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law forbids. The law of equality is in force only where the services performed in the different cases are
substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are similar.
Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC; it did not have
a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and there was only one shipper, one consignee for a
special cargo.
The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC,
and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional, episodic or unscheduled.
First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. CA
Based on Article 1732 NCC, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its
services, and transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited
clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. (De Guzman Ruling upheld)
Respondents argument that the term common carrier as used in Section 133(j) of the Local
Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water is erroneous. The definition of common carriers in
NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land, water or air. It does
not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle.
Home Insurance Company vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.
The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as
such but as a private carrier. Under American Jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a
special cargo or chartered to a special person only becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid.
The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of
its agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. Such policy has
no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use
of a single party. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for negligence of its agent is not
against public policy and is deemed valid. Recovery cant be had, for loss or damage to the cargo
against shipowners, unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its
managers, as distinguished from agents or employees.
San Pablo vs. PANTRANCO
Considering the environmental circumstances of the case, the conveyance of passengers, trucks and
cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping
service. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation
of the highway. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when
crossing rivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters - separating the land, however, when as
in this case the two terminals, Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be
considered as a continuation of the highway. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate
CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions
of law. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service under
the guise that it is a mere private ferry service.
The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private
carrier, not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo
trucks is absurd. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately from the
charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that
crosses Matnog to Allen, PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so
as a private carrier and not as a common carrier. The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its
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amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for
the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen. Indeed evidence to this effect has been
submitted.
National Steel Corporation vs. CA
In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. It carried
passengers or goods only for those it chose under a special contract of charter party. It is a private
carrier that renders tramping service and as such, does not transport cargo or shipment for the general
public. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter
party with its owner. Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their
respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of
private carriage or charter party.
Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public.
Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public
cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.
KMU vs. Garcia
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of
public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public
need. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity
exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need
which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or non-existence of public
convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence, real
and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public hearing
conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look
out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators.
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the
facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The right to operate a public utility may exist
independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities
without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning
the facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the
owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the
shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or
negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the
universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner
who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage.
The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough
to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of
the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. Both owner and
agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the
action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract.
Gelisan vs. Alday
The court has held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service is responsible for
damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of
the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioners that he is not liable in view of the lease contract
executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to 3rd persons, cannot be
sustained because it appears that the lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service
Commission. It is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a Franchise is
transferred or lease to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon
the public and 3rd persons. However, Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to be
indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may be required to pay. This is due to the fact that the lease
contract in question, although not effective against the public is valid and binding between the
contracting parties.
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system on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet flagrant violations of the
Public Service Law but also to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible
drivers.
Ganzon vs. CA
Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art.
1734. The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid authority for petitioner to carry out. In any
case, the intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the
fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the illegal order to
dump into the sea the scrap of iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of
the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the
petitioners employees.
By the delivery made during Dec. 1, 1956, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession
and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier of transportation, the contract
of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, Ganzons extraordinary responsibility for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. According to Art 1738, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or persons with right
to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair the
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody & control of the carrier.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the
time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the
carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance,
by the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161
SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are lost
or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that
diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable (Art. 1735, Civil
Code;Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87; Metro Port Service vs. Court of
Appeals, 131 SCRA 365). There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of fault is
not observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one of
which can be applied to this case.
even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely
stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract
involving a common carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be
applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy
embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the
protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
Yobido vs. Court of Appeals
The explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing
defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and
used is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within
five days use. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure. A common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the death or injury resulting from the accident. Thus, having failed to overthrow the presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages.
and obligations. Therefore, although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an
amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper
and asserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
Servando vs. Phil. Steam
The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse
occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable
against the appellant.
It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question, the
parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the
shipment therein the following stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless
such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage
caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire
. ...
We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals
or public policy.
Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine
letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks
the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, where the same issue was resolved
in this wise:
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the
provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid
and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the
regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the
plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent."
Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the
execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to
be transported. There is no law which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the
issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or, for that matter, that the former
should precede the latter. While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill estops the
carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill," a further reading
and a more faithful quotation of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain
constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a contract between the
shipper and the carrier. . . . (However), as between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have
been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts . . .
Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods
shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. As between
the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a
presumption that all terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him,
and in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he assented to
such terms. This rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full
knowledge of its contents, and acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In
order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier
may arise, it must appear that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of
the contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading
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or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face, if it is shown that
the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that its
conditions are to be found on the back, such receipt comes within the general rule, and the shipper is
held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to be found.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the
common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains
in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper
or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable
time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.
And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the
exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by
the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences. Only when such fact of delivery has been
unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody
of the carrier, absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of fault of
the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.
Macam vs. CA
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the
cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was
indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. However, in the export
invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his
demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws
us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art.
1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was proper.
The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without
the bills of lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of petitioner, we gather that he has been
transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. When mangoes
and watermelons are in season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or
thrice a week. The goods are released to GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the
shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes
through telephone calls by himself or his "people." In transactions covered by a letter of credit, bank
guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. But for buyers using
telegraphic transfers, petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully
paid. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents, there was not a single
instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes.
Maersk Line vs. CA
While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and
persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously
assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should at least
be made within a reasonable time.
While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the
subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of the specific date when the goods
were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there arises no need to
execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. In the case before us, we
find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was
beyond the realm of reasonableness.
Ysmael vs. Barretto
Limiting the common carriers liability for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason for less
than 1/8 the actual value of the goods is unconscionable and therefore against public policy. A common
carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and
reasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made.
subcontractor or agent. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air transportation. Well-settled
rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable
for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. When an action is based on
breach of contract of carriage, the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the latter was not a
party in the contract.
The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was overruled although it is recognized in the
Philippines, stating that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the
passenger) to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage,
without any objection.
introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth, although there is
an occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the
hijackers' complete disposal.
PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. Hijackers do not
board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms and grenades are
brought to the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been faulted for want of diligence, particularly
for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations
prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. The use of the most sophisticated
electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining
hijackers.
The Warsaw Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is
combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. In the case at bar, the baggage check is
combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket complies with
Article 3, which provides:
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a
country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the
Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in
respect of loss of or damage to baggage.
The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for
loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket, was
expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence
to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations.
The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to
take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. In attempting to avoid
registering the luggage by going back to the line, private respondent manifested a disregard of airline
rules on allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that
cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a
handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope.
The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the
corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will
exclude the application of limited liability.
Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The Warsaw Convention's provisions, do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract
by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage, Otherwise, an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its
absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd. In the case at bar,
no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and
Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable
damage.
There can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned
to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time
when, having gone to Rome, she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the
conference. Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the
circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of
baggage.
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As already
mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily, but safely.
The highjacking-robbery was force majeure. The hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant
display of firepower and violent fury. Firearms, hand-grenades, dynamite, and explosives are
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