PEOPLE v.

Hernandez (very long case daming procedures)

ER: Pimentel filed a complaint against Salayon & Llorente, Chairman &
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Canvassers of Pasig for the May 1995
elections for dagdag bawas.
At first, it was denied by the COMELEC, however, upon petition to the SC,
COMELEC was eventually directed to file the necessary criminal charges
against the two. 321 Informations for violation of Sec 27(b) of the Electoral
Reforms Law were filed. Llorente filed a motion for consolidation of the
cases, which was granted. The 321 Informations were consolidated into 1
case.
At the pre-trial stage, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo failed to appear
for several times at the scheduled hearings. Thus, the hearings were
cancelled over and over, until eventually Llorente was allowed to file a
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground of a violation of his right to a speedy
trial. The Motion to Dismiss was granted. (note that 111 days have elapsed
since arraignment up to the filing of MTD)
The Prosecution filed an SCA for certiorari under Rule 65 against the
respondent Judge, alleging GADLEJ. Thus, the two issues are (a) whether
this is the proper remedy against a dismissal in the TC on the ground of
violating the right to speedy trial. (b) whether there was grave abuse.
As to the first, Rule 65 is proper, since an appeal is not available to the
prosecution. A dismissal on the ground of the denial of the
accused's right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious,
certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve
double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness
but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.
As to the second, there was no grave abuse. The 111 days that have
elapsed from the time private respondents were arraigned up to the filing
of the Motion to Dismiss is beyond the 80-day limit provided under the law
and the rules. The concept of a speedy trial is a relative term and must be
a flexible concept. Prosecution interposes an exception under Rule 119,
Sec 3(a)(3) and (f) that there was no inordinate delay on their part to
justify the dismissal. However, delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders" must be read in harmony with Rule 65, Sec 7
of the ROC which provides that the petition under Rule 65 shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in
the case.
COMPLETE:

Facts: Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial candidate in May 1995 elections

filed a complaint against private respondents Salayon & Llorente,
Chariman & Vice- Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig, and a
certain Reynaldo San Juan, Campaign Manager of senatorial candidate
Juan Ponce Enrile, for decreasing Pimentels votes in the Statement of
Votes (SoV) in the canvass for Pasig. COMELEC dismissed. Pimentel
sought a reversal before the SC, which granted Pimentels petition. SC
ordered the COMELEC to file the necessary criminal information with RTC
for violation of Sec 27(b), RA 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),
against Salayon & Llorente.
COMLEC filed 321 informations for violations of Sec 27(b) on four
separate dates. These were raffled to Braches 164, 158, 153 & 69 of RTC
Pasig. Llorente filed a Motion for Consolidation 1. All branches granted
the motion, consolidating it before B.158. Senior State Prosecutor (SSP)
Rogelio Bagabuyo then filed his Notice of Appearance
with Br.158. He filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion on a number of grounds,
which Llorente Opposed.

Judge Hernandez of B.158 issued an Order 2 allowing the consolidation

(This also benefitted co-accused Salayon.) The multiple acts alleged in the
321 Informations were declared to constitute only one violation of Sec.
27(b) of RA 6646. During the hearing for the Llorentes motion, the
prosecution (Director of COMELEC) and even the representative from the
Office of Sen. Pimentel Jr, did not register any objection.

Arraignment followed, where both Llorente and Salayon pleaded not

guilty. SSP Bagabuyo was absent during arraignment but it proceeded in
the presence of Public Prosecutor (PP) Jose Jabson, the assigned
prosecutor in the trial court. Pre-trial was set at June 29, 2001. Thereafter,
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Postpone and MR asking that the
arraignment be nullified for lack of notice to the prosecution Dismissed,
prosecution was informed of the arraignment through the DOJ.
1Longer version: Llorente filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation of the cases pending against him before
B.164 & B.158, to treat the 321 informations as one and allow him to post bail for only one. He also filed 3 Omnibus
Motions before B.158, B.153 & B.69, asking for the same. B.164 granted the motion.Judge Ygana of B.153 also
granted the motion, finding the prayer meritorious and without objection from the prosecution . He remanded the
criminal cases to the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig. Judge Pahimna of B.69 also did the same and
consolidated it with B.158, finding that it is for the convenience of parties, since all the cases involve common
questions of law and fact. He forwarded the cases pending before B.69 to B.158 unless the judge therein objects.

2To hold in abeyance the implementation of the orders of the court prior to his appearance as counsel; 2) remand all
the cases pending before it to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City; 3) hold in abeyance the
resolution of all motions filed by private respondent Llorente with the court; 4) order the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Pasig City to hold in abeyance the re-raffling of all the "dagdag-bawas" cases against private
respondents; and 5) allow him ample time to secure from the Supreme Court a transfer of venue of the cases from
Pasig City to Manila or Pasay City

(summarized postponements)

June 29 pre trial hearing postponed due to the Omnibus Motion,

hearing reset to July 6.
July 6 pre-trial hearing cancelled, SSP Bagabuyo did not appear;
reset to July 26
July pre trial 26 hearing cancelled, SSP Bagabuyo still no show,
reset to Aug 2. In the event that SSP is still a no show on Aug 2,
COMELEC shall take over the prosecution of the case.Eventually, it
was reset to Sept 4 again.
Sept 4 hearing didnt proceed because of SSP Bagabuyos
absence due to a tooth extraction. Respondents moved for
dismissal (denial of right to a speedy trial_. TC gave the
prosecution a last opportunity on Oct 3 & 15.

On Oct. 3 the prosecution refused to proceed with the pre-trial since it had
a pending petition with the CA. Respondents moved for dismissal of the
case, and were given 3 days to formalize their Motions. When they did file
their Motions to Dismiss, the Prosecution filed a Motion to Inhibit against
Respondent Judge Hernandez. The Judge granted the Motion to Dismiss.
The Prosecution filed a Rule 65 to the SC, (later referred to CA), alleging
GADALEJ when he consolidated the 321 criminal informations into one, and
dismissed the case on the ground of violating the right to speedy trial. The
CA denied the Rule 65. Petitioners filed a Rule 45 to the SC.
Issues:
(1) W/N a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy from the dismissal of the cases before the TC on the ground of the
denial of private respondents right to speedy trial. YES
(2) W/N there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Respondent
Judge NOPE.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE:
Rule 122, Sec (1) provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. As a
general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings
from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of judgment
are not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the
order of dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court may be allowed
only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of due process
resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is true that

double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a decision

acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really "acquit" and
therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy
based on a void indictment.
Here, the TC dismissed the case due to a violation of the speedy trial rule.
SC: a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused's right to a
speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Where after such
dismissal the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal and the court re-set the case for trial, the accused can
successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an
acquittal, was final and cannot be reconsidered.
Hence, petitioner was correct in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging that "respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of
dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the speedy
trial rule" as an appeal was not available to it. Where the dismissal of the
case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal
and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal and such grave abuse
of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction which prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.
SECOND ISSUE:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Art III Sec
14(2) and 16. Moreover, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides for time
limits in order to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, RTC, MTC, MTCC, and MCTC. Thereafter, the SC issued the
Implementing Rules of said law. This was adopted in the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
To wit:
Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section
1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its
effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time limit with respect
to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said
provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the
second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month
period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt that
the concept of a speedy trial is a relative term and must be a flexible
concept.3 Here, the 111 days that have elapsed from the time private
3 Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan: The right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In determining whether the accused has
been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; d) prejudice to the
defendant.

respondents were arraigned up to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss is

beyond the 80-day limit provided under the law and the rules. The
postponements at the instance of the prosecution were also not justified.
The prosecution invokes an exception under Rule 119, Sec 3(a)(3) and (f)
Sec. 3. Exclusions.-- The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:
a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the accused, including but not limited to the
following: [...]3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders; [...]
f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by
any court motuproprio, or on motion of either the accused or
his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the
continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh
the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy
trial.
PROSECS AGRUMENTS: Prosecution argued that there was no inordinate
delay on their part to justify the dismissal. When the arraignment of the
accused happened, 51 days elapsed before SSP Bagabuyo filed a certiorari
petition before the CA questioning it. CA denied his petition, and his MR.
Before filing a Rule 45, he filed a motion for extension of time. At this
point, 76 days have elapsed from arraignment. When Judge Hernandez
issued the Order of Dismissal, the 80 day period mandated under R119,
Sec 3 has not yet lapsed. Deducting the time it took Judge Hernandez to
resolve petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for
Reconsideration only 41 days had lapsed after private respondents'
arraignment. R119, Sec 3 provides that "delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders" is excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence.
SC SAID: This provision is not in conflict with R119, Sec 3 as they speak of
two different kinds of delay. If Section 3(f) is not applicable, Section 3(a)
definitely is.
We are NOT PERSUADED. Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the petition under
Rule 65 shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless
a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 3(f) of Rule 119 is also misplaced. Nowhere
in the Orders granting continuance did respondent Judge set forth that his

order was based on findings that the ends of justice served by taking
such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a
speedy trial.
Petitioner also contends that respondent Judge's decision consolidating the
321 Informations amounts to grave abuse. What this argument merely
reflects is petitioner's stubborn insistence not to recognize the trial court's
interlocutory Orders of consolidation.
NOTE THAT THIS ISSUE RE:
CONSOLIDATION HAD ALREADY BEEN DECIDED NOT ONLY BY THE TC BUT
ALSO THE CA AND THE SC. Law of the case applies. Cannot be raised
again.
Moreover, petitioner's failure to proceed to trial, as clearly shown by the
events that transpired in the trial court, was due to its own fault. The lack
of zealousness on the part of the prosecution to prove that the senatorial
elections held in May 1995 was marred by the condemnable practice of
dagdag-bawas which led to the dismissal of the criminal charges against
the private respondents cannot but be lamented. The inexplicable failure
has left this Court no alternative except to affirm the dismissal of said
charges for the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial cannot
be held hostage by the disinterest and mistakes of the prosecution in
discharging its duty.
PETITION DENIED
BONUS:
A writ of certiorari is warranted when 1) any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2) there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because
of passion or hostility