The Anglo-Dutch Treaty Of 1824

In the history of British Malaya few events have been of more momentous
importance than the Anglo -Dutch treaty of 1824, and few have been decided with so little
attention to the importance of the local interests involved. By this treaty the British Cabinet
completed the work begun at the Congress of Vienna, and by further cessions of territory
made it impossible to build up another British Empire in the East Indian islands.
The reason for this policy was largely the same as that which had dictated the
retrocession of the Dutch possessions in the Archipelago in 1815. The Cabinet wished to
make sure of Hollands friendship and support in Europe. Ministers failed to realize the
value of the territories which they surrendered; and in any case they considered the loss was
well repaid by the strengthening of good relations with Holland. Conditions had somewhat
changed since 1815; the danger to be apprehended was not so much a fresh outbreak of
Revolutionary Madness in France as the Holy Alliance. The policy of the French
Government was becoming increasingly reactionary, and by 1824 it was a fully accredited
member of the Holy Alliance. During the last years of Castlereaghs life Britain had been
steadily drawing away from her late allies, and at the Congress of Verona in 1822 the breach
had become irrevocable. The events of the next few years served to show the complete
divergence between the policy of Britain and that of the great European monarchies.
Under these circumstances, the Cabinet was very anxious that the friendship of
Holland should be assured. However cordial the relations between the two governments
might be in Europe, there was continual friction between their agents in the East, and there
was always a danger that this might estrange the two powers in Europe. The foundation of
Singapore for example had greatly angered the Dutch, and Raffles whole career in 1818-19
had on several occasions threatened to cause trouble with Holland. British hostility to the
Dutch in Asia was a traditional policy, dating from the seventeenth century. Origination in
the high-handed actions of the Dutch Company to secure control of the trade of the
Archipelago, it had been kept alive by the commercial rivalry of the two great Companies
wherever they came into contact, as in Sumatra. The records of Bencoolen and of the Dutch
factories in Sumatra, for example, are full of charges and countercharges of intrigues, plots,
violence, etc. With the restoration of the Dutch East Indian Empire in 1816, and the
monopolistic policy which Holland immediately reintroduced, the dormant antagonism at
once sprang again into life. Almost every reference to the Dutch in the records of the
Penang Presidency for the years 1818-24 shows that the Council regarded them with
inveterate suspicion and hostility. The British Government decided to try and put an end to
the constant friction in the East by settling all matters in dispute, and by dividing the Dutch
and English spheres of influence, so that their agents would no longer come into contact.
Negotiations were begun about the end of 1819, and although interrupted in 1820 by
necessary reference to the East Indies they were resumed and successfully concluded in
1824.
The treaty was signed in London in March 17, 1824, and was accompanied by an
exchange of Notes, in order to define more clearly certain Articles. The territorial provisions
were contained in Articles VIII to XV. Holland ceded to Britain all her factories in India,
and renounced all privileges and exemptions enjoyed or claimed in virtue of them. In the
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Malay Peninsula she withdrew her objections to the occupation of Singapore, cede to Britain
the town and fort of Malacca, and all its dependencies, and engaged never to form any
establishment in any part of the Peninsula of Malacca ( the Malay Peninsula) or to conclude
any treaty with any native Prince, Chief, or State therein. For their part the British ceded to
Holland Bencoolen and all the Companys possessions in Sumatra, and promise that no
British settlement shall be formed on that island, nor any Treaty concluded by British
authority with ay native Prince, Chief, of State therein. They also engaged that they would
neither make settlements nor treaties in the Carimon Islands (a small group to the South
Westward of Singapore), the Rhio -Lingga Archipelago, or on any other islands south of the
Straits of Singapore. All ceded territories were to be handed over on March8, 1825, and
their inhabitants were to be allowed six years to dispose of their property and go wherever
they chose without let or hindrance. Article XV contained a stipulation which in later years
became one of the main causes of the Malacca land problem. It provided that none of the
ceded territories should be at any time transferred to any other Power. In case of the said
Possessions being abandoned by one of the present Contracting Parties, the right of
occupation thereof shall immediately pass to the other. Article VI engaged that British and
Dutch officials in the East should be ordered not to form any new settlement on any of the
islands in the Eastern Seas without previous authority from their respective governments in
Europe. The principle underlying these provisions was that British and Dutch spheres of
influence should be separated by the cession of all territory lying within one anothers
spheres, and that by a mutual self-denying ordinance neither power should interfere in the
area of the other. The British Cabinet hoped by this means to avoid disputes such as those
for example which had arisen in 1818-19 because of the conflicting claims of Raffles and the
Dutch in Sumatra.
The Treaty also attempted to settle the commercial rivalry. The general principle
underlying these Articles was that while the right of Holland to control in her own interests
the trade within her sphere was fully recognize, she agreed to make no attempt to
monopolize the commerce of the Archipelago. She also promised never to discriminate
unfairly against British trade as she had often done in the past. The two powers mutually
agreed to grant each other most favored nation treatment in India, Ceylon and the
Archipelago, and laid down general rules as to the amount of duty to be charged. Article III
was aimed at a very common manoeuvre of both countries in hampering one anothers
trade. No treaty hereafter made by either with any native power in the Eastern Seas shall
contain any article tending either expressly or by the imposition of unequal duties to exclude
the trade of the other party from the ports of such native power; and that if in any treaty
now existing on either part any article to that effect has been admitted such article shall be
abrogated upon the conclusion of the present treaty. By Article IV both powers promised
that they would in no case impede a free communication of the natives in the Eastern
Archipelago with the ports of the two governments respectively, or of the subjects of the
two governments with the ports belonging to native powers. By Article VII the Moluccas
were expressly excluded from these provisions, and Great Britain recognized the Dutch right
to retain the monopoly of the trade with the Spice Islands. This concessions was of far less
importance than it would have been two centuries earlier, because the value of the spice
trade with Europe was much less than I t had been in the seventeenth century. The British
Note accompanying the treaty contained a clear declaration of a very important principle, for
it recorded the solemn disavowal on the part of the Netherlands Government, of nay
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design to aim either at political supremacy or at commercial monopoly in the Eastern

Archipelago.
The third subject dealt with by the Treaty was Piracy. By Article V the two powers
bound themselves to concur effectually in repressing it. As will appear this agreement was
more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
In the Notes which accompanied the Treaty the British and Dutch plenipotentiaries
indulged in the pious hope that thenceforward there would be the most cordial friendship
and cooperation between the two powers in the East. This expectation was premature by at
least a generation. Traditional hatreds die hard, no one can read the despatches of Straits
officials, and especially the Singapore newspapers, without realizing how strong was the
dislike of the Dutch. The separation of the Dutch and British spheres however prevented
the rise of territorial disputes, and thus one great cause of friction was removed. The Dutch
commercial regulations however remained for many years a very sore point with both
officials and civilians in the Straits Settlements. The British contention was that the Dutch
evaded the articles of the Treaty, and hampered British trade with the archipelago wherever
possible. The Dutch on the other hand denied the charge, and declared that the complaints
were entirely unjust. A long and at times acrimonious correspondence ensued, and continued
with intervals for over twenty-five years. No attempt is made to deal with it here, for to
establish the rights and wrongs of the case would require a volume as long as the present.
Moreover it was not merely the trade of Singapore which suffered, and the inquiry would
resolve itself into the history of the whole of British commerce with eh East Indian islands.
All that can be said is that the despatches on the subject scattered through the Bengal
Records seem on the whole to make out a fairly strong prima facie case for the British
charges. Rightly or wrongly, belief in Dutch duplicity and dishonesty seems to have been a
cardinal article of faith with every British merchant in the Straits.
The commercial value of the Treaty to British commerce is uncertain; but on
considering the relative value of the territorial cessions one returns to solid ground.
Regarded purely from the point of view of British interest in the East Indian islands, there is
no doubt that Britain surrendered far more than she retained. The retrocession of territory in
1815 had deprived her of the chance of building up in the Archipelago an empire which in
wealth would have been a worthy second to India. There still remained however Sumatra,
whose great latent resources were pointed out to the government by Raffles. Furthermore
many other islands in the Archipelago were as yet unoccupied to form a very large Malayan
empire. Valuable as British Malaya became, a more aggressive policy in 1824 would have
secured an East Indian empire of far greater importance. The opportunity was thrown away,
and it never returned.
Regarding the British policy from the wider point of view, there is much to be said
for it. It was important to retain the friendship of Holland, and a policy of territorial
expansion in the East Indian islands might well have alienated it. Furthermore, there was a
somewhat vague but by no means negligible danger that a more grasping policy would
eventually have provoked dangerous jealousy on the part of the other Great Powers, great
Britain could not pursue an indiscriminate Forward Policy and run the risk of uniting the
world against her.
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Furthermore, the Treaty proved to be of service to Britain fifty years later. By the
withdrawal of Holland from the Malay Peninsula, Great Britain found herself quite
unhampered by rival European clams when, after the Treaty of Pangkor in1874, she at last
began to bring the Malay States under her control. Even if Holland had not ceded all her
rights it is improbable that in the intervening half century the whole Peninsula would have
become a Dutch colony, considering her limited resources, and the extent of her
commitments elsewhere in the East Indies. Having regard however to the usual Dutch
policy of establishing their suzerainty over the native rulers, there seems little doubt that the
same course would have been followed in the Peninsula. This indeed as will be seen, had
already been done in Perak, and a few states of the Negri Sembilan. Rash though it may be
to prophesy, it seems that had it not been for the Treaty of 1824 part of the Malay Peninsula
would have become a Dutch colony.
The Dutch sphere in the Malay Peninsular in 1824 was confined to the Negri
Sembilan, Selangor and Perak. Malacca was still, as it had been since 1641, their capital in the
Malay Peninsula, but it had sadly fallen away from its ancient glory. Owing to the silting-up
of the harbour and other causes, its trade had gradually declined, although there was a
temporary revival from about 1779 to 1795. its commerce suffered very severely from the
foundation of Penang, and from the deliberate attempt made by the East India Company to
ruin it after the British conquest of 1795. Malacca remained fairly prosperous however until
1819. the foundation of Singapore gave Malacca its death-blow, an dby 1824 it retained only
a fraction of its former commerce. Furthermore the former strategic value of Malacca was
almost nullified. It could no longer dominate the sea-route through the Straits of Malacca,
since both entrances were now commanded by Penang and Singapore. It is significant that
Holland regarded the moribund station of Bencoolen as a fair exchange for Malacca and the
few hundred square miles of territory known as the Malacca Territory, which surrounded it.
The inheritance of the East India Company was a decayed port, a chronic deficit, a costly
native war, and a land problem which defied solution for over forty years.
The Dutch trade with the Peninsula consisted mainly in tin, and the constant object
of their policy was to secure a monopoly of the output. Although the quantity of tim
produced was far less than in the later nineteenth century, it was of considerable importance,
the largest mines being in Perak. Dutch connection with Perak dated from about 1648, when
they obtained from Achin, of which Perak was then a dependency, a treaty giving them the
monopoly of the tin-output. The Malays of Perak refused to submit, and it was only after a
generation of desultory warfare that they agreed to the Dutch monopoly in 1681. On several
subsequent occasions the Malays made further vain attempts to expel the Dutch. On the
conquest of Malacca in1795 the Dutch fort in Perak surrendered to the British.
The East India Company did not seek to continue the Dutch monopoly, and until
1818 Perak remained free from European control. A trade in tin grew up with Penang. On
the restoration of Malacca to Holland in 1818, Timmerman Thyssen the Governor sent a
mission to Perak to renew the former treaty. The Sultan refused, although far too weak to
resist a Dutch attack. No attempt was made to overcome his reluctance, probably because
the Government at Batavia knew that the exchange of Malacca for Bencoolen was already in
contemplation.
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Selangor was also under Dutch control. It had been colonize about 1718 by Bugis
pirates from Celebes, who established themselves along the coast and rivers. Making
Selangor their base of operations they raided the whole West coast of the Peninsula, and the
state bore a very bad reputation for piracy. In 1783 the Bugis of Rhio and Selangor made an
abortive attack on Malacca, but were badly defeated. As a result, in 1786 the Dutch
compelled Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor to sign a treaty which acknowledged Dutch
suzerainty, gave them a monopoly of the tin, and undertook to expel all other Europeans
from Selangor.
On the capture of Malacca in 1795 the Company allowed this treaty to lapse, and
until 1818 Selangor was entirely independent. In 1819 governor Thyssen of Malacca
compelled the Sultan to sign a treaty which was practically the same as that of 1786. Sultan
Ibrahim of Selangor was now an old man but his hatred of the Dutch was as bitter as ever.
He also cherished a very great liking for the British, and before accepting the Dutch
demands he made a vain attempt to secure the Companys assistance against them. The
Batavian Government however refused to ratify the treaty, for the same reason probably as
in the case of Perak. Selangor was therefore allowed to declare itself independent.
Dutch suzerainty also existed over some of the petty states of the Negri Sembilan,
although there is some doubt as to the exact number of principalities affected, and the extent
of their subjection. The Negri Sembilan (literally, the Nine States), formed part of the
Empire of Johore, and was colonized in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries by Malays from
Menangkabua in Sumatra. The immigrations seems to have been peaceful, the newcomers
intermarrying to some extent with the wandering tribes of aborigines who then inhabited the
country, instead of extermination or expelling them after the usual Malay practice. By
successive waves of immigration a number of petty principalities arose. During the first half
of the eighteenth century the power of the Emperors of Johore steadily decayed, and their
control over the Negri Sembilan appears to have been little more than nominal. They were
therefore quite willing to grant titles and concessions to any chiefs who would acknowledge
their supremacy. In this way the petty rulers obtained from the Emperors of Johore the
recognition of their hereditary rights as Rajas of their respective states, and the insignia of
their rank. The Emperors could not however confer any real power, and there were constant
wars between the newly created dignitaries and rival claimants to their rank. Although Negri
Sembilan means literally Nine States, the number of principalities varied at different times.
Moreover there was no real confederacy, but merely a congeries of small chieftaincies.
The overlordship of Johore grew steadily more nominal, and it is therefore not
surprising that in 1757 the Emperor of Johore ceded to his allies the Dutch his unprofitable
rights of suzerainty of Rembau. It is uncertain whether the grant referred to Rembau alone,
or whether, and this is more probable, it also included Sungei Ujong and several other
principalities.
The Dutch, following their usual policy in the Malay Peninsula, never attempted to
conquer the Negri Sembilan. Their object was tin not territory. Controlling as they did the
sea-coast and the river-mouths they were able to enforce their monopoly pretty effectually
without incurring the expense of sending large forces into an unknown and almost pathless
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jungle, to carry on an endless campaign with such experts at guerilla warfare as the Malays.
Moreover, none of the petty rulers would gratuitously have offended the Netherlands
Company. Rembau, being on the border of Malacca Territory, was perhaps more fully under
Dutch control than the other states. In 1759 the Dutch made a treaty with Rembau, by
which the state gave the Netherlands Company a monopoly of its tin, and acknowledged
itself to be a dependency of Malacca. The Dutch appear also to have exercised the right to
confirm the appointment of the nominal overlord of the Negri Sembilan, the Yamtuan.
During the British regime, from 1795 to 1818, no attempt was made to enforce the
Dutch rights. In 1818 however Governor Thyssen of Malacca renewed the Treaty of 1759
with Rembau. Batavia refused to ratify the treaty, but retained a sort of paramount power
over its chief. This vague suzerainty passed to the British in 1824.
In 1823 the Dutch attempted to bring under their control the part of the ancient
Empire of Johore which now forms the modern state of that name. Hollands treaty of 1818
with Sultan Abdulrahman applied only to Rhio; but when Raffles produced Hussein as the
lawful Sultan, the Dutch instigate Abdulrahman to wrest from Hussein the present state of
Johore. This territory was the hereditary fief of the Temenggong of Johore, and he and
Hussein appealed to Raffles for protection. This Sir Stampford was quite willing to grant, so
far as he could without embroiling himself with Holland; and in February 1823 he allowed
the Malay chiefs to hoist the British flag in Johore, in order to ward off any attack by
Abdulrahman. His reasons were that the Temenggongs hereditary and legal right had never
hitherto been questioned, and that self-interest required it, as without the hinterland of the
Peninsular Singapore was valueless. The Dutch protested strongly, and the Supreme
Government ordered the flag to be removed, strongly censuring Raffless conduct.
Crawfurd, who succeeded Raffles at Singapore in 1823, regarded Johore as entirely
worthless, and after protracted discussions compelled Hussein and the Temenggong to
remove the British flag. This they were most unwilling to do, and advanced the entirely
untenable claim that the Treaty of 1819 ceding Singapore bound the Company to defend
them. This contention was entirely false, as Article II of the Treaty expressly declared that
the British were not bound to interfere in the affairs of Johore. Nothing however came of
the Dutch manoeuvres, since by the Treaty of 1824 Continental Johore fell within the British
sphere of influence.
Pahang, although nominally a part of Johore, does not appear ever to have been
interfered with by the Dutch. The Bendahara, the hereditary and practically independent
official of the Sultan of Johore who governed Pahang, was the brother-in-law of Hussein,
and at first supported him against Abdulrahman. Apparently realizing the hopelessness of
Husseins prospects, he seems to have give his allegiance to Abdulrahman about 1812. no
attempt was made to make the overlordship effectual, and until 1824 the Bendahara
continued to be the nominal vassal of Sultan Abdulrahman. After this date the Dutch
withdrew from all participation in the affairs of the Peninsular, and since unaided Sultan
Abdulrahman was quite unable to assert his supremacy, the Bendahara of Pahang gradually
abandoned even their shadow of allegiance, and the British finally interned in the affairs of
Pahang they recognized the real situation by creating the Bendahara Sultan of Pahang.

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The inevitable result of the Treaty of 1824 was the dismemberment of the Empire of
Johore, which was divided between Abdulrahman and Hussein. The former was known in
the documents of the time as the Lingga or Rhio Sultan, because his capital was at Lingga,
and he ruled over the island possessions of Johore such as the Rhio -Lingga Archipelago,
which lay within the Dutch sphere of influence. Hussein, from his residence at Singapore,
was known as the Singapore Sultan. Nominally the overlord of Pahang and the present state
of Johore, in point of fact he was practically an emperor without an empire, since the
Temenggong and the Bendahara would not allow him to interfere with their rule. The Dutch
supported their protg in enforcing his authority over his island possessions, but they were
unable to give him any assistance in dealing with Pahang Johore, which he was quite unable
to subdue without their help. They also secured for him the Carimon Islands, a group which
occupied an important strategic position to the South Westward of the Straits of Singapore.
They were indisputably a possession of the Temenggong, the source indeed of much of his
revenue; but they lay within the Dutch sphere, and were therefore claimed by Holland as
part of Abdulrahmans sultanate. Sultan Hussein refused to give them up, but in 1827
Husseins followers were attacked and expelled by Abdulrahmans Malays with the assistance
of a Dutch force. The Penang officials maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, part on the
ground that the Treaty ceding Singapore did not require them to aid the Malay chiefs, and
partly because the Directors orders. Just before the annexation a dispatch from the
Directors arrived which declared that the Dutch could do as they chose with the Carimons,
since by the Treaty the island had come within their sphere of influence and that the
Company must not interfere.
The Treaty of 1824 radically changed the Companys relations with Achin, as settled
by Raffles treaty of 1819. During the five years which had elapsed since his mission,
conditions in Achin had grown steadily worse. He restored Sultan Alam Shah never regained
his authority, the central government had almost completely broken down, and the country
was in a state of general anarchy. From the day of its signature Raffless Treaty had been a
dead letter, since the Sultan was powerless to carry it into effect. The company had not
tried to enforce its rights, since to do so would have involved an expensive war, and the
conquest of the whole country. Moreover, curiously enough, Penangs trade with Achin was
more flourishing than ever before, since all the independent Rajas had thrown open their
ports to British trade, whereas the policy of the Sultans had been to confine it to the capital,
Achin.
Raffless treaty was referred to in the Notes interchanged whne the Treaty of 1824
was concluded, and was declared to be incompatible with it, as it was designed to exclude
Dutch trade form Achin. It was therefore to be replace by a simple arrangement for the
hospitable reception of British vessels and subjects. The Dutch promised to respect the
independence of Achin.
The Directors fully approved of the proposed alterations, true to their usual policy of
refusing to form alliances which might involve them in Malayan wars. In a dispatch to the
Supreme Government they remarked that even if the Anglo -Dutch Treaty had not affected
Raffless arrangement, alterations in it would have been necessary, since we have never
approved of an intimate connection with that state. Whether a mere commercial
arrangement should be made with Achin was left to the discretion of the Indian
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Government. The Supreme government forwarded the dispatch to Penang, and left it to the
discretion of the Council whether a mere commercial arrangement should be made or not.
It was also impressed upon Penang that our political interests in connection with Acheen
have now ceased.
The Penang Council decided that a commercial treaty was unnecessary, since to
negotiate it with the powerless central government would be labour wasted , and to do so
with the independent Rajas was unnecessary, as they had shown their entire willingness to
trade freely with the British. The only danger was from Holland, whose good faith the
Council strongly suspected. They feared she would establish her influence in Achin and
embarrass if not put an end to British commerce there by imposing the Dutch tariff. They
therefore recommended that a sharp watch be kept on her actions.
The subsequent British policy towards Achin followed Penangs recommendations:
after 1824 all diplomatic and political relations with Achin and the whole of Sumatra ceased,
and the intercourse was purely commercial. The only exception was that occasionally as in
1837 and 1844 British warships visited Achin to punish piratical rajas and exact
compensation for injuries done to traders.
On November 2, 1871, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and
Holland by which the Dutch were given a free hand in Achin in exchange for their colonies
on the West Coast of Africa. By the Treaty of 1824 Holland had agreed to respect the
independence of Achin; but by Article I of the Convention of 1871 the British government
promised to make no objections to the extension of the Dutch dominion on any part of
Sumatra. The interests of British trade were safeguarded to some extent, for Article II
stipulated that in any native state of Sumatra that may hereafter become a Dutch
dependency, British commerce should enjoy all rights which are or may be granted to
Dutch trade. But whereas hitherto British merchants had paid only the moderate Achinese
customs duties, they were henceforth to be subject to the much heavier Dutch dues. Great
Britain resigned valuable trading privileges, and threw away what faint chances still remained
to her of ultimately securing Achin. It will be remembered that British control of Achin had
been an essential part of Raffless policy in 1819, since together with Penang it dominated
the entrance to the Straits of Malacca. The ultimate result of the Convention was that Great
Britain became involved in the Ashanti War, while the Dutch entered light-heartedly upon a
war for the conquest of Achin which lasted over thirty-three years.

Source:
L.A.Mills (1961). British Malaya 1824-67. pp86-98

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