Evidence Cases

G.R. No.
160261
November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionerin-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZONABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
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G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionersin-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,

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G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA
SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO
SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,
AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III,
ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO
TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIOCUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA,
NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.
SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG,
RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO
SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ,
HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE,
WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA,
EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL
ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR,
petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C.
DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA,
DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V.
DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS,
ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE
COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
[CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and
seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches
of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one
such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject
of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a
political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence
to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are
to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily,
salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office
and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES
12TH CONGRESS NEW

RULES
RULE II
RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
BAR AGAINST INITIATION

OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed
by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of
the House.
Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint
of impeachment or a citizen files
a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case
may be, is sufficient in substance,
or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of
the said Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is

not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period
of one (1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the
12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their
petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that
he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez
v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that
the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the
legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul
M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary,
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors
and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the
Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections
16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of
Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr.
Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition
for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing
Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare
as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the
issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an
official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of
the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that
as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from
endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays
in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in
their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the
resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment
trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was
put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it
was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28,
2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at
10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this
Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C.
De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin
the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments
on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M.
Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute
itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as
the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R.
No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated
Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty
however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from
section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred
upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for
a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme
law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis

supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of
the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are
mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role
of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame
Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in
Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential
application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a
political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try"
impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v.
United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would
create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution
and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole
power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check
and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the
U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a
duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution
with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives
without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of
the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in
point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional

representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the
courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such memberelect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not
have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.
Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the wellentrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to
distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in
the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of
the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the
personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit;
and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial
of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to
clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the
issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court
to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners
additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not
being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene,
alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.
and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He
alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he
asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected
to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice
to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only
then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature.
Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this
Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The
dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional
infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of
Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,
this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political
questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even
in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion,
when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review
and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that
the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,
reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x
And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with
it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of
the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of
the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our
main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in
their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The
1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was
our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished
what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish
for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite
which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern.
The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt
the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held
from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were
not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the
Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already
in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored
the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question
and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme
Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged
referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members
of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case.
This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as
a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government
or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further
clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power
is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused
its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme
Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away
with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this
Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly
political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would
have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and
non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political
questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review
is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of
the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome
of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling
for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim
to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c)
a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault
on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of
this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general,
which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already
been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including
the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining
the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the

"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for
said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely
endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should
have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who
signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the
scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No.
160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint.
Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions
would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but
the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of
the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute
the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral
compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the
Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of
the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it,
even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it
has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office,
the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
[his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in
the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the SenatorsMembers thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all
of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the
Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought,
leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no
less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections
when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the
fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly
and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests
or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them,
is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of
his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power
of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal
or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of
judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded
as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently,
failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were
not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the preexisting constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of
the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the
branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence,
chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in
People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect
and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to
statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as
amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI
(3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to
commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments
of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles
of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco
and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of
the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated
but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its
records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the
Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings
starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment
by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples
in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It
is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So,
on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules
of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but
the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of
Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in
keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143
(Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting
the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of
the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas,
who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
xxx
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object
in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that
must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing;
and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the
complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point
that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public
official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding
and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the
present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning
of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,
both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing
of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the SecretaryGeneral of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing
Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this
Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles
that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present
only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records
of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear
and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least onethird of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of
Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly
behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes
judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S.
Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in
the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power
if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view
the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to
that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence
of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as
to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk
may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for
a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It
is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by
the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did
not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this
enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not
do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our
trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new
power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of
government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the
view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157
(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that
this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
"the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more.
It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation
whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different
from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes
the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic
flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to
be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought
bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against
the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and
chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state
of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference
was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of
all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in
fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the
rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations
or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by
the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of
the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by
this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this
crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact,
adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.
Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution,
is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of
its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution
precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of
powers under our system of government.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of
the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but
also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by
the mere specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ vs CA
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from
the military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not
through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads
as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa
review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na
kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up
to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung
on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami
ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak.
Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka
kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak
ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by
Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3,
1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the
taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19,
1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible
by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic
Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the
substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly
taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would
lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would
not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the
parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned
under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby
a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it
within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but
as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be
informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that
is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take
a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section
1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker and a
public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in
the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,
as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the
undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they
do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations,
obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of
our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals
and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping,
we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among
those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because
the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
GANAAN VS IAC
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainants residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait
for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the
present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under Rep. Act No.
4200
Held:
No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue
of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D',
tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the
P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico
to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10,
1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department
of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33).
When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section
1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is
covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear
said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of
evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and
his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to
enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense
that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an
extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for
an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in
effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the
call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are
made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up
his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under
Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was
never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is
an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for
that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already
widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was
finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party
lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a
movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired
communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not
be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then
restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the
decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is
based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization,
and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in
contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co.,
134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the
main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by
wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in
the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one
ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no
violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not
occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out
his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use
an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at
bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals;
the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646;
Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction,
Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search
for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more
concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable.
It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only
consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment,
they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the
right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore,
the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the
defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him
to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the
evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and
other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be
with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
SO ORDERED.
Feria
PEOPLE vs Aminuddin
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested

on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC
officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip
from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected

his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was
filed against him. Later, the information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested
with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the
basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion
was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accusedappellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense,
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he
had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two
shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag
was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he
was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him
with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted
he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that
his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he
only has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not search of defendants bag is
legal.
Held:
The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught

in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or
search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not
committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just
done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The
said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as
evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is
acquitted of the crime as charged
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
fine of P20,000.00.
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali
y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he
was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16
He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches
belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial
court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they
received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks
before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin
on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana
leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the
coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you
also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security
reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with
drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received
by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984
that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on
his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping
marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in
your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search
warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.
23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more
flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is
the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged
on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]

En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police
(PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information

regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his
informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As
to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him prior to 8 August
1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged push
will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called
for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they
would wait for the alleged pusher
to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were positioned in the house
of SPO1 Paguidopon, a
"trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to Mula and
Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and
overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina
were accosted. The police officers
then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a
black bag, handed the same to
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer
and asked Molina to open the
bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina
were handcuffed by the police
officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula and Molina, through
counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable

searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the accused, but this was
likewise denied. The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to
file a joint memorandum. On 25
April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of
the offense charged, and
sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated
to the Supreme Court on
automatic review.
Issue:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify
their arrest, and the seizure
of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.
Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be
carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable
cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section
3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search). The first exception
(search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Herein,

Mula and Molina manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, they could not be said
to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters
not that Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open
the bag. Such response which
allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula and
Molina were committing a crime,
is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and
Molina could not be the subject
of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the
names and addresses of Mula and
Molina came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
arrested, and such cannot lend a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the
Court holds that the arrest of
Mula and Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on
their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against them
R. No. 129051 July 28, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO MOLINA y FLORES, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The present case is one for murder brought before us on automatic review, the capital punishment of death having been imposed by the trial
court. Accused-appellant, Romeo Molina, was indicted for the crime of murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1995 at barangay D' Alarcio, municipality of Laoac, province of Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit and stab DOMINGO FLORES with the use of a stone and knife, inflicting
to said victim the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
Contusion + lacerated wound 0.5 cm. over the left eyebrow
Contusion + lacerated wound V-shape over the right parieto temporal area
Contusion + lacerated wound over the occipital area

Deep lacerated wound 2 cm. over the ant. neck area
(+) Subcuteous emphysema base cervinal area
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
Depressed Fracture over the occipital bone with minimal bleeding
Linear fracture over the right parieto temporal bone
which injuries being mortal caused the death of said Domingo Flores to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
On arraignment, accused-appellant with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty and after
trial, Judge Joven F. Costales of Branch 45 Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered the
decision 2 now under review, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROMEO
MOLINA y Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined
and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law,
the offense having been committed with the attendant aggravating circumstance of
dwelling and hereby sentences him with the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be
executed pursuant to Repbulic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law and to
pay the heirs of the victim DOMINGO FLORES in the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay
the costs.1wphi1.nt
Finally, it is said:
"Dura lex, sed lex," translated as "The law is harsh, but that is the law!"
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts, as culled from the evidence of the prosecution are as follows:
On July, 14, 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Domingo Flores was asleep in his house in
D'Alarcio, Laoac, Pangasinan. His daughter, Melanie, who was then listening to the radio, was the only
one in the household still awake at that time. Hearing a sound, she saw accused-appellant, her father's
cousin, barging in through the kitchen door and going straight to her father's room. She peeped through a
curtain and saw accused-appellant hitting her sleeping father on the head with a stone the size of a fist
and afterwards stabbing him in the neck and eyebrow with a knife. She was able to recognize her uncle
as her father's assailant because there was a lamp near her father's head at the time of the attack. Afraid
that she too would be harmed, Melanie did not immediately come to her father's aid and instead watched
as accused-appellant made good his escape. It was only after Molina had left that she hastened to call
her grandfather, Eufrosinio Flores, who lived nearby. 4 Responding to Melanie's cries, Eufrosinio found his
son on the bed soaked in his own blood. As Eufrosinio lifted his son onto his lap, Domingo, fatally
wounded and bleeding, told his father that it was his "insan" Romy who stabbed him. Hours later,
Domingo died from his injuries while being transferred to another hospital. 5 Post-mortem findings
revealed that the cause of his death was severe intracranial bleeding secondary to skull fracture and
blood loss due to a stab wound on the neck. 6
On his part, Molina interposed the defense of alibi to exculpate himself from liability. According to him, on
July 14, 1995, he left his house in Cabilaoan, Laoac, Pangasinan at around three o'clock in the afternoon
to borrow the plow of his uncle, Martin Molina, who lived in Manaoag, Pangasinan. When he was
returning home after getting the plow, he met the victim Domingo Flores and Orlando Fernandez.
Suddenly and without any provocation, the two who appeared drunk at the time, took turns mauling him.
Thereafter, he hailed a tricycle and told the driver to take him to the Don Amadeo Perez, Sr. Memorial
Hospital in Urdaneta, Pangasinan where his injuries were cleaned and treated. The attending physician,
Dr. Noel Obedoza, recommended that Molina be confined but the latter refused, saying he had no money.
According to the accused-appellant, he stayed in the hospital waiting area up to eleven o'clock in the
evening of July 14, 1995 until a nursing attendant in the said hospital, Alejandro Duyag, took pity on him
and brought him to the latter's house where he spent the night. Molina claimed that he has since stayed
with Duyag for about a month as he did not want to go home for fear that his attackers would harm him
again. During his stay with Duyag, he worked for the latter as farm helper. Accused-appellant further
denied having had anything to do with the death of Domingo Flores, claiming that he only learned of the
killing more than a month later. He likewise said that prior to July 14, 1995, there was no bad blood
between him and the victim. In fact, he said, Domingo was like a father to him and he saw no reason why
the victim's family would make any false accusations against him. 7
To corroborate the foregoing testimony of the accused-appellant, the defense presented Dr. Noel
Obedoza 8 and Alejandro Duyag, Sr. 9 Moreover, the policeman who prepared the investigation report
based on the police blotter entry regarding the killing of Domingo Flores and the investigating officer
assigned to the case were likewise called as witnesses to establish certain inconsistencies in the initial
statements of Melanie and Eufresinio. 10
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 states that:
Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employng means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the identity of Domingo Flores' killer is not unknown. The records show that accusedappellant was positively identified as the assailant, not only by Domingo's daughter Melanie, who
witnessed the stabbing, but also by the victim himself while the latter was in the throes of death.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a long line of
cases. Thus, in the case at bar, the victim's ante-mortem statement is entitled to much probative weight
since it has been proven that: (1) at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the
declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to testify
to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the
declarant's death is the subject of the inquiry.
Indeed, a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Thus, it has been held that when a person
is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the truth. 11
Accused-appellant attempted to exculpate himself from liability by pointing out certain inconsistencies
between the sworn statements and the testimonies of Melanie and Eufrosinio. In Melanie's sworn
statement, she said that she saw accused-appellant stab her father that fateful night of July 14, 1995.
However, she testified in court that she saw Molina hit her father twice in the head with a stone before
stabbing him on the left eyebrow and neck. Eufresinio, on the other hand, averred in his sworn statement
that Domingo, making his dying declaration, pointed to Molina as his assailant, in the jeepney while the
victim was being brought to the hospital; in his testimony, however, Eufresinio clarified that the dying
declaration was made while they were still in Domingo's house right after the latter was stabbed.
To our mind, these inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the said witnesses. For one, accusedappellant himself admitted in open court that prior to July 14, 1995, there was never any bad blood
between him and Domingo and that he saw no reason why the latter's family would make false
accusations against him. Moreover, the alleged discrepancies may well be due to the fact that at the time
the sworn statements of the witnesses were taken, they were still in a state of grief and shock, which
explains why they were not able to relate accurately the events that transpired on the night of the killing.
Likewise, it should be noted that the sworn statements of the said witnesses were prepared by police
investigators and misapprehension by the latter of the facts related by the witnesses cannot be
discounted. In any case, the records bear out the fact that during the trial, both Melanie and Eufresinio
were able to clarify their averments in their respective sworn statements and despite the gruelling crossexamination, they managed to consistently and credibly maintain their version of what actually
happened.1wphi1.nt
It should be reiterated that discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and his testimony in court do
not necessarily discredit him because it is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits, being taken exparte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate. 12 Besides, as the lower court cited, the
testimonial discrepancies could have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory which tends to
strengthen, rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 13
Furthermore, as this Court has time and again observed, it is when the testimony appears totally flawless
that a court may entertain misgivings on its veracity. In fact, certain minor variances in the details of a
witness' account, more frequently than not, can be badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood, and
they often bolster the probative value of the testimony. 14
Moreover, well entrenched is the rule that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony of
witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witness where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant, as in the case at bar. 15
With respect to the accused-appellant's defense of alibi, suffice it to say that denials and alibis,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and deserve no
probative weight especially in light of the testimonies of credible witnesses who have positively identified
the accused as the assailant. In addition, it has been held that for an alibi to prevail, the defense must
establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was
somewhere else, 16 as Molina claimed in this case. Accused-appellant himself admitted on the witness
stand that from the hospital where he was treated for his injuries, he could have easily taken a tricycle
ride to get to the victim's house. 17
This Court has had occasion to rule that alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke, and
the courts have always received it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently
unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate. 18
As to the manner in which Molina killed the victim, the same was undoubtedly attended by treachery since
the accused attacked Domingo while the latter was asleep and unable to defend himself. There is
alevosia where the attack was sudden and unexpected, rendering the victim defenseless and ensuring
the accomplishment of the assailant's evil purpose without risk to himself. 19
Likewise, the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated by the trial court,
considering that Molina purposely entered the victim's abode with the intention to kill him. Article 14 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code provides that where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and the latter has not given any provocation, the same is considered an aggravating circumstance.
As Viada puts it, "The home is a sort of sacred place for its owner. He who goes to another's house to
slander him, hurt him or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." 20
It should be emphasized that for dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must
have been no provocation on the part of the victim. The provocation contemplated here is one that is
sufficient and immediate to the commission of the crime. In other words, the invasion of the privacy of the
offended party's house must have been the direct and immediate consequence of the provocation given
by the latter as where, for example, the accused and the victim quarreled in front of the latter's house and
the accused, in a fit of rage entered the victim's house and proceeded to stab him. 21 Such is not the
situation in the case at bar because the killing in the victim's house occurred at least six hours after the
accused's mauling.
There is, however, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to offset the generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. As the records show, accused-appellant was treated for injuries he
sustained when he was mauled in the afternoon of July 14, 1995 and the prosecution did not offer any
rebuttal evidence to deny the allegation that Domingo was one of the men who beat up Molina. Indeed,
that accused-appellant was mauled for no apparent reason by someone he looked up to as a father
understandably engendered a strong feeling of vengeance on his part. Sadly, however, he chose to take
the law into his own hands to sate his thirst for revenge.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court convicting the accused for murder
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua, the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling having been offset by the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
Home
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone

call from an informer that there were three suspicious
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of
whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons
and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the
two tried to run but unable to escape because the other
lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found
with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his
companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from
them and they were turned over to the police headquarters
for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm.
A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles
stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove
that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to
possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was
planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted
for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue:
arrest
Whether or not the warrantless search and

was
illegal.
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal

search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution.
Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest
without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and
(c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
These requirements have not been established in the case
at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused
appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding
his abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at
least being attempt by Mengote in their presence.
Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a
broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained
suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is
acquitted
In People vs. Mengote (G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992), the Supreme Court held that the
accused acts of merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, do not constitute
enough basis to implement a warrantless arrest. There was apparently no offense that had just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by the accused in
the presence of the arresting officers.In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the actual
existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengotes acts created a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had
been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it. The Court shot down this
argument stating that no offense could possibly have been suggested by a person looking from
side to side and holding his abdomen and in a place not exactly forsaken.
In the same case, the Court added this caveat:
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a
peace officer-could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may
have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his
person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver
was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly
without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan,
they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away
but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith
and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan,
who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house
in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the
robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote
made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed
instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted
over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have
been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged
robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote
and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing
or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them
the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had
no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a
bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat
in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently
upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances
no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even
acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it.
All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered
this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos,
this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with
a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest
must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of
People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make
is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of
his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not
only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress
the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no
expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their overzealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search
and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via
this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private
respondent Lawrence C. Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3)
charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16,
Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec
Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU
contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms,
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license

or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine
and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and
one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions,
carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date
which is covered by an election period, without first securing the written permission or authority
from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation
to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead
interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police
operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him.5
Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo,
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios,
Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of
the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the
source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to
call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they
were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned,
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent
manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by
Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled
delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang)
could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided
to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and
placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May
1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked
towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain Margallo and
two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers,
asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and
asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside
the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941
kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c) one
electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was
granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19
December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had rested its case
only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim.
Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992).
Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and
the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and
the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution
has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of
Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition13
alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has
proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein
assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges
for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused is
acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for
lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two
unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated
in favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to
the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and
Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-incharge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the
confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered
owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S
VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO
A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE

SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS
SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY
THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required
the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private
respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which the Office of the
Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial courts
resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against
him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether
there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph
(c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a
notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears
stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law
(Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same
provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double
jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide
open for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal
necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and
it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal
would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however,
the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President
who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8,
1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the
known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal
offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan,
can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then
wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories,
that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous
conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations
at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or
favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where
the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is
at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a
civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous
and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the
century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the
Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420
[Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino
vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of
People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the two separate
demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in
their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving
the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy
faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case,
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United
States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v.
Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
As succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the
case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for
to do so would be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the
case ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed the accuseds acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter
marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CAs
power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds demurrer to
evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The
finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep
into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when
brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know the exact
extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency,
will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based
on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy
will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in
jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in
the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a
pure question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we have enumerated the
distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction
is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court
-- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power
of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner)
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment
or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice
of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to
evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy.
Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this
petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the
trial court by appeal without violating private respondents right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which
definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits
as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident
to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct
lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a
crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of
arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial
court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three
charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the
evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial courts ratiocination is quoted as
follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless
arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the
defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person
without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and
searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest.
Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just
committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the
accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the
handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed
gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had
no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did
they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine
that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.
The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath
the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned
articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03
Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita,
Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the
accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have
previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita,
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the
back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise
when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place
under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory
examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15,
1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16,
1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it
not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the
Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions
look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is
it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched the
BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr.
Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us the
antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck
mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another
previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de
Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the
name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the name of the
person from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of
shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the
shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa
Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car together
with his driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the
compartment of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do with
that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who
inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December
16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has
gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested.
One of whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from
them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover that
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from
the three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two
men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the
time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the
accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu
scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter
concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team
suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor
and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a
gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when
he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me
the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something
unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching
his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car
were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under
any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court)
and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search,
and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is
likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it has
been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon probable cause and
under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to
be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante
delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the
People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case
falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and
seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of
credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition
for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable
only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this
Court. The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of
the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a
warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest
provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5
to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.291awphi1.nt
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious
behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about
to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore,
there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is
settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly
established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously
arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically
identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon
the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following
day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in
front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently
establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph
(b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in
appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called
for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive
finger that triggered his arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has
no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his
person and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33
Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during
the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too
high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDER
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No 170180
November 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana
leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on
him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when
one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his
bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain
Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried
marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that
his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed
was likewise contrary to law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the
arrest and the search.
Held:
The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was
acquitted by reasonable doubt.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only
occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.
(1) the person to be

arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit:
None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon
approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the
warrantless arrest.
However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact
that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the
chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution
witnesses.
Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus
acquitted.
The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure
is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ,
G.R. No. 170180
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 23, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without

valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.1[1] Any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
1
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of

government.2[2]
On appeal is the Decision3[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July

2005, affirming the Judgment4[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner
Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) 5[5]
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.6[6]
I.
2
3
4
5
6
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section

11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information 7[7] which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams,
without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription
from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8[8]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on

the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3)
barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,
Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo
Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17

March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the
National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La
Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed
7
8
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods

observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,
seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him
but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased
him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the
house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he,
as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag.
Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped
in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation. 9[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most

material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted
that he himself brought out the contents of petitioners bag
before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. 10[10]
Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was
petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon
9
10
orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he
who was ordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it
was then that they saw the purported contents thereof. 11[11]
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano

Laya
II
(Laya),
examination
of
the
forensic
chemist
the
marijuana
who
allegedly
conducted
confiscated
the
from
petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him

for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge
neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how
the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could
not identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane
wrapping the marijuana leaves.12[12]
11
12
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole

witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003,
he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union.
After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to
the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk
to his brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution witness
Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him
and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested
to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at
this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting
all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was
Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their destination. 13
[13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was

opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item
wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana
leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have
been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not
give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for
them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was
brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.
13
Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took

out the contents of his bag at his friends house, he averred that it
was one of the tanod who did so at Mercados house and that it
was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. 14
[14]
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt

beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him
and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.15[15]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the

Court of Appeals. On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed
the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent
reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the
barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their
part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to
arrest petitioner. It observed further:
14
15
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of

the seized marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is
denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus
delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his
possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdezs
own testimony.16[16]
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts

that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal,
that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay
tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag
that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he
maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are
inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on

the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded
great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing
that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which
could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied.17[17]
16
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on

hand, however, the Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the
decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can

we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest
before
his
arraignment.
Considering
this
and
his
active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that

petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.18[18] Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in
itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs

in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
17
18
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it

were incidental to a lawful arrest. 19[19] Evaluating the evidence
on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not
lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was

approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of his
bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the
house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas
who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband
allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first
time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the

resolution of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution
evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands out just
the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

provides the only occasions on which a person may be arrested
without a warrant, to wit:
19
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at
the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted
from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense.20[20] The tanod did not have probable cause either to
justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
20
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this

Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. 21[21] Here, petitioners act
of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he
was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged
in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did
not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when
they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth,

in line with our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not
be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner,
walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then
later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at
their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. 22
21
22
[22] Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled

in People v. Shabaz23[23] that [f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone
is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the circumstances of
this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an
innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24[24] [t]he

phrase in his presence therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on
the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be
secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his
own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic
and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to
the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its
application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically
provided by law.25[25]
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that

they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
23
24
25
arrest.26[26] If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to

conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stopand-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based
on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation,
following Terry v. Ohio,27[27] must precede a warrantless arrest,
be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. 28[28]
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his

arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken
during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as
they were seized during a warrantless search which was not
lawful.29[29] As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
26
27
28
29
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also

mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures
are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving
vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or
consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.30[30]
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was

neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was
the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that

apart from the warrantless search being incidental to his lawful
arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not
convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals31[31]
30
31
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable

searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress
or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that
no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.32[32]
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution

albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag
was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already
under the coercive control of the public officials who had custody
of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words
spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo
32
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could

not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered
no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee.33[33] As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.34[34]
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized

marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not
the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution.
We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the
identity
of
the
marijuana
leaves
purportedly
taken
from
petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,

the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction
33
34
took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or

the illicit drug as evidence.35[35] The existence of dangerous
drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.36
[36]
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions

case its failure to prove that the specimen submitted for
laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from
the accused.37[37] There can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to
be the prohibited drug.38[38] As we discussed in People v.
Orteza39[39], where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant
for illegal sale of shabu
35
36
37
38
39
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police

officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized
drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having
initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately
after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or
his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to
comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted
for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually
recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the

confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure
in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the
marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the

Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at
the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and
take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the

material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings
on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs
created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The
Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the

barangay tanod, the records only show that he was taken to the
house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police
station. The Joint Affidavit40[40] executed by the tanod merely

states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they
brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise,
the Receipt41[41] issued by the Aringay Police Station merely
acknowledged
receipt
of
the
suspected
drugs
supposedly
confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the
matter of when petitioners bag was opened, they also gave
conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The
prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to
explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was
the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know
how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the
police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane
wrapping
of
the
marijuana.
The
non-presentation,
without
justifiable reason, of the police officers who conducted the inquest

proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is
fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish
the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until
they were brought for examination by Laya.
40
41
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the

prosecution to establish the chain of custody over the seized
marijuana as such [f]inds prominence only when the existence of
the seized prohibited drug is denied.42[42] We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on

petitioners testimony that the marijuana was taken from his bag,
without taking the statement in full context. 43[43] Contrary to the
Court of Appeals findings, although petitioner testified that the
marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied
ownership thereof.44[44] Furthermore, it defies logic to require a
denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of
chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls

upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public
officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
42
43
44
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and

recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found
until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to
prevent
alteration
or
replacement
while
in
custody.
This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an

accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a
quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45[45] Among
the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most
primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence.
This elementary principle accords every accused the right to be
presumed
innocent
reasonable doubt.
until
the
contrary
is
proven
beyond
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
45
weakness
of
the
defense.46[46]
Moreover,
where
the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one

inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other
compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the
accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test
of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of
conviction.47[47]
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as an

especially vicious crime,48[48] and one of the most pernicious
evils that has ever crept into our society, 49[49] for those who
become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of the living
46
47
48
49
dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety

of law-abiding members of society, 50[50] whereas peddlers of
drugs are actually agents of destruction. 51[51] Indeed, the havoc
created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral
fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the
rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the
hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to
run roughshod over an accuseds right to be presumed innocent
until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its
corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly

fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner
enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in
petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
50
51
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind

the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and
prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons
brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights
at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give
more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to
the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the
practice of planting evidence to extract information or even
harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be [e]xtra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. 52[52] In
the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers
and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness
and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the

52
latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform

the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued

confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL
OMATANG, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152, convicting appellants Rico Calumpang
and Jovenal Omatang of two counts of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay damages to the heirs of the victims.
Appellants were charged under an Information which reads:
That on or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Pamplona Coconut
Plantation, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent
to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the
use of bolos, with which the said accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon
ALICIA CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the temporal bones
4 inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital bone and
the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm
and upon SANTIAGO CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the ear to the
lateral part of the orbital bones.
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall measuring
4 inches in depth 2 inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel protruding the
intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1 inch in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six) inches below
the armpit 5 inches in depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring finger.
which wounds or injuries caused the death of said ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO
CATIPAY shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
On arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr. Rogelio Kadili, and Alexander
Ebias.[3] Their testimonies constitute the version of the case according to the prosecutions point
of view.
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay, Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his
neighbors, the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped at the store of
Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer.
Magno added that Santiago saw appellants drinking tuba inside Anas store, and offered them a
glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just drank the glass of beer he was offering.[4]
After that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the coconut
plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning something
sinister because they followed too closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno
cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about appellants.[5] Magno and the
spouses simply continued walking for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow
waterway that let water from the river into the plantation. Magno removed his slippers and
started to cross ahead of the spouses. Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because
Santiago had to remove his shoes.[6]
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his
companions and saw appellants attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago on the head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked
Alicia.[7]
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he reached
Alexander Ebiass house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw the house of his cousin
Rolando Retada.[8] He decided to spend the night there.[9]
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or Rolando about what he saw at the
waterway because he was afraid. Magno added that he left Rolandos house around 6:30 the
next morning to report the incident at the municipal hall in the poblacion of Pamplona, but was
arrested for questioning by members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of Picio
Yan, where he had to attend to some personal business. Magno declared that he did not report to
them that appellants killed the spouses.[10] It was only after he was turned over to the police
authorities of Pamplona and brought to the police station that he reported what he saw the day
before at the waterway in the plantation.[11]
Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural Health Unit, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, testified that he conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims at around 7:00
a.m. on July 15, 1991.[12] The results of his examination showed the wounds on Santiago and
Alicia Catipay as follows:
[Santiago Catipay]
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending from the ear to the
lateral part of the orbital bones
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left chest wall measuring 4
inches in depth 2 inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the navel protruding the
intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth and 1 inch in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6 (six) inches below the
armpit 5 inches in depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and the ring finger;[13]
[Alicia Catipay]
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving the temporal bones 4
inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the occipital bone and
the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left forearm.[14]
Dr. Kadili likewise identified the death certificates of Santiago and Alicia Catipay which showed
the cause of death as hemorrhage shock.[15]
Alexander Ebias, who lives near the waterway at the Pamplona Coconut Plantation, testified that
around the time Santiago and Alicia were murdered, he heard noise from the direction of the
waterway, but did not do anything to investigate. Moments later, he heard Magno calling from
outside the house. Magno wanted some dried coconut leaves to make a torch. He gave Magno
what he wanted then asked about the noise from the waterway. Magno said he did not know.[16]
For its part, the defense contradicted the version of the prosecution and presented Analyn
Andagan, Conchito Nilas,[17] Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that appellants were
nowhere near the waterway at the precise time that Santiago and Alicia Catipay were murdered.
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending the store of her mother, Ana
Andagan, at Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and
Omatang arrived with one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a gallon of tuba and started
drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and the spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer
and immediately left after finishing their beers. Analyn further testified that appellants did not
follow Magno, Santiago and Alicia when the three left her mothers store. Appellant Omatang
stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two companions, appellant Calumpang and
Conchito Nilas. He left when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor, came to
fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her
close the store. He walked home with her and Conchito Nilas.[18]
Conchito Nilass testimony dovetailed Analyn Andagans testimony. He added that he saw his
friend appellant Calumpang go inside the latters house.[19]
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyns testimony that he fetched his uncle, appellant Omatang,
from the store around 7:00 p.m. upon the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant
Omatang slept in the same room that night.[20]
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyns testimony that he left around 7:00 p.m. with
Joseph. He also claimed he had nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred that he
was at home in the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the spouses were murdered. He
claimed that he learned of the murders only upon his arrest the next day.[21]
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He declared that Santiago and
Alicia had no known enemies and were good people. He corroborated all of Analyns testimony,
and added that Magno and Santiago were arguing when the two came into the store. Appellant
Calumpang likewise averred that after helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper,
and went to bed.[22]
In addition to the above witnesses, the defense presented Rolando Retada and Visitacion Rabor.
Rolando confirmed that Magno spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very early
the next morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on the other hand, testified that she
overheard Santiago berating Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14,
1991. Santiago was mad at Magno because Magno did not want to help Santiago clean the dam
at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued calling
Magno useless at Anas store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago to go home. When Santiago
and Alicia left, Magno followed them.[23]
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of the
murders. Said the trial court:
The testimony of the lone eyewitness describing vividly the events prior, during and after the
killing offers a complete picture of the incident that only an eyewitness could supply. Moreover,
the actuation of witness Magno Gomez of not telling other people of the crime he just
experience[d] for fear of his life, and his coming back to town after sunrise. Even declining
Retadas offer of a cup of coffee [and] to report to the authorities the incident that he witnessed
the night before, is consistent with human behavior and should be accorded great respect and
given more weight. (sic) His conduct after the incident added more credibility to his testimony.
As to the fear he exhibited after the killing of the spouses, the Supreme Court has this to say
there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident especially
if the assailant (assailants in this case) is physically near. No standard form of behavioral
response, quite often said, could be expected from everyone when confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful occurrence.[24]
In its judgment dated November 29, 2002, the trial court convicted appellants as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, each accused, RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL
OMATANG are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and further ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the spouses Santiago
and Alicia Catipay the amount of PhP100,000.00, and to pay moral damages in the amount of
PhP100,000.00. The bail bond posted by both accused for their temporary liberty during the trial
of this case is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant now assigns the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF MAGNO GOMEZ
SINCE HE WAS A PRINCIPAL SUSPECT HIMSELF. HIS TESTIMONY IS REPLETE WITH
MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES, AND MANY OF HIS CLAIMS ARE CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE OF
THE DEFENSE; AND
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN CONCENTRATING ON THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE
VAGUENESS AND WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS LONE EYEWITNESS.[26]
Essentially, for our resolution is the issue of whether the appellants guilt for double murder has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to Magno Gomezs testimony,
which is false and unbelievable. They stress that Magnos testimony that he never saw Santiago
try to escape during the attacks contradicts his statements in his affidavit, executed during
preliminary examination, that Santiago tried to escape but was overtaken by appellants.[27] They
suspect that Magno was himself the killer, and posit that because he was already a prime suspect,
Magno accused appellants of the murder to save himself.[28] Appellants likewise argue that the
trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi on the ground that it was a weak defense.[29]
Significantly, for the State, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that reasonable doubt
concerning the guilt of the appellants exist in this case. The OSG stresses that material
inconsistencies exist between Magnos testimony in court and his affidavit, which he executed
during the preliminary examination.[30] The OSG cites that Magno testified that the spouses
were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and
appellant Omatang attacking Alicia. However, during the preliminary examination, Magno
declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that Santiago was hacked because Santiago
attempted to save his wife.[31] Further, the fact that Magno was a principal suspect and that he
did not choose to exonerate himself right away when he was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army, render his credibility suspect.[32] In addition, the OSG stresses
that it was not shown in this case that appellants had any ill motive to kill Santiago and Alicia
Catipay.[33] The OSG concludes that appellants deserve acquittal on reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the trial court overlooked pertinent
pieces of evidence favorable to the accused and disregarded several significant facts and
circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony of the prosecutions lone
eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a departure from the settled rule that factual findings of
the trial court bind this Court.[34]
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings, the records show that serious
discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court and his sworn statement,[35] executed during
the preliminary examination conducted by Judge Ananson E. Jayme on July 15, 1991, at the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose, Negros Oriental.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants hacked Alicia Catipay first and
that Santiago was attacked after he attempted to save his wife. Magno declared that Santiago
attempted to run away but he was chased and was overtaken and was hacked by both
accused. Magno also claimed that appellants tried to hack him after they had hacked Santiago.
Magno said,
How did the hacking incident happen?

A
At first, it was Alicia who was hacked and followed by stabbing immediately
Santiago was also hacked and when he attempted to flee by crossing the
[waterway] both accused stabbed Santiago and he fell to the river.
When Alicia Catipay was hacked was she hit?
Yes.
What part of her body was hit?
On [the] left side of her ear.
And who hacked her?
Both accused hacked her.
And who stabbed Alicia Catipay?
[Jovenal] Omatang.
Was Alicia Catipay hit?
Yes.
What part of her body was hit?
At the stomach.
Q
Bolo.
Q
You said both accused hacked Alicia Catipay first, what did Santiago Catipay do?
He attempted to save his wife and instead he was hacked.

Q
What weapon did Jovenal Omatang use in hacking and stabbing Alicia Catipay?
You said Santiago Catipay was hit what part of his body was hit when he was
hacked by the accused?
He was hit on his arm.
After he was hit on his arm what did he do?
He attempted to run away but he was chased.
Did Santiago Catipay succeed in escaping?
No, he was overtaken and was hacked by both accused.

Q
When [Santiago] was overtaken by the accused what part of his body was hit
when he was hacked?
I know he was hit but I do not know what part of his body was hit.
Q
When both accused hacked and stabbed Santiago Catipay while running, what
happened to Santiago Catipay?
He fell to the edge of the river.
When Santiago Catipay fell to the water, what did the accused do?
They also hacked me but I ran away.[36]
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of how the murders happened.
Magno testified at direct examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago and that
Alicia was hacked only by appellant Omatang. More important, he averred that the victims were
attacked simultaneously. Magno testified:
Q
According to you, Santiago Catipay and Alicia Catipay were quarreled by Rico
Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang. How was Santiago Catipay quarreled?
He was hacked at the head.
Who hacked him at the head?
Rico Calumpang.
What did Rico Calumpang use in hacking Santiago Catipay?
A bolo.
How many times did Rico Calumpang hack Santiago Catipay?
Santiago Catipay was stabbed once and he was hacked also once.
Q
A
Head.
Q
And where was Santiago Catipay hit by the hacking of Rico Calumpang?
Will you please point to the portion where Santiago Catipay was hit by the
hacking of Rico Calumpang?
Witness pointing at the left side of his head.

Q
And according to you, he was also stabbed by Rico Calumpang, where was
Santiago Catipay hit by the stabbing?
Here witness pointing to this abdomen which is the lower part on the right side
to the breast.
. . .
You testified that Alicia was killed, how was she killed?
She [was] hacked and stabbed.
Who hacked and stabbed her?
It was Jovenal Omatang.

Q
According to you Alicia Catipay was hacked and stabbed by Jovenal Omatang,
was Alicia hit by the hacking of Jovenal Omatang?
Yes, she was hit.

. . .
Q
Was the attack of Santiago Catipay by Rico Calumpang and the attack of Jovenal
Omatang on Alicia Catipay simultaneous or they were hacking and stabbing
almost at the same time by these two accused performing their own individual
acts? (sic)
Yes, it was simultaneous.

Q
After seeing Santiago Catipay hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang and Alicia
Catipay hacked and stabbed by Jovenal Omatang, what did you do?
I ran.
You ran after they were killed or they were still under attack?
They were still attacking when I ran away.[37]
Magno never said that appellants also tried to hack him and even claimed that they were still
hacking the victims when he ran away. Magno also never mentioned that Santiago tried to save
his wife or that Santiago was chased or even that Santiago tried to run. In fact, during crossexamination, he averred that he never saw Santiago run away. Magno testified,
Q
During that hacking of Santiago Catipay, was Santiago Catipay able to run?
I do not know whether he was able to run or not. What I saw is that he was
hacked and stabbed.
And you are very sure of that, Mr. Gomez, that you did not see Santiago Catipay
run?
That is what I can say. What I saw was he was hacked and stabbed. After that, I
ran away.
That is why you told this Honorable Court that you did not see Santiago Catipay
run when he was being hacked and stabbed by Rico Calumpang?
Regarding that question, what I can say is that I saw the hacking and stabbing
incident. After that, I ran away.[38]
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court.
Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist
between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations,
with respect to a persons participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a
grave doubt on the veracity of the witness account.[39]
The trial court believed that Magnos accusations against appellants are true, basing on the fact
that Magno was able to testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack wound
on Santiagos head and the stab wound on his abdomen.[40] But the court failed to consider that
at the preliminary examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked the same
questions asked in court, but could not even recall where Santiago was hit when appellants
hacked him. No explanation was given how Magno was able to supply during the trial the
precise location of Santiagos wounds 19 months after the incident.[41]
Similarly, several portions of Magnos testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to be no
explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him[42] considering that he
was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the
spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that
appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters,
and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by
Alexander Ebiass house, called out to Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and
made a torch to light his path. Magnos actions were certainly not the actions of someone
seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to
Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from.
Magnos claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the
spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating
himself right away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well
settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[43]
Finally, no convincing proof could show that appellants had any reason to kill Santiago and
Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG points out, the supposed grudge, which Magno claimed could
have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be believed. It is highly
improbable that appellants would murder the spouses because Santiago had offered appellants a
glass of beer and they refused him.[44] If anybody should harbor a grudge from such an incident,
it should have been Santiago whose offer appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any
grudge between Santiago and the appellants, and as Magno testified, Santiago simply drank the
glass of beer himself.[45]
Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by their
relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of
the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.[46] Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption remains.[47] There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing
to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 10152 is REVERSED. Appellants Rico
Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. They are ordered
released from custody immediately, unless they are being lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,

SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW

BAR AGAINST INITIATION

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Section 16. Impeachment

resolution, as the case may be, is

Section 17. Bar Against

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by

departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional

by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary

verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested

from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected

sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Whether or not search of defendants bag is

The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught

People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001]

(PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information

been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable

before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. Herein,

Contusion + lacerated wound over the occipital area

The Western Police District received a telephone

Whether or not the warrantless search and

An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

this Court declared:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license

XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE

A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

(1) the person to be

G.R. No. 170180

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

November 23, 2007

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without

importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of

On appeal is the Decision3[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section

That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17

petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods

Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most

The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano

petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him

The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole

Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was

Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the

That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of