
sake.
presents
has
is
identification,
no
I take
intension
as in a proper
If so,
described
a difficulty
But
difficulty,
the
in
and
is
much what
General
Now
"
"
is
of the proposition
me
must express an
to reveal
identity.
Categorical propositions to
mean
is
demands
that of
"
in
Denotation merely
"
"
qualification
is
more
"
to
natural.
The
difficulty is that
must
consist
an identity of S
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
378
"
we
Otherwise than by reference to that identity
have seen that this is admitted in the discussion before us
side.
when
come
to
speak
conclude up to this point that the great
principle of Identity in Difference, to which the General Logic
pays, I fear I must say, a good deal of lip-service, is parodied
(p. 360).
of implication.
But
"
extension of
man
be
another intension
be the intension of
mortal
But
"
(p. 361).
This
is
another, or
means
"
"
or
spells
another.
We
view on
may
latter
And we may
p.
369, where
we
this place
an intensional connection
Now
if
is
And
in
have
deserted Strafford
"
(my
italics).
one intension necessarily carries the other with it, and if there
are propositions which seem at least to have an intension or
abstract content as their starting-point- (whether they have a
"
"
least the
subject is a further question), surely in these at
intensional
proposition.
connection
my
379
of the nature of
But
point.
it
will not be
as denotatum.
One content
it,
when
the
relation, the
with
it,
makes
it
it
means
"
Common
To give
in
two contents are expressions of the same whole, and are often
convertible.
P proposition is not the only type of proposition, a contention with which I certainly agree if we do not push the
the S
understood as a denotatum.
is
(cf. Bradley
Logic, 271 and 453).
But the subject in relational propositions and in abstract
Universals I take to be the whole or system within which a
And
it
appears to
in
me
's
is
developed.
This
is
what
my
to
my
"
*
Compare Mrs. Varden in JBarnaby Rudge
Answering me, Miggs,
and providing yourself, is one and the same thing."
:
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
380
And we
know
all
that ")
is
is
mortal."
meant,
"if
"
"
a simple case.
"
If
"
are
you go
am
The two
first I
not sure
all
if
three of
And
import of propositions.
all
The
there
is
is
But
its
It
seems unnecessary
to analyse in detail
such an example
we here have it
admitted that the denotational identities are based upon intensional connections. I need only point out that if we suppose the
381
we may drop
is
F,
C is
an attribute as
"
as good
of
In
we may know
next," and
is
all
it
is
"
in scores
between.
The unity
is
And
to
is
Certainly in
all
propositions
any one
Logic, p. 23),
3.
e.g.,
of the related
in the case of
"
E is
equal to F."
we
we can want to
man
conditions
of
is
nor that
it is
expression
impossible to discern
which
all
propositions
beginning of conscious
life,
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
382
two
junction of appearances,
and
of laying
down
a law of universal
connection.
it
From
harmoniously fused.
the very
the principle of
the statement of facts
first
upon
and the mere expression of fact tends to mould itself into
the suggestion of law. A denomination of the subject irrelevant
to the point insisted on by the predicate, is resented in converitself,
sation
and impugned
which
argument while the necessary counterpart of the selection which instinctively aims at relevance, is
the completion the successful selection
of the conditions
and
in
which
is
term
to the other,
reflective propositions.
sentence
all
capable of embodying
my
Logic,
i,
236
"
:
all at
may
When
'
immanent purpose
hypothetical
of animal
judgment,
And
expressing a
to be
to
is
life,
expended
necessary or relative
must be supplied.'"
it
forms of proposition
refer to a
relative
may
(p. x).
whole argument
my
work on
completion in the
my
Logic, convinces
intention, the
me
that this
is
It is
383
an attempt to
criticise actual
actual
take account of
it,
of such
And
uncriticised,
meaning
You must
know
efa&pos
away
also
moment by
for the
in
have done.
And
sees.
must remonstrate,
main.
an
seem
form,
me
if
that
propositions.
They
to
constitute
position.
You
lay
down two
specifies a case in
hypothetical rules,
case,
false.
You then
it,
and
find
384
C.
F.
SCHILLEIJ.
S.
not both.
What
could happen
else
either, but
As
is
A,
is
B,
is
P, as
on one
The
first,
am bound
than a certain
anything more
felicity.
III.
WHEN
to protest,
By
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
string to the
was
it
ment
of the
Law
had long
We
Soit.
need
of
my
merely
as
Miss Jones's triumphant analysis of her problem in so far
and continue to cherish a hope that some day
it is a problem
she may be willing to proceed to the philosophic corollaries to
reiterate
If the impatience of
to me to point.
at
our
should
cavil
unprogressiveness and think that
youth
*
No.
Cf.
82.
New
Laio of Thought, in
Mind,
385
more
vital
logicians,
done
my
issues
me
let
to higher ground, I
critic.
I.
me remark
that
What
under discussion.
tions
"
mean
of
meaning
investigate
Is
it,
judgment
first
or
is
If it
it
always important,
meaning
"
then does
is
it
of the
problem
not,
is,
the capacity
of propositions to express
the
meaning
judgments and to establish a one-to-one correspondence between judgments and propositions ? For otherwise
of
we not be nonplussed
If it is not, shall
It
is
what
to be
'
'
feared, however,
that
'
we not have
to
'
meaning,' and
a proposition's import ?
import
we mean by
precisely
and
'
'
many
logicians
'
would not
appealed to
I
me
must perforce
to say
offer
what
I take to be the
my own
interpretation of
import of
S is
P,
it.
most questions in
thought.*
This
is
to say that
Cf.
Formal
it
Logic, ch.
ii,
3, 8.
386
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
real
meaning
at
For
all.
real
'
meaning, as
I believe
is
It does not
its
become
actual meaning
will be
'
Humpty Dumpty.
judgment means on
'
'
of
import
Still
viz.,
to discover
a particular occasion, to
a blackbird
it
what a
know what
live
is
the
is
of
it
ever determine
advance.
It follows
judgment.
thought
*
Cf.
selected
Mind, No.
89,
for
On
of thought.
The
object
Aristotle's
be
387
'
'
'
'
will
'
'
'
'
'
we
whatever we choose
to call them, in
Nothing is such an
thing.
and immutably itself to the
and if there were such a thing it
One
is
absolutely one.
a plurality of aspects.
and
of
It
now
it
Not even
a logical entity at
an object
is, e.g.,
disbelief to pluralists,
As
both
it
any rate
it
has
of belief to monists,
the
is
the Absolute
many
it
absorbs
all plurality.
'
be objected that
'
must not be
P
because the operation indicated by
selection, we can reply (I) that no doubt
'
'
is
it
an
is,
called
'
'
'
'
arbitrary
but so
is
'
S.'
'
'
to be
no
of reference or
'
'
'
'
'
difficulty in assenting
may
assert an identity
P.'
learnt from nature (or from Hegel) that identities are never
If
cease to be two.
therefore,
when we proclaim an
identity,
we
388
C.
F.
S.
SCHILLER.
'
'
'
'
'
'
translations
are
not
real
to
exceptions
For when
this.
'
also
But does
Jones.
it
may
be
made which
are significant
to a variety of purposes,
and
of
and serviceable
nothing
there
is
In so
only one definition which is good for all purposes.
a
as
Formal
where
unrelatedmoreover,
arbitrary
Logic,
game
ness to reality and general uselessness are no obstacles to the
for
propositions
(4)
paper
'
is
alone
One minor
may
'
"of
the
of
import
valid.'
my comment
caution and
conclude.
seems to
It
'
and
'
me
on Miss Jones's
'
apply as if they were convertible terms (pp. 359 and 361), but that a distinction should be
Strictly speaking, a name does not apply until
recognized.
use
to be applicable
to
'
'
it is
used (successfully)
virtue of
its
but
it
can be held
said
"
unless a
'
'
'
applicable
in
name
applies to something it
'
'
'
applies
proleptically.
389
II.
comments on Miss
Jones.
mine
was
in that,
exclusive,
from
whereas
it is
and
assumes
'
valid.'
who
this
'
that
'
Now
is
Now, while
On the contrary
present see any reason for accepting either.
me to be against both. The problem
abstractions or
'
'
fictions
that
it
is
many
arbitrary
covered by
it,
and
if
so there will be
a plurality of answers.
scientifically
show
it
And why
no
difficulty
should
it
about accepting
be assumed that a
to be formally valid
natural,"
to that shape."
"
At
first
would seem
* It
appears subsequently (pp. 374-375) that he thinks
it is not Miss Jones's account.
that
it
can
only
390
F.
a/370?
C.
SCHILLER.
S.
'
innovators
more
But, looking
what Professor
is
commoner dictionary-meaning,
For each
meant.
antecedent
its
terms, or to the
is
more frequently
of these situations
probability
that
in
true,
it
less
'
natural
'
interpretation
nevertheless express better the meaning meant on any
occasion.
As for the objection that some interpretations may
may
be more
that
difficult
than others,
i.e.,
contains
that
ingenuity,
nothing
on the perilous path of finding the
Import of Propositions, he must not expect to find it carpeted
with roses and primroses all the way. He should be thankful
surely
Having once
if
'
'
set out
'
logical analysis
to
avowed
of language
failure.
do
If there-
fore
'
me
to
it
when he shows
meaning
is
may
in other
it
occurs
much
It
this
'
391
"
'
identity of denotation
How,
is
what
then,
repeatedly admits
we may
do,
then
surely, ex
hypothesi,
to
is its
convey
meaning.
import,' and what we mean
"
For is it not plainly " what we aim at conveying by it ? The
"
further fact that there is a connexion between the intensions
'
that
is the
"
themselves
abstain
'
'
speaks
'
'
'
reading in extension/
not
is
In
short I would offer
natural,'
though
possible.'
mediation to the contending views on the basis that their
several claims to truth are neither as exclusive nor as exhaus'
'
tive as is alleged.
(3) Considering next the interesting criticism that Miss
Jones errs in taking " a pure denotational meaning as without
intension," whereas really "in denotation there is intension,"
though
it
is
denotation
'
Miss Jones
is
For
quite right.
'
'
artificial
technical
'
'
analyse
the
to
So
it
conceive
'
'
as
'
having
intension,'
to
consider
'
'
'
'
'
'
course, however,
meaning
of a
their
'
use,
'
392
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER
the
*
'
'
failing
appreciate "the
to
Difference
intensions
"
great principle
that her account
and declares
"
explains
itself either
not at
all,
of
Identity
in
of
difference
of
or otherwise than
by reference
"
refer to an identity,
why
And why
common
connexion that
reference
needed
is
by a judgment
is
If the
news
to be
conveyed
by a
flea,
should
why
it
'
'
'
'
occasioned
collocation of
discovered,
imitated
'
or
life
have
human
reason has
'
reproduced,'
now
at length
an eternally necessary
As
for
that
may
intrusion
is
(5) Professor
"
its
393
Once we
meanings.
we can
real meanings,
realize that
see both
why
the two
'
intensions
'
must
'
'
dictionary-meaning.'
intension
using
it to
almost
*
'
'
quits
the
prevent
describe a sort of
means ruin
is
so long as the
'single,'
nothing in
researcher from
psychical
'
is
ghost.'
two words
but there
(6)
to
has become
is
either
'
'
intension of 'double'
association
'
'
spells
it 'is'
ruin
ruin
is
but that
it
impossible
differ.
To the 'doctrine'
also
that
there
are connexions of
'
ambiguous word
this highly
notion,
it
would
still
'
'
'the'
still
Import of Propositions.
have to show that all
hope that
has enabled
me
my
Cf.
Formal
3.
we
394
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
have strictly any right to include this subject under the formal
import of propositions, but, as he has mentioned it, the temptation
is irresistible, and I gladly follow suit.
I may say at once that Professor Bosanquet's attitude
towards actual meaning seems to me very interesting, but no
less difficult.
I will not delay proceedings in order to comment
on the fact that he seems to have receded from the position he
'
morphism
'
allows
of
which personifies
contract matrimonial
his language,
universals
'
attributes volitional
to
'
'
efforts
viz.,
to
logical entities,
'
propositions.'
and
alliances,
I will
of a
come
at
judgment
is
He
concessions.
its importance, in
other
of
the
older
schools
have never yet
way
logicians
consented to do. He sees that the way in which meanings arise
raises a
meaning
He
and decisions
as to
and power in
incompatibility with well-known logical ideals/
Yet he also seems to think that, in spite of all
their all-pervasiveness
'
this, logic
can
somehow withhold
'
its
'
395
And
man
own
in spite of his
own meaning,
grammarian who
ings, or to the
feel-
And
all.
If in addition
conceived
it
we
to see that
easy
such fantastically
it
not interested
as his sacred
is
any attempt
artificial
terms
of 'the thought-process, it
to describe actual
is
foredoomed to
meaning
in
failure.
Is
the needs of
meaning such as
desiderates.
verbal
the meanings
the conditions
merely
"
expression
raise
questions.
of
of
he
language.
That there
is
"
396
F.
C.
SCHILLER.
S.
'
needs of
'
'
'
aspire
Is it to include,
'
'
of
reality
embrace
e.g.,
notion
is its
all
'
'
illusion
it
to
'
'
Self-consistency
'
'
elsewhere, Formal
'
'
the
criticism
course, that
do
not
'
such criticism
think
that
becoming normative.
is
need
logic
But,
renounce
Must
real
it
life,
its
norms and
do not say,
in
the
of
principle.
ambition
of
before
ideals
'
it
of
on a knowledge
of
these
For the
'
Pro-
tenable' standpoint
inadmissible
any
actual meaning.
of
that
site, in
grow up and in
some human soul reacting and operating upon some vital
situation.
For logic,' therefore, to pretend to depersonalize
'
such thought
fiction.
And
is
not only a
fiction,
man by
murder
of his thought,
397
tinuance on earth.
tions be given
We
possibility of
"
is
a single
form,
which
is
tion.
I hold
that a
"
for all
"
is
be applicable, and
case
my
it
it
is
paper.
could
not
be both
universally
e.g. (p.
and P
375)
is,
"
:
In
all
SP (S is P)
And
With
regard
to
difference
S is P)
is
of intension as
my
view
is
the
other
factor
of
398
E.
"
view
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
intensional connexion
is
me here seems to
propositions" (p. 383).
be that I do not' sufficiently emphasize the necessary connexion
of the intensive elements (or relata) in all assertions.
His only quarrel with
view
think that he
influenced by
J
is
the
following
considerations.
In the
first
and which
"
"
the
He
of denotation as
is
talks of
my taking identity
of certain categoricals,
import
e.g., he
"
When this sameness (of denotation) becomes the
says (p. 375)
import," implying that I hold that this sameness does become
the import,
(p.
361)
is
that
"
it is
the
'
is' or
'
'
it
S is P
The copula,
copula.
and
form
is
of the
diversity.
it is
According
to
me,
it
could
never be said of
form
a Proposition of S is P
"
that
the (denotational) sameness becomes the import"
What
I hold
is
form (S
this
is
PJ
always an
e.g.,
in
Another, and at
first
sight
somewhat
conflicting,
reason
my
"
399
in
Denotation (or
I think Dr.
I persist in
making
My
affirm.
refusal of a
is
all
what
is
of my paper.
I hold that to try and read any proposition
in Denotation only, reduces us to
is A, since we are all
it
agreed,
seems,
or
identity
that
coincidence
Affirmative
in
of
denotation
Categoricals
beween
there
Subject
is
and
Predicate.
"
I have a diffiAgain, Dr. Bosanquet says (pp. 375, 376)
in
what
even
in
the
cases,
culty
simplest
precisely the
seeing,
:
identity of denotation
the proposition.
case satisfied
by
is
The import
There
this account.
is
a connexion between
answer that
it
is
just because
we have
is
What
I take
the proposition
is
identity
that
it
or not.
We
should never
know
or imagined
to be
conjoined differs
400
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
coincident
the cup
"
sarily connected
is
broken,"
"
the key
is
lost
"
or neces-
we
between
connexion
them,
which
view
is,
them
to
also our
appear
knowledge
mere conjunction.
My
causes
But often
think, not
S and
or application of
in
S is P
is identical,
while denotation
what
is
is
by the
We
Subject.
fixed
is
person
is
(p.
remark that
tion (though it
identity).
on several occasions
of
my
"
is is
to
Elements of Logic.
Now
first I
would
might be a very important piece of informais certainly not an assertion of mere extensional
this
here an
Speak
of
show,
is
as I
not in the
have tried
e.g.,
is of applicability.
'
'
Every man
is
one of the
401
Sigwart, etc.
meant
is
commonest
in all the
propositions to
mean
rick
on
is
fire
taking
which the S
propositions in
Mankind
is
"
view that
the
dispute
entirely
The
it
assertions
Categorical
is
bond fide
'
377).
(p.
I suppose, ex
"
What
"
"
purely denotational
terminorum not intensional, and denotation
(p. 377).
is
its
application or applicability
e.g.,
Christian names).
"
blames
Dr.
Bosanquet
my conviction
is
numerical identity, or Identity
identity
that
of
the
only
Existence or
"
of things
classification).
similar to
it
seems
and
to
scalene
triangle,
different from
an
for
instance,
equilateral.
is
But there
both
are,
fragrant,
and
its
simply that
it
is so.
Dr.
Bosanquet
(p.
378) speaks of a
2 c
402
E.
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
"
By this I take
great principle of Identity iu Difference."
him to mean a wholly Qualitative or Intensional principle
am
Difference
Identity in
of
principle
heart-service as well as lip-service,
principle to
(P. 375)
"
Do
and Systematisation.
to which I pay
The
which
is
refers.
we,"
"
in
want
to
whom we mention
'
'
qualify
in another
Do we
To
this I
answer
acknowledged to
we
is
P form.
of the Predicate)
is
denoted by the
Subject.
But
is
on which aspect
lay stress.
of
Terms themselves
As
it is
is
is
capable of embodying
all at
interconnexion."
may
I
Nor,
mind aware
present to the
would add,
is
403
of
their
of
view we
to
Analogously a man
not always the best judge of what his own motives actually
is
may
what he himself
"
has asserted
(p. 381).
are.
Still,
we may employ
is
devices of language
to enable us to indicate more or less
successfully
and from
this
we on
many
"
practical
point of view
conveying by
it."
qua non
of the
abstract forms as
conveyance"
is
P,
"
is
we
375 that
we aim
at
(p. 375).
As
"
conditions
regards such
is,
I hold,
by any concrete or
must (consciously
significant assertion
or
make known
meaning
or to lay stress
It is
upon
exclusive stress.
in both terms.
404
is
is
E.
E.
CONSTANCE JONES.
But he may be
himself.
removal
of
which
cause
may
serious
mental
and
shock
dislocation.
What
does seem to
me
to be a real
and fundamental
differ-
of
is
and myself
falls.
(or concepts)
His interest
is
lies for
him
in qualitative relations
(2) equality of
what
is, is
or involved; or from
rather, anything
what
it
what
really is
fundamentally
is
will
be,
what
it
or
from what
implies,
what
oiujlii
it
to
ought
be
to be,
And so also (I
S is
Accordingly, as regards
405
with
He
its goal.
scholar
citizen
into
what Carlyle
"the
calls
These are ideals which we hope and strive for, but we often
to do with acorns which are yet on the tree, with children
have
who
who
common
to
think of the
good.
conjunctions of intensions.
my fever
is
red
That spoon
is
This isosceles triangle has the angles at the base equal. Then
we may become aware that all isosceles triangles have equal
angles at the base, and that the co-presence of the two equalities
in one triangle results
Caesar
we
most
is
of
necessary
connexions, and
we can
far as
see, are
also
we think we
some
recognise
mere conjunctions.
What
is
is
as
common
one denotation
or application.
In
i.e.,
it
sides, in
that
this is
"
what identity
import
The nature
assertion
$ is P,
of
the
S implies P.
We
is,
I understand,
Universe
is
An
406
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
E.
black.
But
S is P may
represent
Crows are
Or S
Universe.
is
P may
is
Honesty
or
stand for
Hypocrisy
of the
"
378
Now
if
and
if
it,
may
surely
directly be the
Here
situation
P.
which he wishes
379
"
:
If I
to emphasise.
propositions are
forms, belong to
universal application
categorical assertions.
e.g.,
in
as
far
as
we
is
not P,
I hold of
concerned with
are
is equal to F ;
Plato was the pupil of Socrates
Cambridge
is
North-East of Oxford,
is
With
407
ma.kes
is
it.
anything that
we say
terms signify
its
(p.
But
380).
(see p. 380),
if
M
If M
If
or
is
is
then S
"
not these
are
"
stituents
P,
is
P and S
is P
is
"
true
Are not
Hypotheticals
"
"
Categorical
propositions
their
con-
Con-
sequents inferrible
P.
380
"
:
it,
is
a something in
which in
reality
way, etc."
In as
as
far
hypothetical,
we
are
referring
to
is
But
in
any
conflict
here
reality
any
In any reality
it
is
P and
"
"
non-real
is
M then S
is
P.
and supposititious cases even in cases which are self-contradictory, e.g., If A is B, and A is C, and C is not B, then A is
both
and not
his Logic,
Jevons, and
"
with reference to
my
to the suggestion of
criticisms
is
as
of
Lotze and
symbolising the
408
E.
is
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
of
my
logical interest)
and
of
says that
he
is
"
bound
that
to protest
the
new statement
This
cannot claim anything more than a certain felicity."
much
or
little.
Of
account
of
Jevons'
my
perhaps may mean
it
(p. 383).
me
still
in
propositions."
it
is
itself.
now
Dr. Bosanquet
main."
It
is,
in Ch. 2 of
"
Book
Every judgment
I of
of the
and
is
P"
(p.
is
S,
P is P, S is not P
"
409
due to
his
believe
not
keeping
Intension and Denotation
in
see,
58 (pp. 62,
to have
e.g.,
further contributing
63).
But
been some
factor
are black, by
SOME MEN
"
we mean
all
along only
those
men who
"
SOME MEN, has before his mind, and means, black men.
is what happens always in the case of the
or
He has before his mind at starting
teacher.
speaker, writer,
says
This of course
But surely
say, as
Lotze
which
is
that though
does,
surprising because
is
almost childish to
the one as
it
it
:
This red
This rose
And
rose, I
yet cannot
red
but only
is
the matter
is all
the more
From
Dr.
"
Dr. Schiller says that he recognises the interest and importLaw of Significant Assertion, but at the same
more
He
with a complaint
that my paper does not
break fresh ground but merely invites
the Society to rehearse old truth."
But though I admit that I
of
starts
"
fresh, I
my view
cannot
flatter
myself that, so
410
CONSTANCE JONES.
E.
E.
or as true.
Dr.
severe.
'
prepositional form (S
"
P and
an
assert
may
"
that
"
the
is
of its terms."
is
no theoretic limit
which it is
the varieties of analysis of import of S is
possible to make, and that there is no reason to suppose that
to
my
is
analysis
He
more
for
presumption
"
I take
is
to
mean, true
of all pro-
The question as
asking
is
simply
analysis which
is
this
to
:
can
Propositions which I
of
Import
How
offered is right,
is
it
be analysed
must apply
If
am
any
to every Affir-
mative Categorical.
world.
It
it
is
surely
its
business
to try
settled,
instead
centuries
of
of
still
discussion.
The analysis
of
assertion
many
is
the
of Inference.
Intension
in
is
P according
Identity (or
to
which
One-ness) of
it
asserts Diversity of
Denotation
can he
411
which applies
analysis applicable in
in every case
suppose my analysis ?
This analysis only professes to
significant Categorical
something of every
but it
may
case.
"
any
logician could
establish,
possibly achieve."
and what
But what
want
to
an interpreta-
the
way
case
of assertion.
It
every
is,
and
pre-supposed
in
all
"
just as
common
thought.
who remarked
but
Common
Formal Logic
(a student of
it is
mine
Natural Sciences)
me
is
possible
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
412
listener)
"
of the
If writers
and
given occasion.
man
meaning
(p.
"
395).
man
And
unless a
clear
is
in
if
is
Any
V. Rejoinder
to
may
By BERNARD BOSANQUET.
THE
and
done justice to
it.
have explained
why
it
seems to
me
that
413
cover
rejoinder
which must be
short,
to
how from my
point of view
as I see the
the
matter,
operates on them.
Above
all things, I
of Propositions does
Import
The sentence
of enunciative sentences.
is
and
seems to
(p.
as
And
it is,
what Propositions
approximation
such convey, when we ask with Miss Jones what is expressed
think, a
to the study of
first
by the union
of a subject
seems to
this
me
different types of
and
parts,
in
to
many
propositions no S and
are
prima facie
discoverable.
What
in
my
we
view, then,
is
desire to learn
when we study
for
and
science, as
mean
also
its differences,
our
in
if
it
own
efforts
to
say what
its
we
common
features.
I
Import of Propositions
(pp.
at
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
414
"
as applied to
name
own
and that
epithet as
to
applied
Logic,
should
use
it
of
symbolic
Logic.
The study
of Logic, before it
comes
to explicit inference, is
surely almost coincident with the study of the Import of ProAnd both of them I take to be, above all, the study
positions.
of actual meanings,
itself in
them.
with the
spirit of expression
It is this enquiry
which embodies
which fascinated
me from
the
certainly appeared to
I suppose there
same
difficulty,
in
me
e.g.,
essential.
may be two
treating
difficulties, or
Logic
as
degrees of the
dealing
with
actual
meanings.
First, like
any other
science, Logic
is
I really
think I
wrote*
"
It
may
in
mind
is
necessary in Logic,
as
far as possible
that
is
all."
p. 51.
415
haustible stores
of
propositions
known
in
full
other
have inex-
most
and philosophy.
literature, science,
We
sciences do,
actual meanings
precisely defined
and by
their context,
by
who
great fields of
competent
all
of science,
And no
to
man
organised expression.
versed in some or
a
is
their
of
these provinces.
one, I hold,
who
is
Who
not well
would ask
(The neglect of
He
is
is
this
in
immense
characteristic, I think,
always seems to
conversation.
me
to
have in
It is part of his
and
certain.
psychologist as
interpreter
meaning.)
and on the
is
personal nature
of
all sciences,
but there
is
in
as
science
psychologist might
and
literature,
explicit.
is implicit,
And
here
to, if
he were
what
"
Now
it is
twelve."
explicit
by sympathetic interpretation
of the circumstances.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
416
deny
ideas.
If
There
tions.
is
propositions at their
own given
we
of the
find
criticising
level of expression.
certain
common
features of
and
the
certain
by
will
it.
select
one
common
feature,
which
is
affirmed
of
show how
it
those conceptions in
scorn.
my
intensions.
We are
from the
and so
first.
is
with me.
close at hand.
my
point.
It
am
is,
that,
governing
from
and
my
science,
and
also
from
my
to express
my own
when we
see a circumstance
actual meanings.
which
it is
In making a proposition,
affects the truth of the
obvious that
we naturally
"
This is
guard ourselves by putting it into the proposition.
"
well
we
only true under such and such conditions."
Very
;
417
to the proposition."
break
it
off,
which our
in
any one
purpose
series,
requires.
when
and
am
and
only continuing
and beyond
this
Such
over the whole or any coherent area of experience.
complete expression, involving the minimum of liability to be
contradicted by experience,
selectiveness of propositions
actual
what
is
fact of selection
meanings
implies
and relevance
as exhibited
from
the
and
(A meaning,
I
and
by them establishes
this
idea of purpose to
(e.g.,
make
his
arguments establish
my
point
If
end
I think it repays
*
The road it has to travel
Cf. pp. 391, 394, 395.
determined by its author, and in great part by logic
This is how it can be criticised.
analysis.
is
It
only in part
its implications.
BERNAKD BOSANQUET.
418
presupposition of
S and
calls
our
attention to
some
raison d'etre
sort of
for
This expectation,
the other.
bitten
by a
flea,"
"
is
of
biological
truth.
The nature
clear.
Of
of
course, there
is
Import
thus
of Propositions.
made
theoretically
in deter-
We
ideal.
gain in the
way
The same
but
to admit
* "The real
to discover what a live judgment means
logical problem
on a particular occasion." This can only signify, so far as I see, to
restate it in other words. To determine general characters inherent in
classes of
meanings
is
another matter.
419
VI. Reply
THE
~by
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
meaning in their
first
raise.
I.
of
As
my
agreement with
her.
which the
'
'
import of propositions
can be analysed at all. I beg to assure her therefore that I can
swallow her doctrine whole, though I doubt whether it is
nutritious enough to enable the logician to do the whole of his
work.
-all
therefore I
am
formal
it
concerned.
it
Strictly perhaps
than to the proposition.
But propositions, as I urged on
pp. 385-6, have import only as vehicles or instruments of the
'
'
meaning
'
of the
judgment.
'
by persons
'
And
if
we permit
to be applicable to
'
(as
ourselves to use
Miss Jones
does),
it is
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
D 2
420
F.
which excludes
C.
others
all
SCHILLER.
S.
definition, relative to
'
The notion
of
Logic turns,
is
'
validity,'
though
of real thinking.
And
to
nor
is
'
true
'
be 'valid'
is
from being
so far
true
'
in virtue of its
'
assent, therefore, to
convertible
it is
making valid,'
and
think that
terms,
valid.'*
'
true,'
'
valid
'
'
validity,'
I can hardly
'
'
and
applicable
Lastly, I
when
she represents
me
as contending that
my
"
caution
a listener
(p. 412)
cannot be a competent judge of the meaning of any speaker
if he has nothing to go upon but the bare words of the
I agree that the discussion of meaning should not
speaker."
meaning (though
it)
but
'
(as
'
p. 414) considering
from their context, i.e.,
Cf.
Formal Logic,
'
analysis,'
ch. xvi.
and
I fail to
421
to inanity.
With
II.
many
bones to pick
therefore,
differ
mysteries
of
how
and
sentences,
still
explicit
am
'
latter
striving
for
'
'
ideas
'
destroy
expression is embodied in
less will I question the
logician's right to
how
or
language,'
'
will
not
has
understood
my
conception of logical
I regret this both because I tried very hard
to define it in Formal Logic and because it follows that the
argument of my book must be largely wasted on him. But
Bosanquet
Formalism.
own
logical attitude
Formalism.
is
from the
part
by no means
free
from (unconscious)
own
con-
ception of formality.
'
epithet
formal
'
"
because
it
fails
science
is
essential
Formalism in
condemn
to perceive
to
its
itself,
while
it
condemns science
and does
not
entail
its use.
"
(p. 414).
its
antiquity,
it
Why
422
F.
should logic
them
'
'
isolate
Why
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
propositions before
should
it
pride
itself
it
deigns to consider
on making
its
subject-
That
is
But surely
context,
it
ever hinted
at.
is
much
as
i.e.,
is
context as
may
'
whenever a proposition is to be
convey a meaning. Indeed it seems clear that
infinite extension of
actually used to
a logician
'
context,'
if
is
It will, moreover,
guard him
against the error of supposing that the meaning of any proposition is so fixed that he can predict in advance by pondering
'
'
on
'
'
import
but will
it
quotes
what he
fears
and
knowledge
he means by his
'
consummate mathematician,
of the theory of
Myers's delicious
whom
Danai
'
poem about
the
'
eternal truth
'
that
"
the
square of
is
1 is 1 "?
Surely so long as the meaning of the judgments
discriminated from the import of the proposition it is in-
cumbent on
and impossible
to
close one's eyes to the fact that neither can determine the other,
because every meaning can be conveyed in a multitude of ways
and every proposition can convey a multitude of meanings.
423
By far
and the
'
logical
ideal
'
it,
For
is it
if
one
is
and
time, one
finite
'
Now
'
'
"
"
it
"
We
416).
minimize the
"
liability to
be contradicted by experience," we
(till it bursts ?), and
'
'
of
(having failed to include the whole) set up the ideal
complete expression/ and treat all our actual procedures as
'
approximations to it.
This ideal, however, seems to be thoroughly self-contradictory in idea and false in fact, and though one can recognize
which
them together
In the
it is built, it
seems to put
quite wrongly.
first
selections
and rejections
424
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
Secondly,
is
'
vistas,'
i.e.,
indefinite
But does it
fringe of irrelevant associations and implications.
follow that reasoners must pay attention to this fringe and
must emphasize
that logic
meaning
It
Surely not.
it
is
take
impracticable to
quite
for
But the
of the fringe
sciences
know
the reason
is
all
why
'
'
vistas
it
puts up screens, in
Neither
correctly
It
is
does
how we
Professor
Bosanquet
appear
to
describe
of misinterpretation in
we judge
ments but
;
it
as to
self-
so to turn
'
true
'
it
until
into a
it is
'
'
proof
all-embracing.
and
no assertion
is
less
425
I can
consciously excludes, and concentrates upon the relevant.
which
Professor
attribute the vogue of the theory to
Bosanquet so
pertinaciously endeavours to accommodate the facts only to the
judgment.
meaning
A judgment,
of the proposition
if it is
successful, has a
definite
any
indefinition, fringe
which
an 'ideal'
wild-goose
chase of
procedure.
But none
maker
into a
his
whole
stultifies
The
It
is,
from Formalism
(4)
is
pretty sure to do
In considering
demurred
the
flea it is
'
eternal
it.
'
human
thinking.
My
illustration
was meant
to
occasion wanted to say that the former had been bitten by the
latter.
Professor Bosanquet thinks my illustration an undignified jest.
still
uphold
But
my
am
contention.
He
thinks that
flea
"
we
shall
if
become
scientific-
But
will this
(a) It is
still
426
F.
C.
S.
SCHILLER.
become plaguy,
What
(c)
is
or
universal
is
observation, because
it
But
such observations.
particular
and
must ultimately show themselves relevant to the course of
events.
If they fail to do this they become unmeaning, and,
tions are constructed on a basis of particular observations,
sooner or later,
we balk
at calling
'
them
true.'
Even Professor
'
plague-patients.'
(cT)
Even
if all
Professor
is
an eternal parasite of
man and
the rat-flea.
an acquired habit,
when
immune
attempt
The
'
attention
is
Cf.
Formal
7.
(5) I
427"
my
statement that
the-
problem
of logic
failed to
in other words.
ask him to say it again slowly. If its terms had been obscure,.
I should ask him to explain them.
If I suspected it of
I
ask
Do
should
If I
you mean this or that ?
ambiguity,
'
'
suspected
its
good
faith, I
of its allegations.
As
for sitting
this is apparently
I
what
endeavour
If he really
judgment.
an
fixed
between
impassable gulf
verily
Humanism and that of Intellectualism. And yet
to ascertain the
meaning
the logic of
Yet
me to intend when
of a live
is
How
does he manage to do
it
428
November
part.
December
January
4th,
Chair.
1915.
Prof.
Prof. G.
Sir
discussion,
Burns,
Mr.
429
March
A discussion followed, in
March
Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead, Prof. Nunn, Miss Shields, Mr. Stuart,
and Mr. Worsley took part. Dr. Tudor Jones replied.
Dr. A. Wolf in the Chair.
Mr. C. D. Broad read
April 12th, 1915.
a paper on " Phenomenalism." The discussion was opened by
Dr.
May
3rd, 1915.
Prof.
G.
Dawes
Hicks, Vice-President,
in the
Prof.
Prof.
May
Prof. A.
17th,
1915.
Chair.
Mrs.
Hon. Bertrand
Stephen
read
discussion,
in
Members took
part
Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Carr, Miss Gabain, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead,
Miss Oakeley, Mr. Thorold, Mr. Worsley, and Dr. Wolf.
Mrs. Stephen replied.
Dr. A. Wolf in the Chair.
Dr. F. Aveling read a
of
on
"Some
Theories
paper
Knowledge." The discussion was
opened by the Chairman, followed by Mr. Carr, Dr. Downey,
Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Mead, Mr. Worsley, and others.
June
7th, 1915.
430
July 5th, 1915.
Prof. T. Percy
of the Executive
Nunn
Committee
in the Chair.
The Eeport
and
approved
President,
Dr.
H.
Wildon
Carr ;
Honorary
431
as
read.
Prof.
Stout
opened
the
discussion
and
July
5th,
Percy
Prof. T.
1915, at 5 p.m., at 22, Albemarle Street, W.
Nunn in the Chair. The Symposium on " The Import
of Propositions
"
Mr. Delisle Burns, Prof. Brough, and Prof. Stout took part, and
the authors of the papers replied on the whole discussion.
432
THE work
war broke
very
little
of the Session
out,
modification.
was unable
to
the strain
of
J. Balfour,
national service.
September of
this year.
to be abandoned.
We
We regret
Mind
Association.
to record the
W. W.
Carlile.
of
433
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434
NAME.
This Society shall be called " THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY
FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY," or, for a short title,
" THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY."
I.
OBJECTS.
The
IV.
ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.
think
if
they
435
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
VI.
Foreigners
the Society.
They
may be
mittee, and
their
when
election.
ELECTION OF OFFICERS.
VII. The Committee shall nominate the President, the
Treasurer, and the Secretary for the ensuing session, and shall, at
the Annual Meeting, submit the nominations for the approval of
the Society.
ELECTION OF COMMITTEE.
officers
may
first
BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.
436
BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.
XL
Except
at the first
meeting in each
session,
when the
member may
work
PROCEEDINGS.
XII.
BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.
XV
five
members be
present.
VISITORS.
XIV.
Visitors
may
be
introduced
to
the
meetings
by
members.
AMENDMENTS.
XV.
Notices to
amend
at
437
LIST
PRESIDENT.
H.
W1LDON CAEE,
D.Litt.
VICE-PRESIDENTS.
BEENAED BOSANQUET,
Q-.
F.
EEV. CANON
HASTINGS
1904-1907).
HALDANE
WES
AETHUE
1914-1915).
TREASURER.
T.
PEECY NUNN,
M.A., D.Sc.
HONORARY SECRETARY.
PROF. G.
DAWES
HICKS, M.A.,
PH.D., LITT.D.
COMMITTEE.
CALDECOTT.
BEATEICE EDGELL.
CONSTANCE JONES.
DR. A.
Miss
Miss
MB. A. D. LINDSAY.
Miss H. D. OAKELEY.
DB. A.
WOLF.
HONORARY MEMBERS.
F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., LL.D., Merton College, Oxford.
W. E. DUNSTAN, M.A., LL.D., F.E.S., 38, Cranley Gardens, S.W.
Prof.
Prof. Sir
HENRY
JONES, M.A.,
The University,
Glasgow.
Prof. A. SKNIEB, M.D., Ph.D., 28, Herbert Park, Donnybrook, Dublin.
Prof. JAMES WARD, M.A., LL.D., 6, Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.
438
CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.
MARK BALDWIN,
Prof. J.
New
Prof.
&
Co.,
56,
William
Street,
York.
HENBI BERGSON,
Prof. J.
Prof.
Prof. E. B.
Prof.
WM. WUNDT,
States.
Leipzig.
MEMBERS.
Elected.
1885.
1915.
1899.
1913.
ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F^B.A., Vice-president, 24, Brunswick Road, Withington, Manchester.
DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A., 19, St. Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea.
R. ABM STRONG- JONES, M.D., Clay bury, Woodford Bridge, Essex.
Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D., Ph.D., University College, Grower
Prof. S.
Street,
1908.
W.
1908.
1912.
1915.
1907.
Strand.
1893.
1913.
1907.
1888.
1913.
1886.
The Heath
1912.
WILLIAM BOULTING,
1890.
A.
40,
1889.
1908.
N.W.
WILLIAM BROWN, M.A.,
1914.
Vice- President,
D.Sc.,
1913.
W.C.
Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc.,
C. DELISLE BURNS, M.A., 26,
1906.
Prof. A.
St.
Andrews.
Psychological
Laboratory, King's
College,
1895.
1881.
1908.
1912.
Litt.D., 6,
Wood.
439
Elected.
1907.
F. O.
J.
28,
Terrace Road,
Endcliffe
Sheffield.
1895.
1913.
1911.
STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.WG. D. H. COLE, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
F. H. B. DALE, M.A., C.B., 33, Clarendon Road, Holland Park. W.
WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., 8, Queen's Gardens,
1912.
Prof.
1896.
Aberdeen.
1912.
1911.
1910.
1893.
1912.
1914.
Miss
1914.
1899.
1914.
1913.
1897.
MARY
FLETCHER, Newnham
N.W.
College, Cambridge.
1911.
Prof. C.
1913.
1912.
Carlyle Square,
Chelsea, S.W.
G. F. GOLDSBROTTGH, M.D., Church Side. Herne Hill, S.E.
Prof. FRANK GRANGER, D.Litt., Lucknow Drive, Nottingham.
1910.
Prof. S.
1912.
J. C.
1883.
1900.
W. GREEN,
M.A.,
3, Bellasis
Avenue, Streatham
College,
1915.
H.
1890.
Prof. G.
1912.
Prof. R. F. A.
J.
S.W.
Southampton Row,
1913.
1915.
Hill,
Son.
Sec., 9,
Street,
Cambridge,
Mass., U.S.A.
1913.
1911.
1904.
ALEXANDER
W.
Principal
Durham.
440
Elected.
1912.
1912.
J.
1892.
1911.
Rev.
N. KEYNES, D.Sc.,
6,
1881.
1911.
Prof. GEO. H.
1898.
Prof.
1915.
1908.
1897.
1912.
1909.
N.W.
1911.
1910.
1899.
1912.
1914.
1915.
1889.
1896.
1912.
1910.
Clifton,
Bristol.
1913.
Rev. CAVENDISH
1910.
D. L.
1913.
J.
1912.
C.
1900.
Rev. G. E.
1904.
Prof. T.
College,
1908.
1903.
1913.
Prof. A.
Hill,
1914.
16,
Church
Edinburgh.
ADAM RANKINE,
Essex.
1889.
1895.
Prof.
1908.
Gr.
441
Elected.
1896.
1905.
1912.
J.
1912.
SATIS
Cambridge.
1892.
1901.
1907.
1908.
1886.
Prof.
1911.
1910.
1908.
1908.
1911.
1912.
1910.
1887.
1915.
1912.
1915.
1915.
W.
1910.
W.
1908.
Prof. A.
1915.
F.
1900.
Prof. C. B.
1902.
1908.
SYDNEY
1912.
HENRY
1890.
CLEMENT
1896.
Prof.
1912.
H.
1907.
Richmond.
Mrs. JESSIE WHITE, D.Sc., 49, Gordon Mansions, W.C.
Prof. A. N. WHITEHEAD, D.Sc., F.R.S., 12, Elm Park Gardens, S.W.
St.
Andrews, N.B.
St. George's,
P.
WATEELOW, M.A.,
WATT, M.A., Ph.D.,
J.
Hill,
3,
Glasgow.
509,
1915.
A.
R.
C. J.
M.
1911.
1910.
Sir
1900.
FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND,
Litt.D., 3,
2 F
11
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