Cooperation, Trust and Performance

British Journal of Management, Vol.
21, 469483 (2010)

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00647.x
Cooperation, Trust and Performance

Empirical Results from Three Countries
Matthias Fink1 and Alexander Kessler1,2
1
Institute for Small Business Management and Entrepreneurship, WU Vienna University of Economics and
Business, Augasse 2-6, 1090 Wien, Austria, and 2Institute for Management and Entrepreneurship, FHWien
University of Applied Sciences of WKW, Waehringer Guertel 97, 1180 Wien, Austria
Email: matthias.nk@wu-wien.ac.at; alexander.kessler@fh-wien.ac.at
Reverting to the resource-based view of strategic management and cooperation theory,
we provide argumentation for the value of two critical resources to cooperating rms:
cooperation experience and maxim-based trust. The results of a large-scale survey
in three European countries (Austria, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) reveal an
important fact: although cooperation experience contributes to business performance,
the contribution of maxim-based trust to success is signicantly higher. As a result,
corporate success depends not only on the quantity of cooperation experience, but
also and to an even greater extent on the quality of cooperation with regard to the
form of coordinative power established within the cooperation arrangement. Given that
maxim-based trust has been identied as a feasible coordination mechanism in
cooperation relationships, it might therefore be freed from its frequent characterization
as utopian and out of touch with reality.
Introduction
The dynamization of markets in the context of
globalization has intensied the need for businesses
to develop the ability to create unique sets of
resources in order to ensure sustainable corporate
success. For this purpose, one promising means of
ensuring access to these critical resources
especially for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), which normally do not have extensive and
manifold resource congurations at their disposal
is entering into cooperation relationships. By
establishing a cooperation relationship, the partners can bundle (parts of) their resources and may
thereby create a new and unique set of resources
which can hardly be imitated. This is especially the
case when the partners succeed in identifying and
capitalizing on the synergetic potential of the
cooperation arrangement. Under these circumstances, such an arrangement has the power to
The authors would like to thank the two anonymous
reviewers for their constructive and helpful comments.
enhance the performance of both partners. The

contribution of cooperation relationships to business performance can be short term or long term in
nature (e.g. Macneil, 1980; Williamson, 1991).
However, entering into cooperative relationships
becomes a risky venture if the exchange relationship involves forgoing ones own short-term prots
in order to realize long-term gains together with a
cooperation partner (Roessl, 1996). In such
transaction relationships which are the focus of
our research cooperating companies make their
own business performance dependent on their
cooperation partners future behaviour. The ability
to establish and maintain successful cooperation
relationships is a critical resource in its own right,
and it is built up in particular through practical
experience in inter-rm cooperation relationships
(e.g. Brulhart, 2007).
However, it is not only the practical cooperation experience of the partners which makes (the
partners in) a cooperation relationship successful,
but also and to an even greater extent the
coordination mechanism within these relation-
r 2009 British Academy of Management. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford
OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.
470
ships. We focus on long-term dyadic cooperation
relationships between SMEs. These relationships
represent contexts that are highly demanding
with regard to behavioural coordination and are
often characterized by simultaneous market and
organizational failure. In such contexts, e.g. joint
R&D or cooperative internationalization, interorganizational relationships can only be explained
through trust-based behavioural coordination.
These situations call for mutual trust as a
coordination mechanism between the cooperation
partners, as such trust plays a signicant role in
ensuring the success of the cooperation and as
a consequence the individual performance of
each cooperation partner. In order to fully understand the coordinative power of trust, we have to
dierentiate between instrumental (extrinsically
motivated) trust and maxim-based (intrinsically
motivated) trust (Osterloh and Weibel, 2000). We
argue that maxim-based trust represents a valuable and particularly inimitable resource for the
success of the cooperation and the performance of
the cooperation partners.
This paper contributes to the eld of cooperation research on several levels. We not only provide
theoretical justication for the special value of (1)
cooperation experience and (2) maxim-based trust
as critical resources for business performance and
develop a measurement model for cooperation
experience, maxim-based trust and performance
(which contributes to sharpening the measurement
of trust, as called for by Moellering, Bachmann
and Lee (2004), to name one example), but we also
demonstrate the value of these two critical
resources empirically. To this end, we use data
from a large-scale questionnaire survey (n 5 303)
in three European countries (Austria, Slovenia and
Czech Republic) and employ hierarchical linear
regression analysis to test three hypotheses.
The results show that although cooperation
experience contributes positively to business
performance, maxim-based trust makes a signicantly larger contribution to performance in
cooperation arrangements. Therefore, corporate
success depends not only on the cooperation
experience (quantitative aspect), but also and
to an even greater extent on the form of
coordinative power within the cooperation
arrangement (qualitative aspect).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we develop three hypotheses against the
backdrop of a focused literature review. We then
M. Fink and A. Kessler

discuss the sampling and operationalization of
the variables. Next, we present the empirical
results, which are discussed and converted into
implications linked to previous results in the two
ensuing sections. We conclude by stating the
limitations of this study and pointing out several
directions for future research.
Theoretical background and

development of hypotheses
Cooperation, opportunistic behaviour and success
In order to generate prots, each company needs
to have a certain set of resources at its disposal.
For sustainable corporate success, it is crucial to
secure access to such resources. Companies can
employ three dierent modi operandi in order to
ensure this access (Pfeer and Salancik, 2003): (1)
They can either internalize the source or (2) build
up the competence and structures necessary to
generate the resource themselves. (3) Alternatively, companies may enter into a cooperative
arrangement with a company that has access
to the resource in question. As regards the third
alternative, companies need to reach several
decisions: they need to decide which resources
are critical for achieving their value proposition
and which of them they lack; which companies
have those capabilities; and, based on cost, quality
and speed considerations, whether the rm should
partner with or acquire those companies (Kim and
Mauborgne, 2000).
It is easy to see that there is less risk of losing
access in the case of internalization or in-house
production. Thus, in this context inter-rm cooperation might appear to be a less attractive
alternative. However, the resources future value
might not be predictable due to dynamic contextual
conditions such as rapid technological change,
modication of legal regulations or shifts in
demand. In such cases, the risk of sunk costs
impedes the development of capacities for in-house
production. This issue is also relevant in cooperation relationships, as changing partners gives rise to
switching costs (Lipman and Wang, 2000). If the
internalization of resources is also complicated, e.g.
due to time or legal constraints or relatively high
investment requirements, cooperative inter-rm
arrangements become the most favourable means
of gaining access to resources which are critical to
the focal rms business performance.
r 2009 British Academy of Management.
471

In particular, SMEs often face situations in
which both in-house production and internalization are unattainable. Manoeuvring within a
limited number of rather specic and narrow
business areas with a comparatively small war
chest, SMEs typically perceive unacceptably high
risks when they consider obtaining control over
critical resources single-handedly. Consequently,
cooperative arrangements represent an attractive
option in the strategic portfolio of these rms.
At the same time, inter-rm cooperation provides
a vehicle for transactions which would otherwise
overburden the focal SME (e.g. joint R&D or
internationalization projects). By widening the
behavioural portfolio, cooperative arrangements allow SMEs to exploit opportunities which
they would have to forgo as isolated rms, and
these arrangements hold the potential to create
a synergetic, critical and hardly imitable combination of the cooperation partners individual
resources. In this way, inter-rm cooperation may
make a positive contribution to the business
performance of both cooperation partners.
However, SMEs in cooperation arrangements
often nd themselves in a rather paradoxical
situation. By entering into a cooperative arrangement with another company, they agree to
coordinate their behaviour with the cooperation
partner, thus restricting their own autonomy. As
the elements of performance and reward are
temporally separated in a cooperative exchange
relationship and a partner can always deviate from
the agreement (Macneil (1980), from a contracting
perspective; Emerson (1962), from a power-dependence perspective), cooperating companies make
their own business performance dependent on their
partners future behaviour. Therefore, cooperative
strategies bring about a high level of risk: by
frustrating the partners expectations, a cooperator
may skim all of the short-term prots alone at the
expense of joint long-term prots, thus defecting
from the cooperation relationship. The possibility
of such opportunistic behaviour makes cooperative
arrangements a risky venture (e.g. Elango and
Fried, 1997; Wathne and Heide, 2000). The ability
of a rm to build up a sophisticated and eective
instrument to handle this room for opportunistic
behaviour determines the benet it can generate
from cooperative arrangements.
In order to build up such an ability to
coordinate cooperation relationships, the rm
may resort to two critical resources: the rm can
(1) tap its cooperation experience and (2) establish maxim-based trust. In the following, the
dierent bases, functional mechanisms and their
(relative) impact on business performance will be
discussed and condensed into three hypotheses.
Cooperation experience as a critical resource for

business performance
Organizational learning theory argues that
companies may develop the capacity to handle
complex transaction relationships by gaining
experience in similar settings. In an iterative
process, the rm extracts inferences from experience gained in past cooperation relationships and
extrapolates them to future situations in order to
improve its behaviour (Argyris und Schoen, 1978;
Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Levitt and March, 1988).
This argument is also supported by evolutionary
theory (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002), which
claims that a rms competences evolve through
incremental adaptation and progressive learning.
In the context of cooperation relationships, these
competences grow along with experience on two
levels: rst on the level of the experience gained in a
cooperation relationship with a specic partner,
and second on the level of general experience in
cooperation management (Brulhart, 2007), which
can be gained in the context of either domestic or
international cooperation relationships (Nadolska
and Barkema, 2007). Based on the argumentation
above, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: A cooperating companys cooperation
experience (measured in terms of the number,
duration and internationality of cooperation
relationships a company has participated in)
has a positive eect on the focal rms business
performance.
Maxim-based trust within the cooperation

relationship as a critical resource for business
performance
It is not only cooperation experience (quantitative
aspect), but also as we argue even to a greater
extent the coordination mechanism within the
cooperation relationship (qualitative aspect) that
makes a cooperation relationship and its partners
successful. When talking about the coordination
mechanism, a major issue is the kind of power
472
applied in order to coordinate the participants
behaviour within the eld of cooperation.
Consequently, the following question arises:
how can cooperators ensure that their partners
behave according to the rules stipulated ex ante?
There are three ideal-type coordination powers
for the purpose of reducing the latitude for
opportunistic behaviour. They apply to each real
inter-rm transaction relationship in a certain
combination (Adler, 2001; Bradach and Eccles,
1989). (1) The market mechanism (which is based
on isolated actors who pursue short-term advantages) cannot be the dominant coordination
mechanism in a transaction relationship which
strives for joint long-term prot (e.g. Ouchi, 1979).
Following the logic of the ideal-type market,
economic actors would opt for short-term prots,
making long-term arrangements impossible in the
rst place. (2) Behavioural determination by
hierarchical governance (e.g. Wathne and Heide,
2000) is equally limited: credible sanction threats
(Buckley and Casson, 1988) on an actors part
require sucient sanctioning power (Backhaus,
1992; Kaas, 1992a, 1992b), ex ante knowledge
(Eberl, 2004; Shane 1994) and ex post perceptibility (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987) of the
behaviour a cooperation partner is expected to
show. The coordinative power of hierarchical
governance is limited especially in those areas of
inter-rm cooperation where objectives cannot be
programmed at all, or only at prohibitively high
transaction costs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).
Thus, in transaction relationships which are
complex and pursue long-term goals, neither
market and hierarchy nor hybrids of these two
coordination powers (Borys and Jemison, 1989)
can govern the actors behaviour. Transaction
cost economics ignore the fact that, beyond a
certain level of complexity, market and organization failure impede exchange relations (Furubotn,
2001; Roessl, 1996). In direct contrast to Baucus,
Baucus and Human (1996), we argue that this
decit cannot be remedied by mixing elements of
those two ideal-type coordination mechanisms or
by delimiting contractual and relational obligations as proposed by Williamson (1991). From
a transaction cost perspective, trust cannot be
accepted as an alternative because of its neoinstitutional roots, which preclude non-rational
behaviour and with it the acceptance of uncertainty and trust. However, highly complex transaction relationships obviously arise in real business

life (Roessl, 1996) and form the focus of our
investigation. This insight opens up the view to a
third coordination mechanism which has slowly
but steadily made its way into economic thinking.
This third ideal-type coordination mechanism is
particularly well suited in situations of both market
and organizational failure. It is referred to as
relational contracting (Carson, Madhok and Wu,
2006), trust (Eberl, 2004), self-commitment
(Frey and Osterloh, 2002) or Selbstverpichtung
(Fink, 2005; Sydow and Windeler, 2000).
In society, trust was identied as a strong
coordinative power long ago. In the early twentieth century, the Austrian writer Egon Friedell
postulated: The most reliable way to make people
decent is to take them for decent (Friedell, 1983).
However, research on the coordinative role of trust
within economic transactions did not become a
serious issue for economists until the 1960s, when
researchers such as Bator (1958), Ouchi (1979),
Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987), Rotter (1971) and
Wurche (1994) highlighted the shortcomings of the
two classic coordinative powers of market and
hierarchy, and pointed to the catalytic eect of
trust. After that rst in-depth introduction to the
phenomenon of trust in economic theory, transaction cost economics gained the upper hand,
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, widely
ignoring the crucial role of trust in economic
transactions. The subsequent debate focused on
hybrids between market and hierarchy. Whereas
authors such as Zenger and Hesterly (1997) as well
as Holland and Lockett (1997) detected the rising
importance of these hybrid coordination mechanisms, Williamson (1991) asserted their infeasibility
and ineectiveness. Again, these obviously inconsistent standpoints opened up the eld for trust to
be viewed as a key to the controversy. Meanwhile,
European economists in particular pressed ahead,
theorizing on the role of trust in the economic
context (e.g. Osterloh and Weibel, 2000; Roessl,
1994, 1996) and providing a profound basis for a
new global research eort on the unresolved issue
of coordination. In his integrative work, Adler
(2001) reintroduces trust as a third increasingly
signicant coordination mechanism.
How can trust eectively coordinate the
cooperation partners behaviour? Following Ring
and Van de Ven (1992), Osterloh and Weibel
(2000) or Adler (2001), we dene trust as the
response of an actor (an individual, not an
organization) to subjective uncertainty regarding
473

the interaction partners behaviour. In order to
understand the coordinative power of trust, it is
necessary to dierentiate between instrumental
trust and maxim-based trust. Instrumental
trust refers to the exogenous conformity of the
cooperation partners behaviour with the explicit
and implicit rules of cooperation. This kind of
trust draws its coordinative power from sanction
and control. The awareness that the cooperation
partner may face disadvantages in the case of
defective behaviour motivates the actor to place
instrumental trust in him.
By contrast, maxim-based trust is intrinsically
motivated, drawing its coordinative power
from the actors self-commitment to a maxim
(Kant, 1998).
How does a maxim-based trust relationship
evolve? The evolution of maxim-based trust
can be described as a reciprocal, self-reinforcing
process. It starts with the actors mutually
conceding self-commitment to their cooperation
partners, which is based on socialized information on the cooperation partner (e.g. reputation
and perceived behavioural history). In this
situation, the actors feel compelled to provide
risky advance performance (irreversible commitments such as specic investments). In this way,
they communicate their own self-commitment in
a credible manner. Based on congruent expectations, both sides perform acts of maxim-based
trust, which in turn reinforce the initial expectations and justify additional acts of maxim-based
trust (Fink, 2005). They forgo individual shortterm prots in favour of common long-term
prots. As a result, a maxim-based trust relationship evolves. Although latitude for opportunistic
behaviour still exists in such transaction relationships, restricting the participants inclination toward opportunistic behaviour reduces behavioural
uncertainty. Therefore, the complexity of the
transaction relationship and the risk of betrayal
can be partly absorbed. Thus, maxim-based trust
provides a key to double contingency and prevents
the development of social dilemmas such as the
prisoners dilemma from the very outset. In this
way, maxim-based trust enables transaction relationships which would otherwise not take place
due to high behavioural uncertainty.
The prototypical transaction relationship,
which can only be realized by interaction partners
who place maxim-based trust in one other, is
heterarchic cooperation. Heterarchic cooperation
relationships can be dened as voluntary and

organized relationships between autonomous and
equal partners who mutually adapt their behaviour
to each other, thus bringing about the possibility
of one-sided defection. Thus, if two actors who
are ready to commit to each other enter into a
heterarchic cooperation relationship, we can assume that a maxim-based trust relationship has
been established between them (Fink, 2005).
The competence necessary to build up and
maintain such complex cooperation relationships
enables the cooperators to handle behavioural
uncertainty. Consequently, they are able to capitalize on additional opportunities which their
competitors have to go without. Prots will rise
in cases where only few rms are capable of
carrying out a transaction due to their control
over rare, inimitable resources (e.g. Barney, 1986,
1991). In fact, rms will then be able to apply this
highly sophisticated and ecient coordination
power to realize protable transaction relationships in risky contexts. The competitive advantage of being able to develop and manage
cooperation relationships coordinated by maxim-based trust has a positive eect on the focal
rms business performance. Therefore, the
following hypothesis can be postulated:
H2: The more behavioural coordination relies
on maxim-based trust in a cooperation relationship, the better the performance of the
focal participating company will be.
The superiority of maxim-based trust as a
contributor to business performance
Both cooperation experience and the ability to
establish and maintain a cooperation relationship
coordinated by maxim-based trust can be seen as a
rms resources. From this perspective, cooperation
experience can be expected to have a weaker eect
on the rms business performance, as it is easier to
acquire and less bound to the socio-psychosocial
prole of the actors in charge of cooperation
management. As a result, the competitive advantage of cooperation experience is easier to imitate
and therefore of less value to the company.
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Maxim-based trust within a cooperation
relationship has a stronger eect on the
business performance of the focal rm than
cooperation experience.
474
Methods
Sampling frame and response rates
The quantitative part of this paper is based on a
survey carried out in Austria, the Czech Republic
and Slovenia between March and July 2006. A
total of 10,000 (Austria, 2000; Czech Republic
and Slovenia, 4000 each) SMEs (i.e. up to 249
employees) was selected from national databases
(Austria, AURELIA; Czech Republic, ALBERTINA; Slovenia, IPIS) as a stratied random
sample. The region (province) and size of each
business (number of employees) were employed as
criteria for stratication. Stratication by region
(total number of SMEs of a region 2000 or
4000 divided by the total number of SMEs in the
country) was employed in order to avoid over- or
under-representing certain regions in the sample.
Stratication by the size of business ratio 1:3:1
for micro businesses (up to nine employees), small
businesses (1049 employees) and medium-sized
businesses (50249 employees), respectively was
employed in order to avoid over-representing
micro businesses, which show a low propensity
to cooperate.
The questionnaire was addressed to the owner/
manager of each SME, as in view of the topic of
the survey knowledgeable informants were not
available below that hierarchical level.
The survey yielded a total of 458 (4.6%)
returned questionnaires: 119 from Austria (response rate 6.0%), 199 from Slovenia (response
rate 5.0%) and 140 from the Czech Republic
(response rate 3.5%). A check based on telephone
interviews with a random sample of 45 nonrespondents from each country as well as a test
comparing early, middle and late responders
showed no systematic bias. Of these 458 SMEs,
303 (91 Austrian, 150 Slovenian and 62 Czech)
indicated that they participate in cooperation
activities. Therefore, these 303 businesses serve
as the basis for our analyses in this paper. The
breakdown of the sample into cooperating
and non-cooperating businesses showed that the
propensity to cooperate was signicantly lower in
the Czech sample (44.3%) than in the Slovenian
(75.4%) and Austrian (76.5%) samples (w2 5 43.12;
p 5 0.000).
The sample for analysis consists of 49 (16.2%)
micro, 153 (50.5%) small and 101 (33.0%)
medium-sized enterprises across a broad range of
industries. Approximately 43% of the businesses in

the sample belong to the service sector, some 37%
belong to the production sector, and the remaining
20% can be attributed to the trade sector.
Variables and measures
We used four-point scales (completely agree,
inclined to agree, inclined to disagree and
completely disagree) to measure all items.
Cooperation experience. Cooperation experience was measured using the number of cooperation relationships the business had had at the
time of the survey (1, one; 2, two; 3, more than
two), the duration of the cooperation arrangement with the rms main partner (1, up to one
year; 2, one to three years; 3, three to ve years; 4,
ve to ten years; 5, ten to 20 years; 6, more than
20 years), and participation in an international
cooperation arrangement (0, no international
cooperation; 1, international cooperation).
Maxim-based trust. As outlined above, mutual
trust can only evolve if both interaction partners
are willing to make a commitment to each other.
Therefore it is necessary to measure the level of
maxim-based trust on both actors sides. As the
questionnaire survey was kept anonymous in
order to increase the return rate, we could not
match up the partners in cooperation systems. As
a result, we had to apply a combination of direct
and indirect measurements.
On the side of the cooperation partner surveyed,
we measured the level of self-commitment to the
cooperation relationship as a manifest expression
of the maxim-based trust placed in his/her
cooperation partner (direct measurement). On
the side of the cooperation partner not surveyed,
maxim-based trust could be observed by identifying whether a heterarchic cooperation relationship
had been established. Based on the argumentation
outlined above, the existence of a heterarchic
cooperation relationship allows for interference in
the second cooperation partners level of maximbased trust (indirect measure).
As the individual items in maxim-based trust
were considered independent from one another,
we calculated a formative index.
Self-commitment. Our conceptualization of the
self-commitment phenomenon is based on the

work of Roessl (1994, 1996) and comprises
several dimensions. The present cooperation
partners reputation provides information on the
extent to which he/she has met the expectations
of his/her interaction partners in the past (Roessl,
2001), thus aecting an actors decision to
commit to the relationship. Familiarity is based
on personal impressions and provides information about the specic cooperation partner in the
ongoing relationship (Roessl, 1994). Another
indicator is the cooperation partners perceived
behavioural history. In particular, the stability of
the maxims underlying perceived behaviour is
crucial here. Self-commitment requires observable behavioural norms which remain stable
over time and therefore allow a prognosis of
the cooperation partners future behaviour
(Luhmann, 1989; Roessl, 1994). As perceived
behavioural history is not based on personal
impressions, it has to be obtained actively. The
source of this information is socialized impressions of others. If the cooperation partners build
up a personal relationship, the relationship will be
enriched by personal connotations, taking the
relationship to a higher level. Such personal
relationships between self-committed cooperators
have no short-term perspective (Becaerra and
Gupta, 2003; Kanter, 1995; Roessl, 1994).
A further dimension of self-commitment is the
actors self-restriction; the actor connes himself/
herself to cooperative behaviour. He/she takes
the risk that his/her expectations concerning the
cooperation partners behaviour might be
frustrated. Therefore, the willingness to take a
risk is another dimension of self-commitment.
Self-commitment also requires frustration tolerance, i.e. the actors belief in his/her ability to
cope with situations resulting from a frustration
of expectations (Roessl, 1994). An actors selfcommitment represents self-exposure. Furthermore, self-commitment calls for a leap of faith
(e.g. advance performance) which the interaction
partner might capitalize on by defecting from the
relationship unexpectedly.
Heterarchic cooperation relationship. We measure heterarchic cooperation based on (1) structural

characteristics and (2) interpersonal characteristics,
which are a suitable means of delimiting this
specic form of cooperation relationship from
other forms of inter-rm cooperation relationships.
475
Structural characteristics delimit from informal
relationship: whereas informal relationships are
characterized by a minimum share of elements
typical of organizations, heterarchic cooperation
relationships are organized relationships and can
therefore be characterized as systems (Plassmann,
1974).
Structural characteristics also delimit from hierarchical cooperation and concentration: the
essential dierence here lies in the form of
coordination in the transaction relationship.
Coordination based on mutually adjusted behaviour
on the part of autonomous and equal elements in a
heterarchic cooperation relationship (Strohmayer,
1996) is delineated from coordination based on
power, control and sanction in a hierarchy system
(Pleitner and Roessl, 1995). Consequently, each
cooperator has the possibility of one-sided defection
in the heterarchic cooperation relationship at any
time (Plassmann, 1974). Hierarchical systems have
a rigid structure of competences with a portfolio of
sanctions attached, whereas heterarchic relationships are characterized by voluntary participation
and inputs (Strohmayer, 1996).
The interpersonal characteristics typical of heterarchic cooperation arrangements are captured
using four indicators. The measure communication
quality describes how the cooperators communicate
with each other. Communication quality is crucial
for exchanging opinions and thoughts between the
subsystems of the cooperation relationship. Only
high-quality communication ensures that all participants have the opportunity to contribute their
ideas and safeguard their interests. In this way,
high communication quality contributes to high
relationship quality (e.g. Becaerra and Gupta,
2003; Kanter, 1995).
The measure resilience captures those aspects of
the cooperation relationship which only move to
the centre of attention in times of crisis. How
robust the cooperation relationship is in times of
crisis and how elaborated problem-solving competences are determine the relationship quality to a
great extent (De Burca, Fynes and Roche, 2004).
The measure transparency captures the cooperation partners openness concerning the internal
processes of their rms. To what extent do the
cooperation partners provide such insight, and how
well and accurately informed do they feel? Trust
can only evolve if the cooperation partners deal
with each other openly and honestly. The more the
actor knows about his/her interaction partner, the
476
Table 1. Measurement of maxim-based trust

Maxim-based
trust
Self-commitment
Variables
Reputation
Roessl, 2001
Familiarity
Roessl, 2001
Perceived
behavioural history
Personal relationship
Roessl, 2001
No short-term
perspective
Self-restriction
Willingness to
take a risk
Frustration
tolerance
Self-exposure
Leap of faith
Heterarchic cooperation relationship

Structural
Organized
characteristics
relationship
Mutually adjusted
behaviour
Autonomy
Interpersonal
characteristics
Luhmann, 1989;
Roessl, 1994
Roessl, 1994
Troendle, 1987
Plassmann, 1974
Transparency
Relationship intensity
With the cooperation relationship, I aim to realize

noticeable success as fast as possiblea
I attune my behaviour to the aims of the cooperation
relationship
I am willing to take a risk
The cooperation has a strong inuence on the success

of my company
In order to make cooperation work, one has to take
a leap of faith with ones cooperation partner, even
though this involves risk
Plassmann, 1974;
Roessl, 1994
Roessl, 1994
Possibility of
one-sided defection
Voluntariness
Before establishing the cooperation relationship, I

had heard good things about my cooperation partner
I have cooperated with my present cooperation
partner in the past
Before establishing the cooperation relationship, I
gathered information about my cooperation partner
I also meet my cooperation partner in my private life
I am convinced that I am able to cope with setbacks
Luhmann, 1989
Ruehl, 1980
Communication
quality
Items
Becaerra and Gupta, 2003;

Kanter, 1995
De Burca, Fynes and Roche,
2004; Rusbult, Martz
and Agnew, 1998
Osterloh and Weibel, 2000;
Roessl, 1994
McLain and Hackman, 1999
Equality
Resilience
Sources
Strohmayer, 1996
Becaerra and Gupta, 2003;
De Burca, Fynes and
Roche, 2004;
Kanter, 1995
De Burca, Fynes and
Roche, 2004
De Burca, Fynes and
Roche, 2004
Lorenz, 1999
My cooperation partners and I talk about the

cooperation
My cooperation partner and I take joint action in the
area of cooperation
I have remained legally independent within the
cooperation arrangement
In decisions regarding the cooperation relationship,
the opinion of each cooperation partner is equally
important
By behaving opportunistically, I could damage the
cooperation relationship
I can terminate the cooperation relationship
unilaterally at any time
I can get right to the point when speaking with my
cooperation partner
Discussions with my cooperation partner always

result in a solution
I know the internal processes in my cooperation
partners company
Since its establishment, the cooperation relationship
has gained intensity
Reverse item.
less risk he/she will perceive in the trust relationship, and the more likely a heterarchic cooperation
relationship will evolve (De Burca, Fynes and
Roche, 2004).
Once a heterarchic cooperation relationship
has been established and the self-reinforcing
process has started, relationship intensity rises

automatically.
For the purpose of measuring the components of
maxim-based trust, we used four-point scales
(completely agree, inclined to agree, inclined to
disagree and completely disagree). Table 1 shows
477

Table 2. Measurement of performance
Performance
Endogenous
perspective
Exogenous
perspective
Variables
Items
Employee qualications
Kaplan and Norton, 1996
Employee turnover
Gomes, Yasin and Lisboa,

2006; Hatch and Dyer, 2004
Customer satisfaction
Market development
Anderson and Sullivan, 1993;

Anderson, Fornell and
Lehmann, 1994
Bruhn, 1996; Horovitz
and Panak, 1993;
Quartapelle and Larsen, 1996
Share of regular suppliers

Cash ow development
Riner and Weidelich, 2001

Share of regular
customers
Financial
perspective
Sources
Sales development
Development of
investment activity
the measurement of maxim-based trust and its

components.
Performance. Our measurement of entrepreneurial performance is based on an adapted formal
structure of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan
and Norton, 1996). In this way, we can ensure
integrated coverage of the latent variable performance within the framework of our empirical
investigation.
As the individual performance items were
considered to be independent from one another,
we calculated a formative index. Table 2 shows
the variables employed along with their sources
and the items used. As in the case of maximbased trust, we used four-point scales (completely agree, inclined to agree, inclined to
disagree and completely disagree) to measure
all items.
Control variables. We used rm size (number of
employees), rm age (years of existence) and
country of origin (0, Austria as a traditional
market economy; 1, Czech Republic and Slovenia
as emerging market economies) as control variables, as these characteristics can also have an
impact on performance.
Since the establishment of the cooperation

relationship, the qualications of my
employees have improved
relationship, fewer employees have left
my company
My customers are always satised with
my products and services
Most of my customers are regular customers

relationship, I have enlarged my market share
Most of my suppliers are regular suppliers
relationship, I have boosted my cash ow
relationship, I have boosted my sales
relationship, I have boosted my investments
Analysis
We employed hierarchical linear regression analysis to test our hypotheses. In the rst step of
the analysis, the control variables were inserted
into the model, using business performance as
the dependent variable. In the next two steps,
the variables cooperation experience and maximbased trust were added to the model, and
incremental R2 and F tests of statistical signicance were evaluated.
Results
The means, standard deviations and correlations
of the variables are displayed in Table 3. First, it
is striking that (with the possible exception of the
duration of cooperation and maxim-based trust)
the correlations between the independent variables are relatively low, ranging from 0.185 to
0.177. However, the positive correlation between
the duration of cooperation and maxim-based
trust meets our expectations, as it supports the
argument that trust can normally only evolve and
increase with time (e.g. Jones and George, 1998;
Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994). With regard to
the correlations between the independent vari-
478
Table 3. Means, standard deviations and correlations

Mean Standard deviation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Performance
Firm size
Firm age
Country
(Austria versus CZ/SI)
Number of cooperation
relationships
Duration of cooperation
International cooperation
(yes/no)
Maxim-based trust
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
34.11
2.31
2.52
0.70
4.90
0.92
0.81
0.46
1
0.079
0.147**
0.090
1
0.150***
0.004
1
0.185***
1.90
0.90
0.100
0.112*
0.018
0.158***
3.20
0.48
1.35
0.50
0.204***
0.161***
0.017
0.039
0.114*
0.106*
0.008
0.177***
1
0.127** 0.080
0.028
61.92
6.16
0.421***
0.062
0.019
0.050
(7) (8)
1
1
0.107*
0.128* 0.008 1
*p40.1; **po0.05; ***po0.01.
Table 4. Performance: control variables, cooperation experience and maxim-based trust (n 5 303)
1
2
Control
variables
b
Firm size
Firm age
Country (Austria versus CZ/SI)
Number of cooperation relationships
Duration of cooperation
International cooperation (yes/no)
Maxim-based trust
R2
Adjusted R2
DR2
3
Cooperation experience,
control variables
SE
SE
0.101
0.370
0.151** 0.429
0.062
0.744
0.097
0.162**
0.050
0.046
0.212***
0.124*
0.036*
0.022*
0.036*
0.104***
0.077***
0.068***
4
Maxim-based trust, cooperation
experience, control variables
b
0.363
0.423
0.740
0.379
0.248
0.662
0.074
0.159**
0.066
0.017
0.165***
0.124**
0.398***
0.258***
0.232***
0.154***
SE
0.332
0.386
0.675
0.346
0.228
0.604
0.049
Standardized regression coecients are displayed in the table.

*p40.1; **po0.05; ***po0.
ables and the dependent variable, maxim-based

trust shows by far the highest positive correlation
with performance, followed by the duration
of the cooperation. The negative correlation
between rm age and performance is also noticeable. This negative correlation may result from
the fact that our performance measure, which is
based on dynamic indicators, tends to favour
younger, more exible businesses in dynamic
markets in comparison to more established,
experienced businesses in stable environments.
In order to check for multicollinearity in the
regression analysis, the variance ination factor
was calculated for the individual predictors. All
of the values are just over 1 and thus far below
critical levels. In order to test the hypotheses,
we rst added the control variables (see Table 4,
column 2, for results), then the cooperation
experience variables (column 3) and nally the

maxim-based trust variable (column 4).
The control variables (rm size, rm age and
country) explain 3.6% of the variation in performance, and the model only attains statistical
signicance at the 90% level in this step (p 5 0.057).
Nevertheless, while rm size and country do not
show a signicant impact on performance,
rm age turns out to be a signicant predictor
(p 5 0.034) for rm performance. As pointed out
above in the discussion of correlations, the
relationship between rm age and performance
is negative. Once again, we repeat our assumption that this outcome is partly caused by the fact
that we measured performance using dynamic
performance indicators.
In the next step of the regression analysis, the
cooperation experience variables (number of
479

cooperation relationships, duration of cooperation, and existence of international cooperation)
are reviewed beyond the base model. These three
variables account for an additional 6.8% of
the variation in performance (p 5 0.002) and
increase the statistical signicance of the model
(p 5 0.001). Explained variance thus attains a
value of 10.4%. Aside from the negative relationship between rm age and performance already
discovered in the control variables block, the
existence of international cooperation (p 5 0.068)
and particularly the duration of cooperation
(p 5 0.002) show signicant positive relationships
with business performance.
This means that Hypothesis 1 can partially be
supported. Cooperation experience in the form of
the duration of cooperation and with some
limitations due to lower signicance also the
existence of international cooperation make a
positive contribution to business performance.
In the nal step of our analysis, we added
maxim-based trust to the regression model. The
integration of this variable increases the explained
variance considerably by 15.4% (p 5 0.000) to
25.8% (p 5 0.000). Maxim-based trust shows a
highly signicant positive relationship with business performance (p 5 0.000). In combination,
these outcomes support Hypotheses 2 and 3:
maxim-based trust has a positive inuence on
business performance (Hypothesis 2) and has a
stronger eect on business performance than
cooperation experience (Hypothesis 3). In fact,
maxim-based trust explains a higher percentage of
the variance in performance (15.4%) than all the
other variables in the nal model combined.
Discussion
Empirical analysis shows that cooperating
rms with more cooperation experience are more
successful. The longer these rms manage to
maintain their cooperative relationships, the
better the rms perform. Moreover, the internationality of cooperation relationships contributes to rm performance. Interestingly enough,
the data do not indicate that the rms number of
cooperation relationships has a signicant impact
on performance. This can be interpreted as a rst
indication of the greater success contribution
of continuous, systematic and focused investment
in the development of an ongoing cooperation
relationship which lies within the core of ones

business and widens the rms strategic portfolio.
In contrast, the development of cooperation
relationships with ever-changing partners does
not contribute to rm performance. From this
perspective, the rms number of cooperation
relationships alone is not a decisive factor. Moreover, the number of cooperation relationships
maintained seems to be inuenced by rm size,
as increasing company size automatically leads to
an increasing number of external contacts. At the
same time, a larger number of external contacts
increases the probability that cooperatively coordinated transaction relationships will evolve.
Although the results show that cooperation
experience makes a positive contribution to the
performance of cooperating rms, we were also
able to identify a far stronger success factor
for cooperators: maxim-based trust. Inter-rm
cooperation relationships are characterized by
double contingency and are therefore a suitable
context for empirical research into the eect of
maxim-based trust on cooperators performance.
In this context, we showed that maxim-based trust
is a resource that substantially contributes to the
cooperating rms performance. We interpret this
trust based on maxims as a critical resource which
is especially dicult to imitate and may thus
serve as a possible key to developing competitive
advantages. Firms that manage to evolve maximbased trust possess a capability which enables
them to manage cooperation relationships which
could not be coordinated otherwise. They can
seize and capitalize on opportunities which their
competitors have to forgo due to the high complexity and uncertainty involved.
We can sum up our ndings as follows. It is not
so much the quantity of cooperation experience,
but the quality of the cooperation relationship
that accounts for its value to the company. These
ndings concur with those of Lavie (2006), who
highlights the special value of the nature of interrm relationships.
Implications
As cooperation experience has proved to be a
success factor for cooperating rms, it seems
benecial to build up the appropriate management
capacities in due time. From our results, we have
learned that it is not the number of cooperation
480
relationships a rm has experienced but the
intensity of these relationships that contributes to
future success. The management capacities relevant
to coordinating cooperative relationships and the
resulting rm performance obviously grow along
with the challenge. This idea leads to the assumption that, in order to boost business performance,
entrepreneurs have to venture into increasingly
demanding transaction relationships. We argue
that with rising cooperation experience rms build
up a sophisticated and eective instrument for
handling behavioural uncertainty within cooperation relationships. The challenge of coordinating
cooperation relationships grows with longer time
horizons and higher internationality, as these
factors increase complexity and uncertainty. More
demanding settings force cooperating rms to
improve their coordination instruments, thus creating a more valuable resource. Those who invest in
the development of their cooperation relationship
and push the limits within this relationship will
outperform those who only dare to act within the
secure, familiar territory of the past.
Our results show that the more a cooperation
arrangement relies on maxim-based trust, the more
successful it is. However, a rm cannot establish a
maxim-based trust cooperation relationship overnight in order to boost its performance. First, the
rm needs to nd a like-minded partner who is
willing to commit to the relationship to the same
extent as itself. This is not an easy task, as selfcommitment can only be communicated by leaps
of faith and mutual-based trust can only evolve if
the interaction partner does not capitalize on this
self-exposure. The tricky thing is the fact that
self-exposure is only legitimated by its result. Thus,
one can never be sure to succeed with this kind
of advance. On the one hand, this dilemma is
unpleasant for the actor who is willing to develop a
maxim-based trust relationship with a cooperation
partner, as it forces the actor to take a risk that
cannot be legitimated beforehand. On the other
hand, it also serves as a safety mechanism as it
avoids instrumentalizing maxim-based trust: once
you fake it, you break it.
Second, such relationships typically grow over
time. The evolution process of maxim-based
trust cannot be accelerated by force. It rests on
a long-term strategy aimed at building up a
good reputation and ensuring a positive perceived history. Additionally, it requires a longlasting personal relationship with the cooperation

partner in the course of which one has credibly
communicated a willingness to take risks, a
sucient level of frustration tolerance and readiness for self-restriction and self-exposure.
It is easy to see that, although maxim-based
trust is a possible key to boosting rm performance, it is not a management tool suitable for
short-term intervention. As the word maxim
implies, it is more a constant socio-psychological
predisposition underlying the entrepreneurs
decisions and actions.
However, as our results identify maxim-based
trust as a possible key to competitive advantage
and enhanced business performance in the long
run, researchers as well as practitioners may
regard it as an important phenomenon in the
cooperation context. Our ndings may contribute
to freeing this social phenomenon from its
frequent characterization as utopian and out of
touch with reality. In this respect, our results
challenge theoretical concepts that adhere to the
concept of homo oeconomicus. This may provide
support for those who have appropriate resources
at their disposal and are willing to develop a
maxim-based trust relationship. The more maxim-based trust cooperation relationships are
realized in highly uncertain and complex contexts, the less society suers from the consequences of market and organization failure.
In the eld of SME cooperation, our results
challenge arguments based on transaction cost
economics alone, such as those put forth
by Williamson (1991), as well as explanations
of exchange transactions based on rational
choice theory (as argued by Axelrod (1984), for
example). The results also provide empirical
support for more holistic concepts of inter-rm
transactions as proposed by Roessl (1994),
Osterloh and Weibel (2000), Adler (2001) and
Carson, Madhok and Wu (2006), to name just a
few examples.
In light of our empirical results, further
research in this eld is certainly worthwhile,
both from a scientic as well as a practical point
of view.
Limitations and directions for future

research
First, the moderate response rate has to be qualied
in light of the fact that surveys on SMEs (especially

in transition economies) typically show low response
rates. This diculty is exacerbated when surveys
address sensitive issues such as trust in cooperation
partners. However, our check for non-response bias
as well as a test comparing early, middle and late
responders showed no systematic bias, thus indicating robustness of the results presented.
Second, although the survey instrument was
tested in a 2004 survey of over 600 Austrian
SMEs and the consistency of the results with
those of the study at hand indicates reliability,
further use in other contexts would be required in
order to legitimate the claim of reliability. This
could likewise demonstrate whether our ndings
are valid in other geographical and cultural
contexts as well as in a sample of large companies.
Third, our one-sided measurement of maximbased trust is justied by theoretical arguments and
therefore does not compromise the empirical results.
However, the measure should be subjected to
further validation in qualitative as well as quantitative studies using pairs of cooperators. Pairing
would further increase the reliability of the data, but
at the same time represents a major challenge with
regard to the anonymity of the respondents and,
consequently, the resulting response rate.
Fourth, as we employed a cross-sectional design,
we cannot rule out reverse causality. In order to
enhance clarity in this regard, a longitudinal
study would have to be conducted. Such a design
would also yield even higher explained variance in
performance.
However, we are convinced that by presenting
innovative lines of argumentation and current
empirical results, we have been able to enhance
our understanding of how SME cooperation
arrangements generally contribute to business
performance, and to add another piece to the
puzzle regarding the special value of maximbased trust relationships.
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Matthias Fink is an assistant professor at the Institute for Small Business Management and
Entrepreneurship at the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business where he also earned his
PhD in Small Business Management. Furthermore, he is a senior researcher at the Research Institute
for Co-operation and Co-operatives and Visiting Professor at Vaasa University (Finland) and
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona (Spain). Mr. Fink is lecturer at several European universities.
He holds a three-year fellowship (APART Austrian Program for Advanced Research and
Technology) granted by the Austrian Academy of Sciences. His main research interests are
interorganizational cooperation, trust in the economic context, internationalization of SMEs,
community-based entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial marketing.
Alexander Kessler is an associate professor and head of the Competence Center Entrepreneurship at
the Institute for Management and Entrepreneurship at FHWien University of Applied Sciences of
WKW, Vienna. Furthermore he is a lecturer and researcher at the Institute for Small Business
Management and Entrepreneurship at the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business and a
visiting professor at the Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He earned his masters
degree, his PhD and his Habilitation in business administration at WU Vienna University of
Economics and Business. His main research interests are business start-up and development,
corporate entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship in countries of transition, international comparisons
in entrepreneurship research, family business research, and trust in SME cooperation relationships.

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British Journal of Management, Vol.

21, 469483 (2010)