QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO GR No.

L-48157 March 16, 1988

QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in
his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an
administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the
same parties and involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent
over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner
argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondents right
toe eject petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question
which bars a judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioners
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying
that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and
the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case
to be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES
INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT
CASE.
DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510
(1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question
comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending
and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue

must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can
proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the
criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of
the former.

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner
speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Issue:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and
expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
Held:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate
of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did
not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a
candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be
prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such
provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

Facts:
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang
Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-AdamsDamalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial
Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association
with petitioner.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer
Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however,
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order
of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC
en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the
winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission
on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the
Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner exceeded the age requirement to run as chairman in
Sanggunian Kabataan?
Held:
The petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The court discuss the one-year cycle of successive years in construing Section 428
of the Local Government Code Providing that certain elective officials should not be
more than 21 years of age on the day of their election, The provision that an
elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor
days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days

each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year
old on the 365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year. In computing years,
the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th
day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the
second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle.
This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day
cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after
the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on
the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond
21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some
days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
"Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary
to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22
years on election day.
Petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office
on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten
(10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age
limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as
candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in
view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from

the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994
respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner
speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Issue:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and
expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
Held:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate
of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did
not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a

candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be
prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such
provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,

vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

Facts:
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang
Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-AdamsDamalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial
Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association
with petitioner.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer
Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however,
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order
of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC
en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the
winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission
on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the
Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner exceeded the age requirement to run as chairman in
Sanggunian Kabataan?

Held:
The petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The court discuss the one-year cycle of successive years in construing Section 428
of the Local Government Code Providing that certain elective officials should not be
more than 21 years of age on the day of their election, The provision that an
elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor
days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days
each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year
old on the 365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year. In computing years,
the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th
day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the
second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle.
This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day
cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after
the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on
the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond
21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some
days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
"Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary
to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22
years on election day.
Petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office
on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten
(10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age
limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as
candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ,
respondents.
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental

law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He
was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in
view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from

the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Palatino, et al. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) G.R. No. 189868; 15
December 2009 Facts: COMELEC Resolution No. 8514 (issued 12 November 2008)
set 2 December 2008 to 15 December 2009 as the period of continuing voter
registration in all areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 (issued 12 February 2009) adjusted the
deadline to 31 October 2009, instead of 15 December 2009. Petitioners (a member
of Congress and concerned citizens) asked the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 null and void, and to require COMELEC to extend the voter
registration until 9 January 2010, the day before the 120-day period prior to the 10
May 2010 regular elections, during which voter registration is prohibited under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189.* COMELEC argued that Section 29 of Republic
Act No. 6646** and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436*** authorize it to fix other
dates for pre-election acts which include voter registration; the 31 October 2009
deadline was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations; and in
Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC,**** the Supreme Court denied a similar prayer for
extension of the 27 December 2000 deadline for voter registration for the 14 May
2001 elections. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 should be

declared void insofar as it set the deadline for voter registration for the 2010
elections on 31 October 2009. Ruling: COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is null and void
insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the 10 May 2010 elections on
31 October 2009. Voter registration for the 2010 elections is extended until 9
January 2010. The clear text of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 decrees that
voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election. By this provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120
days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time
for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the
coming elections. And the COMELECs rule-making power should be exercised in
accordance with the prevailing law. Both Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 and
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other
periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably
held within the period provided by law. There is no ground to hold that the mandate
of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by Section 8 of Republic Act 8189. There is, thus, no occasion for the
COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. The present
case is different from Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC. Petitioners in Akbayan filed their
petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter
registration under Section 8 of R.A. 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day
registration on 17 and 18 February 2001, also within the 120-day prohibitive period.
In the present case, both the dates of filing of the petition (30 October 2009) and
the extension sought (until 9 January 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive
period.

Bayan Muna vs Romulo

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent
the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted

to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out
of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval
and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the nonsurrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the
RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims
to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous
and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and
defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral
agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one
Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country,
or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the
Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

[USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one
party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of
this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any
allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of
the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of
October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said
agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the
Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized
international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections
(Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of
two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats

the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may
be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements
have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of
executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other
hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form
of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the
Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade
Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of
notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x
x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as
the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance
thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility
for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it
precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as
already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern
to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who
may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and
punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US,
before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind
both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which
may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act
of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.

LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009
FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of
Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was
able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the
Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in
the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the
Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as
the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the
provincial certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as
Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to
certain observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on
the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but
failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondents [petitioner] contention:

Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity
that, while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen
sometime on May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was
the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no
written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure
and refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner]
was issued a contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the
basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner
repeatedly failed to appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force
Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest
and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was
declared in contempt by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the
constitutional powers of the COMELEC.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the
explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws

and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by

Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration
of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article
IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine
those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the
COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e),
Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and
penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.
First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled[12] canvassing
of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao;
and refused to submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken
to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which
were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in
violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers
and radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and
posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a
holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said
petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled

in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the

enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything
else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for
which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil
action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start
the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that
they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders

conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of
the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza
to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716
violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for

the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that:
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a
province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about
the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
a province.

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010
Abad, J.

FACTS:

In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting
percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group.

Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr.

,ErlindaCadapan, Antonia Flores, and JoselitoUstarez are members of the other
party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warrantoagainst Bantay and
its nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House
of Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and nderreprsented
sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.

Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to
assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that
such question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner Palparans qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but
the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of
the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

FACTS:

YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse of
Representatives are of two kinds: members who shall be elected from legislative
districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Thus, it is the part-list
representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations.

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.

As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be

the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives
and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of the partylist nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.

III
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
FACTS:

On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M.
No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council: (1) To resume
its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by
the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (2) To
prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (3) To submit to
the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice
on or before May 17, 2010; and(4) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short
list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion
that a plain reading of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead
to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on
midnight appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight

appointments stated under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

YES: We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters
being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the
decision of March 17, 2010.

Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision
of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended

point in order to suit the purpose of any quarter.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
Nachura, J.

FACTS:

Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (PET) on the grounds that it violates Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. The petitioner chafes the creation of the separate tribunal which was
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.

HELD:

NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as
he was unmistakably estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which
tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004
therefore making the petitioners standing still imperiled by thee white elephant in
the petition. Judicial inquiry requires that the constitutional question be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals
constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme
Courts independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded,
but it remained absolute.

ECSON V. COMELEC
G.R. 16134 March 3, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners herein contended that the Comelec has no jurisdiction in deciding the
complaints against the Presidential candidates particularly the Fernando Poe Jr. as a
Presidential contender. They claimed that the Comelec has violated the provision of
the 1987 Constitution that the Supreme Court only has the original and exclusive
power to settle those queries.

ISSUE:
As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?
HELD:
No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April
1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.

LAMBINO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

Lambino proposed an amendment to modify the Constitutional provisions

particularly the Sections 1-7 of Article VII and by adding Article XVIII entitled
Transitory Provisions by gathering signatures of 6,327, 952 individuals for an
initiative petition which said signatures comprises at least 12 per centum of all
registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per
centum of its registered voters.These proposed changes will shift
the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the
Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC.

Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only

binding to the parties within that case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 Art XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do
not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no
presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to
the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition
contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they
did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided
upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long
as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

Capalla vs. Comelec, GR No. 201112, June 13, 2012

By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera

Facts: On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract
for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010
Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract between the
Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of lease of the AES with option to purchase
(OTP) the goods listed in the contract. In said contract, the Comelec was given until
December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In September 2010, the
Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding
canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in
the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18,
2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary
extension of the option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31,
2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec
did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions were
given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on March 31,
2012.
On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to accept
Smartmatic-TIMs offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31,
2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the Comelec
the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of
Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latters PCOS
machines to be used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize
Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec. The
Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Comelec Resolutions on the grounds
that the option period provided for in the AES contract had already lapsed; that the
extension of the option period and the exercise of the option without competitive
public bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the Comelec
purchased the machines in contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369. On
the other hand, respondents argue on the validity of the subject transaction based
on the grounds that there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision of law
for it to extend the option period; that the OTP is not an independent contract in
itself, but is a provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that had
already satisfied the public bidding requirements of RA 9184; and that exercising
the option was the most advantageous option of the Comelec.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed Resolutions
and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.
Held: No. A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that the
parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the period
within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition on the

extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective. The Comelec still
retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which
indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet terminated.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions thereof may still
be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided said amendment is in
writing and signed by the parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not
an ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency, the rights
and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA
9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain
provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the
contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid
on the same terms.
The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated and Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO) cannot be applied in
the present case. First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was
not previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that aside
from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals should include an
OTP the subject goods. Second, the amendment of the AES contract is not
substantial. The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged
against the supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were,
therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount. The competitive
public bidding conducted for the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding
would be a superfluity. Lastly, the amendment of the AES contract is more
advantageous to the Comelec and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48
rentals paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES contract
was considered part of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject
goods, it was required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not
exercise the option, the rentals already paid would just be one of the government
expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections.
Augusto Sanchez vs Commission on Elections
After the first senatorial elections under the 1987 Constitution, Augusto Sanchez, a
candidate therein, petitioned the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
recount of the votes. Allegedly, votes intended for him, which were merely written
as Sanchez, were considered as stray votes because of the sameness of his last
name to that of Gil Sanchez another candidate who was later disqualified. Sanchez
was then running as the 25th in ranking among the candidates. He filed an
urgent petition to re-count or re-appreciate those votes in favor of him.
Meanwhile, Santanina Rasul and Juan Ponce Enrile, ranked 23rd and
24th respectively intervened and filed before the COMELEC requesting the latter to

proclaim them as the duly elected senators elect completing the 24 senators-elect.
They moved to dismiss Sanchez petition. Rasuls lead over Enrile was just about
1,910 and there were just 3 municipalities left to be counted (amounting to 31,000
votes). Enriles lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes. COMELEC then denied
Sanchez petition. Subsequently, COMELEC declared Rasul as the 23rd senator-elect
but there was still a mathematical possibility that Enrile can overtake Rasul. Enrile
opposed Rasuls proclamation as the 23rd senator-elect and he averred that
COMELEC should complete the canvassing first before declaring who placed 23rd
and 24th respectively.
COMELEC justified Rasuls proclamation on the ground that since the remaining 3
municipalities were in Muslim Mindanao, and that Rasul is a Muslim, there is a
logical presumption that majority of the votes therefrom would be for Rasul. While
this was foregoing, COMELEC, by a vote of 5 to 2 reversed its earlier decision in
denying Sanchez petition and it granted Sanchez request for recount and reappreciation. Enrile then filed a petition against COMELEC and Sanchez. Enrile
alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting Sanchez petition for
recount and abused its discretion in refusing to proclaim him (Enrile) on the ground
that Sanchezpetition for recount is not a pre-proclamation controversy which
involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic validity, of the said
election returns and that Rasuls lead over him was only 1,916 votes while his lead
over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes remaining to be canvassed
in 3 towns, could not offset his lead over Sanchez.
ISSUE: Whether Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed
with the Comelec may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy
falling within the Comelecs exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code)
or properly pertains to the realm of election protest falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualification of the [Senates] members. (Art. VI, Sec.
17, Constitution).
HELD: Sanchez petition must fail. There is no clear showing that the said stray
votes constitute omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate
and/or his corresponding votes (incomplete election returns). The election returns
are in fact complete as the total number of votes that were counted and
appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The scope of preproclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in
pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any
clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or
prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited
to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec.
236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe

resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its
contents, Sanchez petition must fail. The complete election returns whose
authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose
of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. The ground for
recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised
in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of Sanchez votes
intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election
returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC
or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look
beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima
facie case backed up by a specific offer of evidence and indication of its nature and
importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and
the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby.
Otherwise, the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings leading to
a vacuum in so important and sensitive an office as that of Senator of
the Republic could easily be brought about - this time involving the eight place
and next time involving perhaps all the eight places, when it is considered that the
position of senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66 provinces and
57 cities comprising the Philippines.

Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal

In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the
time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking
in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to
said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of
fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no SenatorMember of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

Carmelo Lazatin vs Commission on Elections

Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections)
COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed
office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga.
Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not
the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged that
Lazatins petition had become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC

Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on
October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition
should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The order issued
by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted
under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, was in effect a grant of authority
by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by
Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates
Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due
course to the petition. The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin has
been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously
ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a
matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of
the Electoral Tribunal.

Jocelyn Limkaichong vs Commission on Elections

Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Olivia Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases
against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs
dad. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the (Commission
on Elections) COMELEC. Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in
and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared
Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC
declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to
the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras

countered theproclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.

Limkaichong asailed Paras petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed
winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should
be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with
Limkaichong.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELECEn Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending herproclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as
the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC
has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower house, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning
his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latters election,
returns and qualifications.
The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.