Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
REGALADO, J.:
Roma n Deri l o, Is i doro Ba l di mo y Qui l l o, Luca s Doos ,
Al ejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were cha rged wi th the s o ca l led crime of murder committed by a band before the First Branch
of the former Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Boronga n, Ea s tern
Sa ma r.[1] The i nforma ti on fi l ed therefor a l l eges Tha t on Ja nuary 1, 1982 a t a bout 6:00 ocl ock P.M. a t
s i tio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern Samar, Philippines and
wi thin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
a bove-named a ccused with treachery a nd evident
premeditation, with intent to kill, with the use of firearm
a nd bolos, confederating and mutually helping one
a nother did then a nd there shot (sic) a nd s tabbed (sic)
one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which caused
her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Of the fi ve a ccused, only a ccused-appellant Isidoro Q. Ba ldimo
wa s a pprehe nded a nd brought wi thi n the tri a l courts
juri s diction. At his a rrai gnment on Ma rch 18, 1985, a nd a fter the
i nformation was translated i n the Waray di a l ect wi th whi ch he i s
wel l versed, a ppellant pleaded not guilty. [3] Tri al on the meri ts wa s
conducted therea fter.
However, by the ti me the Peopl e ha d forma l l y fi ni s hed
pres enting i ts evidence on Augus t 6, 1986, a ppel l a nt, through hi s
couns el de parte, ma nifested to the court a quo tha t he wa nted to
wi thdraw his earlier plea of not guilty a nd substitute the s a me wi th
one of guilty. Consequently, a re -arraignment wa s ordered by the
l ower court a nd, this ti me, a ppellant entered a plea of gui l ty to the
cha rge of murder.[4]
A s eries of questions was then propounded by the tri a l court
to tes t a ppel l a nts vol unta ri nes s a nd comprehens i on of the
cons equences in making his new plea of gui l ty. Sa ti s fi ed wi th the
a ns wers of appellant, the trial court convi cted hi m of the cri me of
murder defined and punished under Arti cle 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.[5]
A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecuti on
eyewi tnes s Cres enci o Lupi do. [6] Accordi ng to hi m, Perpetua C.
Ada l im went to his house at Sitio Pa laspas, Barangay Pol angi i n Ta ft,
Ea s tern Samar i n the ea rl y eveni ng of Ja nua ry 1, 1982 to l ook f or
fa rml ands willing a nd desiring to work i n her ri cefields. Lupi do wa s
a n a gricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived on one of the properties
owned by the latter. Upon her arrival, Perpetua instructed Lupidos
wi fe to get food from her house in the poblacion a s she had decided
to s pend the ni ght a t Si ti o Pa l a s pa s .
Whi le Perpetua was waiting a nd s ta ndi ng i n the ya rd of the
hous e, five a rmed men a rrived a nd confronted Perpetua . Lupi do
recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and a ppel l a nt Is i doro
Ba l dimo, a s thes e two frequentl y pa s s ed by hi s hous e a t Si ti o
Pa l aspas. He did not know the other three men but he cl aimed tha t
he coul d i denti ty them i f brought before hi m.
Roma n Deri l o ta l ked momenta ri l y wi th Perpetua . Then,
wi thout a ny wa rning, Deri l o s hot Pe rpetua three ti mes wi th the
pi s tol he was carryi ng. After she fell to the ground, a ppel l a nt, who
wa s standing at the ri ght side of Derilo, approa ched Perpetua a nd
s ta bbed her s everal ti mes wi th a kni fe tha t l ooked l i ke ei ther a
Ba ta ngas knife or a bolo known l ocally a s depang. A thi rd member
of the group, wi th a s hort a nd s tout phys i que, fol l owed s ui t i n
s ta bbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the ga ng wa l ked
a round the ya rd for s ome time and left, walking i n the di recti on of
the mounta i ns . Al l of them ca rri ed l ong fi rea rms .
As s oon as the group had left the scene of the cri me, Lupi do
hurri edly went to Perpetuas house i n the poblacion of Ta ft where
he i nformed the fa mi l y of the decea s ed a bout the i nci dent. [7]
I
Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of
the cri me. Rather, in his brief pitifully consi s ti ng of two pa ges , he
merely a sks for the modification of the dea th pena l ty i mpos ed by
the l ower court to l ife i mprisonment.[8] Al though a ppellant is a wa re
tha t he ha s ma de hi s pl ea of gui l ty a fter the pros ecuti on ha d
pres ented its evidence, thus foreclosing the application of paragraph
7, Arti cl e 13 of the Revi s ed Pena l Code, [9] he contends tha t hi s
unti mely a cknowledgment of cul pa bi l i ty ma y s ti l l be trea ted by
a na logy as a mitiga ti ng ci rcums ta nce under pa ra gra ph 10 of the
[10]
s a me article, i nvoki ng therefor the a fores a i d ca s e of Coronel.
Unfortuna tel y, tha t deci s i on rel i ed upon by a ppel l a nt i s
i na pplicable to his ca se. The death penal ty i n People vs. Coronel, et
al.[11] wa s modified to life i mprisonment not i n cons i dera ti on of
pa ra graph 10, Arti cl e 13 of the code but beca us e the number of
votes then required to a ffi rm a s entence of dea th i mpos ed by a
l ower court[12] wa s not secured by this Court in its automatic revi ew
of the judgment. Apparently, the required number for concurrence
wa s not obtained because some members of the Court trea ted the
bel ated confession of the accused therein a s a n i ndi ca ti on on hi s
pa rt to reform, and they felt that he s houl d onl y s uffer the s a me
pena l ty i mpos ed on s ome of hi s co -cons pi ra tors .
The l ate plea of guilty entered by herein a ppell a nt ca nnot be
cons idered mitigating because the plea ma de i s not of a s i mi l a r
na ture a nd a na l ogous to the pl ea of gui l ty contempl a ted i n
pa ra graph 7 of Arti cle 13. A pl ea of guilty is consi dered mi ti ga ti ng
on the ra tionale that an accused spontaneously a nd willingly a dmits
hi s guilt at the fi rst opportunity a s an a ct of repentance. An a ccused
s houl d not be a l l owed to s pecul a te on the outcome of the
proceedings by pleading not gui l ty on a rra i gnment, onl y to l a ter
s ubstitute the same with a plea of guilty a fter di s coveri ng tha t the
Peopl e has a s trong ca s e a ga i ns t hi m. Wi tha l , a l l i s not l os t for
a ppel l a nt.
The ki lling of the vi ctim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the
l ower court to ha ve been qua l i fi ed to murder by
trea chery. Al though not a l l eged i n the i nforma ti on, the
ci rcums tances of s uperior s trength and cuadrilla were taken note of
by the court a quo ba s ed on the evi dence pres ented by the
pros ecution, but the same were correctly regarded by sai d court a s
a bs orbed in alevosia. However, it found that the generic a ggravating
ci rcums ta nce of evi dent premedi ta ti on l i kewi s e a ttended the
commi ssion of the cri me. Hence, with no mitigating ci rcumstance to
offs et thi s a ggra va ti ng ci rcums ta nce, the tri a l court s entenced
a ppellant to suffer the s upreme penalty of death a nd to i ndemni fy
a nd pa y da ma ges to the hei rs of the vi cti m.
It wi l l be obs erved from a rea di ng of the l ower courts
deci sion[13] tha t i ts judgment was obviously ba s ed not onl y on the
evi dence presented by the pros ecuti on but a l s o on a ppel l a nts
bel a ted a dmi s s i on of gui l t, together wi th s ome i nconcl us i ve
pronouncements of this Court on conspiracy. The former a pparently
proved the ci rcums ta nces of trea chery, s uperi or s trength
a nd cuadrilla, while the latter s upposedly s uppl i ed the ground for
the fi ndi ng of evi dent premedi ta ti on.
We a gree with the finding of the court bel ow tha t a ppel l a nt
pa rti ci pa ted i n the trea cherous ki l l i ng of Perpetua C. Ada l i m.
Appellants presence in the locus criminis and his i dentification were
pos i ti vel y s uppl i ed by the pros ecuti ons eyewi tnes s . The
unwa vering a nd unequivocal testimony of Lupido, corrobora ted by
tha t of Dr. Edua rdo S. Eva rdone who conducted
the postmortemexa mi na ti on on the corps e of the vi cti m [14] a nd
s ubmitted his corresponding autops y report, [15] i ndubi ta bl y s how
the deliberate employment by the a ccused of a reliable and unfailing
mea ns to ensure the killing without giving the vi ctim a n opportuni ty
to defend hers e l f.
However, we ca nnot give the same stamp of a pprova l to the
fi nding on premeditacion conocida declared by the tri a l court. The
di s turbing conclusions of s aid court thereon need to be cl a ri fi ed to
obvi a te misconceptions that may a ffect the stability of o ur pres ent
1
rul es on evidence and cri minal procedure. Said the l ower court on
thi s a s pect:
The a ggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
i s l ikewise present i n the commission of the offense of
murder a s the existence of the conspiracy a mong the
a ccus ed Baldimo and his co-accused having been duly
proven a lso beyond peradventure of doubt, presupposes
evi dent premeditation (People vs. Belen, L-13895, Sept.
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39) whi ch the s aid accused himself
s upplied the evidence on this score by vi rtue of his plea
of gui lty, which ci rcumstance is not the l east disproven
by the evi dence on record. Thus, its a ppreciation a s an
a ggra vating circumstance i n this case.
A pl ea of guilty constitute(s) an admission of a ll material
fa cts alleged i n the information, including the
a ggra vating circumstances alleged, although the offense
cha rged be ca pital. (People vs. Boyl es, L-15308, Ma y 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 88; Peopl e vs. Mongado, L-24877, June
30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; Peopl e vs. Tilos, L-27151, Nov.
29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).
A pl ea of guilty i s mitigating and at the same ti me i t
cons titutes a n admission of all the material facts alleged
i n the i nformation, including the aggrava ting
ci rcums tances, and it matters not that the offense is
ca pi tal. Because of the a foresaid l egal effect of Pinedas
pl ea of guilty, i t was not incumbent upon the tri al court
to recei ve his evidence, much l ess require his presence in
court. (People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs.Es tebia,
40 SCRA 90).[16]
The tri a l court s houl d not ha ve concl uded tha t evi dent
premeditation a ttended the commission of the cri me of murder on
the ba ses of i ts findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant
a nd the existence of cons pi ra cy wi th hi s co -a ccus ed. As ea rl i er
s ta ted, appellant entered his plea of guilty a fter the prosecution had
pres ented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever
wa s a dduced by i t to prove the s uppos ed evi dent
premeditation. The records a nd the tra ns cri pts of s tenogra phi c
notes a re barren of a ny proof tending to show a ny pri or refl ecti on
on, fol l owed a fter s ome ti me by pers i s tence i n, the cri mi na l
res ol uti on of the fi ve a ccus ed.
[27]
COURT:
3
The tri al judge did not himself try to i nform or a dvise appellant
rega rding the consequences of pleading guilty to ha vi ng ki l l ed the
vi cti m wi th both ci rcums ta nces of evi dent premedi ta ti on a nd
trea chery. More particularly, the tri al judge di d not hi ms el f try to
convey to a ppellant, i n ordinary l anguage that appel l a nt woul d be
a s sumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation a nd
trea chery a s ci rcumstances that would qualify the killi ng to murder
a nd to a ggravate the penalty a s to call for the maximum pena l ty of
dea th.[35]
We quote from the old but i nstructive and sti l l a uthori ta ti ve
ca s e of U.S. vs. Ja ma d.[36]
If the a ccused does not cl early a nd fully understand the
na ture of the offense charged, if he is not a dvised as to
the meaning a nd effect of the technical language so
often used i n formal complaints a nd i nformations in
qua lifying the acts constituting the offense, or i f he does
not cl early understand the consequences by way of a
hea vy a nd even a capital penalty flowing from his
a dmission of his guilt of the cri me in the precise
technical manner and form i n which it i s charged, his
pl ea of guilty s hould not be held to be sufficient to
s us tain a convi ction.
Our experi ence has ta ught us that it not infrequently
ha ppens that, upon a rraignment, accused persons plead
gui lty to the commission of the gravest offenses,
qua lified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in
truth a nd in fact they i ntend merely to a dmit that they
commi tted the act or a cts charged in the complaint, a nd
ha ve no thought of a dmitting the technical charges of
a ggra vating circumstances. It not infrequently happens
tha t a fter a formal plea of guilty i t develops under the
probe of the trial judge, or i n the course of the
s ta tement of the a ccused made a t the time of the entry
of hi s plea, or upon the witness stand, that the accused,
whi le a dmitting the commission of the acts charged i n
the i nformation, believes or pretends to believe that
thes e acts were committed under such circumstances as
to exempt him in whole or i n part from cri minal
l i ability. Cl early, a formal plea of guilty entered under
s uch ci rcumstances is not s ufficient to s ustain a
convi cti on of the a ggravated cri me charged in the
i nformation.
In People vs. Al amada ,[37] thi s Court found the tri a l court to
ha ve fa i l ed i n obs ervi ng tha t qua ntum of ca re whi ch i t ha d
pres cribed for the valid a dmission of a plea of guilty by a n a ccus ed,
es pecially i n ca pital ca ses, when i t did not explain to the accused the
na ture of the cha rges a ga i ns t hi m, pa rti cul a rl y the a l l ega ti ons
rega rding conspiracy, treachery, evi dent premeditation and abuse of
s uperior strength, which a re terms s o techni ca l tha t the l a yma n,
es pecially a n unschool ed one l i ke the a ccus ed i n the s a i d ca s e,
ca nnot pos s i bl y unders ta nd wi thout proper el uci da ti on.
It i s neither just nor reasonable to a ssume that an uneducated
pers on unders ta nds the a l l ega ti on tha t the a ggra va ti ng
ci rcums tances of treachery a nd premeditation were pres ent i n the
commi s s i on of the cri me, i na s much a s trea chery a nd
premeditation a re highly technical terms the juridical mea ni ng of
whi ch is beyond the understanding not of the i lli tera tes a l one but
even of thos e who, bei ng educa ted, a re not l a wyers . [38]
If ma ny members of the Ba r a re una bl e to ca l l to mi nd the
technical requisites of treachery a nd evident premedi ta ti on a s
qua lifying and aggrava ting ci rcums ta nces , there i s no rea s on for
s uppos i ng tha t the a ccus ed, who i s a fa rmer by occupa ti on,
understood such elements and requi s i tes a fter a few mi nutes of
whi s pered a dvi ce from a couns el de oficio i n open court.[39]
Another reason why we ca nnot agree wi th the l ower courts
pos ture on this issue is the consistent holding in several ca ses that a
pl ea of guilty to a n information alleging aggravating ci rcums ta nces
wi l l not be considered an admiss i on of s uch ci rcums ta nces i f the
evi dence presented by the pros ecuti on fa i l s to es ta bl i s h them.
Even the ca se of People vs. Boyl es [40] ci ted by the tri a l court
di s allowed the a ppreci a ti on of the a ggra va ti ng ci rcums ta nce of
ni ghttime when the Supreme Court found out tha t other tha n the
Sec. 19. (1) Exces s ive fines shall not be i mposed, nor
cruel , degrading or i nhuman punishment
i nflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (Ita lics supplied).
x x x
Res ponding to the alarming increase of horrible cri mes bei ng
commi tted in the country, Congres s pa s s ed a l a w i mpos i ng the
dea th penalty on certain heinous offenses a nd further a mending for
tha t purpos e the Revi s ed Pena l Code a nd other s peci a l pena l
l a ws. Said law was officially enacted as Republ i c Act No. 7659 a nd
took effect on December 31, 1993. Thi s is now the governing pena l
l a w a t the ti me of thi s revi ew of the ca s e a t ba r.
Al though the elements a nd ci rcums ta nces whi ch qua l i fy a
ki l ling to murder were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 a mended
Arti cl e 248 of the Code by i mposing a hea vi er pena l ty fo r murder
tha n that originally prescribed, the new penalty provi ded i n Secti on
6 of s a i d a menda tory s ta tute bei ng reclusion perpetua to dea th.
Bei ng a penal l a w, s uch provi s i on of Republ i c Act No. 7659
ma y not be a pplied to the cri me of murder commi tted i n 1982 by
a ppel l a nt, ba s ed on the pri nci pl e of pros pecti vi ty of pena l
l a ws. Further, the presumption is that l aws opera te pros pecti vel y,
unl es s the contra ry cl ea rl y a ppea rs or i s cl ea rl y, pl a i nl y a nd
unequivocally expressed or necessarily i mpli ed. [52] In every ca s e of
doubt, the doubt will be resolved a gainst the retroactive opera ti on
[53]
of l a ws. Nor ca n the prospective a pplication of Republ i c Act No.
7659 be doubted just because of the constitutional provision leaving
to Congress the matter of the dea th pena l ty i n ca s es of hei nous
cri mes , s i nce Congres s di d not otherwi s e provi de.
The i nterpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to
dra w up the pres ent Cons ti tuti on i s enl i ghteni ng i n our
determi na ti on of the non-retroa cti vi ty of s a i d l a w, thus :
MR. BENGZON. And then, s upposing Congress passes a
l a w i mpos i ng the dea th pena l ty on thos e very
s a me cri mes commi tted by thos e tha t were
convi cted of the death penalty which pena l ty ha s
been commuted to reclusion perpetua, wi ll they go
ba ck?
MR. MONSOD.
No.
MR. BENGZON.
Not a nymore?
It i s s ettled that a penal law may have retroa cti ve effect onl y
when i t is favorable to the a ccus ed. [58] Obvi ous l y, wi th a pena l ty
more onerous than tha t provi ded by the Revi s ed Pena l Code for
murder, the pertinent a mendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659
ca nnot fall within the exception to the general rule on prospecti vi ty
of pena l l a ws .
La s tly, observance of juridical uniformi ty i n the deci s i ons of
thi s Court requires that we refrain from a ppl yi ng Republ i c Act No.
7659 to the ca s e at bar. The present case i s not the fi rs t a nd on l y
i ns tance where the Court has had to revi ew a s entence for dea th
a fter this a mendatory l aw ca me i nto force. To give retroactive effect
to s a id law i n this case will disturb the numerous deci s i ons of the
Court i mposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who commi tted
ca pi tal offenses prior to the effectivi ty of the 1987 Constitution a nd
were convicted after i ts effecti vi ty but before tha t of Republ i c Act
No. 7659, even though the pena l ty i mpos a bl e woul d ha ve been
dea th.
Ha vi ng eliminated the possibility of a pplyi ng the death penalty
under Republic Act No. 7659 i n the present ca se, we now exa mi ne
the a pplicability of Arti cle 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its
a foresaid a mendment. On Ma y 20, 1987, thi s Court issue d Ci rcul a r
No. 9 rega rding the i mpos i ti on of the dea th pena l ty, under the
ci rcums tances therein defined. In the said circular, a l l courts were
enjoined to impose only the pena l ty of reclusion perpetua, even i n
thos e ca ses wherein our penal l aws provi de for the imposition of the
dea th penalty, until Congres s s ha l l ha ve provi ded by l a w for the
defi ni ti on of the hei nous cri mes contempl a ted i n the 1987
Cons ti tuti on.
Pri or thereto, i n a n en banc res ol uti on da ted Apri l 30, 1987
i s sued i n Admi ni s tra ti ve Ma tter No . 87-5-3173-0, the Court took
cogni zance of the Ca binet Meeting hel d on Apri l 8, 1987 wherei n,
a mong others , the Pres i dent a greed to i s s ue a s ta tement
offi ci a l l y commuting to l i fe i mpri s onment the dea th s entence
theretofore imposed on some convicts, in a ccordance with the l etter
a nd s pirit of the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with the
Executi ve Department, through the Department of Jus ti ce, revea l s
tha t the projected presidential commuta ti on never ma teri a l i zed.
It wi l l further be noted that s aid circular referred only to those
ca s es then under a utoma ti c revi ew by the Court, a nd the
a forestated res ol uti on quoted therei n l i kewi s e contempl a ted
pending cases before the Court, that i s, as of May 20, 1987. Those
i s suances could not therefore a pply to the pres ent ca s e s i nce, a s
hereinafter explained, the case a t bar was brought on appeal to thi s
Court onl y on Jul y 20, 1994.
Be tha t a s i t ma y, however, whether or not evi dent
premedi ta ti on wa s pres ent i n thi s ca s e a nd rega rdl es s of the
i na ppl i ca bi l i ty thereto of the a forementi oned ci rcul a r a nd
res olution, the Court i s reasonably convi nced that i t ca nnot va l i dl y
i mpose the capital puni s hment on a ppel l a nt. The words of the
Cons ti tution a re clear: Any death penalty already i mposed sha l l be
reduced toreclusion perpetua. Appell a nt, i t wi l l be reca l l ed, wa s
s entenced in 1986 to s uffer the dea th pena l ty a s then provi ded
under the Revi s ed Pena l Code. Wi th the ra ti fi ca ti on of the
Cons ti tuti on i n 1987, tha t s entence s houl d ha ve been reduced
to reclusion perpetua under s uch cons ti tuti ona l fi a t.
The fa ct that this Court wi l l ha ve the opportuni ty to revi ew
a ppellants case only now does not detra ct from the force of s uch
di rective of the Constitution. Neither will the fact that Ci rcular No. 9
wa s not yet i ssued when appellant was tri ed a nd convicted prevent
the a pplication to him of that Constitutional provision. It i s not the
a cti on of the courts whi ch, under the ci rcums ta nces , convert hi s
s entence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is di rected
a nd effected by the explicit words of the fundamenta l cha rter; the
courts merely a pply this express and self-executing provision of the
Cons ti tuti on when they i mpos e the pena l ty of reclusion
perpetua ra ther than the imposable penalty of death in appropri a te
ca s es .
Aga i n, the fol l owi ng proceedi ngs i n the Cons ti tuti ona l
Commi s s i on yi el d l i ght on the foregoi ng propos i ti on:
MR. DE CASTRO.
The proponents amendment is a
comma (,) a fter i nfl i cted on l i ne 29 to be
fol l owed by the clause UNLESS FOR COMPELLING
Yes .
MR. DE CASTRO.
Wha t ha ppens to those a waiting
execution, having a l rea dy the dea th pena l ty on
thei r heads, but there is no law yet pass ed by the
Na ti ona l As s embl y?
MR. MONSOD. Then the next s entence wi l l a ppl y:
Dea th pena l ty a l rea dy i mpos ed s ha l l be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.[59]
It ca n be readily s een that the reduction of the pena l ty i s not
a nd was not ma de dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period
before the a forementi oned Secti on 19 ca n be a ppl i ed by the
courts . It ca nnot be i nferred, ei ther from the wordi ngs of the
s ubject provi s i on or from the i ntenti on of the fra mers of the
Cons ti tuti on, tha t a dea th s entence s houl d be brought to the
Supreme Court for review within a certain ti me frame in order that it
ca n be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction i s to
gi ve effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
whi ch is embodied a nd expressed in the consti tuti ona l provi s i ons
thems el ves .[60] Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. A l a w s hould be interpreted with a vi ew to upholding ra ther
tha n des troyi ng i t.
The fa ct that no proclamation or gra nt of commuta ti on wa s
offi ci a l l y i s s ued by the Pres i dent wi l l not prevent the
i mplementation a nd operation of Section 19 to a ppellant. To a rgue
otherwise would be subordinating the command of the Constitution
to the wi ll of the President. The fra mers of the Cons ti tuti on never
i ntended that the non-impos i ti on or non-executi on of the dea th
s entence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent
on the a ct or omi s s i on of the Chi ef Executi ve.
Res ort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commi s s i on
wi l l jus ti fy thi s concl us i on:
MR. REGALADO. Ma y I a sk Commissioner Monsod about
thi s second s entence. Dea th pena l ty a l rea dy
i mpos ed s ha l l be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
When we s a y commuted to reclusion perpetua, I
thi nk we refer to the power of the Pres i dent to
effect commutations because onl y the Pres i dent
ca n commute sentences a lready final a nd i mposed
by the courts . Is tha t correct?
MR. MONSOD. Ma da m Pres i dent, I a m not the
proponent of tha t s entence. Perha ps the
Commi ttee s houl d a ns wer tha t.
MR. REGALADO. That was the a nswer of the Gentlema n
i n res pons e to the i nqui ry of Commi s s i oner
Bengzon.
MR. MONSOD. My a ns wer i s refl ecti ve of wha t the
Commi ttee had answered before. And s i nce tha t
ha s not been cha nged, I s uppos e the a ns wer
woul d be the same. But i f the Commi ttee woul d
l i ke to answer i t in more detail, perhaps i t s houl d
be the one to a ns wer tha t.
FR. BERNAS. The i ntention of the provi s i on here i s ,
upon ra tification of thi s Cons ti tuti on, the dea th
penalty a lready i mposed is a utomatically - wi thout
need for a ny a ction by the President - commuted.
MR. REGALADO. Yes , beca us e the wordi ng here i s :
Dea th pena l ty a l rea dy i mpos ed s ha l l be
commuted to reclusion perpetua. The power of
commuta ti on i s a pres i denti a l preroga ti ve.
FR. BERNAS.
Or we ca n s a y ARE HEREBY
commuted, i f tha t i s cl ea rer. But tha t i s the
i ntenti on.
6
5.
Tra ns mission of Records in Ca se of Death Penalty. - In a l l cases where the death penalty i s imposed by the
tri a l court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment,
wi thin twenty (20) da ys but not earlier than fifteen (15)
da ys a fter promulgation of the judgment or notice of
denial of any motion for new tri al or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded
wi thin ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the
s tenographic reporter.
The Offi ce of the Court Administrator is a ccordingly directed to
i nvestigate this matter a nd s ubmit the corres pondi ng eva l ua ti on,
report a nd recommendation to thi s Court wi thi n ni nety (90) da ys
from noti ce hereof.
Al l cl erks of court a re hereby ordered to s crupulous l y compl y
wi th their duty a nd responsibility of s easonably tra nsmitting to thi s
Court the complete records of cases where the dea th pena l ty wa s
i mposed, especia l l y now tha t the tri a l courts ha ve i mpos ed the
dea th pena l ty i n ma ny ca s es i nvol vi ng hei nous cri mes .
Wi th respect to the case a t ba r, i n jus ti ce to a ppel l a nt thi s
a ppella te proceedi ng s ha l l be trea ted a s a n a utoma ti c revi ew
beca use there is no showing i n the records that he was advised tha t
the death penalty i mposed upon him has been reduced to reclusion
perpetua purs ua nt to the perti nent provi s i ons of the 1987
Cons ti tution; a nd that his ca s e i s no l onger s ubject to a utoma ti c
revi ew, as provi ded a nd requi red i n Ci rcul a r No. 9 of thi s Court,
hence a noti ce of a ppea l s houl d ha ve been fi l ed.
WHEREFORE, for fa i l ure of the pros ecuti on to prove the
a ggra vating circumstance of evident premeditation and by vi rtue of
the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the courta
quo i s a ccordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Ba ldimo
i s hereby s entenced to suffer the penal ty of reclusion perpetua a nd
to i ndemnify the heirs of the victim i n the a mount ofP50,000.00 i n
cons ona nce wi th our current ca s e l a w a nd pol i cy on dea th
i ndemni ty.
SO ORDERED.