1AC: UT CM

1AC: budgets
State budget shortfalls now trade off with education
accessibility specifically kills STEM students new sales tax
revenue is key

Prefer predictive evidence

Phil Oliff et al 13
(Policy analyst at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Vincent Palacios,
research associate at CBPP; Ingrid Johnson intern at CBPP; Michael Leachman,
director of state fiscal research; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Recent
Deep State Higher Education Cuts May Harm Students and the Economy for Years to
Come, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3927)
states prepare their budgets for the coming year, they face the challenge of reinvesting in public higher
education systems after years of damaging cuts the product of both the economic downturn and states
reluctance to raise additional revenues. In the past five years, state cuts to higher education funding have been severe and almost universal.
As

After adjusting for inflation: States are spending $2,353 or 28 percent less per student on higher education, nationwide, in the current 2013 fiscal year than they did in 2008, when the
recession hit. Every state except for North Dakota and Wyoming is spending less per student on higher education than they did prior to the recession.[1] In many states the cuts over
the last five years have been remarkably deep. Eleven states have cut funding by more than one-third per student, and two states Arizona and New Hampshire have cut their higher
education spending per student in half. Deep state funding cuts have major implications for public colleges and universities. States (and to a lesser extent localities) provide 53 percent
of the revenue that can be used to support instruction at these schools.[2] When this funding is cut, colleges and universities generally must either cut spending, raise tuition to cover
the gap, or both. Thats what has happened since the recession hit. More specifically, colleges and universities have: Increased tuition. Public colleges and universities across the
country have increased tuition to compensate for declining state funding. Annual published tuition at four-year public colleges has grown by $1,850, or 27 percent, since the 2007-08
school year, after adjusting for inflation.[3] There has been great variation across the states. In two states Arizona and California published tuition at four-year schools is up more
than 70 percent, while other states universities and many two-year colleges have held tuition increases closer to the rate of inflation. Major increases in federal student aid and tax
credits, on average, have fallen well short of covering these increases. These sharp increases in tuition have accelerated longer-term trends of reducing college affordability and shifting
costs from states to students. The College Board reports that the price of attending a four-year public college or university, even after accounting for increased federal financial aid and
tax subsidies, has grown significantly faster than the growth in median income over the last 20 years.[4] Cut spending, often in ways that may diminish the quality of education. Tuition
increases have made up only part of the revenue loss resulting from state funding cuts. Public colleges and universities also have cut faculty positions, eliminated course offerings,
closed campuses, shut down computer labs, and reduced library services, among other cuts. For example, Arizonas university system cut more than 2,100 positions; merged,
consolidated or eliminated 182 colleges, schools, programs and departments; and closed eight extension campuses (local campuses that facilitate distance learning).[5] Reversing
these trends and reinvesting in higher education should be a high priority for state policymakers. A large and growing share of future jobs will require college-educated workers.[6]
Investing in higher education to keep tuition low and quality high at public colleges and universities, and to provide financial aid to those students who need it most, would help states to
develop the skilled workforce they will need to compete for these jobs. But policymakers will need to make sound tax and budget decisions in the coming years if they are to renew
state investment in higher education. Significant investments in higher education in most states may require raising new revenue, as state revenues have yet to recover from the
recession and a wide range of other crucial public services also require reinvestment after years of deep cuts. Conversely, states that enact deep tax cuts will make it much more
difficult to rebuild their higher education systems and jeopardize their ability to compete for the jobs of the future. Florida governor Rick Scott, for example, is calling for $135 million in
business tax cuts at a time when Floridas higher education funding has fallen by 41 percent over the last five years. Other states considering tax cuts also have reduced their higher
education funding substantially in response to the recession. States Have Cut Higher Education Funding Deeply Since the Start of the Recession Public colleges and universities

educational revenue
at public higher education institutions.[8] The great majority of that 53 percent
comes from state tax revenue.[9] States have cut higher education funding deeply. Comparing current 2013 fiscal year spending with
educate over three-quarters of the nations undergraduates.[7] In 2012 state and local government revenue made up 53 percent of
(revenue that can be used to support instruction)

spending in fiscal year 2008, the fiscal year just prior to the recession, and adjusting for enrollment and inflation, we find that: State spending nationwide is down $2,353 or 28
percent. Every state except North Dakota and Wyoming has cut funding. Thirty-six states have cut funding by more than 20 percent. Eleven states have cut funding by more than
one-third. The two states making the largest cuts by percentage, Arizona and New Hampshire, have cut their higher education spending in half.[10] (See Figures 1 and 2.) Why Have
States Cut Higher Education? The cuts have resulted from state and federal responses to the deep recession and continued weak recovery.

revenues fell very deeply and remain depressed.

State tax

States are required to balance their budgets annually. The

recession of 2007-09 hit state revenues hard, and the slow recovery continues to affect them. Persistently high unemployment and still-depressed housing values have left people with

states are taking in less income and sales tax

revenue, the main sources of revenue states use to fund education and other services. Indeed,
less income and less purchasing power. As a result,

state tax revenues remain 6 percent below 2008 levels after adjusting for inflation.[11 Limited revenues must support more students. Higher education dollars are spread over
increasing numbers of students. In part due to the baby boom echo causing a surge in the 18- to 24-year-old population, enrollment in public higher education increased by about 1.3
million full-time equivalent students, or 12.4 percent, between the beginning of the recession and the 2011-12 academic year (the latest year for which there is data).[12] Other areas

more K-12 students

of state budgets are under pressure also. For example, about 535,000
are enrolled in the current school year than were enrolled in 200708.[13] An estimated 3.9 million more people were eligible for subsidized health insurance through Medicaid in 2012 than were enrolled in 2008, as employers have cancelled health
coverage and people have lost jobs and wages.[6][14] States could have reduced the size of spending cuts by enacting significant new revenues, but many chose not to. States have
disproportionately relied on spending cuts to close the very large budget shortfalls they have faced over the last several years, rather than a more balanced mix of spending cuts and
revenue increases. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, states closed 45 percent of their budget gaps through spending cuts and only 16 percent of their budget gaps through taxes and
fees (they closed the remainder of their shortfalls with federal aid, reserves, and various other measures). States could have lessened the need for deep cuts to higher education funding
if they had been more willing to raise additional revenue. The federal government allowed aid to states to expire prematurely. States used emergency funds from the federal
government (including both education aid and increased Medicaid funds) to cover roughly one-third of their shortfalls through the 2011 fiscal year. After the 2011 fiscal year, the federal
government allowed this aid to expire, even though states continued to face very large shortfalls in 2012 and beyond.[15] Cuts Have Driven Up Tuition Public colleges and universities
across the country have increased tuition to help make up for lost state revenue.[16] As a result, the average cost of attending a public college or university particularly a four-year
institution has surged in recent years. Average annual published tuition at four-year public colleges the sticker price has grown by $1,850, or 27 percent, in real terms
between the 2007-08 school year, the year just prior to the recession, and the current 2012-13 school year. Tuition increases have been both substantial and widespread. Since the
2007-08 school year, after adjusting for inflation, the average tuition at public four-year colleges has increased by: More than 50 percent in seven states; More than 25 percent in 18
states; and More than 15 percent in 40 states. [17] (See Figures 3 and 4.) Two states, Arizona and California, have increased tuition by more than 70 percent. Significant boosts in
federal student aid and in the value of federal tax credits have reduced the impact of these tuition hikes on students and their families, but only partially so. Beginning in 2009, the
federal government significantly increased Pell Grant awards for low-income families. The federal government also expanded a key higher education tax credit that mostly helps middleincome families and is available to individuals with incomes up to $80,000 and married couples with incomes up to $160,000. With few exceptions, states themselves have not increased

financial aid to offset rising tuitions; per-student state grant aid has actually fallen slightly since the 2007-08 school year, after adjusting for inflation.[18] Thanks to the boost in federal
assistance, the College Board calculates that the annual value of grant aid and higher education tax benefits for students at four year public colleges has increased by an average of
$1,410 in real terms since the 2007-08 school year, enough to offset over three quarters of the $1,850 tuition increase paid by the average student nationwide.[19] But since the sticker
price increases have varied so much while federal grant and tax-credit amounts are basically the same across all states, students in states with large tuition increases (such as Arizona or
New Hampshire) undoubtedly have borne a much higher share of the increased cost, while students in states with smaller tuition increases may have realized net reductions in cost.
The cost of college has spiked even as the recession and its aftermath have diminished students and their families financial resources. Between 2007 and 2011, even as tuitions surged,
real median household income fell by 8.1 percent.[20] While the recession has ended, the slow recovery has meant continued high unemployment and still-depressed real estate values,
leaving many families in a precarious financial position. It is worth noting that, in contrast to these trends, two-year colleges generally have increased their tuition rates less than fouryear colleges during the recession, both in dollar terms and in percentage terms. In fact, the College Board estimates that the increases have been small enough that after taking into
account increased federal aid and tax credits the net cost to an average student for attending a community college has gone down during the recession. Here again, however, there
are significant state-to-state variations, with community college tuition rising more than $1,000 above inflation in Massachusetts, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.[21] Public
Colleges and Universities Also Have Cut Staff and Eliminated Programs Recent tuition increases, while substantial in most states, have fallen far short of fully replacing the funding that

Between 2009 and 2010 (the latest year for which data is available), tuition increases offset: Just over
60 percent of cuts to funding that state and local governments provided to public colleges that offer graduate degrees; About
public colleges and universities have lost due to state funding cuts.

30 percent of the cuts to funding that state and local governments provided to public colleges that offer bachelors degrees but not graduate degrees; and Only 14 percent of the cuts
to funding that state and local governments provided to community colleges.[22] Because tuition increases have not compensated for the loss of state funding, public colleges and
universities have simultaneously cut spending to make up for declining state funding. Data on spending at public institutions of higher learning in recent years are incomplete, but
considerable evidence suggests that public colleges and universities have constrained spending to make up for lost state funding, often in ways that reduce the quality and availability of
their academic offerings. For example, since the start of the recession, in response to state budget cuts: Arizonas university system cut more than 2,100 positions; consolidated or
eliminated 182 colleges, schools, programs, and departments; and closed eight extension campuses (local campuses that facilitate distance learning).[23] The University of California
laid off 4,200 staff and eliminated or left unfilled another 9,500 positions; instituted a system-wide furlough program, reducing salaries by 4 to 10 percent; consolidated or eliminated
more than 180 programs; and cut funding for campus administrative and academic departments by as much as 35 percent.[24] Californias community colleges have cut enrollment by
485,000 students or about 17 percent, cut course offerings by 15 percent resulting in hundreds of thousands of students being denied access to classes, increased class sizes, laid off
faculty and staff, and instituted furloughs.[25] The University of Colorado system between 2009 and 2011 laid off 339 staff and faculty, even as enrollment grew by 2,100 students.
[26] The University System of Louisiana furloughed 727 employees, laid off another 210 staff and faculty members, and cut 217 academic programs. In addition, campuses have
reduced library services and cut funding for athletics, student scholarships, and research.[27] Since 2007, the University of Nevada-Las Vegas eliminated more than 700 faculty and
staff positions, 15 academic programs, and 31 degree programs.[28] The University of New Hampshire eliminated nearly 200 staff positions, implemented a hiring freeze, and froze
staff salaries.[29] The University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill eliminated 493 positions, cut 16,000 course seats, increased class sizes, cut its centrally supported computer labs from
seven to three, and eliminated two distance education centers. [30] Since 2009, Highline Community College in Washington eliminated 72 staff positions, increased the number of
courses taught by part-time faculty, and reduced Adult Basic Education and English-as-a-Second-Language programs by 10 percent.[31] Nationwide, employment at public colleges and
universities has grown modestly since the start of the recession, but that growth has been well below the growth in the number of students. Between the 2007-08 and the 2011-12
school years the number of full-time equivalent instructional staff at public colleges and universities grew by about 6 percent, while the number of students at these institutions grew by
12 percent. As a result, the ratio of students to instructors grew from 19.7 to 1 to 20.9 to 1 during that period. In five states California, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, and New
Hampshire full-time equivalent instructional staff at public colleges and universities fell between the 2007-08 and the 2011-12 school years, even as enrollment grew.[32] Funding
Cuts and Tuition Increases

Exacerbate a Longer-Term Erosion of Higher Education Affordability

The decline in state funding and the resulting rise in tuition since the start of the recession have accelerated a longer-term cost shift from states to students and families. For at least
the last quarter-century, state and local funding for higher education has been dropping, and tuition has been increasing. Per-student revenue from state and local governments fell by
$2,600, after adjusting for inflation, between 1987 and 2012. During that same period, per-student tuition increased by $2,600. In other words, the entire increase in tuition at public
colleges and universities over the last 25 years has gone to make up for declining state and local revenue, leaving no additional funding available to improve programs and services or
fund costs that are rising faster than the rate of inflation such as employee health care. This trend has meant that students have assumed much greater responsibility for paying for
public higher education without those institutions receiving more money to fund quality improvements. In 1987, public colleges and universities received 3.3 times as much in revenue
from state and local governments as they did from students. They now receive about 1.1 times as much from states and localities as from students. The cost shift from states to
students has not occurred in a steady, straightforward way. During and immediately following recessions, state and local funding for higher education has tended to plummet, while
tuition has tended to spike. Funding has tended to largely recover, and tuitions have tended to stabilize, during periods of economic growth.[33] But the long-term trend is clear: states
have been reducing their contributions to public higher education, while students have been picking up a larger share of the costs. (See Figure 5.) This trend along with slow growth
in middle-class incomes has caused a decline in higher education affordability. As students have shouldered greater responsibility for paying for college, the growth in the cost of their
education has far outstripped the growth in students and their families financial resources. Over the 20-year period between 1991 and 2011 (the latest year for which there is data),
median household income grew by about 3 percent, after adjusting for inflation.[34] Between the 1990-1991 and the 2012-13 school years (the current school year), tuition at four-year
public colleges grew by 159 percent in real terms. Grants and tax benefits for higher education also grew during that time, somewhat mitigating the growth in the cost to students. But
even after taking those grants and tax benefits into account, the cost of college grew by 58 percent in real terms, well above the rate of growth in household income.[35] Adequate

Reinvesting in public higher

education should be an urgent priority for policymakers who are concerned about the long-term
Financing for State Higher Education Systems Will Be Required for Student Success and National Prosperity

economic success of their state and its residents. Diminished educational resources and rising tuition at the nations public colleges and universities have serious consequences for
students, their families, and the broader economy. Rapidly Rising Tuition Threatens College Access and Burdens Students with Increasing Levels of Debt Rapidly rising tuition makes it
less likely that students will attend college. Research has consistently found that college price increases result in declining enrollment.[36] While many universities and the federal
government provide financial aid to help students bear the price, research suggests that both the advertised tuition cost and the actual price net of aid affect whether students go to
college; in other words, a high sticker price can dissuade students from enrolling even if the net price doesnt rise. Research further suggests that college cost increases have the
biggest impact on students from low income families. For example, a 1995 study by Harvard University researcher Thomas Kane concluded that states that had the largest tuition
increases during the 1980s and early 1990s saw the greatest widening of the gaps in enrollment between high- and low-income youth.[37] Gaps in college enrollment among
higher- and lower-income youth are already pronounced, even among prospective students of similar ability levels. In a 2008 piece, Georgetown University scholar Anthony Carnavale
pointed out that among the most highly qualified students (the top testing 25 percent), the kids from the top socioeconomic group go to four-year colleges at almost twice the rate of
equally qualified kids from the bottom socioeconomic quartile.[38] (See Figure 6.) Rapidly rising costs at public colleges and universities likely widen these gaps further. For those who
do attend college, rapidly rising costs make it more likely that they will need to work a significant number of hours every week to finance their education. Working a significant number of
hours, in turn, places students at greater risk of dropping out of school. A 2003 study from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that students who work more than 20
hours a week are less likely to complete their degree.[39] Moreover, rising tuition burdens students with mounting levels of debt. Indeed, student debt levels have swelled since the
start of the recession. Between the 2007-08 and the 2010-11 school years, the amount of debt incurred by the average bachelors degree recipient at a public four-year institution grew
from $11,800 to $13,600 (in 2011 dollars), an inflation adjusted increase of $1,800, or 15 percent. The average level of debt incurred had grown from $11,100 to $11,800, an increase of
$700, or about 6 percent, over the previous eight years.[40] Diminished Educational Resources May Make It Harder to Improve Graduation Rates and Academic Quality Research
supports the idea that smart investments in higher education can help students especially those from lower-income families stay in school and complete their degrees. Both
instructional spending (spending directly related to classroom instruction) and student services spending (spending on counseling, career guidance, tutoring, and other services intended
to support students outside of the formal instructional program) positively affect student graduation rates according to research by Ronald Ehrenberg and Douglas Webber of Cornell
University.[41] Student services expenditures have a particularly large impact on the graduation rates of students with lower levels of academic preparation and fewer financial
resources. The authors findings make intuitive sense. Students with less academic preparation and fewer financial resources are more likely to need intensive tutoring to ensure that
they are keeping up with their coursework and guidance navigating the complexities of college course offerings to ensure that they get the credits they need to graduate. But

state funding cuts are reducing public colleges and universities ability to make these kinds of
investments. Additionally, funding cuts have made it harder for public colleges and universities to staff classrooms with full time, tenure-tracked professors, which
may also threaten student outcomes. Many schools have turned to part-time and non-tenure-track faculty as a cost-saving measure, but the use of those types of instructors reduces the
likelihood that students will graduate from college, according to a study by Ehrenberg and Liang Zhang (also of Cornell).[42] Dr. Ehrenberg explained in an interview with the New York
Times, Its not that some of these adjuncts arent great teachers. Many dont have the support that the tenure-track faculty have, in terms of offices, secretarial help, and time. Their
teaching loads are higher, and they have less time to focus on students.[43] Another study by Paul Umbach of the University of Iowa finds that part-time and non-tenure track faculty
spend less time preparing for class, are less likely to challenge their students, and interact with students less frequently than their full-time, tenure-track peers.[44] Moreover,
increased class size and larger student loads for faculty also consequences of reduced state aid negatively affect student assessments of class quality, according to research by

reduced college
access and reduced graduation rates that research suggests are likely to result from budget cuts affect more
than just the students, because college attainment has grown increasingly important to long-term
economic outcomes for states and the nation. Getting a college degree is increasingly a pre-requisite for professional success and for
James Monks and Robert Schmidt of the University of Richmond.[45] Funding Cuts Jeopardize Both Students and States Economic Futures The

entry into the middle class or beyond. A young college graduate earns $12,000 a year more annually than someone who did not attend college, after adjusting for inflation, according to
research from the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. The benefits of academic attainment extend beyond those who receive a degree; research suggests that the whole
community benefits when more residents have college degrees. Areas with highly educated residents tend to attract strong employers who pay their employees competitive wages.
Those employees, in turn, buy goods and services from others in the community, broadly benefitting the areas economy. Economist Enrico Moretti of the University of California at

Berkeley finds that as a result, the wages of workers at all levels of education are higher in metropolitan areas with high concentrations of college-educated residents. This finding implies
that even though not all good jobs require a college degree having a highly educated workforce can boost an areas economic success. And the economic importance of higher
education will continue to grow into the future. The Georgetown Center on Education and the Workforce projects that by 2018, 62 percent of all jobs will require at least some college
education. That is up from 59 percent in 2007, 56 percent in 1992, and 28 percent in 1973. The Georgetown center further projects that the nations education system will not be able
to keep up with the rising demand for educated workers. By 2018 the countys system of higher education will produce 3 million fewer college graduates than the labor market will
demand, Georgetown projects. The increase in student debt in recent years also has important implications for the broader economy. While debt is a crucial tool for financing higher
education, excessive debt can impose considerable costs on both students and society as a whole. Research finds that higher student debt levels are associated with lower rates of
homeownership among young adults;[50] can create stresses that reduce the probability of graduation, particularly for students from lower-income families;[51]

and

reduce the likelihood that graduates with majors in s cience, t echnology, e ngineering, and
m athematics will go on to graduate school.

This research suggests that

states should strive to expand

college access and increase college graduation rates to help build a strong middle class and develop the skilled
workforce needed to compete in todays global economy. It suggests further that the severe higher education
funding cuts that states have made since the start of the recession will make it harder to achieve
those goals.

Increasing STEM education is key to sustain US deterrence

Mackenzie Eaglen et al 12
(American Enterprise Institute, Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research, Robert P. Haffa, Haffa
Defense Consulting, Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution, Peter W. Singer,
The Brookings Institution, Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting, Barry Watts,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) January 2012 The Arsenal of
Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy
Yet there are severe challenges that could result to the nations security interests even with 10 percent cutbacks. Despite the likely
potential of lesser resources, the demand side of the equation does not seem likely to grow easier. The international security

Chinas economic, political and now military rise continues. Its

direction is uncertain, but it has already raised tension, especially in the South China Sea. Irans ambitions and
machinations remain foreboding, with its nuclear plans entering a new phase of both capability but also crisis.
North Korea is all the more uncertain with a leadership transition, but has a history of brinkmanship
environment is challenging and complex.

and indeed even the occasional use of force against the South, not to mention nuclear weapons-related activities that raise deep
concern. And the hopeful series of revolutions in the broader Arab world in 2011, while inspiring at many levels, also seem likely to
raise uncertainty in the broader Middle East. Revolutions are inherently unpredictable and often messy geostrategic events. On top
of these remain commitments in Afghanistan and beyond and the frequent U.S. military role in humanitarian disaster relief. Thus,
there are broad challenges for American defense planners as they try to address this challenging world with fewer available
resources. The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as
the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed
through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the

Qualitative superiority in
weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of
American military power in the modern eranot only for winning wars but for deterring them. That
requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilitieswhich in turn can also generate
technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance.

civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace. While procurement budgets have finally,
in recent years, reached their historic norms as a percent of the overall defense budget, the legacy of the 1990s procurement
holiday remains real. In that period, the United States as a matter of policy bought much less equipment than it would normally,
enjoying the fruits of the 1980s buildup as it sought to reduce defense spending. But Reagan-era weaponry is wearing out, and the
recent increase in procurement spending has not lasted long enough to replenish the nations key weapons arsenals with new
weaponry. The last decade of procurement policy focused more on filling certain gaps in counterinsurgency capabilities than

the main
elements of DoDs weapons inventoriesfighter jets, armored vehicles, surface vessels and
submarinescontinue to age. We often say that, in todays American armed forces, people are our most cherished
replacing the mainline weapons programs that make up the bulk of conventional capabilities. Meanwhile,

commodity and greatest asset. That is certainly true at one level, through the dedication and excellence shown by our brave men
and women in uniform. But it is also true that adjusting the personnel size of the military up or down has been done with success
multiple times, and seems likely to happen again. By contrast, scientific and

manufacturing excellence in the

would be

defense space is not something easily moved up and down. Todays industrial capabilities took decades to build and

hard to restore if lost (Great Britains difficulty restoring its ability to build nuclear submarines is a frequently cited
example.). Unlike the period just after the Cold War, there are no obvious surpluses of defense firms, such that a natural paring
process will find the fittest firms and ensure their survival. While there are roughly five major firms, there are often just one or two
suppliers in any given major area of defense technology. Similar challenges exist within the subcontractor community, which has
become highly specialized, with certain key components or capabilities similarly reflecting monopolies or oligopolies, or being
acquired by the primes in a way that risks future competition. The defense economy is also experiencing meta-changes in

everything from shifts in traditional sectors, such as the move from manned to unmanned planes, to new sectors arising like
cybersesecurity, to a broader move from the exclusive production of goods to the growing provision of defense services. Such issues
in the defense economy also touch on broader areas of national economic and geopolitical competitiveness. Top class American
firms rely on top class scientists and engineers. At present, the United States ranks in the lower half of industrial countries for the
average math and science scores of its public school students and graduates just a fraction as many scientists and engineers a year
from university-level studies as does either China or India. These trends should not be overstated; the quality of American scientists
and engineers remains world class. But the trends still pose deep worries in the American defense industrial field as its looks
towards the future of its work force, which is aging rapidly in numerous sectors. Not only then are the U.S. military services, but also
American defense industry at a crossroads. Normally, defense policy decisions in times of retrenchment begin with strategy, threats,
missions, and force structure and only address defense industrial issues as an afterthought. In past days of flush budgets and
numerous duplicative suppliers, this approach may have made sense. It makes sense no longer. Careless defense reductions or poor
planning wont just cost jobs or competitiveness, but could actually result in lost American military industrial capability in core areas.
The Department of Defense has recently made some encouraging moves towards emphasizing the role of the industrial base in its
strategic and budgetary planning. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review examined the subject, for example, and Secretary Panetta
and his deputies have convened several meetings in recent months with industry leaders to discuss their concerns. But industrial
base considerations remain little discussed outside the specialist community and too frequently take a short term or single interest
approach, such as asking a candidate to weigh in on an individual product or firm. Rather, it is the overall state of the field and its
future that should be of concern to all, regardless of where they stand on the political spectrum. Thus, as presidential candidates

any serious discussion of

the current state and future of the military must also give direct
attention to matters of the American national security scientific and industrial
base. This discussion should be direct and forthright, recognizing the context of severe budgetary dilemmas for the nation, the
and other national leaders develop their platforms for the 2012 elections and beyond,
national security and

success and challenges of the defense economy, changing military demands, and the gradual erosion of American manufacturing in
many sectors over the last several decades. Among the core questions for candidates to develop their policy answers
around are: 4 1. Are there any sectors within American defense industry or types of technologies for the Department of Defense that
should be prioritized? If this is the case, what should be prioritized and what are the areas that are not quite as important as others
or even over resourced at present? 2. The Department of Defense is likely to reduce the size of the nations ground forces
considerably in the years ahead, as the war in Afghanistan gradually winds down. Does this imply prioritizing investment in Air-Sea
battle capabilities at the expense of ground force capability, or should the United States try to do all with less? 3. Do the Pentagon
and Congress have enough tools for evaluating the strength of the nations industrial base and its access to key raw materials and
technologies? If not, what should be done to give this subject greater scrutiny and sustained attention? 4. Should the Department of
Defense move to more fixed-price contracts in its procurement policies? Should private companies be allowed to compete for a
higher share of maintenance contracts, even if that means downsizing government depots? 5. Is the Pentagons increased focus on
enlarging its acquisition oversight workforce making the acquisition process more innovative, economical, and efficient or more
burdensome and bureaucratic? 6. Are there tools of export and trade policy that need to be adjusted to strengthen the U.S. defense
industrial base? If so, what? Is the FMS program basically sound? Does the consolidation of export control lists within Commerce
bode well or are other steps needed? 7. Are there certain allies from which the United States should be willing to import more
defense technology, especially if the improved trade opportunities are reciprocated? Should we explore pooling and joint production
options with our close allies, along the lines of what Britain and France have recently launched? 8.

nation strengthen STEM education

How should the

in the United States, in high schools and colleges, to encourage more

Americans to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and math? Does the nation need to revise any of its immigration
and green-card policies to increase the ability of foreign scientists to remain in this country after studying here and contribute to its
scientific and industrial strength? 9. Do government regulations and requirements deter new and innovative firms from entering the
defense market to the detriment of the nations military? If so, what should be done to induce their entry? 10. Are there any other
policy interventions that might be needed to ensure American military technological preeminence in the years ahead? A certain floor
under R&D budgets? Targeted sustainment funding for specific capabilities such as independent weapons design teams at numerous
firms? Greater DoD contributions to research and prototyping by defense firms? The United States, and its civilian leaders, cannot
afford to avoid the hard questions that now come with maintaining a strong successful military, a top flight defense industrial base,

Our defense industrial base is certainly not broken,

but there are clear, unavoidable challenges that loom, which might undercut broader
and a fiscally sound national economy.

national security, and the looming big budget cutbacks raise the stakes and heighten the sense of urgency in addressing the issue.

If allowed to
atrophy, it would take decades to rebuild. Those who would seek to lead the U.S. armed
forces must answer the key questions to ensure these capabilities are not lost in a matter of
In sum, the arsenal of democracy that arms the best military in the world, took decades to build.

years.

Global proliferation is inevitable maintaining US deterrence

prevents catalytic nuclear war
IFPA 10
(The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis at International Security Studies Program of
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, a conference report summarizing the consenus
of experts at Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in the 21st-Century, Prepared by
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. President, IFPA and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of

International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University,

http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/USAFreportweb.pdf)
In marked contrast, the second nuclear age is characterized by multiple, independent nuclear decision-making centers. Some of these independent nuclear weapons states are potential

the United States may need to

continue to provide security guarantees to non-nuclear friends and allies. It may face the possibility of
catalytic warfare where, for example, an American ally such as Israel, or a third party such as China could initiate action that might escalate
to include the United States.5 In such a scenario, the United States would not have been directly a party to the decision chain to initiate such escalation, even
though it could be drawn into the escalating conflict. By the same token, there is likely to be a learning curve between nuclear weapons
acquisition and the determination of how, when, or whether the weapons will be used. What is the learning curve, for example, for a nuclear North
Korea or a nuclear Iran? Will either or both be prepared actually to use nuclear weapons? In the absence of
a definitive answer to such questions, the U.S. nuclear deterrent must restrain a wider variety of
actors today than it did during the Cold War. Deterrence functions by denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging restraint. An effective deterrence posture requires a
adversaries, some are rivals, and some are friends, all of whom Washington will seek to influence, signal, and restrain. In addition,

range of capabilities and the capacity to orient forces to address specific challenges. The deterrent must provide security guarantees and assurances sufficient to prevent the initiation of
catalytic warfare by an ally, while

deterring an adversary from resorting to nuclear escalation . As Dr. Bracken pointed out, compared to the

extensive literature on deterrence, there has been little recent attention devoted to the dynamics of escalation in a multi-nuclear world. For example, how does one measure escalation?
What are the different escalation frameworks? Is escalation the intensification of the use of force? Is it about crossing thresholds? What is counter-escalation when one party escalates
against another? In short, there is abundant need for developing and understanding the strategic interactions and therefore escalation in a multinuclear world. In light of the
complexities of todays security environment, General Kevin Chilton, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), described his efforts to develop a broader, whole-of-government
approach to deterrence. This combines military, economic, diplomatic, political, and information resources to dissuade or deter potential adversaries from making decisions that put
Americas vital national interests at risk. General Chilton spoke about the need not only to define vital interests as clearly as possible, but also to understand which actors have the
capabilities or might be developing the means to hold these interests at risk, understanding the key decision makers and their processes as well as what they value the most and, just as
important, what they fear. Elaborating on deterrence requirements, General Chilton emphasized the importance of four critical elements: early warning, command and control, delivery
systems, and weapons. In each, the Air Force plays an indispens able role. In the early warning area, the United States relies on the Air Force through satellites and radar network. In
command and control, key elements are provided by the Air Force, including Milstar satellites and, in the future, advanced extremely high fre quency (AEHF) satellites. In the area of
delivery systems, as noted earlier, two legs of the strategic triad, ICBMs and bombers, are furnished by the Air Force. For nuclear weapons, the Air Force has crucially important
responsibilities to ensure the safety and security of the current stockpile. General Chilton outlined the continuing need for a comprehensive stockpile management program that ensures
that warheads have built into them the requisite safety and security measures while ensuring their continued reliability. The discussion of nuclear weapons and deterrence included a
detailed consideration of extended deterrence in a multinuclear world. As Dr. Clark A. Murdock, Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, suggested, the United States faces a three-dimensional problem: how to reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence while assuring allies that extended deterrence can be trusted,
and maintaining a safe, secure,

and effective nuclear arsenal. America will need both to deter potential adversaries while it assures allies of the reliability of an extended security
use of biological or chemical weapons.

guarantee. The United States also faces the need to deter

The United States has
demonstrated in the post-Cold War era (in Iraq for example) that it is not deterred by the prospect that its adversaries may have biological or chemical weapons. However, America has

As long as nuclear
weapons exist, extended deterrence and assurance must remain serious U.S.
commitments. This means sustaining a robust nuclear weapons capability. The logic set
sought to prevent nuclear acquisition by potential adversaries out of fear that it might be deterred if they possess nuclear weapons.

forth by Dr. Murdock included the assumption that global reductions in nuclear inventories can only be achieved if nations lessen their reliance on nuclear weapons. Yet we have nations
seeking nuclear weapons not necessarily to use them in war but instead to prevent or even threaten their use. Nuclear weapons may be acquired not only for defen sive or deterrent

in the second nuclear age there are increasing

numbers of nuclear weapons states, this means that such states are becoming more dependent on nuclear weapons. Therefore,
striking the proper balance between reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and maintaining credible extended deterrence and
assurance becomes an imperative for U.S. security policy. Building on the theme of sharp differentiation between the bipolar Cold War era and the emerging multinuclear world, Dr. Camille Grand, Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique in France, underscored the fact that nuclear proliferation is
accelerating and could cease to be manageable. The quickening pace of nuclear proliferation is evident in the fact
that in the first fifty years of the nuclear age we had on average one new nuclear power per decade. In the last twelve years alone four additional nuclear players have emerged, in
this case from regions where international tensions are great, namely East Asia, South Asia, and
the Middle East. In addition to the problem of a growing number of nuclear-weapon states is the proliferation of missiles and other WMD.
purposes but also for offensive uses, including nuclear blackmail. If

Infinite causes of war only stabilizing deterrence puts a

ceiling on escalation dont make the good contingent on
perfection
John Moore 4
(Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of
Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; Beyond the
Democratic Peace, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence,

theories of war have focused on the role of

ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition
for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a
what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary,
specific disputes between nations,

The reality, however, is that while some of

these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of
role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion.

motivating

factors , or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the

existence of such
or encouraging

motivating

factors

for war

but

rather

the circumstances permitting

high-risk decisions leading to war that is

controlling

armed

conflict.

independent

the

key to

more effectively

And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic

conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that
a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. 158 Certainly if
we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed,
democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader

No one, however, has yet been able to

demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in
the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social
achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress.

problems, an approach
us to war

to war exclusively

dependent on their solution may doom

for generations to come. [*394] A useful framework for thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man,

the State and War, 159 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of
war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international
system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in
this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis.

structures , at the second level, seem to play a central role in

risk behavior leading to major war.

levels of

Government

aggressive ness in high-

In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of

analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision to go to war, is also critical when government structures do
not restrain such high-risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they
may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the
individual, is unimportant - I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant
necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to
power those who are disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposed to high-risk behavior. We might also
want to keep open the possibility that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding
psychological profiles of particular leaders as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence. Nondemocracies' leaders can
have different perceptions of the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or
Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of

major international war is critically an interaction, or

absence of [*395] democracy and an absence of effective

individual leaders, however, the key to war avoidance is understanding that

synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three - specifically an

deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own
way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high-risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways
including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the
objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. 160 III. Testing the Hypothesis Hypotheses, or paradigms, are
useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is

No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war;" there are
simply too many variables. We should insist , however, on testing against the
unlikely.

real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other
constructs.

In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars. That is, in looking, for example, at the principal

interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence? 161 And although it,
by itself, does not prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in non-war
settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international
system in either element of the synergy. That is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice
versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

Status seeking is inevitable overwhelming research

consensus proves ambiguity causes great power conflict

William C. Wohlforth Jan 9

(Professor of government at Dartmouth College World Politics Volume 61, Number
1, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War)
IT is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity-based explanations.31 It is thus put forward as a
psychological explanation for competitive behavior that is completely divorced from distributions of material resources. But there
is no theoretical justification for this separation. On the contrary, a long-standing research tradition in sociology, economics, and

political science finds that actors seek to translate material resources into status. Sociologists from Weber and Veblen onward

When social actors

acquire resources, they try to convert them into something that can have
more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. As Weber put it: Property as such is not
have postulated a link between material conditions and the stability of status hierarchies.

always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. 32 This link continues to
find support in the contemporary economics literature on income distribution and status competition.33 Status is a social,
psychological, and cultural phenomenon. Its expression appears endlessly varied; it is thus little wonder that the few international
relations scholars who have focused on it are more struck by its variability and diversity than by its susceptibility to generalization.
34 Yet if sit captures important dynamics of human behavior, and if people seek to translate resources into status, then the
distribution of capabilities will affect the likelihood of status competition in predictable ways. Recall that

theory,

research, and experimental results suggest that relative status concerns

will come to the fore when status hierarchy is ambiguous and that people will tend to
compare the states with which they identify to similar but higher-ranked states.35 Dissatisfaction arises not
from dominance itself but from a dominance that [End Page 38] appears to rest on
ambiguous foundations. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of
clear hierarchies in which the relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially.
Applied to international politics, this begins to suggest the conditions conducive to status competition. For conflict to
occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that
leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identitymaintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another
state that is also willing to fight for its position. This set of beliefs and strategies is most
likely to be found when states are relatively evenly matched in capabilities. The more closely matched actors are materially, the
more likely they are to experience uncertainty about relative rank.

When actors start receiving mixed

signals some indicating that they belong in a higher rank while others reaffirm their present rank they
experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the
uncertainty.

When lower-ranked actors experience such

inconsistency , they will use higher-ranked actors as

referents. Since both high- and low-status actors are biased toward higher status,

uncertainty fosters

conflict as the same evidence feeds contradictory expectations and claims.

When the relevant out-group is unambiguously dominant materially, however,
status inconsistency is less likely. More certain of their relative rank ,
subordinate actors are less likely to face the ambiguity that drives status competition. And even if
they do, their relative weakness makes strategies of social competition an unlikely response. Given limited material wherewithal,
either acquiescence or strategies of social creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict.

Deterrence is epistemologically verifiable

Frederick Kroon 96
(Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland, Deterrence and
the Fragility of Rationality, Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Jan., 1996), pp. 350-377, JSTOR)
I take it that from the point of view of the early proponents of nuclear deterrence this would not be a concession of
any worth. They didn't just think that nuclear deterrers were doing something that happened to be rational (and

deterrers were acting the part of

properly rational agents, that nuclear deterrers were doing what a fully rational agent
would be doing if put in the same difficult situation, despite the monstrousness of
what was threatened. Call this kind of position an "agent-rationalist" view of nuclear
deterrence. More precisely, agent-rationalists about nuclear deterrence are those who think that it is not
only the act of threatening retaliation-in the sense of conditionally intending it-that is fully
rational in the specified circumstances; the agent who threatens retaliation in these
circumstances can also be fully rational, despite the fact that what she threatens to
even moral); they thought that in the specified circumstances nuclear

do is irrational. The contrary position held by Kavka I call an "agent-irrationalist" view of nuclear deterrence.
On such a view, deterrers must be irrational in some way, perhaps through having undergone a process of
corruption that gives them irrational goals or makes them unable to understand the full implications of what they
propose.9 (Although I am mainly interested in nuclear deterrence, the issues, of course, are wider. Thus agentrationalism and agentirrationalism can also be understood more broadly as views concerning the rationality of
agents who face "Special Deterrent Situations" in roughly Kavka's sense; these situations include our nuclear
scenarios but also many other possible situations of conflict between agents. While the argument of this article
may be general enough to extend to all such situations, I shall continue to focus on the nuclear case.)10 In the
same way, we may talk of "agent-moralism" and "agentimmoralism." Thus agent-immoralism about nuclear
deterrence holds that because of the immorality of the retaliatory act, and despite the moral desirability of the
threat, no morally good agent can seriously threaten retaliation in the nuclear scenarios described.11 Any agent
able to threaten retaliation must have undergone a process of moral corruption, or be affected in some other way
by an element of moral imperfection in her nature. (This is again Kavka's view, but versions of the view are held by
many others; David Lewis, for example.) These various positions are not, of course, exhaustive. Take rationality
again. Some theorists think that there can be no situation in which threatening nuclear retaliation is rational.12 If
so, no fully rational agent could be a nuclear deterrer. And in the mid-1980s (but no longer) David Gauthier held

because threatening retaliation is sometimes clearly rational, it would

ipso facto be rational in those cases for a deterrer to act on her
retaliatory threats should deterrence fail. If so, agent-irrationalist
arguments can't get a toehold, and we can no longer deny full rationality
to nuclear deterrers. While I reject these various positions, they are not the direct concern of this
that

article. 13

The debate I am presently interested in is between agent-rationalists and agent-irrationalists, agent-

philosophical opponents who all accept that threatening

(nuclear) retaliation can be rational and moral where acting on the threats is not. In
moralists and agent-immoralists:

this article I am mainly concerned to defend agent-rationalism about nuclear deterrence against its irrationalist
critics. That is, my main goal is to show that we can coherently regard both of the following rationality claims as

not only is the act of forming and maintaining deterrent conditional intentions
perfectly rational in the nuclear circumstances envisaged, but in addition forming
and maintaining such intentions is something that rational agents are fully capable
of, despite their knowing that such intentions, conditionally enjoin an irrational
act. I thereby take myself to be defending nuclear deterrence against an
important and persuasive philosophical attack on the character of those running
the policy. By implication, however, I will also be defending an agent-moralist view of nuclear deterrence and
true:

hence defending deterrence against another kind of attack on the character of those running the policy. For the
moral case turns out to be similar and in some ways easier. Although there are conclusive reasons of a moral kind
against applying a nuclear sanction should deterrence fail, I claim that broadly the same kind of argument can be

rational and moral agent is nonetheless able to form and have the
relevant conditional intention to apply such a sanction. And nothing, as far as I can see,
would restrict this conclusion very strongly to certain favored accounts of morality,
such as some version of consequentialism. While agentmoralism is not the focus of this article, I
hope to say enough to justify these claims. Why suppose for a moment that rational agents cannot
form and sustain such deterrent intentions? I can think of five more or less seductive arguments to
this effect, some reconstructed from the literature on the topic, others independently plausible. All are based
directly or indirectly-on the content of the conditional intentions contemplated and on the
implications for a rational agent who contemplates such intention s. Recall the problem.
Because of what any such intention enjoins, we allegedly have a
circumstance where an agent satisfies the following conditions: P: PI, the agent
used to show that a

is (fully) rational; P2, she conditionally intends to do something E if a certain event C happens; P3, it is clear to her
that if C should happen it would be irrational to do E. This triad of conditions appears inconsistent, however,

no rational agent can have such a conditional intention in full

knowledge of what it involves. But then neither, it seems, can a rational agent
form such an intention in full knowledge of what it involves; deterrence
can't even get started unless the deterring agent first becomes irrational .
which suggests that

Different agent-irrationalist arguments provide different ways of showing how the tension inherent in (P) argues
for agent-irrationality. But before I begin my survey of these arguments, let me say a bit more about the idea of

agent-irrationalist
arguments variously mislocate or misdescribe aspects of this idea. What follows is
agent-rationality itself. The substance of my critique will be that, one way or another,

To describe an agent as rational is to characterize the agent

as epistemically responsible: such an agent responds to evidence in the right sort
of way, believing propositions when the evidence supports them (but at any rate
not when it is cognitively unsafe to adopt such beliefs) and deciding how to act by
taking proper account of her desires and beliefs regarding the likely outcome of
actions. This is clearly a dispositional notion, for someone is correctly described as rational to
the extent that she is disposed to function in this way , not just that perchance she
always does function in this way . But note that the disposition is characterized in terms
of a more local rationality: options open to a person have the property of being
rational if they are supported by her evidence in the right sort of way or if they
reflect her beliefs and desires in the right sort of way.
supposed to be uncontentious.

Newest studies prove benefits outweighs costs, but federal

legalization is key to state revenues

Chris Miles 3/1/14

(Managing Editor of News at PolicyMic, MA, Political Science and International
Relations from Louisville, worked with the Clinton Foundation, the United Nations,
and with the Kentucky state legislature; Marijuana Legalization Is a Multi-Billion
Dollar Revolution That's Sweeping Across the USA,
http://mic.com/articles/83075/marijuana-legalization-is-a-multi-billion-dollarrevolution-that-s-sweeping-across-the-usa)
In the mere two and a half months since legalization went into effect, marijuana in Colorado has left the rest of the world in
awe. On the first day of sales, the drug made $1 million. According to a budget proposal by Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper, the

is expecting roughly $1 billion in sales for the rest of the fiscal year, generating
roughly $100 million in revenue for the state. The money is slated to be used to build new
schools. Marijuana-related arrests which make up 50% of all drug-related crimes
have plummeted in Colorado, freeing up law enforcement to focus on other criminal activity. By removing
marijuana penalties, the state saved somewhere between $12 million and $40 million in 2012, according to the Colorado
state

Center on Law and Policy. "This is going to be one of the great social experiments of the 21st century," Hickenlooper said. So far,

Washington State will start retail marijuana sales in June. It's expected that the state
will achieve the same level of monetary success that Colorado has. Budget estimates project that legal weed
Colorado's gamble is paying off.

sales will bring the state nearly $190 million in taxes for the four years beginning in the middle of 2015. Other U.S. states are
eyeing Colorado's experiment and planning their own. Alaska, Oregon and California could have their say on legalization this year.
Other states, including New York, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee and Arizona are toying with the idea. The New Hampshire State
House legalized marijuana in January, though the governor promptly vetoed that deal. Critics of legalization are beginning to show
signs of support. President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, former Republican presidential nominee John McCain and even
Roger Goodell, the head of the NFL, have all been open to the great experiment. However, they have yet to make public comments
of approval outright. The great experiment is going global. From Africa to Europe and South America, other countries are looking at
the U.S. marijuana experiment and designing new laws of their own. The great experiment that started in Colorado looks like it is
turning into an all-out green revolution. The marijuana tidal wave is upon us. There is some real cash to be made here.

Keeping pot illegal is possibly keeping billions of dollars out of the economies in the
most rural parts of the U.S., preventing these regions from banking on America's "biggest" cash crop. Just how much
money are we talking about? Estimates point to over $100 billion, easily dwarfing
America's current top two biggest cash crops. We've seen the economic power of legal pot. On January
1, when recreational weed became legally available to Colorado consumers, 24 pot shop owners across the state believe they
collectively made more than $1 million in a single day of business. Residents can currently purchase up to an ounce of marijuana at
one time for recreational purposes. Non-residents can purchase up to a quarter ounce. State officials expect up to $578 million in
first-year sales revenue, as well as $67 million in tax revenue, which will be used to build schools and fund regulatory efforts. But
how much could marijuana sales add up to

if legalization went national ? There are a variety of estimates, but

when you put them all together, it's a range of $10 billion to over $120 billion per year. The map above, which illustrates the
complexities of the marijuana marketplace, is one of the first of its kind. It focuses mainly on retail price of marijuana, based on
user-generated reports from the Price of Weed website over the period of a few years. It was compiled by the Floating Sheep blog.
Darker areas indicate where marijuana is the cheapest, and lighter spots indicate where marijuana is more expensive.

Weed

would be the biggest cash crop. For comparison, the market for brewed beverages (like beer) in the U.S. is
studies claim marijuana is the biggest cash crop in America easily exceeding the combined
value of corn ($23.3 billion) and wheat ($7.5 billion). Wowza. Some states would see a massive payday.
a little over $100 billion. Some

The map points to some massively interesting trends. Cost rises moving east from the Pacific Coast, with Oregon having the lowest
prices. There are also pockets of maximum affordability around production areas, notably in Northern California, Eastern Kentucky
and Western Tennessee. Price also varies based on your city, with the cost generally rising with the size of the city. The map
confirms other research. Kentucky, for instance, is reported to be a major center of marijuana production in the U.S. More so, it
paints a picture of a complex marketplace that has failed to be fully tapped. Just think how much money Kentucky, Tennessee and
California are missing out on.

it.

It makes more economic sense to accept it than to fight

Police made a marijuana-related arrest every 42 seconds in the U.S. in 2012. Here's what that looks like hourly: [FIGURE

OMITTED] Enforcement costs about $40 billion per year, and marijuana makes. Since President Nixon
ramped it up heavily, it has cost nearly $1 trillion. If you're staring at these stark numbers and wondering why the government
even bothers, you're not alone. Public opinion has never been more in favor of decriminalizing possession of small amounts of pot.
An October 2013 Gallup poll found that 58% of adults favored legalizing marijuana for adult use. Most Americans believe marijuana
shouldn't see such a dramatic crackdown. Since the mid-1990s, marijuana legalization has received outspoken support from within
the medical community and more recently by the business community. Among the general public, support for legalization has slowly
outgrown opposition. In 2013, 52% thought that marijuana should be legalized with 45% opposed. According to Pew, this is an 11point jump from 2010, when 45% thought it should be legalized and 50% opposed. The year 2010 was when Proposition 19, which
would have legalized marijuana in California, was defeated with only a 53% majority. And of course, this is a dramatic swing from
1969, when nearly eight out of 10 Americans were opposed to legalization. Remember that Colorado saved upwards of $40 million
when it stopped cracking down on marijuana crime.

Imagine what could happen across the rest

of the U.S.

State taxation causes social costs and gets hollowed out by Big
Marijuana only federal legalization solves
Mark Kleiman 14
(Professor of public policy at the University of California Los Angeles, How Not to
Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legalization,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/how_
not_to_make_a_hash_out_of049291.php?page=all)

Like it or not,
legalization is on its way, unless something occurs to reverse the current trend in public opinion. In any case, it shouldnt be controversial to say that,
if we are to legalize cannabis, the policy aim going forward should be to maximize the gains and minimize the
Maybe you think the gains of legalizing marijuana will outweigh the costs; maybe you dont. But thats quickly becoming a moot point.

disadvantages. But the systems being put in place in Colorado and Washington arent well designed for that purpose, because they create a cannabis industry whose commercial interest
is precisely opposite to the public interest. Cannabis consumption, like alcohol consumption, follows the so-called 80/20 rule (sometimes called Paretos Law): 20 percent of the users
account for 80 percent of the volume. So from the perspective of cannabis vendors, drug abuse isnt the problem; its the target demographic. Since we can expect the legal cannabis
industry to be financially dependent on dependent consumers, we can also expect that the industrys marketing practices and lobbying agenda will be dedicated to creating and
sustaining problem drug use patterns. The trick to legalizing marijuana, then, is to keep at bay the logic of the marketits tendency to create and exploit people with substance abuse
disorders. So far,

the state-by-state , initiative-driven process doesnt seem up to that

challenge.

Neither the taxes nor the regulations will prevent substantial decreases in retail prices, which matter much more to very heavy users and to cash-constrained

teenagers than they do to casual users. The industrys marketing efforts will be constrained only by rules against appealing explicitly to minors (rules that havent kept the beer
companies from sponsoring Extreme Fighting on television). And theres no guarantee that other states wont create even looser systems. In Oregon, a proposition on the 2012 ballot
that was narrowly defeated (53 percent to 47 percent) would have mandated that five of the seven members of the commission to regulate the cannabis industry be chosen by the

It remains to be seen whether even the

modest taxes and restrictions passed by the voters survive the inevitable
industry pressure to weaken them legislatively. There are three main policy levers that could check cannabis abuse while making the drug legally available.
growersindustry capture, in other words, was written into the proposed law.

The first and most obvious is price. Roughly speaking, high-potency pot on the illegal market today costs about $10 to $15 per gram. (Its cheaper in the medical outlets in Colorado and
Washington.) A joint, enough to get an occasional user stoned more than once, contains about four-tenths of a gram; that much cannabis costs about $5 at current prices. The price in
Amsterdam, where retailing is tolerated but growing is still seriously illegal, is about the same, which helps explain why Dutch use hasnt exploded under quasi-legalization. If we too
want to avoid a vast increase in heavy cannabis use under legalization, we should create policies to keep the price of the drug about where it is now. The difficulty is that

marijuana is both relatively cheap compared to other drugs and also easy to grow (thus the nickname weed), and will just get cheaper and easier
to grow under legalization. According to RAND, legal production costs would be a small fraction of the current level, making the pre-tax value of the cannabis
in a legally produced joint pennies rather than dollars. Taxes are one way to keep prices up. But those taxes would have to be ferociously high, and
theyd have to be determined by the ounce of pot or (better) by the gram of THC, as alcohol taxes now are, not as a percentage of retail price like a sales tax. Both Colorado
and Washington have percentage-of-price taxes, which will fall along with market
prices. In states where it was legal, cannabis taxes would have to be more than $200 an ounce to keep prices at current levels; no ballot measure now under consideration has
taxes nearly that high. Collecting such taxes wouldnt be easy in the face of interstate

smuggling, as the tobacco markets illustrate. The total taxes on a pack of cigarettes in New York City run about $8 more than the taxes on the same pack in Virginia. Lo
and behold, theres a massive illicit industry smuggling cigarettes north, with more than a third of the cigarettes sold in New York escaping New York taxes. Without
federal intervention, interstate smuggling of cannabis would be even
worse. Whichever state had the lowest cannabis taxes would effectively set prices for
the whole country, and the supposed state option to keep the drug illegal would fall victim to inflows from neighboring states. The other way to keep legal
pot prices up is to limit supply. Colorado and Washington both plan to impose production limits on growers. If those limits were kept tight enough, scarcity would lead to a run-up in price.
(Thats happening right now in Colorado; prices in the limited number of commercial outlets open on January 1 were about 50 percent higher than prices in the medical outlets.) But
those states are handing out production rights for modest fixed licensing fees, so any gain from scarcity pricing will go to the industry and encourage even more vigorous marketing. If,
instead, production quotas were put up for auction, the gain could go to the taxpayers. Just as a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions can be made to mimic the effects of a carbon
tax, production quotas with an auction would be the equivalent of taxes. The second policy lever government has is information: it can require or provide product labeling, point-of-sale
communication, and outreach to prevent both drug abuse and impaired driving. In principle, posting information about, say, the known chemical composition of one type of cannabis
versus another could help consumers use the drug more safely. How that plays out in practice depends on the details of policy design. Colorado and Washington require testing and
labeling for chemical content, but techniques for helping consumers translate those numbers into safer consumption practices remain to be developed. The fact that more than 60
percent of cannabis user-days involve people with no more than a high school education creates an additional challenge, one often ignored by the advanced-degree holders who
dominate the debate. The government could also make sure consumers are able to get high-quality information and advice from cannabis vendors. In Uruguay, for example, which is
now legalizing on the national level, the current proposal requires cannabis vendors to be registered pharmacists. Cannabis is, after all, a somewhat dangerous drug, and both much
more complex chemically and less familiar culturally than beer or wine. In Washington and Colorado, by contrast, the person behind the counter will simply be a sales agent, with no
required training about the pharmacology of cannabis and no professional obligation to promote safe use. A more radical approach would be to enhance consumers capacity to
manage their own drug use with a program of user-determined periodic purchase limits. (See A Nudge Toward Temperance.) All of these attempts by government to use information
to limit abuse, however, could be overwhelmed by the determined marketing efforts of a deep-pocketed marijuana industry. And the courts creation of a legal category called
commercial free speech radically limits attempts to rein in those marketing efforts (see Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Corporate Free Speech Racket). The commercial free
speech doctrine creates an absurd situation: both state governments and the federal government can constitutionally put people in prison for growing and selling cannabis, but theyre
constitutionally barred from legalizing cannabis with any sort of marketing restriction designed to prevent problem use. Availability represents a third policy lever. Where can marijuana
be sold? During what hours? In what form? Theres a reason why stores put candy in the front by the checkout counters; impulse buying is a powerful phenomenon. The more restrictive
the rules on marijuana, the fewer new people will start smoking and the fewer new cases of abuse well have. Colorado and Washington limit marijuana sales to government-licensed pot
stores that have to abide by certain restrictions, such as not selling alcohol and not being located near schools. But theyre free to advertise. And theres nothing to keep other states, or
Colorado and Washington a few years from now, from allowing pot in any form to be sold in grocery stores or at the 7-Eleven. (Two years before legalizing cannabis, Washingtons voters
approved a Costco-sponsored initiative to break the state monopoly on sales of distilled spirits.)

To avoid getting locked into bad

policies, lawmakers in Washington need to act , and quickly. I know its hard to imagine anything good
coming out of the current Congress, but theres no real alternative. Whats needed is federal legislation requiring states that legalize cannabis to structure

their pot markets such that they wont get captured by commercial interests. There are any number of ways to do that, so the legislation wouldnt have to be overly prescriptive. States
could, for instance, allow marijuana to be sold only through nonprofit outlets, or distributed via small consumer-owned co-ops (see Jonathan P. Caulkins, Nonprofit Motive). The most
effective way, however, would be through a system of state-run retail stores. Theres plenty of precedent for this: states from Utah to Pennsylvania to Alabama restrict hard liquor sales
to stateoperated or state-controlled outlets. Such ABC (alcoholic beverage control) stores date back to the end of Prohibition, and operationally they work fine. Similar pot control
stores could work fine for marijuana, too. A state store system would also allow the states to control the pot supply chain. By contracting with many small growers, rather than a few
giant ones, states

could check the industrys political power (concentrated industries are almost always more effective at
avoiding a beer-like oligopoly offering virtually

lobbying than those comprised of many small companies) and maintain consumer choice by

interchangeable products. States could also insist that the private growers sign contracts forbidding them from marketing to the public. Imposing that rule as part of a vendor
agreement rather than as a regulation might avoid the commercial free speech issue, thus eliminating the specter of manipulative marijuana advertising filling the airwaves and
covering highway billboards. To prevent interstate smuggling, the federal government should do what it has failed to do with cigarettes: mandate a minimum retail price. Of course,
theres a danger that states themselves, hungry for tax dollars, could abuse their monopoly power over pot, just as they have with state lotteries. To avert that outcome, states should
avoid the mistake they made with lotteries: housing them in state revenue departments, which focus on maximizing state income. Instead, the new marijuana control programs should
reside in state health departments and be overseen by boards with a majority of health care and substance-abuse professionals. Politicians eager for revenue might still press for higher
pot sales than would be good for public health, but

theyd at least have to fight a resistant bureaucracy.

1AC: solvency (NPs)

The United States should legalize marihuana for production
and sale by non-profit organizations via removal from Schedule
I of the Controlled Substances Act, taxation, and regulation.
Non-profits solve the advantage, avoid social costs, and fund
harm-reduction

Jonathan P. Caulkins March/April/May 14

(Stever Professor of Operations Research and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon
Universitys Heinz College and coauthor (with Mark Kleiman, Angela Hawken, and
Beau Kilmer) of Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know; Nonprofit
Motive,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/march_april_may_2014/features/nonp
rofit_motive049293.php?page=all)
Entrusting the supply of sensitive commodities or services to nonprofits
such as blood banks, credit unions, art museums, and so onis not new.
Indeed, a good chunk of economic activity in the United States is conducted by
organizations that are neither government nor for-profit enterprises.
Of course, simply designating an organization as a nonprofit doesnt
guarantee that it wont be self-aggrandizing and politically powerful.
(Nonprofit hospitals and universities, for example, compete aggressively, though
they are typically more restrained by ethical principles than are corporations.) But
in the nonprofit arena one can do more to guard against those
tendencies. For example, a nonprofit seeking a marijuana license could be
required to have a board of trustees whose members are selected by child
welfare and public health agencies. The state could require that any
licensees charter documents (e.g., its articles of incorporation or bylaws)
pledge that it operate in ways that meet demand but eschew promotion,
and stipulate that all excess net operating revenues be donated to drug
prevention, treatment, or other charitable causes related to substance
abuse.
Placing the cannabis industry in the hands of nonprofits committed to
fostering public health would rejigger the incentive structure. For-profit
corporations seek to grow sales and, as with alcohol and tobacco, the
greatest revenues come from the most vulnerable populations ; 40 percent
of past-month marijuana users today meet clinical guidelines for
substance abuse or dependence (on marijuana, alcohol, and/or some other
substance). Nonprofits, by design, operate under different prerogatives.
They are not inherently interested in expanding sales or streamlining
production, since their mission is to serve the public interest, not to
maximize shareholders profits.
The usual knock against nonprofits is that they do not operate as
efficiently as do for-profit businesses. But that hardly matters, because after

legalization marijuana production costs will be very low. A typical heavy user
can be supplied annually by three square feet of greenhouse space (at forty grams
per harvest, four harvests per year), and professional farmers annual costs for
comparable crops run between $5 and $20 per square foot. Outdoor farming would
be even cheaper; all of the marijuana currently consumed in the U.S. each year
could be produced on about 10,000 to 15,000 acresor about a dozen modest
Midwest farms.
Production costs today are high because growing is done by two entities:
criminal organizations, whose comparative advantage is avoiding
enforcement, not practicing agronomy; and by plant-loving aficionados
supplying medical dispensaries and other high-end markets from artisanal
operations. A decade or so down the road, when the for-profit marijuana
farming sector approaches the efficiency of tomato or pepper farmers, the
production cost for a joints worth of basic, high-potency intoxicant, which
runs about $4 today, will drop to about a nickel.
The challenge under a system of legal availability is therefore not
achieving greater efficiency and lower prices but, rather, keeping prices
from falling too far, since low prices are not good for public health.
Multiple studies have shown that consumption rises as price falls.
Consumption may be especially price sensitive among heavy users,
because marijuana now takes a bigger share of their personal budgets,
and among cash-strapped teenagers: two groups whose consumption wed
prefer to see go down, not up.
Low prices also undercut revenues from taxes that are assessed as a
percentage of value, as in Colorado and Washington. While nonprofits
would not pay corporate income or property taxes, their products would
be subject to excise and sales taxes, and employees wages would be
taxable. (Bringing employees wages above the table might generate
roughly as much tax revenue as will the sales and excise taxes, something
the debate often overlooks.)
Restricting production and sale to nonprofits also solves the problem of
how to allow production without also allowing aggressive marketing ,
including promotions that appeal to youth , such as the Joe Camel
campaign or alcopops. Its very difficult to limit commercial entities
advertising and other promotional efforts, since they enjoy constitutional
protections as commercial free speech. (Most restrictions on alcohol and
tobacco advertising come from voluntary restrictions, negotiated agreements, and
lawsuits, not legislation, which helps explain why they are so weak.)
Placing the industry in the hands of public health-minded nonprofits
sidesteps the problem of overzealous promotion, because their interests
would be aligned with social welfare, not with shareholders. Big Tobacco
and Big Alcohol court youth because it is the only way they can grow, and
growth is in their DNA. Nonprofits operate under different incentive
structures.

Plan solves and is a pre-requisite to effective state action

CMA 11

(California Medical Association, Cannabis and the Regulatory Void: Background

Paper and Recommendations, http://www.cmanet.org/files/pdf/news/cma-cannabistac-white-paper-101411.pdf)
to allow for a robust
regulatory scheme to be developed, cannabis must be moved out of its current
Schedule I status within the DEAs official schedule of substances. Rescheduling cannabis will
allow for further clinical research to determine the utility and risks of cannabis, which will then
shape the national regulatory structure for this substance. CMA policy has acknowledged the
Policy Recommendations Cannabis is currently not sufficiently regulated. In order

criminalization of cannabis to be a failed public

movement toward the

health policy (HOD 704a-09) and has recognized a public

legalization of cannabis (HOD 101a-10). Cannabis

illegality has perpetuated the

prevented the

effective prohibition of clinical research on the properties of cannabis and has

development of state and national standards governing the cultivation, manufacture, and
labeling of cannabis products, similar to those governing food, tobacco and alcohol products, most of which are
promulgated by federal agencies. So what shifts in public policy could protect public health and benefit personal
health?

In order to fully evaluate and regulate cannabis, it should be legalized

and

decriminalized. Solutions Sustain physicians as gatekeepers until a proper gate is built: CMA believes that the
physician role as gatekeeper should be sustained, under Council on Scientific and Clinical Affairs (CSA)
guidelines, until such time as the legal and regulatory environment has changed from one in which medicinal
cannabis is decriminalized at the state level but illegal at the federal level to a desired environment in which
cannabis use is legalized and regulated at both the state and federal levels. Reschedule cannabis: The federal
Controlled Substances Act classifies cannabis as a Schedule I controlled substance, therefore preventing
prescriptions from being written for the substance and subjecting it to production quotas by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA). These production quotas make it extremely difficult to acquire cannabis for clinical
research purposes, thus contributing to the lack of data currently available about cannabis. As of 2010, CMA
supports the rescheduling of cannabis to facilitate further clinical research (HOD 102a-10). This clinical research
should be targeted at determining the safety and efficacy of cannabis and its constituent active chemicals. Three
options exist for rescheduling cannabis and supporting further research: 1. Move cannabis to an appropriate
scientific schedule within the current DEA scheduling structure; 2. Place cannabis on its own schedule with
parameters unique from other enumerated schedules; 3. Support the development of local cannabis regulations
as an interim alternative pending federal action. The route to challenging cannabiss status as a Schedule I
controlled substance is by filing a rule-making petition with the DEA Administrator. The Administrator has the
authority to reschedule substances by considering the scientific evidence of [the substances] pharmacological
effect, if known and the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the [substance].33 Because the DEA
has historically denied petitions to reschedule cannabis, CMA should encourage the formation of a national
coalition between state medical societies, medical specialty societies, and other relevant groups for the purpose
of building support for cannabis rescheduling. The national movement whereby 16 states and the District of
Columbia have decriminalized the use of medical cannabis should serve as a model for building this coalition. With
strength in numbers and the power to place the necessary political pressure on the DEA, this coalition should

to reschedule cannabis. Regulate medical cannabis: Rescheduling

allow for further clinical research is the acceptable avenue for providing an opportunity to
formulate a workable, evidence-based federal and state regulatory structure that protects

consider jointly petitioning the DEA

medical cannabis to
public health and

safety. By allowing adequate research to determine the utility, safety and efficacy of

cannabis

as well as the necessary controls for the substances production, distribution, taxation, etc.,

cannabis regulation is able to mirror that of other prescribed medications. The appropriate regulatory bodies can
use funds collected through a cannabis tax to enforce violation of the implemented standards. The regulation of
cannabis should address several broad areas, including: Research: As with any drug or pharmaceutical product,
the properties of cannabis should be thoroughly studied through clinical research to determine utility, safety,
and efficacy for potential medicinal uses. The outcome of this 33 21 U.S.C. 811(c)(2), (3), 1994.annabis and the
Regulatory Void 13 clinical research should be used to determine an appropriate regulatory framework for
cannabis control. Production & Distribution: Production of cannabis should be held accountable to quality control
measures and standardization. All vendors should be licensed and distribution of cannabis should include
restrictions on purchase and use to all minors. All cannabis supply should be subject to purity, concentration and
product labeling standards. Labeling standards should include warning labels, similar to those on tobacco and
alcohol products. Pending federal regulation of cannabis, local regulatory structures should be implemented in
order to control the production and supply of cannabis. Public Safety: Workplace safety should remain a priority,
with the enactment of prohibitions against workplace intoxication, similar to the treatment of alcohol use. Also,

regulations surrounding driving safety and zero-tolerance for school possession

should be implemented. Advertising: Public advertisement of cannabis should be
subject to time and place provisions, similar to tobacco and alcohol, with sanctions
including loss of

licensure for those entities that violate this provision. Reporting: An outcomes reporting system

is needed to track beneficial and

adverse effects of cannabis in real-time. Regulate recreational cannabis:

Consider permissive federal authority for states to regulate this more widely used
cannabis for purity (strength) and safety (contaminations) with current, education and research on outcomes of
such policy. These actions would mirror alcohol and tobacco control. While an unlikely
political act nationally at this time, Colorado is already attempting this without federal authority. Growing local
discontent with federal non-actions coupled with increasing violence among cannabis dealers (cartels) in Mexico
could help leverage this action. CMA should authorize responsible collaboration with groups which support such
action. Tax cannabis: A tax should be levied on cannabis as a means of
collecting funds dedicated to regulation, enforcement and education.

state level

Facilitate dissemination of the benefits and risks of cannabis use as determined by clinical research: The outcomes
of clinical cannabis research should be publicly shared so as to educate the public. Support educational efforts:
Various educational campaigns targeting different demographics are needed. These educational activities can be
funded through an earmarked portion of the cannabis tax. The goal of these educational campaigns should be to
reduce cannabis use among children, adolescents, and young adults. Separate campaigns should be launched
targeting the public, physicians, and medical students. ` Within the general public demographic, smaller targeted
campaigns will educate specific cohorts such as youth, adults, and law enforcement officials. Refer for national

National advocacy is essential to promoting the adoption of

consistent, effective regulations at the federal level. Without a national
solution, a patchwork of state-by-state decriminalization efforts will
persist, thus exposing physicians and members of the public to liability and federal
criminal sanctions. White paper dissemination: This white paper shall be distributed to interested CMA
action:

members, component medical societies, specialty societies, and other interested

organizations.

Political simulations in a game-setting are good for education

and decision-making defined rules, a stable topic, and
institutional gaming are key

Jeffrey S. Lantis 8
(Professor in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International
Relations Program at The College of Wooster, The State of the Active Teaching and
Learning Literature,
http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/thestateoftheactiveteachingandlearninglite
rature_sample.pdf)
Simulations, games, and role-play represent a third important set of active teaching and learning
approaches. Educational objectives include deepening conceptual understandings of a particular
phenomenon, sets of interactions, or socio-political processes by using student
interaction to bring abstract concepts to life. They provide students with a real or
imaginary environment within which to act out a given situation (Crookall 1995;
Kaarbo and Lantis 1997; Kaufman 1998; Jefferson 1999; Flynn 2000; Newmann and Twigg 2000; Thomas 2002;
Shellman and Turan 2003; Hobbs and Moreno 2004; Wheeler 2006; Kanner 2007; Raymond and Sorensen 2008).

enable students to actively experience, rather than read or hear about, the
constraints and motivations for action (or inaction) experienced by real players (Smith and
The aim is to

Boyer 1996:691), or to think about what they might do in a particular situation that the instructor has dramatized
for them. As Sutcliffe (2002:3) emphasizes, Remote theoretical concepts can be given life by placing them in a
situation with which students are familiar. Such exercises capitalize on the strengths of active learning
techniques: creating memorable experiential learning events that tap into multiple senses and emotions by
utilizing visual and verbal stimuli. Early examples of simulations scholarship include works by Harold Guetzkow
and colleagues, who created the Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in the 1950s. This work sparked wider interest in

political simulations as teaching and research tools . By

the 1980s, scholars had

accumulated a number of sophisticated simulations of international politics, with names like Crisis, Grand

reflect
decision makers , by small groups like

Strategy, ICONS, and SALT III. More recent literature on simulations stresses opportunities to

dynamics faced in the real world by

individual

the US National Security Council, or even global summits organized around international issues, and provides for a
focus on contemporary global problems (Lantis et al. 2000; Boyer 2000). Some of the most popular simulations

involve modeling international organizations, in particular United Nations and European Union simulations (Van
Dyke et al. 2000; McIntosh 2001; Dunn 2002; Zeff 2003; Switky 2004; Chasek 2005). Simulations may be
employed in one class meeting, through one week, or even over an entire semester. Alternatively, they may be
designed to take place outside of the classroom in local, national, or international competitions. The scholarship
on the use of games in international studies sets these approaches apart slightly from simulations. For example,

games are structured systems of competitive play with

specific defined endpoints or solutions that incorporate the material to be learnt. They are similar to
simulations, but contain specific structures or rules that dictate what it means to win
the simulated interactions. Games place the participants in positions to make choices that 10 affect outcomes, but do not require
Van Ments (1989:14) argues that

that they take on the persona of a real world actor. Examples range from interactive prisoner dilemma exercises to the use of board games in
international studies classes (Hart and Simon 1988; Marks 1998; Brauer and Delemeester 2001; Ender 2004; Asal 2005; Ehrhardt 2008) A final subset of
this type of approach is the role-play. Like simulations, roleplay places students within a structured environment and asks them to take on a specific role.
Role-plays differ from simulations in that rather than having their actions prescribed by a set of well-defined preferences or objectives, role-plays provide
more leeway for students to think about how they might act when placed in the position of their slightly less well-defined persona (Sutcliffe 2002). Roleplay allows students to create their own interpretation of the roles because of role-plays less goal oriented focus. The primary aim of the role-play is
to dramatize for the students the relative positions of the actors involved and/or the challenges facing them (Andrianoff and Levine 2002). This
dramatization can be very simple (such as roleplaying a two-person conversation) or complex (such as role-playing numerous actors interconnected
within a network). The reality of the scenario and its proximity to a students personal experience is also flexible. While few examples of effective
roleplay that are clearly distinguished from simulations or games have been published, some recent work has laid out some very useful role-play
exercises with clear procedures for use in the international studies classroom (Syler et al. 1997; Alden 1999; Johnston 2003; Krain and Shadle 2006;
Williams 2006; Belloni 2008). Taken as a whole, the applications and procedures for simulations, games, and role-play are well detailed in the active
teaching and learning literature. Experts recommend a set of core considerations that should be taken into account when designing effective simulations
(Winham 1991; Smith and Boyer 1996; Lantis 1998; Shaw 2004; 2006; Asal and Blake 2006; Ellington et al. 2006). These include building the simulation
design around specific educational objectives, carefully selecting the situation or topic to be addressed, establishing the needed roles to be played by
both students and instructor, providing clear rules, specific instructions and background material, and having debriefing and assessment plans in place
in advance. There are also an increasing number of simulation designs published and disseminated in the discipline, whose procedures can be adopted
(or adapted for use) depending upon an instructors educational objectives (Beriker and Druckman 1996; Lantis 1996; 1998; Lowry 1999; Boyer 2000;
Kille 2002; Shaw 2004; Switky and Aviles 2007; Tessman 2007; Kelle 2008). Finally, there is growing attention in this literature to assessment. Scholars
have found that

these methods are particularly effective in bridging the gap

between academic knowledge and everyday life. Such exercises also lead
to enhanced student interest in the topic, the development of empathy, and
acquisition and retention of knowledge.

Specifically key on this topic structured simulations give

competitive incentives for ethical criminal law education
Deborah Young June 9
(Faculty at Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. Professor Young
teaches courses in evidence, criminal procedure, and trial advocacy. She also
serves as director of Trial Advocacy and Clinical Education, coauthor of Federal
Sentencing Law and Practice; Alternative Teaching Methods: Using Simulations to
Enhance Substantive Courses,
http://lawteaching.org/conferences/2009/handouts/1dAlternativeTeachingMethods.pdf)
Alternative Teaching Methods: Using Simulations to Enhance Substantive Courses This workshop will enable teachers to efficiently and easily incorporate skills activities and simulations into their courses. Teaching materials are
provided here for advocacy simulations on authentication in Evidence; a writing simulation on sentencing in Criminal Law; and role-playing simulations on stops and seizures in Criminal Procedure. Additional materials for other
simulations (beyond the eight pages permitted here) will be distributed at the workshop in paper and electronic format. Demonstrations of the simulations will show how they are effective for teaching substantive material,

simulations
accomplish several goals at once. Student learning is enhanced
actively participating
increases preparation.
immediate feedback, both internal and external
requires
students become aware of weaknesses.
Misunderstandings can be addressed promptly
ethical concerns naturally come to
light, leading to discussions
of

assessing student knowledge, and raising ethical issues in the context of substantive learning. Principles of designing quick simulations for other courses will also be discussed. Using
substantive courses

in

es

, particularly

for students for whom kinesthetic learning is most natural. When students are

, their attention is necessarily heightened. For those observing, the novelty of

watching classmates creates great interest. Alerting students that they will have to actually perform a task in class also greatly

Simulations allow for

. Using knowledge in a simulation

fully understood and

their

that the principles be

At the same time, the professor can immediately assess how thoroughly the

students understand the substantive law.

, ensuring that the building blocks of the

subject are solid before moving on. Finally, as students actually carry out the role of an attorney, judge, officer, or suspect,
in the context

substantive learning.

Criminal Law Simulation:

This simulation is designed to complete the study on justifications for

punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. Students act as judges issuing a one page written sentencing order. After completing readings and class discussion about punishment, I assign the sentencing
drafting exercise below. Students are explicitly asked to refrain from discussing the sentencing exercise with anyone. Unbeknownst to the students, half of the students have the female defendant Sandra and half have the male
defendant Sam. Otherwise, the circumstances are identical. The facts are based on a case I had as an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia. I give the students a deadline to submit the memos before the next

justifications
consequences which facts were most significant
what personal biases
influenced
decisions
and
class so I have time to calculate some statistics. The subsequent class discussion is usually fascinating as we explore: (1) what
, (2)

individual sentencing

for punishment were utilized with what

, and (3)

. Before this class I calculate the average sentence imposed

whether there are differences for male and female defendants or male and

female sentencing judges. Students readily see how disparate discretionary sentencing can be. Students often comment on how difficult it was to actually determine a sentence. We also discuss
judges found there was significant assistance to

the government

and whether this conclusion

had a factual basis

whether

some

. I then lead students through an analysis

of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines recommended sentence for the offense. (At the workshop I will hand out the sentencing guidelines worksheet that corresponds to this case). Students are often surprised that facts that were
significant to them, such as parental responsibilities, do not alter guidelines sentences. Throughout the discussion, we consider ethical concerns,

with which they

may

disagree.

including

the complex issue of judges bound by

laws

If I have the available time, I may begin class by having the students discuss the sentencing with a neighbor and then report what sentence they

would give. This time for consultation usually reduces the number of outlying sentences. This exercise cements the students understanding of the justifications for punishment, clarifies the difference between discretionary
sentencing and guidelines sentencing, places students in the role of judges,

and

raises ethical issues including

gender bias.

Done early in the semester, this exercise also gives me a quick glimpse

of my students abilities at legal analysis and writing so I can provide support where necessary. Here are the memos I distribute: Memo 1, female defendant: If you were the judge in the following case, what sentence would you
impose and why? Write a brief (one page) memo stating your sentence and explaining your reasons. United States v. Sandra Johnson Sandra Johnson was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 600 grams of cocaine in
powder form in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 2009. On that date, officers of the Washington, D.C., task force watched passengers leaving the Amtrak train which had just arrived from New York. Officers noticed Ms. Johnson
because she looked nervous, had no luggage other than a large tote bag, and proceeded immediately to a pay phone. A plain clothes officer stood at the next phone and heard Ms. Johnson describing her own clothing and agreeing
to meet someone just outside the station in thirty minutes. The officer identified himself to Ms. Johnson and asked to search her bag. Ms. Johnson began trembling, but handed the officer the bag. The officer opened the bag and
found the 600 grams of cocaine. The officer placed Ms. Johnson under arrest. When asked to cooperate in an ongoing investigation, Ms. Johnson gave the officers two nicknames of persons she had picked the cocaine up from in
New York. She said she could provide no other information. Ms. Johnson is twenty years old. Ms. Johnson is not married. She has a one-year-old son and a three-year-old daughter. She completed the eleventh grade. From June 2008

until November 2008, Ms. Johnson was employed as a waitress. She lost her job when the restaurant closed. She has no previous arrests. After losing a motion to suppress the physical evidence, Ms. Johnson pleaded guilty to one
count of possession with intent to distribute 600 grams of cocaine. The statutory mandatory minimum penalty is five years in prison. The maximum penalty is forty years in prison. A judge can sentence a defendant to less than the
statutory minimum only if the court finds that the defendant gave substantial assistance to government authorities to aid a criminal investigation. Memo 2, male defendant: If you were the judge in the following case, what

sentence would you impose and why? Write a brief (one page) memo stating your sentence and explaining your reasons. United States v. Sam Johnson Sam Johnson was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 600
grams of cocaine in powder form in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 2009. On that date, officers of the Washington, D.C., task force watched passengers leaving the Amtrak train which had just arrived from New York. Officers
noticed Mr. Johnson because he looked nervous, had no luggage other than a large tote bag, and proceeded immediately to a pay phone. A plain clothes officer stood at the next phone and heard Mr. Johnson describing his own
clothing and agreeing to meet someone just outside the station in thirty minutes. The officer identified himself to Mr. Johnson and asked to search his bag. Mr. Johnson began trembling, but handed the officer the bag. The officer
opened the bag and found the 600 grams of cocaine. The officer placed Mr. Johnson under arrest. When asked to cooperate in an ongoing investigation, Mr. Johnson gave the officers two nicknames of persons he had picked the
cocaine up from in New York. He said he could provide no other information. Mr. Johnson is twenty years old. Mr. Johnson is not married. He has a one-year-old son and a three-year- old daughter. He completed the eleventh grade.

From June 2008 until November 2008, Mr. Johnson was employed as a waiter. He lost his job when the restaurant closed. After losing a motion to suppress the physical evidence, Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of
possession with intent to distribute 600 grams of cocaine. The statutory mandatory minimum penalty is five years in prison. The maximum penalty is forty years in prison. A judge can sentence a defendant to less than the statutory
minimum only if the court finds that the defendant gave substantial assistance to government authorities to aid a criminal investigation. Criminal Procedure Simulations: In criminal procedure, simulations bring to life key issues
of stops and seizures. Two classic cases that work well for in class student simulations depicting police stops are the initial seizure in US v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and the stop and frisk in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In Mendenhall, DEA agents approach Ms. Mendenhall after she disembarked in the Detroit airport from a flight from Los Angeles. The agents take her license and ticket, but return them and then ask her to accompany them to their
office. Ultimately they ask for a consent search and Ms. Mendenhall consents and heroin is found on her person. To set the scene for Mendenhall, I like to show a one minute clip of an airport scene from Catch Me If You Can.
Students today are so accustomed to the high level of scrutiny at airports that they can hardly conceive of how open airports were at the time of the Mendenhall case. Of course one also has to explain why an agent holding ones
plane ticket had such significance, since most students have only had electronic tickets. The student playing the defendant, Ms. Mendenhall often comments about how she did not feel free to refuse the agents request at each step
and how she did in fact feel seized, contrary to the Supreme Courts conclusion that a reasonable person in Ms. Mendenhalls situation would have felt free to leave. The students playing the agents sometimes comment on how
fine the line seems to be between what is permissible police conduct and what is not. In Terry v. Ohio, the very experienced Detective McFadden stopped and frisked three young men he thought were casing a store. The student
playing Detective McFadden often comments on how difficult it is to imagine how to control three potential defendants, when you suspect they are armed and might harm you. Seeing the facts demonstrated heightens the
discussion of how the Supreme Court must craft rules of criminal procedure that can be applied in daily settings. Students readily see there was no arrest to justify the searches, and understand why the Court created the stop and
frisk doctrine based on reasonable suspicion to protect officers. To demonstrate various car and container searches, I use a Barbie car and three dolls. I usually have a Barbie driving, Ken as a male passenger, and a Barbie police
officer. Driver Barbie has a purse with her. Passenger Ken has a suitcase in the trunk. There are little tiny packets of white powder (baking soda packaged in small pieces of ziploc bags) in various locations throughout the car,
including in the purse, in a pocket, and in the suitcase. As a variation, there can be weapons in the car or on the persons. Driver Barbie commits some traffic error such as failing to use a turn signal which can be the beginning of a
traffic stop. I have students carry out various traffic stops and car searches with the dolls. As with other simulations, it is easy to spot where students understand the law and where they do not. An outline of significant cases and
their key facts will be distributed at the workshop to make this a quick and easy simulation project. Faculty can then choose which cases to use, depending on what is covered in the course text. All of these criminal procedure

simulations assist
seeing the implications of constitutional law from
the perspective of suspects and
police, reminding students of the
human factor
of
whether police might lie
demonstrating
that courts alone do not guarantee
rights.

Evidence is a natural
subject for incorporating simulations
because of
need
for preparation
the students in

the perspective of

, as urged by the Carnegie report. Students better understand why courts try to establish bright line rules that can be readily followed in the field. Often students raise the issue
about how a stop occurred to make it appear legal, thus

the fundamental concept of criminal procedure

constitutional

role of witness and recognize how perceptions and memory can vary, even under ideal conditions with perfect lighting.

In reviewing exactly what occurred after a simulation, students also experience the

Evidence Simulations:

, but many faculty do not do so

concerns of use of class time,

of materials, or lack of actual experience in advocacy. I begin the semester with authentication. I have found authentication to be an easy first topic in Evidence that quickly teaches

students something they expected to learn: how to introduce evidence in court. I preview the simulations with the text assignment and a very practical power point that I also use in a basic trial advocacy class. Here is an outline of
the powerpoint presentation: Authentication of Documents and Exhibits Authentication: You must show the item is what you say it is. Who decides? Under 104(b) judge decides if there is enough evidence for jury to find
that the item is what you say it is Authentication: Providing sufficient evidence for the judge to decide that a jury may conclude the evidence is what you say it is. Steps to lay the foundation for any exhibit 1. Have item
marked for identification. (Do in advance). 2. Show exhibit to opposing counsel for inspection; note on record or note on record counsel has previously examined. 3. Ask courts permission to approach witness. (Optionaldepending on judges preference.) 4. Show exhibit to witness. Witness, I show you what has been marked for identification as plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 5. Ask witness to identify article. Do you recognize plaintiffs exhibit A for
identification? How do you recognize plaintiffs exhibit A for identification? 6. Lay basis for foundation-authentication (may take more than one witness). 7. Move exhibit into evidence. Your Honor, I move governments
exhibit A for identification into evidence. 8. Respond to any objections. 9. Obtain court ruling. 10. Use Exhibit. Can have witness use exhibit in testimony. Can have witness mark the exhibit, or you may mark exhibit
pursuant to witness testimony. Can ask courts permission to publish the exhibit to the jury. Remember you should not display an exhibit to the jury or otherwise use the exhibit until it is admitted Position in courtroom
while using exhibits: jury must see witness must see judge not required to seebut some want to Know there are alternatives to authentication Inclusion of documents in pretrial pleadings pursuant to FRCP Stipulations
Statutory schemes Once students have learned the basic principles of authentication, I assign them items of evidence to introduce including: a photograph-any photo will suffice, but students really enjoy a photo of an
intersection near campus a gun-I use a cardboard cutout with a serial number on it a tape recording cocaine-baking soda in an FBI heatseal lab bag and a document, usually a contract For each simulation we have at
least four roles: judge, witness(es), and two students as co-counsel introducing the evidence. I initially take the role of judge, but switch to witness for the cocaine case unless I have someone in the class knowledgeable enough to
play the officers role. The rest of the class acts as opposing counsel when it is appropriate to object. With each of the exhibits, the observing students and I watch to see if the critical foundation is laid. For the photograph, does the
student attorney establish that the photograph fairly and accurately and represents the scene on the date in question? If the photograph was taken at a different time, has the witness acknowledged any changes from the relevant
date? Does the student attorney erroneously believe that the photographer must be called as a witness? With the gun, does the student realize how basic the foundation is if the officer who seized the weapon noted the serial
number? Can the witness refresh the officers recollection, if needed, for the serial number? Does the student attorney mistakenly think that a chain of custody is required? With the tape recording, the student has several choices,
the easiest of which is to have a witness who was present during the conversation and has reviewed the tape. Does the student attorney establish that the tape is an accurate recording of the relevant conversation? Does the
student attorney have the witness describe the conversation and identify the voices? For the cocaine, does the student attorney realize there must be a chain of custody established? Are the appropriate witnesses called? For the
contract I often vary the simulation by having a number of different students authenticate the contract in different ways, such as by lay handwriting testimony and eyewitness to the signing testimony. I do not usually assign
students

specific problems in advance

, although that

expedite

s class. I prefer to have all students prepare all problems. At the beginning of class, I

announce who will do which problems and give those students a few minutes to speak to their co-counsel while I prep the witnesses. We then begin the simulations. Doing simulations in class takes about the same amount of time

discussing the problems

and
spur students to master the material
to perform well
evidence
can be engaged by
having them make objections
or
suggest alternate
approaches
Students
understand there is rarely just one way
to accomplish a legal task.
as

alone. At the workshop we will discuss techniques to make the most of these simulations

for each simulation. The authentication simulations

I will distribute sample question and answer scripts

in order

front of their classmates. They require students to tailor the basic authentication steps to fit the kind of

offered. The rest of the class

to admission if the authentication is inadequate

in

easily

by having them

, particularly with the document which can be admitted in many different ways. This class serves as an icebreaker, usually in the second week of the semester. Once students become engaged

and speak out in class, they tend to continue that practice.

also begin to

Advocating state action doesnt deny our location or lack of

direct institutional power it simply recognizes that sites of
democratic argumentation will always exist and their limits are
open to external revision, but those revisions must be couched
in testable, recognizable discourse.
Amanda Anderson 6
(Professor of English at Johns Hopkins; The Way We Argue Now, pg. 181-187)
proceduralism that I want to consider is the way in which argument
functions as a key practice within it, as the preeminent form of
deliberative democracy and as a key moment before some of the decisive
moments of deliberative closure (e.g., vote taking, consensus, compromise). Argument
actually becomes, in a certain way, the key collective ethos of proceduralism. But
what does it mean to conceive of argument as ethos? For Habermas, what crucially sets
Rawlss proceduralism in a different direction than his is their divergent
ways of reconciling an aspiration to Kantian universalization (aiming at
what is good for all) with the contemporary fact of social and ideological
pluralism. Rawls responds to pluralism by imposing a common perspective on all, an original
position enforcing informational constraints that effectively neutralize
difference (the famous veil of ignorance). In contrast, Habermas invests
his hope in a discourse ethics that privileges an enlargement of
perspective brought about precisely through argumentation. As he puts it,
Discourse ethics, by contrast [with Rawls], views the moral point of view as
embodied in an intersubjective praxis of argumentation which enjoins
those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive
perspectives.20 Asserted here is an integral link between the ongoing aspiration to transcend ones
current horizon and the social practice of argumentation. Indeed, for Habermas, argument, which we might
gloss as reflective communicative action, is both a privileged form of ethicopolitical practice
and the very condition for the possibility of justifying proceduralism:
Because there are no ultimate sources of evidence or definitive kinds
of arguments in practical questions, we must have recourse to the
The final aspect of

process of argumentation as our procedure if we are to explain how it is

possible for us to raise and vindicate validity claims that transcend the
present context. 21 Linked to this is also Habermass strong sense that argument keeps the
democratic project fundamentally open and incomplete , a desideratum that he
believes Rawlss theory precludes insofar as it emphasizes the act of constitution making as a founding moment.22

decision making within proceduralism, Habermas requires

that participants in democratic decision-making processes be selfreflective, and this self-reflectiveness involves awareness of clash ing
value systems and the possibility of persistent disagreements. What
Habermas asks participants to understand as they are forced to come to
decisions within these sublunary conditions, is that they regard such
decisions as interim results of an ongoing discussion seeking the one
right answer to a practical-political problem but interrupted by institutional pressures
In his own understanding of

for a decision. The use of the regulative ideal of the one right answer has prompted sharp critiques based on an
assumption that Habermas is introducing a form of authoritian reason. But the one right answer
functions in precisely the way that the horizon of the universal or the pressure of aiming for the right over the good
does:

it simply enjoins participants to continue the argument, to respond

with the rigorous refusal to imagine that one has actually come up with
the one right answer. It is an ideal that allows the process of argument to
prevail over any given perspective. In this conception, argument as ethos
would always trump identity as ethos.

The question of how dialogue under conditions of

pluralism might ideally be conceived has led to alternate theories that define themselves against Habermasian

proceduralism, which is seen as ethnocentrically invested in rationality and

consensus. It is important, in my view, to acknowledge how fundamental to these alternate
views remains the attempt to define ethos against argument, which
amounts to refusing the idea of argument as ethos. As in the case of the
Foucault/Habermas debate, and in certain articulations of the new cosmopolitanism, ethos in these
alternate models is elevated above argument, most visibly as a critique of
reason and abstract universalism, but also , I shall argue, as a model of
difference that poses problems for democratic politics and particularly for
the fate of debate within it. In the Rawlsian model of overlapping consensus (where people with
fundamentally different conceptions of the good agree on political principles but for different reasons) and in
models of accommodation that have been proffered in objection to what are seen as the deficiencies of the
consensus models, there is an expectation of fundamental, nonnegotiable disagreement among parties who
nonetheless have an investment in cohabiting within a pluralistic democratic state. One of the more thoughtful
critiques of Habermasian proceduralism along accommodationist lines is that of Thomas McCarthy, who argues that
Habermass emphases on rational acceptance and a cooperative search for truth intended to gain the assent of a
universal audience are not themselves the proper informing ideals of a discourse proceduralism enacted under the

McCarthy argues that Habermas

wants to prevent any skepticism about the possibility of ethicopolitical
consensus from undercutting the orientation to reasoned agreement on
which he bases his conception of legitimacy. For McCarthy, by contrast, participants need
conditions of posttraditional pluralism and individualism.23

to recognize the possibility of reasoned disagreements and then use this recognition to devise democratic
procedures that will enable and enhance coexistence. Mc-Carthy therefore suggests that Habermass organizing
presuppositions, which favor procedures meant to promote consensus and negotiated compromise, might be
foreclosing the possibility of devising a different order of proceduralism that would aim to promote not agreement
but rather mutual accommodation. He concludes, tantalizingly: it would be an important and interesting task to
explore the logic of the ethical-political dialogue that could produce such mutual accommodation and to elaborate
its differences from the logics both of truth-oriented discourse and of strategic, self-interested bargaining (151). In

Habermas refuses the concept of mutual

accommodation that McCarthy introduces. He entirely cedes the point
that we must expect disagreement an ideal of argument presupposes
his reply to McCarthys critique,

this and that this awareness should form part of reflective participation
in democratic debate.

He then maps out three positions on dialogue under conditions of pluralism,

rejecting the first two and endorsing the third. The first position holds that it is impossible to escape clashing
horizons; when they encounter one another, the only possibility for overcoming their differences is the assimilation
of one to the other. The second position, which is Rawlss, envisions an overlapping consensus (parties accept a

the third position promotes the progressive

expansion of horizons: beyond the limit of their respective selfinterpretations and world views, the different parties refer to a
presumptively shared moral point of view that, under the symmetrical
conditions of discourse and mutual learning , requires an ever broader
decentering of perspectives. What Habermas insists upon is the necessity that people accept
regulating procedures elaborated with the goal of coexistence for the same reasons. As he concludes, We
consensus result for different reasons).24 And

can agree to the mutual toleration of forms of life and worldviews that
represent existential challenges for each other only if we have a basis of
shared beliefs for agreeing to disagree. 25 In the case of McCarthy, whose position is

those virtues that would best express a goal of

accommodation tolerance, respectare elevated above any principle of shared
reasons. This creates a situation in which ethos, in the sense of an avowed form of
ethical life, is somehow allowed to cushion the participants against
argumentative challenges, a condition that Habermas is persistently
concerned to disallow. In its most pronounced form, such an approach risks
closer to Rawlss, the elaboration of

collapsing argument into identity: here the ineluctable fact of difference

whether radically conceived or more traditionally pluralistbecomes
the overriding reason for reasoned disagreement. But

of course the position that

McCarthy advances need not be taken so far: read another way, there is a potential similarity between McCarthys
position and the new cosmopolitanism, insofar as both locate a virtue in refusing the insistence on explicit
justification and rational agreement that we find in Habermas. The logic of accommodation implies a willingness
not to argue out every last detail, but rather to exercise the tact that consists in recognizing that we may differ.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that

accommodation

here

operates as an attitude

informing democratic practices that otherwise still need to be based on

procedures for ensuring open debate and equitable forms of
representation. These procedures can be refined and debated
themselves, but never suspended completely. Ethos in this view does not
replace or eclipse procedure, just as cosmopolitanism has the potential to refine universalism
through tact and phronesis, without disavowing its fundamental universalistic principles. By way of closing, I
want to address objections that have been raised against the privileging
of argument and debate as an ethicopolitical ideal. It has been claimed
that such an ideal is too narrow in its conception of how political
commitments find expression, and unable to comprehend nonrational
forms of solidarity or aesthetic political practices (theatrical display,
performativity, ironic critique). I argued in chapter 1 for a democratic model of
politics that could acknowledge a wide range of forms of expression as
possessing theoretical and political significance: in this sense I have no quarrel
with those critics of Habermas who seek to emphasize affective or
aesthetic modes. And I have suggested elsewhere in this volume, most particularly in the essay on
pragmatism, that liberalism should remain open to a plurality of
characterological and expressive modes, rather than seek to elevate a
specific temperament or persona. I would argue, however , that the
accommodation of plural modes of expression still requires procedural
elaboration if it is to have any political meaning or effectiveness , as
McCarthys own critique makes clear.

In order to affect institutionalized deliberative

procedures, nonrational forms of political expression require some form

of translation into terms that can impact decision making and policy.
While dramatic displays of protest that rely on theatrical tactics and
visceral power cannot entirely be explained in rational terms , and can be
recognized to have a force on their own terms,

in order to affect policy they have to be

translated into claims recognizable within existing political institutions.

We do not remain inarticulate about the visceral if it effectively affects

our political views and our social interactions. A second critique that has
been leveled against the argument model of politics focuses on the forces
that mitigate against rational argumentative ideals. Gerald F. Gaus has argued
specifically against the principle of sincerity presupposed in models of deliberative democracy.26 His central claim
is that sincerity will be more likely to produce disagreement than consensus, which always requires some fudging
and bending, and which fares better under conditions of incomplete honesty. Ultimately we rely on the procedures
of democracy as a kind of umpire: at some point we take a vote, not because we have been readied and steadied
by exhaustive political debate, but because we need a way to adjudicate difference. Argument, Gaus contends, is a
philosophical ideal, not a political one. Moreover, it cannot be seen to function empirically in the ways that certain
political theorists would want. Gaus cites research on the heuristics employed in argument, which tend not so much
toward some ideal of exhaustive consideration of information and viewpoints but more toward shortcuts:
preeminently, vividness of example and available information. There is a desire for economy and also for closure.

along with the studies that show that reasonable people often adhere
to unreasonable beliefs even in the light of new information, makes the
idea of exhaustive reasonable debate, for Gaus, impractical. It will tend to
This,

produce impasses of disagreement, no more. From an empirical standpoint, Gauss observations certainly make a

there are myriad ways in which rational argument is

thwarted or truncated in political argument, and many practices of
persuasion and achieved consensus rely precisely upon conditions of
insincerity and adjudication. But this type of criticism is itself weak when
good deal of sense:

it imagines it has delivered a fatal blow to theories that rely on an ideal

of argument.

First,

it overstates the case against rational argument when

it imagines that a pragmatic and almost cynical attitude prevails in the

political arena , while idealism remains the dream of philosophers. Both philosophers and
politicians in the democratic tradition have long argued in service of the
kind of procedural ideals and universal principles that Habermas
elaboratesand debate animated by these principles is readily identified
even if it does not achieve pure forms or animate all instances of
discourse. In discussing the relation between philosophy and citizenship, and the need for philosophy to
avoid either an apologetic relation to the status quo or a paternalistic
role, Habermas insists upon the very close connection between the
impartial standpoint of philosophy and the stance of social critique:
insofar as it draws on procedural properties of practical reason,
[philosophy] can find confirmation in a perspective that it encounters in
society itself: by the moral point of view from which modern societies are
criticized by their own social movements. 27 Moreover, what Habermas elsewhere refers
to as the process of argumentation is a regulative idea, not an empirical
reality, and communicative action oriented toward understanding relies
upon presuppositions that are continuous with that idea. It is true that Habermas
does not typically acknowledge the many ways in which actors can be irrational, but such an
acknowledgment, along with the acknowledgments he does make about
the ways in which speech situations fail to approximate the ideal, need
not be fatal to the project. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, the very critique
advanced by Gaus itself relies on the very ideal he intends to debunk. It is
only possible to identify the many ways in which rational argument falls
short if one is actually measuring against some standards of rational
completeness. Let me conclude by trying to summarize what I take to be the value of affirming argument

as ethos, rather than privileging ethos in any of its other various guisesauthentic ethical life, charismatic critique,
or accommodating tact. While I understand the motivation behind McCarthys critique of Habermas, his sense that

an
intersubjective praxis of argumentation more closely achieves the ideals
we may need to expect disagreement more than aim for agreement, I think the Habermasian principle of

of universalization and respect that undergird the democratic project.

Simply accepting the views of others because they are asserted to be
fundamentally linked to their nonnegotiable conceptions of the good or
to their given cultural identityaccepting a merely overlapping
consensus, or insisting on accommodation of ways and customs that may
seem to jar with liberal democratic practiceseems to me precisely to
fail in according the forms of respect that the model seems to claim for
itself. 28 I am not arguing that identity issues should be excluded from
consideration, but simply that they should not be permitted to stand
inviolable or uncontestable. Argument with those from whom we differ is
a form of respect and it implies an aspiration to universalism. Committed
to the possibility of agreement as well as the conditions of pluralism, it
does not attempt to tame or stabilize disagreement : it is capable of
reasoned disagreement, but it is perhaps more fundamentally
characterized by a dissatisfied recognition of disagreement. To take a current
example, the debate over the banning of the hajib (Muslim headscarf ) and other religious symbols in schools in
France has created a certain dialogical demand whose benefits outweigh, it seems to me, a situation in which
clarification and articulation of self-reflective pluralism are simply avoided in the name of passive toleration. This is
not to imply that this particular issue cannot be resolved in favor of toleration. What the French debate importantly
demands is that citizens of a pluralist state go beyond peremptory appeals to cultural identity and clarify their
understanding of what it means to live together under conditions of pluralism with the collective responsibility of
providing education consonant with the secular principles of the state. This demand extends not only to Muslims
and Jews, but also to the historically dominant Catholic population, whose own partial universalism is revealed in
the attempt to include only large crosses in the ban. In this situation, there is a need to negotiate between

The process of
argument is what enables the very act of pluralist self-clarification to
occur, and the society in question must cultivate an ethos of argument if
it is to meet the ongoing challenges of its political (re)constitution. When
differing forms of affiliation, as well as between political principle and cultural identity.

argument can itself be recognized as an ethos, disagreement remains

live, not merely the nonnegotiable emanation of a pregiven cultural
identity or holistic ethos. To put this in yet another way, tolerance and respect are
not utterly coterminous, as the accommodationist position would have us
believe. Indeed, if we collapse these terms, we are left in a situation where
the tradition of sincerityconceived of in its broadest terms as allied with
critique and the promotion of political integrity remains impotent in the
face of peremptory appeals to authenticity. Proceduralism is itself a
dialectical overcoming of the sincerity/authenticity problematic, but , unlike in
Trilling, its polemical relation to received opinion is not in the service of
nature, fate, or the unconscious, but rather in the service of an aspiration
toward universalism.