NRC Information Problems 7-22-13w

NRC and Nuclear Industry Generation of False Records and Tolerance of Inaccurate Technical
Information on Zirconium Nuclear Fuel Rod Cladding and Other Systems Critical to Public Safety
M. J. Kelly. July 15, 2013 Draft*
Key Points
Summary
Nuclear Industry Technical

Information Includes
Significant Errors.
Inaccurate information was found in reports describing zirconium alloys that were
sent to several companies in the nuclear industry. Zirconium alloys are used in
nuclear fuel rod cladding, guide tubes, and in other reactor core components.
An NRC Report Confirmed

that Industry Reports
Included Inaccurate
Information.
The supplier responsible for the errors refused to allow reviews of past reports for
errors or industry notifications. The NRC was informed. The NRC confirmed that
two types of zirconium alloy texture errors were in reports. GE Nuclear had
notified suppliers that these errors could create radiological hazards.
Scientific Studies Confirm GE

Nuclear Safety Concerns.
Numerous technical publications support GE Nuclear concerns that

misunderstanding zirconium alloy textures creates hazards. Fuel rod cladding and
other zirconium alloy components can leak, deform, and break due to bad texture.
The NRC stated that the NRC

would not require
corrections of known errors
or reviews of suspect
reports.
Relying on two limited consultations, the NRC dismissed safety concerns. Intended
uses of the erroneous information were unknown to the NRC and its consultants.
They could not know potential uses of the inaccurate information. To date, some
known inaccurate information identified after the initial NRC report remains
uncorrected. Suspect information remains unreviewed. Clients remain unnotified.
The NRC disregarded GE

Nuclear and scientific studies
indicating safety concerns.
The NRC dismissed written safety notifications and disregarded publications

describing safety concerns. An NRC report indicated that the NRC would not
pursue dissemination the erroneous information. The NRC reaffirmed this in a
2011 letter to Sen. R. Lugar. (Both the NRC report and 2011 NRC letter are
reproduced in the appendix below.)
NRC Audit Records

Document Recurring Nuclear
Industry Deficiencies.
NRC personnel later participated in two audits at the facility responsible for the
erroneous reports. These audits identified recurring procedural, training,
software, and other QA deficiencies that an earlier NRC report and industry
records confirmed were the sources of errors in earlier nuclear industry reports.
An NRC Audit Record

Contains Significant False
Information.
One NRC audit record inaccurately indicates that no previous NRC inspections had
been done at the facility. This NRC audit noted many of the same deficiencies that
were identified in earlier NRC records of an audit at the same company.
The False NRC Information

Has the Effect of Concealing
Recurring Nuclear Industry
Deficiencies.
The inaccurate NRC record decouples documented errors from federal regulations
and explicit GE Nuclear safety notifications applicable to earlier reports. These
reports relied upon the same defective procedures, software, training, and QA for
accuracy. Thus, this inaccurate NRC record conceals defects, could misdirect
reviews for inaccurate technical information, and could undermine failure analysis
investigations. (The NRC audit records are reproduced in the appendix below.)
What are the Bases of

Current Nuclear Regulations?
Given NRC tolerance of inaccurate information and generation of false records,

are nuclear industry regulations always grounded in facts, reality, and science?
NRC and Nuclear Industry Generation of False Records and Tolerance of Inaccurate Technical Information
NRC Tolerance of Bad
Zirconium Alloy Data
Creates Specific Nuclear
Hazards
Spent nuclear fuel is one of the most hazardous materials created by man. Nuclear
isotopes are contained by cladding composed of zirconium alloys. Failures of fuel rod
cladding have allowed escape and spread of hazardous radioisotopes. Numerous scientific
studies indicate that bad zirconium texture can lead to cladding failures. Understanding
cladding texture and failure modes is critical to safe use of nuclear fuel rods and safe
storage and handling of spent nuclear fuel rods. Integrity of cladding is essential to
radiological containment in spent fuel cooling pools and during subsequent handling and
storage. Bad texture properties contribute to failure modes of other zirconium alloy core
components. Dissemination of bad zirconium texture information in industry is hazardous.
Poor NRC Information

Practices Are Systemic
Problems Undermining
Nuclear Safety
Technical information of known reliability is required to make good decisions concerning

designs and uses of alloys, to guide actions taken in event of accidents, and to develop safer
nuclear systems. NRC failures to correct known bad information and to require reviews of
suspect data undermine safety. Some potential uses of the inaccurate and suspect
information cannot be known, so their impact on nuclear safety cannot be assessed.
NRC Tolerance of Bad

Data Undermines
Industry Credibility
Documents demonstrate that the industrial scientist that the NRC consulted for its safety
assessment worked for a company that had received and failed to recognize erroneous
zirconium alloy information. Therefore, information from this consultant is suspect.
Courts Rely on NRC

Safety Assessments
Legal decisions have relied on the NRC report to dismiss safety concerns about the spread
of inaccurate technical information in the nuclear industry. Citing the NRC report, courts
have disregarded specific industry warnings, studies published by experienced scientists
and engineers, and testimony describing hazards of inaccurate information.
NRC Toleration of
Inaccurate Information
Led Courts to Rule that
Generation of False
Records by the Nuclear
Industry is Legal and
Reasonable
Relying on the NRC report, one court found that the nuclear supplier violated no laws in
requiring employees to sign false QA documents. Evidence demonstrated that the
falsifications concealed the errors, that the QA documents were reviewed by outside
auditors, and that accident investigations relied on similar internal records. NRC failures to
require reviews for and corrections of inaccurate technical information and fraudulent
documents creates opportunities for companies to avoid liabilities in event of nuclear
accidents by requiring employees to aid in generating false records that conceal problems.
The NRC Should Require

Correction of the
Erroneous Reports,
Related Inaccurate
Records, and the NRC's
Own Flawed
Information Practices in
Order to Reduce
Nuclear Hazards
The NRC should recognize that tolerance of inaccurate data and false records hinders
nuclear technology and put public safety at risk. Known inaccurate zirconium information
must be corrected. Accurate information about cladding and all other nuclear materials will
be required for safe waste handling and storage. Suspect information must be reviewed.
Such information is relied upon for decades. Permanent solutions to nuclear waste disposal
remain as chimerical as nuclear energy too cheap to meter promised at the dawn of the
nuclear industry-- no doubt these inaccurate projections arose from faulty understanding of
the realities of nuclear technology due to reliance on bad information. If unanticipated
nuclear fuel rods degradation causes radiation leakage and, later, accidents, deficient NRC
and industry information practices are responsible. However, tolerance of any deficient
information practices creates systemic hazards. 2012 NRC Indian Point license renewal
hearing transcripts contain examples of ongoing NRC problems with information.
Are accidents the time to ask Can the data be trusted?
Page 2
Table of Contents
Key Points and Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
An Overview: Some Quotes from NRC and Court Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
1. Materials Information and Zirconium Alloys in Nuclear Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
2. Errors in Reports on Zirconium Texture Sent to the Nuclear Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
3. An NRC Report Confirmed Errors in Nuclear Industry Zirconium Alloy Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
4. Published Scientific Studies Describe Nuclear Safety Implications of Zirconium Texture. . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. NRC Responses to the Texture Analysis Errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
6. Recurrences of Zirconium Texture Analysis Failures and Falsification of Records. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Courts Rely on Uninformed NRC Safety Assessments to Dismiss Safety Concerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8. Opaque and Incomplete NRC Investigations and Audits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
9. Inaccurate NRC Audit Records Conceal Recurring Nuclear Industry Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
10. Accurate Records and Good QA Are Essential to Failure Analysis and Error Identification. . . . . . . . . . 52
11. Conclusions and Recommended NRC Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix I. Four NRC Records Documenting Flawed NRC Information Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Appendix II. How Inaccurate Information Impeded UA 232 Accident Responses and Failure Analysis . . 82
Appendix III. Short ARB Decision and Related Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94
Authors Experience and Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99
________________
(Draft Ver. July 21, 2013. No proprietary company information is included in this document. Note: this
reports primary purpose is to describe NRC and industry information problems in order to get the specific
inaccurate information and unsound NRC information policies corrected. Further details and analysis
information are available upon request. mark.kellyzr2013@gmail.com. )
Page 3
An Overview: Some Quotes and Excerpts from NRC and Court Records
(The following excerpts can be read in the full context of their source documents. The NRC report is Appendix I. The others are posted on-line.)
The NRCs summary of errors appearing in reports of zirconium alloy cladding materials properties:
(Source: NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057. 1 Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy. Reproduced in Appendix I Part A below.)
The NRCs lack of action regarding known errors in reports:

(Source: NRC ReportNRR-1999-A-00571.)
GE Nuclear Notification to Lambda Regarding Zirconium Alloy Texture Work:
(Source: Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01. 19 The GE Purchase order
notification reproduced on page 19 in the decision.)
Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium. Paper on Texture:

Manufacturing technology used nowadays was to a great extent determined by the relation of texture with
physical and mechanical properties of zirconium tubes, their dimensional stability under irradiation, and
sensitivity towards stress corrosion cracking . . 12 (Grytsyna et al. Destruction of Crystallographic Texture in Zirconium Alloy Tubes.
Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium, p 305. Journal of ASTM International, Sept. 2005 Vol 2 No. 8. 12)
Sworn DOL Hearing Testimony from a Physicist Concerning Zirconium Texture Report Errors:
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31 )
NRC Conclusion Regarding Safety Implications of Known Report Errors Conflicts with GE Nuclear and Others:
(Source: NRC ReportNRR-1999-A-00571.)
Page 4
Sworn DOL Hearing Testimony from a Physicist Concerning Zirconium Texture Analysis Report Errors:
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31 )
Federal Court Ruling on Errors Relying Upon the NRC Report:
( Source: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. 15 )
The District Court Ruling on Falsified Records Concerning Errors in Nuclear Reports:
(Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01. 19 )
Flawed NRC information practices over the decades: Uncertainty and lost records, but not great science in
2012 Indian Point Relicensing Board Hearing transcripts excerpts.
(Copy of these transcripts38 were provided by Clearwater and are posted on-line at scribd.com. Since these
transcripts could not be located on the NRC web site, copies have been posted at Scribd.com for review.)
But what this does is leave us with a degree of uncertainty as to exactly what the source for the contaminants
that are referred to. It may have been plutoniumbut at this point theres no way to really be sure of that.
38.
United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Hearing. Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR.
ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01. In the Matter of: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3). Judge McDade. Page 2026.
We have a gaping hole in the record, and we have no way of knowing what went into these costs.
38.
ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01. In the Matter of: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3). Lemay. Page. 2043.)
So, okay, we lost the reference to 1984. Someone convinced themselves, and then the Staff viewed it as
reasonableand, again, I know were not looking at great science, but what Im struggling with is, okay, we
lost the reference, but it is 30 years later, and were trying to deal with a plant-specific analysis for this facility.
38.
ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01. In the Matter of: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3). The Staff is the NRC staff.
Judge Kennedy. Page 2016.
Page 5
1. Materials Information and Zirconium Alloys in Nuclear Applications.

Reliable technical information of known quality is critical to safe nuclear technology. Good technical
information is required to control the chemistry and physics and safely operate nuclear reactors. Accurate
records of events and the understanding that has guided past operations are critical to assessing current
operations and improving future procedures and designs. Accidents are not the time to ask Can the data be
trusted? Unlike sales and legal professions, where advocates routinely and purposely manipulate and distort
information selectively to persuade others to facilitate targeted outcomes, engineering and science rely on
consideration of the best available information of known quality to achieve societal goals. Actual
performances of engineered systems like nuclear reactors are ultimately determined by the unbending laws of
chemistry and physics, not the persuasive powers of advocates from the legal and sales professions.
Inaccurate and distorted information corrupts nuclear technology in several ways. Bad information
can mislead engineers about the underlying physics and chemistry of nuclear reactors. As a result, they can
make poor decisions and miss opportunities to improve safety and avoid hazardous practices. Poor decisions
sometimes lead to disastrous accidents. When reliance on bad information is exposed, public confidence in
the technology and those controlling it is undermined. At Fukushima, reliance on bad information on tsunamis
led to decisions to construct sea walls which proved to be too low, which led to the nuclear accidents that the
spread radioactivity that rendered areas of Japan uninhabitable. Reactions of the public and politicians have
initiated actions that have curtailed and may end commercial nuclear energy in Japan and Germany. As a
direct result of the accidents, the Japanese Nuclear Energy and Industrial Safety Administration, NISA, has
been abolished. Due to the high actual and potential costs of such unnecessary accidents, the future of
nuclear power faces uncertainties.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and nuclear industry information practices are
not adequate to guarantee the integrity of technical data and records necessary for a safe nuclear industry.
To demonstrate the NRCs information problems, NRC documents and records wherein the NRC clearly states
that the NRC would take no action to correct known inaccurate and suspect nuclear industry information on
zirconium alloys used in nuclear fuel rod cladding and other nuclear components critical to safety are
reproduced and described in the following. Additional NRC documents, court records, published technical
information, and other information are included to demonstrate why NRC tolerance of inaccurate zirconium
information is scientifically unsound and inherently unsafe. The focus is on the zirconium information
problems because these information problems are well documented. However, the zirconium information
problems include just a few types of examples of broader NRC information problems. While in-depth
understanding of the technical details may be difficult, the NRCs generic problem of tolerance of inaccurate
technical information is simple to understand. Accurate information is required to understand and control any
process, including nuclear power generation. Unfortunately, NRC information problems have proven to be
difficult to correct. NRC tolerance and generation of inaccurate information creates systemic hazards in the
nuclear industry, so the NRC problems must be corrected.
NRC officials have stated that they would not take any action to correct or limit the distribution of
inaccurate technical information in the nuclear industry. When confronted with records demonstrating that
inaccurate technical information purporting to describe properties of zirconium alloys intended for use in
Page 6
nuclear fuel rod cladding and other reactor components was distributed in the nuclear industry, NRC officials
wrote:
(Source: NRC ReportNRR-1999-A-00571. The full NRC report is discussed in more detail below. The NRC reaffirmed this report in a 20112. The full NRC
report and letter are described in detail the following and are included in the appendix below.)
Correction of information now known to be inaccurate, review of suspect information, and notification
of those clients who had received the inaccurate information and NRC actions to that end would indicate that
the NRC now takes a scientific approach to technical information and records. Review and correction could be
simple and inexpensive. However, the NRC appears to continue to take an irresponsible approach to technical
information. Not only has the NRC report quoted above been a legal barrier to corrections of known errors,
reviews, and notifications, but, in 2011, the NRC has reacted to attempts to get the information corrected by
reaffirming that they would take no action and would not require correction of inaccurate information.2
Furthermore, in 2012, NRC records containing false information4 that have the effect of concealing the extent
of suspect information have been identified. (Note that the NRC records reproduced in this document are
sufficient to demonstrate that these problems have occurred. The remainder of this document only provides
background information and context.)
Immediate goals are to have the NRC or other responsible party take the following actions: 1) Correct
the known inaccurate zirconium information in records and reports sent to nuclear industry clients. 2) Review
zirconium fuel rod cladding information that is suspect. 3) Notify the affected parties (which available records
indicate are unaware of the known bad information). 4) Correct the false information in NRC records. These
goals could be accomplished simply, quickly, and with expenditure of few resources.
Broader goals are to have the NRC reform cease flawed information practices evident in this and other
situations. As described below, the NRC and nuclear industry appear to tolerate inaccurate information and
inadequately documented procedures that appear to be necessary to manage materials degradation
responsibly. The NRC must require industry to maintain accurate technical information and records.
Implementation of a zero tolerance policy for bad technical information similar to those policies practiced by
most reputable academic institutions and by most reputable technical publishing companies would be a
significant step towards nuclear regulation that is based on the best available science and is grounded in facts
and reality.
NRC officials generated records containing false information that conceal repeated occurrences of
industry problems that caused inaccuracies in technical information.3,4 NRC officials have also generated
records that decouple false information from known industry problems.3 (The NRC documents are described
below in detail. Some relevant parts are reproduced in the appendix.)
Court records demonstrate that the NRC has tolerated irresponsible industry behavior that includes
making false statements and generating fraudulent records that conceal the nature and extent of distribution
of inaccurate technical information within the nuclear industry.
Page 7
Hearing transcripts from the 2012 NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel in the matter of
Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3 indicate other NRC information problems arising from flawed NRC
practices over the decades. Important documents, including those used to develop nuclear regulations,
appear to be lost or poorly understood. The origins and appropriate applications of information in nuclear
regulations (NUREGs) and source references appeared to be open to question.
Why does the accuracy of technical information and related NRC and nuclear industry records
matter?
Accurate technical information is required to make the correct decisions necessary for safe operations,
for appropriate accident responses, and for waste handling and storage procedures.
Inaccurate and suspect materials information can undermine nuclear safety in many ways.
A) Design and manufacturing of zirconium cladding and other components are impaired by bad
information.
B) Bad decisions can be made when those decisions rely on bad information about the state, behavior,
and degradation of zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding in reactor cores during operations and
accidents.
C) Safe cooling, handling, transportation, and storage of spent nuclear fuel rods and other nuclear waste
require an accurate understanding of spent fuel rod cladding and other materials conditions,
properties, and degradation in order to prevent radiation releases and other hazards. 5
D) Flawed failure analyses of incidents and accidents arising from inaccurate technical information and
inaccurate industry records leads to faulty Lessons Learned. Faulty Lessons Learned could lead to
bad decisions that make subsequent accidents worse. Origins of accidents may never be understood,
which could result in recurring mistakes and accidents.
E) Bad information misdirects limited resources and thereby impairs technological advances. Inaccurate
technical information could lead to development of inherently unsafe reactor designs and procedures.
Reliable materials information can be particularly important in event of nuclear accidents, when good
decisions must be made quickly.6 Misunderstanding the condition of reactor materials and nuclear waste
stored around reactors can lead to decisions that make accidents worse.
In past incidents and accidents, many important questions have concerned the states of the zirconium
nuclear fuel rod cladding in cores and in spent fuel pools. Have elevated temperatures from loss-of-coolant
accidents compromised cladding integrity and allowed release of radioisotopes? 6 Has exposure of fuel rod
cladding to air compromised cladding integrity? Have zirconium fuel rod cladding failures led to loss of
radioactive materials during normal operations? Have cladding failures increased temperatures during
ongoing accidents and caused releases of radioistotopes into the environment?
According to reports from the US General Accounting Office7 and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development6 , in many incidents, the answers to these questions have too often been Yes .
Cladding has failed, and those failures have created significant hazards. Furthermore, in response to the
Page 8
incidents in the reports, the then-current understanding of what had happened to the fuel rods before and
during incidents and accidents guided urgent decisions that determined how limited resources were spent to
prevent ongoing accidents from getting worse. These decisions have themselves have had significant
influences on the courses and consequences of accidents, both good and bad. As the Fukushima and
Chernobyl accidents demonstrated, nuclear facilities sometimes explode before plants can be brought under
control and shut down after an incident. Inaccurate and suspect information is always an unwelcome and
pernicious factor when critical decisions must be made quickly.
Why Is Understanding the Condition and Behavior of Zirconium Alloys Important?
Accurate technical information on zirconium alloy properties is required to assess reactor core
conditions and to anticipate how zirconium components will continue to degrade as a nuclear accident
develop. Inaccurate materials information can undermine the sophisticated procedures and computer
modeling that nuclear operators might implement in their attempts to understand reactor conditions and take
appropriate actions that will reduce, not increase, the possibility and consequences of accidents. 6, 8
Nuclear designs rely on zirconium alloys because their properties make them highly suitable for use
in critical components. 9 Zirconium alloys can be manufactured to retain high strength, melting points,
radiation resistance, and corrosion resistance under the demanding conditions within a nuclear reactor.
Nuclear reactor components made of zirconium alloys include pressure tubes, fuel channel tubes, and, most
notably, fuel rod cladding. When manufactured and used appropriately, components made of zirconium alloys
resist degradation in nuclear reactors and can be relied on to contain radioisotopes in nuclear waste for long
times.
Zirconium components do degrade within reactors. With time, the cumulative effects of radiation
exposure in the high temperature and chemically-corrosive environments of nuclear reactors during normal
operations cause zirconium properties to deteriorate. Such deterioration creates weak links that can initiate
failures or can contribute to the cascades of materials and systems failures that often make ongoing nuclear
accidents worse.6
Zirconium components can deteriorate and fail quickly if exposed to extremes and fluctuations in
radiation, temperature, pressure, and chemical conditions6,8,9 that occur during excursions from normal
operating conditions (such as those that occur during nuclear incidents or accidents). Zirconium degradation
contributions to failure cascades occurring in the courses of nuclear accidents often make accidents far more
difficult to understand and control. As a result, accidents and their consequences can become far worse.
Zirconium component failures have led to increased spread of radionuclides released during nuclear
accidents.6
Coolant reactions with zirconium alloys generate hydrogen. 5,6,8 Rates of these hydrogen generation
reactions increase as temperatures increase. Much of this hydrogen reacts to form hydrogen gas. Hydrogen
gas can accumulate in reactor buildings and can explode, as occurred multiple times at Fukushima. A
significant portion of the generated hydrogen also diffuses into zirconium alloys, forming zirconium hydrides.
Zirconium hydrides weaken components and are highly reactive. Zirconium hydrides within the alloy act as
Page 9
energy reservoirs. When exposed to oxidants, hydrogenated zirconium alloys can undergo runaway
reactions or burn. Burning zirconium can release large amounts of energy in short periods of time. This
release of energy can not only destroy reactor components (like cladding, whose destruction releases
radioisotopes into cooling water), but can also raise core temperatures. Loss of system control can occur as a
result. Runaway zirconium hydride reactions in spent fuel pools can initiate containment failures and
explosions that allow the uncontrolled spread of radioisotopes in the environment.
Maintaining the integrity of the zirconium cladding of spent fuel rods is necessary to containing
radioisotopes. Spent nuclear fuel contains radioisotopes that make it one of the most hazardous substances
made by man.7 Intact zirconium fuel rod cladding is necessary to prevent release of radionuclides into the
environment during the years they are cooled in spent fuel pools. Therefore, degradation of zirconium fuel
rod cladding continues to be a concern long after spent fuel rods are removed from nuclear reactors. For
economic reasons, zirconium-cladded fuel rods are increasingly taken to higher burnups in cores at higher
temperatures for longer periods of time than in the past, increasing the deterioration of zirconium cladding
and the frequency with which fuel rods leak and break. 10 Deteriorated zirconium cladding is more likely to
crack and release radiation, especially in spent fuel pools and when spent fuel is handled and transported.7
Accidents have released excessive amount of radionuclides whose spread cannot be controlled by
current containment technologies. Limitations of currently available practical cleanup methods allow some
contamination to persist and spread indefinitely.11 Once released from fuel rods, gaseous and soluble
radioisotopes can be spread steadily and quickly by winds and water. Fissionable solids have been
irretrievably lost due to zirconium cladding failures. 7
Use of zirconium alloys in reactor components is necessary for a combination of technical and
economic reasons. The performance of zirconium alloys under some of the harsh conditions encountered in
nuclear applications and accidents is unparalleled. When manufactured properly, cost-effective zirconium
alloy components can be fabricated and safely used in many nuclear applications for limited periods of time.9
For technical and economic reasons, there are no currently-available substitutes for zirconium alloy in some
nuclear applications.
However, the safe use of zirconium alloys and storage of spent components requires an accurate
understanding of zirconium alloys properties and performance under anticipated conditions. Numerous
studies have demonstrated that understanding the deterioration of zirconium alloys in nuclear applications
requires accurate information concerning the original properties of zirconium alloy components and how
those properties change in nuclear reactors and during storage as waste. 5-13
Accurate technical information on zirconium alloy properties is essential. Designs depend upon
accurate alloy information. 9 Cladding condition is often the limiting factor that determines how long nuclear
fuel rods can be safely used in reactors. 5-13 In event of accidents, good decisions that determine how limited
resources will be allocated will must be made quickly. Computer and lab simulations required to assess
component reactor conditions and to guide operator decisions, especially under accident conditions, rely on
the accuracy of information on alloy properties for accurate descriptions and projections of alloy behaviors. 9
Page 10
Although not directly involving zirconium , bad operator decisions and misunderstandings were responsible for
the severe nature of the Chernobyl accident.
Inaccurate alloy properties information can undermine and compromise the accuracy of
results obtained from computer simulations of reactor systems. If computer simulations that are
compromised by bad data are utilized to help guide reactor maintenance or responses to a nuclear accident6,
bad decisions might be made that could initiate or exacerbate accidents. Because of the unpredictable nature
of incidents during normal operations and during accidents and because of the long time periods involved in
nuclear operations, computer modeling is commonly used to predict the degradation and condition of reactor
systems and components for both practical and economic reasons.6,38 Current technology makes it possible to
simulate full operational lives of components, to predict deterioration that might occur during hundreds of
years of storage of nuclear waste, and to predict the reactor conditions that might be created by various
possible responses to unanticipated accidents within short periods. However, such simulations rely on
accurate input information. Safe decommissioning of plant requires accurate assessments of component
condition and degradation. Nuclear waste must be stored for thousands of years. The decisions about how to
handle and store spent waste without accidental radiation releases rely on accurate information concerning
the properties of zirconium alloys.
Why is Zirconium Texture Important?
The distribution of crystallographic textures within zirconium alloy components is one of many
crucial factors known to contribute to changes in zirconium alloy properties that occur during manufacturing
processes and during exposure to high temperatures, radiation, or corrosive environments. 5-13 Under some
conditions, some textures of zirconium alloy components can be the weak links that cause components to
break or fail. Materials scientists have demonstrated that zirconium components with some textures perform
well and that components with other textures perform poorly. It is known that component textures and other
properties changes with time in nuclear reactors in significant ways that depend on initial alloy textures. 5-13
Zirconium fuel rod cladding is welded shut; zirconium alloy texture influences weld strength, corrosion
resistance, and weld embrittlement.14
(A technical note- pertinent information for those with technical background that is not necessary to
understand the NRCs information problems. Careful consideration of texture is sometimes more important in
designs and applications employing zirconium alloys than for those using steel alloys. The importance of
zirconium alloy texture originates in the hexagonal zirconium atomic arrangements (ie, crystal structure) that
tend to form during component processing and that can change under the high energy conditions within
nuclear reactors. Because of its crystal structure and chemistry, zirconium is fundamentally different than
steel. The hexagonal atomic arrangement has a limited number of directions that zirconium atoms within a
given crystallite can readily slip to relieve stresses. In highly textured polycrystalline hexagonal zirconium
alloy, the ordering of these crystallites can amount to alignments of weak links within a component that can
lead to failure. In steel and many other common materials, simplistically, atoms can be presumed to assume
higher symmetry cubic crystalline arrangements. The cubic arrangements allow atoms to relieve stresses by
slipping in more directions than is possible in a hexagonal atomic arrangement, thereby reducing likelihood
of failures. In steels, alloy textures are sometimes not important factors in failures. Therefore, texture is often
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neglected in steel component design. As a consequence, texture is less familiar to some engineers. In some
nuclear applications, zirconium alloys are used because zirconiums corrosion and radiation resistances are
greater than those of steel alloys. However, unlike steel, zirconium alloy components can more readily fail to
perform as expected if texture is not taken into account in component design, manufacture, and operation.5, 9
Studies have shown that zirconium alloy textures existing within a component can change during operation,
which further complicates understanding texture effects on alloy behavior, particularly in cases where the
texture data is inaccurate. 5-13 )
Bad materials properties information can impact nuclear safety for decades. Nuclear reactors
operate for decades. Materials information is used to produce designs and simulation software that are relied
upon for decades. Spent nuclear fuel is sometimes handled decades after being removed from reactors.
Permanent solutions to nuclear waste disposal remain as chimerical as nuclear energy too cheap to meter.
(Those projections of clean and cheap nuclear energy were no doubt based on inaccurate technical
information.) As long as nuclear waste might be handled, accurate understanding of the materials properties
of components will be required to avoid creation of unnecessary nuclear hazards.
Some details of the influences of crystallographic textures on alloy states and properties are still not
completely understood6, 9 . Improvements in the understanding of zirconium alloy texture are necessary in
order to improve component performance, to anticipate component deterioration, and to mitigate
consequences of nuclear accidents.6,9 Unreliable texture information undermines efforts to improve alloy
understanding.
Developers of some computer models recognize the importance of the crystallographic texture in
computer simulations and designs, but must simplify or neglect texture due to limitations in understanding
how to incorporate complex but fundamental texture properties into programs6. Inaccurate data renders
computer modeling results inaccurate. (Texture is often neglected in designs incorporating steel alloys with
crystal structures of higher symmetry because texture is often not a limiting property; this differs from the
situation driving neglect of zirconium texture in some nuclear designs, where complexities and lack of
necessary understanding limit efforts to address texture in detail. 6 )
The NRCs toleration of zirconium texture technical information known to be inaccurate is a serious
specific problem that has not yet been corrected. However, NRC toleration of any inaccurate technical
information and generation of false records by NRC officials are serious systemic problems that undermine
NRC and industry credibility and, more importantly, create serious but unnecessary radiological hazards.
Technical Notes.
1) What is "crystallographic texture"? Crystallographic texture is a term used to describe the relative
order and disorder of crystallographic orientations of crystallites (or grains) that make up alloys (Figure 1).
Specimens composed of alloy crystallites whose orientations are more aligned with each other are described
as having "higher" or "more" texture. Groups of crystallites which are more randomly are said to have "lower"
or "less" texture. Although some groups of crystallites are disordered to the degree where they are described
Page 12
as having "no texture", texture can develop in zirconium components manufactured to have no texture when
the components are exposed to the high energy conditions found in nuclear reactors.
FIGURE 1. Texture in Polycrystalline Zirconium Alloys.
Less Texture (Crystallites alignments shown by arrows are more random. Weak directions of crystallites,
indicated by arrows, are randomly oriented. Weak links are not frequently well aligned.)
A.
B.
More Texture (Crystallites alignments shown by arrows are less random. Weak directions of crystallites
tend to be oriented sideways. Forces aligned with weak directions might be more likely to cause failures.)
C.
D.
Figure 1 caption. Texture in Polycrystalline Zirconium Alloy (caption). Atomic arrangements within grains
and relative orientations of those grains can determine alloy strengths and weaknesses. More technical
description. Simplified 2-dimensional representations of a five-grain alloy sample with low texture (A and B)
and an alloy sample with much higher texture (C and D) are shown. Arrows indicate crystallographic
directions. O's were used to represent the atoms in A and C in order to indicate possible arrangements of
atoms lying in alternating "basil planes" of individual hexagonal crystallites. The figures are not drawn to scale- grains sizes are typically on the order of microns, while atoms are much smaller. The O's are removed in B
and D to simplify the diagrams- their textures are the same as those indicated in A and C respectively .
Individual grains in each of the two groups of five adjacent irregular crystallites were drawn with the same
shapes and sizes in the figures to emphasize that texture is independent of crystallite shapes and sizes. In real
alloys, three dimensional grain shapes, sizes, and orientations exhibit great variations and rarely appear to be
identical. Note that in the highly textured groups of grains shown in C and D, the arrows (or "weaker"
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crystallographic directions) roughly line up horizontally in the group of grains, indicating a high degree of
texture. Susceptible sites in textured samples like that show in C and D are often more likely to degrade
because weaknesses can fail synergistically or to link up to initiate or propagate cracks or other flaws.
Distortion of part dimensions (which can impede insertion of control rods) and formation of brittle hydride
growth (which lead to cracks that allow radioisotopes to leak into cooling water) are examples of alloy failures
that can be caused by inappropriate component texture. Note that while sorting out the details of texture can
be complex and that a single specimen can have multiple textures, in the final analysis, texture simply amounts
to how the atoms are arranged. In components with strong texture, "weak links" can be more likely to line up
and act in concert to cause failures. High energies in systems like nuclear cores can cause changes in texture.5
Inaccurate texture information can produce inaccurate understanding of deterioration of alloy properties and
can hinder optimization of materials properties. Appropriate texture can improve component performance
under some circumstances. Note that, for alloys composed of hexagonal zirconium phases, alloy texture is
often far more important for component designs than for cubic alloys. (Alloy microstructure is somewhat
more complex than explained here. Zirconium alloys can be processed to be composed of cubic phases.
Transitions between the low temperature hexagonal zirconium phases and the higher temperature cubic
zirconium phases can occur at significant rates and thereby alter texture within the temperature regime of a
nuclear core, especially during an accident. See Tenckhoff 9 for a more sophisticated description of texture in
zirconium alloys.)
---------------------2) Why is crystallographic texture important? Crystallographic texture can determine how zirconium
nuclear fuel rod cladding and other reactor components fail during normal operations, under the extreme
conditions generated in the courses of many types of accidents, and during transportation and storage of
spent fuel rods. Weak links are sometimes more likely to line up in components with a high degree of
texture. For example, some cracking will be more likely to grow, spread, and eventually cause failure.
A simplified diagram indicating how cladding failures involving formation and cracking of zirconium
hydrides occurs is shown in Figure 2. Brittle zirconium hydrides form in cladding due to alloy reactions with
some of the hydrogen that is generated when fuel rods are in contact with cooling waters. Orientations and
extent of zirconium hydride formation depend strongly on alloy texture. Some alloy textures lead to the
precipitation of larger hydrides which are oriented in ways that make the cladding susceptible to cracking
when subjected to stresses.
Page 14
Figure 2. Highly Textured Alloys Can Be More Susceptible To Deterioration and Failure. Hydrogen generated
by oxidation of surface zirconium from coolant water can diffuse into alloys and react with zirconium to form
weak and brittle zirconium hydrides . Grey areas indicate zirconium hydrides. Cracks like those shown in D can
be initiated by horizontal tensile stresses (ie, stresses with components in the direction indicated by the
arrows). At high hydride levels, alloy failures might be initiated by stresses in other directions.
A. As- Manufactured.
B. Hydrides Precipitate C. Hydrides Grow
D. Hydrides Crack, Components Fail
Figure 2 (caption). Highly Textured Alloys Can Be More Susceptible To Deterioration and Failures.
Formation and growth of brittle hydride precipitates lead to formation of cracks in components manufactured
with textured zirconium alloys. Simplified 2-dimensional diagram showing five grains of a highly textured
component. Arrows indicate the "c -crystallographic direction" of the three dimensional hexagonal
arrangements of zirconium atoms in each of the five grains composing the sample). The levels of zirconium
hydrides (irregular grey areas) forming at some types of grain boundaries increase with time of exposure to
coolant water (A to D).
A. As- manufactured zirconium has no or extremely low levels of zirconium hydrides. No exposure to coolant.
B. Coolant water reacts with surface zirconium to form hydrogen. The hydrogen can diffuse into the alloy and
react with zirconium at higher rates at certain surfaces to form localized hydride precipitates (shown in grey).
Certain unfavorable textures facilitate hydrogen uptake and transport through the alloy, leading to hydride
accumulations in certain areas. Hydride growth rates can increase with temperature.
C. Hydride precipitates grow and sometimes link up, forming larger brittle regions in the alloy. 5 Taking fuel
rods to higher burn-ups (ie, operating reactors at higher temperatures and using fuel rods for longer periods)
increases the rate and extent of hydride formation. Accident conditions can increase rates of hydride
formation and levels. Alloys with certain unfavorable textures form large plates that are more susceptible to
cracking.5 Hydrides formed in some highly textured alloys are more likely to link up. Zirconium hydride
volumes are about 16% larger than parent alloy volumes and are unevenly distributed, so hydride formation
increases mechanical stresses within components.
D. Brittle hydrides can crack due to thermal, pressure, or mechanical stresses. Cracks can spread and cause
components to fail catastrophically. Cracks in fuel rod cladding can allow radionuclides to escape into cooling
water and the environment. Zirconium hydrides are highly reactive. When cracked fuel rods containing
hydrides are exposed to oxidizing conditions (eg, exposed to air), hydrides can react energetically. Large
energy releases and temperature increases can occur very rapidly, initiating explosions. Cracks increase the
amounts of alloy and hydrides exposed to oxidizers, thereby increasing rates of energy release and producing
higher temperatures in shorter times. Components with unfavorable textures are more likely to form larger
hydrides with orientations that make them susceptible to breaking completely when subjected to stresses.
(See Chung et. al. 5 for a more sophisticated description of hydride formation in alloys.) Reactor operation and
control depends on maintaining appropriate distributions of radioisotopes in the core. Fuel rod failures and
Page 15
releases of radioisotopes can change distributions of radioisotopes within the core and other critical reactor
conditions. Failure to understand these processes can lead to poor decisions in response to incidents or
accidents, making bad situations worse. 6
-----------------------------------------
Cracked cladding has led to cladding failures and releases of radionuclides into the environment. For
economic and practical reasons, large releases of radionuclides sometimes cannot be cleaned up.11 Large
areas around the Chernobyl and the Fukushima remain uninhabitable years after accidents involving releases
of radioisotopes.
When fuel rod cladding is exposed to air or other chemically oxidizing conditions, accumulation of
hydrides and cracks in cladding can contribute to release and spread of radiation in other ways. Hydrides react
vigorously with air, releasing large amounts of energy very quickly. Cladding with the elevated levels of
hydrides that form when fuel rods taken to high burn-ups can release large amounts of energy very quickly
when fuel rods are subjected to oxidizing conditions, such as exposure to air. (Cladding is more likely to catch
fire when exposed to air.) Cladding cracks increase the surface area of hydrides exposed to the environment.
On reaction with air, more energy is released in a shorter period of time, leading to far higher temperatures.
Some reports indicated that these types of "runaway reactions" occurred during the Three Miles Island and
other nuclear accidents. Understanding cladding texture is critical to understanding these types of reactions,
to designing parts that are less susceptible to runaway reactions, and to making the right decisions in response
to accidents involving operational and spent fuel rods.
Although unfamiliar to many scientists, important aspects of crystallographic texture are relatively
simple to understand. As shown in the simplified diagrams in Figure 1, texture indicates how atoms in
individual alloy grains (or crystallites) are oriented relative to those in other grains. The importance of texture
lies in how those orientations impart strengths and weaknesses to components made from an alloy. Texture
measurements describe various aspects of alloy texture quantitatively. While detailed descriptions of the
distributions of orientations within alloy components made of multitudes of microscopic grains can become
complex9, the importance of understanding the texture within a component often simply amounts to
understanding how weak links in an alloy interact with each other and with external and internal stresses on
that component (Figure 2).
2. Errors in Reports on Zirconium Texture Sent to the Nuclear Industry.

Errors were found in zirconium alloy (Zr) properties data reported to the nuclear industry by Lambda
Research, Inc., a private laboratory that specialized in materials analysis. The US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission verified that Lambda reports contained two types of errors that led to inaccurate descriptions of
zirconium alloy component properties. 1
The first error was a 90 degree rotation error.
An NRC report stated the following:
Page 16
( Source: NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3.1 Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy. A copy is reproduced in Appendix I Part A at the end
of this document. Note that court records demonstrate that report results, not specimens, were incorrectly rotated 90 degrees in orientations. The
NRC was provided with information indicating that this was a data problem, not a specimen rotation problem. This misleading NRC statement is
significant when considered in the context of fraudulent activity in industry. )
Reports with these 90 degree data rotation errors indicated inaccurate textures in the samples that
were perpendicular to actual measured textures, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Effects of a Ninety Degree Rotation Error on Reported Texture Results.
A. Individual Grains
Arrows Show Crystallographic
Orientations of Individual Grains
B. Accurate Indication
of Average Texture
C. A 90 Degree Rotation Error:

Inaccurate Indication of
Direction of Average Texture
Figure 3. Effects of a Ninety Degree Rotation Error on Reported Texture Results.

A. Texture of individual grains of actual specimen is indicates by arrows.
B. Large arrow indicates the actual average texture within a specimen.
C. In a report with a 90 degree rotation error, the specimen average texture is inaccurately described as being
oriented in the wrong direction.
Technical notes of interest to those with technical backgrounds, but not necessary to understand the error:
Texture in real specimens containing a multitude of microscopic crystallites is often more complex than that in
the simple hypothetical five grain specimen shown. For example, a single specimens can appear to have two
or more significant populations of crystallites with different orientations that could each be considered as
having its own distinct texute. Using multiple arrows sometimes would not be a clear and effective way to
indicate the crystallographic textures found in more complicated specimens. Therefore, materials scientists
often rely on pole figures, orientation distribution functions, and other representations to indicate texture.
As texture can be considered as the degree of randomness of crystallographic orientations, representations
that indicate texture in terms statistical properties of crystallite populations such as mean orientations and
calculated distributions of orientations about that mean are often used. However, as complex as a detailed
picture of texture might be, a 90 degree rotation error simply flips that picture on its side.
For any engineer using texture information to make decisions, 90 degree rotation errors are as
serious as not knowing which way is up. For example, in nuclear fuel rod cladding tubes, 90 degree rotation
errors can be the difference between fabricating tubes with alloy orientations so that through wall stress
corrosion cracking rates are maximized (making tubes that are more likely to fail) instead of minimized (making
tubes that are less likely to fail). Since there is a 90 degree orientation difference between the tubes thinnest
Page 17
direction and the tubes thickest direction, the 90 degree rotation errors could mislead a designer or engineer
to select the worst alloy orientations (which could lead to faster cladding failures) instead of the best
orientations (which could maximize cladding performance).
Identification of errors in one report led to reviews of past reports for data rotation errors. These
reviews identified several past zirconium analysis reports containing rotation errors that were sent to
companies in the nuclear industry, including Westinghouse, for some time. Clients were notified that their
past reports contained errors and were given revised reports. The rotation errors were described in a Lambda
QA Incident Report (QAR).
These data rotation problems appeared to be corrected to most parties involved. The NRC was not
notified of these errors at the time that the errors were found. (Actually, the problems were not completely
corrected at that time. Significant false records purporting to describe the nature of the errors were
generated by Lambda management, unbeknownst to most Lambda employees and affected clients (including
nuclear industry clients and at least one US military lab). These false records appear to have deceived affected
parties, may have deceived the NRC if they reviewed them, and, if an accident were to occur, could have the
effect of misleading accident investigators, as described below.)
Lambda procedures were reviewed and changed in an attempt to prevent recurrences of data
rotation errors. Unfortunately, these procedure revisions automated some of the data analysis; analysis and
review responsibilities were spilt between analysts in ways that made understanding and recognition of other
different Lambda texture analysis errors less likely when they occurred.
A second type of error involving software failures, defects in written procedures, inadequate
training, and other quality assurance (QA) deficiencies led to data distortions in reports sent to GE Nuclear
just months later.
An NRC report stated the following.
(Source: NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3. 1 Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy. Reproduced in Appendix I Part A below.)
A QA report (QAR) describing these distortion errors and QA deficiencies was written and signed by
the technician and lab manager. This QAR recommended that past reports be reviewed for this type of error,
that procedures (some of which had been provided to clients at their request) be revised, and that affected
clients be notified of the problems. The QAR objectively described software failures, procedure deficiencies,
employee training failures, and other QA deficiencies that contributed to the errors. The QAR was
appropriately critical of Lambda QA and the technician and manager.16
Lambda Research management refused to allow reviews of past reports for these distortion errors.
Management demanded that the QAR be edited to include false and misleading information. Edits included
removal of statements indicating the need for reviews of past reports for distortion errors, changes indicating
that nuclear clients had already been notified of distortion errors, and removal of recommendations that
Page 18
procedures and software be revised to include measurements and checks to prevent recurrences of distorted
results. A decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision summarized some of
the events.
Page 19
(United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. 15 Note that the decision inaccurately describes the earlier 90 degree rotation error as an unrelated procedural datacollection flaw, not a data rotation during post-data collection analysis by the previous lab manager, apparently following the NRCs inaccurate
description of this error1. This propagation of NRC errors in court decisions is significant, as described below. Note that evidence in the court record
indicated zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding specimens, not zirconium insulation specimens, were analyzed incorrectly. Also note that evidence
demonstrating other problems such as software deficiencies, procedure problems, calibration deficiencies, QA, and GE Nuclear audit problems were in
the court record, but are not addressed in this description. However, despite these issues, this portion of the decision does give an overview of some of
the events demonstrated by the evidence available in the court record. )
The handwritten QAR edits described in the court decision inaccurately indicate that the client was
notified data were reviewed. See attached list and that procedure revisions were Already present.
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(Source: NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf. 16 Portion of QAR edited by Lambda Owner Paul Prevey. Note that edits removed
recommendations that past data be reviewed, that the client be notified, that procedures be revised to include measurements, and that directions to
cover software failures be addressed. The see attached list edit referenced an email (reproduced in Section 10 below) listing reports containing the
unrelated 90 degree rotation errors written months prior to the GE Nuclear distortion errors. Note that these three issues were the points of dispute
about the incident. The technician and manager did not dispute the other statements in this and the owners versions of the QAR.)
Note that the decisions Footnote 3 in the above excerpt from the decision states that At
deposition, Prevey conceded in that, contrary to his revision to Kellys QA Report, Lambda had not informed
GEND of the procedural defects in Lambdas mounting process-- the decision confirms that Preveys revision
rendered the QAR inaccurate. (Preveys explanation for his demand that the QAR be edited to inaccurately
indicate that the client had already been notified is a separate issue. The decision indicates that Prevey
explained that he had confused that issue, the distortion error, for the ninety degree rotation error.
Basically, he claimed he made a mistake about a mistake when confronted with evidence that his QAR edits
were not accurate. The QAR was a QA record concerning nuclear work and was audited by the nuclear
industry- even if Preveys explantion is accepted, what does compounding mistakes say about management
responsibilty? Evidence appeared to indicate that there were other incidents where management took actions
that concealed errors and defective QA. )
Note also that the procedures were revised after procedures failed again later, as described in Section
6 below.
3. An NRC Report Confirmed Errors in Nuclear Industry Zirconium Alloy Reports

Court records included documents from GE Nuclear audits of Lambda zirconium texture analysis QA
work and procedures. GE audit documents included explicit notifications that Lambda texture analysis
required to comply with 10CFR21 and 10CFR50b (which addresses nuclear supplier QA ). Some past GE
Nuclear purchase orders clearly stated that 10CFR21 applied to the texture analysis because errors could lead
to significant risk of radiological hazards. (One such 10CFR21 notification is described in some detail in
Footnote 2 in the above excerpt of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Case No. 023035.15 )
Safe operations require good information about components materials properties. In event of
accident or failures, failure analysis relies upon good information. Lambda employees knew that bad
information could lead to bad engineering decisions affecting safety, ineffective corrective actions, repeats of
accidents, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of corrective actions intended to correct safety problems.
When it became obvious that Lambdas owner would not allow correction of the problems or
notifications of clients, the NRC was contacted about the errors and attempts to conceal them. The NRC was
asked to correct the technical problems. The NRC verified the problems. An NRC report stated the following.
Page 21
Note the types of problems found to cause distortions in information in zirconium alloy reports sent to
the nuclear industry were fairly wide-ranging. Problems included procedure deficiencies, training, and
software deficiencies.
4. Published Scientific Studies Describe Nuclear Safety Implications of

Zirconium Texture
Nuclear industry and materials science studies demonstrate the importance of understanding the
crystallographic texture of zirconium alloy in nuclear applications. The following quotes from published studies
indicate that misunderstanding zirconium texture can create serious nuclear hazards. ( Note that
crystallographic texture is referred to as preferential or preferred orientation in some quotes. Questions
and some comments were included in order to organize the information and focus attention on the
significance of the quotes. Comments were added in parenthesis to further explain some of the quotes. Note
that these parenthetical comments were not from the publications cited.)
How do some studies describe the importance of zirconium alloy texture?
It would be difficult to identify another problem that has aroused so much permanent interest and been the
focus of such continuous attention, investigation, and scientific debate as zirconium reactor core component
texture. (Emphasis added.) (Grytsyna et al. Destruction of Crystallographic Texture in Zirconium Alloy
Tubes. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium, p 305. Journal of ASTM
International, Sept. 2005 Vol 2 No. 8. 12)
(Several references published before 1999 were cited in support of this statement, so the NRC should have
been aware of the attention, investigation, and scientific debate prior to issuing their report.)
Does texture influence how zirconium reactor core components are fabricated?
Manufacturing technology used nowadays was to a great extent determined by the relation of texture with
physical and mechanical properties of zirconium tubes, their dimensional stability under irradiation, and
sensitivity towards stress corrosion cracking . . 12 (Emphasis added). (In support of this statement, the
authors cite ten published references describing zirconium alloy applications, degradation modes, and
performance failures in nuclear reactors related to texture. Stress corrosion cracking is a degradation process
that can occur in reactor cores and in spent fuel pools.)
What did an Argonne National Laboratory study funded by the NRCs Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
state about the general importance of zirconium hydrides crystallographic properties (which include
texture)?
The morphology, orientation, distribution, and crystallographic aspects of Zr hydrides in fuel cladding
fabricated from Zr-base alloys play important roles in fuel performance during all phases before and after
discharge from the reactor, i. e., normal operation, transient and accident situations in reactor, temporary
storage in a dry cask, and permanent storage in a waste repository. 5 (Emphasis added.)
(Source: H. M. Chung, R. S. Daum, J. M. Hiller, and M. C. Billone, Characteristics of Hydride Precipitation and
Reorientation on Spent-Fuel Cladding. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 13th International Symposium, p.
Page 22
561. 5) (Note that zirconium hydrides are mechanically brittle and, chemically, highly reactive species that form
and accumulate in zirconium cladding while in use in the reactor. When stressed or exposed to coolant water,
hydrides are weak links in cladding that can form pinholes and initiate cracks that leak radioisotopes.
Cracking can cause fuel rods to break and release fuel pellets and fission products. )
What did this same group state about zirconium alloy texture and precipitation of deleterious zirconium
hydrides within cladding?
the susceptibility to hydride reorientation will be more pronounced in a cladding with a 0 degree, 30
degree, or 90 degree basal-pole texture, because easy precipitation is more likely to occur on either prism,
pyramidal, or basal planes. 5 (Emphasis added.)
(This quote describes textures effects on formation of Zr hydrides, which are weak links that can determine
how cladding will fail. See Figure 2 in Section 1 above for a simplistic picture of this process.)
DIMENSIONAL CHANGES.
Does reactor core radiation rearrange and destabilize zirconium alloy atoms and thereby influence their
crystal structures?
"Incident neutrons cause displacement of zirconium atoms from their stable positions by collision." 13
(Source: M. Dahlback, M. Limback, L. Hallstadiu, P. Barberis, G. Bunel, C. Simonot, T. Anderson, P. Askeljung, J.
Flygare, B. Lehtinen, A. Massish. The Effect of Beta-Quenching in Final Dimension on the Irradiation Growth
of Tubes and Channels. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium, P. 276. Journal of
ASTM International, June. 2005 Vol 2 No. 6 . 13 )
How do these radiation-induced displacements of atoms in crystallites deform zirconium nuclear
components during irradiation growth?
For zircaloy guide tubes, prism hcp planes are preferentially aligned perpendicular to axial (longitudinal)
direction. This means that irradiation growth causes axial length to increase and tube diameter and wall
thickness to contract." *13 (Emphasis added. Note that prism hcp planes are preferentially aligned means
that crystallographic texture is present and that lengths, thicknesses, and shapes of guide tubes will change or
warp in ways determined in part by texture. Significant changes in component dimensions could cause
serious reactor malfunctions, such as impairment of control rod insertion. Such problems create hazards.16,17)
Do component distortions create measurable bows and dimensional changes in zirconium components due
to texture effects?
Irradiation-induced lateral displacements (bowing) of Zircaloy-2 channels irradiated in various BWRs to
different exposures have been measured using Westinghouse standard channel deformation measurement
procedure. 13 ( It is of interest to note that Westinghouse failed to recognize that it had received inaccurate
results from Lambda Research. This leads to questions: If some Westinghouse technical data is inaccurate, do
some Westinghouse measurement procedures and some Westinghouse computer models produce inaccurate
and misleading gibberish? )
What problems can these dimensional changes of zirconium components cause in operating nuclear
reactors?
Page 23
Excessive or unexpected dimensional changes of guide tubes or spacer grids of a nuclear fuel assembly can
result in operational issues such as incomplete (control) rod insertion (IRI) or potential fuel assembly
interactions and handling concerns due to increases in the fuel assembly envelope resulting from the lateral
growth of the grids. 17 (Source: King, S. J., Kesterson, R. L., Yueh, K. H., Comstock, R. J., Herwig, W. M. and
Ferguson, S. D., Impact of Hydrogen on Dimensionaly Stability of ZIRLO Fuel Assemblies. Zirconium in the
Nuclear Industry: Thirteenth International Symposium. ASTM SPT 1423, G. D. Moan and P. Rudling, Eds.
ASTM. pp. 471-489. 17 Note that incomplete control rod insertion can prevent interfere with and possibly
prevent shutdown (eg, scrams), which can lead to loss of reactor control and meltdown.)
CORROSION:
What did a corrosion study state about the importance of in-reactor degradation of zirconium alloy
cladding?
"The extended fuel burnup, longer fuel cycles, power uprates, higher temperatures, and increased lithium in
PWR primary water put a premium on the ability of the cladding to withstand in-reactor degradation." 18
( Source: Arthur T. Motta, Aylin Yilmazbayham, Robert Comstock, Jonna Partezanna, George P. Sabol, Barry
Lai, and Zonghou Cai. Microstructure and Growth Mechanism of Oxide Layers Formed on Zr Alloys Studied
with Micro-Beam Synchrotron Radiation. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium18,
P. 205. Journal of ASTM International, May. 2005 Vol 2 No. 5. 18 )
What did the same study state about the importance of texture for understanding of zirconium alloy
cladding performance and degradation?
"We believe that, in addition, the local texture and grain-to-grain alignment are crucial for understanding
differences between the alloys. 18 (Emphasis added.)
HYDRIDE PRECIPITATION : Zirconium corrosion due to formation of zirconium hydrides within alloys, such as
the processes diagramed in Figure 2 above. Note that hydride levels increase with temperature due to
increased hydrogen generation at water-alloy interfaces.5
Does zirconium alloy texture determine the formation, distribution, and crystallographic characteristics (eg,
texture) of deleterious zirconium hydride precipitates?
Face-centered-cubic delta hydrides frequently precipitate on a certain habit plane of the unit cell of the hcp
alpha-phase Zircaloy metal. 5
(Source: H. M. Chung et al. Characteristics of Hydride Precipitation and Reorientation on Spent-Fuel
Cladding. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 13th International Symposium, P. 562. 5 This statement means
that precipitated hydrides will accumulate in ways determined by texture. The implications of this include the
fact that that cladding and other components can accumulate hydrides and fail in ways determined by texture.
Certain types of zirconium hydrides are known to accumulate in certain types of zirconium cladding alloy
crystallite planes. If Zircaloy develops certain types of textures, then zirconium hydrides formed in the core
could make cladding susceptible cracking, leaking, or breaking when stressed. The study stated Hydride
platelets that are distributed perpendicular to the direction of primary stress (i. e., radial hydrides) are
particularly deleterious to the claddings mechanical properties. 5 Essentially, bad texture can promote growth
of zirconium hydrides that creates weak links in cladding. See Figure 2 above. Also note that 90 degree
Page 24
rotation errors in texture analysis would thwart accurate understanding of primary stresses and radial
hydrides. In fact, 90 degree rotation errors could mislead designers to select the worst rather than the best
orientations. See Figure 3 above.)
Does zirconium texture determine how zirconium hydride reorientation occurs?
the susceptibility to hydride reorientation will be more pronounced in a cladding with a 0 degree, 30
degree, or 90 degree basal-pole texture, because easy precipitation is more likely to occur on either prism,
pyramidal, or basal plane. 5 (Emphasis added.)
How well is hydride precipitation in nuclear fuel rod cladding understood?
the fundamental crystallographic and microstructural characteristics of hydride precipitation in irradiated
cladding remain unknown. 5
(Among other things, this statement indicates that texture is an area of active research and development. In
general, inaccurate information undermines research and development.)
Why is the texture of hydrides important to consider in cladding design?
Hydride platelets that are distributed perpendicular to the direction of primary stress (i. e., radial hydrides)
are particularly deleterious to the claddings mechanical properties. 5
(In other words, bad texture promotes growth of zirconium hydrides that are weak links in cladding.)
Is hydride formation and orientation important to zirconium degradation and waste handling?
One example is the hydride reorientation that can occur during the initial stage of vacuum drying and transfer
of spent- fuel assembly to a dry-storage cask. Radial hydrides in such a situation could lead to significant
degradation of creep and other mechanical properties under long-term dry storage. 5
(This means that cladding continues to degrade and eventually could fail when handled and after being put
into dry storage long after fuel rods are removed from the core.)
These studies clearly indicate that misunderstanding zirconium texture can create serious hazards.
Very hazardous situations can develop when nuclear reactors are operated at higher temperatures, cooling
pools are packed with ever increasing numbers of spent and deteriorating fuel rods, and when spent fuel rods
are handled if unfavorable zirconium alloy textures are present or develop in components.
The Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear plants were technological wonders right up until accidents
destroyed them. Multiple systems were in place to ensure safety. Prevention of the accidents were well
within technological capabilities. The causes of the accidents were understood before the accidents. The
accidents were caused by wrong decisions based on wrong technical information. (Decisions leading to
inappropriate heights of sea wall and locations of backup generators caused the Fukushima accidents.) Few
recognized the dangers created by the bad decisions until it was too late; the accidents had progressed to the
point where the effects of the decisions could not be reversed. Once the accidents started, many safety
systems were overwhelmed and defeated in cascades of systems failures, making the accidents worse.
Cleanup of these accidents is well beyond current technological and economic capabilities.
Page 25
Requiring industry to maintain accurate technical information amounts to cost-effective and

responsible accident prevention. Once cladding breaks, radioisotopes can spread uncontrollably and cleanup
often becomes impractical. NRC failures to require correction of and to block the spread of known bad and
suspect technical information that could undermine attempts to prevent such incidents is irresponsible.
Checking data is cheap. Nuclear accidents are unacceptably expensive and hazardous.
What did GE Nuclear state about the importance of accurate zirconium texture analysis data in some of its
purchase orders?
(Source: Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01. 19 The GE Purchase order
notification reproduced on page 19 in the decision.)
5. NRC Responses to the Texture Analysis Errors.

The NRC confirmed that both types of distortion errors were included in reports sent to the nuclear industry.
An NRC report1 stated the following.
The NRC confirmed the origins of the distortion error. An NRC report1 stated the following.
The NRC assessment of the errors was superficial and based upon uninformed sources.
The NRC report1 states that the NRC did not understand texture, so the NRC relied upon the unreviewed and
unpublished opinions from two selected consultants. These consultants also did not know intended and
potential uses of the data by GE Nuclear and other nuclear industry clients.
(Source: NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3. 1 Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy. Reproduced in Appendix I Part A below.
Documents posted on the NRC web site appeared to indicate that the major nuclear fuel fabrication company was Westinghouse, one company which
court records demonstrate had received and failed to recognize bad zirconium texture data from Lambda. Does the situation where the NRC relies on
Page 26
consultant from a company who had failed to recognize bad information in order to determine effects of that bad information amount to an absurd case
of the blind leading the blind?)
The NRC report1 indicates that neither the NRC nor its two selected consultants knew intended or
potential uses of texture information by GE Nuclear and Lambdas other clients.
The NRC experts qualified their limited conclusions, which appear to be somewhat vague and open
to interpretation. Both experts believed that texture analysis, alone, cannot be used to determine the
intrinsic mechanical properties of zirconium-based tubing material. The experts covered themselves by
qualifying their statements, as intrinsic mechanical properties can be considered as different from other
properties such as stress corrosion cracking resistance. Did the NRC inappropriately disregard these
qualifications to make broad, general conclusions for their report?
The NRC report indicated that their industrial experts company used different methods to evaluate
properties of zirconium alloys routinely. The report indicated that the experts believed that the errors could
indicate that good material was unacceptable, which could lead to bad decisions about zirconium uses .
(Note that evaluations of materials properties and performance testing often rely on unacceptable and
good materials as benchmarks and standards; accurate understanding of both unacceptable and good
materials is essential. Misidentification of good material as bad can create serious misunderstandings
about how alloys perform and degrade when exposed to harsh conditions like those in nuclear applications.
Also, the key problem is generation and spread of inaccurate information, not the particular test methods used
to qualify zirconium. The NRC consultants responses dont excuse uncontrolled dissemination of known
inaccurate technical information in the nuclear industry.)
The NRC report did not address published studies indicating that zirconium alloy texture was an
important property that determined, to a large extent, how zirconium alloys would perform and fail in
nuclear applications.5-14, 17,18 As summarized in Section 4 above, many studies and performance testing
demonstrate that texture influences zirconium failures. (Although some of the studies quoted in Section 4
were published after the initial NRC report, these studies cited earlier publications which described the
importance of texture in zirconium degradation. Some are quoted in Section 7 below.)
An internal NRC document (downloaded from the NRC web site in 2011, but apparently written
around the time of the NRC report) indicates the importance of understanding uses of the data in
determining concerns over bad data. Internal NRC documents downloaded from the NRC web site indicate
that the NRC had doubts based on uncertainty of how GE used the information. However, the NRC report did
not include the questions and concerns noted in their own documents. The following is an excerpt from the
document from the NRC web site that indicates that some at the NRC knew that texture could be important to
nuclear safety:
Page 27
(Source: NRC web site document ML011430491.pdf. )
Available records do not indicate what was meant by some minimal properties of the cladding. If
texture is not accurately measured, how can it be controlled? Despite its ignorance of the uses of the data and
a great amount of information indicating that understanding texture is critical to understanding zirconium alloy
component performance and failures, what did the NRC conclude about safety?
Publications indicate that distortion errors like those in the Lambda reports could make material look more
suitable for some nuclear applications than it actually was.
The distortion errors had the effect of making pole figures from some of the samples indicate lower
texture than actually was present in the sample. Grytsyna et al stated in their paper that There is no doubt
that lack of texture would be optimal in terms of radiation stability.12 The findings in this and other papers
indicate that the NRCs conclusions that texture errors are not safety concerns are inaccurate because, as this
and other papers note,13,17 radiation stability is a significant concern for zirconium fuel rods and other core
components. Simply put, even after consultations with two experts, the NRC got it wrong.
Did the NRC take any action concerning distorted or suspect results in past reports?
The NRC report indicates that the NRC relied upon limited statements from two selected expert
consultants (one of whoms company had received but failed to recognize inaccurate texture information)
as the basis for the NRCs broad conclusions and statements that the distribution of inaccurate technical data
was not safety concern and to decide that the NRC would not take action to eliminate or prevent the spread of
suspect technical information about critical reactor core components in the nuclear industry.
6. Recurrences of Zirconium Texture Analysis Failures and

Falsification of Records
As described above, after the NRC failed to take any action, technical issues concerning review of past
reports for distortion errors, the notifications to past clients, and Lambda procedural and related QA problems
remained unresolved and errors remain uncorrected and unresolved.
Page 28
Lambdas owner (Mr. Prevey) had forbidden Lambda Phase and Texture Analysis Laboratory Manager
(Dr. Kelly) from discussing them under penalty of dismissal.
(Source: Administrative Review Board (ARB) Case No. 02-075. Final Decision and Order. 20 The 3 page decision is reproduced in Appendix III below.)
Preveys own deposition testimony showed that Preveys edits included false information and that
their inclusion in the QAR would have made the QAR inaccurate.
(Source: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. 15 )
Prevey had edited the QAR to remove recommendations to improve defective procedures which had
been repeatedly provided to GE Nuclear in the course of audits of the texture analysis procedures for
compliance with 10CFR50b and 10CFR21.
(Source: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio.
15
Prevey removed recommendations to address failures of the procedure to reliably produce flat
samples, measurement of sample flatness, and software failures were removed from the QAR. He wrote that
they were Already present on the QAR.
( NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf. QAR edited by Lambda Owner Paul Prevey. 16 )
However, after the NRC was notified of the problems, the sample mounting procedure again failed
during analysis of another GE Nuclear zirconium fuel rod cladding specimen. In an unlikely coincidence,
Lambda management passed a version of Preveys edited QAR covering the past GE Nuclear failure to the lab
manage for signature on the same day as the GE Nuclear procedure failed again.
Page 29
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. Recommended Decision and Order. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).
21
Confirmation of the necessity to revise the procedures and to notify GE Nuclear (and other clients)
that procedures used on past samples were deficient became apparent the next day.
21
Note that Prevey had demanded that this same procedure not be changed. He had backed his
demands with firing threats.20 (Evidence indicated that Prevey fired people frequently. In one instance, he
fired the staff of a lab. Firing threats at Lambda were to be taken seriously.) Preveys actions appear to
confirm that procedure deficiencies contributed to the problems, that procedures needed revision, and that
his demanded edits to the QAR would have rendered it inaccurate.
Despite the recurrence of the procedure failure and subsequent procedure revisions, the QAR was still
inaccurate in ways that could mislead a future accident investigation and in ways that could lead to bad
decisions about review and use of inaccurate technical information. The original QARs descriptions of past
procedure failures that led to GE Nuclear analysis errors, descriptions of required procedure revisions,
recommendations to notify GE Nuclear (and other clients) of procedure deficiencies, and recommendations to
review past work done with the defective procedures for errors were kept out of the QAR prepared by Lambda
management. Therefore, this QAR would have misled any subsequent failure analysis investigation about the
history and extent of zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding analysis errors.
Furthermore, the QAR and managements new texture procedure still did not address the procedures
lack of sample flatness measurement and analysis software failures. (Procedure revisions to require flatness
measurements were made much later after court actions started. Effective NRC action could have forced
correction of these problems years earlier. Note that although the NRC was notified that inaccurate
information in reports and records were found during legal proceedings, the NRC appears to have done
nothing. As of 2013, there are no indications that effective reviews of past work done with defective
procedures were made and there are no indications that results known to be inaccurate were corrected and
that affected nuclear industry clients were notified of the errors. To the contrary (as unbelievable as it may
seem), in 2011, NRC officials wrote a letter to Senator Lugar indicating that the problems were not pursued.2)
Page 30
The failures of the Lambda procedures could have and should have been resolved months earlier,
when the original QAR was written. However, Lambdas owners removal of this procedure revision from the
QAR and his firing threats prohibiting discussion of the QAR and its problems prohibited correction of these
deficiencies.20,21 (Note that several judicial decisions findings of facts describe how the procedure deficiencies,
demands to prepare and sign inaccurate QARs, failures to allow reviews of past reports for errors and
notifications to clients, and firing threats were intertwined. )15,19,20,21
Prevey continued to pressure lab analysts to sign the QAR whose inaccuracy was confirmed by
procedure failures and his revision of the procedure.
(United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio.15 )
Coincident with the recurrence of the GE Nuclear cladding analysis problems, the owner changed lab
conditions to make any type of work impractical, made several angry outbursts, and made various threats.
(Court and deposition testimony demonstrate that lab workers did not argue or confront Prevey showing
anger.) Since the threats were more serious and the owner created conditions under which responsible
completion of technically difficult work was becoming increasingly impractical, the NRC was again contacted
and asked to investigate the testing problems, firing threats, a physical threat, and retaliation surrounding
concealment of the nature of the GE Nuclear errors and defective procedures. The NRC did not respond
during this critical period.
Prevey demanded signatures on an inaccurate QAR that concealed the full effect of the zirconium
alloy texture analysis problems. He initially demanded that the QAR be signed within five minutes, which
meant signing an unread QAR. The technician signed. Kelly asked for time to read it. Prevey demanded that
Page 31
the QAR be signed before Kelly left his office. He then stated that there would be no discussion or changes to
the QAR. Lambda Managements version of events recorded in the QAR was to remain unchanged. Lambdas
inaccurate QAR was to be signed unedited.
The ALJ decision described these events.
21
Although Kelly had attempted to contact the NRC in the week prior to the demands to sign the false
QAR, the NRC did not respond until well after events were over. (Oddly, one NRC investigator asked if Prevey
had smiled or laughed during his angry demands and exchanges. In another odd exchange, Prevey had made
the cryptic statement These people are not your friends shortly before he demanded that the QAR be
signed, but he never indicated who these people were. The NRC investigator later participated in the audit
described by NRC audit records containing false information.4)
What purposes do signed false document have when those documents have not been read by the
signers? Do they have any use other than to serve as possible cover for errors or misconduct? Do false
documents muddy the water so that, in event of an accident, misconduct by culpable parties might go
undetected? Do inaccurate and conflicting records foam the runway for companys who have engaged in
unethically risky but profitable practices? False information certainly has no role in good science. False
records have no legitimate place in engineering failure analysis investigations or in the nuclear industry.
Months later, other documents containing false statements that had been prepared by Lambda
management and signed by Prevey were found in legal discovery. The false statements concealed the extents
of analysis errors, including zirconium texture analysis errors. These fraudulent documents indicate why
signatures of the technician and Lambda manager on the inaccurate QAR might have been useful to parties
attempting to avoid being held responsible in event of an accident.
Page 32
Historically, inaccurate documentation has impeded accident investigations, concealed root causes of
accidents, could have led to inappropriate accident responses that made consequences of accidents worse,
and left doubts about effectiveness of operational decisions intended to prevent recurrence of accidents.
Notably, in the aviation industrys UA Flight 232 accident investigation, 22 the FAA stated that corrective action
intended to prevent a repeat of an engine explosion due to a materials failure that caused an accident that
killed over 110 passengers may fail to have its intended effect because suspect disks could remain in service
due to inaccuracies in decades-old manufacturer records. 22
(Source: National Transportation Safety Board, PB90-910406 NTSB/AAR-90/06, Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232. 22)
In Nov. of 2011, the NRC reaffirmed its conclusions that the NRC would take no action on known
inaccurate and suspect zirconium materials information in a letter to US Senator Richard Lugar.
To date, the NRC has not reported any correction of known inaccurate and suspect zirconium alloy
data in industry. After being told of inaccurate information identified after their initial report, the NRC did not
follow-up or request details required to retrieve records containing false information for review. To the
contrary, the NRC reaffirmed its 1999 report (ignoring subsequent errors and misconduct noted above) in a
letter to Senator Richard Lugar in 2011.
(Source: NRC Correspondence. R. W. Borchardt letter to Senator Richard Lugar, dated Nov. 23, 2011.2 This letter is reproduced in the appendix below.)
The NRC had new information between the date of their original report and the time that the NRCs
2011 letter to Senator Lugar was written. The NRC was notified of specific bad zirconium data found in
discovery in court actions. The NRC was on distribution lists of legal proceedings which included and involved
generation of fraudulent industry records which were unavailable at the time of the original NRC report. The
NRC was provided with published references describing how zirconium texture influenced the deterioration of
nuclear components. The NRC was told of bad and suspect data identified after their initial report. The NRC
itself had funded studies indicating that zirconium texture helped determine component deterioration in
nuclear applications years earlier.5 (Does the NRC pay any attention when it is notified of bad information?
Does the NRC read and understand the studies that it funds at taxpayer expense? )
Page 33
In 2011, problems involving control rod insertion systems were identified at several plants.23 Were
industry and the NRC-directed corrective actions intended to fix these problems based on accurate technical
information?
7. Courts Rely on Uninformed NRC Safety Assessments to Dismiss Safety Concerns.

Judicial decisions have significant impact on nuclear safety 24, 25. Courts proceedings will help
determining if existing nuclear industry practices are adequate to allow continued safe operation at nuclear
power plants.38 Courts decide whether or not frauds and bad behavior that could create unacceptable hazards
will be corrected. Courts set binding precedents concerning nuclear safety that are followed by other courts
deciding legal actions.25
Some current legal precedents have been interpreted to require courts to rely on NRC information. In
one recent case, the decision supported NRC positions over opposing views and evidence that lower courts
found to be more credible and responsible. Citing legal precedent, the appeals court ruled that the lower
courts overstep their legal bounds by preempting Congress role in regulating nuclear material under the
Atomic Energy Act.24,25
Does the NRCs stated toleration of bad information in industry and reliance on industry for technical
guidance amount to "institutionalizing ignorance"? Does this NRC approach lead to legal decisions and laws
that require practices known to be unsafe by the scientific community? Do such rulings set precedents that
allow pro-industry and politicized elements within the NRC to trump science and technology with
authoritarian pronouncements base on application of law?
The following section focuses on how the NRC safety assessment accepting inaccurate technical data
and records while disregarding explicit industry warnings and the scientific literature impacted legal
proceedings arising from the zirconium errors. A few broader information issues arising during 2012 Indian
Point nuclear plant licensing hearings are described. The purpose is to show that legalistic approaches to
technical information can be inadequate due to authoritarian approaches to information. Courts
inappropriately relying on the NRC as an authority can lead to decisions that increase nuclear hazards. Flawed
NRC information practices are root causes of these types of problems.
NRC Dismissals of Safety Concerns Lead to Judicial Findings that Refusal to Falsify
Documentation of Zirconium Analysis Errors Was Unwillingness to Obey a Valid Order.
The problems with the zirconium analysis errors led to several legal actions. The NRC recommended
making a complaint with the US Department of Labor based on discrimination and filing for unemployment.
Cases arose from the Energy Reorganization Act, the Lanham Act, and various other laws involving industry
frauds and demands by industry that employees participate in frauds.
Courts repeatedly cited the NRC report in dismissing safety concerns. Multiple actions and multiple
appeals led to multiple decisions in multiple courts which also relied on the NRC assessment. Courts
Page 34
disregarded evidence from more-technically informed parties and publications that refuted the NRC
conclusions. Was the NRC channeling complaints into legal venues that would bury industry problems?
The 6th District Court of Appeals relied on the NRCs Report to determine that erroneous texture
analysis of the zirconium encasement on fuel rods will not have adverse safety consequences.
( Source: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. 15 Note that the NRCs letter is the cover letter to the NRC report which is part of Reference 1, reproduced in Appendix 1 .)
In light of other NRC information and other technical information not addressed in the NRCs letter,
this courts statements are technically incorrect and far too broad. What hazardous practices could be ruled
legal and thus, unstoppable, if this ruling was regarded as a legal precedent?
The courts broad conclusions conflict with internal NRC records which indicate that there are uses
where texture results may be very important.
(Source: NRC web site document ML011430491.pdf. Note that this document was not made available by the NRC during court proceedings.
The NRC kept the investigation open until legal proceedings are concluded. Ongoing investigations can be barriers to discovery of internal NRC
documents. )
The courts broad conclusions also conflict with a later Argonne National Laboratory study funded by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research state about the general
importance of zirconium hydrides crystallographic properties (which encompass texture).
The morphology, orientation, distribution, and crystallographic aspects of Zr hydrides in fuel cladding
fabricated from Zr-base alloys play important roles in fuel performance during all phases before and after
discharge from the reactor, i. e., normal operation, transient and accident situations in reactor, temporary
storage in a dry cask, and permanent storage in a waste repository. 5(Emphasis added.)
(Source: H. M. Chung et al. Characteristics of Hydride Precipitation and Reorientation on Spent-Fuel Cladding. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 13th
International Symposium, p. 561.) (Note that zirconium hydrides are mechanically brittle and, chemically, highly reactive species that form and
accumulate in zirconium cladding while in use in the reactor. When stressed or exposed to coolant water, hydrides are weak links in cladding that can
form pinholes and initiate cracks that leak radioisotopes. Cracking can cause fuel rods to leak, break, and release fuel radioactive fission products.)
The Federal Court relied on the NRC report to find that the inaccurate data and generation of fraudulent
documents were not safety concerns or violations of law.
Page 35
( Source: Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01.19)
Once courts discard safety concerns, courts appeared to be free to find that companies can lawfully demand
preparation of and signatures on documents containing false information.
(Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01. 19 Note that the NRC documents
reproduced in the appendix below and GE Nuclear documents in the court records indicate that the NRC and GE Nuclear each reviewed these internal
quality assurance incident reports whose falsification the court deemed legal. Its also interesting to note that Lambda had actually introduced copies of
the Quality Assurance Incident Report (QAR) in a hearing along with an ex parte communication to the hearing officer explaining the QAR. Practically,
this court decision appears to amount to legalizing deception and fraud. Technically, this is a recipe for disaster and cover-up by the nuclear industry at
the expense of the general public. Acceptance of and deference to corporate misconduct is not unusual in the greater Cincinnati legal community
where the legal proceedings took place. 29 )
The Sixth District Court ignored the unsure statement in the NRC report, characterized the few NRC
phone calls to its two select consultants as a specific investigation into the potential dangers posed by
zirconium-cladded fuel rods which had been inaccurately tested, and regarded the admittedly ignorant NRC
as the overriding authority in legally determining what constituted a safety concern (even though the NRC
safety assessment appears to have relied upon an employee of one of the major fuel fabrication companies
which received bad texture information and failed to recognize it as inaccurate).
(United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. 15 The statement dismissing Glavicic is inaccurate: Glavicic clearly testified that he was a physicist, not a chemist, and one of his
publications concerning his work on nuclear reactor materials in nuclear engineering applications was in evidence. Also in evidence was Kellys
experience in metallurgical analysis, including work in support of the UA 232 accident investigation described below. The courts statements are good
examples of the judiciarys inappropriate authoritarian approaches to science and technology.)
In counterpoint to the last sentence in the above excerpt from a federal courts decision, it should be
noted that materials scientists have indicated that materials must be understood in terms of fundamental
chemical processes. Professor Donald Sadoway of MIT succinctly commented on the importance of
Page 36
understanding the chemical origins of materials At the end, everything is chemistry. The rest is stamp
collecting. 30
The Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on the NRC report dismissing safety concerns
to dismiss allegations that the errors and defective procedures were safety concerns.
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. Recommended Decision and Order. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 21
(Its interesting to note that no evidence indicated that Prevey had performed any meaningful assessment of the safety situation. Preveys testimony
indicates that he did not know how GE Nuclear or other nuclear industry clients could use or misuse inaccurate information and did not have the
knowledge or resources to perform a safety assessment.)
No evidence indicated that Prevey ever performed or was qualified to make a credible safety
assessment. While the excerpted statement from the decision appears to be creative invention by ALJ,
reliance on the NRC led the ALJ to ignore the very real GE Nuclear 10CFR21 and 10CCFR50b safety notices,
testimony, and published scientific literature describing texture effects on cladding deterioration in evidence
that accurately described the safety situation.
GE Nuclear notifications, testimony, and publications in evidence demonstrating safety concerns that were
disregarded by courts due to the NRC report.
The GE Nuclear purchase orders (PO) warnings and audit documentation for zirconium texture analysis
indicated that 10CFR21 and 10CFR50b applied to the work and described nuclear hazards that could arise from
errors.
(Source: Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western
Division. 12-3-01. GE Purchase order reproduced on page 19 in the decision.)19
Testimony from a former Lambda physicist hostile to the legal actions (one of whose publications in
the nuclear field was in evidence) indicated that texture was Most definitely a safety concern:
Page 37
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).
This physicist also testified about the importance of texture in more technical terms (which may be
less clear to those without appropriate technical backgrounds):
(Source:
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31)
Page 38
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31)
Published scientific studies linking texture to nuclear safety concerns were in evidence.
One paper in evidence, The influence of Crystallographic Texture and Test Temperature on Initiation
and Propagation of Stress-Corrosion Cracks in Zircaloy, D. Knorr et. al. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 6th
International Symposium (1982), P. 627 32 concludes Crystallographic texture exerts a strong influence on
both the initiation and propagation of iodine stress-corrosion cracks in unirradiated Zircaloy. (p. 649.)
The published discussion of this paper includes this comment by A. B. Johnson of Battelle Northwest
that indicates that failures occur suddenly without warning: Having inspected many cross sections of
irradiation Zircaloy fuel cladding, I am impressed that evidence of incipient cracks is generally absent. I am
aware of a view that a crack will propagate rapidly to failure if it initiates under reactor operating conditions.
This could explain why we generally observed either failures or absence of cracks.32
The paper and discussion include comments on texture effects on methods commonly applied to
materials failure analysis. As the papers title The influence of Crystallographic Texture and Test
Temperature on Initiation and Propagation of Stress-Corrosion Cracks in Zircaloy indicates, crystallographic
texture influences zirconium failures in nuclear reactors and in spent fuel storage pools, especially when
overheated (eg, during loss of coolant accidents ).
The abstract of another paper in evidence Variation in the Strain Anisotropy of Zircaloy with
Temperature and Strain, by Hindle and Worswick, published in Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry, 6th
International Symposium (1982) p. 133, 33 begins The strong crystallographic texture which is developed
during the fabrication of zirconium-based alloys cause pronounced anisotropy in their mechanical properties,
particularly deformation. The abstract ends The effects of the strain anisotropy observed are discussed in
relation to the effects of temperatures on the ductility of Zircaloy fuel cladding tubes during postulated
large-break loss-of-coolant accidents.
Lacking technical expertise to evaluate technical issues and relying on the NRC, courts did not appear
to understand or appreciate the fact that that inaccurate technical information undermines such studies and
the understanding of the very same experts who the NRC and others would likely call upon for guidance in
event of nuclear accidents. (Papers published as late as 2009 indicate that the roles of texture in zirconium
component failures are still not fully understood6, indicating that the 2011 NRC response to Senator Lugar2 was
Page 39
irresponsibly inaccurate.)
Dismissing safety concerns, courts ruled that refusals to prepare and sign an inaccurate record concerning
zirconium alloy errors in reports distributed to the nuclear industry were failures to obey a valid order.
Despite finding that Preveys edits would have rendered the QAR inaccurate and despite the later
history of actually changing the procedure as requested in the original accurate QARs, the ALJ court still found
that the QAR should have been changed as requested by Lambda management and that refusal amounted to
unwillingness to obey a valid order .
21
The 6th District court had noted that Preveys own deposition indictated that one ordered edit of the
QAR was inaccurate:
`(Source: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio.15 Note that the DOL ALJ hearing included the evidence that Preveys QAR edits contained false informationthe ALJ
ignored this evidence in the decision21.)
Prevey actually participated in changing the procedure at a later date, demonstrating that other
ordered QAR edits removing mention of the procedure deficiencies and the need for procedure revisions
were inaccurate.
21
Yet a court found that QAR recommendations to change the procedure were unreasonable.
(Source: Administrative Review Board (ARB) Case No. 02-075. Final Decision and Order.20)
Three courts appear to have ruled that preparation of a QAR record containing false information about
notification of defects to a client is unwillingness to obey a valid order21, is unreasonable20, and does not
violate any federal, state, or local laws19.
Page 40
Refusal to obey a valid order is a firing offense. Unreasonable behavior is often considered
reasonable grounds for dismissal. Courts into which the NRC directed legal complaints appear to rely on NRC
guidance to render decisions that support nuclear industry demands on employees to generate false records
that conceal nuclear industry defects.
Hearing rules limited introduction of evidence into the record. Technical evaluations are made by
judges unqualified to make technical assessments. Different courts made different and sometimes
incompatible findings of facts. But in nearly every case, the courts reliance on bad information from the
NRC was the greatest barrier to correction of known errors in nuclear technical information. Legal
precedents and flat-earther authoritarian pronouncements led the judges to rely on the NRC and to disregard
more credible sources. (The NRC report1 appears to have been effectively employed by industry and their
lawyers and relied upon by the courts to block corrections of errors in reports sent to the aviation and other
industries, including US military organizations.34,35 )
In 2012, flawed NRC information practices became apparent during the NRC Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board Panel Hearing. (Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR. ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01. In the
Matter of: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3. Note that copies of the
hearing transcripts quoted below were provided by Ms. Manna Joe Greene of Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. Since copies of the transcripts and hearing exhibits could not be located on the NRC web site, the copies
of the hearing transcripts provided by Clearwater were posted on at scribd.com. While there is no reason to
doubt the accuracy of the transcripts at this point, the following quotes should be reviewed in the full context
of the official hearing transcripts, exhibits, and other evidence when the NRC makes them available in order to
understand how NRC information problems impacted the course of this hearing.)
In 2012, an NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel of three judges held evidentiary hearings
involving contentions and concerns raised by New York State, Riverkeeper, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, and
other parties opposing relicensing of the applicant Entergys Indian Point Generating Station. The transcripts
of this hearing38 provide several examples of the NRC information problems which could adversely influence
decision processes. (In the following, the location of the discussion in the hearing transcript is indicated by a
T. followed by the page number in the hearing transcript.)
Discussion of differences in results obtained from computer models included testimony about NUREG1150 (Nuclear Regulation 1150), which concerns consequences of nuclear reactor accidents. Origins of certain
numbers, input parameters, and other information important to accident cleanup calculations were
questioned. (T. page 2006). This led a judge to ask if a witness if it was his position that Sandia study
referenced in a NUREG actually looked into a dispersion of primarily plutonium contamination? (T. page
2007.) A witness identified the referenced Sandia study (also called Os84): Its Ostmeyer and Runkle, An
assessment of decontamination costs and effectiveness for accident radiological releases, Sandia National
Labs. And, again, its stated as To Be Published. (T. page 2008.)
However, the Sandia study referenced by the NUREG appeared to have remained unpublished. An
attorney for the state of New York said we searched libraries. I also contacted Brian Harris, counsel for
NRC Staff and requested a copy of Os84. Mr. Harris represented to me that he searched internal NRC libraries,
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as well as Sandia libraries, and that no copy of Os84 in any form, draft, or otherwise could be located, so we do
notnone of the parties have a copy of this document. (T. page 2010.)
One hearing judge questioned the situation. Let me ask, if the NRC doesnt have a copy of it, how can
the NRC -- how did the NRC rely on it in developing this guidance on NUREG/CR-3673? How were you able to
reference it if you never had it? (T. page 2010.)
A copy could not be located. Mr. Joseph Jones of the NRC responded to a question about whether
Sandia Lab could provide the study. No, I checked with our librarians, as well, and we were unable to locate
it. (T. page 2011.)
There were guesses about assumptions about the kinds of contamination described in the lost Sandia
study. Dr. Anita Ghosh stated And it does talk about severe accidents, so I guess we would have no reason to
assume that they were looking at a different composition than what a severe reactor accident would produce.
(T. page 2011.)
Judge Michael Kennedy commented on the lost Sandia study. So, okay, we lost the reference to
1984. Someone convinced themselves, and then the Staff viewed it as reasonableand, again, I know were
not looking at great science, but what Im struggling with is, okay, we lost the reference, but it is 30 years later,
and were trying to deal with a plant-specific analysis for this facility. (T. page 2016.)
Judge Lawrence McDade commented. But what this does is leave us with a degree of uncertainty as
to exactly what the source for the contaminants that are referred to. It may have been plutoniumbut at this
point theres no way to really be sure of that. (T. page 2026.) (Note that plutonium contamination can have
serious implications.)
Its unclear if the lost and apparently unpublished Sandia study was located. Its difficult to determine
from the available transcripts if the questions about values were resolved. Was acceptance of the values
rationalized based guess about what the NRC would have done at the time (T. page 2011), on the observation
that, so far, the NUREGs have stood the test of time (T. 2251), or on a responsible and reviewable scientific
basis that many would expect (T. page 2010)? Even if the issues were all resolved in a technically responsible
manner, the course of the hearing did seem to indicate that the NRC had significant problems with information
that they should have maintained. The NRCs failures may have undermined the credibility of the NUREGs that
rely upon the lost information, may have cast doubts on the credibility of hearings like these, and did lead to
the waste of hearing time and the waste of the limited resources of the parties.
The judges approach to the information problems in the hearing seemed appropriate for a legal
exercise. Would the same approach be appropriate (or even be possible) if answers to question questions
about the origins and the reliabilities of values used to derive or derived from NUREG information were
needed by engineers making urgent decisions that that would determine responses to an ongoing nuclear
accident? In legal proceedings, there is time to question NUREG references (T. page 2010), guess about
assumptions (T. page 2011), and consult with librarians (T. page 2011). Lawyers and judges dont need great
science for their legal semantics (T. Page 2016). In event of a nuclear accident, decisions would probably have
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to be made quickly. Guesses and assumptions would not be welcome. There might not be time to ask
question librarians about document locations. Decisions would be difficult if information sources did not
answer question like Were these estimates of cleanup effectiveness of a certain set of available methods
based on an accident involving plutonium or just other radioisotopes? Would information whose credibility
was largely based on the fact that it stood the test of time for all of three decades be regarded as reliable?
Accidents are the times that great science are required. However, the NRC, the courts, and industry lawyers
appear to work to ensure that the best science available in event of a nuclear accident will fall far short of
great science. The resulting doubts and confusion about information will serve the purposes of parties
attempting to evade being held responsible quite well.
Different types of NRC information problems were evident earlier in the hearing, when contentions
concerning metal fatigue and flow-accellerated corrosion of pipes were addressed. Questionable technical
information appeared to be the basis for use (abuse?) of hearing rules to exclude important technical
information that was not from the nuclear industry from consideration (T. page 1543). The significance of this
problem is that the judges were controlling the course of the hearing, including what evidence would be
allowed into the record.
One contention in the hearing concerned materials degradation due to flow-accelerated corrosion
(FAC) of reactor coolant pipes. Parties disagreed about the effectiveness of the aging management program.
The effectiveness of software, scheduling, and inspection procedures employed to address FAC was
questioned. The NRC, industry, and the parties raising the concerns seemed to agree that FAC was responsible
for significant amounts of degradation at the plant. Testimony and other evidence seemed to hinge on
definitions of what constituted FAC and what degradation was not FAC. (T. page 1395.) The industrial
applicant and the NRC appeared to narrowly define FAC as involving a relatively simple degradation process
that thinned pipes at rates linear with time. Industry pipe inspection programs included some scheduling that
was to be initiated by a relatively simple computer program that assumed that pipe thinning with time was a
relatively simple, linear process. In their procedures, pipe thinning inspections for pipes believed susceptible
to nonlinear modes of erosion that are known to occur synergistically in pipe elbows and other flow
geometries involving turbulent flow were to be managed by application of operating experience and
engineering judgment. (T. page 1439.) This vague criteria appears to be more appropriate for limiting legal
liabilities than for preventing pipe failures.
Other testimony and evidence raised questions about whether or not, in the real world, the more
complex nonlinear thinning processes could be separated or defined out of FAC. Corrosion and erosion due
to cavitation and other degradation appear to occur synergistically in many systems; considering them as
distinct, separate processes would appear to be, technically, the wrong approach. Inspection procedures and
frequencies under the applicants aging management program did not appear to be adequate to detect wall
thinning due to synergistic corrosion and erosion before failure. Both parties agreed that the software used
for scheduling of inspections for many types of pipes did not address the nonlinear modes of corrosion
involving synergistic erosion and cavitation processes (T. page 1438).
In support of their view, the NRC and industry appeared to rely on vague procedures and descriptions
of how to manage inspections and degradation. Judges questioned statements like procedures would be
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consistent with legal requirements for an aging management program were adequate. (T. pages 13441346, 1368-1371.) Application of operating experience and engineering judgment appeared to mean that
certain things are kind of within the skill of the personnel that are implementing the program that may be
covered by the procedures... (T. page 1372). Kind of...--what does that mean? NRC staff had a highly
questionable response to questions about this procedure and a four page long Flow-accelerated corrosion
program: But I would expect that the FAC engineer probably has a notebook thats probably about that thick
that would have all of the procedures that exist to implement the program. (T. page 1417.) In event of an
accident, would one expect that a judge probably might not find industry liable if the NRC knew of and
approved of such apparently undocumented and uncontrolled procedures and allowed industry to operate?
(Note that a federal judge in one zirconium case described above ruled that industry did nothing illegal by filing
internally false documentation.19 Does this type of ruling meant that the notebook of procedures thats
probably about that thick could legally contain false information generated to reduce legal liabilities in event
of accidents? ) After the Fukushima accidents, TEPCO blamed NISA for some of the circumstances leading to
the accident. TEPCO was bailed out. NISA was abolished.
This type of testimony may have been effective in supporting legal arguments advanced at this and
other licensing renewal hearings. However, many responsible engineers and scientists would probably find
aging reactor management plans that include statements like operating experience and engineering
judgment and that actions would be consistent with legal requirements for an aging management program
would be too nebulous and vague to be considered reliable procedures. Objective procedures and criteria are
a far better basis for establishing timely inspection schedules and procedures. Accurate understanding of
materials are the basis these types of technical decisions, which are required to safely operate reactors and to
respond to accidents in ways that will take into account the actual behaviors and conditions of decades-old
systems and components. Vague procedures and company records may limit legal liabilities in event of
failures, but they also increase the probability that engineered systems will fail and accidents will actually
occur as a result of misunderstandings of the chemistry and physics of plant degradation.
At some points in the hearing, the parties and the judges appeared engaged in absurd-sounding
semantics and word games. The arguments might sound like great law to a lawyer, but they read like terrible
science to an electrochemist or a materials scientist.
The license hearings are also fundamentally flawed because they limit participation to a few parties on
either side of the issue opposing or supporting the license renewal. Much of the scientific information is
shielded from public review on the grounds that it is proprietary. Unlike a scientific discussion, which benefits
from open input from many parties, the NRC hearing process gives voice to and, as importantly, limits access
to much of the industry information to only a few parties. Some parties appear to be follow narrow risk-averse
legal strategies to advance positions most likely to succeed rather than advocate for a decision based on a
comprehensive review of the technical issues. The proceedings sometimes appear to amount to arguments
for justifiable caution against arguments backed by dubiously optimistic projections.
The NRC and the nuclear industry appear to be excluding significant technical information from the
record and appear to be concealing technical information that is in the record from public scrutiny with claims
of proprietary confidential information. The legal decision might well be rendered based on the legal
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resources of the opposing parties and the judges that control the course of the proceedings. They might not
be based on open, objective, and complete evaluations of the chemistry and physics of the materials in the
aging reactors.
(Going beyond the specific information issues, are the NRC ALJ hearings appropriate venues for
resolving relicensing disputes involving complex technical issues? While courts and science both employ logic
as a tool, logic is only as good as the facts or premises to which it is applied. Courts have rules of evidence
which are sometimes arbitrarily interpreted by judges to control which facts that the court will decision in
rendering decisions. Courts also regard on precedent for decisions in attempts to maintain consistencies in
application of the law across disparate sets of cases. Courts often apply the legal principle of res judicata (or
a thing settled) and consider Findings of Facts and decisions as final). In a technical review, such practices
would be regarded as scientific misconduct. Although they are imperfect, scientific reviews attempt to
consider facts based on their reliability and do not disregard facts or remove from consideration due to
exclusionary rules or other rules of the process. Issues are reconsidered when warranted by improvements
in understanding and other circumstances -- there is no equivalent of res judicata in science. Science does
not defer to precedents; each review stands on its own merits. Scientific reviews question and critically
evaluate the facts used as the basis of past conclusions when revisiting a dispute. While scientific reviews may
include some elements that could be considered advocacy, scientific reviews are fundamentally different from
legal proceedings in that good lawyers are expected to put clients interests above all else. Lawyers win-at-all
costs ethics often leads them to seek exclusion of evidence contrary to their position. Good scientists would
regard such behavior as scientific misconduct. Is the NRC committing a fundamental error by relying on courts
that operate under hearing rules that have developed in civil law, not science?)
Based on the number of times that lawyers were able to elicit admissions of uncertainty and error
from the other side, the superficial projection of technical competence and confidence by the applicant, and
the legal logic of the arguments in the transcripts, the applicant appears to have presented evidence and a set
of facts more favorable to relicensing the plant, from a legal viewpoint.
However, the NRC staffs consistent support of the industry that they regulate appears to be one of
the most influential factors on judges controlling hearings like these. Courts have ruled that lower courts
overstep their authority when their ruling contradict NRC decisions. 24, 25 Regardless of the merits of any
particular cases,, the NRC disregard of the need for accurate and reviewable records combined with the courts
deference to the NRC amount to institutionalization of ignorance and are a recipe for disaster.
What effects do court rulings that refusals to falsify documentation of nuclear errors are
unreasonable, violate no laws, and amount to unwillingness to obey a valid order have on the integrity of
nuclear industry information that will be relied on to mitigate effects of nuclear accidents and to derive the
lessons learned from post accident analysis of industry information? Are inaccurate, suspect, or lost
technical information and false records more likely to cause or prevent nuclear accidents?
8. Opaque and Incomplete NRC Investigations
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Although impaired by the judges lack of technical expertise and reliance on the uninformed NRC
report, court proceedings did lead to the generation of court records that contained the evidence reviewed.
Judicial decisions did serve to describe judges perceptions and reasoning, right or wrong.
In contrast, the NRC investigation was opaque. The NRC investigation appears to have consisted of
limited interviews, followed by a whitewash audit supplemented by inaccurate records.
NRC officials had indicated that they would conclude their investigation after legal proceedings were
finished. Practically, keeping their investigation open and ongoing appears to kept significant NRC
information concealed from and unavailable to parties in court actions. Some examples of unavailable
information include inaccurate and conflicting NRC audit records 3,4 . (These inaccurate NRC records were
found on the NRC web site in 2011. Parts are reproduced in the appendix below.) This raises questions. What
other information and activities did the NRC conceal in the course of their investigation that could be viewed
as adverse to the nuclear industry agenda?
During discovery, the NRC was told of inaccuracies in reports sent to the nuclear industry that were
found during discovery, as well as other misconduct. The NRC was on the distribution lists of legal filings which
included exhibits documenting misconduct. Available records indicate that the NRC took no action to correct
bad information or review suspect information. The NRC did not even request information that would allow
retrieval of specific inaccurate and suspect documents for review. The NRC 2011 letter to Senator Lugar and
other documents indicate that some NRC officials responsible for investigating problems were not even aware
of many of the court records and other information provided to or by the NRC.
Eventually, the NRC dismissed all allegations against Lambda. When asked about these results and
misconduct, one NRC official stated that the NRC applied a no harm-no foul standard to these situations. He
then indicated that the issue was over. His statements indicated that the entire NRC process was not
intended to find and fix nuclear industry problems, but a farce intended to fix employees and critics
troubling the nuclear industry. In the NRCs view, what constitutes a foul which would motivate them to
take action to correct known inaccurate information? Excessive harm arising from a nuclear accident?
Related NRC audit records indicate that there were gaps in the NRC investigation and considerable
tolerance of inaccurate industry information and faulty QA practices. NRC audit records also contain false
information apparently generated by NRC investigators. However, the NRC did not provide details of their
investigation or audit records to parties who could evaluate these problems and who recognize these
problems. Some relevant NRC records that were generated during legal proceedings were provided to the
nuclear industry, but not to the courts or plaintiffs involved. Eventually, some relevant NRC records were
found on-line.
(Note that excerpts of court decisions, NRC records, and related records are reproduced in order to
describe the circumstances surrounding the attempts to correct the inaccurate and questionable zr
information distributed in the nuclear industry. Complete court decisions 15, 20, 21 and related NRC records 3,4
are posted on the internet. Different judges arbitrarily relied on different evidence to arrive at different
findings. Prior to the zirconium case ALJ decision, a settlement offer of $60,000 with restrictions on plaintiffs
Page 46
speech regarding the issue was countered with $90,000 (approximate value of lost salary and benefits from
the entire situation) to open a lab (ie, no restrictions due to anti- competition) and no other restrictions on
plaintiff. A day later, a second alternative counter offer of $50,000 but requiring an ALJ decision and no
restrictions on plaintiff speech was submitted through the complainants lawyer. Being on the distribution
list, the NRC and others should have had access to the court records at that point. The ALJ issued a decision
against the complainant before a response was received. Appeals over the next five years cited the NRC report
to find that it was not reasonable to view inaccuracies in reports on zirconium nuclear components as safety
concerns. Regardless of the decisions and viewed in the context of the published literature and NRC
statements, judicial records indicate that the NRC and the nuclear industry still have significant information
problems that could create serious hazards in event of a nuclear accident. Like the NRC, the judiciary appears
to have a consistent pro-industry bias, although the details in findings of facts that judges arbitrary select
from evidence in the courts records are inconsistent with each other. In every nuclear accident, physics and
chemistry will creates one set of facts. The consequences of many of those facts will be adverse to all
concerned, and no judicial decision will undo the real-world consequences of those facts. Reliance on bad
information in deciding what actions should be taken in response to accidents could very well make accidents
worse. The NRC should pursue inaccurate and suspect information in the nuclear industry and require that
industry review for the errors and maintain only accurate information that will be of value in event of a nuclear
accident and flag suspect information as unreliable. Reliance on inaccurate technical information can be far
more hazardous than recognizing that reliable technical information is not available.)
9. Inaccurate NRC Audit Records Conceal Recurring Nuclear Industry Problems.

The NRC itself generated inaccurate information that conceals the recurring nature and significance of
QA problems that led to the release of erroneous reports. The NRCs tolerance of inaccurate information,
faulty procedures, deficient Quality Assurance (QA) practices, unreliable software, and false records is
irresponsible behavior for a regulatory agency. However, NRC audit records found in 2012 in the course of
preparing this document indicate that NRC itself has actually generated inaccurate records that could conceal
industry problems and has generated records that intentionally and disingenuously decouple industry
deficiencies from regulatory requirements. These significant regulatory failures demonstrate that the NRC has
systemic information problems.
A. The NRCs 1999 report clearly states that errors in Lambda reports were due to QA problems, yet
the NRC took no effective actions at that time.
(Source: NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3. Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy.1 )
B. Later, NRC observation of an audit of Lambda high level nuclear waste container materials
analysis noted several of the same types of procedure, training, software, record, and QA problems that led
to the earlier-identified dissemination of inaccurate Zr data in the nuclear industry.
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In 2001, Lambda was audited to evaluate its implementation of QA in work unrelated to their errorprone Zr texture analysis.3 The NRC, DOE, and Bechtel SAIC participated in this 2001 audit. The purpose of the
audit was evaluation of QA for the residual stress measurements of welded mockups supporting the design of
the high-level waste containers for nuclear waste repositories. The work was related to Yucca Mountain.
The 2001 NRC Observation Audit Report No. OAR-02-01 Observation Audit of the Bechtel SAIC LLC
Audit No. BSC-SA-01-30 of Lambda Research Inc. states that NRC auditors were at Lambda in 2001:
(Source: US NRC Observation Audit Report No. OAR-02-01, NRC web site file ML013330072.pdf. 3 Parts of this audit record are reproduced in the
appendix below. Note that Lambda occupied only one small building located in Cincinnati, Ohio.)
This 2001 audit identified deficiencies in training, procedures, software, and records while observing
testing activities at Lambda:
(Source: US NRC Observation Audit Report No. OAR-02-01, NRC web site file ML013330072.pdf. 3)
These deficiencies in the nuclear waste repository work are the same types of problems that were
noted in the earlier NRC in Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy report1, quoted above. Residual stress analysis
is different than zirconium texture analyses, but stress analysis relied on some of the same procedures. The
same Lambda QA system covered residual stress analysis, zirconium analysis, and other analysis done at
Lambda.
As a result of this audit, some corrective actions were recommended. The QA deficiencies that
contributed to the generation of inaccurate zirconium texture analysis information and the distribution of
inaccurate reports were not mentioned in this NRC audit report. Lambda appears to have been allowed to
continue QA work on waste containers.
An incredible irony apparently lost on the NRC was that Lambdas QA-deficient work for Bechtel was
itself QA support. What good is QA support if it is based on bad QA? Is this an example of the type of
defense-in-depth safety that the NRC and nuclear industry claims that they practice? Does bad QA guard
against bad QA? Or is it closer to intentional incompetence that would be very convenient and useful in the
finger-pointing and blame shifting that often follow accidents as companies and their lawyers exploit every
inconsistency in records in legal maneuvers intended to avoid liabilities. From a standpoint of public safety,
which is worse -- incompetence or corruption? (It may also be interesting to note that Lambda marketing
literature claimed that Lambda was certified by all major corporations in the nuclear industries for meeting
their specific criteria for laboratory testing.)
(Its also significant to note that, as described in Section 7, a federal judge ruled that generation of an
internal false QA record did not violate any federal, state, or local laws.19 The NRC, GE Nuclear, and other
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nuclear industry audits rely in large part on review of internal QA records of the company being audited. Is
NRC auditors tolerance of poor QA setting the NRC up to be held responsible in event of an accident? After
Fukushima, some TEPCO officials offered the defense that TEPCO only did what Japans nuclear and industrial
safety agency allowed TEPCO to do. Do demonstrably inaccurate records of a subcontractor limit legal
liabilities of larger companies in event of a nuclear accident? Its interesting to note that this judge relied on
the earlier NRC report indicating that the NRC would not pursue whether distorted results were reported to
Lambda clients1 for some findings in the decision indicating that filing false internal QA records was not
illegal19.)
C. Misleading information and inaccuracies in NRC records of a later audit of Lambda zirconium analysis
have the effect of concealing a history of recurring QA problems that caused dissemination of inaccurate
information about nuclear fuel rod materials in the nuclear industry.
On September 27-28, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) audited portions of Lambdas
Quality Assurance (QA) program and effectiveness of 10CFR Part 21 controls.4 The2004 audit examined a
Quality Assurance Incident Report of problems with crystallographic texture analysis of zirconium alloys for GE
Nuclear.
Comparisons of 2004 NRC audit records of Lambda Research texture work with 2001 NRC audit
records of Lambda Research high level nuclear waste container stress work indicate that the NRC produced
audit records containing serious false and misleading information. This NRC production of false information in
NRC audit records has the effect of concealing the recurring nature of nuclear industry QA problems.
Concealing such problems amounts to tolerating their recurrence. Industry technical and QA information
becomes increasingly unreliable under such conditions, sometimes apparently being corrected only when
problems are discovered by external parties due to a failure and industry is forced to fix problems. In event of
an accident or incident, follow-up investigations intended to prevent recurrence of the accident or incident
could be compromised by conflicting information, as occurred in the UA 232 accident investigation22.
This 2004 NRC audit record contains false information that conceals the recurring nature of QA
problems.
The NRC 2004 audit reports part 2.0 Status of Previous Inspection Findings is inaccurate.
(Source: NRC Inspection Report 99901345/2004-201. NRC web site file ML042750057.pdf. 4 Portions of this document are reproduced in the appendix
below.)
The statement There were no NRC inspections or technical reviews performed at the Lambda facility
prior to this inspection is both false and misleading. The NRC observation audit at Lambda Research in 2001
was both an NRC inspection and an NRC technical review of some of that same procedures and QA at the
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same Lambda facility in Cincinnati, Ohio. The statement is misleading in that it conceals deficiencies in
Lambda QA found in the earlier Bechtel audit of the same QA system. The Bechtel audit records clearly
indicate that NRC observers observed Lambda employees execute procedures at Lambda, and that this
earlier audit of the same Lambda QA system identified deficiencies that the NRC also noted in the earlier NRC
report on the zirconium analysis.
D. This 2004 Audit Record Disingenuously Decoupled Deficiencies in Procedures, Training, Records, and
other QA Problems Described in the QA Incident Reports Describing Errors in Zr Texture Analysis From
10CFR21 and 10CFR50b Requirements that Applied to Safety-Related Services.
(Source: NRC Inspection Report 99901345/2004-201. 4 NRC web site file ML042750057.pdf. Some relevant portions of this audit record are reproduced
below in Appendix Part D.)
(Source: NRC Inspection Report 99901345/2004-201. 4 NRC web site file ML042750057.pdf.)
Note that this QAR is the same QAR that Lambda's owner demanded be edited to include false
information about the GE Nuclear texture analysis errors. This NRC audit record explicitly decoupled safetyrelated activities from Lambdas history of repeatedly releasing bad nuclear fuel rod cladding alloy
information by defining safety-related activities as those reports whose POs explicitly cited 10CFR21 or
10CFR50b requirements. This NRC record appears to support the industry claim that the inaccurate
information is not safety -related, despite the fact that the review of the errors, past analysis work, GE Nuclear
audits, and the scientific literature indicate that the inaccurate information is safety-related. This NRC audit
record could shield industry from liability.
The NRC audit records fail to note the fact that court records and Lambda Research records
demonstrate that the same defective procedures and software described in this QAR were used by the same
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employees and other employees with the same training to do analysis for other GE Nuclear projects that did
explicitly cite 10CFR21.
The NRC audit fails to note that Lambdas owner prevented reviews of that previous GE Nuclear and
other work by making firing threats.20,21 Some POs from that previous work did explicitly state that 10CFR21
applied. The same defective procedures, software, training , and QA that produced errors were used for that
previous work.
The NRC report also fails to mention that GE Nuclear NIAC audits of the same deficient procedures and
QA practices that led to the errors did explicitly state that 10CFR50b and 10CFR21 applied to the work and
were included in those audit scopes.
To summarize, the NRC audit report4 fails to note the following: 1) 10CFR21 applied to past GE nuclear
work done with the same procedures, software, training, and other QA elements found to be defective. 2)
Lambdas owner changed versions of the QAR so that contained false statements that GE Nuclear had been
notified of the defects. 3) Lambdas owner directed firing threats at employees in order to prevent reviews of
reports for errors and to prevent discussion of defects in procedures, software, training, and QA. 4) Using the
NIAC standard, GE Nuclear audited the same defective procedures, software, training, records, and related QA
that contributed to errors. The GE Nuclear NIAC audit scopes did explicitly indicate that 10CFR21 and
10CFR50b applied to the Zr texture analysis. These GE NIAC audits failed to detect deficiencies, failed to note
inaccuracies, failed to include contacts with analysts actually doing Zr texture work, but did include
contacts with technicians who were not doing the texture analysis.
The 2004 NRC audit records did not reference or mention the NRCs 1999 report1 describing the
inaccurate zirconium texture analysis information sent to industry and QA problems. (It is also interesting to
note that the 1999 report was not posted on the NRC web site. In fact, the NRC requested a copy of this
report from those involved in the case in mid-2011, just months before they wrote their letter to Senator Lugar
citing that report. Did the NRC lose or destroy their copies of the 1999 report on Lambda Zr analysis errors?
The NRCs 1999 report appears to undermine conclusions in the later NRC audit records. What other records
documenting nuclear problems has the NRC lost or destroyed? )
A major NRC regulatory failure is evident in the failure of the NRC audit to address the failures of
multiple GE Nuclear NIAC audits to detect the deficiencies in those same procedures, software, records, and
training that the NRC found to have contributed to the fuel rod cladding analysis failures which caused
distribution of inaccurate zirconium information to the nuclear industry. Available NRC audit records do not
mention the Lambda records indicating that the GE Nuclear/Global Nuclear Fuels/ Nuclear Industry
Assessment Committee (NIAC) audits of Lambdas Zr texture analysis procedures, software , and QA system did
explicitly cite 10CFR21 and 10CFR50b. NRC records indicate and court records confirm that these QA
deficiencies actually did contribute to distribution of inaccurate zirconium information within the nuclear
industry. Court records demonstrate that these NIAC-audited procedures were used for analyses work having
POs that did explicitly state that 10CFR21 applied to the work. The GE Nuclear NIAC records from several
audits were provided to the NRC investigators conducting the audit prior to their audit. The NRC failed to
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explain how or why GE NIAC audits missed the deficiencies that led to repeated errors in reports before and
after GE NIAC audits.
NRC audit records, the NRC reports, and the 2011 NRC letter to Senator Lugar ignored literature
explicitly describing bad zirconium texture effects on serious safety issues, including alloy degradation, and
component failures involving corrosion, radiation damage, and welding quality. 5-14, 17,18, 32, 33 (Some notable
studies were published prior to any of these NRC documents.32,33 While some of the scientific papers cited
were published after some of the NRC documents, all were published prior to the 2011 letter to Senator
Lugar.) The NRC audit records do not indicate if the problems with Lambda software, training, and procedures
that caused release of distorted texture information to nuclear industry clients which were described in the
audited QARs were ever corrected. While GE Nuclear was provided with copies of the defective texture
procedures, no records were produced that indicated that GE Nuclear had ever been notified of defects in the
procedures. No records of objective reviews of past zirconium texture reports for distorted results were ever
produced.
Despite finding 10CFR21 violations (and apparently dismissing audit records demonstrating that the
examined QAR records indicated that the same problems could have led to previous releases of inaccurate
reports to the nuclear industry and that previous NIAC audits missed the QA problems prior to generation of
some of the inaccurate report, as well as threats that included firing and other retaliation for refusing to
participate in falsification of records), the NRC minimized the concerns and found that Lambda QA was
"generally acceptable with some exceptions".
(Source: NRC Inspection Report 99901345/2004-201.4 NRC web site file ML042750057.pdf.)
To summarize, the 2004 NRC audit generated records that : 1) contained false information, 2)
concealed previous audit history describing the recurring Lambda QA problems related to nuclear work and 3)
decoupled Lambdas release of faulty nuclear fuel rod information from safety concerns, 4) excused blatant
10CFR21 and 10CFR50b violations and related firing threats.
10. Accurate Records and Good QA Are Essential to Failure Analysis and
Error Identification.
The NRC conducted or participated in audits of Lambda Research which indentified their many QA
deficiencies, including inaccurate and inconsistent record keeping. Most labs and auditing bodies have zero
tolerance policies towards known inaccurate information and known bad QA. However, the NRC not only
repeatedly did not require review or correction of recurring QA problems and record inaccuracies that led to
actual errors in reports, but the NRC itself also generated records containing false statements that appear to
intentionally have the effect of concealing inaccurate information and concealing the recurring nature of the
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QA problems. NRC audit records also decoupled explicit industry radiological safety warnings from identified
deficiencies and errors in reports sent to clients, including GE Nuclear.
This type of behavior in the nuclear industry is both dangerous and scientifically irresponsible. Any
one of these irresponsible NRC actions could have the effect of concealing nuclear information inaccuracies
and defects. Inaccurate information could lead to bad decisions that could cause accidents, that could make
ongoing accidents worse, that could compromise safety, and that could undermine improvements in designs
or operator procedures intended to reduce the possibility of accidents and mitigate accident effects.
Uses of information determine quality requirements for that information. When the information will
be relied upon for design, manufacturing, or operations, information quality should be known and match the
intended uses. However, the potential uses of information to make decisions during nuclear accidents and
during subsequent nuclear failure analysis investigations cannot be anticipated. Therefore, the quality and
reliability of technical information in the nuclear industry must be understood. Limitations of data must be
known since all potential uses of data are unknown. Information known or suspected of being inaccurate
should not be tolerated.
Failure analysis investigations often serve as sources for lessons learned that could, if accurate,
prevent or improve the effectiveness of responses to future accidents. Flawed investigations or lessons
learned can lead to poor decisions and unintended creation of additional hazards.
A. The UA 232 Accident Investigation: Inaccurate Records, Conflicting Documents, and Materials
Defects.
Very clear and notable examples of inaccurate records impairing corrective actions intended to reduce
the possibility recurring accidents and impeding accident investigations are found in the aviation industry. The
FAA accident investigation report of United Airlines Flight 232 crash at Sioux City describes how inaccurate and
conflicting records impeded urgent responses required to avoid recurrence of the accident and undermined
failure analysis investigations needed to determine responsibilities. 22
In this accident, a GE engine disk exploded in flight due to a materials defect. In an event
characterized as one in a billion, the explosion severed critical hydraulic lines, rending critical aircraft control
systems useless. Extraordinary efforts by the airliners crew enabled them to save many lives by crash landing
the crippled jet in Sioux City Iowa, but over 110 passengers were killed and many were injured.
Examination of the wreckage indicated that rotational forces caused the explosion of the defective
disk, initiating the accident. Defects were present in the disk when it was manufactured about two decades
earlier. Conflicting and missing records of that defective disk impeded the post-accident failure analysis
investigation.
The FAA report described doubts created by conflicting manufacturing records that might have led to
inappropriate prioritization of grounding and inspection of other airliners likely to have defective disks. If
airliners with defective disks continued to fly, engine explosions could have caused repeats of the accident.
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It is important to note that the inaccurate records and the defective disk they purport to describe
appear to have been produced about two decades before the accident occurred: the defective disk and flawed
information literally amounted to two decades of an accident waiting to happen.
The crash disk had the serial number of a disk which some manufacturing records indicated had an
anomaly. Records on the disk with the anomaly are inconsistent and incomplete.
(Source: National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 Sioux City
Gateway Airport Sioux City Iowa July 19 1989 PB90-910406Y "NTSB/AAR-SO/06"22. The No. 2 engine in the accident airplane exploded and severed
aircraft control lines, initiating the UA 232 accident.)
Doubts about the origin of the disk and conflicting records led to doubts about whether the accident
disk and other airliner engine disks made at the same time were composed of titanium that was suitable for
use in rotating parts like fan disks.
(Source: National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 Sioux City Gateway
Airport Sioux City Iowa July 19 1989 PB90-910406Y "NTSB/AAR-SO/06"22.)
The investigation could not determine if all disks suspected of having defects similar to those that
caused the crash had been removed from operating aircraft.
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(Source: National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 Sioux City Gateway
Airport Sioux City Iowa July 19 1989 PB90-910406Y "NTSB/AAR-SO/06" 22.)
(Note that the probability of an accident involving loss of all flight controls due to severing of the
redundant hydraulic lines was characterized as one in a billion. Japan Airlines Filght 123 had crashed just a
few years earlier when its hydraulic lines were severed, also rendering critical aircraft control systems
useless.26 The estimation of loss of all flight controls due to the severing of all hydraulic lines as one in a
billion appears to have been inaccurate; this underestimation of the risk appears to be an example of risk
management based on bad technical information. Accidents whose frequencies were described as one in a
billion have occurred far too frequently in the aviation industry. Accidents whose projected probabilities are
inaccurate due to reliance on bad technical information probably could also occur repeatedly in the nuclear
industry.)
Eventually, several disks containing the same defects as the UA 232 disk were identified and removed
from service prior to explosive failure. If they had not been identified prior to failure, what impact could their
failures have had on the risk analysis estimates for this type of accident?
B. Accurate Records and Responsible QA Practices Have Led to Identification and Correction of
Inaccurate Information in Nuclear Industry Reports.
Several reports containing 90 degree rotation texture analysis errors were identified through QA
records. A Lab and QA manager was rotating results by 90 degrees to make them look right. Results in some
reports were literally tipped on their sides.
Lambdas owner testified about 90 degree rotation errors in reports:
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( Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31 ALJ Testimony of
Lambda Owner. Perry was Lambdas QA manager and had been the manager of the lab where zirconium texture analysis was done. Note that court
records document that Perry was the previous manager of the laboratory. He trained analysts in texture analysis, popLA, and other XRD analysis
work. He also was the QA administrator. The rotation described was the 90 degree rotation error described in the NRC report1.)
Note that changing data so that a result looks right to correct for making some mistake is generally
considered to be fudging data in a way not acceptable in responsible laboratories. Any suspect result is
usually checked so that it is understood, not arbitrarily changed so that it looks right. Changing results in this
way amounts to falsification and is not regarded as acceptable behavior in science.
Initially, rotation errors were found in one report.
When asked about this inaccurate report, the manager making the errors recognized that all of his past
reports were suspect.
(Source: Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430464.pdf. 34)
Following the record trail led to identification of other suspect reports. Specifically, past reports
prepared by this manager were reviewed.
Emails describe a limited review of past reports conducted by Lambdas texture expert as best he
can. This review identified several reports with the 90 degree rotation errors, referred to and described as
having an extra 90 degree rotation, rotated, skewed, incorrect, the mistake, definitely wrong, and
difenitely wrong (sic) in this Lambda email.
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(Source: Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf. 35 Note that inaccurate results were not limited to nuclear materials. For
example, this email shows that Lambda results didnt accurately indicate which way is up in reports describing analysis of aircraft materials in Wright
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) reports.)
Accurate records and following good QA practices led directly to identification of all past reports done
by the manager as suspect. As his email states, then all others are also wrong. Suspect reports were
reviewed for errors. Nuclear industry clients, including Westinghouse, were issued corrected reports for
zirconium texture analysis. (Note that the above email does not describe reviews of GE Nuclear reports.)
Westinghouse had not recognized the errors in their reports and had not requested that zirconium
alloy texture results be checked. It is interesting to note that, around the same time, Westinghouse did
request a revised zirconium report to correct a misspelling. (What do these practices and failures involving
Westinghouse say about Westinghouse competence? What do these failures say about Westinghouse
information and software? Spelling is important, but does Westinghouse prioritize expenditure of attention
and resources towards such superficial appearances or prioritize the accuracy of technical information that
could influence decisions and understanding of nuclear materials?) NRC records appear to indicate that the
senior engineer of one of the major nuclear fuel fabrication companies who the NRC investigators consulted
was a Westinghouse engineer. Other records indicate that the Westinghouse client who received and
apparently repeatedly failed to recognize that some information was definitely wrong was a Westinghouse
scientist who worked with that NRC consultant.
In summary, previous inaccurate reports were identified because 1) it was known that the Lambda QA
and lab manager was rotating results by 90 degrees and 2) unlike the situation with GE records related to the
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UA 232 crash, accurate internal records indicating which work was done by that Lambda manager enabled
identification, review, and in many cases, correction of suspect reports. (This situation should not be taken to
imply that Lambda QA did not have serious deficiencies. Note that other information indicates that errors
remained uncorrected in some Lambda reports and that related communications with clients contain
fraudulent information concealing the nature (and thereby the extent) of errors.)
Records inaccurately indicating that the 90 degree rotation errors were due to technician errors would
mislead an investigator attempting to trace origins of inaccurate information into an inappropriately limited
review of that technician's work that could miss the source of the errors entirely. Some reports containing
errors made by the manager might not be reviewed if investigators were looking only at reports involving that
technician. Misleading records of this type would impair prioritization of information review and could delay
urgent actions required to respond appropriately to a nuclear incident or accident.
Note that the NRC report1 and at least one court decision15 inaccurately stated that the sample (not
the data) was rotated 90 degrees; sample rotation inaccurately indicates that a technician, not a manager,
would have made the errors, per Lambdas QA system and records. Also, rotating data is a fundamentally
different process than physically rotating a sample. Note also that, after the above emails were sent,
management prepared and sent false information about these errors to nuclear industry clients stating that
the 90 degree rotations were due to technician errors, which makes the problems seem less severe than the
systemic errors due to the QA and lab manger arbitrarily changing results to make them look right. During
an accident investigation, would flawed analytical work that had been altered to look right be detected?
In the case of the rotation errors, some results were recalculated or regenerated. Corrected reports
were issued to clients. (Records do not indicate that errors were found in GE Nuclear zirconium texture
analysis reports prepared by this manager. The inconsistencies between the GE Nuclear and Westinghouse
texture analyses results that were obtained using the same procedures are not clear.) It is also interesting to
note that records from a GE Nuclear/ NIAC audit of Lambdas zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding texture
analysis procedures conducted between the date that the first rotation error was found and the dates on
corrected reports do not mention the rotation errors, but audit documents in court records do appear to
indicate that the rotation error should have been disclosed to GE and noted in NIAC audit records. Also note
that the distorted GE Nuclear work discovered soon afterward involved the same procedures and the same
technician as the work containing rotation errors.
Later, texture analysis records sent to nuclear industry clients were found that contained both false
information that conflicted with the earlier email reproduced above35 and additional errors.
Its also significant to note that Lambda documents indicate that Lambda management knew that this
manager had caused problems with this analysis years prior to the discovery of the 90 degree rotation error.
Lambda QA records indicate that this manager also trained other analysts and technicians in the analysis.
However, the managers approach to arbitrarily changing data to match expectations appears to have arisen
from a misunderstanding about appropriate laboratory conduct rather than an attempt to intentionally falsify
information to order to conceal errors. His email 34 indicates that he was helpful in identifying suspect reports.
Intentional record falsification to conceal defects involved other management personnel.
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C. Zirconium Texture Analysis Distortion Errors: Management Refusals to Allow Reviews Led to Persistence
of Inaccurate and Suspect Information in the Nuclear Industry.
The second type of zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding texture analysis error Involving data distortions
was identified shortly after the rotation errors were corrected. One report containing this type of distorted
data was sent to GE Nuclear. These distortions and the QA deficiencies which caused the distortions were
discovered about a month after the 90 degree rotation errors were corrected and just months after the GE
Nuclear NIAC audit of the Lambda texture analysis procedures and QA system for compliance with 10CFR50b
and 10CFR21. The owners hostile reaction to investigation of these problems impeded, delayed, and, in
critical aspects, prevented review and disclosure of these distortion problems and corrective actions required
to correct recurring errors and related QA problems. 15,19-21
Note that results with distortion errors can make samples appear to have less texture.12 Note that
some published work indicates that some zirconium components having less texture are better suited for some
nuclear applications than components with greater texture. Thus, texture distortion errors could make some
alloys appear to be more suitable for nuclear applications than they actually are. Technically, the NRC reports
statement that texture procedures producing the errors cannot be used to qualify substandard material1
appears to be incorrect in some applications.
In an attempt to prevent recurrence of the 90 degree rotation error, management had Lambdas
texture expert write software to automate some of the data acquisition and data analysis tasks.
Unfortunately, this automation split up responsibilities and oversight of sample preparation, data acquisition,
data analysis, and report writing tasks; previously, these tasks were supposed to be done in one lab under one
fully- trained supervisor, which made QA more reliable. The net effect of the changes intended to prevent
recurrence of rotation errors prevented recognition that atypical results were actually inaccurate results.
Lambdas texture expert described some distorted results as indicating that one specimen was
atypical and exhibited a texture that is more complex than texture found in other specimens.
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(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). Testimony of Lambda
Texture Expert31).
(Note that writing in a report the texture is more complex and a specimen was atypical from what is
generally seen in zircolloid tube specimens clearly indicate that the report intended to describe the sample -ie, not the data. The objection seems to have been intended to prevent the witness from confirming that his
report specifically stated that a physical specimen, not data, was being described in the report. The witness
did confirm this fact; the judge was too slow to stop the witnesss response confirming his statements in his
report whose content he described in his testimony. Whats more importantlegal gamesmanship or finding
out what happened? Does the NRC direct those who refuse to cooperate with industry misconduct into legal
venues where judges can arbitrarily interpret rules and complex technical issues that they dont understand,
thereby preventing disclosures by trumping evidence and common sense with preemptive applications of
hearing rules? )
Problems causing texture distortions in Lambda report were identified after GE Nuclear requested that
texture analysis of the zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding sample be repeated in order to determine if
reported atypical results described in the report as indicating more complex zirconium nuclear fuel rod
cladding texture were correct.
The atypical results were repeatable if Lambdas analysis procedures were used on the original
specimen prepared by the technician (who was trained to prepare samples by the same Lambda manager who
had made the 90 degree rotation errors). However, since the original specimen was not flat, and since sample
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preparation was part of repeating the analysis, the lengthy process of preparing a new analysis specimen
from the same sample for analysis was also started. GE was kept informed of these activities.
Texture analysis results from this flatter new specimen were typical and did not match the original
distorted results, demonstrating that the original distorted results first reported to GE Nuclear on this
zirconium alloy nuclear fuel cladding material specimen were incorrect. (Note that no tube specimens
prepared by this Lambda procedure were ever perfectly flat; they were visibly wavy and bent. Also, the
procedure did not include any measurement to determine if specimen flatness were adequate for accurate
analysis.)
Court testimony from the owner of Lambda indicated that the texture results originally described in
the report as being from an "atypical specimen" having more complex texture were "physically impossible":
(Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).31 Testimony of Lambda Owner.
Note that his testimony about This report refers to the same report written by and described in the previously quoted testimony of Mike, Lambdas
texture expert. ).
GE Nuclear was issued a revised report correcting the one particular distortion error.
Reviews of Lambda procedures for the origins of the distortion errors indicated that failures in training
software and procedures had contributed to the distortion error. Since the same technician used the same
procedures and software to produce earlier specimens and reports, other distortion errors could have
occurred.
The original prepared specimen was not flat. Preparing flat specimens from tubing was difficult,
expensive, and time consuming. The procedures did not always work. The technician who prepared the
specimens was asked how he checked to see if specimens were flat within 0.002 inches.
The technician testified that he used visual inspection to determine if specimens were sufficiently flat for
texture analysis:
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(Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31 Testimony of Lambda Technician.
It after the first Q (for question) refers the edited QAR16 excerpted above.)
The technicians testimony reproduced above indicates that his method to determine if a sample was
flat enough was Look at it and decide whether or not you think if its good enough. The owners QAR edits
indicating that flatness measurements were already present16 indicates that he approved of eyeballing
flatness measurements. However, good QA system procedures include both a method and specific criteria to
determine if a measurement is good enough; specimens prepared with a procedure that included adequate
flatness measurements would be easy to evaluate. Later, the technician confirmed that the procedure
indicated that specimen surfaces had to be within a 0.002 inches (or 0.002 mils) range to be considered flat
enough for texture analysis:
(Source: Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). 31 Testimony of Lambda
Technician. Here refers to the procedure.)
When pressed, Lambdas technician admitted that his look at it and decide if samples were good
enough method was not that good in determining if samples met the 0.002 flatness criteria:
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Technician. )
This technician had previously done other analyses on zirconium for the nuclear industry. Reviews of
the procedures actually used indicated that tube specimens were very difficult or impossible to flatten to
within 0.002 inches using Lambdas procedure. The procedure described no measurement procedure to
measure specimen flatness. It is also significant that Lambda records showed that this technician had been
trained in the sample preparation procedure by the same Lambda manager who made the 90 degree rotation
errors. Apparently, the trained technician was as comfortable with eyeballing 0.002 inch measurements as
the Lambda QA manager was with rotating results 90 degrees to match expected results.
These facts indicate that previous analysis involving this technician should be reviewed for the same
distortion errors, just as previous analysis by the QA manager were reviewed for 90 degree rotation errors. As
described previously, Lambda management refused to allow reviews of previous reports for distortion errors
or allow procedures to be changed to include actual flatness measurements. In, fact Lambda management
demanded preparation of QA records falsely indicating that suspect reports had been reviewed and
inaccurately describing procedure changes as already present.15, 16
Zr Texture Analysis Procedure and Software Problems Contributed to Production of Distorted Results.
Lambda records demonstrated deficiencies in texture analysis software and other procedural
problems. Lambdas owner testified:
Owner.)
Lambdas owner was asked about other texture procedure and software QA issues:
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Owner. Note that Embat was software.)
Lambdas owner described the data collected by the automated software for GE Nuclear as just
nonsense because data was not collected properly:
Owner.)
Later, distorted texture analysis results were found in another report sent to the nuclear industry. The
NRC was notified, but apparently took no action.2 Circumstances indicated that the results were used for alloy
design work and may have been published. There is no available evidence that some distorted results were
ever corrected.
Note that the owner himself reviewed and released reports containing distorted results. Lambdas
owner 1) demanded removal of any mention of software and written procedure problems from the QA
Incident report. 2) demanded removal of mention of the lack of any measurement procedure or objective
criteria to determine if the specimen was flat enough for analysis. 3) refused to allow reviews of past reports
for errors arising from these deficiencies or notification to GE Nuclear that the Lambda procedures and
software audited under the NIAC standard were deficient.15, 16
The NRC report lists the QA problems that led to the errors:
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(NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3. Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy1. )
These are serious problems. In todays labs dominated by computer-controlled instrumentation, one
poorly trained technician can generate and widely disseminate large amounts of inaccurate information very
quickly, especially if the technician relies on faulty software and procedures whose output he does not
understand. Errors escape when technicians cannot recognize nonsense and physically impossible results.
Personnel records and other evidence21 indicated that management regarded data collection instruments idled
because technicians were busy checking and analyzing data as wasted resources. The lab manager was told
that this situation amounted to stealing from the owner. Detection and retrieval of massive amounts of
erroneous results can be difficult under some circumstances. Repeating analysis could cost as much as $1000
per sample. However, costs of correcting these problems would pale in comparison to the cost of an accident.
Objective Reviews of Past Work Were Never Done.
These problems indicate that inaccurate results and information about zirconium nuclear fuel rod
cladding and other materials were being distributed to the nuclear industry due to systemic QA problems.
Later audits conducted by or involving the NRC found the same types of problems with Lambda and its
procedures again, well after the zirconium texture analysis problems were initially identified.
Yet, no reviews or corrections of past reports were done.
Attempts at accurately documenting the problems with recommendations to review work and notify
clients led to firing threats. 15
Courts did find that the reports were inaccurate. 15 Courts found that intentional preparation of false
reports constituted no violations of law. 19
Courts indicated that refusals to falsify reports or sign inaccurate reports were unreasonable 20 and
amounted to unwillingness to obey valid orders21.
D. Poor QA and inaccurate records undermine failure analysis and error identification. The NRC audits not
only repeatedly excused recurring QA and records problems that led to actual errors in reports, but the NRC
itself also generated records containing false statements that could have the effect of concealing the recurring
nature of the records and QA problems. NRC audit records also decouple explicit industry radiological safety
warnings from identified deficiencies.
The NRCs behavior is both dangerous and scientifically irresponsible. Any one of these NRC actions
could have the effect of concealing nuclear information inaccuracies and defects. Inaccurate information
could lead to bad decisions that could cause accidents, make accidents worse, compromise design efforts, and
undermine improvements in designs or operator procedures intended to reduce the possibility of accidents
and mitigate their effects. Conflicting and missing records impede failure analysis investigation and leave
doubts about effectiveness of corrective actions and the value of lessons learned, as the FAA report of the
UA 232 accident investigation stated.
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(Source: National Transportation Safety Board, PB90-910406 NTSB/AAR-90/06, Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232. 22 )
Technical information and company records known or suspected of being inaccurate should be
reviewed and corrected when they are recognized as suspect or inaccurate, not after an accident. Accidents
are not the time to ask Can we trust the data? Post- accident investigations, during which companies
sometimes attempt to protect profits and evade responsibilities, are not the time to discover ambiguous
technical information and records. After accidents have occurred, ambiguities about information only serve to
help parties whose irresponsible actions have contributed to accidents avoid being held liable. Advocates,
such as lawyers, are motivated to exploit such questions in their attempts to serve irresponsible parties.
Requiring industry to keep accurate records is cheap compared to the serious consequences and expenses of
nuclear accidents.
The NRC has been informed of known bad technical information and company records that are still
present in the nuclear industry. The NRC has not only decided not to require industry to correct this
information, but has actually generated false information that will muddy the water in ways that could
mislead anyone attempting to find out what actually happened and correct the problems. NRC generation of
false records makes it complicit in industry misconduct.
Like dubious records, irresponsible actions by regulatory agencies can shield industry being held
accountable for their actions. Industry can risk highly profitable optimistic behavior if the public pays when the
nuclear industrys optimistic projections prove to be unrealistic.
After Fukushima, some TEPCO officials blamed lack of preparations and failures during their accident
on Japans Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), stating that TEPCO only did what that agency allowed
them to do. In the aftermath of the accident, large areas of Japan remain abandoned due to high levels of
radioactivity. TEPCO was bailed out. NISA was abolished. The public is paying for massive cleanup efforts.
Many residents will not be able to return home for decades, if at all.
Fukushima shows that positioning regulators to serve as scapegoats reduces industry liabilities. Are
NRC employees and industry positioning the NRC to serve as a scapegoat in the event of a serious nuclear
accident?
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11. Conclusions and Recommended NRC Actions.

1. The NRC must require industry to correct the specific zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding alloy
information known to be inaccurate.
Inaccurate technical information about zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding alloys can create significant
hazards, as described above. Correction would be very inexpensive and fast. A main barrier to correction
appears to be NRC and industry unwillingness to admit that inaccurate technical information has been
tolerated. However inaccurate technical information is hazardous because it remains in circulation for
decades.6 (The NRC should also recognize that their report was relied upon by industry and the courts to block
correction of analysis problems that involved aviation and other industries, including military
organizations.34,35)
Spent nuclear fuel rods and nuclear waste will probably be transported for great distances when a
permanent repository is identified. Until then, spent fuel rods will continue to be stored on-site at many
nuclear plants. During storage and transportation, containment of radioactive materials will depend on the
integrity of the zirconium nuclear fuel rod cladding.5 Storing and handling fuel rods in ways that will not
compromise cladding integrity rely on good cladding alloy information. The history of waste handling and
transportation indicates that accidents are inevitable. One serious mishandled nuclear accident will cost more
and do far more damage to the nuclear industry than correcting known inaccurate data.
Accurate understanding of nuclear fuel rod cladding will remain important as long as nuclear fuel
waste is generated, handled, transported, and stored. Release of radioactive species due to cladding and
other containment failures can render large areas of land uninhabitable, as occurred at Fukushima and
Chernobyl. Technical information will be relied upon to minimize the chances of cladding failures for decades,
if not centuries.
2. The NRC must require industry to review the zirconium alloy information that appears suspect. Suspect
information is identifiable by the circumstances under which it was created. If reviews identify errors in
suspect reports, flagging or correction of the inaccurate materials information should be required.
3. The NRC and industry must be required to adopt zero tolerance policies for known inaccurate
information. This is only common sense. The idea that a regulatory agency with responsibilities like those of
the NRC would tolerate known inaccurate information would seem to be seem incredible if the NRC report1
and 2011 NRC letter to Senator Lugar2 did not both indicate that the NRC would not pursue known inaccurate
technical information. NRC tolerance of known inaccurate information has effect of institutionalizing
ignorance. Accurate technical information is essential to prevention of nuclear accidents, making correct
decisions to limit effects of ongoing nuclear accidents, and safe handling and storage of nuclear waste.5,7 NRC
regulations and practices are regarded as models for the nuclear industry worldwide.6
4. The NRC must require industry to keep accurate records. Accurate records are essential to quick
responses in event of nuclear accidents and to post-accident failure analysis investigations relied upon for
lessons-learned intended to prevent recurrences of accidents. Inaccurate records serve only to confuse
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investigations and allow parties who have profited from irresponsible behavior to avoid being held liable for
consequences of damage caused by their actions. Accidents are not the time to ask Can records be trusted?
5. The NRC must provide open venues for investigations of industrys technical performance. Irresponsible
and incompetent industry and NRC actions must be openly documented as lessons learned about bad
information practices. Hearings for plant licensing and other actions that impact public safety are being
conducted under scientifically-dubious legal procedures where only parties following narrow legal strategies
have access to all of pertinent technical information. Public safety relies on openness; neither should not be
compromised by secrecy imposed by presumptions that all technical information and company records are
proprietary. Due to the fact that public safety and public assets are put at risk when a nuclear plant
operates, public disclosure of company technical information can be considered a reasonable cost of doing
business.
6. Individual companies that have inappropriately concealed information and engaged in other misconduct
should be presumed to have forfeited any right to conceal information by claiming it to be proprietary by
their history of misconduct. Companies must be prevented from concealing evidence that their practices put
public safety at risk for the sake of their short term profits. In the long run, disclosure of the information will
improve the safety of the technology for all involved and improve profits of competent companies who do not
profit by putting public assets at risk. All parties who could lose their health, home, peace of mind, or
livelihood as a consequence of risks taken by industry benefit from open reviews of industry information. The
likelihood that fraud, information problems, and unnecessary risks will be exposed should increase when many
eyes with different backgrounds and interests are able to examine inherently risky activities. Technology
advances (and is usually made safer) by the free flow of information.
7. The NRC itself must not produce false information. Manipulation of public perceptions by whitewash
audits, promotion of a nuclear renaissance, and pro-industry biases are counter to the intent of the Energy
Reorganization Act (ERA) which led to the creation of the NRC.
8. The NRC should not "lose" or destroy information. The NRC emailed parties requesting some of the NRC
information used to produce the 2011 response to Senator Lugar's inquiries. Why? The Indian Point hearing
exposed gaps in NRC records. Did the NRC lose or destroy information? What confidence can the public have
that the NRC will be able to respond quickly to incidents when the NRC cant find basic information? Why
wasnt the missing information posted on their web site?
From "cradle-to-grave", nuclear activities involve long time periods. Plants have operated and spent
fuel has accumulated for over a half of a century. The NRC allows companies to take up to 60 years to
complete plant decommissioning after power generation operations cease. Permanent solutions to nuclear
waste disposal remain as chimerical as nuclear energy too cheap to meter promised at the dawn of the
nuclear industry. (No doubt these inaccurate projections arose from faulty understanding of the realities of
nuclear technology due to reliance on bad information. ) Spent nuclear waste, which a GAO report describes as
containing the most hazardous substances on earth7, continues to accumulate at many nuclear plants in the
US. Safe storage of spent fuel rods in cooling pools (some of which are leaking into groundwater) rely largely
on intact zirconium cladding to prevent releases of radionuclides into coolant and into the environment.
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Information about cladding and other nuclear components will be relied upon for an indefinite period
of time. Some uses of the information, like some types of accidents, cannot be foreseen. Therefore, the
nuclear industry and regulatory agencies must maintain all records indefinitely. As the UA 232 FAA accident
report demonstrated, accidents are not the time to ask "Can the records be trusted?"
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Appendix I. Four NRC Records Documenting Flawed NRC Information Practices

Part A. The Initial NRC Report Describing Zirconium Texture Analysis Errors
NRC correspondence and a report indicating that the NRC did not consider dissemination of known
bad texture information in industry to be a safety concern and indicating that the NRC took no action to curtail
the distribution of inaccurate information on zirconium fuel rod cladding material properties.
At the NRCs request, a copy of this report to the NRC in mid-2011. This is the report referred to in the
NRCs November 2011 letter to Senator Lugar included in Appendix I Part B.
Note that the NRC cites the unpublished and unreviewed opinions of two experts to support its
conclusions. One consulted expert, described as an engineer of one of the major nuclear fuel fabrication
companies who has experience in texture analysis from a fuel cladding design perspective, appears to be from
Westinghouse. Westinghouse failed to recognize texture analysis errors in multiple reports and also received
fraudulent information which inaccurately describes causes of errors.
Note that the NRC report does not explicitly address information in published papers indicating that
texture influences the deterioration and failure of zirconium alloys in nuclear application. For example, see
The Influence of Crystallographic Texture and Test Temperature on Initiation and Propagation of StressCorrosion Cracks in Zircaloy, Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 6th International Symposium (1982) 32 and
citations therein. Note that numerous studies have since confirmed that understanding zirconium texture is
necessary for some nuclear applications. 5-10, 12-14, 17,18
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(The NRC report sent with the attached letter is reproduced below under Allegation NRR-A-0057.)
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Appendix I
Part B. 2011 NRC Correspondence to Senator Lugar
2011 NRC Correspondence to Senator Lugar reaffirming the initial NRC report. The NRC indicates that
they believe problems were remediated. However, the NRC did not appear to understand what data and
records were later found to contain errors, so remediation was unlikely to have been effective. No record of
remediation is available. The NRC appears to have taken no effective action to curtail the distribution of the
bad data, to require review of suspect data, or correction of inaccurate records identified after their earlier
report.
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Appendix I
Part C. NRC Observation Audit Record of Lambda High-Level Waste Container Material Analysis
2001 NRC Audit Records of Lambda Research work on high-level waste container design for Yucca
Mountains describing Lambda QA deficiencies. Note that the report states The audit team identified
potential deficiencies in training, calibrations, document control, software verification and validation, and
corrective action. The same types of deficiencies led to distribution of reports with inaccurate texture
information to the nuclear industry. Note also that this Yucca Mountain work was itself QA work. This record
was posted on the NRC web site in ML013330072.pdf.3
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Appendix I. Part D. NRC Audit Record Containing False and Misleading Information
Excerpts from 2004 NRC Audit Records of Lambda Research. (The full audit record was available on the NRC
web site in the document posted as ML042750057.)
Note that part 2.0 STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS inaccurately states There were no
NRC inspections or technical reviews performed at the Lambda facility prior to this inspection. Note that this
statement can be shown to be inaccurate because it conflicts with the records from the 2001 NRC audit of
Lambda Research (reproduced in Appendix I Part C above), which demonstrates that NRC auditors did perform
a technical review at Lambda of the same QA system and some of the same procedures. This inaccuracy is
significant in that it could conceal earlier audit records that describe QA deficiencies related to Lambda
analysis of high level nuclear waste container material. Accident investigators could be misled into believing
that the zirconium audit was the first NRC audit of Lambda; investigators might not look for earlier records.
Also note that Lambda records, GE Nuclear records, and court records indicate that the same deficient
Lambda procedures, software, and training that created errors in the GE Nuclear work described in the QAIR
(Quality Assurance Incident Report) were employed in work whose purchase orders explicitly stated that
10CFR21 was applicable. Records show that these NRC auditors knew the following: 1) Defective texture
analysis procedures, software, and QA had been used zirconium analysis work which did explicitly state that
10CFR21 was applicable (eg, see ML011430464.pdf). 2) Defective texture analysis procedures, software, and
QA had supposedly been audited by GE Nuclear and Global Nuclear Fuels under the NIAC (Nuclear Industry
Assessment Committee) audit standard for compliance with 10CFR21 and 10CFR50b (eg, see
ML011430464.pdf). However, the following NRC audit record states that The inspectors were not able to
identify any QAIR records relating to a 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B purchase order and Part 21 was not
applicable to the Lambda activities performed for the specific testing. Two of the NRC auditors had been
provided with copies of the GE Nuclear and NIAC audit records and information describing violations of
10CFR50b and 10CFR21 requirements. The following NRC audit records do not mention the initial NRC report
describing errors in the audited zirconium texture analysis (reproduced in Part A above). The NRC audit
records do not mention the problems getting information corrected, which included threats that employees
reviewing or discussing the errors and deficiencies would be fired. At the time of the NRC audit, the ALJ had
sent the decision wherein the judge found that Kelly engaged in protected activity when he prepared the QAR
and that Preveys threat to fire Kelly was an adverse employment action. 20,21 Furthermore, the NRC had
information that Prevey had demanded that Kelly edit the QAR to inaccurately indicate that Westinghouse and
other nuclear industry clients listed in an email describing rotation errors had been appropriately notified of
the distortion errors. (The Court of Appeals decision notes that, contrary to his revision to Kellys QA report,
Lambda had not informed GEND of the procedural defects alleged by Kelly.15 Decision. Page 5 Footnote 3,
reproduced above in Section 2.)
This 2004 NRC Audit Report contains false statements that are significant in that they conceal the
history and extent of deficiencies in Lambda analysis for GE Nuclear, Global Nuclear Fuels, Westinghouse, and
other nuclear industry clients.
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(The full NRC audit record is posted on the NRC web site as ML013330072.pdf.)
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Appendix II. How Inaccurate Information Impeded UA 232 Accident Responses and
Failure Analysis
A. NTSB Accident Report on UA Flight 232. A Case Study of Post-Accident Decisions Impaired by
Bad and Suspect Information about a Component Designed and Manufactured Decades Before the
Accident.
The history of the effects of bad information on nuclear accidents and steps required to prevent their
recurrence is limited. However, NTSB Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight 232 22 describes how
inaccurate and suspect information can create hazards and thwart efficient failure analysis efforts and
corrective actions.
The Accident. A titanium disks uncontained separation, fragmentation, and forceful discharge from a GE
gas turbine engine destroyed the hydraulic systems of United Airlines Flight 232 while in flight.22 Overcoming
extreme difficulties, the flight crew crash-landed the plane in Sioux City, Iowa. Basically, a bad engine disk
exploded and ruined critical aircraft controls. Over 110 fatalities and numerous injuries occurred during the
crash landing.
1. The Accident Investigation: The NTSB accident report states that the accident was initiated by a defect in
an engine disk. The defect in the crash disk was present when this disk was fabricated decades earlier. The
disk was in service for almost two decades before deterioration in the disk materials condition caused the
catastrophic failure. See: National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report United Airlines Flight
232 McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 Sioux City Gateway Airport Sioux City Iowa July 19 1989 PB90-910406Y
"NTSB/AAR-SO/06". Section 1.17.3.22 Excerpts of this NTSB report are reproduced below.
Bad GE materials and bad GE information appeared to have been major factors in this crash.
Inaccurate records impeded identification and removal of other suspect disks from service. If left in service,
other bad disks could also have failed and caused more crashes at any time.
The NTSB report described inaccurate engine manufacturing records that should have contained
reliable information about the origins and history of the crash disk. Accurate and self-consistent records
should have enabled fast identification of similar (therefore, suspect) disks in service so that they could be
immediately removed from service and inspected before another accident occurred due to the same type of
manufacturing defect. Examination of records of the crash disk and suspect disks along with inspections of
suspect disks should also have enabled fast and efficient determination of the root causes of the accident.
However, inaccurate, conflicting, and suspect records impeded the accident response and
investigation. The report indicates that two disks from two different sources had the same serial number as
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the crash disk:
Since conflicting GE and supplier records indicated that there were at least two possible sources of the
bad disk (and some records indicated that the disk was from materials cut after the engine was shipped, which
is physically impossible unless something really unusual occurred), investigators attempted to identify the
source of the crash disk by chemical analysis.
Results of the chemical analysis could not identify the source of the crash disk. Reasons for the disk
failure remained speculative.
GE started inspections and the NTSB recommended examination of over 100 engine disks. Disks
manufactured with and like the crash disk were considered the riskiest disks. They should have been removed
from service for inspections first. The failure to understand the source of the bad material made immediate
identification of riskiest disks for prioritized inspections impossible. During inspections, flaws like those found
in the crash disk were found in some disks were removed from service and inspected after the crash.
However, suspect manufacturing information left doubts.
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The phrase intended effect because suspect disks could remain in service indicates other engines
with bad disks could have remained in service because of bad information.
GE records contained anomalies, some of which appeared to obscure the disk history at GE. Several
record anomalies call into question all disk records from the same period.
The most interesting anomalies are records and evidence indicating that the crash disk was made from
titanium material that other records show: 1) was not supplied to GEAE 2) was not cut until two months after
GE shipped the engine with the crash disk 3) was not qualified for rotating parts like disks (note that parts that
rotate fast tend to explode if they have certain types of defects, so special materials and processes are used to
manufacture them.) 4) a disk with the same serial number as the crash disk had an unsatisfactory ultrasonic
indication.
About the time that the crash disk was manufactured, GE records indicate that inspection showed that
a disk with the serial number of the crash disk contained an unacceptable flaw.
Note that the No. 2 engine in the accident airplane is the engine that exploded.
Other GE records indicated that GE reassigned this serial number to the crash disk using titanium from
another supplier. However, this suppliers record indicate that this titanium was not ever shipped to GE. GE
had records indicating that GE shipped the flawed disk to another location to verify the flaw. The NTSB report
appears to indicate that GE fouled up their records by recycling an essentially free serial number (rather than
using a flawed titanium disk costing thousands in materials whose replacement might cost much more in
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manufacturing delays).
The NTSB report indicates that no record of warranty claims or credit for the disk with defects were
found (p. 55). This might seem trivial to some who dont work at a company like GE, which is obsessed with
supplier performance, costs, and budgets. Those disks cost thousands.
One crash, one failed disk, records of two disks with the same serial number, two disk suppliers, and
several sets of conflicting records. Chemical analysis failed to resolve the conflicts in information. Did the
NTSB ever sorted out the record anomalies described in their report?
2. Chemical Analysis Questions.
Some of the blue-etch anodization work that helped confirm that the crash disk flaw described in the
NTSB report was due to the presence of a hard alpha phase in the titanium was done by Kelly prior to his
employment at Lambda research. A record describing this work is the following GE achievement recognition
from GEs Engines Materials Technologies Laboratories (EMTL) where the work was done.
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Kellys blue etch work on this investigation was also mentioned in his GE performance review.
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Kelly was later asked to do analysis of soil from the farm field where the crash disk was found as part
of a post-accident investigation. GEs position appeared to be that United Airlines missed the flaw during
fluorescent penetrant inspection of the disk before the crash. Some phosphorous analysis done by another
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materials analyst using a method for metals analysis seemed to support this position. Since the lab did not
have appropriate methods for soil analysis, a sample was submitted to an agricultural lab. Their results
indicated that some initial GE phosphorous analyses results were questionable.
The previous analysis for phosphorous in soil from the crash disk appeared to have been done using a
method designed for metals. The blanks done as part of this analysis appeared to have been prepared from
deionized water reagent blanks. The results were questioned because the crash disk was found in a farm field.
Analysis indicated that the dirt contained quartz and possibly other silicates. Silicates can interfere with the
colorimetric phosphorous analysis method under certain conditions. Therefore, a soil blank would have been
appropriate for analysis of the crash disk sample in question. Other uncertainties about the results arose from
the fact that typical agricultural fields contain phosphate fertilizers. Analysis of more samples might have
helped determine levels and variability of phosphorous in the soil. Analysts involved agreed that these were
issues prior to report preparation.
The report did not describe any conclusive results. The report just raised some questions about a
previous analysis. Previous analysis results should have been checked (ie, repeated) or discarded.
The FAAs investigation made it seem that flagging data as questionable might be in the best interests
of all concerned, especially GEAE. Credibility is always an important consideration in a failure analysis
investigation.
The same manager who had signed Kellys evaluation and achievement recognition records strongly
disagreed with releasing these technical findings and indicated that Kellys report did not present a just
picture of the colorimetric P analysis done here at GE (see his note at the bottom of the soil analysis report
reproduced below).
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The manager and Kelly discussed the report, as requested. The technical issues were clear. Some
were certain of the uncertainties in the phosphorous results. There were concerns that bad decisions might
be made. Also, if the matter were questioned by the FAA, NTSB, or United Airlines, these problems with the
phosphorous analysis would seem obvious. If not addressed, the problems could undermine the credibility of
GE and the client requesting the work. Changing the report to remove uncertainties did not appear to be
appropriate.
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The reaction of the manager was surprising. He expressed anger over the fact that this and
subsequent revisions included findings that he wanted out. The discussion lasted about a minute. The
customer got the information, but did not react as expected.
It is not clear if the questions about the validity of some of the results indicating that phosphorous was
found on the crash disk surface were ever investigated. If phosphorous from fluorescent penetrant was
found on the crash disk surface, failure analysis questions would focus on maintenance inspection failures to
detect that fluorescence. However, if the phosphorous found came from the farm field or fertilizer or the high
results were due to silica or other analysis interferents , the results of that phosphorous analysis would be
irrelevant in determining the accidents origins.
There were other measurements which stand independently of the labs phosphorous analysis. The
FAA and NTSB did appear to find that maintenance inspection failures caused the crash. However, several
questions arise. Why not check the validity of suspect results? Why risk having suspect results undermine a
failure analysis investigation? Why risk a labs credibility on information that may appear suspect to
experienced analysts? While GEAE EMTL was technically an outstanding organization and most GEAE
scientists in the labs were very capable professionals with high integrity, some management actions raised
serious questions.
In summary, this accident investigation report and related documents describe how a materials failure
severed critical controls in-flight decades after the flawed material was manufactured. The failure of the
airliner engines titanium disk initiated at a metallurgical flaw that led to disk failure, causing a crash landing
with over 100 fatalities and additional injuries. Basically, a bad engine disk exploded during United Airlines
Flight 232. Problems with records generated decades earlier and other information impeded fast identification
and removal of other suspect engines from service and raised doubts during the subsequent failure analysis
investigation.
3. Zirconium Information Problems and Court Proceedings
Based on experience, Kelly and others at Lambda were aware that these types of problems and
hazards could arise from inaccurate data, records, and other information problems in the nuclear industry.
Lambda audit records show that GE NIAC audits included examination of other QARs as evidence of
compliance with NIAC requirements. NRC audit records indicate that QARs were examined. Lambdas owner
later described QARs to an OSHA/DOL investigator:
Lambdas owner later wrote an affidavit submitted to federal court describing the QARs
differently.
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Does comparison of the affidavit with statements made to the OSHA investigator and audit records
indicate that the owner either submitted a false affidavit to federal court, gave false statements to a federal
investigator, or both?
It is interesting to note that, months prior to introducing this affidavit, Lambda sent copies of the QAR
along with an ex parte communication to a hearing officer explaining their position. Prior to preparing the
above affidavit, Lambda had itself used a QAR for a purpose other than internal quality control.
The judge cited the above affidavit several times in a decision dismissing the complaint19. Motions for
reversal citing the fraudulent nature of the affidavit were not acted on by the court.
The NRC did not act on the information. The NRC did say that they would conclude their investigation
of Lambda when court actions (some of which they recommended) were finished. After some court actions
were finished and the, the NRC said it applied a no harm-no foul approach to these situations.
The ALJ decision characterized the QAR as a document available for review by outside parties.
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(Administrative Review Board (ARB) Case 02-075 Final Decision and Order. Appeal for reconsideration of decision of Administrative Law Judge Case
2000-ERA-035.)
A Federal Court decision stated the following.
(Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division. 12-3-01. )
The NIAC audit records, the NRCs audit records, and other records indicate that the affidavit is false
and misleading. Is producing a false affidavit to federal court acceptable to the NRC? How serious was the
NRC investigation if they ignored a false affidavit to federal court and/ or false statements made to a federal
investigator? In event of a nuclear accident, will the NRC allow industry to make false statements and alter
industrys versions of events recorded in statements made to federal investigators documented in sworn
affidavits to suit their shifting positions as situations develop?37 Are companies free to generate records
containing false information that would be useful to conceal defects and reduce liabilities in event of costly
incidents or accidents?
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Appendix III. Short ARB Decision and Related Information

The three page Administrative Review Board Final Decision and Order. (Note that the order does not
mention evidence and findings in other decisions demonstrating that management demanded signatures on
the edited QAR on the last day of employment. Note also that factual errors which judges arbitrarily included
in this and other decisions are uncorrectable. For example, this decision incorrectly states that Lambda was
established in 1997. However, earlier errors might exist. Lambda was in business over a decade earlier.)
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Its interesting to note that this decision states that the ALJ determined that Kelly did not
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that submitting the QAR contributed to his termination of
employment from Lambda. Statements in the ALJ decision do seem to indicate that the QAR contributed to
the termination of employment.
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21
Authors Experience and Credentials.

Mark Kelly holds a Ph. D. in chemistry from the University of Cincinnati, where he studied electroanalytical
chemistry. As a chemist in GEs Engine Materials and Technologies Laboratories, he preformed materials
analysis in support of engine development, operations, and failure analysis, which included work on the UA
232 Sioux City accident investigation described above. He has also worked as an analyst in the chemical,
materials, and water treatment industries. He has experience implementing auditable laboratory quality
systems and laboratory information systems that complied with ISO 9002 standards. He has written numerous
internal and external analysis reports concerning materials properties, chemical analyses, and regulated
contaminants for the aviation, materials, chemical, and other industries. He co-authored the following three
publications concerning materials, electrochemistry, and radiation effects on materials.
S. T. Wlodek, M. Kelly, and D. Alden. "The Structure of Rene '88 DT". Superalloys 1996. Edited by R. D.
Kissinger et al. The Minerals, Metals, and Materials Society. Warrendale, PA, p. 129 (1996).
S. T. Wlodek, M. Kelly, and D. Alden. "The Structure of N18". Superalloys 1992. Edited by S. D. Antolovich et al.
The Minerals, Metals, and Materials Society. Warrendale, PA, p. 467 (1992).
Mark J. Kelly and William R. Heineman. "Gamma-Irradiated Polymer-Modified Mercury Film Electrodes". J.
Electroanal. Chem. 222. pp. 243-256 (1986).
(Kelly is from St. Bernard, Ohio, former location of P&G headquarters.29 After graduating from high school,
Kelly worked for a brief period at United Dairy Farmer, which was partially owned by C. Lindner, who later
headed Chiquita Brands29 . Kellys brother was Cincinnati police officer. After brief employment with
Wackenhut security assignment targeting striking workers, his assignments at CPD included work with some of
the law enforcement offices which later were consolidated into the Cincinnati area fusion center29 .)
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References:
1
NRC Allegation NRR-1999-A-0057 Concerns 1 thru 3. Texture Analysis of Zirconium Alloy. NRC
correspondence and report stating that the NRC does not regard known bad texture information to be a safety
concern and will not pursue bad data distributed in industry. (A copy is reproduced above in the appendix and
has been posted on the Internet at Scribd.com as NRCAllegationNRR-1999-A-0057. )
2
Correspondence. R. W. Borchardt, NRC Executive Director for Operations, to Senator Richard Lugar, United
States Senate. November 21,2011. NRC correspondence reaffirming NRC Report NRR-1999-A-0057. (A copy is
reproduced in appendix and has been posted on the Internet at Scribd.com as
NRCBorchardtToSenateLugarNov212011.)
3
NRC Reading Room File ML013330072.pdf. NRC Observation Audit Report No. OAR-02-01 and related DOE
correspondence. (Portions of this document are reproduced in appendix.)
4
Source: NRC Inspection Report 99901345/2004-201. NRC web site file ML042750057.pdf. (Portions of this
document are reproduced in the appendix.)
5
H. M. Chung, R. S. Daum, J. M. Hiller, and M. C. Billone , Characteristics of Hydride Precipitation and

Reorientation on Spent-Fuel Cladding. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 13th International Symposium,
2002, P. 449.
6
Nuclear Fuel Behavior in Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Conditions. State of the Art Report. Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA No. 6846). Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Report.
2009.
7
NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel. Unites
States Government Accountability Office. GAO-05-339. April, 2005.
8
Delayed Hydride Cracking in Zirconium Alloys in Pressure Tube Nuclear Reactors. Final Report of a
Coordinated Research Project 1998-2002. International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA TECDOC-141-. ISBN 920-110504-5. October, 2004.
9
E. Tenckhoff, Review of Deformation Mechanisms, Texture, and Mechanical Anisotropy in Zirconium

Alloys. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium, P. 25. Journal of ASTM
International, April. 2005 Vol 2 No. 4.
10
Arthur T. Motta, Aylin Yilmazbayham, Robert Comstock, Jonna Partezanna, George P. Sabol, Barry Lai, and
Zonghou Cai, Microstructure and Growth Mechanism of Oxide Layers Formed on Zr Alloys Studied with
Micro-Beam Synchrotron Radiation. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium18, P.
205. Journal of ASTM International, May. 2005 Vol 2 No. 5.
11
Timble, D., Hanford Waste Treatment Plant. DOE Needs to Take Action to Resolve Technical and
Management Challenges. GAO -13-38. December, 2012.
12
Grytsyna et al. Destruction of Crystallographic Texture in Zirconium Alloy Tubes. Zirconium in the Nuclear
Industry. 14th International Symposium, p 305. Journal of ASTM International, Sept. 2005 Vol 2 No. 8.
Page 99
13
Dahlback M. Dahlback, M. Limback, L. Hallstadiu, P. Barberis, G. Bunel, C. Simonot, T. Anderson, P.

Askeljung, J. Flygare, B. Lehtinen, A. Massish, The Effect of Beta-Quenching in Final Dimension on the
Irradiation Growth of Tubes and Channels. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium,
P. 276. Journal of ASTM International, June. 2005 Vol 2 No. 6 .
14
P. Rudling et. al. Welding of Zirconium Alloys. IZNA7 Special Topic Report Welding of Zirconium Alloys
2007. Advanced Nuclear Technology International. 4-3(4-13).
15
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Case No. 02-3035. Decision. On Appeal from the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. A copy has been posted on the Internet at
Scribd.com as USCourtAppeals6thDistrictCase02No3035.
16
NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf. QAR edited by Lambda Owner Paul Prevey.
17
King, S. J., Kesterson, R. L., Yueh, K. H., Comstock, R. J., Herwig, W. M. and Ferguson, S. D., Impact of
Hydrogen on Dimensionaly Stability of ZIRLO Fuel Assemblies. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry: Thirteenth
International Symposium. ASTM SPT 1423, G. D. Moan and P. Rudling, Eds. ASTM. pp. 471-489.
18
Arthur T. Motta, Aylin Yilmazbayham, Robert Comstock, Jonna Partezanna, George P. Sabol, Barry Lai, and
Zonghou Cai, Microstructure and Growth Mechanism of Oxide Layers Formed on Zr Alloys Studied with
Micro-Beam Synchrotron Radiation. Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium18, P.
205. Journal of ASTM International, May. 2005 Vol 2 No. 5.
19
Order. Case No. C-1-00-661. United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division.
12-3-01. A copy has been posted on the Internet at Scribd.com as USDistCtCaseC1No00661.
20
Administrative Review Board (ARB) Case No. 02-075. Final Decision and Order. A copy is reproduced in the
Appendix III above and has been posted on the Internet at Scribd.com as DOLAdminRevBoardCaseNo02075.
21
Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. Recommended Decision and Order. Department of Labor, Office of
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ). Reproduced in Appendix III above.
22
National Transportation Safety Board, PB90-910406 NTSB/AAR-90/06, Aircraft Accident Report United
Airlines Flight 232. Retrieved April 2012.
23
Possible Fuel Rod Hazard Seen at Some Nuclear Plants. The Wall Street Journal. Feb. 16, 2011.
24
Mathew Walds. Judge Rules Vermont Cant Shut Nuclear Plant. NY Times. Jan. 19 2012.
25
Supreme Court Declines Nuclear Waste Case, Government and Policy Concentrates, Chemical and
Engineering News, Dec. 17, 2005. P. 23.
26
Japan Airlines Flight 123, Boeing 747-SR100, JA8119. FAA Web Site.
lessonslearned.faa.govll_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=16 . Retrieved July 12, 2013.
27
R. C. McMaster. Nondestructive Testing Handbook. The Ronald Press Co. NY. 1963. P. 32-7.
Page 100
28
NRC web site document ML011430491.pdf. Note that the NRC keeps the investigation open until legal
proceedings are concluded. Ongoing investigations can be barriers to discovery of internal NRC documents.
29
The history of the Cincinnati area legal community and law enforcement in business-worker litigation is
documented. While the following examples might seem off-topic, they offer insights into seemingly
outrageous behavior by the legal communities and courts in which the zirconium actions played out. First
example: A series of 1998 Cincinnati Enquirer Chiquitas Secrets articles were critical of Cincinnati-based
Chiquita business practices in Latin America involving mistreatment of workers, forcible prevention of workers
from unionizing, and other misconduct. Chiquita filed federal lawsuits against a reporter and several Chiquita
employees believed to be responsible for leaking the information. A special prosecutor obtained a guilty pleas
from the reporter for felonies involving his illegal access of Chiquita voice mails that he had used to obtain or
corroborate information about Chiquita activities (Dan Horn, Former Enquirer Reporter Guilty, in The
Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept . 25, 1998, retrieved 2/20/1013, Douglas Frantz, Mysteries Behind Storys
Publication, in The New York Times, July 17, 1998). In Chiquitas case, despite the fact that some of the
descriptions of illegal and unethical activities in the stories did not rely on any illegal activities by the reporter
or were just corroboration of other evidence of illegal activities, Chiquitas president was quote in the 9/25/98
Enquire article as saying Todays guilty plea by the lead reporter clearly supports the fact that these stories
were false, misleading, and lacking credibility. The decision in this Chiquita court case indicated that the
reporter committed illegal acts while gathering information, but that does not mean that this or other
information used as sources for the stories were false or lacking credibilty. While the FBI and local law
enforcement had aggressively investigated the employee and reporter misconduct, available reports do not
indicate that Chiquitas illegal business practices involving their Cincinnati offices were investigated in 1998.
The 2009 Al Jazeera English program People and Power- Chiquita: Between Life and Law 10 June 09 (www.
Youtube.com/watch?v=PMCTPoLT42U retrieved Feb. 24, 2013) reported that, between 1997 and 2004,
Chiquita gave millions of dollars to Columbian a paramilitary groups who employed violence and murder to
intimidate workers and union leaders. Did the FBI and local law enforcements failures to investigate
Cincinnati Chiquita offices roles in illegal activities in Latin America, along with law enforcements aggressive
pursuit of employees and reporters who brought some of those types of activities to light, allow Chiquita to
continue to pay paramilitary groups that committed violence and murder against banana workers for years
after these types of payments were uncovered by Chiquita workers and reported in the Cincinnati Enquirer?
In 2001, one group paid by Chiquita was designated a Specially-Designated Global Terrorist, making it a
federal crime for Chiquita, as a US Corporation, to provide money to this group. In 2002, senior Chiquita
executives established procedures to pay directly and in cash; a senior Chiquita officer described these
procedures to Chiquitas Audit Committee. Against advice of legal counsel, Chiquita continued to pay until
2004. (See the Department of Justices 2007 document #07-161:03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International
Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine
retrieved 2-20-2013.) Instead of stopping the misconduct in 1998, inaction of law enforcement and the courts
appear to have allowed Chiquitas funding of organizations responsible for intimidation, violence, and murder
to continue until 2004; in the meantime, The Cincinnati Enquirer paid a million dollar settlement to Chiquita
and subjected Enquirer readers to a long series of positive front-page stories about Chiquita and its directors.
It is significant to note that the original Enquirer series of articles "Chiquita's Secrets Revealed" and some
subsequent articles describing Chiquita's behavior, such as Salon's article, cannot be found readily on the
internet (if at all). Does silencing critics by prosecution under pretenses that disclosing evidence of criminal
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activity amounts to violation of laws protecting companies proprietary information amount to establishing a
corporate code of omerta that runs counter to public policy? Second Example: Cincinnati-based P&G
contacted local law enforcement about suspicions that some of its employees were leaking information to the
press. Reports indicate that P&Gs CEO directed eager-to-please law officers, hip-pocket prosecutors, and
a city detective who gets a second salary from the company to investigate. Subpoenas were issued for
thousands of home and business phones in actions described as intended to intimidate its critics and conceal
its embarrassments. (William Safire, Essay; At P&G: It Sinks NY Times, Sept 5, 1991). One reporter was
accused of breaking the law. An attorney called the Cincinnati Police chief to stop one of their officers with
ties to P&G from continuing to harass the reporter. An Ohio State professor is quoted as saying The people
who govern Cincinnati treat the town like a plantation. Local officials protect the good old boys. The Ohio
Legal Director for the American Civil Liberties Union is qoted as saying P&G has law enforcement to its beck
and call (Alecia Swasy, Soap Opera The Inside Story of P&G Times Books, 1993, p. 297-305). The reporter
wrote about various P&G problems, including toxic shock syndrome deaths that appeared to be caused by a
P&G product, prostitution and drug scandals at the company, and retaliation against employees for raising
concerns about illegalities. Notably, despite the fact that prostitution and drug trafficking were illegal, law
enforcement appeared in indicate that they performed no investigation of the evidence that these activities
occurred at P&G. Third Example: A Cincinnati-area chemical companys CEO informed a state attorney
general that an employees disclosure of information demonstrating that regulated chemical products
marketed as approved for food contact applications and cosmetic ingredients were contaminated with heavy
metals was a felony, as the company regarded records of the contamination as proprietary information. The
highly profitable cost-cutting practices included "test and switch" of raw materials and processing conditions.
Documentation indicates that, after testing indicated that products passed regulatory tests, substitution of
cheaper raw materials with higher levels of regulated contaminants led to savings of 20% or more. Processing
lines of regulated and unregulated contaminated products were also shared, leading to more savings.
Company sales literature included claims that these products were FDA approved for food contact. A different
set of company sales literature did not indicate that one of the products was even suitable to be thrown in the
garbage, per some states' "Toxics in Packaging" regulations. In response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests regarding the food contact approval claims and related regulations, the FDA indicated that it had no
information about the situation, despite having been provided with the information requested in the FOIA
over a year earlier and information indicating that the product met FDA requirements appearing the Code of
Federal Regulations.
In addition to appearing to have sufficient influence to manipulate the CPD and an alphabet soup of other
governmental groups to harass and possibly prosecute those calling attention to corporate misconduct,
companies appear to have sufficient resources to employ private firms, medical entities, and other
consultants to harass and undermine their critics credibility. Some of the Greater Cincinnati governmental
offices involved in these activities appear to have been consolidated into a "fusion center", making their
activities less visible to the public.
As one former DOL investigator explained, the Cincinnati DOL takes the employers side in complaints unless
they are certain that the employer will lose in order to avoid sending the wrong message. Some Cincinnati
employments lawyers have stated that they dont do DOL ALJ hearings.
Page 102
Corporate influence over governmental actions appears to create a situation where law enforcement is coopted in actions that leverage the law to conceal (rather than investigate, expose, and limit) corporate
misconduct. Information demonstrating record falsification and inaccurate nuclear industry technical
information must be made available to those who could act on it (particularly in view of events at Fukushima
and the increased urgency to address the spent nuclear waste accumulating at US reactors). Unfortunately,
circumstances indicate that it is likely that such efforts could create undesirable outcomes that prevent
corrections, as occurred in the case of Chiquita.
30
Donald Sadoway. MIT 3.091SC Introduction to Solid State Chemistry, Lec 20, Fall 2010. www.youtube
.com/watch?v=malCa9k17Ag&list=PL1F2179A79AEC920D. At 18:37 min. Information retrieved 3/12/2012.
31
Case No. 2000-ERA-0035. ALJ Hearing. testimony. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law
Judges (ALJ).
32
D. Knorr et. al., The Influence of Crystallographic Texture and Test Temperature on Initiation and
Propagation of Stress-Corrosion Cracks in Zircaloy, Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 6th International
Symposium (1982), P. 627.
33
Hindle and Worswick , Variation in the Strain Anisotropy of Zircaloy with Temperature and Strain,
Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry, 6th International Symposium (1982), p. 133.
34
Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430464.pdf
35
Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf.
36
Some parts of this document are redundant in some respects. Redundancy appeared to be necessary in
order to allow some sections to "stand alone" and in order to improve clarity and to reduce the effects of
misunderstandings arising from recurring uncontrollable instabilities in the word processing program that have
changed, swapped, or removed words and phrases in the document as it was being revised.
37
The technical problems with fuel rod cladding properties information were confirmed in court
decisions
and by the NRC.1,2 The false statements in the QA Incident Report were confirmed in court
decisions. Employees actions intended to correct problems and notify clients were blocked by adverse actions
by management prior to notification of the NRC. Demands to sign the QAR backed by firing threats and other
adverse actions was confirmed in court decisions.20,21 GE Nuclears safety warnings were reproduced in at
least two decisions.15, 21 The fact that erroneous technical information and related records have not yet been
corrected was confirmed in court decisions and has been confirmed (or reaffirmed) by the NRC.2 Note that
these findings were based on evidence from Lambda records backed by testimony of Lambda employees
hostile to the action. (The DOL disregarded the testimony of the alleger or plaintiff based on its interpretation
of responses about testimony about a partially inaudible statement in a partially inaudible telephone
unemployment hearing (that was part of an unemployment process that the NRC told the alleger to file) and
based on flawed interpretation of some highly technical testimony that the DOL judge did not appear to
comprehend. These DOL findings and their impact on company records used in the decision were not
apparent until published in the decision. Neither these findings nor their impact on the decision could be
reversed on appeal. However, it is important to reiterate that the nature of the errors, the threats over
document generation, the false nature of the document, and GEs notification of safety issues, along with
15,19,20,21
Page 103
other elements, were established with other evidence despite the DOL judges selective use testimony and
arbitrary discarding of other records and evidence.) The judge in the federal case also relied on the owners
false affidavit and disregarded GE Nuclear audit documents and other records to dismiss the case covering
broader issues and evidence indicating that inaccurate materials analysis was more widespread than the
zirconium analysis. 19 The NRCs report documents the NRCs ignorance of the nature and uses of texture
information. The NRC and courts that rely upon the NRC have blocked correction of correction of erroneous
technical information about nuclear fuel rod cladding properties and removal of related fraudulent records
from company archives. The NRC has also generated false audit records and generated audit records that
decouple safety concerns from errors and deficiencies that the NRC repeatedly found in industry
procedures.4,3,1 Calling attention to these events and problems, which is in none of the parties direct interests,
appears necessary to establish that responsible parties must correct the specific and systemic information
problems. As the Fukushima accidents and ongoing leakage of radioactivity indicate, current technology does
not have the capabilities necessary to stop the spread of radioactive materials once a serious accident has
occurred. Understanding the quality of information that will be relied upon when incidents and accidents
occur is required to limit the impact of nuclear technology on the public health, the environment, and the
economy. Concerns about the problems described above were described in a Limited Appearance
Statement on the Renewal of the Licenses for the Indian Point Energy Center, which is posted on the NRC
ADAMS database with Accession Number ML12270A373. This statement and other earlier communications to
the NRC got no meaningful response. Steve Schulin at power plant news from nuclear.com made a
comment indicating that the NRC problems with hiding and mishandling information continue, writing It is
downright ironic that ADAMS database entry for this document shows author name of Mary Kelly rather
than Mark Kelly in the document title, and Kelly, M in the author name field. (Steve Schulin. #nuclear #Zr
Lax and flawed NRC information practices. Thats Dr. Mark Kellys polite description. Posted at nuclear.com.
10-15-12. Concerns directed at congressmen seemed to get more response, but every indication is that bad
information remains uncorrected. Correcting inaccurate data and reviewing suspect data is incredibly simple.
Accidents and incidents are incredibly expensive. Lack of responsible NRC action appears to indicate that the
NRC is more interested in managing nuclear perceptions rather than nuclear safety.
38.
United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Hearing. Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR. ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01. In the Matter of: Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Generating Units 2 and 3). Note that the transcript was provide by Hudson River
Sloop Clearwater (for other purposes). Copies of the transcripts could not be located on the NRC web site for
reference and verification, so the copy provided by Clearwater has been posted on the internet at Scribed.com
under the following file names: IndianPointTranscript of Oct 15 2012.pdf (pages 1252-1456),
IndianPointTranscript of Oct 16 2012 (pages 1457-1779), IndianPointTranscript of Oct 17 2012 (pages 17802083), IndianPointTranscript of Oct 18 2012 (pages 2084-2387), IndianPointTranscript of Oct 22 2012
(pages2388- 2721), IndianPointTranscript of Oct 23 2012 (pages 2722-2918), IndianPointTranscript of Oct 24
2012 (pages 2919-3169). Note that these copies of the files may not display properly on some devices due to
formatting. Clean format copies are available on request from mark.kellyzr2011@gmail.com.
Page 104

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NRC and Nuclear Industry Generation of False Records and Tolerance of Inaccurate Technical

Nuclear Industry Technical

An NRC Report Confirmed

Scientific Studies Confirm GE

Numerous technical publications support GE Nuclear concerns that

The NRC stated that the NRC

The NRC disregarded GE

The NRC dismissed written safety notifications and disregarded publications

NRC Audit Records

An NRC Audit Record

The False NRC Information

What are the Bases of

Given NRC tolerance of inaccurate information and generation of false records,

Poor NRC Information

Technical information of known reliability is required to make good decisions concerning

NRC Tolerance of Bad

Courts Rely on NRC

The NRC Should Require

The NRCs lack of action regarding known errors in reports:

GE Nuclear Notification to Lambda Regarding Zirconium Alloy Texture Work:

Zirconium in the Nuclear Industry. 14th International Symposium. Paper on Texture:

(Source: NRC ReportNRR-1999-A-00571.)

Federal Court Ruling on Errors Relying Upon the NRC Report:

1. Materials Information and Zirconium Alloys in Nuclear Applications.

B. Hydrides Precipitate C. Hydrides Grow

D. Hydrides Crack, Components Fail

2. Errors in Reports on Zirconium Texture Sent to the Nuclear Industry.

C. A 90 Degree Rotation Error:

Figure 3. Effects of a Ninety Degree Rotation Error on Reported Texture Results.

3. An NRC Report Confirmed Errors in Nuclear Industry Zirconium Alloy Reports

4. Published Scientific Studies Describe Nuclear Safety Implications of

Requiring industry to maintain accurate technical information amounts to cost-effective and

5. NRC Responses to the Texture Analysis Errors.

(Source: NRC web site document ML011430491.pdf. )

6. Recurrences of Zirconium Texture Analysis Failures and

7. Courts Rely on Uninformed NRC Safety Assessments to Dismiss Safety Concerns.

8. Opaque and Incomplete NRC Investigations

9. Inaccurate NRC Audit Records Conceal Recurring Nuclear Industry Problems.

11. Conclusions and Recommended NRC Actions.

Appendix I. Four NRC Records Documenting Flawed NRC Information Practices

the crash disk:

A Federal Court decision stated the following.

Appendix III. Short ARB Decision and Related Information

Authors Experience and Credentials.

H. M. Chung, R. S. Daum, J. M. Hiller, and M. C. Billone , Characteristics of Hydride Precipitation and

E. Tenckhoff, Review of Deformation Mechanisms, Texture, and Mechanical Anisotropy in Zirconium

Dahlback M. Dahlback, M. Limback, L. Hallstadiu, P. Barberis, G. Bunel, C. Simonot, T. Anderson, P.

Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430464.pdf

Lambda Internal Email. NRC web site document ML011430469-1.pdf.

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