Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
L-5270
charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not
appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount
to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879
the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted
in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and
battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port
of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.)
Representations were made through diplomatic channels to
the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts,
Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish
and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter
careful consideration in connection with the views and
suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth
article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and
Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last
clause of that article . . . are those under which it is
contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a
civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of
the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies
resulting from personal violence involving offense for which
the party may be held amenable under the local criminal
law.
This Government does not view the article in question as
susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to
their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences
as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels,
where such differences do not involve on the part of the
captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of
the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local
People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the
present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were
knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion
that "according to his experience, the system of carrying
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and
more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was
conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly
and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders,
No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or
omission complained of as constituting a crime or public
offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition.
It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it
must be in such form as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended and the court to
pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which
complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4
Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the
master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The
allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the
defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by
reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to
provide suitable means for securing said animals were
cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty
wounded, bruised, and killed."
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August
19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of
prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that
this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court
of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et
al.", more particularly the application of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the
provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said
Court of First Instance from taking any further action or
entertaining further the aforementioned application for
probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng
may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with
the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in
said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the
on
November 24, 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a
second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial
and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.
(section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the
authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance
of different provinces without uniformity. In another
supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the
Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the
petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for
the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner
regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the
oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated
on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and
therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive
power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves.
On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums
in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only
encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but
also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative
power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On
October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the
City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the
petitioner,
the
Hongkong
and
Shanghai
Banking
Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to
impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending
that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of
legislative
power,
were
presented.
Another
joint
memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same
day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is
unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of
the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of
legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void:
that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning
the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may
intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the
probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may
pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition
proceedings.
vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs.
Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the
state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney,
may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he
will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo
warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan.,
803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel
obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108
Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3
Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State
vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs.
S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley
[1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County
Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn
vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs.
State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins
[1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last
cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district
attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws,
has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In
support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State
ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial
District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor
vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So.,
592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor
(47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These
decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a
statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one
which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District
Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should
not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be
unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of
information charging a person with a violation of the statute.
In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a
statute
unconstitutional
until
the
question
of
constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must
be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant.
State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the
proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute
imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid
the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is
immune
from
responsibility
if
the
statute
be
unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority
for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the
state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to
perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute,
on the ground that they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal
laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution
of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two
statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals
another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is
unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in
order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by
way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If
it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free
from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal
laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the
correctness of the general proposition that the state may
impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any
any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a
convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final
sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his
sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be
suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the
period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in
the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly
demonstrated in various other enactments, including the
probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law
enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently
amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole
(secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in
imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as
amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof.
The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency
Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act
No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the
amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine
Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act
M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L.
R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex
rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp.,
928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore
vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re
Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W.,
568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233
P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69;
State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112;
70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States
[1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn.,
100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100;
169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep.,
618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim.
Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122
Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927],
100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131
Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash.,
287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich
[1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.)
We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding
that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature
to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of
probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs.
Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R.,
393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute
enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the
execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the
court, and required that the convicted person be placed
under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the
term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may
determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the
court a power in violation of the constitutional provision
vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the
the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature
to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation
on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third
case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the
Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign
cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the
country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign
cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and
livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not
concerned with the simple transference of details of
execution
or
the
promulgation
by
executive
or
administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our
own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908],
11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs.
Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co.
vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915],
31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made
to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on
certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive
or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6
R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10
Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United
State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not
legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also,
Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W.,
738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a
Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an
Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency
upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such
agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864;
State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr
[1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide
that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body
the power to determine when the specified contingencies
has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not
made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the
provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it
is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no
rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by
the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts
or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any
purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason
whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds
for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which
rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future
time we cannot say when the provincial boards may
appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and
thus put the law into operation in the various provinces will
not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we
reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the
provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain
facts or conditions by a person or body other than
legislature itself.
delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to
the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the
provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to
any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1
subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a
restraint on all the tree grand departments of our
government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal
protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme
Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30
Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North
Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed.,
735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184,
U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others
in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and
nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs.
California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S.,
150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell &
Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification,
however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be
probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall
supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is
given, as to the person placed in probation under his care,
the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the
probation officer to see that the conditions which are
imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care
are complied with. Among those conditions, the following
are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or
vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful
character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the
court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at
reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the
part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or
condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g)
Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved
parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from
time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance,
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the
rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in
force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration
of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought
for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to
be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The
consequences of the various constructions offered will also
be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a
rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed
by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited"
has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed;
confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration,
extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.,
February 2, 1953
March 7, 1919
MALCOLM, J.:
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No.
2711.
LAW I.
II. HISTORY.
xxx
xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at
Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be
formed should have the facilities of waters. lands, and
mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway
of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live
xxx
xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT
ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other
court, has the right to alter or to remove the pueblos or the
reducciones once constituted and founded, without our
express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal
district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos,
priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by
offering or giving information to that en. And, because these
claims are often made for private interests and not for those
IN
THE
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25,
1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10,
1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at
Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law
and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE
NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws
concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April
9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111,
422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113,
1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra,
Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. LepantoBontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan,
Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an
example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the
Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of
Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal
government,
the
provincial
governor
is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers
from among them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided,
That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in
excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in
the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named
Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general
language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
in
President
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "nonChristian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who
profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial
corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas,"
Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan
Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands,"
1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine
Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we
shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical
signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of
many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the
authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,Secretary of Finance
and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by
Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated
by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal
Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable
Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30
of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter
No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for
consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion
of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian
who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The
precise questions were these: "Does he remain nonChristian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an
infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay
himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The
opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the
same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is
probable that is probable that the person in question
remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating
liquors both he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act
No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise.
was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical
ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient,"
from which we can deduce that the name was applied to
men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern
invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond
the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive,
semi-nomadic
people.
They
number
approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no
desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble
to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any
form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine
(Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the
Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for
the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government
of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called
non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of
the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before,
the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage."
The recognized relation between the Government of the
instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early
Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be
made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton
County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief
Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat.,
1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.)
The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence
to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to
accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not
this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a
petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the
Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred
and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the
United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided:
"The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
the
greatest
of all rights,
is no
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same
rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived
thereof without due process of law?
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right,
generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not,
however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an
example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess
absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law
provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians.
Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted
and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we
leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is
asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose
hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little
or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry
out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If,
indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there
always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior
officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of
grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is
called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government
in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far,
consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the
individual members of society be subordinated to the will of
the Government? It is a question which has assailed the
very existence of government from the beginning of time.
Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be
decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice
Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing, opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well
settled signification when used in the Philippine statutebook as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people,"
or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts
and provinces throughout the Islands.
administrative
authorities
in
the
enforcement
of
reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section
2145 of the Administrative Code, against a petitioner
challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian" as
that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no
opinion on that question at this time.
void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of legislative
powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its
authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future
certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates
issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and
(b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the
respondent Public Service Commission in the decision
complained of in the present proceedings, reads as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding
section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from
the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of
public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and
public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do
business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be acquired by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that
the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time;
and that the violation of any of these conditions shall
produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate
without the necessity of any express action on the part of
the Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the
equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or
other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall
be taken into consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or
amendment of certificates actually force and to those which
may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and
time schedules of public services and to authorization to
renew and increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of
Act No. 146, as amended, no public service can operate
without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of
convenience and public necessity to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do
business will "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions
which the Public Service Commission may prescribed the
issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph
is that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth
of the Philippines or by any instrumental thereof upon
payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a
restatement of the principle already embodied in the
Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides that "the
State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense,
establish
and
operate
industries
and
means
of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of
just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
"Another condition which the Commission may prescribed,
and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate
"shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public
utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for
the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate
exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of
the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not
unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts,
taking property without due process, or denying the equal
protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question
whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public
and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the
owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in
public service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to
the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 910.) in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of
public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor
contract, confers no property right, and is mere license or
privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235
Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321;
Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz
vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E.
[d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil.,
773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however, of the
opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission
should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for
further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The
Public Service Commission has power, upon proper notice
and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any
certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever
the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said
certificate was issued have been misrepresented or
materially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth
Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an
REYES, J.:
formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in
pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions
thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and
approved by the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an
undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36
Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is
untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an
already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of
and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel.
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34
Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and
definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In
the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425,
January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d
For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh
Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200
was or less plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in
excess of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY LIGHTING
P0.01 per watt per night.Minimum Charge: P1.00
Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple
of five centavos. The above rates may be revised, modified
or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public
service.
Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted
the present action for certiorari to annul said order of May
17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate
inception in 1948, petitioner it "never was able to give and
xxx
xxx