Introduction

The present paper advances the literature on the economic determinants and effects of
international migrations. We make three main contributions. First, we gather and organize annual
data on bilateral immigration flows from 74 countries of origin into 14 OECD countries from
1980 to 2005 and on immigration laws in those OECD countries in order to analyze the
economic and legal determinants of migration flows. We first update the data used in Mayda
(forthcoming) from the OECD international migration statistics. These data were discontinued
in 1994. For the period 1995-2005 it has been substituted with a new database on immigration
flows and stocks in OECD countries.1 We merge these two datasets on flows covering the period
1980-2005 with data on the stock of immigrants residing in the 14 OECD destination countries
from the same 74 countries for the period 1990-2000. This also allows us to impute the "net"
migration flows to the OECD countriesthat is, immigration net of re-migration out of the
country. For the same 14 OECD countries we also collect, organize, and classify information on
immigration laws, distinguishing between laws regulating entry, stay, asylum, and a few specific
multilateral treaties with implications for international labor mobility. The richness of our data
allows us to control for a very large set of fixed effects when analyzing the determinants of
bilateral flows. Furthermore, it allows us to identify the effects of economic variables and
immigration laws using variation by destination country over time only.
The second contribution is that we use an empirical generalized gravity equation, derived from
a model in which potential migrants maximize utility by choosing where to migrate. We use such
a model to estimate the effects of variation in geographic, economic and policy variables in the
destination countries on immigration flows. Our empirical model adapts and generalizes the one
proposed in Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008). In
contrast to them, however, we do not focus (as they do, following Borjas, 1987) on the selection
of immigrants according to skills but rather on the total size (scale) of bilateral migration flows.
On the other hand, we allow for a more general empirical specification that is consistent with
several different discrete choice models (simple logit as well as nested logit) and requires only
data on bilateral stocks (or flows) of migrants in order to be implemented. Importantly, we allow
for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and nonmigrants. Also, since we have

data on bilateral flows over time we can control for unobserved, time-varying, sending-country
characteristics and focus mainly on income per person, employment, and immigration policies
in the destination countries as determinants of migrations.
Third, and most importantly, we can identify the aggregate effects of these immigrant flows on
the economy of the receiving country, specifically on total employment, total hours worked,
physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity. While the recent literature on the
impact of immigrants on labor markets (Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008)
acknowledges that the country is the appropriate unit with which to analyze such effects (due to
the high degree of mobility of workers and capital within a country) there are extremely few
cross-country (or panel) studies of those effects. The reason is that in order to do this one needs
to overcome two problems. First, we need to gather consistent, yearly data on hours worked,
employment, capital stock for each of the 14 OECD countries of destination, over the period
1980-2005. Second, we need to isolate the impact of immigration on those variables when we
know that productivity, investment and employment growth are also determinants of immigration
flows (through their effects on income and wages). We address the first issue by employing data
from different OECD datasets, while to solve the second issue we use our bilateral migration
equation estimated below. Restricting the explanatory variables of the bilateral migration flows
to factors specific to the country of origin and to bilateral costs only, we obtain a predicted flow
of migrants to OECD countries that can be used as an instrument, since it isolates the pushdriven flows. Those flows vary across country of destination due to the different bilateral costs
(due to geography and networks) of migrating from one country to another, which are
independent of any destination country variable. For instance, a boom
in emigrants from Poland due to the opening of its border is more likely to generate large
migration to Germany than to Canada (for geographical and historical reasons), while a boom of
emigrants from the Philippines is more likely to generate large immigration to Japan (proximity)
and the US (previous networks) than to France. Using such push-driven flows we track their
effects on the employment, capital and productivity of the receiving countries.
The paper has three main findings. First, confirming previous literature (e.g. Mayda,
forthcoming), our regressions consistently show that differences in the level of income per
2

person between the destination and origin country have a positive and significant effect on
bilateral migration flows. An increase in the gap by 1000 PPP$ (in 2000 prices) increases
bilateral migration flows by about 10% of their initial value. Also, we find that stricter entry laws
significantly discourage immigration. Each reform which introduced tighter rules of entry
for immigrants decreased immigration flows by about 6% on average. Second, we find that timevarying push factors specific to countries of origin and interacted with bilateral fixed costs of
migration, predict a significant share (between 30 and 40%) of the variation in migration to the
OECD receiving countries. Such variation of immigration flows for a receiving country over
time can legitimately be consider as "exogenous" to the economic and demographic conditions of
the receiving country. Third, consistent with an increase in the labor supply in the neoclassical
growth model with endogenous capital adjustment, we find that the exogenous inflow
of immigrants increases one for one employment, hours worked and capital stocks in the
receiving country, implying no crowding-out of natives and a speedy and full adjustment of
capital. Hence, even in the short run (one year), the capital-labor ratio at the national level fully
recovers from an immigration shock. We note that in most instances, immigration flows are only
a fraction of a percentage point of the labor force of the receiving country. Moreover, the largest
part of these flows is easily predictable, implying that full capital adjustment is
a very reasonable finding even in the short run. Also, immigration does not seem to have any
significant effect on total factor productivity. These effects, taken together, imply no significant
effect of immigration on average wages and on the return to capital in the receiving countries.
Instead, immigration shocks lead to an increase in total employment and a proportional response
of GDP.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature on the
determinants and effects of international migrations and puts the contribution of this paper into
perspective. Section 3 describes and presents the data, especially those on migration flows and
immigration laws. Section 4 justifies the empirical model used to analyze the determinants of
bilateral migrations and estimates the effect of income differences (between sending and
receiving country) and immigration laws (in destination countries) on bilateral flows.

Section 5 presents the estimates of the effect of immigration on employment, physical capital
accumulation and productivity of the receiving country. Using an instrumental variable approach
which isolates only the pushdriven part of immigrant flows, exogenous to the economic
conditions of destination countries, we can provide a causal interpretation of the estimated effect.
Section 6 discusses the main implications of our findings and provides some concluding remarks.

The international system working as one

The global discourse on migration has shifted significantly in recent years with the
increase in knowledge and awareness about the multifaceted nature of human mobility
and its potential to benefit development at the human, social and economic levels.
The various players in the international system that are engaged in migration issues
the United Nations (UN), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN and
IOM Member States, regional cooperation mechanisms (both formal and informal),
civil society and other concerned stakeholders have all contributed to this changing
discourse.
Since the first UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration
and Development (HLD) in 2006, there has been growing consensus that migration can
be beneficial for all concerned if managed in ways that facilitate safe and empowering
mobility, while ensuring that migrants human rights are respected and protected.
International cooperation and partnership are essential to promoting the development
potential of migration, while addressing its negative effects. The second UN HLD, to be
held in October 2013,1 will take stock of the international debate and activities around
migration since 2006, and the international system underpinning these.
This showcases the mandates and work of 28 UN organizations and related
international entities engaged with international migration issues, which have
supported the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)2 in preparing
for the second HLD. They comprise members of the CEB, including the 16-member
Global Migration Group (GMG), which includes IOM;3 the Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants; and the NGO Committee on Migration.4 For the purposes of
the book, these bodies are referred to as HLCPGMG agencies.

1.The second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) will be
held during the UN General Assemblys sixty-eighth session, from 3 to 4 October 2013.
Information on the preparation for the HLD can be found at:
2.The UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), chaired by the UN Secretary
General is the main instrument for 29 executive heads of the UN system to coordinate their
actions and policies. Its High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) advises on policy,
programme and operational matters of system-wide importance and fosters inter-agency
cooperation and coordination on behalf of the CEB.
3 . IOM is a founding member of the GMG, but it is not a UN agency and therefore also not a
member of the CEB.
4. The HLCPGMG agencies that contributed to this book include: the 16 GMG members,
namely, ILO, IOM, The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN
Department of Social and Economic Affairs (UN DESA), the UN Development Programme
(UNDP), UNESCO, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), the UN regional commissions, UN Women, WHO and the World Bank; 10
non-GMG agencies, namely, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UNAIDS,
the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN-Habitat, Universal Postal Union (UPU), WIPO
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants; and the NGO Committee on Migration. The Special Representative of the
Secretary General for International Migration and Development (SRSG) also contributed to the
recommendations and outcomes on migration reflected in this book.

Migration Flows
The data on yearly migration flows come from the International Migration Dataset (IMD)
provided by the OECD. Data for the period 1980-1995 relative to 14 OECD destination countries
and for close to 80 countries of origin were collected and organized by Mayda (forthcoming)4 .
We merged these data with the new data relative to the period 1995-2005 for 25 OECD receiving
countries and more than one hundred sending countries, available at OECD (2007). In order to
obtain a balanced and consistent panel we select 14 OECD destination countries5 and 74
countries of origin (listed in table A1 of the Appendix). The data on migration flows collected
in the IMD are based on national statistics, gathered and homogenized by the OECD statistical
office6. The national data are based on population registers or residence permits. In both cases
these are considered to be accurate measures of the entry of legal foreign nationals. We consider
the data relative to the total inflow of foreign persons, independently of the reason (immigration,
temporary or asylum). While the OECD makes an effort (especially since 1995) to maintain a
consistent definition of immigrants across countries, there are some. We refer to Mayda
(forthcoming) for specific descriptions of the data relative to the 1980-1995 period. The source
(OECD International Migration Data) and the definitions, however, are the same as those
provided by the OECD for the statistics relative to the 1995-2005 period. Hence, we simply
merged the two series. 5Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 6More details on the
immigration data and their construction is provided in Appendix A. differences between
destination country definitions. An important one is that some countries define immigrants
on the basis of the place of birth, and others on the basis of nationality. While this inconsistency
can make a pure cross-country comparison inaccurate, our analysis focuses on changes within
destination countries over time. Therefore it should be exempt from large mis-measurement due
to the classification problem. The total inflow of foreign persons each year for each country of
destination, as measured by these OECD sources, constitutes what we call total (gross)
immigration. We also construct a measure of total net immigration for each receiving
country. In this measure we try to correct for the outflow of foreign persons, due to re-migration
or return migration. 7 Those flows, however, are harder to measure as people are not required to
communicate to the registry of population their intention to leave the country. Hence we infer the
7

net immigration flows using the gross immigration data and the data on immigrant stocks (by
country of origin) from Docquier (2007) for 29 OECD countries in years around 1990 and
around 2000. Therefore, for each of our 14 countries of destination we know the yearly inflow
and the stock circa years 1990 and 2000. For each receiving country we impute a yearly outmigration rate of the stock of immigrants that, using the stock in 1990 and the measured yearly
flows between 1990 and 2000, would produce the measured stock in 20008 . We apply this
constant, destinationspecific, re-migration rate to all years and obtain the stock of immigrants
each year (between 1980 and 2005) and the net immigration rates each year. Panel A1 in the
Appendix reports the gross and net immigration rates (i.e. immigration flows as a percentage of
the population at the beginning of the year) for our 14 destination countries over the 25 years
considered. For most countries gross and net immigration rates are similar and move together
over time. We note that our net immigration rates are probably much less precise than our
measures of gross immigration. Recall that we assumed constant re-migration rates for all years,
while gross immigration flows and re-migration rates are likely to be correlated9 . Second, any
difference between stocks and flows could also be due to undocumented immigration, their
somewhat different classification systems, or other discrepancies, rather than to re-migration
only. Third, for some countries the implied re-migration rate is extremely high and not very
plausible10. Hence, while we will use the net immigration flows to check some regression results
(see Table 3 and 5) the preferred specifications which analyze the impact of immigration on
the receiving economy will be based on gross inflows of immigrants.
A preliminary look at Panel 1 reveals two facts. First, immigration rates have displayed an
increasing trend in many countries but for some countries, such as the US and Germany, they
peaked in the middle of the period (corresponding to the regularization of the late 1980s for the
US and to immigration from the East in the early 1990s in Germany). Therefore it is hard to
establish a common trend of immigration flows over time. Second, This phenomenon can be
significantdepending on the country, we estimate that every year between 0.5 and 10% of the
existing stock of migrants will migrate out. This procedure is like finding the unknown
"depreciation rate" when we have a measure of a stock variable in 1990 and 2000
and a measure of yearly flows between them.

Coen-Pirani (2008) analyzes migration flows across US states. He finds that gross inflow and
outflow rates are strongly,positively correlated.Appendix A reports the calibrated re-migration
rates for each country of destination. there is a lot of idiosyncratic fluctuation in immigration
rates across countries. Hence, in principle, the variation within country over time is large enough
(and independent across countries) to allow us to identify the effects of immigration on
employment, capital accumulation and TFP. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the summary
statistics and the data sources for the other economic and demographic variables in the empirical
analysis. Note that the average GDP per person was more than double in the receiving countries
relative to the countries of origin in each year; furthermore, the employment rate was also
consistently higher and income inequality (Gini coefficient) consistently lower in the countries of
destination. Countries of destination also typically had a lower share of young persons in their
population, reflecting the fact that most international migration is by young
workers from countries where they are abundant to countries where young workers are scarc..

Determinants of Immigration
This section presents a model of migration choice across multiple locations and derives an
estimating equation from the model. Our estimating equation is consistent both with a simple
logit model (McFadden, 1974) as well as with a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978). Our
migration model extends Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008) by allowing for unobserved
individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. Potentially, this is an important
omission. It is plausible that migrants systematically differ from non-migrants along important
dimensions that are hard to measure, such as ability, risk aversion, or the psychological costs of
living far from home. An additional attractive feature of our empirical specification is that it is
reminiscent of a generalized gravity equation in which the logarithm of bilateral migration flows
is a function of origin and destination 13Three research assistants read the laws and provided us
with a brief summary of each law. These summaries were read by thetwo authors and discussed
until converging on the sign of the policy change. 9country fixed effects and bilateral migration
costs.

10

Impact of Immigration on OECD countries

In order to evaluate the impact of immigration on the receiving economys income, average
wages, and return to capital, we use an aggregate production function framework, akin to the one
used in growth accounting (see for instance Chapter 10 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).
Suppose that total GDP in each destination country and year, Ydt, is produced using a labor input
represented by total hours worked, Ldt (that can be decomposed into Employmentdt times Hours
per workerdt ), services of physical capital represented by Kdt and total factor productivity Adt.
According to the popular Cobb-Douglas production function
Where is the capital income share and can be approximated for the destination countries in our
sample by 0.3324. In such a framework if we intend to analyze how immigration flows affects
income or wages (marginal productivity of labor), we need to identify first how immigrations
affects the supply of each input and of total factor productivity. Then we can combine the effects
of immigration using the implications of the model. Specifically, the percentage changes in total
real GDP, Ydt, real GDP per hour, ydt, and the average real wage,wdt, are given, respectively,
by:
If we can identify the percentage changes in Adt, Kdt, and Ldt in response to exogenous
immigration flows to the country we will be able to evaluate the impact of immigration on total
income, labor productivity and average wages. Clearly, immigration flows directly affect labor
input Ldt by adding potential workers. However, the increase in employment may be less than
one-for-one if immigrants displace native workers (out of the country or out of the labor market).
In addition, there may also be composition effects if immigrants employment rates or hours
worked are lower than those of natives. Regarding the capital input, standard models with
endogenous capital accumulation imply that immigrationinduced increases in the labor force will
generate investment opportunities and greater capital accumulation, up to the point that the
marginal product of capital returns to its pre-shock value. However, the short-run
response of the capital stock to an international immigration flow can be less than complete and
it has yet to be quantified empirically. Concerning TFP, on the one hand immigrants may
promote specialization/complementarities (Ottaviano and Peri 2008) which increase the set of
11

productive skills (Peri and Sparber, forthcoming) and increase competition in the labor markets,
generating efficiency gains that increase TFP. Or there can be positive scale effects on
productivity if immigrants bring new ideas or reinforce agglomeration economies (of the kind
measured by Ciccone and Hall, 1996). On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration
induces adoption of less productive, unskilled-intensive technologies (as in Lewis 2005) that
lead to reductions in measured TFP. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether an
immigration shock increases, decreases or does not affect

12

Effect of Immigration laws on bilateral migration flows

In evaluating the effects of immigration reforms, it is easier to look at the effect on subsequent
immigration flows. After all, the immigrant stocks are the long-run accumulation of yearly flows,
so the determinants of the first should also determine the second. Hence we simply adopt the
specification in (9) and use as the dependent variable the logarithm of the flow of immigrants
from country o to country d in year t, adding immigration laws as an explanatory variable.
Our data on (M igrant F low)odt are from the OECD International Migration Database, from 74
countries of origin into 14 OECD countries. The variable "Immigration policy tightness" is the
measure of tightness of immigration (and asylum) laws described in section 3.221 . The other
columns of Table 2 Panel A perform variations and robustness checks on this basic specification.
In Panel B of Table 2 we estimate a similar specification but now include a full set of (73x14)
country-pair fixed effects, Dod, rather than the four bilateral variables (Distance, Land Border,
Colonial, Language) in order to capture any specific time-invariant bilateral costs of migration.
Moving from left to right in Table 2 we modify our basic specification (1) by including income
on logarithm, rather than in levels, (specification 2), then using a broader measure of tightness
(specification 3), or longer lags of the explanatory variables (specification 4). Specification (5)
includes extra destination country controls, (6) omits observations with 0 flows and (7) omits the
UK data, whose immigration flows recorded before 1990 appear suspiciously small. In all these
specifications we include four variables that capture aspects of the immigration laws. The first
variable is our constructed measure of "Tightness of entry laws", the second is our measure of
"Tightness of asylum laws". Both are described in section 3.2 and their values for each country
and year are shown in Panel 2A. We also include dummies for the two most important
multilateral treaties affecting several 21Notice that all the explanatory variables (that vary over
time) are included with one lag.of the considered countries22.
The "Maastricht" treaty was ratified by most EU countries in 1992. Among other things, it
introduced free labor mobility for workers of the member states and it led to the introduction of
the Euro, which may have reduced migration costs within the European Union. The
corresponding dummy takes a value of one for those countries and years in which the agreement
13

is in place and 0 otherwise. The "Schengen" agreement, adopted in different years by 22

European countries, regulates and coordinates immigration and border policies among the
signatory countries. While it eases intra-EU movement for citizens of the signatory countries, the
agreement also implies more restrictive border controls to enter the "Schengen" area. The
corresponding dummy takes a value of one for countries and years in which the agreement is in
place. Three main results emerge from Table 2. First, income differences between origin and
destination country (whether in logs or in levels) have a positive and significant effect on
immigration flows to OECD countries in almost every specification. Second, the
"Tightness of entry" has a significant negative effect on immigration flows in most
specifications. Each reform that introduced less restrictive measures increased, on average,
immigration flows by 5 to 9%. For instance, this implies that a country like Canada, whose
immigration policy loosened by 6 points between 1985 and 2005 (see Panel 2A), should exhibit
an increase in immigration rates of 25 to 54%. The yearly immigration rates, in Canada, went
from 0.5% of population in the early eighties to 0.7-0.8% in the early 2000s. That is, the entire
increase in immigration flows can be attributed to the change in the laws. Third, among the other
laws the most significant effect is associated with the Maastricht treaty which increased, on
average, the immigration of signatories between 50 and 60%. Tightness of asylum laws had a
negative (but rarely significant) impact on immigration and Schengen had no effect at all.
Interestingly, column (3) in both Panel A and B reveals that combining immigration entry- and
stay- laws decreases the precision of the estimated coefficient, suggesting that mainly entry laws
had an effect on the actual inflow of immigrants. At the same time the effect of entry laws
is less significant when we include population, income distribution and the share of young
among the receiving country variables (specification 5, both in Panel A and B). This may imply
that some of those variables affect immigration laws, and indirectly immigration, so that
including them reduces the effect of the laws. Finally, omitting the cells with 0 immigration
flows (specification 6) reduces drastically the effect of wage differentials,
while the effect of entry laws is still significant. Since almost 70% of the cells are zeros, because
we are looking at bilateral flows (rather than stocks), it is remarkable that the immigration laws
variable maintains its sign and significance. Omitting the UK (column 7) does not change the
results much. The estimated effects on the geographic variables (not reported in Table 2 and
available only for Panel A) are qualitatively and quantitatively close to the estimates reported in
14

Table 1. In particular, sharing a land border (point estimate -1.6 and standard error 1.3) and
sharing a common language (point estimate 0.4, standard error 0.5) have no significant impact
on migration flows, while having had colonial ties (point estimate 3.88 and standard error 0.46)
and the log of distance (point estimate -2.2 standard error 0.46) are both very significant in their
impact on migration flows23. Let us emphasize that the estimates in Table 2 Panel B include
1022 country-pair fixed effects and 1825 country-of-origin by year fixed effects. Hence any
variation is identified by the change over time in a specific bilateral migratory flow, after
controlling for any country-of-origin by year specific factor. We are not aware of any previous
analysis that could run such a demanding specification on bilateral migration panel data. All
in all, our analysis finds statistically and quantitatively significant effects of income differentials
on bilateral immigration stocks and flows. These effects are very robust to sample choice,
specification and inclusion of controls. We also find strong evidence that the receiving country
laws, particularly those relative to the entry of immigrants, significantly affected the size of
yearly inflows. The inclusion of income differences in levels or in logs does not produce very
different effects.

15

Inter-agency perspectives on migration and development

The 2013 High-level Dialogue offers a timely opportunity to take stock of the mandates
and work of the United Nations and its partners in the migration (and development)
field since the first HLD. It also marks an important occasion to discuss how migration
may be integrated into the post-2015 United Nations development agenda. To prepare their
proposed recommendations and outcomes on migration for the 2013 HLD, as requested by the
CEB, the relevant international entities were asked tocomplete a questionnaire covering the
following areas:
(a) Their activities to promote the development aspects of international migration,undertaken
since the 2006 HLD;
(b) The support they provided to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD);
(c) Good practices identified in the organizations respective fields;
(d) Challenges in carrying out their work;
(e) Perceived gaps in the field of migration and development;
(f) Recommendations for the 2013 HLD.
The summary of responses to the questionnaire formed the basis of therecommendations and
outcomes on migration submitted to the CEB in early 2013 in preparation for the HLD. In their
more detailed form, the agency responses provided the substance for the chapters in this book,
which are structured in line with the areas surveyed, as listed above.
In their responses to the questionnaire, the contributing agencies pointed to the urgency
of concerted action by all stakeholders in a world where migration and development

16

interconnect in complex, ever-widening and evolving ways. As policymakers

increasingly understand and seek to strengthen these connections, they are looking to
factor migration into other areas of public policy relevant to development. This, in turn,
requires better coordinated support from the United Nations and related international entities
with relevant mandates in these areas
.
In the Recommendations and Outcomes paper, the agencies represented in this
book agreed on the following key elements for improved policies and practices at
the international, regional and local levels to enhance the development outcomes of
migration for migrants and societies:5
(a) Facilitating orderly and safe mobility, recognizing that greater mobility is inevitable
and indeed necessary in the twenty-first century;
(b)Aspiring to make migration a genuine choice, instead of a desperate necessity;
(c) Prioritizing the protection of migrants and their human rights including labour
rights; access to asylum, health and decent work; considerations of social protection and wellbeing; and the rights of all children in the context of migration in rights-based and gendersensitive policies and practices;
(d) Focusing on the human development potential of migration, including the potential
to improve the lives of individuals and families, as well as migrations contribution
to the economic growth and development of countries;
(e) Addressing public perceptions of migrants and migration to counter anti-migrant
sentiment, xenophobia and discrimination, and raise awareness of migrants overwhelmingly
positive contributions to societies of origin and destination;
(f) Recognizing that forced and voluntary forms of migration are not always easily
distinguishable, and ensuring protection and assistance for the most vulnerable;
17

(g) Committing to cooperation with all partners involved in and affected by migration,
while recognizing the sovereign prerogative of States to determine the entry into and stay of nonnationals on their territories, within the limits set by States
international legal obligations;
5 These key elements were cited verbatim from the Executive Summary of the proposed
Recommendations and
Outcomes for the 2013 UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration
and Development,
considered and endorsed by the CEB at its first regular session for 2013 on 5 April 2013.
(h) Finding balanced measures to combat harmful forms and effects of migration, including
cross-border trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, while protecting human rights.
This ad hoc collaboration among 28 entities in formulating a common set of recommendations
and outcomes on migration for the 2013 HLD marked a new stage in the evolution of a more
coherent and broad-based framework for dialogue and cooperation on migration, which started
with the Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD).

18

Tracing global cooperation on migration from 1994 to 2013

The year 1994 was a defining moment in the recent history of multilateral cooperation on
migration.6 The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo
produced the first comprehensive agenda and call for global action to deal with international
migration. In particular, Chapter 10 (International Migration) of the ICPD Programme of
Action urged States to cooperate on issues ranging from promoting the development potential of
migration to respecting the human rights of migrants, combating human trafficking and reducing
irregular migration.7 It remains one of the most comprehensive texts on international migration
adopted by the international community to date.
Following Cairo, the issue of international migration and development has been a subitem
with biennial periodicity on the agenda of the second Committee of the General Assembly. Major
UN conferences and their outcome documents, including the World Summit for Social
Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the
UN Millennium Declaration (2000),8 the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (of
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance), and the World Summit Outcome (2005) all have addressed relevant aspects of
international migration.
Yet throughout the 1990s and early 2000s a basic tension remained between the
desire of some States to retain the sovereign right to determine who may enter and
remain in their respective territories and the growing desire of others for rightsbased
and multilateral approaches to migration governance. Repeated calls by some Member States to
convene a world conference on international migration remained unanswered, and it took almost
a decade before the ICPD recommendations were acted upon within the UN system.
The lack of consensus among Member States about how and whether to move forward on the
global migration agenda is in part exemplified by the UN International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW). Adopted
in 1990 after more than ten years of discussion, it took another 13 years before the ICRMW
19

entered into force in 2003. As of 3 May 2013, only 46 States were party to the Convention, none
of which were high-income destination countries.
At the same time, the need for better dialogue and cooperation on migration issues had become
clear, as no State could effectively manage the full complexity of migration on its own. In the
1980s and 1990s, regional groups of governments began creating informal, non-binding regional
consultative processes on migration (RCPs) to discuss common, neighbourhood migration
challenges, in some cases expanding these to interregional dialogue processes.
A number of further developments occurred at the turn of the millennium, reflecting
the need for more multilateral, interdisciplinary dialogue on migration:9
(a) A global consultative process, the Berne Initiative, was set up in 2001 by Switzerland
to manage cross-border migration through enhanced understanding and inter- State cooperation.
Its outcome document, International Agenda for Migration Management, was in some ways a
precursor of the GFMD.
(b) In 2001 IOM Member States initiated the International Dialogue on Migration, a multistakeholder forum for migration policy dialogue, to allow themselves and IOM Observer States,
as well as international and non-governmental actors, to analyse current and emerging issues in
migration governance.
(c) In his 2002 report on Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further
change (A/57/387), then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan identified migration as a priority
issue for the international community. As a follow-up, Kofi Annan convened a working group
which recommended in its final report in 2003 the establishment of the Global Commission on
International Migration.
(d) In 2003 the General Assembly agreed to devote a high-level dialogue to international
migration and development in 2006. In contrast to a migration conference, which would require
negotiations, it was determined that the outcome document of the high-level dialogue would be a
non-binding Chairmans Summary.
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(e) In 2003 the Geneva Migration Group was established by ILO, IOM, OHCHR,
UNCTAD, UNHCR and UNODC as an informal consultative body for the heads of
agency on cross-cutting migration issues.
(f) In 2004 the International Labour Conference of the ILO adopted the Plan of Action for
Migrant Workers, which is based on international labour standards, including, specifically, for
the protection of migrant workers,10 and supports a rights-based approach to labour migration
while recognizing labour market needs. The centrepiece of the Plan of Action is the non-binding
Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, approved by the ILO Governing Body in 2006.
Both address migration and development and provide good examples of multi-stakeholder
cooperation at the global level (governments and workers and employers organizations).
(g) In 2005 the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) proposed six global
principles for action and the establishment of a high-level group of agencies involved in
migration-related activities to guide and implement a more coherent global system of migration
governance.11
In response to the recommendations of the GCIM, Kofi Annan appointed Peter Sutherland to be
his Special Representative for International Migration and Development (SRSG) and encouraged
the Geneva Migration Group to expand into the Global Migration Group (GMG). The new interagency group was formed to promote the wider application of international and regional
instruments and norms relating to migration and strengthen inter-agency coherence.12
The first UN General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development was held on 1415 September 2006. As a result of the UN HLD, the GFMD was
created as an informal, non-binding, voluntary and State-led process to move forward the global
dialogue and cooperation on migration. The GFMD was to operate outside the UN system, but
closely linked to it through the SRSG. The GFMD process assumed a similar model to that of
RCPs, which are also informal and voluntary in orientation

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Framing the migration debate in the development context has helped reduce some of the heat
around migration issues and open the way for more integrated and coherent policymaking. Since
2006, more evidence has been gathered about the potential benefits of migration for both
developing and developed countries, which has allowed migration to be seen increasingly as a
potential win-win option for all involved. Today,in the global discussions on redefining the
global development agenda post-2015, migration is viewed as a potential enabler for equitable,
inclusive and sustainable social and economic development, to the mutual benefit of affected
countries, and the human development of migrants, their families and communities, if governed
and supported appropriately.14
Today, the agency-led GMG and State-led GFMD are two of the most important global
mechanisms for multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation on migration and development
which can underpin a more coherent global migration governance system. The GFMD is the
largest forum for governments outside the United Nations to discuss migration and development
issues, while the GMG brings to the table universal principles, the diversity of perspectives and
the technical support necessary for such a complex, cross-cutting subject. As such, the GMG is
the pre-eminent multilateral partner of the GFMD.

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The International Labour Organization

The main aims of the International Labour Organization (ILO)1 are to promote rights at work,
encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen the
dialogue on work-related issues. The Organizations unique tripartite structure gives an equal
voice to governments, workers and employers to ensure that the views of social partners are
closely reflected in labour standards and in shaping policies and programmes, including those
relating to labour migration. Most international migration today is linked, directly or indirectly,
to the world of work and decent employment opportunities. According to ILO estimates,
approximately 105 million of the estimated 214 million international migrants globally are
economically active,2 many of them women and young people.3 Hence, the relationship between
migration and development, and the policies and activities to address it in countries of origin and
destination, as well as internationally, cannot be detached from labour issues falling within the
mandate of the ILO. Similarly, the identity of the migrant in employment cannot be separated
from his or her status as a worker.
The work of the ILO on migration and development occurs in the context of: (a) a rights-based
approach to labour migration and mobility; (b) the Decent Work Agenda,4 with attention to the
creation of decent work opportunities in both countries of origin and destination; and (c) social
dialogue.5 ILO activities also highlight the contributions of migrant workers to the maintenance
of social protection and living standards in countries of destination. The rights-based approach is
reflected in the Organizations constitutional global mandate to protect migrant workers;
international labour standards, including the Organizations fundamental human rights
conventions,6 which cover all migrant workers (unless otherwise stated); and those conventions
specifically concerned with the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant
workers, namely, Migration for Employment Convention (revised), 1949 (No. 97) and the
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143).7 At the 2004
International Labour Conference, the tripartite constituents of the ILO, mindful of the changing
dynamics of international labour migration, reached the consensus that a fair deal for all
migrant workers requires a rights-based approach which recognizes labour market needs,
and adopted the Plan of Action for Migrant Workers to advance this goal.8
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Support provided to the Global Forum on Migration and

Development
IOM has supported the State-led GFMD from its beginning through: (a) the secondment
of a senior migration expert (20072012); (b) substantive inputs into national and regional
thematic events and annual summit meetings; (c) preparing round table background papers,
identifying experts and case studies and presenting at the meetings; and (d) hosting the GFMD
Support Unit since 2009.
Specific examples of IOM expert input to the GFMD and follow-up on recommendations
include: (a) co-producing, with ILO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, the Compendium of Good Practice Elements in Temporary BilateralLabour
Arrangements (2008), sponsored by the Governments of Morocco and Spain; (b) substantial
input to the joint European CommissionMauritius Workshop on Creating Development
Benefits through Circular Migration (2008); (c) facilitating exchange among RCPs through the
above-mentioned global meetings of RCP chairs and secretariats; (d) commissioning an
assessment of RCPs in 2010;22 and (e) a comparative review and analysis of IOM migrant
resource centres (2010).
In support of the GFMD ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research,
IOM prepared an information note for its Migration Profiles series, in advance of the 2010
Puerto Vallarta discussions. Also in support of the 2010 GFMD, IOM and Mexicos National
Institute of Migration collated good practices and successful partnerships in Mexico: Public
Policies Benefiting Migrants. In addition, IOM has contributed to the GFMD Platform for
Partnership since 2010, for example, by making available the Migration Profiles Repository, in
partnership with the GFMD, in 2011. IOM contributed to 9 out of the 14 GFMD 2011 thematic
meetings, including as co-organizer of a workshop entitled Managing International Migration
for Development: Policymaking, Assessment and Evaluation, together with the World Bank. In
Mauritius in 2012, the IOM Director General opened the Common Space between
governments and civil society, during which IOM acted as rapporteur for a number of round
tables. In 2012 IOM dedicated the first volume of the new IOMSpringer series, Global
Migration Issues, entitled Global Perspectives on Migration and Development: GFMD
24

Puerto Vallarta and Beyond, to the GFMD. This first-ever book on the GFMD examines
the relationship between migration and development and explores fresh strategies
proposed by the GFMD in its fourth year of operations in Mexico.

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Key gaps in the global migration and development sphere

Despite progress in dialogue and cooperation at the global level, a balanced appreciation
of the interactions between migration and the social, economic and environmental dimensions of
sustainable development have not been fully realized in either policy or practice. Above all,
channels for legal migration remain inadequate and inaccessible, especially at lower skill levels.
This mismatch between labour demand and supply gives rise to abusive forms and conditions of
migration, including trafficking and smuggling, and reduces the positive potential of migration
for development. Linked to this is the fact that migration policies generally do not adequately
protect the human rights of all migrants to safe and dignified migration, nor do they allow
individuals to realize their human development potential and aspirations through mobility.
Specific gaps in seeking to enhance the benefits of migration for development are described
below.
(a) Migration remains inadequately reflected in development frameworks and broader
sectoral policies at both the national and local levels and in global development agendas,
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given the relevance of migration for
sustainable development in economic, social and environmental terms, coherent policy
frameworks must consider how migration could be a help or a hindrance in achieving sustainable
developmental goals. For instance, migration is insufficiently addressed in health policies, yet
being healthy is a pre-condition for migrants to be able to contribute to sustainable development
for themselves, their children and families, and the wider communities in both origin and
destination countries.
(b) While there is a growing awareness of how migration affects development, there
may be merit in re-focusing the debate on how development, including achieving the MDGs,
may in turn impact migration.
(c) There is a lack of understanding of how migration affects sustainable development in
developing countries. Given the significance of SouthSouth migration, there needs to be greater
focus on data and capacities in destination countries in the global South, as well as on the
impacts of intraregional labour mobility on regional economic development.
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(d) Public perceptions of migrants and migration have not kept pace with the reality of human
mobility and remain dangerously negative. Resulting xenophobia and discrimination threaten
social cohesion and the overall rights and well-being of migrants.
(e) The impacts of humanitarian crises on migrants and migration are emerging as an important
concern and can have implications for development, for example, the loss of employment and
income for migrants and their families; the sudden departure of an important labour force from
destination countries; and the serious reintegration challenges for countries of origin.
(f) The relationship between human mobility and climate change and environmental
factors has not been sufficiently factored into policies that aim to bridge disaster
preparedness, climate change adaptation and sustainable development.

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Support provided to the Global Forum on Migration and Development

UNESCO held the GMG chairmanship together with UNICEF in the year 2011. Among
the Organizations chairing responsibilities was the follow-up on key priorities and outcomes of
the 2010 GFMD, among others, through the organization of major international events, such as
the UN General Assembly informal thematic debate on international migration and development.
During its chairmanship, UNESCO proposed that the GMG focus its work on linkages between
the environment, human settlement and population movement, and that the GMG members work
jointly to identify the displacement and relocation caused by climate change. The factors
affecting climate change are multidimensional, and include governance, conflict, human rights,
genderand economic development. In line with the GMG chairmanship theme and a round table
focus of the GFMD in Mexico, UNESCO published its book on Migration and Climate Change,
where it identified the gaps between the perception of environmental migration and the policy
responses.

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MAIN TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The analysis of the main trends in international migration is presented in four sections. The first looks at
changes in migration movements and in the foreign population of OECD Member countries. The second
section considers the position of immigrants and foreigners in the labour market. The following section
focuses on two regions, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, an overview of migration policies
is provided. It reviews policies to regulate and control flows and the whole range of measures to promote
the integration of immigrants in host countries. It also describes recent moves to enhance co-operation
between host countries and countries of origin in the spheres of migration and development. A.
MIGRATION AND POPULATION TRENDS Since the mid-1990s, there has been a gradual upturn in
migration flows in most OECD Member countries. Owing to regional conflicts, but also to the restrictions
placed on other immigration channels, the number of asylum seekers and refugees has risen substantially,
particularly in some European countries. Immigration for employment reasons, permanent but in
particular temporary, also increased sharply in 1999-2000 in response to economic trends in Member
countries and the resulting labour shortages in certain sectors. Nevertheless, immigration for family
reasons continues to predominate, especially in the longer-standing countries of immigration. Lastly, the
persistence of illegal migration, the volume of which is by definition impossible to determine, indicates
clearly the difficulties that host and origin countries are encountering in their attempts to control
migration flows. Immigration plays a significant role in the annual population growth of certain OECD
countries. They have a high proportion of foreign births in total births, and the foreign or foreign-born
population is growing and diversifying. The importance of migration inflows is sometimes emphasised in
connection with the ageing of the population. Without denying their potential contribution to reducing
demographic imbalances, their impact in this regard should not be overestimated. 1. Trends in migration
movements and changes in the foreign population Although the 1980s were characterised by an increase
in immigration flows in most OECD countries, a substantial decline in the number of entries was
perceptible by 1992-93. This downturn continued until 1997-98, after which immigration started to rise
again, particularly in Europe and Japan. Over the entire period 1980-99, there was also a diversification of
migration movements and an increase in the range of nationalities involved, although the traditional flows
and regional movements persisted. The volume of the foreign population shows a trend similar to that for
flows. There is a trend increase in numbers, together with a wider range of countries of origin and greater
heterogeneity in demographic terms. a) Upward but contrasting migration trends During the 1980s and
above all at the beginning of the 1990s, inflows increased in almost all OECD countries (see Chart I.1).
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This trend peaked in 1992- 93 for the main immigration countries such as Canada, Germany, Japan and
the United States, while in others, notably Australia and the United Kingdom, the peak had come earlier.
Since then, as the result of restrictions, the flows of legal entries have fallen sharply. In 1999 they
represented around three-quarters of the volume of entries reported for all European Union countries in
1992 and for North America in 1993. The left-hand side of Chart I.1 presents the post-1980 time-series
for foreign migrant inflows. The host countries are divided into four groups in

30