Consti Compilation

Constitutional Law II (Atty.
Edgar Pascua II)

Case Digests Compilation
I-Wigmore (2014-2015)
PEOPLE VS RACHO
626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
FACTS
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend
the appellant. The team members posted themselves along thenational highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00
p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team
approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his
hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet
containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the
confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the
contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was charged
in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded
"Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity
of the subsequent warrantless search.
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
HELD
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from
this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from
the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender
a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no
search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was
the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As
testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped
information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description
but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day, there was an assurance
that he would be there the following day. Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
PEOPLE VS ARANETA
FACTS
This is an appeal from the decision of Court of appeals affirming the decision of RTC Pasig City finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the comprehensive drugs act of 2002. The accused argue that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution was not able to establish without a doubt, that the dangerous drugs presented
in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by
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the requirements of the law as regards the proper custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged buybust operation.
The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and seizure of the shabu and marijuana were
lawful and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence of any credible evidence to
the contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. More importantly, all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. The prosecution
asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue on the alleged failure of the law enforcers
to comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the prosecution believes that it has shown
that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
2. Whether or not seized items are admissible.
HELD
Yes, the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. The Court
finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction. It is morally convinced that the
accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against them.
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed
because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling,
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the
spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in
the execution of their criminal plan.
The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of
the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant
was likewise not needed to conduct it.
ONG VS PEOPLE
FACTS
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two 2 to 3
inches in size, including 2 cellphones, 1 pair of scissors and 1 Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he
asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which
turned out to be 4 plastic sachets, the 2 of which were empty while the other 2 contained suspected shabu.
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Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search
and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest.
HELD
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned
in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation
is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter;
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed
of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used
against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and
while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the
police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are
the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi)
a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
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It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the stop and
frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may
lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons. The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. The
subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.
ABENES VS CA
GR No. 15632014, February 2007
FACTS
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered firearm and its
ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms and its
ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a
checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police
saw the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one,
the police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder.
The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges.
Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and thathis
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the checkpoint was legally set up.
2. Whether Abenes constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had been violated.
HELD
YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three
days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted
its seizure without a warrant (plainview).
NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and
were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the
policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating Abenes where they saw the gun tucked into his
waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the vehicle. However, there
is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no license. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must
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be exculpated from criminal liability under the illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is still convicted for
violation of the Comelec Gun Ban.
SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010.
FACTS
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two police
officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the
officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was
eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her. The lower cause said
that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE
Whether the arrest was valid.
HELD
The SC denied the appeal. Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did
not quash it before arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view doctrine was
imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as stated in
People v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person
who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons.
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ
637 SCRA 791 (2010)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y
CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN
G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010
FACTS
On September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community
Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot
session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon
receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz, and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) team went to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located.
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As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria coming out of the side door and
immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon
(Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of
them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized and turned
over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The accused were subjected to a
drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC found the accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN
MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession
of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation
to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay the fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive possession of
the dangerous drugs by the accused. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt Accused-Appellants were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
No.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the
evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody
has not been duly established.
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search,
both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.
The facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an incident
thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to,
and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was
going on in said house.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the
arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable
cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As admitted in the testimony of PO1
Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that
was reported to the police.
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of one
of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable
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cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal,
the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search
and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. The subject
items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.
Numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions position that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved.
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to the failure of
law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law. Some bona fide arrests and
seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives
compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement
agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of
seized drugs.
POSADAS v. COURT OF APPEALS

188 SCRA 288 (1990)
ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
FACTS
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members
of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In
the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and
the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense The
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and ammunitions but failed to
do so.
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners right against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
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RULING
No. Between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in
the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions, hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE
210 SCRA 14 (1992)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
FACTS
On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team
of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. Two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was
holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned
over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After
he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence
of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. There was apparently no offense that has
just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.ACQUITTED.
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MANALILI v. COURT OF APPEALS

(280 SCRA 400)
FACTS
Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to reports
of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon)
who seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking
in a swaying manner.
When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding in his hands.
Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to
contain crushed marijuana residue.
Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili
of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen
ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of
marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some
extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)
ISSUE
WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.
HELD
Yes. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.
However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law: Search incidental to a lawful arrest;
Search of moving vehicles; Seizure in plain view; and Customs search.
Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the cited cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to
search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established
with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against
searches without warrant.
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SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010.
FACTS
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two police
officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. While the officers were coming, one of the
officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked, she fled but was
eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.
The lower court said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation.
RULING
Yes.
The Court held that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The
search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited to the
police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after
PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting
suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over
that of petitioner.
The SC denied the appeal.
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VEROY v. LAYAGUE
FACTS
Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When Veroy was promoted to the position
of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to
Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric
Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to
Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the
Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located,
was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero
of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroys house in Davao City on information that the said residence was
being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers.
They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not
present and they did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who
consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. The following day, Capt.
Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma.
Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside
an unlocked drawer in the childrens room. 3 half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also
found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag
containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the
Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious
pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated
Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution
dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an
Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao
City). No bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscals resolution was received by the Veroys on 13 August
1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day which was denied for being premature, as they have not been
arrested yet. The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o the
ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, the
Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and
anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that
they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990,
the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement, which was denied.
The court ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At the
conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys were
returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys
that he had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2
October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court, unless otherwise
restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining threat the presence of alleged rebel soldiers
include the authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house.
HELD
unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches
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and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto
are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view
(People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt.
Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission granted by was for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant
but did not.
Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure
a search warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights.
As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The offense of illegal
possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the
exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the criminal action against them for
illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while
there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or
voluntariness there is no crime.
PP v. NUEVAS
FACTS
Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in Olongapo
City, came across Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed them a
plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2
other persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.
The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, could
be located. Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.
When the police officers introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After the items
were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the police office.
Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during their physical
examination. He also escorted all 3 to the Fiscals office where they were informed of the charges against them.
The 3 were found guilty by the trial court, and the case was automatically elevated to the CA for review. However,
Nuevas withdrew his appeal. Thus, the case was considered closed and terminated as to him. The CA affirmed the trial
court.
ISSUE
W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
HELD
NO. The search conducted in Nuevas case was made with his consent. However, in Dins case, there was none. There
is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police
officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, he cooperated
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with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His
actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others, and save oneself
even at the cost of others lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas conviction had he not withdrawn his
appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given.
The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic
bag. Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Thus,
the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. On
the other hand, Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his
act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish
illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by
convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal
items.
PP v. DEQUINA
FACTS
Accused-appellants Dequina et al were charged before the RTC-Manila with violations of the offense of illegal transport
of marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1 Anthony
Blanco were instructed by their superior to proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila,
where, according to the report given by the informant, three persons a male and two female[s] would be coming
from Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana.
At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of the pier. From
it emerged three passengers a man and two women each one of them carrying a black travelling bag.
As the trio started walking towards the western portion of Raxabago St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol
car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its presence. She started walking in a more hurried pace.
While trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the bag gave way.
Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags case into view. Thus, they arrested the three accused.
During the investigation, it was discovered that each of the three black travelling bags confiscated from the three
accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal. They were not doing anything
illegal that would have justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons and
belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot be justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was
lawful.
ISSUE
W/N the warrantless arrests of the appellants were lawful.
HELD
YES. Decision affirmed.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
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judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of
said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to
another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags.
Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
PP v. UYBOCO
FACTS
On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were abducted and
brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. Nimfa was able to recognized one of the kidnappers as
appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office.
The kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson
was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions. After, numerous times of
negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind,
such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes
Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10)
minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes
Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified
Macias together with appellant and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and
helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place
and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A
few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said
car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant
suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed
him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money,
jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?
HELD
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: x x x; (b) When an offense has in fact
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and, (c) x x x.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:
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A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2)
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it. Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes
Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such
knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to
pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission
of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a
number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is
equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue
of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in
the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to search
his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS v. OGARIO

FACTS
On 9 December 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the M/V
"Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally imported. The report
stated that the rice was landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan." It was then shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto." Forfeiture proceedings were started in
the customs office in Cebu (Cebu Seizure Identification Case 17-98). On 10 December 1998, Mark Montelibano, the
consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer, Nelson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case CEB-23077) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. In separate motions, the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu and the
EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were denied in a resolution dated 11 January 1999.
BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC in its order dated 25 January
1999. In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of Ogario and Montelibanos bond to P22,500,000.00. On
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were sustained on 15 April 1999. Accordingly,
on 26 April 1999, upon motion of Ogario, et. al., the RTC ordered the sheriff to place in their possession the 25,000
bags of rice. Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of Cebu, a decision was
rendered forfeiting the vessel M/V "Alberto"; the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks
bearing Plates GCC 844 and GHZ 388 in favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed by law
while releasing the 7 trucks bearing Plates GFX 557; GFX 247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 in favor of
their respective owners upon proper identification and compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before the District Collector of Customs despite due notice sent to his
counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the forfeiture proceedings On 30 April 1999, Ogario and
Montelibano filed the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Courts are competent to pass upon the validity or regularity of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs.
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HELD
Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The
Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from
assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Under the law,
the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial
Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on
board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power
to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings.
FELICISIMO RIETA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004
FACTS
After a car chase, Col. Lacson and his men searched a vehicle and found several firearms. The persons in the car
belonged to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission orders. During that same
incident, when the cargo truck which was accompanied by the car during the car chase was searched, 305 cases of
blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside.
Rieta, one of the passengers of the seized cargo truck, denied any knowledge of the alleged smuggling of the blueseal cigarettes. He alleged that the cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were the contents thereof
shown to them upon their apprehension. These allegations were corroborated by one of his companions during the
incident.
RTC and CA found Rieta guilty of smuggling.
ISSUE
Were the evidence obtained against the accused inadmissible in evidence because petitioner and his co-accused were
arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared
illegal and invalid by this Honorable Supreme Court?
HELD
The Chicot doctrine cited in Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should
be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order
No. 60 -- long before our Decision in Taada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be
disturbed or simply ignored.
The search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation of customs laws, is
one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional provision. Such provision mandates that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined the
existence of probable cause.
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Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a warrant for purposes of
enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code
specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building
that is not a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package,
box or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
TOMAS SALVADOR v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005
FACTS
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then aircraft
mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing
thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
Consequently, they were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 117, Pasay City with violation of
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5843. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of June 1994 at the NAIA/Domestic Airport vicinity, Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and felonious assist in the concealment and unlawful importation of
several items.
ISSUE
Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence
HELD
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search
warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct
a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of
the airport.
In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs
search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law. Law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when
there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of the
tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of holding
or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.
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PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA

GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994
FACTS
At the height of the December 1989 coup detat staged against the Government, the members of the Reform the
Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) bombarded various establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila with their tora-tora planes and took over the Villamor Air Base, the Headquarters of the
Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, the government television station, and the Greenhills Shopping Center
in San Juan.
The accused in this case was charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance
of rebellion. According to the military officers involved, said establishment was being used as a communication
command post by the RAM-SFP. However, when they neared the establishment, they were attacked and fired upon by
a group of men. This resulted in the subsequent raid of the sales office, wherein the military officers discovered and
confiscated high-powered firearms and explosives inside one of the offices.
The officer who first entered the building alleged that he saw the accused inside the office of the Colonel holding a C-4
while suspiciously peeping through the door. The accused was arrested and was made to sign an inventory of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
The team, however, failed to secure a search warrant prior to the raid. They attributed this failure to the disorderly
circumstances at the time, i.e., the attack of the nearby Camp Aguinaldo by rebel forces with the simultaneous firing
within the vicinity of the sales office, coupled with the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
ISSUE
Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup detat.
HELD
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant
at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters
by the RAM. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives in the Eurocar Sales Office
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts.
The trial judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was
closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI

[GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
FACTS
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.
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Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the
contract necessary for the transaction. Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the
former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
Before delivery of Marti's box, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples
he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the NBI, the box containing Marti's packages
was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves.
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila
Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be invoked against
the State.
HELD
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the
accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not
be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where
no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION VS NLRC

[GR 113271, 16 October 1997]
FACTS
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp. Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of
Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per
unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a refund for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an
envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a
check for P640 for Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
the government.
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ISSUE
Whether Waterous act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers is contrary to the injunction against
unreasonable search and seizure and a persons right to privacy of communication.
HELD
In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. The Court
finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication, and Waterous
was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business
communication in which it had an interest.
However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.
Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters
decision, viz., that the evidence against Catolico was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures, which was set
aside.
PEOPLE v. MENDOZA
[G.R. No. 109279-80. January 18, 1999]
FACTS
On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court found her
husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However, the real victim of this unfortunate occurrence is the
spouses only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the care of her maternal grandparents.
For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charge with parricide
and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable
motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver one
Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly
caused her death.
Criminal Case No. 637
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No.
41001 and Four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of parricide, without first securing the necessary license or
permit therefor.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a violation on the constitutional right to privacy of the accused.
HELD
Accused-appellant denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal weapon,
and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute
between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went, and not about
the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
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But this claim is believed by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal
weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her
mother was shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness,
Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was
surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by
accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a
mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these
documents were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and
papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity
of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law
Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
PEOPLE v. BONGCARAWAN
[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002]
FACTS
This is an appeal from the Decision dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in
Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly
known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA 7659.
ISSUE
Whether or not the confiscated drugs were admissible as evidence in court against the accused/ appellant.
HELD
The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he
claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti[15] is not applicable in this
case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.[16] Evidence
acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed
by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,[18] [i]n the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.[19] The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
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government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was
only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel
security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the
state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
348 SCRA 527 (2000)
FACTS
Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California,
U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been
working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent
homes in the United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village
Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m.
the next day, 26 June 1998.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area.
Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 67 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard
on the latter's abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had
just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported
the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She
was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection.
Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the
women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the
same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Johnson
brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The
confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional
Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were
taken and her luggage opened.
Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic
bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay
City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
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HELD
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited,
hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
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PEOPLE v. CANTON
[G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002]
FACTS
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under
an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE
HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed
through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee
of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time. Upon
frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of
SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.4 When
Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to
bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter
to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.
Mylene called Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination.
Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed
SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages
individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them.The first was
taken from SUSANs abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.
They brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they
contained white crystalline substances which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was an unreasonable warrantless search and seizure.
HELD
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or
consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to
a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was
passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter
felt a bulge on SUSANs abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint
did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
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arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense.
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security personnel had no
knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.
PEOPLE v. CONDE
[GR 113269, 10 April 2001]
FACTS
On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw
4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc poked
a gun at the two Indians while his three companions (Alejandro Perez Jr. Y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and another
unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians
on installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3 Rodencio
Sevillano of the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, Kalookan City investigated the incident. On
30 May 1992, the police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when
Felicidad Macabare, Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to Conde. These weapons were discovered inside
her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad's bag and when they
searched the house of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde, Perez and Atis were charged with
the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused entered pleas of not guilty.
On 15 December 1993 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found Conde, Atis and Perez guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of each of the
victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the amount of P50,000.00. Conde, et. al. appealed. However, the counsel
de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The
decision of the trial court became final and executory with respect to Perez. Hence the present appeal concerns only
Atis and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.
ISSUE
Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was waived, is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of error.
HELD
The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At
the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
namely: (a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 110
)Narratives (Berne Guerrero) he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
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escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al. were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue
and were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed as 5 days had
already passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting officers had
probable cause based on personal knowledge, as PO3 Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from
Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the police more than enough time
to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights of Conde, et. al.,
provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution 28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did not assert their constitutional
rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case.
An accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. When they entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights to
question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should
had been made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for them to raise the question of their warrantless
arrests. Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful
restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the
conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts on record point to their culpability.
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
170 SCRA 256 (1989)
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection
of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?
HELD
DISMISSED. NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
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reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
185 SCTA 665 (1990 DECISION)
HELD
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e.
at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus,
under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organizedgovernment is on the balance, or where the lives
and safety of the people are ingrave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have
absolutely no reason to remain. One must concede to the basic right of the (government) to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended or public welfare; and in the pursuit of
those objectives, the government hasthe equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and
methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These routine checks,
when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive
In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the citizen is not helpless. For the military is not
above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man
checkpoints, who abuse their authority act beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and
civilly for their abusive acts.
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PEOPLE v. EXALA
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS
A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine
inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of the inspection team,
went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang
proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a black leather bag measuring about
1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When he asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from
the 3 accused. Nobody answered. Instead, they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag
opened, which was found out to contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter prosecuted and convicted of illegal
transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana
as evidence against him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.
ISSUE
Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in evidence against the accused?
HELD
The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the admission of the seized marijuana because
he neither raised this issue before the trial court nor objected to the admissibility of the marijuana when it was offered
in evidence.
And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalans contention deserves scant
consideration because there are instances where search and seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest. An illustration would be the stop-and-search without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa]. Vehicles are generally
allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are
stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those
manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been
instruments in the commission of an offense.
According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do away with the general
rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except
of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot
of a lawful stop-and-search at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with Operational Bakal, the main object of which was to
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing through
it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants
were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were
bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor
of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc.
Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more
extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
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GUANZON v. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
FACTS
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place
(Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is
no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and
windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that
they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and
maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution
grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state.
The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for
the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
ISSUE
Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
HELD
It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which
"offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment
to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep
were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be
achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should
not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In
the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged
violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
ABENES VS CA
GR No. 15632014, February 2007
FACTS
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered firearm and its
ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms and its
ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a
checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police
saw the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one,
the police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder.
The trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges.
Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up, and thathis
constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial court.
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ISSUE
1. Whether or not the checkpoint was legally set up.
2. Whether Abenes constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure had been violated.
HELD
YES. The production of a mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three
days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted
its seizure without a warrant (plainview).
NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and
were properly in a position from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the
policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating Abenes where they saw the gun tucked into his
waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the vehicle. However, there
is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes carried had no license. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must
be exculpated from criminal liability under the illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is still convicted for
violation of the Comelec Gun Ban.
GAANAN v. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809; October 16, 1986
FACTS
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, Pintor made a telephone call to
Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his regular lawyer went on a business trip. When Pintor called up, Laconico requested
Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Gaanan heard Pintor enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint
for direct assault. Pintor called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
Department of Public Highways, but the latter insisted that Pintor himself should receive the money. And when he
received the money at a restaurant, Pintor was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Pintor then charged Gaanan with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the
telephone conversation without the formers consent.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between Pintor and Laconico was private
in nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard such communication without the
knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to
overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term device as provided in
R.A. 4200.
ISSUE
WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of R.A. 4200 such that its use to overhear a
private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a
telephone line.
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HELD
NO. The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices
enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone
line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties
being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the
case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the
penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court
or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere
act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. 4200 or
others of similar nature.
STONEHILL, et. al v. HON. JOSE DIOKNO

20 SCRA 283 (1967)
FACTS
42 search warrants were issued against petitioners (Stonehill, et.al) and the corporations of which they were officers.
The search warrants were directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into 2 major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
because:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
ISSUES
1.
2.
WON the warrants for search and seizure in the offices of the corporations were legal/lawful;
WON the warrants for search and seizure in the residences of the petitioners were legal/lawful
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HELD
1.
YES. The SC held that petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and
of the seizures made, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature.
2.
NO. The Constitution provides that:

(1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and
(2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitution to outlaw the so-called general warrants
which are contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
PASTRANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104504; October 31, 1997
FACTS
On February 13, 1989, a group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, intelligence operations officer of the
Philippine Constabulary in Oroquieta City. They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his father,
petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were willing to testify but expressed fear of the petitioner who, according to
them, had firearms. Clyde Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had been the victim of foul play.
On February 20, 1989, two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife James Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton
Steve G. Pastrano also saw Capt. Maoza, seeking his assistance in connection with the death of their brother
Clyde. The brothers reported that their father and his common-law wife were keeping unlicensed firearms in their
house. They executed a joint affidavit on February 20, 1989 in which they stated that they had personal knowledge of
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the fact that their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of his
house. On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza applied for a search warrant on the same
day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico Durias of the MTC of Oroquieta City issued a
search warrant which Capt. Maoza and his men later served at the residence of Pedrito Pastrano. Seized from
petitioner's dwelling was a sack containing the following:
1 Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum; 1 round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum; 1 Revolver Cal. 32; Six rounds of live
Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
On January 14, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty, even as it found his common-law
wife, Erlinda Ventir, innocent of the charge.
ISSUE
WON the Search Warrant issued by Judge Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution.
HELD
NO. Although petitioner contends that Capt. Maoza, who applied for the search warrant, did not have personal
knowledge of the facts on which the warrant was based, the trial court actually examined the two brothers, James
Clement and Clinton Steve Pastrana. These two were the ones who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza. They gave
information of the illegal possession of firearms by their father on the basis of personal knowledge. Their testimonies,
not that of Capt. Maoza, formed the basis of the trial court's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.
Petitioner also assails the absence of a written deposition showing that the judge had examined the complainant and
his witnesses by means of searching questions in writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, 4 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. But although this is a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to
this end. He did not move to quash the information before the trial court. Nor did he object to the presentation of the
evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal search.
Petitioner thus impliedly waived any objection based on the illegality of the search. The right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly
or impliedly.
ABERCA v. VER
G.R. No. L-69866; April 15, 1988
FACTS
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs
by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in
view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila."
Plaintiffs allege that complying with said order, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively
issued judicial search warrants; that certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation
of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
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Seeking to justify the dismissal of the complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers, they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function. They
are members of the AFP and their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less
provides that the President may call them "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
or imminent danger thereof."
ISSUE
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
HELD
NO. The SC finds respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit
of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely responding to their duty. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience
and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages
for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32
of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation. The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. General
Ver, who ordered the raid, is therefore also held liable together with the members of the TFM.
FORBES VS CHUOCO
16 PHIL 534 (1910)
FACTS
In 1910, Respondent Chuoco Tiaco and other Chinese citizens were expelled from the Philippines and returned to
China under the orders of the Petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, with the said
expulsion carried out in the public interest of the Government and at the request of the proper representative of the
Chinese Government. Having been able to return to the Philippines, he feared that he should be again deported by the
said defendants, concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in this
case prohibiting them from deporting the respondent and to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.
ISSUE
Whether or not the (executive) government has the power to deport aliens without due process of law.
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HELD
Yes, the government has the power to deport aliens without due process of law. It has been repeatedly decided when
a government is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is not governed by that "due process of law" which
governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For instance, the courts of the United States have decided that in the
deportation of an alien he is not entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by jury being one of the steps in the
"due process of law" in dealing with civil rights.
It is also admitted that the act of the Governor-General in deporting the defendant was in compliance with a request
made by the official representative of the Imperial Government of China. It would seem, therefore, that said request,
in the absence of any other power, would be sufficient justification of his act. The mere fact that a citizen or subject is
out of the territory of his country does not relieve him from that allegiance which he owes to his government, and his
government may, under certain conditions, properly and legally request his return.
This power to deport or expel obnoxious aliens being invested in the political department of the Government, the
judicial department will not, in the absence of express legislative authority, intervene for the purpose of controlling
such power, nor the purpose of inquiring whether or not he is liable in damages for the exercise thereof.
PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ

571 SCRA 469 (2008)
FACTS
Respondent Dela Cruz was the family driver of the petitioners. He was accused of raping the 6-year old daughter of
the said family when he kissed, touched the genitals and played with the girl and assured her that it was just a
father-mother plaything. Later that day, the girl told her parents of respondents acts. According to respondent, the
girls father was so angry at him the next day that he him and banged his head against the garage wall. After the
girls mother pacified her irate husband, barangay officials arrived and brought accused-appellant to the police station.
Once there, accused-appellant was charged with molesting the girl.
Respondent states that while he has been detained since April 26, 2000, his arraignment came only on March 2, 2001
and the prosecution started to present its evidence only on May 9, 2001. To compound matters, the prosecution was
not deemed to have terminated its presentation of evidence until April 14, 2004.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused- appellants right to speedy trial was violated
HELD
No, his right to speedy trial was not violated. Accused-appellant never invoked in the RTC that he has been deprived
of his right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of case. As it is, any allegation of violations of rights should first be
ventilated with the RTC concomitant with the prayer to dismiss the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in the day
for herein accused- appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial. By raising this point belatedly with the CA,
accused-appellant has thus waived his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to the aforesaid constitutional
guarantees.
The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules and must be
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The same right may also be considered violated when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the parties having their case tried.[14] None of these circumstances are,
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to us, present in the instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in
some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive kind.
PEOPLE VS AGOJO
585 SCRA 652 (2009)
FACTS
Respondent Agojo was arrested via a buy-bust operation, and then was subsequently convicted by the trial court and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. First, a civilian reported to the police of the drug activities being
conducted by the Respondent in their area. A police team was dispatched to conduct the said buy-bust operation to
apprehend Agojo. From the spot where the buy-bust team was, they witnessed the sale of shabu took place. After
their insider had signalled the buy-bust team when he received the VHS tape (where the drug was concealed) from
respondent, the Head of the operation approached the insider and immediately examined the tape. Soon thereafter,
he executed the ruse to make respondent to go down, as the latter had in the meantime gone up his hide-out. The
ruse succeeded when respondent went down, and he was arrested right then.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest of Agojo is proper even though the arrest was made without a warrant?
HELD
YES. The arrest of Agojo is proper even though the arrest was made without a warrant.
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant ; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. A
review of the records shows that both requirements were met in this case.
In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the existence of discrepancies in the serial
numbers of the buy-bust money and a prior attempt to frame him up as proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact
that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no consequence.
PEOPLE VS TAN
608 SCRA 85 (2009)
FACTS
Bobby Tan was the head of a wealthy extended family. In his house lived his immediate family members, along with
respondents Jan Tan (his illegitimate child) and his other illegitimate brother Archie. Respondents were accused of
murdering most of their family members in the said house. They were said to have nurtured ill feelings towards their
stepmother and siblings, as well as constantly having heated arguments with their father. Respondents claimed that
they were away when the crimes took place at the house. But evidence shows that the two were still at home when
the killings happened.
At first, the RTC found no probable cause against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan. Judge Aguilar thus granted their
motion to suspend the issuance of warrants for their arrest and to defer the proceedings. Upon a motion, RTC
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reversed the order and found probable cause against respondents Archie and Jan Tan this time and ordered the
issuance of warrants for their arrest.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the arrest of the accused
HELD
Yes, there was probable cause to warrant the arrest of the accused. Probable cause assumes the existence of facts
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and that it was
likely committed by the person sought to be arrested. It requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and convincing
evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of
the accused. As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has sufficient
ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.
Here, admittedly, the evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. The prosecution
evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been at odds with their father and stepmother. They had
opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of new gloves
from his car late that evening. Their stepmother was apparently executed inside Archies room.
The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial,
unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the interrogations of the
witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is important is that there is some rational basis
for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case.
ONG VS GENIO
609 SCRA 188 (2009)
FACTS
Petiitoner Ong filed a criminal complaint for Robbery (of his kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal
things) against respondent Genio. The RTC however dismissed the case because the other elements of the crime of
Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things, were not specifically alleged in the Information filed against respondent; that the information should be
dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it
does not cover the determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information against respondent, which is
executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the Public Prosecutor. The RTC denied the same motion, stating that
RTC has the power to evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation
and eventually filed the Information in court, but also the evidence upon which the resolution was based. In the event
that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the regional trial court has authority to dismiss the information on the ground of lack of probable
cause.
HELD
Yes, the regional trial court has authority to dismiss the information on the ground of lack of probable cause. The RTC
judge, upon the filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in
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case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If
he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information.
PEOPLE v. PEPINO
622 SCRA 293 (2010)
FACTS
Anita Ching left her office aboard her car when they were blocked by a vehicle from which alighted four armed men
who poked their firearms at them. The armed men, two of whom Pepino and Pelenio took the victim and boarded
her on their vehicle. The victim was 30 minutes later transferred to another vehicle and taken to a safehouse where
she was to be detained for 19 days. Daisy, one of two female cohorts of the group, warned her not to escape,
otherwise, she would be hanged. The group initially asked for a P30 million ransoms but the amount was eventually
negotiated down to P500, 000.00 which was paid to the group.
The victim was released on November 6, 1997 and dropped near a drugstore along Bonifacio Avenue in Quezon City
by Pelenio and Daisy. Pelenio escaped. He was eventually recaptured in Cebu City but was killed in a shootout with
the police on February 3, 2000. Before his death, however, Pelenio sent a letter to the presiding judge of the trial
court asking for forgiveness for his escape and admitting his complicity with Pepino in the crime.
Sr./Insp. Vicente Arnado, who was called as a hostile witness for the defense, identified Pepino as the leader of a
notorious kidnap-for-ransom group. Without presenting evidence, Pepino merely challenged his warrantless arrest for
kidnapping as illegal, insisting that he was arrested not for said crime but as an incident of his arrest for illegal
possession of firearms. As for Daisy who claimed to have been arrested on December 6, 1997 with her uncle Pelenio,
she denied having met the victim at the safehouse, alleging that it was only on December 18, 1997 when she was
presented at the Department of Justice that she met the victim for the first time.
Branch 86 of the Quezon City RTC, by Decision of October 9, 2000, found Pepino and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the crime of of kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal detention.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT PEPINOS ARREST WAS ILLEGAL.
HELD
NO, it is settled that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a motion to quash
the Information at any time before arraignment, failing which he is deemed to have waived. Since Pepino did not raise
such alleged irregularity early on, he is now estopped.
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REBELLION v. PEOPLE
623 SCRA 343 (2010)
FACTS
At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor, Jr. together with members of the
Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City, were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway,
when they chanced upon two individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers
introduced themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out from his possession
three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet
which contained white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was "shabu", he
confiscated the plastic sachet.
Petitioner and his companion, who was later identified as Clarito Yanson, were brought to the MAC station at the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the plastic were
found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Clarito, on
the other hand, was further investigated by the City Prosecutor's Office. Petitioner denied the charge against him. He
claimed that he was merely standing in front of a store waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was
suddenly accosted by the MAC team.
On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not committing any crime when
he was arrested.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT REBELLIONS ARREST WAS WARRANTLESS.
HELD
NO. Nowhere in the records show any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his
arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if
he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Also, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was lawful because he was caught by the police officers in flagrante
delicto or while he was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu".
PINEDA-ANG v. JOSON
634 SCRA 736 (2010)
FACTS
On December 19, 2007, Information for Qualified Theft was filed against: (1) Richard Francisco (Francisco), Branch
Manager of private complainant Philippine Business Bank (bank) located in Dolores, City of San Fernando, Pampanga;
(2) Mailada Marilag-Aquino (Aquino); and (3) petitioner Ma. Imelda Pineda-Ng (petitioner).
The prosecution found that Aquino had drawn and issued the 7 checks in favour of petitioner. In turn, petitioner
presented these seven (7) checks for payment before the bank by virtue of her Bill Purchase Accommodation facility
through Francisco, who, in excess of his authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact that each
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check had a face value of more than P100,000.00 and that the same were actually drawn from Closed Accounts
and/or drawn against insufficient funds.
Judge Reyes of RTC 42 found probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against Francisco, but dismissed the
case against Aquino and the Petitioner. However, on Motion for Reconsideration by the Prosecution, Judge Reyes
reversed its earlier order and found probable cause against the Petitioner and Aquino and ordered their arrest.
Hence, this Petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the CA insofar as the impugned decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with and not supported by the law, the facts, as well as, the settled
jurisprudence laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter of filing of criminal cases against the accused
where there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE IN ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST.
HELD
YES. The general rule is that this Court does not review factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this
Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court judge on the existence of probable cause, such
as cases when the Court finds it necessary in order to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect
the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime
subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute
certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts
upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion, but less
than evidence which would justify a conviction.
IMPERIAL v. JOSON
635 SCRA 71 (2010)
FACTS
About 2:00 oclock in the morning of 11 May 2001, an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck.
After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van.
There were multiple damages on the vehicles. Much more tragic than that, the accident resulted in the death of Noel
Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van, and seven of its passengers. Although they survived the mishap, on the other
hand, respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix and Jasmin Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were
immediately brought to the nearest hospital for treatment. As a consequence of the collisions, a criminal complaint for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was
filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial on 16 May 2001.
On 3 July 2001, a complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco and Imperial against respondents
Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the Fuso six-wheeler truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja, its alleged
registered owner, and respondent Maricel Joson. In turn, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel Joson and her
husband, respondent Gerard Ferdinand Joson, in filing against petitioners Francisco and Imperial the complaint for
damages.
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On 6 August 2001, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the dismissal of the Civil Case on the ground of
litis pendentia. Invoking the interest of justice rule, said respondents argued that Civil Case No. 8314 before the
Valenzuela MeTC should be maintained despite petitioners earlier filing of their complaint for damages before the
Naga RTC. Likewise invoking litis pendentia and relying on the earlier filing of their complaint, on the other hand,
petitioners filed a motion dated 28 September 2001, seeking the dismissal of the complaint for damages respondents
Giganto and Spouses Joson filed against them before the Valenzuela MeTC.
With the Valenzuela MeTCs 28 February 2002 dismissal of the complaint filed against them by respondents Giganto
and Spouses Joson, petitioners amended their complaint before the Naga RTC for the purpose of impleading the
following additional defendants: (a) the respective spouses of respondents Giganto, Cubeta, Maricel Joson and Leticia
Pedraja; (b) the driver of the KIA Besta Van, respondent Lazo; and (c) the surviving spouse of the registered owner
thereof, respondent Agnes Tagle. In said amended complaint, petitioners averred, among other matters, that the
vehicular accident was caused by negligence of respondents Giganto and Lazo, the drivers of the Fuso six-wheeler
truck and the KIA Besta Van, respectively.
In the meantime, respondents Lazo, Tagle, Felix and Galvez joined respondents Gregorio Felix and Antonio Landoy,
the heirs/relatives of the deceased passengers of the KIA Besta Van, in filing a complaint for damages against
petitioners on 13 September 2001, said complaint asseverated that petitioner Franciscos negligence was the direct
and proximate cause of the mishap.
On 2 August 2002, the Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners amended complaint on the ground that
the same was barred by the complaint for damages filed against them before the Paraaque RTC. The Valenzuela
MeTC went on to issue an order dated 30 September 2002 reconsidering its earlier dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314
and requiring petitioners to file their answer to the complaint filed by respondents Giganto and the Spouses Joson.
On 4 September 2003, the CA's then Tenth Division issued a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 74030 to the following effect:
(a) nullifying the Valenzuela MeTC's 30 September 2002 order which reinstated Civil Case No. 8314; (b) affirming the
2 August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders issued by the Naga RTC which dismissed petitioners' amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 on the ground of litis pendentia; and, (c) affirming the Paraaque RTC's 7
October 2002 order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-0325.
Aggrieved, petitioners assailed the foregoing order in the 9 November 2003 petition for review on certiorari. In the
meantime, the Sariaya MTC proceeded to conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after
petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in the case.
On 9 January 2002, the Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying petitioner Franciscos motion for
reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial conference be set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to
Prosecutor Francis Sia and the appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case. Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco
filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before
Branch 58 of the Lucena City RTC. Likewise contending that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in
Criminal Case No. 01-99 were capricious, vexatious and oppressive, petitioner Francisco further moved for the
dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Upon the Sariaya MTCs 17 April 2002 denial of said motion as well as the motion for reconsideration he subsequently
interposed, petitioner Francisco filed yet another petition for certiorari and prohibition which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2002-90 before Branch 58 of the Lucena RTC and, later, consolidated with Civil Case No. 2002-37.
On 23 June 2003, the Lucena RTC rendered a consolidated decision in Civil Case Nos. 2002-37 and 2002-90,
dismissing petitioner Franciscos petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit. Brushing aside
the grave abuse of discretion petitioner Francisco imputed against the Lucena RTC, the CA ruled that: (a) the pre-trial
order cannot be corrected in the absence of evidence of the error supposedly reflected therein; (b) the Public
Prosecutor cannot be compelled to enter into any stipulation that would substantially affect the theory of the
prosecution; and, (c) the postponements of the hearings a quo were brought about by the assignment of at least
three Public Prosecutors to the case and cannot, therefore, be considered capricious and violative of petitioner
Franciscos right to a speedy trial. Undaunted, the latter filed the petition for review on certiorari docketed before this
Court as G.R. No. 170410.
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Having issued the 14 November 2003 order holding petitioners payment of the same fees in abeyance pending the
final outcome of said petition for certiorari, the Paraaque RTC, upon the motion dated 20 May 2004 filed respondents
Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy, issued the 8 June 2004 notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on 16
August 2004 and requiring the parties to file their pre-trial briefs.[34]
However, for failure of petitioners and their counsel to attend the pre-trial conference and to file their pre-trial brief,
the Paraaque RTC issued the order dated 16 August 2004 authorizing respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as well
as respondents Tagle and Landoy to present their evidence ex parte. In said order, respondent Evelyn Felix was
likewise declared non-suited alongside respondents Galvez and Lazo whose complaints were, as a consequence,
dismissed without prejudice in view of their failure to attend the same pre-trial conference. Aggrieved by the
Paraaque RTCs 6 October 2004 denial of their motion for reconsideration of said order, petitioners filed the petition
for certiorari and prohibition which, under docket of CA-G.R. SP No. 87906, was subsequently denied for lack of merit
in the 17 February 2006 Decision eventually rendered by CAs then Special Sixth Division.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners argument that the cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case will
not be served by the Paraaque RTC is tenable
HELD
NO. Although the Constitution concededly guarantees that (a)ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies, it is evident that petitioners arguments in G.R.
No. 160067 have more to do with the wisdom of the assailed rulings of the RTCs of Naga and Paraaque than said
courts jurisdiction to issue the same. Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, however, the rule is settled that errors of judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision
are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. Not being intended to correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling, a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic
correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. As long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgments, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.
Under the interest of justice rule, moreover, the determination of which court would be in a better position to serve
the interests of justice also entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature of the controversy; (b)
the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c) other similar factors. Considering that majority of the
parties live closer to the Paraaque RTC, we cannot hospitably entertain petitioners insistence that the abatement of
the case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC would promote the expeditious and
inexpensive disposition of the parties complaints for damages against each other which are indisputably personal in
nature.
PEOPLE VS MARTINEZ
637 SCRA 791 (2010)
FACTS
On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct along
Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members
of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house.
Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused
Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and
Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
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The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police
Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL.On February 13,
2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt
under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP
500,000 plus cost of suit .The CA supported the findings of the lower court.
The defense claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in
Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and
who was to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for
Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were talking,
Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and
brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT MARTINEZ & CO. ARREST WAS ILLEGAL
HELD
YES. The said arrest does not fall under the arrests and seizures allowed even in the absence of a warrant: (i)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. The Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve
either a buy-bust operation
or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of
these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on
an informers tip. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity
and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal.
ONG VS PEOPLE
GR 197788 , Feb 29 2012
FACTS
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused
was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to
three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the
other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law. Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search
and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
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erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest.
HELD
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned
in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation
is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter;
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop, than to a formal arrest.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed
of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used
against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and
while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the
police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are
the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi)
a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Neither does the search qualify under the stop and
frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may
lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.
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The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.
PEOPLE v. QUEBRAL
606 SCRA 247 (2009)
FACTS
This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized prohibited drugs and the conduct of warrantless search
of a suspect by the roadside based on probable cause.
September 7, 2002 - the Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit called him and other police officers to a briefing
regarding a police informers report that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate
number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, on the following day at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas to
Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list.
September 8, 2002, - PO3 Galvez and six other police officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit at
Burol 2nd, watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. At around 4:00 p.m., such a jeep, bearing the reported
plate number and with two men and a woman on board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two men
as accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as accusedappellant Zenaida Quebral.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused- appellant Michael Salvador alighted. He walked
towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a white envelope to him. On seeing this,
PO3 Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move. Galvez took
the envelope from Michael, opened it, and saw five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he
believed was shabu. Chemistry report stated that it was shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.
Appellants denied having committed the crime, claiming only that PO3 Galvez and his fellow police officers merely
framed them up.
RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P5 million.
CA was reviewing the case on appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 01997, accused Eusebio Quebral died, prompting it to dismiss
the case against him. CA rendered judgment, entirely affirming the decision of the RTC. The remaining accused
appealed to this Court.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in not excluding the evidence of the seized shabu on the ground that, having illegally arrested the
accused, the police officers subsequent search of their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal.
HELD
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The police officers had information that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas
and hand over a consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer whose name was on the police
watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes as they watched from a distance, the police came down on
those persons and searched them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their possession. In
such a case, the search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came after it.
It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate court for a search warrant since their
suspicion found factual support only at the moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral
rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the handover of the drugs. An immediate search was
warranted since they would have gone away by the time the police could apply for a search warrant. The drugs could
be easily transported and concealed with impunity.
PEOPLE v. AVA
609 SCRA 309 (2009)
FACTS
Appellants Ava Cariquez and Leezel Franco, were charged with parricide and homicide, respectively, for the death of
Ethel, Avas two and a half year old daughter, whose cause of death was traumatic head injury. Both pleaded not
guilty, claiming that Ethels cause of death was due to an accident when she slipped and fell hitting the edge of the
cemented stairs which was the proximate cause of her death. This was contrary to her affidavit executed before the
trial wherein she pointed to Leezel as the person who inflicted the injuries on her daughter, Ethel. Three prosecution
witnesses, Lilia, Avas sister, and neighbors, Michelle and Theresa, testified that Ethel, whom they often see with
bruises, contusions and cigarette burns on her neck, was maltreated by Ava and Leezel. This was revealed to them by
Ethel herself whom they also saw with shaven head, with black eyes on both eyes and contusions on her knees due
to prolonged kneeling. Dr. Bienvenida who examined the body of Ethel testified that the injury on her head was a
confluent injury, which means that it was sustained on different dates.
ISSUE
Whether or not the decision was based on circumstantial evidence.
HELD
Hence, this appeal questioning the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence claiming that such was purely hearsay.
The Supreme Court held that the totality of the circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial was sufficient to convict;
that the testimonies of witnesses on what they saw and personally noticed regarding the injuries and telltale marks of
torture were not hearsay; that the answer of ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries on her was part of the res gestae
and, therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; that the
burden of the evidence was on appellants which they miserably failed to overthrow; and that conspiracy which need
not be proved by direct evidence was inferred from the combined acts of appellants in maltreating ETHEL.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following requisites are present, namely:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and
(3)the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion
that points to the guilt of the accused.
There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae.
1)that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
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In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them
spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries and
the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time that
should separate the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations.
ESQUILLO VS PEOPLE
629 SCRA 370 (2010)
FACTS
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, SUSAN ESQUILLO Y
ROMINES (37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City) without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).
The substance was tested by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),
which came out positive as Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. Esquillos urine sample was also tested, and it also gave
out positive results for the presence of shabu.
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around
4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an
alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the
direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what
appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not
sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to
approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she
was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby
but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet on which he marked
her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where
P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum dated December 10, 2002
addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the
substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on
the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension9 recounting the
details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home, several policemen in
civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one named "Ryan" who they
claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers then
forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained. While she was under
detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed contained shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by
the police officers to extort money from her and her family. Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter
Josan Lee and family friend Ma. Stella Tolentino, corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the
police officers never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.
RTC convicted Esquillo, finding her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11,
Article II of R. A. 9165.
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Upon appeal, Esquillo questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on the
occasion thereof inadmissible.
CA in its decision cited People v. Chua, held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the
"stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.
In her petition before SC, she assails the appellate courts application of the "stop-and-frisk" principle in light of PO1
Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could
only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.
ISSUE
WON the stop-and-frisk principle was properly applied.
HELD
In a stop-and-frisk, it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons
or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her person was
warranted: The police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts when PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance into her cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a
police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid stop-and-frisk
operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily
exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette
case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner
was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself. Absent
any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over
that of petitioner.
LUMANOG VS PEOPLE
630 SCRA 42 (2010)
FACTS
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The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence
and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the PNP, Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, who was ambushed in
broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
Abadillas black Honda Accord was caught in traffic while traversing Katipunan Avenue going to Santolan. While on
stop, 4 men armed with handguns surrounded the said car and fired several successive shots at the man inside it. 1 of
the men who were positioned at the left side of the car opened its door and took something inside. He grabbed the
victim by the neck and dropped his body down towards the pavement at the left door.
As a result of follow-up operations, Joel de Jesus, alias "Tabong," was apprehended, and admitted that the ambushslay of Abadilla was planned by the group whom he named, 3 days before. In his second statement, Joel pointed to
his cohorts in a police line-up inside the CID-CPDC, PNPNCR, Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively
identified Rameses de Jesus ("Ram"), Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and PO2 Romeo Costibolo as among those who
participated in the ambush-slaying of Abadilla on June 13, 1996.
The testimonies of P/Insp. Castillo, SPO2 Garcia, SPO2 Tarala, Atty. Rous and P/Sr. Insp. Macanas were given in court
in the light of serious allegations of torture, forced confessions and violations of constitutional rights raised by the
accused, which were widely reported in the media and brought before the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) and
eventually to Amnesty International-USA.
HELD
Once again, this Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation. But while we strike down the extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined
rights and declare it inadmissible in evidence, appellants are not entitled to an acquittal because their conviction was
not based on the evidence obtained during such custodial investigation. Even without the extrajudicial confession of
appellant Joel de Jesus who was the first to have been arrested, the trial courts judgment is affirmed, as the
testimonial and documentary evidence on record have established the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS ARANETA
634 SCRA 475 (2010)
FACTS
On July 5, 2002, a confidential informant arrived at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police
Station to report to Officer-In-Charge SP04 Numeriano de Lara the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in couple
Botong and Malou, later identified as appellants Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou Santos y Tantay. SPO4 de Lara
immediately formed a team composed of SPO2 Dante Zigapan who acted as the team leader, PO2 Danilo Damasco,
PO1 Orig, and PO1 Bede Montefalcon, to confirm the veracity of the informants report and conduct a buy-bust
operation.
SPO2 Zigapan designated PO2 Damasco as the poseur-buyer giving him a marked P100 bill to be used in the
entrapment. The team proceeded to the target area on board two vehicles. PO2 Danilo Damasco, upon reaching the
area in the early morning of July 5, 2002, he and the confidential informant approached the accused. After a brief
introduction and short conversation, accused Botong went inside their house while accused Malou received the marked
money from the poseur-buyer. Malou then called Botong who thereafter came out of the house. Malou gave the
marked money to Botong who, in turn, gave Malou a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. The
plastic sachet was then handed over to PO2 Damasco who examined it and immediately gave the pre-arranged signal
to arrest the accused.
During the arrest, the marked money was recovered from Rolando and so were several other plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances together with a plastic sachet containing marijuana. Subsequently, the
accused were brought to the police station and the seized items were later brought to the Police Crime Laboratory
Office for examination. The laboratory tests gave a positive result of the presence of methampethamine hydrochloride
or what is locally known as shabu on the contents of 9 sachets and marijuana on 1 sachet.
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The trial court found accused Botong and Malou GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5 in relation to
Sec. 26, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In another
criminal case, the Court finds accused Botong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present during the
buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that the RTC
erred in not finding that they were illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from them
were inadmissible in evidence.CA rendered the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED ANDS, AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF
SHABU RECOVERED FROM THEM WERE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM FOR VIOLATING THE
COMPREHENSIVE DRUGS ACT OF 2002
HELD
After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction.
Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object of the sale and the
consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold upon payment.
The Court stressed that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale
by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or
not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of
the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should
not disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of
habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at
all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team performed
their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed
because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling,
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the
spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in
the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
The illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like the Court to believe.
The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of
the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant
was likewise not needed to conduct it.
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PEOPLE VS UYBOCO
640 SCRA 146 (2011)
FACTS
On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were abducted and
brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Paraaque. Nimfa was able to recognize done of the kidnappers as
appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office. The kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for
ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant
because he had several business transactions. After, numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a
ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked
Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag
in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for 10 minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and
P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to take photo and
video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and the latter as the one who
took the ransom.
Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and
helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place
and found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort
Bonifacio then heard on their radio that the suspects vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A
few minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmarias Village in Makati. When said car
slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle. They introduced themselves as police officers
and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .38caliber revolver and a
scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT
HELD
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Records
show that both requirements are present in the instant case.
The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively
consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort
Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team
that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed
appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. Likewise, the
search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to such.
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Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by
virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes both the duty
and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but
also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to
search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
PEOPLE VS PENAFLORIDA
551 SCRA 111 (2008)
FACTS
SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation
Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset
that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of
Competente as team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team
boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook appellant who
was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant's possession. The
police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters
where he was booked.
Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP, recounted that at around 1:00 p.m. on 7 June 1994, he
was called by Competente and was briefed about the operation. While they were in Nasulan, the members of the
police team caught a man riding a bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana wrapped in a
cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so the latter was brought to the police headquarters and turned
over to the desk officer.
On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE POLICE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE FIRST INVESTIGATED AND TRIED TO OBTAIN A WARRANT OF
ARREST AGAINST APPELLANT, INSTEAD OF ARBITRARILY ARRESTING HIM
HELD
Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack of a warrant of arrest. The OSG
correctly justifies the failure to apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the essence in
appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that there is no law requiring investigation and surveillance upon
receipt of tips from assets before conducting police operations.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly,
they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime. The
arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with
him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances,
the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is
justified.
PEOPLE VS SEMBRANO
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628 SCRA 328 (2010)

FACTS
On 28 July 2004, two separate Informations against MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO alias Takol for (1) illegal sale
and (2) illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug.
The combined testimonies of PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay sought to establish that at around 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon of 26 July 2004, an informant of the police relayed information regarding illicit drugs trade operations
conducted by Takol in the area of Gulod in Novaliches, Quezon City. Superintendent (Supt.) Ramon Perez, formed a
buy-bust team. The group then proceeded for the entrapment operation. The group arrived at the designated area at
around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. They waited until appellant arrived at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Upon appellants arrival, the confidential informant introduced PO1 Manaol to him as an interested buyer of shabu.
PO1 Manaol handed the two marked One Hundred Peso bills to appellant, who, in turn, handed 1 plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance to him. The transaction having been consummated, PO1 Manaol executed their
pre-arranged signal and scratched his head. When the other members of the team saw PO1 Manaol execute the prearranged signal, they immediately proceeded to their location and arrested appellant.
After his arrest, the police officers took appellant to the police station where he was turned over to the desk officer
and to the on-duty investigator. Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE
result to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged. Seeking recourse from his conviction by the trial court, the
appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal. Insisting on his innocence, the defense
questioned the admissibility of the confiscated evidence on the ground of illegality of appellants arrest. The defense
also attacked the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, claiming their stories are unbelievable and should have led
to the dismissal of the charges. CA sustained the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS
SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM HIM WERE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
HELD
The Court found no merit in the appeal. The defense challenges the RTC and Court of Appeals rulings, anchored on its
claim that the warrantless arrest against appellant was unlawful. Consequently, applying the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during such unlawful warrantless arrest cannot be used as evidence.
The defense proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly seized from appellant during the buy-bust operation should have
been declared inadmissible.
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs if the following elements are
present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment thereto. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug.
On the legality of the warrantless arrest, the Court reiterated that appellant was arrested during an entrapment
operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. All the aforesaid elements were
established. Finally, this Court held in a number of cases, that mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes
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prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or
animus possidendi.
PEOPLE VS JACK RACHO

GR 186529, Aug 3 2010
FACTS
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase
of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed
of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the
local police force to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus
and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members
then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis
bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that
would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as
he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned
over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field
test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.
RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of
the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS VALID
HELD
The appeal is meritorious. The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding, Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Search of evidence in plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and Frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
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What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally,
the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu
of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although
probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
What prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that
information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible
in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an
acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a
plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,
In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be lawabiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to
gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless
of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and
to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within
the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
PEOPLE v. BIYOC
G.R. No. 167670 - December 7, 2007
FACTS
Rodolfo Biyoc, having moral ascendancy over the complainant, [AAA], who is a minor, 11 years old, the latter being
his daughter by means of force, coercion and intimidation had a sexual intercourse with her against her will. The sister
of AAA witnessed the incident and hurriedly reported it to her mother and they reported it to the DSWD. They were
accompanied by a Social Worker to report the incident to the police station. PO1 Javier, together with AAA, her sister
and mother proceeded to the family home, and on their way, they met Biyoc. PO1 Javier at once informed him of his
rights, arrested him, and brought him to the police station. Biyoc denied the allegations imputed against him and he
was aware of the gravity of the offense lodged against him,thus, he made no attempt to escape which is an indicative
of his innocence.
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The regional trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, which was also affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. In his brief, he raised several issues contending that the trial court erred in giving such judgment.
One argument he raised was that the trial court failed to consider the fact that the accuseds arrest was legally
objectionable. Appellant claims that his arrest was illegal because a "warrantless arrest was effected even before the
statement of the private complainant was taken."
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Biyoc is illegally arrested.
HELD
No, accused-appellant Biyoc was not illegally arrested. The Court ruled that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court as what was done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter their pleas during arraignment,
but they also actively participated during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their
arrest.Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment;
otherwise, they are considered waived.
VALDEZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 170180 - November 23, 2007
FACTS
On March 27, 2003, while the tanods were conducting their patrols, they have observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something, approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run
away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio
Mercado (Mercado) where he, ordered Valdez to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim
pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out
an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof.
He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting
the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,Bautista, Aratas and Ordoo, who
arrested petitioner.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
against him and it was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par.
2(2) of R.A. No. 9165
Petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful
and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Barangay Tanod unlawfully arrested Valdez.
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HELD
YES, the Barangay Tanod unlawfully arrested valdez. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
the only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not
the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well. It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay
tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to
his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming
that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate
his warrantless arrest.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. Petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. Therefore, the accused is hereby
acquitted for reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 176735 - June 26, 2008
FACTS
On 8 March 2003, the SDEU operatives of the Pasig City Police conducted a buy-bust operation in a residential area
along Pasig City, on the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs in the said locality.
Upon reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted from their vehicle, while the rest of the
team were left inside.The informant then pointed to two persons standing along the target area, one of whom was
Monching Labo, later identified as appellant Ramon Catoc . After approaching, the informant introduced PO3 Luna as a
shabu customer to one of the persons, later identified as appellant Jerry Santos. When appellant Santos gave the
plastic sachet to PO3 Luna, the latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a policeman.At that point, the
other members of the team arrived and likewise held and arrested appellant Catoc.
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The policemen then informed the appellants of their violations and apprised them of their constitutional rights.
Afterwards, appellants Santos and Catoc were brought to the Pasig City Police Station for proper investigation. The
appellants offered a version of the facts that was diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. According to them,
there was no buy-bust operation to speak of and that prior to their arrests, they were literally strangers to each other.
The RTC rendered a decision to both accused found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal sale of shabu). In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the buy-bust operation conducted by the SDEU operatives was legitimate and regular. Appellants contend
that the trial court erred in convicting them, as their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that
the prosecution failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests without warrant were not
legally effected.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest of both accused without warrant were legally effected.
HELD
YES, the arrest of both accused without warrant were legally effected.
In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established. The prosecution witnesses PO3
Luna and SPO3 Matias consistently testified that a buy-bust operation did indeed take place, and the shabu subject of
the sale was presented and duly identified in open court.
The court uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. This presumption in favor of PO3
Luna and SPO3 Matias was not overcome. As testified to by the appellants, they did not know any of the policemen
who arrested them, and it was only during the trial in open court that they came to know of the identities of the
above-mentioned policemen. Thus, there was no indication that the police were impelled by any improper motive in
making the arrests.
The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also lacks merit. The Court notes that nowhere in
the records did we find any objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We
have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of
the conviction of the accused. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction
rendered against him.
The court have already declared the legality of the buy-bust operation that was conducted by the police, it follows
that the subsequent warrantless arrests were likewise legally effected. Furthermore, any search resulting from the
lawful warrantless arrests was also valid, because the appellants committed a crime in flagrante delicto; that is, the
persons arrested committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
After a careful evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, we find no error in the trial and the appellate
courts' factual findings and conclusions.
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et.al

G.R. No. 127685 , July 23, 1998
FACTS
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy. Petitioner Ople prays to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On
December 12, 1996, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
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On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
its implementation.
There are three contended issue by the petitioner, one of which is the implementation of this administrative order will
insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the bill of rights in the constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right to privacy and it is unconstitutional.
HELD
YES, Administrative Order No. 308 violates the right to privacy and it is unconstitutional.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But
what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put
our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does
not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification
but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls
short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes.
The court rejects the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes
from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
The petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
IN RE: CAMILO SABIO

G.R. No. 174340 , October 17, 200
FACTS
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On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455, "directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors."
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote to Chairman
Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance."
Several notices were given to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter, but still
refuses many times reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing. This prompted Senator Gordon
to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and
Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the Senate.
On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation,which partly reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of law requires that
even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to
provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia
(Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, arrested Chairman Sabio in his office and brought him to the Senate premises
where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard
Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. the above-named respondents countered several issues, one of which, that
the respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and
(b) right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE
Whether or not Respondents have violated the individual civil rights of the petitioners, such as their right to privacy.
HELD
NO, the respondents have not violated the right to privacy of the petitioners.
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on government action."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these
zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued
by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks."
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create
zones of privacy. It highlights a person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine what, how much, to whom
and when information about himself shall be disclosed." Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that
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"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion. Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers
of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second,did the government
violate such expectation? It was in negative.
Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their
offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over
which the people have the right to information.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of
pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact
vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial
measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to
privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
SJS v. DDB
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
FACTS
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, assailed RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002) which requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses to be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUES
Whether RA 9165 is unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy of:
(1)
Secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices
(2)
Persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses
HELD
The court ruled that concerning secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, it
infringes upon their right to privacy; however, concerning persons charged, it does not.
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(1)
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. The
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional
since it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. The right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. Authorities are agreed that the
right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
(2)
Unlike the situation in the first category, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical
to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
LEE v. CA
625 SCRA 66 (2010)
FACTS
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from
China. They had 11 children who are the respondents of this case. In 1948, Lee brought from China a supposed
housemaid named Tiu Chuan (Tiu) who actually had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu had children with Lee. The Lee-Tiu children
claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate. The NBI found that results were contrary to their claim, therefore, the
Lee-Keh children filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for the deletion from the certificate of live
birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu to testify in the case.
The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the
subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees
stepmother. On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive
considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into
admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.
The CA set aside the RTCs Order. Thus, the petition.
ISSUE
Whether compelling Tiu to testify regarding her alleged illicit relation with Lee and their possible children infringe her
right against invasion of privacy.
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HELD
No. It does not. The CA was correct in quashing the subpoena.
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made
and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance
the reasonable cost of the production thereof.
The CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for the production of documents
and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion
of privacy.
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or
admit that she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not
give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for
seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a
material witness.
MERALCO V. LIM
632 SCRA 195 (2010)
FACTS
Respondent Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). On 04 June 2008, an anonymous letter stating an informal accusation to Cherry, posted at the door of
the Metering Office of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG
BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB.
In a memo sent by the Head of MERALCOs HR, Cherry Lim was directed to be transferred to Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk,, reasoning out that the accusations against her would possible compromise her
safety and security. The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an appeal with MERALCO
claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She likewise claimed the
grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job
security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Since she didnt receive a response, she filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners
before the RTC of Bulacan. She claimed petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and
refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received
concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security,
correctible by habeas data. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
Her petition was granted by the RTC, prohibiting the transfer and ruling that recourse to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent
whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the
reported threats to her person. Thus, the petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether or not the remedy of habeas data may be properly issued to protect purely property or commercial concerns
where there is no clear showing of any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of the right to privacy in relation to the rights
to life, liberty, and security.
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HELD
No. It cannot be properly issued to protect purely property or commercial concerns such as this case. The Supreme
Court granted the petition for review on certiorari in favor of petitioners. The assailed decision of the trial court was
reversed and set aside.
PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS DATA
The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty,
and security The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons
right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from
those provided under prevailing Rules.
The Writ of Habeas Data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no unlawful violation of the right to life,
liberty, or security Castillo v. Cruz (G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009) underscores the emphasis laid down in
Tapuz v. del Rosario (G. R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008) that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy
of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal
to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere
jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent
of management and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
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ZULUETA v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. Accusing her husband of infidelity, she
went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter. She opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and papers consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in
a case for legal separation filed by Zulueta.
Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The RTC,
decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering
petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and
cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N the act of the wife of securing the documents and papers that belong to her husband without his consent
violative of the privacy of communication?
HELD
Yes. Such act is against the constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable.
Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as provide bylaw. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
PETITION DENIED. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
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OPLE v. TORRES
FACTS
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12, 1996 entiltled Adoption of National
Computerized Identification Reference System or commonly known as NatioanalID System. Senator Blas F. Ople filed
a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the said executive issuance on two important
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for ther ights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
ISSUE
Does A.O 308 violate the right to privacy?
HELD
Yes. It cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308, if implemented, will put our people's right to privacy in clear
and present danger. It presents no vital safeguards because it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This
is an admission that the Population Reference Number (PRN) will not be used solely for identification but for the
generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded -- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include
his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .The potential for misuse of the data to be
gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters claim.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The
reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.
IN RE ALEJANO
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
FACTS
27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration.
Around 7p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
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On 31 July 2003, a directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel
under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners (lawyers on behalf of their detained clients)
filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of
the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the
detainees are already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is
under a valid indictment which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The CA recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there
is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, it held that the constitutional rights (one of which is detainees right
to privacy of communication), alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty.
The regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.
CA declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of
communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal
restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the
former opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Maestrecampo
HELD
NO. Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Also, the letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In
the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL

G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
FACTS
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the countrys ID system.
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from
implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy
of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the president.
ISSUE
Whether the said EO is unconstitutional for infringing on the citizens right to privacy
HELD
NO. All these years, government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions and there have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their
right to privacy. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior
to EO 420 violate their right to privacy, and that petitioners failed to not show how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy.
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and
shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to
protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards.
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Also, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do
not already possess under existing laws.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control
over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.
IN RE SABIO
G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
FACTS
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to
appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.
ISSUE
Whether Senate Committee's inquiry violates Petitioner Sabio and his Commissioners right to privacy
HELD
NO. One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected." Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least
two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate particularly "on the anomalous losses incurred by
the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by
their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of
their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of
privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such
matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is NOT ABSOLUTE where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of
pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact
vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial
measures and policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy.
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CHAVEZ v. GONZALES
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
FACTS
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped
mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had
ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the
contents of a tape. Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution hence unconstitutional?
HELD
YES. Philippine jurisprudence, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior
restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4)
freedom of circulation. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
The Court said that a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the
clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Prior restraint
on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, said the Court.
The mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC were nullified by the SC for having constituted
a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. The Court held that the challenged acts
in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. It
is not significant that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions.
Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the
rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. v. DY

G.R. Nos. 170270
April 2, 2009
FACTS
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM and FM radio broadcast station in Cauayan
Citry, Isabela. In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and
transmitters on property located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela. On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and
certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the
location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
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In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate
Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion
papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the
issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds
that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents officers closed the radio station. Due to the provision of
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC
issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent
Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run
again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts denied the petition.
Petitioners argued that the recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had
ruled that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is
understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
ISSUE
Whether the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations are considered an act of prior restraint
against speech, expression or of the press
HELD
YES. The acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents
who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude
for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification
than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior.
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and
a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial
concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that
may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government requirements for the
operation of their stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor
of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose these new requirements substantiating the conversion of
CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other
members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified
immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was
mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be
the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City
government are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the
Philippines.
All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioners
radio station were ultimately content-based.
The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content
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regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish
such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.
SORIANO VS LAGUARDIA
FACTS
The Minister of INC felt directly alluded by an offending remark made by Soriano in one of his episode in his regular
program aired on UNTV 37, Ang Dating Daan. This ensued 8 private complainants who are members of INC to file an
affidavit-complaint against herein petition
(Soriano) before the MTRCB. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in relation to the alleged
use of some cusswords in the said episode. After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRC
Bordered preventive suspension of his program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Laguardia and two other
members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case, but withdrew the same two days after,
and, instead filed with the SC of a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order thus
issued. Meanwhile, in the administrative case filed against the respondent with the MTRCB, it was held that the
respondent is liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from
said program. He then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief on the ground that
the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid inasmuch as
PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE
Whether or not the preventive suspension order by the MTRCB is considered an act of prior restraint against speech
and expression
HELD
No. Petitioner offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used
in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is
that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of
the equal protection guarantee and freedom of expression.
Petitioner blames MTRCBs preventive suspension order which made him unable to answer the criticisms coming from
the INC ministers. Petitioners position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons
subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred
and liabilities imposed." It guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not
facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582; April 2010
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 (the Second
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Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.
FACTS
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad
laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise
for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed
to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought
reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct
the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
RULING
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality. The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Rather than relying on religious belief, the
legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the Office
of the Solicitor General agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members
have committed or are committing immoral acts. Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated,
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message
or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
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sectors. This is in accord with the countrys international obligations to protect and promote human rights. The
principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the
ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True
democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions.
The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December
16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC was directed to GRANT petitioners application for
party-list accreditation.
SOLIVEN v. MAKASIAR
G.R. No. 82585; November 1988
FACTS
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino, when Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a
coup d' etat.. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavitagainst him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavitbecause this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that
a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed
under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions
of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for
contempt.
ISSUES
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President (MOOT).
2. Whether the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause (NO).
3. Whether the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit (YES).
RULING
First Issue: Instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before
the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent (herein petitioner) be
given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Second Issue: Art 3 Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
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The Constitution does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The judge is,
however, required to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause if he finds no probable cause. On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted
Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. It has not been shown that respondent
judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Third Issue: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction. Petitioner Beltran argues that the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would be an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury
The Court ruled that the immunity from suit may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the President's behalf. An accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. The President may shed
the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
BORJAL v. CA
G.R. No. 126466; January 1999
FACTS
Borjal, the President of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Soliven, the publisher and chairman of the Editorial Board of
Philippine Star, were sued by Francisco Wenceslao for allegedly alluding to him in the Jaywalker column, wherein he
was portrayed as an extortionist by using the conference for the revamp of transportation laws as a means of getting
money from unwitting businessmen. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National Press Club for unethical conduct,
and with the courts for libel. The criminal case for libel was dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor, which was
sustained by the DOJ and by the Office of the President.
Undeterred, Wenceslao filed a civil case against Borjal and Soliven based on the libel subject of the criminal
complaints. The trial court ruled in Wenceslaos favor. The CA affirmed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Jaywalker articles constituted privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.
2. Whether Wenceslao is a public figure.
3. Whether Borjal acted with malice in the publication of the articles.
RULING
First Issue: YES. Privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. There is no denying that
the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest, as the conference that Wenceslao was allegedly soliciting
funds for had the object to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country. As such, it cannot but invite
close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of the
qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.
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Second Issue: YES. A public figure is a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has
become a public personage. It includes anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused
upon him as a person. As Executive Director and Spokesman of the said conference, Wenceslao consequently
assumed the status of a public figure.
Third Issue: NO. Borjal was moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman to
expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. To be
considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge
that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. The articles in the instant case can hardly
be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not. They
were based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal interviews and after
considering the varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources.
VASQUEZ v. CA
G.R. No. 118971; September 1999
FACTS
The accused Rodolfo R. Vasquez with malicious intent of impeaching the reputation and character of one Jaime
Olmedo, chairman of Barangay 66, Zone 6 in Tondo, Manila, and with evident intent of exposing him to public hatred,
contempt, ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously caused the publication of an
article entitled "Pamilya Inagawan ng Lupa" in Ang Tinig ng Masa, a daily newspaper sold to the public and of general
circulation in the Philippines with which statements, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact he did
mean and convey false and malicious imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is engaged in landgrabbing and involved in
illegal gambling and stealing of chickens at the Tondo Foreshore Area, Tondo, Manila, which statements, as he well
knew, were entirely false and malicious, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of said
Jaime Olmedo, thereby tending to impeach besmirch and destroy the honor, character and reputation of Jaime
Olmedo, as in fact, the latter was exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule. He was
convicted by the trail court for libel. On appeal he interposed the defense that what he said was true and was made
with good motives and for justifiable ends.
ISSUE
Whether or not Vasquez is guilty with libel.
RULING
No. The petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. Under Art. 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his
official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area
were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty
is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of
every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted
with good motives and for justifiable ends. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only
be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing
community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled.
As Justice Brandeis has said, public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people.
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For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Vasquez was acquitted.
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. v. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372; December 13, 2005
FACTS
On 30 September 1990, the following news item appeared in the Peoples Journal, a tabloid of general circulation:
"Swiss Shoots Neighbors Pets RESIDENTS of a subdivision in Paraaque have asked the Bureau of Immigration to
deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain.
The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained that the deportation of Francis Thoenen, of 10
Calcutta BF Homes Phase III, could help prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future.
Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and cats when they slip out of their dwellings
unnoticed.
An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he shot recently threatens to exacerbate the
problem, Angara said.
Cristina Lee"
The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina
wife and their children. Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly
in failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against herein petitioners
Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee.
The principal source of the article was a letter by a certain Atty. Efren Angara addressed to Commissioner Andrea
Domingo of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration), which states:
Dear Madame:
We would like to request your office to verify the true status/authenticity of the residency in the Philippines of a
foreign national (a Swiss) by the name of Francis Thoenen who is presently residing at No. 10 Calcuta cor. Beirut
Street, BF Homes (PH. III), Paraaque, Metro Manila. I received (sic) complaint from my clients residing around his
vicinity that this foreigner had (sic) been causing troubles ever since he showed up. He is too meticulous and had (sic)
been shooting dogs and cats passing his house wall everytime.
Such act which (sic) is unacceptable to the owners especially if inspite (sic) of control their pets slips (sic) out
unnoticed. A confrontation between him and the owner of the dog he shoot, (sic) already occurred last time. In some
instances this guy had been always driving his car barbarously inside the subdivision with children playing around (sic)
the street. Before my clients petitioned themselves with the endorsement of the Homeowners Association and filed to
your office for deportation were respectfully seeking your assistance to investigate this alien to prevent further
incident occurrence (sic) in the future. He should not be allowed to dominate the citizens of this country. Very truly
yours,
Atty. Efren B. Angara
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The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the CID, acquired a copy of the above
letter from a trusted source in the CIDs Intelligence Division. They claimed to have reasonable grounds to believe in
the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their) sources.
It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline, which categorically stated
that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting pets, was untrue.[5] Moreover, it is immediately
apparent from a comparison between the above letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere
request for verification of Thoenens status, Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had asked the Bureau of
Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors pets. No complaints had in fact been lodged against
him by any of the BF Homeowners,[6] nor had any pending deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the
Bureau of Immigration.
Thoenen also submitted a Certification from the Office of the Bar Confidant that there was no lawyer in its rolls by the
name of Efren Angara, earlier cited by petitioner Lee as the author of the letter on which she based her article. Finally,
the trial also showed that despite the fact that respondents address was indicated in the letter, Cristina Lee made no
efforts to contact either him or the purported letter-writer, Atty. Angara.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners can use the constitutional right to freedom of speech and the press as a defense.
HELD
The Court held that the constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and the press against liability for
damages does not extend to the petitioners in this case.
The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
fighting words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.
Libel is not protected speech. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a
crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.
As a general rule, malice is presumed. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 354. Requirement of Publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The article is not a privileged communication. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or
qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
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Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand,
qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been
made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong private communications and fair and true
report without any comments or remarks.
As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials,
which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly
privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement.
Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to
redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged
communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among
the general population. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated in public, which was what the petitioners did in this case.
Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual
seeking a quiet life.
The petitioners also claim to have made the report out of a social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of
general interest.
This argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public
official or public figure. A newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted,
even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.
Having established that the article cannot be considered as privileged communication, malice is therefore presumed,
and the fourth requisite for the imputation of libel to attach to the petitioners in this case is met. The news article is
therefore defamatory and is not within the realm of protected speech.
TULFO v. PEOPLE
Doctrine of fair comment
FACTS
Atty. Carlos Ding So filed a complaint against petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing
editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo
Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the
articles in the column Direct Hit in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.
The articles, written by Tulfo and published in a news paper of general circulation, accused a certain Atty. So, from
the Bureau of Customs, for being an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired
wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the
bar of public opinion.
Atty. So testified that he is also known as Atty. Ding So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of Customs,
and that he was assigned as OIC of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division. He testified that
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petitioner Tulfos act of imputing upon him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor,
discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and superior officers in the
Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said articles.
In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew
Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the
South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. Ding So at the
South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other peoples names to advance their
corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as
per his source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any
research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had
several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.
ISSUE
Whether the article is a qualified privileged communication. NO
RULING
The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on
public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight
over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible
exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the
rights of others.
It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of qualified
privileged communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove
actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent
with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in
which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on
criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and
civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules
governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a
public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of actual malice on the part of the person
making the libelous statement.
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and
reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere
error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead
misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession,
but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance
of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.
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Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354
of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified privileged
communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The expansion speaks of fair commentaries on matters of public interest. While Borjal places fair commentaries
within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or
a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a
discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based
on a false supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false
and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles.
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all
other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other.
And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm
which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide
effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or adjustment
between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of
Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines.
AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG

Doctrine of Balanced Interest
FACTS
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB
as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is
designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture,
or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation.
Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
Enrile filed a complaint and a TRO to enjoin petitioners from proceeding with the motion picture as his right to privacy
was violated because it made reference to his or his family by creating a fictitious character in lieu of him, which
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nevertheless is based on, or bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable
with him.
Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of
expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and
claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his
privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
ISSUES
1. Whether motion pictures are included in the freedom of expression. YES
2. Whether it is available to foreign owned corporations. Yes
RULING
Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to
exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are
a univesally utilized vehicle of communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press, radio and television,
motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information, education and entertainment.
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse. Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre
cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the Importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' . There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there
is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. ...
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies.
Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In our community as in
many other countries, media facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private
sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in whole or in part to revenue
producing activities. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence
to exclude commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech
and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and
the movies, is the "balancing of interest test". The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation".
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom
of expression invoked by petitioner taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into
by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of
expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern."
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant
Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by
petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
PHILIPPINE JOURNALIST, INC. V. THOENEN

Qualified Privileged Communication
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FACTS
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a
Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed that BF
Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent
the recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration
he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages. The petitioners admitted publication of the news item,
ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good
and protect the moral public of the people, and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.
ISSUE
Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of speech.
HELD
The right of free speech is not absolute. The freedom of speech and press and assembly, first laid down by President
McKinley in the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of 07 April 1900, is an almost verbatim restatement
of the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Enshrined in Section 4, Article III of the Bill of Rights
of the 1987 Constitution, it states, No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
But not all speech is protected. The right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or fighting words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among
the general population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a public
figure. Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the
deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she reported never happened.
Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer. There
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances societys interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of
utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection
IN RE: PUBLISHED
Right to Know and Discuss Judicial Proceedings
FACTS
Atty. Leonard De Vera was directed by SC to explain his contemptuous statements published in the Philippine Inquirer
in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
Some of his statements:
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1. De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
2. people are getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged. Said lawyer Leonard de Vera of the Equal
Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement. He voiced his concern that a
decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more
massive than those that led to People Power II.
3. People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail.
He argued that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that
a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more
massive than those that led to People Power II.
Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that the people wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court
decision that is basically wrong as an expression of his opinion and as historically correct, citing the ouster of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people power in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada
from office as a result of pressure from the people who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be
stopped for being a farce, and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino people.
While he admitted to having uttered the statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court,
to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.
ISSUE
Whether his statements are covered by the guaranteed right to freedom of speech, hence not liable for contempt of
Court. NO
RULING
Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it would declare the
Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was basically wrong and would not be
accepted by the peopleas utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not cover
statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and interfering with the administration of
justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it
is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor
and confidence therein. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from
every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them. The court has previously held that-As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of selfdefense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
In People vs. Godoy, this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings and decisions of the
court and discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their
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stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to
attempt to degrade the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught
its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press,
for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the course of
justice.
Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or risk
another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling within the ambit of constitutionallyprotected speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are
threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the
public. Such statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to
promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot
be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried fairly by an
independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.
It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.
Respondents utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by
this Court, belies his protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on
the Court.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO P. MACASAET
PUBLISHED IN MALAYA
FACTS
Personal attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable consequences. First, the
criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the personal and political consequences of making an
unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the
publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution.
Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution are vital components
in maintaining a healthy democracy.
Amado Macasaet penned several articles in Malaya newspaper regarding alleged bribery incidents in Supreme Court.
From the series of articles, he painted a clear picture that he was pertaining to Associate Justice Ynarez Santiago; that
she ordered the dismissal of Henry Gos case upon receiving cash gift of P10 million from him and that she fired her
secretary Cecilia Muoz Delis when the latter opened the box containing the cash gift without knowledge of the lady
justice.
Despite attempts of Delis and Associate Justice Ynarez- Santiago to correct Macasaets claims, publications never
ceased. The Court En Banc required Macasaet to explain why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect
contempt of court. The Investigating Committee recommended to hold Macasaet in indirect contempt.
ISSUE
Whether or not freedom of the press is violated by judicial independence
HELD
Macasaet is GUILTY.
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Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize and criticize
government. The freedom to question the government has been a protected right of long-standing tradition
throughout American history. There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily
includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over
200 years ago, American judges have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of themselves, if
not of the judiciary as a whole. This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom
of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the determination
of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there
is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism levelled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. The potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism
can threaten the independence of the judiciary.
In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial power, which includes the
duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The present judicial system allows the people to rely upon our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the
resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather than on the streets.
To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy.
It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley
Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial independence encompasses two distinct but
related concepts of independence.
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her
ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when
he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of
his personal morality and fitness for judicial office.
The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch
of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public
confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of
judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. For sure,
judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits public attention. Public
awareness, debate, and criticism of the courts ensure that people are informed of what they are doing that have
broad implications for all citizens. Informed discussion, comment, debate and disagreement from lawyers, academics,
and public officials have been hallmarks of a great legal tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the law.
But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges.
Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to
discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the peoples confidence in the courts. Personal
attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the nature and context of judicial
decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of
society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a
grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a
constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government.
Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable consequences. First, the criticism
will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the personal and political consequences of making an unpopular
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decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics
trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence
in the judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the
core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute.
For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder
and anarchy.
Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, this Court ruled that [f]rom the language of the specific constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however,
a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is no tabsolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and
under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales, it was held that while the right of freedom of expression occupies a
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the
limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is when it hits the nose of another.
Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and philosophical contexts, it is
always regarded as liable to be overridden by important countervailing interests, such as state security, public order,
safety of individual citizens, protection of reputation, and due process of law, which encompasses not only the right to
a fair trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the proper administration of justice.
In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must be caution and
hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible exercise of his awesome prerogative presents itself.
The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. But when called
for, most especially when needed to preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this
principle bears importance.
In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, the Court weighs the conflicting
constitutional considerations respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the other hand,
ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly
administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of a just society.
The Court has no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even
how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more
responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed
the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave
no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High
Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial
independence.
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Macasaet has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These
publications directly undermine the integrity of the
justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to
speculation and fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the
institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly
administration of justice.
Aggravating Macasaets affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for
his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before the Investigating Committee when asked
what his thoughts were about his having published the instant articles, he replied that he was happy in the sense
that he did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of the investigating panel.
It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept the findings of the
Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court. He must be made
accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of responsible journalism in publishing his
unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable people who serve it.
LEJANO v. PP
December 14, 2010
GR No. 176389
FACTS
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were
brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose
interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed
to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on
August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.
The trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their
defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses and the physical
evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered
judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six
years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. The appellate
court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient
evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had
a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request
of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then
believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
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Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen
that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
HELD
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to
due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the
semen specimen taken from Carmela.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For
one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen
and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not
yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as
evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for
DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the
specimen in the meantime.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
June 7, 2011
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
FACTS
This proceeding, while ostensibly docketed as an administrative matter, is premised on a finding of indirect contempt.
Accordingly, with all due respect, the honorable court erred in finding that the respondents breached their ethical
obligations without observance of the due process safeguards guaranteed in an indirect contempt proceeding.
HELD
Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter as an administrative case,
there was purportedly a finding that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the mention made in
the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly, a case involving a contempt charge; and (2) the
references to respondents contumacious language or contumacious speech and conduct and to several authorities
which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
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The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed
against the courts done by any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt
under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a
fine or both.
Contrary to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same
incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable
either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez, for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the
concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties
were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty
to give due respect to the Court).
Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto was purely a contempt proceeding. Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for
contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00 payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The
unmistakable reference to Atty. Sottos failure to observe his ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action
against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to
show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should not be disbarred for his
contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.
The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the
courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the
administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving
the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or
discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents contrary position in their
motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of
court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would
stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when
there is no basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.
TEXAS v. JOHNSON, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

FACTS
Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag outside of the convention center where the 1984 Republican National
Convention was being held in Dallas, Texas. Johnson burned the flag to protest the policies of President Ronald
Reagan. He was arrested and charged with violating a Texas statute that prevented the desecration of a venerated
object, including the American flag, if such action were likely to incite anger in others. A Texas court tried and
convicted Johnson. He appealed, arguing that his actions were "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear his case.
ISSUE
Whether flag burning constitutes "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment.
DECISION
Yes. The majority of the Court, according to Justice William Brennan, agreed with Johnson and held that flag burning
constitutes a form of "symbolic speech" that is protected by the First Amendment. The majority noted that freedom of
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speech protects actions that society may find very offensive, but society's outrage alone is not justification for
suppressing free speech.
In particular, the majority noted that the Texas law discriminated upon viewpoint, i.e., although the law punished
actions, such as flag burning, that might arouse anger in others, it specifically exempted from prosecution actions that
were respectful of venerated objects, e.g., burning and burying a worn-out flag. The majority said that the
government could not discriminate in this manner based solely upon viewpoint.
DISSENT:
Justice Stevens
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the flag's unique status as a symbol of national unity outweighed
"symbolic speech" concerns, and thus, the government could lawfully prohibit flag burning.
DELA CRUZ v. CA 1999

FACTS
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged,
preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariio of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
They were alleged to have participated in a mass action or illegal strike which constitutes grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal
to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence
without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines.
Petitioners failed to give their answer, thus this Office finds the respondents guilty as charged; the herein respondents
are dismissed from Office effective immediately.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
CSC found petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" for having participated in the
mass actions and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension. However, in view of the
length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by reason of the immediate implementation of the dismissal
orders of Secretary Cario, the CSC likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service without back
wages.
Petitioners were unhappy, the filed a petition for certiorari with SC, which was referred to CA. The CA dismissed the
case for lack of merit; that the CSC decision was based on reasonable and justifiable grounds. MR was also denied.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with this court.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was to exercise their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners are tenable
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HELD
No. The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling all the issues raised by
petitioners.
As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers
Association v. Laguio Jr. and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the
term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said
teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons -- to protest and pressure the
Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial
implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in
payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional
teaching loads and longer teaching hours." In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the
teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass
actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their
classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time
- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court - could have held
them liable for their participation in the mass actions.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions
by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work
the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We again stressed that
the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner
by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in
various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers
were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers
were immediately appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot
take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might
have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners
for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became
necessary.
Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the CSC resolutions
finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
OSMENA v. COMELEC 1998

FACTS
NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and
of the press. In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the
decision in that case has shown the undesirable effects of the law because the ban on political advertising has not
only failed to level the playing field, [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s] by
depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to
other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
Petitioners say there is no need for empirical data to determine whether the political ad ban offends the Constitution
or not. Instead they make arguments from which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court
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on the constitutionality of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue already
decided in that case. What is more, some of the arguments were already considered and rejected in the NPC case.
Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They do not complain
that they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media advertising. Their contention that,
contrary to the holding in NPC, 11(b) works to the disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to
wage a campaign outside of mass media can hardly apply to them. Their financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out
campaign, using means other than the mass media to communicate with voters, cannot be doubted. If at all, it is
candidates like intervenor Roger Panotes, who is running for mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, who can complain
against 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But Panotes is for the law which, he says, has to some extent, reduced the
advantages of moneyed politicians and parties over their rivals who are similarly situated as ROGER PANOTES. He
claims that the elimination of this substantial advantage is one reason why ROGER PANOTES and others similarly
situated have dared to seek an elective position this coming elections.
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of an academic exercise. And since a
majority of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is founded in error, it will suffice for present
purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This is what makes the
present case different from the overruling decisions invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding
of its reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech.
HELD
In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case
sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118[1984])
This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien. It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which,
like 11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the
speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for
or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like 11(b), are not
concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support
them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity.
Justice Panganibans dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media ads do not partake of
the real substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the peoples
cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The clear-and-present-danger test is
not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of
constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases.
For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends
and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional
validity of laws which, like 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with
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their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a
sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions
distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a
particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the OBrien test in this case,
we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication
or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental
and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
FACTS
A Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez
Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit
survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be broadcast immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also
noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group, its agents
or representatives from conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections.
RULING
No. Our Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The
freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It is a preferred right and stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
The Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a
free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the
broadcast of the results thereof an exercise of press freedom," it argues that "press freedom may be curtailed if the
exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then
contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees,
which further make the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in
harmony with the official count made by the Comelec is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and
present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the TRO by issued is made PERMANENT.COMELEC resolution is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
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SWS v. COMELEC
FACTS
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day
of the elections on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and
other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as
close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither
empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the
voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from
explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political
issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be
denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.
ISSUE
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media, valid and constitutional?
RULING
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression. It has been held that legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
BAYAN VS. ERMITA

FACTS:
The petitioners, Bayan, alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed
by
policemen
implementing
Batas
Pambansa
No.
880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition
and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments,
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the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising
factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies
of
September
20,
October
4,
and
6,
2005.
ISSUE:
Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12,
13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by
the
people
of
the
right
to
peaceably
assemble.
HELD:
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would
be
meaningless
and
unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety,
and
general
welfare
of
the
people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content
of
the
expression
in
the
rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
A.M. 98-7-02-SC DATED JULY 7, 1998

RE:
GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF DEMONSTRATIONS, PICKETS, RALLIES AND OTHER SIMILAR
GATHERINGS IN THE VICINITY OF THE SUPREME COURT AND ALL OTHER COURTS
EN BANC
Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair
and impartial administration of justice and the constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and complementing further the Per Curiam Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon.
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Augusto S. Sanchez, et al., dated September 30, 1987, the Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy and
procedural guidelines, regarding the conduct of demonstrations, pickets, rallies and other similar gatherings in the
vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court and all other courts:
1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their freedom of expression and assembly. Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values.
These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to use the streets for communication of views on
national questions must be balanced with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will enable them to dispense
justice free from bias and unnecessary pressure. The courts would not exist and survive to protect the people's most
revered rights if they were unable to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the institution
from all forms of distracting, degrading and prejudicial influences that threaten the fair and orderly administration of
justice.
2.
Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from holding any activity on the
sidewalks and streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer
boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court
sala. Such activities unquestionably interrupt and hamper the working condition in the salas, offices and chambers of
the courts.
3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must keep all public thoroughfares free and unimpeded
to allow the smooth flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
At no time should ingress to and egress from the
premises of the courts and the offices of the courts and the offices of the justices, judges, and court officials and
employees be obstructed.
4.
Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are prohibited from camping out on the streets,
sidewalks or pavement adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer
boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court
sala. No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets' quarters, and other similar makeshift structures shall be
established in said areas.
5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum
and proper attitude toward courts of justice when engaged in demonstrations, pickets, rallies and similar activities. As
officers of the court, they must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to insulate the courts from all forms of
influence that may adversely affect judicial impartiality and violate a party's right to due process.
6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court. Members of the Bar violating this resolution
may, in addition, be subject to the administrative sanctions of fine, imprisonment, suspension from the practice of law
or disbarment as circumstances may warrant.
The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these Guidelines in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. The Guidelines shall take effect upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after such publication.
The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the PNP, and all
agencies of local governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations, rallies, pickets and similar
activities, around the vicinity of courts of justice with copies of this Resolution.
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IBP VS ATIENZA
FACTS:
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the
City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from
2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi sectoral
organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein
Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
The Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then
mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the IBP
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor gravely abused his discretion when
he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard
precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on
the permit. Respondent mayor failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing i n t h e
issued
permit
adverts
to
an
imminent
and
grave
danger
of
substantive
evil,
which
blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
GSIS and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners,
vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.
FACTS
A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the
GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, was instituted. Participants were GSIS personnel, among them
members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector
union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other government agencies joined causes with the GSIS
group. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the
Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered
by a prior approved leave.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing
131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their
participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on
the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-
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to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25,
2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, commenced the instant suit on
November 2, 2004, with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its members should not
be made to explain why they supported their union's cause, petitioner [KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant
disregard of Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action,
Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to "harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and
attention to employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance
machinery or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules."
On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision holding that Garcia's "filing of administrative
charges against 361 of [KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject
of the writ of prohibition." Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and erroneous legal
premises holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought reconsideration, and it was likewise denied. Thus, the petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a
strike or prohibited concerted mass action. YES
It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or
those created by special law. As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are
subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and
general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and
like concerted actions. Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines
for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which
provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.
Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting
rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate
issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent's argument,
assumed the view and held that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in
the exercise of their "broader rights of free expression" and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.
More significantly, the CA find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons charged administratively to
be, at the very least, antithetical to the best interest of the service. While its decision and resolution do not explicitly
say so, the CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available
to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are
not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate
charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive
effect of such mass action.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance
with law." This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain
sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the
Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the limits of the right of
government employees to organize in the following wise:
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the
public
service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action
that will lead in the
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike, adding that public employees
going on disruptive unauthorized
absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
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To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS
personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against
the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and
enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily
be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were proceeded against - and eventually
either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their
right to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in what appeared to be a
prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted that its members and other GSIS employees might have
disrupted public service. To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of
discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those charged as
well as the gravity or the dire consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability demands that every
erring government employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed.
The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance machinery and other modes
of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead
with his formal charges. If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less
confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass action without
resorting to available settlement mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened fire
first. That none of the parties bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be
taken against the GSIS. At best, both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of
prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED.
GSIS and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS,
Petitioners, vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA
THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
FACTS
Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents Dinnah Villaviza,et al, for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III,
D, (1, c, f)in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in theCivil
Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,committed as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unitin a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and AlbertVelasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;x x x
xxxxx
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly
raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24
May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty.Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as
the Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; That respondent, together with other
employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No.021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus
Rules on ProhibitedConcerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employeesand
disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.x x x x x x x x x
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31,2005, by the
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Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the sameday, the Manager of the GSIS
Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued amemorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents
requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively
dealt with.Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others,submitted a
letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a plannedmass action, the respondents
explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was aspontaneous reaction after learning that their
former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in
that hearing as it might also affect them.For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that
she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about
it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath. PGM Garcia then filed the abovementioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or ConductPrejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against
each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005.Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers
under oath within three (3) daysfrom receipt thereof.
None was filed.On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven
(7)respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory
penalties appurtenant thereto. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the
lesser offenseof Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. TheCSC
ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them
guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going
to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a publichearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense.
Appellants' (respondents herein)assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their Union President, who
pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right. x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. The CA upheldthe CSC. Not in conformity, PGM
Garcia filed this Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative tribunal may apply suppletorily the provisions of the Rules of
Court on the effect of failure to deny the allegations in the complaint and failure to file answer,where the
respondents in the administrative proceedings did not file any responsive pleading to theformal charges
against them.
RULING
There is no merit in the petition. Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of
explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never filed their answers to
the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they
filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.-- Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of liquidated damages,shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.Allegations of
usury in acomplaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4of the Rules of
Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, andother cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)The Court does not subscribe
to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI,Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and
Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides: If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5)
working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall beconsidered
to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render
judgment, as may be warranted by the factsand evidence submitted by the prosecution. A perusal of said section
readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merelytranslates to a waiver of "his right to file an
answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that thecharges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the
burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.It is true that Section 4 of the
Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a "suppletorycharacter." Suppletory is defined as "supplying
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deficiencies." It means that the provisions in theRules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an
insufficiency in the applicable rule.There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of
failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must
remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them
are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out inthe complaint. Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered
as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We
must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who
have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges
GONZALES V KATIGBAK G.R. NO. L-69500 JULY 22, 1985

FACTS: Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults only
by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene deletions. He justified that
these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic expression. He adduced that the film is an
integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for
the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board
as basis for its classification. He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decision of the sub
committee. When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and
the requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only. The petition
was amended to contest the rating only.
ISSUE: Was the rating made with grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES
Ratio: Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse
Censorship doesnt full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic rights. However, there
must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right without denying the
freedom from liability. Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is
limited to classification of films to safeguard other constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings. That is
to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise
prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. The test, to repeat, to determine
whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character
that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt
that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also,
there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice
if such danger be only probable. Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is
banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. Some material can legitimately deal with sex and its effects
on susceptible persons. Such a censorship can be considered violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the
substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious
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motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is
one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and
letters "shall be under the patronage of the State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would
invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It
is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres
deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is
entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such
a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an
elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions,
that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will
always adopt the former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.
There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The
supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the
scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they
refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this
Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State
as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

THE POWER OF THE STATE TO REVIEW AND CLASSIFY (CENSOR) RELIGIOUS TELEVISION SHOWS
FACTS: This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For
Moving Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing
on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to
submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment
ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from
attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner
prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes
of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed
before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to
review the TV program. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over
reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with
such.
ISSUE: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it
by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is
accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The
decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.
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Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it
reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV program
of the petitioner.
2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:
1. Freedom to believe (absolute)
Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting the public,
this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the state.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. DANS

FACTS:This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE whichhad been
summarily closed on grounds of national security.The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was
closed on the mere allegation thatthe radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing
was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not
informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was
taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action.The petitioner
alleged that it has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastranaas well as its rights and
interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment, and that they are not
anymore interested in pursuing the case any further.The case has become moot and academic. But, for the guidance
of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court still issued the guidelines
regarding the matter
ISSUE: Whether or not there was denial of due process to the petitioner.
HELD: The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow
it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the
same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if
broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient
and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.Broadcast
stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.The closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of national security without
elaboration of the grounds and without hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that
due process was not observed. If there is an Idea which should be impressed in the minds of those who wield power it
is that power must be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed Broadcast media while subject to
government licensing and regulation are equally protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the press and
by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property. The
summary closure in October, 1980 of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any
hearing before or after the closure itself ") violated its constitutional rights and must therefore be declared null and
void.
SENATE VS ERMITA
FACTS
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
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alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads
and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the
department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of
Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent
belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO
464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the EO 464 is constitutional
2. Whether or not the Senate can ask the Executive department officials to appear in hearings in order to
disclose information
HELD
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry
is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect,
in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries
in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt
by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
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impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a
co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
HILADO VS REYES
FACTS:
The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition. Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the
surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of
administration, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 00-97505, "Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto" (the case),
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes
(public respondent). Private respondent was, by Order of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of
Benedicto (the estate), and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor.
Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar Corporation
and First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City RTC two
complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No.
111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.
From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed
petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and to
secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners' counsel, was denied
access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court's clerical staff, could not be located and was
probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.
On February 2, 2004, petitioners' counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on February 13,
2004. Petitioners' counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for Inhibition of public
respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest partiality towards the administratrix.
Public respondent, noting that an error was committed in the service to petitioners of the notice of hearing, ignored
the motion of petitioners' counsel.
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate's inventory all of which properties were appraised at a
fair value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been ceded in 1990 to the decedent
under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on Good Government petitioners' counsel sent the
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of
the "updated inventory."
By still another letter, petitioners' counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the order
issued by the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
thereon.
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In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the
right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article
III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality through
her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her denial of their right to
access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case; and public respondent's incompetence, malice,
bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for more than three years the requirement of the
Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic
accounting of her administration.
By Comment filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is fatally defective
since petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping that they had earlier instituted an
administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the same reliefs - for the disqualification of public
respondent from presiding over the case and for the court docket to be opened for examination.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since petitioners are
not parties to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for inhibition.
As to the alleged denial of petitioners' right to examine court records and participate in the proceedings,
private respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of the inventory
of the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair value of the estate and their counsel
was present during the February 13, 2004 hearing.
ISSUES: 1. whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine and
obtain copies of any or all documents forming part of the records of the case
2. whether a writ of prohibition will issue in favor of petitioners, who are not parties to the case, to inhibit
public respondent from presiding over the case.
HELD:
On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right the right to information on matters of
"public concern" and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the like. The right to
information on "matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional
right of access to public documents.
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term "judicial record" or
"court record" is in order.
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued
and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are
in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has
also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video
recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic
form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and
includes all evidence it has received in a case.
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance as it relates to or affect the public.
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It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of
justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of
the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs.
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the
Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears legitimate, for, as the
plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome
of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. x x x x The records of every court of justice shall be
public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under
the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden
their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency. (Underscoring supplied), entitled to be informed of the inventory
as well as other records which are relevant to their claims against Benedicto.
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays
court fees, a court may not deny access to such records.
BANTAY RA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
There were two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certainissuances of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifestedtheir intention to
participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, forshort) and
the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutionsaccrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list electionson May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possessthe requisite qualifications defined in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" andbelong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to represent.
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundationand
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectivelydenying their
request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)accredited participating partylist groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of thenominees
of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have theadditional prayers that the 33
private respondents named therein be declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groupsfrom participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by theConstitution
HELD:
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
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research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A.
7941,which last sentence reads: "The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A.
No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified
List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the
basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The
Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting
of the votes in an election.
NERI VS SENATE
FACTS:
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of
the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with
P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of the executive privilege violates the Right of the people to information on
matters of public concern
HELD:
No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The
right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
peoples right to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There are
clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of
people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
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MASANGUID CPEG vs COMELEC
EPICHARIS GARCIA VS. THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE

NOVEMBER 28, 1975
FACTS:
In summer, 1975, Respondent Lambino admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology. That on May
30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-1976 respondent told her
about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school.
reason in the letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the
class. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision
was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School. Petitioner then
subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A.
in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to
fulfil their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology which would
entail about four to five years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being
unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the
purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing petitioner to continue
studying or not?
HELD:
Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic
freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty
and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on
him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishments.
That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by
the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of
this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims
and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice
of students.
Petitioner cannot compel the mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to
admit the petitioner. That respondent Fr. Lambino and
Loyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the petitioner or not. Factors that were considered
are academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and nature of Loyola School of Theology as a
seminary.
DLSU V. CA
December 19, 2007
FACTS:
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On March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents
with "direct assault" due to mauling incidents as a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James
Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They
were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal
Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents,
representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf
is/are restrained and enjoined from
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming
the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent De La Salle
University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to
enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. Aguilar also prayed
that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20,
1995.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of
expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to
be excluded.
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private
respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
DLSU.
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation stating that he has long completed his course at
petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated
in his transcript of records issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic requirements for his
course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents
RULING: Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners that while CHED Resolution No. 18196 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from
petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of
having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to
enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of
supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
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On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher
Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes." Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for
the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the
Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission. The Commission shall be
independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of
the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry
out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement
of growth or development of higher education.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On
the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from
its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION V. HENRY SOJOR

May 22, 2008
FACTS: Respondent Henry A Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of Central Visayas
Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete city on August 1, 1991. He was subsequently reappointed by the Board of
Trustees when the law mandated that a BOT be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. On June 25,
2004, CVPC converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), the Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the
BOT as its governing body. Meanwhile the respondent was charged with 3 administrative cases filed by CVPC faculty
members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and
Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service; and (3) Nepotism. Respondent argued that CSC has no jurisdiction over him as presidential appointee.
He further argued that only the BOT has the power to remove university officials citing provisions of R.A. No. 8292
(Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997). CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondents appeal and authorizing
the regional office to proceed with the investigation and preventively suspending the respondent. When the CSC
denied the respondents motion for reconsideration with finality, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC
encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president
of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC. The CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the
questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation.
Hence this petition was filed by CSC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate
academic freedom?
HELD: The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every governmentowned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. The CSC has also
been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the
government service, whether career or non-career. As provided in Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service Sec. 4:
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Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
Argument of the respondent that BOR has the sole authority to discipline and remove his office cannot prosper. The
power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a
president of a state university. Academic freedom cannot be invoked by Sojor as this is not applicable to the present
case. It cannot be justified that he is within the bounds of academic freedom since administrative complaints filed
against him involve violations of civil service rules. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
YOLANDA MERCADO V. AMA

April 13, 2010
The petitioners were faculty members who started teaching at AMA Computer College (AMACC) on May 25, 1998.
For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on
the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were
also used to determine the present faculty members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a
passing rating based on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase
Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC on July 25, 2000, for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th
month pay, and for discriminatory practices.
On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources
Supervisor Mary Grace Beronia, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would
no longer be renewed.
The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In
their Position Paper, the petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their
complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The petitioners also contended that
AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual.
AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured appointment
and were still within the three-year probationary period for teachers. Thus, their dismissal was justified because they
failed to meet the standards as provided by the new screening guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not AMACC can justifiably dismiss the petitioners through the exercise of their academic freedom
HELD: Yes. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom.
The institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and adopt its aims and
objectives, and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or interference,
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the
term academic freedom encompass the freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach;
(2) who may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
AMACC has the inherent right to establish high standards of competency and efficiency for its faculty members in
order to achieve and maintain academic excellence. The schools prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and
to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the
educational institution the right to choose who should teach.
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The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its
teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom, too, is not the
only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected
by its management prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the
freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. Thus, AMACC has
every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its medium for hiring its
teachers. It also acted within the terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the
petitioners to be merely on probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters.
RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS)
December 14, 2005
FACTS: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be allowed to
enjoy the following privileges: (1)to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee
breaks during the month of Ramadan; (2) to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Salazar
expressed his conformity with the first request. However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request.
In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 291[1] as amended by P.D.
No. 322[2] enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce
national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of our national holidays.
Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277 dated November 13, 1981
granting both of the requests. In a resolution, the court ordered the court administrator to study the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2nd request of the employees as stated in their letter is not violative of the nonestablishment clause of Sec. 5 Art. 3 of the constitution
HELD: Yes. The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause. The subject
requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in the
Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that: The right to religious profession and worship
has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare.
The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic
faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible
office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3
(a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year.
On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to
all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded.
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To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
(Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working
hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules
for each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious
denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not
exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
TARUC V. DELA CRUZ

453 SCRA 123 (2005)
Petitioners
: Dominador L. Taruc, Wilberto Dacera, Nicanor Galanida, Renerio Canta, Jerry Canta, Cordencio
Consigna, Susano Alcala, Leonardo Dizon, Salvador Gelsano and Benito Laugo
Respondents
: Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz, Rev. Fr. Rustom Florano and Delfin Bordas
FACTS
Petitioners [who were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte]
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request.
Hostility among the members of the PIC worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be
celebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Bishop de la Cruz knew this, he tried to
dissuade petitioner and also appealed to refrain from committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of
the PIC. However, the bishop failed to stop Taruc and he (petitioner) proceeded to hold open mass with Fr. Ambong.
On June 1993, petitioners were expelled/ excommunicated from the PIC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/ excommunication of members of a
religious institution.
HELD
No. The Courts Do Not Have Such Jurisdiction. Section 5, Article Iii Of The Bill Of Rights Provides That:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
The Court of Appeals decision that the expulsion/excommunication Of Members Of A Religious
Institution/Organization Is A Matter Best Left To The Discretion Of The Officials, And The Laws And Canons, Of Said
Institution/Organization.
Based from the petitioners claim that they were not heard before they were expelled from their church, the records
show that Bishop de la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of
pic. They were also warned of the consequences of their actions, among them their expulsion/excommunication from
PIC. Yet, these pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears and petitioners went ahead with their plans to defy their bishop
and foment hostility and disunity among the members of PIC. They should now take full responsibility for the chaos
and dissension they caused.
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ESTRADA v. ESCRITUR
408 SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant,
wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation
of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten
a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On
the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio
and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the
congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely
executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.
ISSUE
1. whether or not respondents right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.
2.
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral
conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD
1. In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest
exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
2. A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation
of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard
of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate
the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and
punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment
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of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of
religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
SORIANO v. LA GUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
FACTS
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
ISSUE
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
HELD
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioners
utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be
properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior
restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the
public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA v. PROVINCIAL BOARD

51 PHIL 352 (1927)
FACTS
The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church is the owner of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On the south side is
a part of the Church yard, the convent and an adjacent lost used for a vegetable garden in which there is a stable and
a well for the use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the Church. On the north side
is an old cemetery with its two walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower. The provincial board
assessed land tax on lots comprising the north and south side, which the church paid under protest. It filed suit to
recover the amount.
ISSUE
Whether the lots are covered by the Churchs tax exemption.
HELD
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The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of land tax refers to the home of the priest who presides over
the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. The exemption includes not only the
land actually occupied by the Church but also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. A
vegetable garden, thus, which belongs to a convent, where its use is limited to the necessity of the priest, comes
under the exemption. Further, land used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities,
which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, likewise comes within the exemption. It cannot be taxed
according to its former use, i.e. a cemetery.
TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY
235 SCRA 632 (1994)
FACTS
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.The value-added tax (VAT) is
levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
Among the Petitioners was the Philippine Press Institute which claim that R.A.7716 violates their press freedom and
religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay Value Added Tax. It is contended by the PPI that by
removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom
is unconstitutional." PPI argued that the VAT is in the nature of a license tax.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630.
ISSUES
1.
2.
Whether or not the purpose of the VAT is the same as that of a license tax.
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
HELD
1.
A license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its impositionon the press is unconstitutional
because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of itsright. Hence, although its application to others, such those
selling goods, is valid, itsapplication to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovahs Witnesses,
inconnection with the latters sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to
exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on theexercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and thelease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment
isnot to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income taxor subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
2.
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue
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statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ DIGEST, G.R. NO. L-45459 MARCH 13, 1937

FACTS:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter
to the President. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having
sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage
stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation of church and state
HELD:
NO.
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. In so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt
and highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs. Even
if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in
question, still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the
official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny the petition for a writ of
prohibition.
IGNACIO AND DELA CRUZ VS. ELLA, ETC.
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99 PHIL 346
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Fernando and Simeon dela Cruz are members of the Jehovahs Witness, a religious denomination whose
tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic organization.
2. Desiring to hold a meeting, petitioners asked respondent Mayor Norberto Ela of Zambales to give them permission
to use the public plaza together with the kiosk.
3. Instead of granting the permission, respondent Mayor allowed them to hold their meeting on the northern part
corner of the plaza.
4. The mayor adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any religious denomination as it
is his belief that said kiosk should only be used for legal purposes.
5. Petitioners contend that the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of
speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of petitioners constitutional rights?
HELD: The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not
absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the right of the community or society, and this power may be exercised under the police
power of the State, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
The power exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from
the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that, to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it
necessary to prohibit the use of the kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members.
This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent
never denied such request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northern part of the public
plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were denied their constitutional right to assembly for such right is
subject to regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so considering that the tenet of
petitioners congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have
considered in denying their request.
The contention that the northwestern part of the plaza cannot be considered as part of said plaza but of the road in
the northwestern portion beyond the concrete fence is untenable, for it appears that portion is part of the plaza and
has a space capable of accommodating hundreds of people. In fact, during the past celebrations of the traditional
town fiesta of the municipality, said portion has been utilized by the authorities as a place for staging dramas,
zarzuelas, and cinematograph shows. Verily, the pretense of Petitioners cannot be attributed to the unsuitability of
that portion as a meeting place but rather to their obstinate desire to use the kiosk knowing it to be contrary to the
policy of the municipality. 1 The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Petitioners.
Freedom of Religion: B. Free Exercise Clause; 1) Flag Salute
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOL OF CEBU

GR 95770, 29 DECEMBER 1995; EN BANC RESOLUTION, KAPUNAN [J]
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from
school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting
the patriotic pledge.
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All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic
Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by
Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational
Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education
where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The children of
Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school
population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Freedom of Religion: B. Free Exercise Clause; 2)Freedom to Propagate Religious Doctrines
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA

GR NO. L-9637 | APRIL 30, 1957
FACTS:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in
Manila in November, 1898
City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for operating
without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license
fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees
under protest
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and
3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
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a.
b.
They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee
or sales tax
it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in
question
Trial Court dismissed the complaint
American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles
RULING: NO
Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of the
business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license from the
City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is not among those enumerated
However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not
mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said
business, trade or occupation.
2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax
and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers
and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal
tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers.
For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes:
namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles.
A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the
same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the
higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as
may be provided by ordinance
The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a
retail dealer has to pay per annum
As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has
repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of
policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a
condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and
religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent
vice and evil of this flat license tax.
Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so
costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code, Corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .:
Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be
liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed
from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
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MARTIN CENTENO VS. HON. VICTORIA VILLAON-PORNILLOS

G.R. NO. 113092 SEPTEMBER 1, 1994
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.
An information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for
religious purposes with the submission, inter alia, that the term religious purpose is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
ISSUE:
Whether the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose.
HELD:
No. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words charitable and
religious separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive
words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that charitable institutions, churches and
personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and religious in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA
FACTS:
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC) were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks
against contrary religious beliefs.
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Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent
Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the
CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV
program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials
constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing
of petitioners religious program?
RULING:
The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Boards Xrating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it
sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.
1.
YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term television program in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has
the power to review and classify should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A
contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
The court rejected petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it
out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the
more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of
religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise
to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners
religious program.
Any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its
act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking either religions,
especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called attacks are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by
the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as
indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD
1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no
excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task
of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board
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cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between
the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling
ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech
for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is
a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible
attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF)
since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers Union). Under the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which
means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in
the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU
claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the
INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that
his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate
Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close
shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional and that
said law violates the EPWUs and ERFs legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a
labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his
employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join
a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions
and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers right to join or not to
join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
PAMIL VS TELERON
FACTS:
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In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Albuquerque, Bohol. He was also
proclaimed as a mayor therein. Pamil, a rival candidate file a quo warranto case against Gonzaga questioning the
eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in the Revised Administrative Code; in no case shall there be
elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality. In this case, the
elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code
of 1971 which allowed the prohibitions of the revised administrative code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Revised Administrative Code is no longer operative.
RULING:
Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted
and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty
position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the Churchs interest above all be in duty to
enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the
church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal.
SALONGA VS HERMOSO
FACTS:
During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a mandamus proceeding to compel Rolando Hermoso of the Travel
Processing Center to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel to Salonga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
RULING:
No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not deny Salongas
request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel.
The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid such
similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
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Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into
presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses
themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus andprohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his familyand to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she has the
power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And
have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?
RULING:
Petition Dismissed. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the
President's decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia
(the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters
the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover
from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates
and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away
by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
SILVERIO v. CA
FACTS:
On 14 October 1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On
26 January 1988, or more than 2 years after the filing of the Information, the People of the Philippines filed an Urgent
ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure Order against Silverio on the ground that he
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had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Silverio's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding
that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has
never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court."
Silverio's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. Silverio's Certiorari Petition before the Court of
Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, the Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest
of national security, public safety or public health."
HELD:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety,
or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text.
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under
the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon
application of an interested party. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer. Herein, Silverio is
facing a criminal charge.
He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required.
Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were
to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused
in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered
as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in
any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should
run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes.
COJUANCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of
their public positions and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority granted a donation
in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a
private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the
Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines.
In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country
except upon approval of the court.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with urgent motion for hearing thereon citing the urgency of lifting the travel restriction on him
in view of the various problems involving the investments of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be
immediately attended to by petitioner as duly elected Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts
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that quite often, it becomes necessary for him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be
confirmed promptly. Considering that he must first secure the permission of respondent Sandiganbayan before he can
travel abroad and abide by the conditions imposed by said court upon the grant of such permission, petitioner
contends that it becomes impossible for him to immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.
ISSUE: whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on should be vacated to enable petitioner to go abroad without
prior permission of, and other restrictions imposed by, the respondent Sandiganbayan.
HELD: With respect to the issue of whether or not the ban on foreign travel should be continued, as imposed on
petitioner by respondent Sandiganbayan per its Order dated February 20, 1995 with accompanying restrictions in
effect, we resolve to rule in the negative. The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now
prevailing.
The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail does
not have an unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a persons right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. But, significantly, the Office of the
Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated November 20, 1998 indicated that it is not interposing any objection to
petitioners prayer that he be allowed to travel abroad based on the following considerations:
x x x (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, including the second paragraph,
Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that the petitioner has always
returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now
Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes,
more often than he had done in the past, x x x.
It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months instead of six (6) months as
requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to post an additional cash bond equivalent to the
present cash bond posted by him.
Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by
respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the
continued restriction on petitioners right to travel abroad. Admittedly, all of petitioners previous requests to travel
abroad has been granted and that, as confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always
returned to the Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further denying
petitioners right to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of flight is further
diminished in view of petitioners recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel
Corporation, though he has now more justification to travel so as to oversee the entire operations of that
company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that his assumption of such vital post has come at a time when the
current economic crisis has adversely affected the international operations of many companies, including San
Miguel. The need to travel abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate and implement the necessary
corporate strategies and decisions, could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the petitioners duties to a
publicly held company militate against imposing further restrictions on petitioners right to travel abroad.
YAP VS CA
FACTS: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence
and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and
was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as
maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it
exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash
bond
he
had
filed
earlier
in
the
proceedings.
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ISSUE: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?
HELD: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of
this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
MIRASOL VS DPWH
FACTS: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and Communications
issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed
an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North
and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
ISSUE: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all motorized vehicles created
equal?
HELD: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited
access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or
function
which
it
does
not
possess
in
the
first
place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification among
modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where
the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a
child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference
would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
REYES v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007 that were
brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. They were charged for Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
Respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the
Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his
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specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must
be made personally by a judge.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that
Howver, despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO still subsists; therefore petitioner filed an
instant petition that everytime he travel, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the
continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List.
A petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioners constitutional right to
travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject
HDO has no legal basis since Criminal Case has already been dismissed. However, the CA denied the petition and the
privilege of writ of amparo.
Petitioner argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of
the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD: The petition must fail.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to
travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is
a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to
travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. A persons right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion.
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to
the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his
motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear
threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V Reyes

G.R. No. 178300
March 17, 2009
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon
each of them the capital punishment of death. The RTC rendered a decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting
appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA, and JOSELITO
FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH
(DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH ..xxx..
On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC Decision. The
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion
perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity ..xxx.. The fallo of the
Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, dated
February 26, 2002 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1)
accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
..xxx..
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was denied. Hence, appellants
filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
The appeal challenged the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the
written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants constitutional
right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that
the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of
their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the
availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates
of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores
cannot be utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it was obtained
in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial
investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the
assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was
coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the
beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to
the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it was
procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial
investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not
ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to
hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants extra-judicial confessions can be admitted as evidence. YES
RULING:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention are prohibited.
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(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been
satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a
person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the
time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he
must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first
question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the
consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be
an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent
counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo
and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are
admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Consequently, the
burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and
Flores.
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or
coerced to make their respective confessions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROMULO TUNIACO

G.R. No. 185710
January 19, 2010
FACTS:
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman
with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City. On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered
judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court appeals rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision
of the RTC with modification on civil liabilities.
One of the issues upon appeal is the admissibility of extra-judicial confession that became one of the basis in the
conviction such that it was alleged that it was obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. However he did not present evidence of
compulsion, he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, no physical
evidence of violence was presented. Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never
brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at
the police station. Atty. Besinga, a lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted
accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that
the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Alemans extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. YES
RULING:
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.
These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga,
assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. The act of not bringing out the issue of alleged
torture to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath indicates
voluntariness of the confession.
It is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has
details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas
confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such
corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V Reyes

G.R. No. 178300
March 17, 2009
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon
each of them the capital punishment of death. The RTC rendered a decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting
appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA, and JOSELITO
FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH
(DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH ..xxx..
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On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC Decision. The
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants from death penalty to reclusion
perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also decreased the amount of civil indemnity ..xxx.. The fallo of the
Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, dated
February 26, 2002 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1)
accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
..xxx..
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was denied. Hence, appellants
filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
The appeal challenged the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based solely on the
written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains, however, that said extra-judicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants constitutional
right to have an independent counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that
the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of
their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the
availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates
of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores
cannot be utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it was obtained
in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial
investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the
assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was
coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the
beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to
the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it was
procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial
investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not
ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to
hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants extra-judicial confessions can be admitted as evidence. YES
RULING:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention are prohibited.
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(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been
satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a
person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the
time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he
must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first
question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the
consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be
an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent
counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo
and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are
admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Consequently, the
burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and
Flores.
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or
coerced to make their respective confessions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROMULO TUNIACO

G.R. No. 185710
January 19, 2010
FACTS:
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman
with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City. On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered
judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court appeals rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision
of the RTC with modification on civil liabilities.
One of the issues upon appeal is the admissibility of extra-judicial confession that became one of the basis in the
conviction such that it was alleged that it was obtained in violation of their constitutional rights.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. However he did not present evidence of
compulsion, he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, no physical
evidence of violence was presented. Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never
brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at
the police station. Atty. Besinga, a lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted
accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that
the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Alemans extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. YES
RULING:
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.
These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga,
assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. The act of not bringing out the issue of alleged
torture to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath indicates
voluntariness of the confession.
It is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has
details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas
confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such
corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.
LENIDO LUMANOG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command
Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N.
Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at 211
Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he
testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
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All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint
examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of
Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of
Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based?
2. Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation valid?
3. Was the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?
4. Was the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused credible?
5.
Was the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness, security guard
Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?
6.
Were the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests conclusive of the innocence of the accusedappellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the accused prevail over their positive identification in this case?
RULING:
1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the
facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error
raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling
affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted
before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution
evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results,
circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants
essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and
discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the
Solicitor Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of
failure of intermediate review by the CA.
2. NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation was NOT valid.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent,
that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and
independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided
with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could
not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall
only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement before Atty.
Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions
must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to questions
propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While
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SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of the
investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if
Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof,
or any previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel inspected Joels
body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
3.
No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was NOT violated.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This protection extends to all
citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial,
speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render
rights nugatory.
It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four
years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive.
In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution
or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from
enduring the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not entitled to the same
relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable
or arbitrary.
4.
YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused was credible.
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the trial judge took into account
his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to
view frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their faces (when the two [2]
lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth in front of his guard post pointed their guns at him one [1]
after the other, and later when the four [4] armed men standing around the victims car momentarily looked at him
as he was approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his positive identification in the courtroom of
appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The
clear view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza (now an Associate
Justice of this Court) during the ocular inspection conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court
personnel, and witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how the assailants shot
Abadilla[,] who was inside his car, the relative positions of the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at
them in the face. Alejo immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the incident took
place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number of
assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already
been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer
to those persons actually standing around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled
that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the
credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify
the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.
5. YES, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness,
security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we reiterate that Alejos out-court-identification [of the accused]
is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near the place where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of
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the gunmen, not to mention that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their guns at
them; second, no competing event took place to draw his attention from the event; third, Alejo immediately gave his
descriptions of at least two (2) of the perpetrators, while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would
see them again, and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence that the police had
supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the suspects, except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to
just pinpoint on the basis of a photograph shown to him by the police officers, insisting that he would like to see said
suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively identified appellant Joel de Jesus
independently of the previous identification made at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive,
straightforward and categorical.
6. NO, the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were NOT conclusive of the innocence of
the accused-appellants.
[T]he negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no showing that the firearms
supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that
ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug were fired from another firearm does not disprove
appellants guilt, as it was possible that different firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. Neither will the
finding that the empty shells and slug matched those in another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such
that they could have been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the appellants who
are on trial in this case and not the suspects in another case. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the
firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of firearms,
were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not indispensable in this
case. Even if another weapon was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog
cannot escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones
who shot Abadilla to death.
The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise
inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only
two (2) fingerprints were taken from the car of Abadilla.
7.
NO, the defense of alibi of the accused CANNOT prevail over their positive identification in this
case.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason
that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible
for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that
no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
However, none of the appellants presented clear and convincing excuses showing the physical impossibility of their
being at the crime scene between 8:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the trial
court and CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
HO WAI PANG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No. 068 from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who
came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco examined the baggages of
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each of the 13 passengers and found, all in all, 18 chocolate boxes with white crystalline substance contained in a
white transparent plastic from the baggages of the petitioner and his five co-accused. Six separate Informations all
dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425. After
pleading not guilty to the crime charged, all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their defense.
They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While conceding that petitioners
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold
that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was
deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination regarding the existence
of conspiracy among the accused.
ISSUE:
Did CA err in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation?
HELD:
No. Petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation. While
there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities
and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not,
however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against himself. Petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his
custodial investigation. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the
custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS,
ROSENDO ANOR and RODOLFO TORRES,defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal Case No. CCCVII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic review.
There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor, Rodolfo Torres
and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died
during the pendency of the case.
From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about 7:56 o'clock in the evening, prisoners
from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in opening the door of their dormitory by means of a false key (tin can)
and attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then getting their food rations from the delivery
truck wherein the victim was among them.
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on November 20, 1971, all the
accused executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo Cutamora. Consequently, an
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Information for Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal.
The delay in filing was due to the separation from the service of a principal investigator.
Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who died on August 15,
1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded Guilty, while the other
two accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias Rolando Amor, alias Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas
of Not Guilty. The Information was amended to correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro,
alias Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence was adduced.
At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo Torres
withdrew their pleas of Guilty. Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their participation in the killing of Bernardo
Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the same under duress. Accused Federico
Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted having executed their respective confessions, while accused Rosendo Anor
changed his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty of the lesser offense of Homicide.
On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:
WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely: Tobias Ribadajo,
Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information,
Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had been exposed for more or
less one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of the rain, and had been subsequently beaten up
and placed in a "bartolina "
On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance Casting doubt on their
integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could have supplied. In those statements, they
called their co-accused by their nicknames, not knowing their true names, like "Lilat" for Basas, "Manok" for Anor and
"Bukid" for Torres. The investigators could not have concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M.,
appellants had planned to kill any prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the "rancho"; that they are
members of the Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang and their leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same
date at around 8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can opened the door of their dormitory and an the accused
rushed towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a were waiting for their food; that they stabbed the
victim with their "matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing of human waste on them by inmates of
Brigade 3-a.
What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all admitting their guilt but for the lesser
offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.
Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however, opposed the change of plea because it had
already finished with the presentation of its evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession can be admitted as evidence.
RULING:
We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants' confessions. The
presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession of an accused in
a criminal case, for no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so
by truth and conscience. The burden of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. Mere repudiation of
confession by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. Concrete evidence of compulsion or
duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put forward. No report
of such maltreatment was made to the prison authorities nor to the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary
investigation. During cross-examination, Corpuz admitted that he was not maltreated. Ribadajo himself did not
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protest when he was brought to Exequiel Santos, Administrative Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his own words,
was "like a father to me."
As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during custodial
investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused
during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of
the 1973 Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions
obtained during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect.
FILOTEO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner, along with others, was charged for the crime of brigandage after having robbed a postal delivery truck of
the Bureau of Postal of documents such as treasury warrants and SSS Medicare checks and vouchers. During the trial,
an extrajudicial confession was allegedly made by petitioner, admitting to the crime charged against him and his
fellow accused. Despite this, however, petitioner waived his right to present evidence, nor impugned such allegation.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner and his co-conspirators guilty for the said crime and was sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion temporal. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration the petitioner filed.
In this present petition, petitioner questioned the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, arguing that the court erred and
gravely abused its discretion when it admitted and considered against him his alleged extrajudicial confession. He
further argued that these were obtained from him through torture, physical maltreatment, and intimidation; and thus
should have been inadmissible in compliance to the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 12, Art. III) and the prevailing
jurisprudence. Additionally, he argued that the said provision should be retroactively applied to him as the accused in
a criminal case.
ISSUES:
WON the alleged extrajudicial confession by petitioner should be inadmissible for being obtained through torture and
intimidation.
WON Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution should be applied retroactively to him.
HELD:
NO. First, petitioners claim of him going under torture was doubtful, as evidenced by the medical tests done on him.
Second, the examination of his handwriting in the documents showing his confession proved that the same was done
by him voluntarily, without being the subject of interrogation through torture. There being said, no proof that the said
confession was obtained through torture and intimidation.
NO. First, what is being contended by petitioner is based on Article 22 of the RPC which states that (p)enal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal. This cannot
be sustained, for the provision being contemplated is not a penal statute, but a constitutional provision which is found
in the Bill of Rights. Second, while the requirement of a counsel in cases like this is not provided in the 1973
Constitution, the same was established in jurisprudence since 1983. However, since the confession in question was
executed in 1982, this said ruling cannot apply.
SANTOS ET AL. V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged for the complex crime of estafa through falsification after falsifying the clearing statement
issued by the central clearing office of BPI in order to withdraw the amounts of Php 1M, Php 3M, and Php 5M. They
were later convicted for the said crime, in which they filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied by the
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Sandiganbayan, prompting the petitioners to file the present petition. One of the assertions of the petitioners was that
their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because of the extrajudicial confessions of petitioners Estacio and
Valentino are inadmissible due to their right to counsel, provided in Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
being violated when these were executed.
ISSUE:
WON the right to counsel, as provided in Section 12 of Article III, can be applied retroactively in the case at bar.
HELD:
NO. As ruled in the case of Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, such right to counsel, when violated prior to the effectivity of
the (1987) Constitution cannot be applied retroactively. Additionally, the ruling established in 1983 by the case of
Morales Jr., v. Enrile, which provided that the waiver/confession must be made with the advice of a counsel, cannot
also be applied retroactively. This is because the law provides that legal decisions form part of the legal system, but
such decisions are to be applied prospectively.
PEOPLE V. DANO
FACTS:
Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain Fernando Teves that
the Dano brothers were quarreling. Demosthenes went to appellants home to investigate. On his way, he met
appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes left
appellant in Wilfredos house and proceeded to appellants residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim
sprawled in the yard, near the stairs. He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds.
Demosthenes fetched appellant from Wilfredos house and took him to the police station.
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional right to custodial investigation is violated when the appellants admission of his crime to the
Brgy. Captain was admitted.
HELD:
NO. Appellant admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officer nor a law
enforcement agent. Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of appellants
constitutional rights. The constitutional requirements on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous
statements made in a voluntary manner whereby appellant orally admitted authorship of the crime. What the
Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts.
PEOPLE V. ENDINO
FACTS:
Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him
repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack,
pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis
dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino
appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the
airport. Weeks after, Gerry Galgarin was arrested. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Police.
Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the police Station to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed
by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his
nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part
in the slaying of Dennis.
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ISSUE:
WON the appellants admission was violative of the constitutional provision on custodial investigation.
HELD:
NO. Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such admission
proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was
not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen
who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him as the trial court stated in its Decision. Furthermore,
accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H) freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino
had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there
is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.
PEOPLE V. ARONDAIN
FACTS:
Acting on a report of a robbery of a taxicab Officers found a witness, a security guard of the nearby compound, who
told them that after he heard a gunshot, he saw two male persons come out of the taxicab and run toward the field at
the back of the compound. One of them came from the backseat of the taxicab while the other from the front seat,
carrying a gun. Acting on the lead, the police officers requested the security guard of the compound to illuminate the
field. As soon as the search light was turned on, the policemen saw accused-appellant holding a gun. One of the
officers fired a warning shot and approached accused-appellant. He asked him where his companion was, and he
pointed to him who was lying on his belly about 8 to 10 meters away.
The police officers asked why they shot the victim, and accused-appellant answered that he shot the victim because
the latter resisted his demand for money. He added that after shooting the driver, he panicked and immediately
scampered away, leaving the money bills scattered on the floor of the taxicab.
ISSUE:
WON the confession made by the accused-appellant is admissible as part of res gestae.
HELD:
NO. The confession made by the accused-appellant admitting the crime of frustrated robbery cannot be admitted as
part of res gestae. It must be stressed that said statement, if it was at all made by accused-appellant, was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Said confession was given after he was arrested and without the
assistance of counsel. He was not informed of his right to remain silent or right to counsel. From time he was arrested
and deprived of his freedom, all the questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose of
eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information came within the ambit of a custodial investigation. As such, he
was entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section 12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe this
constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of accused-appellant cannot be admitted as evidence against him.
PEOPLE VS TABOGA
FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which reads that with intent to gain, and
with violence against persons, entered the house of one Francisca Tubon, and once inside, with treachery and abuse
of superior strength, assault, attacked and stabbed Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which
necessarily caused the death of said Tubon and took away several personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was
likewise indicted for Arson for setting the victims house on fire.
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After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao confronted Taboga, and the latter
readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing the whole house, including the dead body of
the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS,
went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her
house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes charged and interposed an
alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime.
Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation
room of the police station where policemen were present and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution.
Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a private person, can be admitted as
evidence against him.
HELD:
Yes.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory
evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even remotely suggests that the radio
announcer was instructed by the police to extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the
reporter even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. The records also show
that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but to several others.
Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that he was maltreated and
compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their
persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no
marks of violence, on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating the voluntariness of the confession.
The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession. Such confession did not form part
of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit
sympathy. The record even discloses that accused-appellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain that he clubbed and
stabbed the victim even before the police started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if he had indeed
been forced into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman.
PEOPLE VS BALOLOY
FACTS:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3August 1996, the dead body
of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery was
accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he
was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he seeks that
his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his
conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the alleged confession of the accused-appellant to
witnesses luzviminda ceniza and judge celestino dicon as evidence against the accused.
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RULING:
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect
orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[26In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope
and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and
thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.
JESALVA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva
(petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs.
Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and
boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to
eat and drink. While Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and
[F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a tricycle, once again
boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was
seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20
meters away from Leticias house. While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him
to defer it until the next day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of
barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the
former immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards 7th Street where
Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the
Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys
Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a
flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom
he knew since childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however,
petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is
directly opposite his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the Bishops Compound
in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman
naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it
was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so,
a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, "What is that?"
Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to
check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even got stained with her
blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera came
back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
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De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail. On their way back at
about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in
identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed
innocence. He admitted he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day. However, because the
evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He
"surrendered" at one (1) oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.13
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was courting
Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she was already married, and
that she loved her handsome husband.14 Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of
September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, 15 together with other police officers, Senior
Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone.
Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was
directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls.16 Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of
September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police
station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his
vehicle.17 At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police officers, Fiscal
Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified as the place where he and Leticia sat. They
found bloodstains thereat.18
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, which the
RTC, Branch 51, denied in its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case; hence,
the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY
PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS
FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY
HELD:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from
him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police
would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements herein
were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that
petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the
statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did
not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime of Homicide. The
prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and
sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when
considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.
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SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA
FACTS: On April 22, 1993, the marking of the documents to be testified on by the lone prosecution witness, Auditor
Lilibeth Rugayan of the Commission on Audit, who conducted the audit examination, took place before the Deputy
Clerk of Court of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The marking of the exhibits was with the conformity of all of
the accused and their respective counsel.
Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution rested its case5 and formally offered its
evidence on July 6, 1993. Among those offered as evidence were the sworn statements made by all the accused,
including that of petitioner, and previously marked as exhibits "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", and "U-1" for the prosecution.
Said exhibits were offered as part of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan.
On August 19, 1993, all the accused (including petitioner) filed their "Joint Objections to Formal Offer of Evidence" on
the principal ground that the sworn statements were "hearsay" evidence.
The Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution dated August 24, 1993, admitted said evidence, thus:
Acting upon the "FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated July 5, 1993, of the Prosecution and considering the "JOINT
OBJECTIONS TO FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated August 19, 1993, of accused, the Court RESOLVES the same as
follows:
Exhibits A, B, and C are admitted, they being certified true copies of official documents; Exhibits D up to U and U-1
inclusive of submarkings are admitted as part of the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as examining auditor under the
State Auditing Code (P.D. No. 1445).
Dissatisfied, the three accused, on September 13, 1993, jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the respondent court in its Resolution dated September 27, 1993. It ruled that:
Considering that under the Order of this Court dated April 22, 1993 (p. 85) the exhibits "off-court" was admitted by
the accused through counsel, among which were exhibits "A", "B" and "C", the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
accused Pada, Torres and Sebastian with regard to the admission of said exhibits dated September 10, 1993 is
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in evidence "as part of the
testimony of the prosecution witness".
HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers.
Petitioner argues that the said issue should be resolved in the negative on the ground that the subject sworn
statements are hearsay evidence. Petitioner contends that he and his co-accused were never presented as witnesses,
thus, they were not given the opportunity to identify and authenticate their respective sworn statements and that
Auditor Rugayan had no personal knowledge of the contents thereof.
We disagree.
As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Thus, the rule explicitly provides that a witness can testify only on
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. However,
while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement
in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement
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In the present case, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and co-accused were offered not to prove the
truth or falsity of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such written statements were actually made and
executed. As stated in the Resolution dated August 24, 1993 of the respondent court, Exhibits "D" up to "U" and "U-1"
were admitted only as part of the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as Examining Auditor. Title II, Chapter I, Section 55
of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code provides that "the auditor shall obtain through
inspections, observation, inquiries, confirmation and other techniques, sufficient competent evidential matter to afford
himself a reasonable basis for his opinions, judgments, conclusions and recommendations".
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when
a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation." Custodial investigation has been defined as
any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing postage
stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by a Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal Service
Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is merely an administrative investigation.
While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea
that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
REMOLINA V CSC
FACTS:
Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in Kiborosa Elementary
School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service
eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery
was campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It
was eventually revealed that Nery Remolons name did not appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the
exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of
65%.Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty.Salupadin in a bus, who
offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was
no vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked for
money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988,America was able to receive 6 checks at
2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility
and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service,
the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On
Motion For Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him was in
blank form and that he was not assisted by counsel.
HELD:
NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation when questions are
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only
upon the start of such investigation. The exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation.
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PEOPLE vs SALONGA
G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001
FACTS:
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.
On January 7, 1991, Salonga was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused,
Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup are still at large.
Salonga was later found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document by the RTC.
Upon the perusal of the evidence of the prosecution regarding the unauthorized issuance of cashiers check,
accused Abelardo Salonga was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant,
Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank. After allegedly appraising Abelardo Salonga of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to counsel, an interview in a question and answer from was conducted. Accused
Abelardo Salonga allegedly waived his constitutional rights and submitted himself to the interview. In the
course of the interview, accused Abelardo Salonga admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without
any legitimate transaction, to accused Amiel Garcia as accused who was then encountering financial
difficulties. That out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to the personal benefit of accused Abelardo
Salonga.
After said interview, Abelardi then executed a written statement which he authenticated by affixing his
signature thereon.
Upon the other hand, accused-appellant relied on denial as his defense; attributed to simple negligence the
loss of the check which was admittedly in his custody and also repudiated his extra-judicial confession.
ISSUE: W/N Salongas extra-judicial confession/admission is admissible
HELD:
The constitutional right to counsel may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an
offense.
The Court rejects accused-appellants argument that his "so-called extra-judicial confession/admission"is inadmissible
in evidence on the ground that the waiver of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel in
violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Sec. 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) which
mandates that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an
offense. Accused-appellants extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the trial court
considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation is "the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. Indeed, custodial investigation refers to "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there was a discrepancy in the proof
sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and
Services, accused-appellant was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of
Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that Elevado is not a police officer or law enforcer but
a private person who was a bank officer. In the course of the interview, accused-appellant admitted having issued the
subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then encountering
financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal benefit. His
admissions were reduced into writing and offered as evidence by the prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal
formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those extra-judicial confessions obtained during
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As such, since the Court rejected the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the Court likewise rejects
Salongas contention that his conviction was based merely on speculations, possibilities, suspicions and conjectures.
The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of Salonga in the crime
alleged.
PEOPLE vs TING LAN UY

G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005
FACTS:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase
of US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus, Jaime
Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation
through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The Sandiganbayan later rendered a decision finding Ochoa guilty of the crime Malversation through
Falsification of Commercial Documents. Ting Lan Uy, Jr. was however acquitted but was held to be civilly liable
for the damages suffered by the NPC.
From the facts culled by the Sandiganbayan, The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds
covered by the two PNB Managers checks by falsifying a commercial document called an "Application for
Cashiers Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number of a private individual after the name of the payee,
UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering that the Payment
Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a Managers check to be charged to NPCs savings
account did not contain any account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in
diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George
Aonuevo, Mara Aonuevo, who is still at large.
In his defense, Ochoa asserts among others that there was no evidence that he committed any of the acts
alleged in the information. He claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Ochoa maintains that he signed the sworn statement while
confined at the Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not
assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit.
ISSUE: W/N Ochoa should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement, which is incompetent
evidence since this was taken without the benefit of counsel.
HELD:
The investigation under Par. 1, Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution refers to a custodial
investigation where a suspect has already been taken to custody.
This is when investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the
suspect.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not
available before government investigators enter the picture.
As such, it was found that Ochoas statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team
and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the
time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect. Thus, it cannot be considered as a custodial investigation.
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time at the Philippine
Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. Appellant can hardly claim that,
under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the
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borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and
incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that
he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional
provision.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn statement was
taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from
coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs
administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and
independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.
ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 159734, NOVEMBER 29, 2006
FACTS:
Petitoners were hired by Western Marketing, a chain of appliance stores, as sales persons. Benitez and Robel
were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively.
An incident ensued later wherein the petitioners and the other accused were involved wherein the daily cash
collection report of the company did not reflect any remittance of payments from the transactions covered by
the alleged missing invoices.
It was later found out that the goods covered thereby in the invoices were missing. Concluding that the
transactions under the said invoices were made but no payment was remitted to Western, branch accountant
Camilo reported the matter to Aurora Borja, the branch assistant manager.
Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to report the matter to the management, he
cautioning that many would be involved.
Later, in a subsequent meeting with the branch manager Lily Ong, accused-petitioner Orellana admitted
having brought home some appliances while Benitez gave a handwritten statement.
The other accused as well executed statements relating themselves to the incidents.
On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation, petitioners Astudillo and Orellana were collectively charged
with Qualified Theft, along with a certain Robel and Benitez, under an information dated September 9, 1996.
Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and a certain Javier were individually charged also with Qualified Theft in four
separate informations all dated September 9, 1996.
During arraignment, petitioners, with assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the RTC found the accused-herein petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment with modification as to the penalties imposed.
ISSUE: W/N the employees extra-judicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an
administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against them.
HELD:
The petitioners argue that their extra-judicial statements were taken without the assistance of counsel, they are
inadmissible as evidence, following Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file
any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, this Court answers the issue
in the affirmative.
The rights above specified (Miranda rights), to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
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"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he
should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether
at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc) which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.
People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. is similarly instructive:
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not
available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus we held in one case (People v. Ayson, [supra]) that
admissions made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the
purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or
confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity.
The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not under custodial investigation to call for
the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.
ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE VS CA AND PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 102786, AUGUST 14, 1998
FACTS:
In various incidents, electrical engineers of MERALCO who were assigned to inspect six electric meters
installed in Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) discovered that these electric meters
were missing. These engineers suspected that employees of CAPASSCO must have damaged the electric
meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the
electric meters.
Later it was discovered that several crewmembers of MERALCO were removing the electric meters. Patrolman
Edgar Enopia ascertained the identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre.
These men were later brought to a police lineup.
Petitioner de la Torre was pointed to be the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the
CAPASSCO premises.
As such, de la Torre was charged with Qualified Theft. The RTC found de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft.
De la Torre appealed to the CA, contending first that his constitutional rights were violated during the
custodial investigation of the case.
CA however denied reconsideration.

ISSUE: W/N de la Torres rights under custodial interrogation or investigation were violated.
Dela Torres contention: he was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel
during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO
service truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up. He further invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the
same sec. 12 that "any confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him."
HELD:
In Gamboa v. Cruz, this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
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either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall
not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel." However, this applies only from the moment the
investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information
from the accused. A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that
stage is reached.
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO truck number 522, was
merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group
which had removed the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus
on petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the
complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial
interrogation were violated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDUARDO PAVILLARE

G.R. NO. 129970, APRIL 5, 2000
FACTS:
On March 10, 1996 the accused appellant Pavillare was apprehended in connection with the kidnapping of an Indian
national Accused-appellants were thereafter charged and convicted of kidnapping for ransom for abducting the Indian
national. Pavillare contends that the identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up is
inadmissible because the appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel, and that the money given to
them was not ransom money but was given in exchange for their dropping of the charges of rape against private
complainant.
ISSUE: W/N Pavillares rights under custodial interrogation or investigation were violated.
HELD:
Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence.
The prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is not
yet a part of custodial investigation.
It has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on
the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a
person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel
because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been
held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an in-court
identification. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of
his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel.
We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the identification in open court of the
accused-appellant by the private complainant and his cousin as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample
opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember their faces.
PEOPLE VS. CASIMIRO
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FACTS: In a buy bust operation, after arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the Narcom Office,
where the policemen wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence custodian. The
policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory examination of the
confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a "receipt of property seized," Accused-appellant signed the receipt without
the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant was properly informed of the charges against him. (No)
RULING: The receipt could not be considered evidence against accused- appellant because it was signed by him
without the assistance of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by
accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a
prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it
cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the Constitution to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while he was being arrested outside the
grocery:
Also, the recitation of the Miranda rights to the accused was incomplete and was made without any effort to find out if
he understood it. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be
assigned to him.. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. SC
ruled that signing of the receipt without a lawyer, the accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. The
police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was willing to answer
their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused- appellant could not afford counsel, one
would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It
was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in
signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused- appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the
police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was willing to answer
their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.
PEOPLE VS. SAYABOC

FACTS: Witnesses of the shooting of the deceased Galam identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death. SPO4 Cagungao was called on the very
same day to the Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc
Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Sayaboc told him that he
wanted to have a counsel of his own choice however sSayaboc could not name one. The police officers brought Atty.
Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, "okay,"
he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. Cagungao would stop
questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. Sayaboc executed an
extrajudicial confessionin Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon
Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. Accused argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted
in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation,
was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is inadmissible.
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RULING:
Sayabocs extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and
unconstrained giving up of a right (waiver of rights) is missing. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these
rights especially in this case where the suspect only has an educational attainment of Grade IV.
Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the
unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of
Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the
PEOPLE VS BAGNATE
FACTS: Appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation and was informed by the latter
in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used against
or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. His rights were reiterated by Atty. Brotamonte in the
absence of the policemen. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. Appellant signed his
typed confession. The next day, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the MTC of Tabaco, Albay.
Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of
the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to
appellant the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting
them. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative
saying that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in the presence of Atty.
Brotamonte after which appellant affixed his signature. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extrajudicial confession of appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants confession was executed in violation of his constitutional rights thus inadmissible.
HELD: The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the Constitution. An extra-judicial
confession must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent
counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start to be
admissible evidence. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra- judicial confession,
and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused. The assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory. His testimony during
cross-examination leaves no room for doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during the investigation. Appellant
signed the confession with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also
sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the MTC of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the consequences of his confession.
What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an accused without having been
informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably
his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights
was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by
violence or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to
inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed.
PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985

FACTS:
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The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated
almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link
him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his
face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His
body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken.
He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused
be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation.
Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he
had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any
waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment,
again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
SANTOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 7152368
FACTS: All the accused appropriated among themselves the proceeds of amounted to 9,000,000,000 to their own
personal use and benefit which was illegally taken from Central Bank of the Philippines or Bank of the Philippine
Islands. In 1985, accused are found guilty as co- principals in the three separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru
Falsification of Public Documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible in evidence
as their right to counsel was violated when said confessions were executed.
HELD: Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation. It reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
First paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states: (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The 1973 Constitution does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring
that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of said Constitution. Waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of
counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. The
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories,
a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue. Valentino and petitioner Estacio failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the use of
force or intimidation on their persons to obtain he confession.
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PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial confessions; Waiver; If the accused fails to object during the trial
to the presentation of his confession which was taken during the trial to the presentation of his
confession which was taken during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, he is
deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla was charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The information against the accused-appellant charged:
That on or about July 7, 1994 in Iloilo City, said accused, armed with a knife, cosspiring and confederating with Marco
Aguirre who is still at large, working together and heping on another, with deliberate intent and with violence
employed upon the person of Hernandez Abatay, that is by stabbing him with the said knife, with which the accused
was armed at the time, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away with intent to gain 1
Seiko Divers wristwatch valued at P300.00 and cash of P15.00 owned by Hernandez Abatay and as consequence of
the stab wounds suffered by Hernandez Abatay at the hands of the accused, the said Hernandez Abatay died a few
days thereafter.
Accused-appellant contends that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Pauls Hospital that he and
Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given without the assistance of counsel
while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence is inadmissible because the confession was made without he assistance of counsel.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the
constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel.
However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial with the result that the defense is deemed to
have waived objection to its admissibility. No error was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of
the confession.
PEOPLE VS GONZALES
Searches and Seizures: The right to be secure from an unreasonable search may be waived either
expressly or impliedly.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph Bernaldez with robbery with
homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which alleged:
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That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Davao Oriental, the accused, by means of violence
and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously take, steal, and carry away Seiko divers watch valued at P1000.00, one Sanyo cassette recorder
valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00 with a total value of P4,325.00, belong to Nicanor Suralta to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs, represented by his widow, Carolita Suraltain the aforestated sum; and on the
occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed hand gun and a knife, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, therefy
inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.
Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo
Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation of
Section 2 and 12, Art., III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in
evidence against them.
Accused appellant Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant when the latter conducted a search
of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the
cassette recorder and wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial are inadmissible in law because accusedappellants were not informed of their Miranda rights and therewas an absence of a search warrant.
RULING:
As regards to the Miranda rights issue:
The Supreme Court held that the contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was picked up at around 8 am
near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline and was
wearing a wristwatch. According to inspector Malintad, Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation
and voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their admissions to the
police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had begun to
focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom
in a substantial way. Hence, the admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sec.
2(1) and (3), Art. III of the Constitution.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Gonzales told him that one of his companions was Romeo
Bernaldez. On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail at the Police Station of
Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the victim and accused-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez answered that it was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his co-appellant Gonzales. For the
constitutional provision of custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having
committed the crime.
As regards to the absence of search warrant:
The contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales voluntarily
surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of accused-appellant Gonzales, the watches,
cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a consented search, which
constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be
secure from an unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art III, sec 3(2)) in the
Constitution does not apply.
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PEOPLE V. JARA, 144 SCRA 516

The presumption is against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. A curt Opo is insufficient to constitute a
waiver. *Jara, Vergara, and Bernadas were all sentenced to death for robbery with homicide. Jara was also
sentenced to death in the companion case of parricide. They robbed and killed Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara using
a hammer and a pair of scissors while both were sound asleep in the bedroom they shared. The accused took with
them a piggy bank and a Buddha bank. The victims were found the next morning by their employees. The accused
gave extra-judicial confessions without the assistance of counsel.*The presumption is against waiver of the
constitutional right to counsel. The stereotyped advice found in practically all extrajudicial confession to which police
investigators type together with a curt Opo is insufficient to constitute a waiverits tired, punctilious, fixed and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of the right is missing.
FACTS: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue
on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date
of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants,
Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The
confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks
of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution
is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted
his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him
during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.
PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO (G.R. NO. 139179)

FACTS:
On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their
house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what
it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were
inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo explained
that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo
then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it
to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.
Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying.
Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of
wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away
from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and
falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of
the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped
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his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo
successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing the
victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin and
warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told
them.
On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and
Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed Hernan
Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.
However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo
Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan
Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros.
The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit
the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by
treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested his approval of the
killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused.8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a
co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an accessory?
DECISION:
Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who
had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet
took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit
by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the
commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.
Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the
effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That,
precisely, is wanting in the present case.
In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed
to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his
innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear
for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the
victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.
The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
he must be acquitted.
PEOPLE VS ENANORIA
FACTS:
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At around 9:00 oclock in the morning of May 7, 1988, while he was at the Davao Medical Center where he was
brought after his arrest. Enanoria executed an "ante-mortem" statement before P/Cpl. Cerilo S. Solana, Jr. in the
presence of Mayor Duterte and Lt. Col. Calida. Although he claimed that he would still survive inspite of his wound, he
admitted having been shot because he was involved in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He informed the police that
one alias Amil shot Mrs. Dakudao and that they were not able to get the P50,000.00 ransom they had demanded
(Original
Record,
p.
6).
Four days later or on May 11, 1988, Enanoria executed a sworn statement before P/Cpl. Solana at the Talomo Patrol
Station of the Davao City Metrodiscom. After he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel of his own choice, he admitted involvement in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He claimed, however, that he
did not know that he was participating in a kidnapping as he was merely picked up in Tunggol, Pagalungan,
Maguindanao by Amil and one alias Totong. According to Enanoria, Amil and Totong each carried a .38 caliber revolver
and it was Amil who shot Mrs. Dakudao only once at around 1:30 a.m. of May 7, 1988 (Exh. "1" ; Original Record, p.
7).
On June 27, 1988, Enanoria executed a supplementary sworn statement before T/Sgt. Florante M. Rotor of the PCCIS. Assisted by Atty. Jonathan M. Jocom of the CLAO XI, Enanoria was once again apprised of his constitutional
rights before he executed the statement which was sworn before 4th Assistant City Fiscal Antonina B. Escovilla.
In said statement, Enanoria related that he joined the group of Rodrigo Ferolino alias Eboy, his first degree cousin, in
November 1987. The other leaders of the group were Sgt. Bibit of the Philippine Army assigned with the 27th IB
stationed at Bansalan, Davao del Sur and one alias Lugum. The group lured Enanoria with "instant money" as they
had kidnapped a certain Leong and one Angel who respectively paid P50,000.00 and P200,000.00 ransom money.
Hence, Enanoria, one alias Totong, one alias Boy and Rodrigo Ferolino alias Eboy were charged of the crime of
KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER.
Enanorias counsel asserts that the extrajudicial statement which was allegedly the only piece of evidence against his
client, was obtained under duress and in violation of the latters right to counsel and therefore, it should have been
disregarded. Appellants counsel insists that had the court properly disregarded his extrajudicial confession, the cause
of the prosecution would have been reduced to nothing as the prosecution had miserably failed to prove that Lea
Dakudao had indeed been kidnapped and that Enanoria participated therein. As conspiracy was not established,
Enanoria could not be held liable for the crime charged.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the extrajudicial statement was admissible as evidence. YES
(2) Whether or not there is a violation of Enanorias right to counsel. NO
RULING:
(1) Firstly, the rule is well-settled that a confession is presumed to be voluntary and that the confessant, who
bears the burden of proving otherwise , must duly substantiate his claim that the admissions in his affidavit
are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.
(2)
Considering however, that voluntariness is largely determined by external manifestations, the Court has laid down
several factors indicative thereof. Thus, "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor
violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and when they did not have themselves examined by a
reputable physician to buttress their claim" , the defendants are deemed to have voluntarily confessed. Still another
indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the
declarant. Significantly, all these are present in the case at bar.
It is worthy to note as well that the extrajudicial statement was subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City Fiscal
Escovilla who herself extensively testified that she translated the contents of the statement and inquired into the
spontaneity of its execution. There is no showing whatsoever that she was actuated by any reason other than her
desire to perform the solemn task of having affiant voluntarily and intelligently swear to the truth of his statement.
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Based on the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that Enanorias extrajudicial statement is admissible as
evidence. As it sets out in detail his participation in the kidnapping and the eventual murder of Mrs. Dakudao,
Enanorias responsibility has been pinpointed. However, Enanorias extrajudicial confession is not the sole basis for his
conviction. He has been positively identified by Pfc. Aquino Serenio as one of those who scampered out of the Ford
Laser car when it stopped due to flat tires. Enanoria could have disproved this testimony but he failed to do so.
Neither did he present proof that Pfc. Serenio had a motive or reason for his inculpation. Moreover, as correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, his flight from the scene of the crime strongly indicated his guilt.
(2) Enanorias claim that his right to counsel was violated does not hold water either. It is already beyond dispute that
he was actively assisted by a lawyer in the person of Atty. Jocom. The latters presence adequately fulfilled the
constitutional requirement. It must be reiterated at this point that the right to counsel is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Verily, whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in
open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.
BALBAS - PP VS BACOOR, PP VS ANDAN

MARCELO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 109242, JANUARY 26, 1999
FACTS:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those
mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of
the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that
the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of
Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one
Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep
bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were
later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a
travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved
their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to
Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed
the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars. Vela and the
other NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in the letters which, if converted to Philippine
pesos, at the then exchange rate of P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00. 15 the addressees agreed to leave the
envelopes of the letters with the NBI. Those letters which was not claimed were opened in court in the presence of the
counsel for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five dollar bill, one (1)
twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian riyals.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were
asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI
Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated
from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty.
The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbavan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he
was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence.
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HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. The purpose for securing the signature of petitioner
on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. It is
known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any
admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the
letters, the letters are still admissible as evidence because the letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero
as an incident of a valid arrest.
A ruling that petitioner's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on
February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That
these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown
by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis
of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other
prosecution witnesses. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO

FACTS:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of Cesario Alcantara allegedly robbed and raped his
daughter Marites. The group took cash in the amount of P1,400.00, three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one
chicken.
On December 9, 1987, both accused appellants Janson and Pinantao pleaded not guilty.
Appellant JOEL JANSON, denied the accusation against him and claimed that he was not assisted by counsel during
the custodial investigation. He claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that he was made to execute a
sworn statement before a certain policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty. Zerrudo sign the
document. On cross-examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him, saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario
Alcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987 because he was implicated by appellant Janson as one of
the perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio.
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment and found accused Ricky Pinantao alias Ogco
and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the guilt of appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) Whether the extrajudicial confession of Janson is admissible as evidence for the prosecution? and
(3) Whether said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao.
RULING: NO. Appellants should be acquitted.
The trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered
would materially affect the result of the conviction.
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant Joel
Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his right
to counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.
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Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by
which it was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice
of extracting confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false. What
is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional
guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical,
atmosphere of such investigation.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel, and it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver of
the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value.
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant
Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense. As held in the case of People v.
Bonola, where the accused was unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe
that considering the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In such instances,
the need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared statement when they went to the
lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial
confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or when there is an
opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered
hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA V. HON. PURGANAN

GR. NO. 148571 SEPT. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its
decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein
seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty.
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Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best
to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUE:
i.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it.
i.
YES.
The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision
in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts
of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
An information was filed charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a),
subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of
laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant "AAA," a minor, 13 years of age, to
engage in prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having
carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision against Fitzgerald.
Meanwhile, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of
the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.
On August 31, 2001, the CA granted Fitzgerald's bail application.
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on
September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioner
argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong. It also questions the
jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial, In
his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the previous findings of the
existence of strong evidence of his guilt; and justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an
extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail
HELD:
With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA erred when it
allowed respondent to bail.
The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the
law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a
security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified condition. n sum, the
circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to
the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5
directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein
such as those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx not on the
grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of old age and is not in
the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx." The
Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural requirements on bail.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it is
worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee
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or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be
that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing
proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such
gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It
merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the latter's state of
health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent's condition required him to
"xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when,
in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison.
Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. In its August 1,
1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would commit a
similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.
The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such finding, therefore,
remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail application. The CA, therefore, erred when it
granted respondent's Motion for Bail.
CANDOLITA - RODRIGUEZ VS PRESIDING JUDGE, GOVT OF HK VS OLALIA
CASTANEDA - PP VS SANDIGANBAYAN, VALERO VS CA
TRILLANES VS. PIMENTEL

GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
FACTS:
July 27, 2003- more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials.
Later that day, Former President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A
of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
June 30, 2007 - petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate
June 22, 2007 - petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the
media
(e) To be allowed to receive reporters and other members of the media
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related
activities
July 25, 2007 - the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in
which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.
September 18, 2007 - trial court just the same denied the motion, citing the Jalosjos case
Trillanes petitioned for certiorari on the following grounds
- The jurisprudence cited by the honorable court is inapplicable
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a. The accused in the Jalosjos case was already convicted. He was not, therefore he still enjoys the
presumption of innocence
b. Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. He was charged with "coup d'etat," a
political offense
c. Jalosjos attempted to flee. He did not.
- The recommendation to allow the petitioner to attend the senate sessions was not overruled
- His election by the people as senator provides the proper justification to allow him to work and serve his
mandate
- There are enough precedents to allow liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
a. Joseph Estrada
b. Nur Misuari
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Trillanes are tenable
RULING: No. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided bylaw. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE

FACTS:
An information for murder was filed and raffled in the sala of Judge Infante.
recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.
Said information contained a
Based on the said information, without the accused filing a petition for bail and without hearing, Judge Infante issued
twin orders, one granting bail to the accused and another releasing the accused from custody.
Atty. Gacal, private prosecutor, upon learning the orders, made a very urgent motion to cancel the bailbond and to
enforce or re-issue a new warrant of arrest but the same was denied by Judge Infante on the ground that it was a pro
forma, without conformity coming from the public prosecutor, and that he was not authorized to act as such under
Section of 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. He further directed that the bail issue be held in abeyance awaiting the
comment of the public prosecutor.
The public prosecutor, in his comment, stated that the bail and the releasing of the accused was proper based on his
recommendation and that such recommendation was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to bail hearing.
Atty. Gacal then filed an administrative complaint against Judge Infante, that the granting of bail without a petition for
bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the
rules.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
HELD:
Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines on the matter of bail: (1) in case no application
for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable; and (2) public prosecutors failure to oppose application for bail or to
adduce evidence did not dispense with hearing.
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His role in the administration
of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded
by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was
inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.
He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial
discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was
made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any order
he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and
caprice and outright arbitrariness.
COMENDADOR vs. DE VILLA

FACTS:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising
from the same incident.
The petitioners, who are officers of the AFP, were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup d' etat on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now
claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. The charges against
them are violation of AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), and AW 94 (Various
Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the RPC (Murder).
Before the charges were referred to General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel had been
constituted to investigate the petitioners. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses,
and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel
to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing. This was done through a Motion for Summary
Dismissal. The PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
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The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial of the motion, alleging denial of due process. They
also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were
presented to reaffirm their affidavits.
One of the petitioners applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the
RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction.
Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their
release.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was a denial of due process.
2. WON there was a violation of the accuseds right to bail. **
HELD:
1. NO denial of due process.
Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the
scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990,
when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly
warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of
their right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. Due process is satisfied as long
as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.
2.
No. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available
in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail. National security considerations should also impress that release on bail of
petitioners constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 accused soldiers roaming the
streets of the Metropolis on bail. They could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept
of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated, and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated
against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
ASWAT vs. GALIDO

FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Aswat and Felix Nebres were both enlisted men of the AFP respectively holding the ranks Private
First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of
Brigadier General Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Galido's wife. On
December 29, 1988, Aswat was involved in a shooting incident at Baguio City, which resulted in the death of Nebres.
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Records disclose that Aswat voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated
at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on December 31, 1988. Aswat has been
detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Lucena City since then.
On April 20, 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial with violation of Article 94 of the
Articles of War (AW). the specification being homicide.
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition, contending: (1) that the
specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the
offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right
pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay,
aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention.
Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and those committed inside a military
installation or reservation. He assails the jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide
was committed in Baguio City and in an area outside any military installation or reservation.
ISSUES:
1. WON Aswat shall be tried in a regular, civilian court;
2. WON he is entitled to be released on a bail as a matter of right pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. NO. The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago.
Article 94 of the AW, in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine military
reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article
94:
Art 94. Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or
violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the
penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the
offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct xxx
There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the time the
latter was shot and killed. Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOMGCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed
estopped to deny such jurisdiction.
2.
NO. Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled in Comendador vs. De Villa that
the guarantee is not without any exception. It has been held that the right to has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Under Article 70, A.W., "any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under
these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require." Confinement is one way
of ensuring presence during sessions of the General Court-Martial; the more important reason underlying the
authority to impose confinement is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with the
command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct
may be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter
properly left to the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers.
VILLASEOR VS. HON. ABAO, ET AL SANCHEZ
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FACTS
-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a
family of five, was charged with the murder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was
reduced to P40k. The petitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty. However,
respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the information, now accusing the petitioner with Direct Assault Upon an Agent
of a Person in Authority with Murder" before the arraignment on the murder charge. So on August 7, respondent
judge cancelled the petitioners bond and ordered his immediate arrest.-On September 9 upon petitioners motion to
reconsider, the respondent judge resolved to admit petitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60k.
On September 15, on petitioners motion that original bond previously given be reinstated ,respondent judge resolved
to fix "the bond anew in real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the province of
Marinduque actually staying, therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said
residents for five years."-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for preliminary junction to SC, seeking to set aside
respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, and to reinstate the bail bond approved on May
29(original bond), charging the respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdiction and w/grave
abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed orders-Oct 3: the Court issued
a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal
case to avoid delay in its prosecution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the P60K bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that excessive bail
shall not be required?
RULING:
NO, the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability of
the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.
Reasoning
Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2)) nature of the offense; (3)penalty for the offense
charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused;(6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7)probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definition of bail):
"the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance."-Circular 47 of the
Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of
P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here, petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct
assault upon an agent of a person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of capital
punishment.
DE LA CAMARA VS. ENAGE

FACTS:
Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in
the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his coaccused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted
and the amount was fixed at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of the bailbond is excessive
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HELD:
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the
Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be
clearer, therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional provision under the
circumstances.
YAP JR VS CA
FACTS: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence
and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and
was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as
maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it
exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash
bond
he
had
filed
earlier
in
the
proceedings.
ISSUE: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?
HELD: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of
this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
MANOTOC VS. CA
FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc
Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a
case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for
departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of
its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He
was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative
to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the
judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request
denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail
nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.
HELD: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
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himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as
consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never
indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the provision on right to travel.
DIMALIGALIG - SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ, SILVERIO VS CA
PEOPLE VS DONATO (1991)

FACTS:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and
after February 1986. On May 9, 1987, Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is
not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834
and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory
decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall
report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof.
Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to
present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested;
(Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to
substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were
also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his
arrest.
ISSUE: WON the private respondent has the right to bail.
HELD:
Yes, he has the right to bail. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without
hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of
rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
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Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case (petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein:
accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released
immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for habeas
corups was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a
waiver. The SC ruled that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
LARDIZABAL VS REYES (1994)

FACTS:
Minor Cynthia L. Lardizabal, through Atty. Luis L. Lardizabal, filed a complaint against Judge Oscar A. Reyes, for
ignorance of the law resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. The complaint alleges that on 1 September 1993, the
complainant, a 12-year old girl, filed a criminal complaint for rape against a certain Dionisio Lozano alias "Dioning";
that after conducting the required preliminary investigation of the complainant and her witnesses, respondent judge
issued on 2 September 1993 an order directing the arrest of the accused, but at the same time, motu proprio, fixed
the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without any application on the part of the accused to be admitted
to bail and without conducting any hearing thereon; that when the accused filed on 7 September 1993 a motion to
reduce bail from P80,000.00 to P20,000.00, respondent judge, again, without prior notice and hearing, reduced the
bail to P40,000.00. Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent Judge Reyes explained that after carefully
considering and evaluating the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation, acting with all honesty and good
faith, he arrived at a conclusion that the evidence adduced was not strong enough to deny bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused; that he later reduced the bail to P40,000.00 on the premise that justice must be tempered with
mercy and based also on the due process clause which protects an accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged.
ISSUES: (1) WON the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. Answer: In the course of a regular trial (2) WON the order of the court
granting the bail should be considered void on the ground that there was violation of procedural due process since the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present evidence on the probable guilt of the accused before the court
resolved motion for bail: Answer: It should be declared void.
RULING: The Court does not accept as satisfactory respondent's explanation that good faith urged him to fix and
grant bail motu proprio for the provisional release of the accused charged with rape. By so doing, he acted irregularly,
thereby depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. The rule is explicit that
when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be
granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a
judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong.
PEOPLE VERSUS SERGIO AND RAMIL MANES
FACTS: The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their
purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shut Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and
.38 caliber revolver with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and
gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death immediately thereafter.
The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.The trial court issued a warrant of
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arrest against the accused. the accused filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution.
The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage
of the trial and the trial court rendered judgment and convicted both the accuse guilty of the crime.
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of
relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful
aggression.The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not both the accused should be granted the right to bail?
RULING: No, both the accused should not be granted the right to bail.
Under the law, in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court
hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in
the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest
opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail.
What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an accused is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of
guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. Thus, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ALONTE VERSUS SAVELLANO

G.R. NO. 131652 MARCH 9, 1998
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was
alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of
Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian.
The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of
venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due
to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape
and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
RULING: NO. Alonte was not being denied of criminal due process.
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Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of
choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after
she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not
used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one
and may be waived." (emphasis supplied) it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must
be positively demonstrated.
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right
should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an
enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the
court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as
prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it
appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper
disposition of the trial court.
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him
and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and
the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by
repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and
the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
PEOPLE V. MACARANG
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed charging appellant, Ariel Macarang, with the crime of qualified rape of his own
daughter; one when she was 12, the other when she was 13. He was sentenced to suffer the ultimate penalty of
death in each of the criminal cases.
Ariel filed an appeal against the fact that the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to present
his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver.
The trial court, apparently irked by the numerous postponements of the cases, issued a warning that if in the next
scheduled hearing, he would not still be ready to present evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to
do so. Despite warning, accused was still not able to present evidence, therefore he was declared as deemed to have
waived his right.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant was deprived of his right to due process in such criminal case.
HELD: YES. In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, the presiding judge is called upon to see
to it that the accused is made aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial court. It must
be noted that the waiver of the right to present defense evidence in the present cases was not even voluntary nor
upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and his
counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings.
As stated by the trial court, appellant manifested in open court that he was still not ready to do so, that is, that he
was not ready to present his evidence. Appellant never said that he did not wish to present evidence. It should have
been clear to the trial court that appellant never intended to waive his right to present his evidence. Thus, a simple
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forewarning to the appellant that the next time that he would not be ready with his defense evidence, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to present it, did not satisfy appellants constitutional right to due process. The trial
court should have first apprised appellant or explained to him in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a
waiver. The trial court should have satisfied itself that appellant understood the real import of the courts action if it
would consider him as having waived his right to present his evidence if he would not be ready to do so the next time
the case would be called for trial.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial court granted
the motion of appellants counsel to withdraw his appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no more counsel. The trial
court did not ask him if he would wish to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or want the court to
designate a de oficio counsel for him. Consequently, appellants inaction should not be taken against him. It did not
justify the trial court to render judgment against him without first ensuring that appellant was aware of the
consequences of the waiver of his right to present his evidence, and without exerting any effort to ask him if he would
like to be represented by another lawyer of his own choice or through the assistance of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) or through a counsel de oficio appointed by the court.
DIMARUCUT V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
The accused was charged with Frustrated Murder in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan for allegedly hitting a certain Angelito
Rosini on his head with an iron pipe. After trial, he was charged of the lesser penalty of frustrated homicide.
While still at the trial stage, petitioners motion to admit and demurrer to evidence was denied as it was not
seasonably filed (petitioner was granted fifteen (15) days from August 8, 2001 within which to file demurrer to
evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.[16] Before the CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no less than
four (4) motions for extension to file brief, his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants
brief due to personal problems emanating from his [counsels] wifes recent surgical operation. but which was never
filed nor attached. The last extension given expired on June 6, 2007, without any brief submitted by petitioner or his
counsel.
He filed the Omnibus Motion on May 8, 2008, asking for another 30 days to file the appeal brief, reiterating that his
failure to file was due to the fault of his lawyer who is suffering from personal problems and depression. He also cited
his advanced age of almost 76 and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary
emphysema.) But even as he did, still no appellants brief was attached by petitioner. This was denied; thus, the
appeal.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process of law given that he was not served with a notice requiring him to
show cause?
HELD: No. Under Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal case may
be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the
prescribed time. The phrase with notice to the appellant means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant
to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.[13]
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show cause
why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give an
appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed because of such failure,
in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.
Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in
considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions
granted to him and non-compliance to date. Dismissal of appeal by the appellate court sans notice to the accused for
failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse. Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate
court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for
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reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file
his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held
proper. Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant took no steps either by
himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his
abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal.
Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by petitioner and his counsel of the reglementary periods for filing
motions and perfecting appeal. Having been afforded the opportunity to seek reconsideration and setting aside of
the motu proprio dismissal by the CA of his appeal for non-filing of the appeal brief, and with his subsequent inaction
to have his appeal reinstated after the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner cannot impute error or grave
abuse on the CA in upholding the finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance with the requirement of notice or
show cause order before the motu proprio dismissal under Section 8, paragraph 1 of Rule 124 had thereby been
cured.[17] Under the circumstances, the petitioner was properly declared to have abandoned his appeal for failing to
diligently prosecute the same.
Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period. Thus,
we explained in Redea v. Court of Appeals:[21]
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of
property without due process of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To
him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he
was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellants
brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin for new
trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and
allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of
these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the clients cause must be shown. Here, petitioners counsel failed to file
the appellants brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does
not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceeding below. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[22]
EUGENIO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and
lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend separate loans to Saquitan and Ty (the borrowers). Two
parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. With regards
to TCT No. 171602, its validity was confirmed with the Register of Deeds of Manila. With this assurance, Respondent
Mangali extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale.
The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Respondent Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT
Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not
registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an
entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against
Eugenio. The RTC convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition.
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Petitioner denied taking part in any conspiracy to swindle Mangali. Petitioner claimed that since 1993, Mangali had
sought her services to run errands for him in the titling of lots and follow-up of a Social Security System claim.
Afterwards, Mangali recruited her as his commissioned agent in Mangalis check re-discounting and lending
businesses. Thus, even before 14 November 1995, petitioner had brokered check rediscounting and loan deals with
Mangali.
Petitioner Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that there was conspiracy between her and the borrowers
to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some irregularities which
attended her arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether the inference for Petitioners innocence must prevail
HELD:
YES. While it is true that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the
concerted acts of the accused, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
conspiracy suffices to negate the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.
In determining petitioners participation in the events leading to her arrest, the following unrefuted facts must be
considered: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and lending
businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602.
As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn
commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the ocassions Mangali met the borrowers, Saquitan and Ty
she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to
receive commission from Mangali.
Regarding the validity of TCT No. 171602, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds of
Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office.
On petitioners alleged liability for Estafa in using the allegedly falsified TCT No. 92585, the trial court anchored its
finding on the presumption that petitioner was party to its falsification because she had possession of such title.
However, as pointed out by petitioner, it was Ty who brought with her what she represented to be her owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 92585 and which she presented to Mangali. For the presumption of authorship of
falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had profited from the use of the falsified document. Here,
the prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali extended to
Ty, just as there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to
Saquitan. Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan signed.
In sum, the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed, when,
as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring
the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent
with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
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powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that,
in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is
a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
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by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
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The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
FULGAR - LEJANO VS PP, DEL CASTILLO VS PP
VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Callangan was found guilty of the crime of perjury. She then filed a motion for new trial on the ground that she was
deprived of her day in court because of the gross negligence of her counsel, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, and his
utter lack of diligence in the performance of his duty to represent her in every stage of the suit. She attributed the
following omissions to her counsel:
1. failure to file the demurrer to evidence despite leave of court previously granted;
2. failure to inform his client of the April 14, 1999 order of the court considering the intended demurrer to
evidence as abandoned;
3. failure to attend the hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense (i.e., petitioner) despite
notice, which failure was deemed by the MTC as a waiver of petitioners right to present her evidence;
4. failure to seek proper relief from the adverse effects of said orders and
5. failure to appear on the promulgation of judgment.
The MTC denied the motion for new trial. It held that the ground invoked by petitioner was not among those provided
in the Rules of Court for new trial in criminal cases. Upon appeal, the MTC decision was affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether Callangans right to be heard was violated. No
RULING: True, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it issued the order denying
petitioners motion for new trial. The records of the case are bereft of any indication that Judge Cornejo arbitrarily,
despotically or deliberately failed to afford petitioner her constitutionally mandated right to be heard. The cause of
petitioners travails and misfortune was the negligence of her own counsel.
However, in view of the circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of
petitioners criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of
justice and to give meaning to the due process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner
to present evidence in her defense.
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1)
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such
cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.
The omissions of petitioners counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show
conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of
petitioners counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance
(malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel. Considering these
findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due
process.
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In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave
denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned.
In People v. Ferrer, the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in
the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of
her cause. Counsels utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his
part. Such inaction definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioners cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It
should not be allowed to prejudice petitioners constitutional right to be heard. The Courts pronouncement in Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, applies strongly in this case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just
because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of rules must
yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged.
Therefore, in consonance with the demands of justice and to prevent any outright deprivation of liberty, the Court
deems it best to give petitioner a chance to present evidence in her defense. The case should be remanded to the
MTC for acceptance and appraisal of petitioners evidence.
Petitioner does not seek her exoneration but the opportunity to present evidence in her defense. Considering the
gross negligence of her counsel on whom she reposed her trust to protect her rights, justice demands that she be
given that chance.
PEOPLE V. SIONGCO G.R. NO. 186472 JULY 5, 2010

Rule 115 Rights of the accused
FACTS: Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko Satimbre, a resident of Balanga, Bataan,
to board a bus bound for Pilar, Bataan and promised the latter a Gameboy. He was then bought to Dinalupihan,
Bataan where he was kept for the night. Two days after, Siongco called Elvira Satimbre, Nikkos mother, and
demanded P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her son. Siongco further threatened that Nikko would be killed
if Elvira failed to give the ransom money. Nikko was moved to Taguig City and was cautioned not to tell anybody that
he was kidnapped. Appellants were finally arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the PAOCTF four days
after Nikko was kidnapped. The RTC convicted appellants of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, then punishable
by death, with the exception of Boton, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction byt
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
On review, the appellants claimed that they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel
when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the pre-trial
conference, direct examination and cross-examination of the prosecutions principal witness, Nikko. This was so,
despite Atty. Moraldes manifestation during Nikkos cross-examination that the defense of his actual client, accused
Boton, conflicts with that of the other accused.
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ISSUE:
Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel by the
appointment of Atty.Moralde.
HELD: NO, A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants counsel de oficio in six (6)
hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was
inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is appointed during the
absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire
to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. The choice of counsel by the accused in a
criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not
precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and independent, to enable the trial to
proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be
entirely dictated by the accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
MILLA VS PP
Facts:
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In March
2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation, which was
engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property therein located. For this purpose,
he showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title registered in the name of spouses Farley and Jocelyn
Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the spouses in favor of Milla.
Since Lopez was convinced by Millas authority, MPI purchased the property for P2 million After receiving the check,
Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI
and (2) an original Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT After receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 25 March 2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopezs partner, a copy of the new Certificate of Title to the
property registered in the name of MPI but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the transfer taxes and other
costs incurred in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with the
Register of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could not be found
therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered
in the name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of P2 million from Milla, , who then issued Equitable PCI
Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of P1 million each. However,
these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the demand letter
sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board of Directors, filed a Complaint
against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Public Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial Court.
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence.[9] In its Order dated
26 January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to do so
despite having been granted ample opportunity.[10] Though the court considered his right to present evidence to
have been consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
CA affirmed RTC
Issue: whether or not Milla was deprived of due process because of negligence of counsel?
Decision: No
Held:
Milla was not deprived of due process.
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Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him of due
process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised
to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it had issued a warrant for
his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New Trial, which Milla claims to have
been denied by the trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus, demonstrating his counsels negligence. These
contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is
so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client.[20] In this case, Milla was able to
file a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial courts denial thereof, was allowed to present evidence.[21] Because of
his failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had waived his right thereto. Nevertheless, the
trial court still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of justice. Further, contrary to his assertion that
RTC Br. 146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his former counsel, a reading of the 2
August 2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Recall of
Warrant of Arrest, but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing
him to file an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and was
granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so
gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.
PP VS RIO
Facts (regarding counsel de officio):

On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
poverty.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the
accused-appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he desired the appointment of a counsel de
oficio on appeal, in view of the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and inasmuch as poverty
should not preclude anyone from pursuing a cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of court of the trial court
be required by the Court to submit the response of the accused-appellant along with a certificate of compliance with
the duty imposed on him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court
upon the presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain from the appellant, if he is confined in
prison, whether he desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend him
de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to be prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate
of compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.
Issue: whether or not legal assistance should be given to accused?
Decision: yes
Held (dont know if this is from SC or lower court, basta ito ang reason lol):
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the
appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant for, as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason offered by him
for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a
reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any forum.
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It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his
appeal pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional mandate provided in Section 11
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel
Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is
required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty,
as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of
the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law."
9 Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales
should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another
Facts (case regarding rape of the child):
The above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. After relieving herself but before she could
raise her panty, the accused entered the bathroom with his body already exposed, held Wilma's hands, and ordered
her in a loud voice to lie down and when she resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to lie down.
The medical report also showed that Wilma is "in a non-virgin state physicially."
The accused's defense was anchored on alibi. Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape.
Issue: whether or not accused is guilty of rape?
Decision: yes
Held:
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents and children, husband and wife, and
other relatives and even among those not related to each other. For such defense to prosper, the accused must prove
that it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's
brother Amado, it deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the fact that while the accusedappellant had another brother and sister living in Manila besides the complainant's mother, those two never came to
his aid. Were the accused the innocent man he claims to be, these siblings would have readily helped in his defense.
The testimony of his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the necessary doubt to acquit him as against the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a twelve-year old child, would undergo the expense,
trouble and inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention suffer the scandal, embarrassment and humiliation such
action inevitably invites, as wen as allow an examination of her private parts if her motive were not to bring to justice
the person who had abused her. A victim of rape will not come out in the open if her motive were not to obtain
justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will abuse her child and make her undergo the trauma
of a public trial only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for leaving her without the services of an unpaid helper
were it not with the aim to seek justice for her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish to stamp his child
falsely with the stigma that follows a rape.
MARTINEZ VS PEOPLE
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FACTS:
Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a motion
to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner to go to the
Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.
Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto affidavits by
himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court subsequently issued a
resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees within five (5) days from
notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court.
Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under
protest" and that the money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money
orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.
In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the
required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket fee. In the
second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on the ground that it was short of 150.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as
pauper litigant?
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a motion to
litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with the
Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion
to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other disinterested persons were enough to
convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.
The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow the
petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.
PEOPLE VS TABIO
FACTS:
Jimmy Tabio, appellant, raped a 23 years old with a mental age of a six-year old child. Tabio was charged with three
(3) counts of rape in a single Information.
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ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecutions
failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information
RULING:
The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with
approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder,
or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the
imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information.
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally
retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental disability of the complainant at the time of
the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that
sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the
Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.
The Court also observes that there is duplicity143 of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a
motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to
interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver
PEOPLE VS AURE (2008)

Facts: On 20 January 2000, 2 separate informations for rape were filed with the RTC charging appellants (Arnulfo
Aure and Marlon Ferol) of rape of AAA. Both happened on November 7, 1999 when AAA was under investigation for
illegal recruitment. Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. The appellants pleaded not guilty to
the charges. On Nov 9, AAA went to a hospital for a medical examination wherein she admitted to the doctor that she
was raped. Per advice of her lawyer, she reported the incident to the NBI.Subsequently, preliminary investigations
were made but appellants did not appear during the hearings. The prosecution proffered documentary evidence to
bolster the testimonies of its witnesses: (1) sworn statement of AAA, (2) medico-legal certificate of AAA, (3) referralletter of the NBI to the Caloocan City Prosecutors Office, (4) joint-affidavit of Agent Abulencia, Agent Erum and other
NBI agents,etc. The defense presented the testimonies of appellants, SPO2 Jaime Acido, Virgilio Torres, Ronald
Orcullo, Mary Ann Aglibar,etc to refute the foregoing accusations. Appellants denied any liability and interposed the
defense of alibi. On 12 November 1999,NBI agents swooped down in the CIDG office to conduct an inquest proceeding
on appellants for the rape of AAA. Colonel Danao refused to turn over appellants because the proceeding was
improper as appellants were not previously arrested. RTC rendered a decision convicting Aure and Ferol but they were
acquitted for the other charge for failure to prove conspiracy. Appellants maintain that the foregoing findings and
rulings of the RTC are inconsistent with the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot
individually and separately convict appellants of rape because the informations in the two cases alleged conspiracy
between them in raping AAA. Also, appellant Ferol cannot be convicted in Criminal Case II of rape committed on 8
November 1999 because such fact was not alleged in the informations. Appellants argued that the said finding and
ruling of the RTC violated their constitutional rights to be informed of the nature of the case against them, to be
presumed innocent of the charges, and to due process.
Issue: THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ACCUSED APPPELLANTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
REQUISITE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
THE RTC IN RENDERING AND PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT ASSAILED DECISION MANIFESTED CLEAR SIGNS
OF BIAS, PARTIALITY AND PREJUDICE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
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Held: It appears from the records that upon filing of a complaint by AAA for rape against appellants with the Caloocan
City Prosecutors Office, a preliminary investigation was scheduled on 3 and 17 December 1999 by Prosecutor Yu.
Thereafter, two subpoenas for the said investigation, dated 22 November 1999 (for the 3 December 1999 schedule)
and 3 December 1999 (for the 17 December 1999 schedule), were sent by Prosecutor Yu to appellants at the latters
CIDG office. Despite receipt of these subpoenas, appellants did not appear during the conduct of preliminary
investigation. Appellants claim that they did not receive said subpoenas in the CIDG office does not inspire belief
because they were active, on-duty police officers at the CIDG during the period of November and December 1999. In
fact, appellant Ferol was the acting Chief of the Warrant Department of the CIDG office during the period of November
and December 1999. The said department was in charge of receiving subpoenas and warrants from courts and other
offices. It was unbelievable that they did not receive, nor was informed, of the subpoenas.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is not enough since bias and partiality can never be presumed.
There was no plausible proof that Judge Vidal was bias. On the contrary, the records show that Judge Vidal was fair
and considerate to both prosecution and defense. In the said 47-page Decision, Judge Vidal has thoroughly and
extensively discussed the facts and the law on which appellants conviction for rape were based. Thus, the appellants
were afforded due process.
PEOPLE VS GUEVARRA (2008)

Facts: On Aug 30, 2002, the accused were charged with murder wherein he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
followed and the prosecution presented witnesses namely: Anacleto who is the cousin of the deceased saw appellant
shoot Inspector Barte several times with a short firearm. He also brought the victim to the hospital, Antonette, 2
police officers who were in duty and the surgeon.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Ferdinand Ravino. No documentary
evidence was presented. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He said that at the time of the incident, he was at
Brgy Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a certain Hector Africa (Africa). He arrived
therein on the afternoon of 23 August 2002 and left on the morning of 26 August 2002. He was not acquainted with
Inspector Barte and came to know that he was accused of killing Inspector Barte when he arrived at Batangas City
from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon of 26 August 2002. He was informed that he would be salvaged for killing
Inspector Barte. Hence, he became afraid and hid in his house for two weeks. Thereafter, he surrendered to the
mayor of Batangas City who turned him over to the Batangas City police. He alleged that Anacleto and Antonette
testified against him because he did not support the candidacy of Antonette during the previous election for barangay
captain where Antonette lost. He supported then the candidacy of the incumbent barangay captain. After trial, the
RTC rendered a Decision on 4 July 2006 convicting appellant of murder.
Issue: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Held: Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.Denial and alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case, the court
found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of Anacleto and Antonette credible. In
addition, the crime scene was well-lighted by a nearby lamp post and lights coming from the videoke bar which
enabled him to recognize appellant. Further, he was familiar with the face of appellant because the latter was his
barriomate. Anacletos direct account of how appellant shot Inspector Barte is candid and convincing. Aggravating
circumstance were also proven but he is entititled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (mao ra
gyud na ang discussion sa fulltext, not sure kung related sa topic nato.)
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MASANGUID - PP VS BARTOLINI, PP VS MENDOZA
TAN vs. PP (2009)

Speedy Trial
FACTS: On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of
the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World
Resources Corporation (BW) shares and the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. In two other related cases, two
Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act
involving BW shares of stock. On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano,
filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that the cases be consolidated together which the trial court granted.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial
was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.
ISSUE: whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy trial.
HELD: There is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to
speedy trial
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of
Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating
historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, justice delayed is
justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal
cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was
deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was
presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution
did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To
this, we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case
No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter
was discussed during the initial hearing. Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the
preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal
Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried separately
is fatal to his case
In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said right to
speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More
importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary
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hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and
waived his objection thereto.
MELENDREZ - OLBES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
JACOB v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2010)

FACTS
Petron received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by assignment from 18 private firms registered with the Board of
Investments (BOI) and used these TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities. Petron then forwarded said documents to the
One Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (OSS), with a request for authorization to use said
TCCs to pay for its excise tax liabilities.
However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman eventually found that the
aforementioned transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement dated
August 29, 1989.
The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against several public officers and provate individuals including
Jacob (President of Petron) and Legarda (Vice President of Petron) for perpetrating the so-called tax credit scam.
Petitioners and four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office
of the Ombudsman. Sixty days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on the
status of the motions for reconsideration. Months passed and then an entire year passed. The sixty days granted to
the prosecution became more than four hundred days but still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario then issued a verbal order dismissing the cases. Six months after the verbal order of dismissal, the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division issued an Order setting aside said verbal order.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying petitioners right to speedy trial.
HELD
No. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners
and their co-accused by reason thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a finding that petitioners right to
speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them would have justified the dismissal of the criminal cases.
In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a
valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without
the approval or consent of the other members of the Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of
dismissal of the cases.
MARI v PEOPLE (2011)

FACTS
Complainant executed a sworn statement in PNP-CIDG of Tacloban City where she stated that she was raped by the
respondent at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A warrant of arrest was issued and private respondent
voluntarily surrendered and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.
Private respondent filed a motion for bail and was allowed to post bail set at P200,000.00. A probable cause was
found against private respondent and an Information for Rape was filed. A warrant of arrest was immediately issued
against private respondent.
The arraignment and hearing were repeatedly rescheduled on different dates due to different reasons. One of the
reasons for the postponement of hearing was the pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of venue
before this Court.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rashly
and precipitately dismissing the rape case against private respondent.
HELD
No. The Supreme Court debunked petitioners argument that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private
respondent too hurriedly. Here, it must be emphasized that private respondent had already been deprived of his
liberty on two occasions.
Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive. Because of private
respondent's continued incarceration, any delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice. Thus, it was
absolutely vexatious and oppressive to delay the trial in the subject criminal case to await the outcome of petitioners'
petition for transfer of venue.
Hence, the Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing the case
against private respondent for violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
GARCIA vs. DOMINGO

FACTS:
In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, eight informations were filed on
January 16, 1968. The criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana, were as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana), there were 2
cases for slight physical injuries and 1 case for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel, the cases were for
maltreatment, slight physical injuries, and light threats; c. Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and
Carbonnel) the cases were for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer), and
slander."
The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held from March to August 10, 1968. The trial of the cases
in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia.
During all the fourteen days of trial it was only on April 20, 1968 that Atty. Consengco, representing
respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. At the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, on the said date
and and respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. At the conclusion of the
hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Up to this date,
respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings.
The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September
28, 1968, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning. The applications for postponement were not
grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.
In the morning of October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Consengco, filed with the
Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge acting on such petition issued a restraining
order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an
order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely
affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held
exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner,
"to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the
criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'"
A motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: WON there was a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a public trial
Ruling:
The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, explicitly enumerated
the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Justice Jose P. Laurel stressed: "Trial should also be public
in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner. He concluded his historical review that
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"Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal
trials be open to the public."
The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. It does seem fairly obvious that here is an
instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial
must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is
the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity
and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the
importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right
is deemed embraced in procedural due process.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size
of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a
trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he
may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. Chief Justice Moran said
thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record
that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed
waived" (United States v. Mercado).
There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as
against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts
would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil
as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense
atmosphere. As a result, the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence
unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal
acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be
rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that
a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust,
unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned
chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the
order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
FACTS:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broad Kaster ng Pilipinas(KBP), an association representing duly franchised
and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history."2 The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to
the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
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ISSUE: What is the extent of the right to information of the press on covering judicial proceedings?
RULING:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also
approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must
never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process.
ANIMAS VS MINSTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS: Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate for Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental in the November 11, 1971 local elections. The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the
alleged killing of Yanson on the of the November 11 elections.
The accused were arrested almost a year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was only
in 1974 that a summary preliminary investigation was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate
General Service. The report of the Negros Occidental PC Command states that Zacarias Seminio Jr., a candidate for
Vice-Mayor, gave fist blows and kicked Yanson then ordered Carlos Javier to get a piece of water pipe to beat up the
victim, while pointing his pistol and watching the latter being mauled. Yanson was allegedly brought in a car to
Malicon Beach, shot, tied with rope attached to an engine block and dumped at sea. Originally, 18 men were to be
charged with murder, qualified by superior strength, night time, use of motor vehicle, and treachery. The list of 18
accused was later trimmed to 14.
The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering that one of them,
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding
charge sheet, but he modified the crime charged from Murder to Violation of Section 878 of the Revised
Administrative Code in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, Illegal Possession
of Firearms with Murder.
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunals Branch of the Judge
Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. 27.
Sometime in 1977, the petitioners were released even as the Provincial Fiscal commenced to investigate the murder
charge. However, a warrant of arrest was issued on June 8, 1978, resulting in the re-arrest of 14 accused including
the petitioners.
On November 25, 1978, with two of the accused agreeing to become witnesses for the State. However, when the case
was called for trial on June 25, 1979, the title of the charge sheet was amended on motion of the prosecution by the
addition of the phrase Violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There was, however, no amendment of the
body of the charge sheet.
Before trial could proceed, the respondent Minister of National Defense ordered on June 30, 1979, the transfer of the
case to the civil courts. Before the order could be implemented, it was superseded by the respondent Ministers 1st
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Indorsement dated August 22, 1979, directing immediate implementation of the hand-written marginal instructions
dated August 14, 1979 of the President enfaced on the letter of Nelly Yanson, the wife of the deceased-victim.
ISSUE: WON the Military Commission has jurisdiction wherein the formers jurisdiction only refers to illegal
possession of firearms and explosive and not in relation to crimes committed with a political complexion.
RULING: The petitioners allege that respondent Military Commission No. 27 has no jurisdiction over the instant case.
They ask that it be declare as null and void the lst Indorsement of respondent Minister of National Defense and the
corresponding order of arrest dated June 8, 1978 of respondent military commission for having been issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction.
According to the petitioners, Military Commission No. 27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against
them because General Order No. 59 upon which the Commissions jurisdiction is anchored refers only to illegal
possession of firearms and explosives in relation to crimes committed with a political complexion. They point out that,
from the charge sheet, the only crime imputed against them is murder and that the essential elements of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms were not alleged. They also stress that the alleged killing of the deceased Yanson was
devoid of any political complexion.
The President issued Proclamation No. 2045 which ostensibly lifted martial law in the Philippines. Unfortunately, the
more important and necessary step of dismantling the apparatus and structures of martial rule was not taken.
Proclamation No. 2045 while revoking General Order No. 8 and dissolving the military tribunals earlier established
under the Order, created a lacunae or penumbral area insofar as pending military tribunal cases were concerned. The
policy announced in the Proclamation was to transfer cases pending with the military tribunals to civilian courts except
those which may not be transferred because of irreparable prejudice to the state in view of the rules on double
jeopardy or other circumstances which would render further prosecution of cases difficult if not impossible. While
dissolving military tribunals, the Proclamation also mandated that their dissolution would be effective only when they
finally decide pending cases which should not be transferred to civil courts.
When civilian and military accused are segregated and tried for the same offense in two separate tribunals, the
witnesses would be presented twice and would testify two times on exactly the same incident, with all the concomitant
mischief such a procedure entails. This is not to mention the ever present possibility of the military tribunal and the
civil court coming up with diametrically opposing decisions on the same facts and issues. The P. D. also mandates that
any waiver is for the civilian to submit himself to the military tribunal and not for the armed forces member to opt for
a civilian trial.
Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of the decrees insofar as civilian takeover of jurisdiction was concerned
and notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and vacillation characteristic of its implementation, this Court relied on the
enunciated policy ofnormalization in upholding the primacy of civil courts. This policy meant that as many cases as
possible involving civilians being tried by military tribunals as could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over
immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts always trying civilian accused.
The petitioners were investigated for Murder. The crime was committed on November 10, 1971 long before there
was any intimation that cases with absolutely no national security implications nor political complexion and, whoever
the accused may be, would be taken away from the civil courts where they properly belong. The Summary Preevaluation Report prepared by Captain Federico G. Real, Inquest Officer, and approved by Lt. Col. Meliton D. Goyena,
Provincial Commander of the Negros Occidental Constabulary Command refers to the crime of murder committed by
the petitioners. The resolution of Captain Cesar T. Demetria of the Judge Advocate General Service on the preliminary
investigation he conducted covers an investigation for murder, and nothing else.
When the charge sheet was prepared, the offense charged was no longer murder but Violation of Sec. 878 of the
Revised Administrative Code in Relation to Sec. 2692 of the same Code and P.D. No. 9 (Illegal Possession of Firearm
With Murder). The change in the offense charged was obviously to bring it within the jurisdiction of a military court.
The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10, 1971 long before the proclamation
of martial law. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at
the time. Now that it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past, hopefully never more to return, there
is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained, at this time, by a military tribunal. The
reason given by the August 14, 1979 marginal notation on the letter of Mrs. Nelly M. Yanson for retention of
jurisdiction by military courts, In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party, even assuming it to be
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true, can be overcome through a careful monitoring by an interested parties to insure that the trial court is indeed
responsive to the demands of justice.
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes and civilian accused at a time when all civil courts
were fully operational and freely functioning.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is hereby GRANTED. Criminal Case No. MC-27-68 is ordered transferred to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental with the prosecution to be handled by the Provincial Fiscal. The
temporary restraining order dated October 23, 1979 is made permanent.
OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members
Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose
Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro
Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and
inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition
and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the
period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
SILONGAN - CRUZ VS PONCE ENRILE
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HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE
FATCS: 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah
(Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane
8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first
traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the
second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming
suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately called the attention of her
immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the
four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and further examined their bags. The bag
of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing except for
personal effects. Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to
him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and
Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the
baggages of the six accused.
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their
defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
petitioners claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him.
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante
delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of
Cinco was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the
entire incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. Thus, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where
such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a
conviction.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to confrontation. Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to confrontation, viz:
Section 14. x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
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Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. According to him,
only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being
offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel crossexamined them. It is petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so,
he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the
witnesses against him.
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to crossexamine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for
cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of
confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to crossexamination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not
impaired.
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
GIMENEZ V. NAZARENO
Facts:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein
private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all of them were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following
the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973
at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including De la Vega, Jr., were duly informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing, De la Vega, Jr., escaped from his detention center and on the said
date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals (FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B.
MERCADO) handling the case to file a motion to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying
that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Pursuant to the provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave De la
Vega, Jr., the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1
On November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding
in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the decision of the trial court on
the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this
was denied by the lower court .
Hence, this petition.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody
of the law
2. whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried
in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him
Ruling:
1. No. The court did not lose jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of
the law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
2. No. The Court ruled that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence
on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. Upon the
termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The
court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court
to present his evidence and cross examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for
this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to
present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived
these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a
right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.
Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an
accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to
have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in
regained....
Adjudication:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is
reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon the innocence or guilt of
the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable
law.
SOMOGOD - PARADA VS VENERACION
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BERNARDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo was charged with six counts of violation of BP 22 for issuing six postdated checks in
equal amounts of Php 22,500. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Petitioner
failed to appear at the pre-trial conference held on August 25, 1999, thereby prompting the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him and set the cases for trial in absentia. After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner
filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, and a Motion to Quash two Informations charged
against him. In an Order dated April 5, 2000, the trial court lifted the warrant of arrest in view of his appearance, but
denied the Motion to Quash. However, petitioner failed to appear on the next trial date, drawing the trial court to
proceed with the trial in absentia and issue another warrant of arrest against him. The trial court, in a decision
promulgated in absentia, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the cases.
Ten months following the decision, petitioner posted a bond in another branch of court, which was cancelled due to
petitioner having been convicted and no motion having been filed for his temporary liberty pending appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied due to his and his counsels failure to appear at
the motions hearing. Petitioner, upon the denial of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, appealed to the RTC. The
RTC in turn affirmed the lower courts judgment with modification.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the CA. He filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
within 30 days from June 1, 2004, which was granted by the CA but only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42.
Because of his failure to file his petition during the 15-day extension, his petition was denied by the CA. One of the
errors he pointed out is the CAs denial of his petition for review.
ISSUE:
W/N he was denied due process of law upon the CAs denial of his petition for review.
HELD:
NO. The CA correctly dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to comply with Sections 1 and 2(d) of Rule 42. Since
these provisions are clear and mandatory in character, there is no reason for the courts to bend them. Furthermore,
he was not denied due process, as his failure to appear during his trials at the MeTC level constituted a trial in
absentia, which is allowed by the Constitution.
The holding of a trial in absentia is allowed provided that the following requisites are present, viz, (1) the accused has
already been arraigned, (2) he has been duly notified of the trial, and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. These
three requisites are established in the facts of the present case. This being said, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law since he was given the opportunity to defend himself.
US V. TAN TENG
FACTS:
The defendant was charged with rape after forcefully having carnal knowledge with a 7 year-old girl. Upon gaining
information regarding the said crime, the police arrested the defendant and taken to the police station to be
examined. The police took a sample substance from the defendants body and had it examined in the Bureau of
Science. It was later found out that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea, the same venereal disease the victim
suffered after having been raped (the results of the analysis was later on used as evidence during trial). The
defendant was later on found guilty for the offense of abusos deshonestos (rape?). Upon appeal, defendant pointed
out that the analysis of the substance taken from his body is an incriminating piece of evidence, and thus should be
inadmissible.
ISSUE:
W/N the report of the Bureau of Science is an incriminating piece of evidence, and thus inadmissible.
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HELD:
NO. As the Court ruled in the present case, the prohibition against self-incrimination provided in Section 5 of the
Philippine Bill only covers oral examination of defendants before or during trial. This prohibition, as established in
People v. Gardner, is for the prevention of extortion of unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the
commission of a crime. It does not cover situations such as the one contemplated in the present case. To do so would
limit the actions the courts (and even the sanitary department of the Government) can take. In the case at bar, since
the defendant was not compelled to admit or answer any question pertaining or related to the crime, it has been held
that his right against self-incrimination was not violated.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]
FACTS: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that
such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination.
HELD: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused
is permissible.
PEOPLE VS. YATAR (2004)

FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers (Isabel Dawangs) house, despite her intention to go
forth Tuguegarao City, as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am, accused-appellant
Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn,
Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the
second floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual
since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not
be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt
(without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked
about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately
left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her
house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were
still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door
therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the
darkness of the second level of her house, she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding
out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns
clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also
found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns
cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical
to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the
same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court
in order to assail the court a quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much
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weight to the evidence DNA testing oranalysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victims
(cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against selfincrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
MAIN ISSUE
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for Yatars
conviction?
HELD
Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the Rules on DNA evidence
took effect. The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In
the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so
long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.
RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA
evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative weight or
value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA testing. Such factors, are, to wit:
(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the
possibility of contamination of the samples;
(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and
disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the
laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and
(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided
APPLICATION DAUBERT TEST:
The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis
of Yatars blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it
held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant. In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it
must be determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or
nonexistence. In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime; In giving probative
value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the biological sample
(semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the
facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA
test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used
was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a
tiny amount of DNA sequence to be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis
may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria
Corazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
v CONCLUSION:
Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA
evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction of the crime of Rape
with Homicide.
IN THE MATTER FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO VS HON. SEN.
RICHARD GORDON
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006
Facts:
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455) directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The
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Senate invited Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be the resource
person in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate Res. No. 455.
Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4, paragraph (b) of Executive Order No. 1, which
provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Senator Richard J. Gordon
issued a subpoena ad testificandum, requiring Chairman Sabio and the four PCGG Commissioners to appear in the
public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate
Res. No. 455. Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent to Chairman Sabio requiring him to
appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply.
Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners were arrested for contempt of the Senate and brought to
the Senate premises where they were detained.
Chairman Sabio filed the present petition for habeas corpus (G.R. No. 174340) and, together with the four PCGG
Commissioners and the PCGGs nominees to PHC, petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 174318). They allege
that the investigating committees concerned disregarded Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason, the
inquiries conducted by the said committees are not in aid of legislation, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of
duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, and the said committees are not
vested with the power of contempt.
Moreover, in G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged: that
the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. 455 constitutes violations to petitioners rights against selfincrimination.
Issue: W/N petitioners rights against self-incrimination were violated.
Held:
This Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees inquiry does not violate the petitioners right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, this may be invoked by the PHC officers and directors only when the
incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the
questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying the
investigating committees their power of inquiry.
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by the
investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain the facts
needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to
respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of
proper investigation.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

G.R. No. 157870, 158633, 161658, November 3, 2008
Facts:
Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, said
mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by the
Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
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Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed
undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached.
In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that
said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue: W/N Sections 36 (c) (d) (f) and (g) should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against selfincrimination.
Held:
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right
to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
ROMERO - PP VS GAMIH, LUMANOG VS PP
PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was
alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being awitness against himself. Petitioner
then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of
grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand
and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be
availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
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complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by
respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination
Clause. YES.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with
the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions,
but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not
the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and
his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine
will."
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the
most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
GALMAN VS PAMARAN
Facts: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside the premises of
the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which
later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board.
Pursuant to PD 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified by
obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
Upon termination of the investigation, 2 reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other
members of the Board namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto
Herrera.
The reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action.
After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 Informations
for murder one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino (Criminal Case 10010) and another for the killing of
Rolando Galman (Criminal Case 10011), who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of
Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day.
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In both criminal cases, Ver, et. al. were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
In the course of the joint trial, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. before the Agrava Board were marked and
thereafter offered as part of its evidence,
Ver, et. al., through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits.
Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as
Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right
against self incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886, and thus prayed that his testimony be
rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other accused likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective
individual testimonies invoking the same ground.
The Tanodbayan opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by Ver, et. al. in support of their
motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right
against self incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
On 13 June 1985, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution
except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by Ver, et. al. in view of the immunity granted by PD 1886.
The Tanodbayan, along with Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman moved for the reconsideration of the said
Resolution, but were denied. They filed two separate petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in the proceeding
before the Agrava Board. YES.
Held: Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all
legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible
therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice.
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or
determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.
And as safeguard, the Presidential Decree guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to
counsel at any stage of the proceedings."
Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of receiving evidence,
persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and coparticipants in the tragic killing.
And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the
person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in
order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to
determine the character and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals
Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies
before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled
to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Section 5 of PD 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under
pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so, the jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars
even before conviction dangled before their very eyes.
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Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly
enshrined and protected by our fundamental law.
Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself were right
away totally foreclosed by PD 1886. When they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune
from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
It must be noted that initially the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States
and was as follows: "That no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself."
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The
deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to
cases other than criminal.
Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to Ver, et. al. notwithstanding that
the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. No doubt, Ver, et. al. were not
merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness.
The review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of
both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process.
The manner in which the testimonies were taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under
the "due process clause" and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al.cannot be admitted against
them in any criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the
presence of a grant of immunity by law.
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