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G.R. No.

L-22041
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant.


Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of
legal age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where
after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. He returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he
was admitted merely for a temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a
residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He
receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of
the United States of America. He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to
renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground
that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed
his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.

The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization'
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of

naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive


permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo
Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state
where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a
temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is
characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this
country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of
health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established
his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and
must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case,
petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted
into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of
the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which
continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the
specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present
petition."

We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a
correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires
that before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided
in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word
"residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs.
Republic, L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that
term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been
admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words,
the term residence used in said Act should have the same connotation as that used
in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving
the law permitting the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has
liberalized its requirement by foregoing the qualifications and special
disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire
his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that
he may come within the purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth
Act No. 63.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-21289

October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:

In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her
failure to do so."

The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been
denied, the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective
evidence.

The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General
are these:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into
the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said
Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in
his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January
25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after
her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either
English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so
holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same
reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent
portions of which read:

First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should
be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an
alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage
to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites
provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee
Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of
paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

3.
That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by
naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to
plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization
Laws of the Philippines.

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not
to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses all the
qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a
temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at
least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization
Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified
under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not
disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."

Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized
stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last
February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just
a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said
marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then
impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.

Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5.
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien
visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will
enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go
back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil.
Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the
very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 which reads:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines


permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine
Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is
added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940).

And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the


administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in
the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the
Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration
CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be
disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.

It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot write
either language.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have
some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of
petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ...,
it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not
possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional
somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that
during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged
marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for
seven months a child by her husband."

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF
BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE
POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS
SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES
NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO
MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH
MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH
(9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A


FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS

CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED
STAY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF


IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD
MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT


AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR
WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'


MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN
ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision
upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in
the court below, viz:

That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor
on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and
stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on
her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines

as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R.
No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No.
L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No.
L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would
necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We
will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.

The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that
an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot
remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to
a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the
proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the
appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were
the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso
facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have
held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to
depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of
the Immigration Act providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines


permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines
permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the
immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it
is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses
employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent
residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision
already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling
in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:

... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time,
and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first
departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of
"change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above
the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens
to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a
limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such
claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and
effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right
to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to
prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what
he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are selfevident.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been
here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should
be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat
for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come

back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has
been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor
children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto
citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be
processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent
residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and
its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction.
Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:

... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also
a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow
that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and,
hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond
shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his
legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization
of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring
upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to
permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and
express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable
to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants'
second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.

II

Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge
is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect
of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all
the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised

Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does
not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor
General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below
that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of
applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as
a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual
proceedings for naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the
view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1 for it was only in Zita
Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court
held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has
to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the
Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that
she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law
but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any
other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending
resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second
assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan
Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all
subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,


Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha
case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese
nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on
March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8,
1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified
the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had
become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her
bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to
leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner
confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court
sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she had
become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner
appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:

The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to
a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart
from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative
view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became,
also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would
follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for
section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned
to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether
an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his
political status.

The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to
his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held
in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation
of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:

(a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;

(b)
Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

(c)

Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d)

Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e)

Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f)
Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g)
Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during
the period of such war;

(h)
Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok
Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the
parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the
period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof,
petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political status, from
alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case
against the respondents-appellants.

Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the


lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly
Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in
our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the
parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have
any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the
above decision as regards the following propositions: .

1.
That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she
"herself might be lawfully naturalized";

2.
That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that
the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under
Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;

3.
That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in
the action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;

4.

That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5.
That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court
somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5
specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the
Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration,
the most important of which are the following:

Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision
in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not requiring
the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the
case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of
persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11,
12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons
who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization
Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or
after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the
assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176,
s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of
inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of
the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No.
473, which reads in part as follows:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.

The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen must not
belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s.
1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs.
Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the
law.

It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an
illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the
Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows
the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus.,
Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs.
Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage

(Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo
Nepomuceno.)

The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so
appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The
Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same
ruling on the basis of the following facts:

Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned


out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for
her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married
Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry
considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of
Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings
and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court
denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other
hand, that:

Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok
Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does
not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition,
that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in
the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a
Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.

No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino


citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The
lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the
deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites
indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity
of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis
supplied] .

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave
the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering

from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any
judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the
above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of
an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be
proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the
need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said law.

It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to


qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any
event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such
qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus
Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6 so ruled in
opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which
held: .

At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
needs only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such
as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through
judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops.
Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized
as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In
other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the
ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the
petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification
for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not
based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified
causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a
foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law.
(Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus
G. Barrera.)

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or
supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB
Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the
above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes,
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act
No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in
section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of
Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a
new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15
Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950;
No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of
section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S.
Gatmaitan.)

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above
construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay,
supra, in which the facts were as follows:

Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay
in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of
Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within
24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For
failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the
Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E).
Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration
confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal
proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the
bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a
satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered
against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture
of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court
proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under
the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In
the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined
in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Pias, Rizal.)

Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices
Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:

The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not
relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1
April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the
bond failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to
the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice were
committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an
alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must
possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied
upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the
statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by
law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15,
Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be
recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly
adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940,
above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your
Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should
be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely
that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification
of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of
the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should
have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the
opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but
apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the
particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in
Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more
than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15
of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by
itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled
in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the

qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without


explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and
opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without
elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.

It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775,
November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a
Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor
with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7,
1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was
requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so,
claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she
submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473.
When the case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in
addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that
Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral
character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law.
Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the
possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from nondisqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .

It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the
basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11,
where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman
"should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing
laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions,
being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and
therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If,
whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship
arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her
marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman
then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a
share. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but
years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to
find.")

In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white
woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an
American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on
residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.

Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as
amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone might
become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of that law provided:

Section 1.
Who may become Philippine citizens Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of
the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein.

Section 2.
Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as
Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with
any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with
whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war.

Section 3.
Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section
one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less
than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.

The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in
addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of
the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:

First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five
years, except as provided in the next following section;

Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner


during the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation
with the constituted government as well as with the community in which they are
living;

Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession; and

Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and
under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and
allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native,
citizen or subject.

Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then
stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be
deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were
not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions
of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the
laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein.
With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were
deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes.

But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial consideration
from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent,
the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of
the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and
against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and,
second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]),
even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the

context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was
found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.

The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is
that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of
the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.

There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien
woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in
Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications" and
"disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that
even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that
the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant
did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of
disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of
her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons
qualified to become citizens by naturalization the assumption being always that
she is not otherwise disqualified.

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the
citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner
has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect
that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was
correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving.

Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration,


G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun
Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of

her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required
her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775,


promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband
became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the
Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications,
and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no
allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino
citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the
naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would
become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San
Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November
12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the
Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a
Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had
the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion
when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang,
G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was
granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31
of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept
commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case
being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked
the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as
well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request
was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted.
Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only
reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that
the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship. 7

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower
court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all
the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had
none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight
days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.

Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion
to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the
danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into
account the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9

Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10


Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the
dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may
be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with
the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications
and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law,
citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he
impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May
31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that
the point now under discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue.
Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:

SEC. 15.
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the


naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a
foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized,
shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate
of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is


married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino
citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by said
law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted
above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the
question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was
actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang,
Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra,
were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if
not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial
change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in
the Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and
Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with
copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the
memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly
and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the
legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects
thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos
who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have
always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing
continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in
charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if
only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who
took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to

further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later
in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not
categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the
first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the
deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later
cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are
construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken
directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate,
said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief
review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature
under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then,
as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the
Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted
pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only
after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically
impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our
own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of
March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein.

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .

SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding
the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit
under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which
were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable
that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act
2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon
the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a
native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although
Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

SEC. 13.
Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and
minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case

shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act
2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections
thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands.

SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law,
being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their
parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered
citizens thereof.

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June
17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been
quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was reenacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for
the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any
other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and
everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty,
discussed above, were rendered.

As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it
was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a
Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she
becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not

suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act


473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated
in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the
possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in
Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the
qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the
alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as
follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in
order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics,
"the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of
the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no
support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong
to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law." 14

A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference
may be qouted:

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of
cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the
qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen
(Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784,
December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer
of this opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in
the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned.
That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30,
1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927,
which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition
of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the

Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular
possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners
who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter country
if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become
American Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified
races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were
concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the
two countries and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the
interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision concerning the
citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.

This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the
enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June
17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when
Congress chose to retain the said provision that to be deemed a Philippine citizen
upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman
belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized"
would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory
construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy
thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to
a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for
naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is not
entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the
same conclusion thus:

On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been
residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n.,
id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.);
and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).

While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized
indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who
marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in
addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by
marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the
view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under
section 4.

At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the
question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being only the
concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23,
1959, to the effect that:

The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.

Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established
the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the
Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who
"might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the
disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the
qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784,
Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v.
Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under
section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its

section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the
wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that
citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute.
For example, section 4 disqualifies only

(c)

Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d)

Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously


convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain
that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the
requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral
character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in


government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not
"opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively
on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha
admittedly does not possess.

As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was
derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same
territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has
rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in
Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.

It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a


closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which
adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.

1.
The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927
providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth
Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of
allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact
accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away
with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:

SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be


acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States
may become citizens of said country if residing therein.

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any
mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine
citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the
inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American
regime to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the
United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was
precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not have
been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which
was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which
have already been footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative
autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature
naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American
legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one
of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.

2.
Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in
subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American
citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision.
Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of
Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the
third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could
be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey
any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others,
but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or
long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the
United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the
Congress of June 29, 1906:

SEC. 7.
That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining
and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who
advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or
killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers generally,
of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized government,
because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized
or be made a citizen of the United States.

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship
under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More
importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to
Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform
Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial
disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being
among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was
enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial
exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the
United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem
that the rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the
elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for
no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has
no clear factual basis. 17

3.
In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why
the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the
first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute
that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of
Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing
but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the
United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a
definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United
States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be
considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that
when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction
in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute,
they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the
construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of
the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the
implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952];
Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353;
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo
of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts


and administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora
Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523,
decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p.
117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen."

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section
provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen."

And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British
Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman married,
or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be
deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges
of a natural born subject."

The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp.
Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the
Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman
who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage ..."

Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are
repealed."

Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or
retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the
marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends
upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284,
construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of
the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time,
only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white
person," and not an alien enemy."

This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to
the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the
other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to
any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or
deportation of aliens.

In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed
the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married

to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the
necessity, of the case," the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an
alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the
existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also,
and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the
other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court,
in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to
the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a
citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions
of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt
of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v.
Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who
might be lawfully naturalized.

In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to


the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the immigration
laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with
the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus,
and pending the disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American
citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court
below, that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared:
"The rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United
States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her
husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became her
domicil." .

In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed.
980, had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of naturalization.
It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at
New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious
disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the husband's
naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that
contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's application
for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined whether the
wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that
the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he

express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not effect her
naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own
capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her
attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot
confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case, and the
views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be
regarded as something more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for
the learned judge, unable to accept them.

In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge
Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who
married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United
States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease
which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her
exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this
court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that
case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been lawfully
naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney
to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be
excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators."

We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also
said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should be a
citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now
before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any
order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after
such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and
has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The
administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time the
order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being
carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion
should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a
contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain
that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of
the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good
faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and
that she thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised
Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the
immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies
only to aliens, and not to citizens.

In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the
right of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances: She
entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey.
She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the following
September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her
counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted with a
dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the reasons
assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the
United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared
himself unable to believe that a marriage under such circumstances "is capable of
having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of
the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not
otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons
excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come within the
provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the
Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.

In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994
and held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an
alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby
became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was
revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her
marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be
established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the
purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666,
219 Fed. 1022.

It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the
statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence
within the United States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot
necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having married a
citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States,
she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.

In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in
an opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried
woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and
went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen
months after her arrival she was taken before a United States commissioner by way
of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134,
Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the
ground that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had
been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the same within
three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the
United States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the
Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the
United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage an intention to
abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in
Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in
her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim
being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and
therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to
deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws
was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation
that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that
the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ...
shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such
alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts
which make her liable to deportation under this act."

Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:

(1)
Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class
avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an American citizen.

(2)
If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien
woman of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her detention,
should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the

country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been
confined solely to women of the immoral class.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and
We have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a
racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other
writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v.
Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions 19
simply held:

As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married
to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for whose
naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who
shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of
marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a
woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a
citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or
before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His
citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The
construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of
marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as
we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her
citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the
restriction suggested.

The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit
the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be
"a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L.
153.

A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in
Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions.

Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" 20 it hastened
to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that
the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but
also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of
the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy
aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen
only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other
non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this
is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race.
This is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression
used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white
women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the
incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not
an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her
race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the
naturalization of her husband.

4.
As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha,
the Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by
Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section
particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife
"may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not
be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and
write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of
children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has
been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further
consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such
inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already
explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to
indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is
that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the

United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had
already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions


quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically
worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which
was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are
unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character,
adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the
only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the
subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the
very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang,
the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:

The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the
Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply
that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary
means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be
"deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as
having been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing, and
have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the
effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly
by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that
in a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word
for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before
its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how
We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At
least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion
appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative
background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.

Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of


Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927
cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section
2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of
Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically
the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the
phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended
by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same
Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination
of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time
Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said
Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are
not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are
the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully


naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different
than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As
already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken
by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been
repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the
automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead,
that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal
terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted
the phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction
in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of
a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would
seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448,
had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled
construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring
judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no
alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American
Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939,
the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress,
had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own,
or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our
legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly
important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of
Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the

Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to
be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated
differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before
the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those
given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction
here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our
legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction
thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the
modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology.
Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of
Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective
orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous American
posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It
is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible
judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to
indicate otherwise.

5.
Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in
reality and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American
laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the
same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as
disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones
who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of
the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the
former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is
the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American
decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8,
section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly
Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary
of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements
were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other
disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or
understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should
such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as
irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of
the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of
Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of
the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase
in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial

disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473?


Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not
be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section
2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could
not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than
decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot
see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications
into disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from
qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence,
qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
"who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing
the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely
copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6.
In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and
judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical
considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the
motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23,
1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:

Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications"

There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction


that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively
prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she
may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes
unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:

1.
One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under
Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an
alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at
least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens
to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a
foreigner she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her
husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be

stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for
ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted,
in which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.

2.
Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that
he "must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an
alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5,
Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must
have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade,
profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v.
Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965;
Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must
prove that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her
husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have
gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of
supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that
universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty
is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this
duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?

3.
Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have
enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an
alien woman has minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine
schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for
naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the
requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions
is that they follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666,
March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87
Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v.
Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her first

husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such
requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

4.
Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by
Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is)
married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino
wife should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for
citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for
ten years.

Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife
related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner
who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of
the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by
reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens.
It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act
No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special
privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was
precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No.
3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is
enlightening:

It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on
October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino
citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector
of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political
have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States.
Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act
No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the
former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .

To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding
section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22,
s. 1941; emphasis ours).

If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court


did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the qualifications
prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory.
It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of
the statute must be rejected.

A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the


language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other
defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re
National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L.
ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85
[1910).

... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the
court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in
injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction
which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as
will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or construction resulting in
unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.

So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent


inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions,
or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by
the legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least
likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the intention of the
legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp.
623-632).

7.
In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need
for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective
admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable
to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make
it more difficult if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman
marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for
naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and

logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien
women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions,
their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for
better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal
conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such
marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the
criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in
joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the
customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and
associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage.
Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is
made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the
following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and
Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the
question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers to a
case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for
naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy
of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice
between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds
no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such
cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming
citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the
statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a
citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a
Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A
minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of
his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has
lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an
alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself
be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a
fact.

A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this


regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is
universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an
alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a
unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb.

453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively
through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and
law has placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and
decisions govern the life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with
favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose
preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code).
Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of
person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation,
the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It
should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife,
and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the
nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For
as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held:
"The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage
her husband's domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine
law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of
conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the
other.

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot
be that the husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law
to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of
husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for
Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best
interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in
the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and
copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities.
There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in
the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our

naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between


the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world,
and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic
almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather
passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and
resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect,
should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We
cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under
scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken
bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence
of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the
work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity
to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction.
Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the
United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still
chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was
consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien
women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special
qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and
American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We
now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding,
that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.

As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there
will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this
provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide
matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case
can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.

The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of
this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings
before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If
this case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only
been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been
sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack
of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her
undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim
that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with
the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a
Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?

Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must
necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca
has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration
by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion,
this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.

In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be
a citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship
reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2)
Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided
at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action
by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other
than the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an
alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and
void.

3.
We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of
law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the
petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove

afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The
trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in
fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to
be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the
whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to
oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a
Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her
Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed
allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for
naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain
the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make
her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful
occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of
intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of
two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc.,
etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two
years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will
she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly,
she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.

Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other
hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it
to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an
alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision
itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended
by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves
Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court
might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different
from that complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave
importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons
affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid,
whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect
upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to
endorse.

AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and
standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity,
legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly
evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite
Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present
case -- that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso
facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through
ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that
all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to be a Philippine
citizen are null and void" has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of
the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than
simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand
women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court.
These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish,
British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members
of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three
decades, have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine
citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their
citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred such
property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is
limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in
companies engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino
equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with
possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges
exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has
been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of
government charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully
suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and farreaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive
scrutiny and reexamination.

To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan
Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 when Chief
Justice Concepcion observed:

The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases
although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to those
obtaining in the case at bar may have contributed materially to the irregularities

committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned
to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.

Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the
Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state
"how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of
naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the
periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was
promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from
May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the present case was
rendered).

After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's
motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of
the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the
Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization
issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957.

Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to
expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a
previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice
and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed,
the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo
San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become
the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor,
all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.

For ready reference, We requote Section 15:

Sec. 15.
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization


of the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born
minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall
be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to
be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance.

It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised
Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete
procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified
aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful
inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons
becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it
prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25
and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who
have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such
minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such
naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the
Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also
redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they
transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c)
all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization,
shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by
failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country
where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife,
she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that
the minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and
residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly
by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial
proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the
provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the
same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the
wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by
legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach
only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of
any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is
that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the
minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves
her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional


authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by
legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1
Taada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done
so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no
reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions
applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry
Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is
whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15
of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect
authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A
special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to
women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen
becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply
for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499
[10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962
edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision
of the United States statutes from which our law has been copied, 28a the American
courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice
but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted.
The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the
United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of
naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970

ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct.
106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .

We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as
paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of
November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time
already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative
authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who
married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and
as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any
naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To
repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would
unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be
reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the
American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such
construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such
alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than
those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine
Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act
3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter
law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of
1922.

Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel
that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her
national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial
scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but
proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing
country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which
our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above,
provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification
of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which
it is not institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be
going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.

There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite
clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the
Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who
dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another
naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings
involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .

SEC. 16.
Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his widow and
minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case
shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.

In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:

Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that
under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the same
proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the
widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the
petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment
becomes executory.

There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said
Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original petitioner
remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the
petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the
proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise,
it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it
affected the widow and the minor children.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person
can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath
is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath
of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked
that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall
have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of
her children, as recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the
herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the
Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting
citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the
petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed
his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the
Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen
of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp.
8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion


for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following
views of counsel: .

It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be


considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship
by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1
Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution
itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization,

under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with
legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire
citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the
"naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by
marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at
152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras,
Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the
Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship.
Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her
marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the
subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney
General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1,
1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S.
Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt.
71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the
person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means
or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be
"deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as
having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and
have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the
effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly
by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).

That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the
first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual
analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:

(See supra).

The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically


become" as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading
idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of
law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by
blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever
the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the
fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said
persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used
does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from
the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do
not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean,
however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the
relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the
point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who
was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the
time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and
the time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is
able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may prove some 25
years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and
should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he
became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who
married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her
citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship
only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had
proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very
phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife
should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that
she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of

citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her


citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in
evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the
time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to
become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191
[1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes
such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she
became a citizen.

(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the
status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of
citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for
citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the proviso
does not mean that she must first prove that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen.
Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did
not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her
qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in
those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish
their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the
case was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner,
whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the
Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving
her alleged change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board,
101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a
Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof
that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of
Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court,
the lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized"
did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens
upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these
wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.

In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when
citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship
status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be

required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order
to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences
from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a
subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully
naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by
showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no
difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes
a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a
proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a
citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal
proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such
a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v.
Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a
presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna
Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is,
what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established
so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform
an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such
paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date
of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the
truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This,
as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate
proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and
judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort

easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent
official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point
and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the
following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of
Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by
the interested parties:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or
supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB
Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an


alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in
any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the
opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon
was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court
prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by

virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508

November 13, 1990

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on
the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C.
Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to
the local elections on January 18, 1988.

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of
the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for
the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito
Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.

In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to
him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident
of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order
that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and
to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on
February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional
elections on May 18,1987.

After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception
of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:

The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary,
inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections
in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section
42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:

A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign


country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that
he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to
run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)

In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs.
Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto
filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and
desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:

... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has
ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable
to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)

These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof
that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether
respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant
to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18.
Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:

SEC. 68.
Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).

In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public
officials in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of
green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective
public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the
outcome of this case.

In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of
State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US
Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's
answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the
back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he
did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he
entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the
entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.

An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent
residence. As shown, however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the
term "immigrant."
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the protection given to him
during the period of his residence therein.

Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in
general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.

In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain
are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their rights of
person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien
friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of
the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a
livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the
protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3
CJS 529-530.)

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country


shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.'

Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself
as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of
his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus
Election Code).

Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he
is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this
case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran
for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold
that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least
one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao
for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent
residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid
down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those
Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved
that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without
mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are
resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here,
they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of
their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently,
for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S.
with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for
immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot
in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true,
this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to
benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he
is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for
it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that
he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for
mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that
he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null
and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC
Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby
set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

N RE PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JOSELITO YU.


JOSELITO YU, represented by his guardian ad litem, JUAN S. BARRERA, petitioner and
appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

Syquia Law Offices for petitioner and appellant.


Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. C.
Zaballero and Atty. J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor and appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by his
guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to
Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a
Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to
the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as
he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the
care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in
school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real
name also stated."

Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the
ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.

In his appeal, petitioner1 contends that the lower court erred (1) in ruling that an
alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of the rules of court relating to change of
name; (2) in concluding that in this jurisdiction family or personal rights of an alien
should be governed by the laws of his country; (3) in concluding that a simple
reason why an alien's name should not be changed by judicial decree in this
jurisdiction may be found in the inability of the local judicial authority to provide for
the alien's change of name in his passport; and (4) in engaging in judicial legislation
beyond its authority when it applied the law on change of name.

Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change
of name.2 Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he
resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here
the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but
embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of
the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified,
signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that
the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the
change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear
and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino
citizenship is not one of them.

The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and
since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse of the principle must be
recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien must be governed
by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may be true in
a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an
individual but one's family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles
364 to 373) contains provisions for the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated,
illegitimate, and adopted children, as well as by women who are married, widowed
or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name as authorized under
Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family
relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family
rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal
capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and
which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large
in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The
situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or
an alien.

To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not
because he would thereby acquire certain families with them but because the
existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind. But this
is precisely the purpose of the judicial application to determine whether there is
proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. As held by this Court in

several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow (Ong Peng Oan v.
Republic, L-8035, Nov. 29, 1957; Tan v. Republic, L-16384, April, 26 1962; Ong Te v.
Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962; Moore v. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In not
one of those cases, however, has it been ruled that an alien is not entitled to file a
petition at all.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.1wph1.t

G.R. No. 170603

January 29, 2007

EDISON SO, Petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise
assailed is the appellate courts Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
of its Decision.

Antecedents

On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for
Naturalization3 under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition:

He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived
in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives
an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog;
he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended,
because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the
Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a
person of good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation

with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the
qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to organized government
or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success
or predominance of mens ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice
of polygamy; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he
is not suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation;
the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention
in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission
as citizen of the Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No.
02-102984.

Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit4 of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark
B. Salcedo; and petitioners Certificate of Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate of
Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence.7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30
a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were
enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire
petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week
for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the
petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City
Hall Building.9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire
petition and its annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27,
2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, on
May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.

No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa,
Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and
adviser of the So familys business. He would usually attend parties and other social
functions hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications
mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully
employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila;
petitioner had been practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the
Constitution; petitioner had been socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors
and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire
stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed Christmas and New
Year and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was
not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to
organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist and
has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he suffering
from any mental alienation or any incurable disease.12

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were
classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with
friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during
fiestas and special occasions when he would go to petitioners house. He has known
petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of
good moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner has a gainful occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.

At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the


following documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien Certificate of
Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate of Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupils17
and High School Students18 Permanent Record issued by Chang Kai Shek College;
(5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;19 (6) Certification
of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and
Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8) Certification from Metrobank
that petitioner is a depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been charged or
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates

and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General Hospital.24 The RTC
admitted all these in evidence.

The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring


that petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to become a Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the Philippines,
after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes
final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period
required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded
that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the decision to the CA on the following grounds:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION


DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO
ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.

II.

PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to


prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2)
character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to
become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving
specific details about his character and moral conduct.28 The witnesses did not
even reside in the same place as petitioner.29 Respondent likewise argued that
petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen
because he did not give any explanation or specific answers to the questions
propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general
statements in answer to his counsels questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to
prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by
law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST
with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as
a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements
for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to
Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine
government entered into diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China;
the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was
signed into law.31 Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was
published in the official gazette and a newspaper of general circulation; notices
were likewise sent to the National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice,
Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from these offices came
forward to oppose the petition before the lower court.32 Petitioner insisted that he
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This
was clearly established by his witnesses.

In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that
even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be
dismissed.

In its Decision33 dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and
dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice.34 According to the CA,
petitioners two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention
specific details of petitioners life or character to show how well they knew him;
they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly
explaining their applicability to petitioners case.35 The appellate court likewise

ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the
applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty
(20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the
requirement.36 The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close
the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and
that it believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided
asset to this country.37

Petitioners motion for reconsideration38 was denied in a Resolution39 dated


November 24, 2005; hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE


ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA.40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the
Brief filed before the CA.

In its Comment41 on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which
took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age requirement was
lowered to eighteen (18) years old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to judicial
naturalization before the court, as in the present case.42 Respondent, through the
OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before the court a quo does not
preclude it from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to
question an already final decision by filing a petition for cancellation of
citizenship.43 Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument that petitioners character
witnesses are not qualified to prove the formers qualifications.

In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a


Filipino citizen, it is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A.
No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or
not the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the
jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political
body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.
Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A.
No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.45

Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should


possess are those provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No.
473 is barren of merit. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 246 and 447 of C.A. No. 473.
On the other hand, Sections 348 and 449 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for the
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by
administrative act.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of
lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting
"brain gain" for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioners contention
that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for
naturalization by judicial act.

First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who
lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all
along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to
the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention
of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes
that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is
nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended
or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of

by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice
to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the
time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139
was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No.
473.

Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable
even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it
would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that
R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been
residing here.

Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary
to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the
country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was
born in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one
who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years
from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we
maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not
qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands
and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were
competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of
good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants conduct and character. Thus, they
ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the
applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law.53

Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts;
they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that
they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his
qualifications. As correctly found by the CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted
mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his
counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set
forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty. Adasas
testimony follows:

q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?

a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and
adviser of their family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to
their place way back in 1991 to 1992.

q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner
more or less contin[u]ous?

a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family
some social function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to
attend.

q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioners
birthday?

a On several occasions I attend the birthday.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?

a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.

q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?

a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.

q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression
of his conduct?

a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working
individual and ah (sic) he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no
adverse report concerning the character of the petitioner.

q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a]
citizen of the Philippines?

a Yes.

q Can you tell us why do you say so?

a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications
mandated by law and presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in
the Philippines particularly in the City of Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten
(10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good moral character and I have
observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah (sic) those
embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and meddle
(sic) some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and
learn the customs and ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier

mentioned that he conducted himself in proper and approachable (sic) manner


during his entire residence in our country and he has a gainful occupation.

q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?

a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah
observed (sic) the usual Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and
some occasions such as fiestas.

q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act
to become Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?

a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of
coming (sic) the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah
(sic) he is qualified under Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not
opposed to ah (sic) organized government. His family and himself does not believed
(sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah (sic) he is not a poligamist
(sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted in any crime
involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental alienation
or any incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.

q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?

a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously
having ah (sic) the usual contact with his family.54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioners family, but not
specifically to petitioner. Atty. Adasas statements refer to his observations on the
familys practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony
suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his
qualifications.

Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:

q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?

a Yes, Sir.

q Are you personally acquainted with him?

a Yes, Sir.

q How long have you known the petitioner?

a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.

q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you
come to know the petitioner?

a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.

q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or
less contin[u]ous?

a Yes, Sir.

q How often did you see the petitioner?

a I see him twice a week, Sir.

q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?

a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).

q Do you go to church together?

a Yes, Sir.

q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?

a Yes, Sir.

q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also
go during fiestas?

a Yes, Sir.

q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?

a Yes, Sir.

q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?

a Twice a week, sir.

q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?

a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.

q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?

a Since birth, Sir.

q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us
your impression of his conduct?

a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the


Philippines (sic) Constitution.

q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of
the Philippines (sic) Constitution?

a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over
the people and the government authority emanate from within; and the other one is
the civilian government is not supreme over the military.

q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir.

q What are these qualifications?

a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in
the Philippines since birth.

q What else?

a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and


appraochable (sic) manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir.

q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?

a Yes, Sir.

q What is the occupation of the petitioner?

a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.

q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?

a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.

q Is the petitioner still a student?

a Yes, Sir.

q Where is he studying?

a In UST, Sir.

q Is he your classmate?

a Yes, Sir.

q What was his course?

a Pharmacy, Sir.

q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?

a Yes, Sir.

q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?

a Yes, Sir.

q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic)
with?

a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.

q Who else?

a Elmer Ramos, Sir.

q Who else?

a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.

q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?

a Yes, Sir.

q Why do you know that?

a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah
better approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well with
friends.

q So during school days you see him everyday?

a Yes, Sir.

q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a
week?

a Yes, Sir.

q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become
the citizen of the Republic of the Philippines?

a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.

q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?

a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not
polygamus and he is not convicted of any crime, Sir.

q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?

a No, Sir.

q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable
disease illnesses?

a No, Sir.

q Why do you know?

a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic)
he is a very intelligent person, Sir.

q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?

a Yes, Sir.

q What organization?

a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.

q What does starget means?

a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.

q How about the other one which you mentioned?

a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate,
Sir.55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioners qualifications.

In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their
testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his
own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses,
who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization law, a
"credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of
a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such

person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest
and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word
may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are
persons of good standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the
educational attainment of the witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their
credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build his
own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good moral
character of his witnesses.

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from


questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A
naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may
be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising
subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a
final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC
within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the
lower court.

Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements
of naturalization law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the
petition for naturalization without prejudice.

It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that
the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should
not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the law.60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. L-43314

December 19, 1935

A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff


-appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.

Ohnick and Opisso for appellant.


Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action
to recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P77,018.39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against
the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.

The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:

I.

That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.

II.
That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified
copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by
virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer,
who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, United
States of America.

III.
That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of
of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was
Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same
case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked
attached and made a part hereof.

special administrator
filed by W. Maxwell
being designated as
Exhibit BB is hereto

IV.
That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a
decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked Exhibits
CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.

V.
That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by the
court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto attached
and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration of heirs, Ida
M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925, and addressed
to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit FF hereto attached
and made part hereof.

VI.
That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally
of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully
shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with the
court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit GG is
hereto attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not, however, cover
the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.

VII.
That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the estate
of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy of which
marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part, hereof.

VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period
from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit 11 is
hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon
Moody.1awphil.net

IX.
That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with
the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached
and made a part hereof.

X.
That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to
the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked
Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

XI.
That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter
of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said
answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.

XII.
That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney for
Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached
and made a part hereof.

XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a
letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.

XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum
of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932,
making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the
assessment for income tax against said estate.

XV.
That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the
protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.

XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing
of the present case.

Manila, August 15, 1933.

In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral
and documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an
American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged
actively in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on
February 18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left
an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations
organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other
intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and
claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of
inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of his death was
located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows,
he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA,
executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the Philippine
law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:

I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the


Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and
Testament . . ..

The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his


complaint as follows:

That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands
under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected
upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a
person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by
defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, credits
and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking
and deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights
and organic law of the Philippine Islands.

Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:

SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of


inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of
inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and
real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the
Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or
sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance
with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or any personal
property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax:

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a
"non-resident of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets
up as a special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date
of his death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was
engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was
the legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?

The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any


evidence that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his
death based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the
Collector of Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the
payment of the tax, this objection cannot be considered in a suit against the
Collector to recover the taxes paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the
case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C. Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call
attention, however, to the fact that this decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72
Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the
requirement that the action shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such,
as were presented in the protest had been waived by the collector. In the case
before us no copy of the taxpayer's protest is included in the record and we have no
means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary objection made
on behalf of the appellee does not lie.

We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to


whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day
of his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal
domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he
accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands He lived in the

Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left
Manila the latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was
afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he
would be reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated
and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he
surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of
night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate. The record
does not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived
with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929
where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record
does not show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November
26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila,
offering to sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine
corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among
other things, he states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business
again." In this same letter he says:

I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided
either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the
necessary investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply
to this ... I have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be
executed until March and this will give you plenty of time ... anything that kills a
business is to have it peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to
avoid. He wrote letters dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the
same line to Wendt. As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these
letters were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been immediately
segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He
was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands.

There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a
new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present
for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does
not claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta
that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he
had no intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim
that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains
no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris
he had any fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no
evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business

on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove
the establishment of a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told
Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had
established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely
consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving
treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates clearly that
Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and
reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious
departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he
doubtless knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his
affliction became graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his
precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he
was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to
the date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there
must be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be
one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth
of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign
country.

The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate
is, in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the
Collector of Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound.
That the amount of P59,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends
declared out of surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the
evidence. The appellant contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because
the corporation paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was
accumulated as surplus; second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was
assessed against the estate, and third, the same amount is assessed as income of
the estate. As to the first, it appears from the collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to
the collector allowed the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said
amount because it had already been paid at the source by the Camera Supply
Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or
surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate,

having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged
double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in
question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are
not convinced by the appellant's argument that the estate which received these
dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon
because the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation
into the property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S. vs. Phellis, 257 U.S., 171,
and Taft vs. Bowers, 278 U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is
relied on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt property
shall be included as income subject to tax.

Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G.
Moody at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine
Islands and, second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was
within the Philippine Islands. Costs against the appellant.

REMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,


vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor
for appellant.
L. D. Lockwood and Manuel O. Chan for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization,
accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of
intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing. The petition was
finally set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date because
the province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations
for liberation in March, 1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947,
and the evidence was presented on August 28 and September 30, 1947. On the
same day resolution was issued granting the petition.

Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the


witnesses for the petitioner, he did not file an opposition or presented any evidence.

The lower court made the findings of fact in the following paragraphs of its
resolution:

Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship naturalization under the


provisions of Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.

The records shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization
supported by the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano,
both residents of Camarines Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be precise,

he filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen of this country. Notice of the
hearing was published as required by law.

It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian, having
first seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg,
Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under
the Czars. World War I found him in the military service of this Government. In 1915
he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy and was sent to the Navy Aviation
School. He fought with the Allies in the Baltic Sea, was later transferred to the
eastern front in Poland, and much later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor. In the
latter part of the war, but before the Russian capitulation, he was transferred to the
British Air Force under which he served for fourteen months. When the revolution
broke out in Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and
fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was
overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the Bolshevik regime, he fled
by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he found his way to
Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of White Russians under
Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for about seven months, then
moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided for about a year, and from this
place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where he established his permanent
residence since May, 1925. He has remained a resident of this municipality, except
for a brief period from 1942 to July, 1945, when by reason of his underground
activities he roamed mountains of Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he
returned to Iriga where again he resides up to the present time.

The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with


whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in
Saint Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the
Government.

The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation Company, with


about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He receives an annual salary of
P13,200 with free quarters and house allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of
this and other companies.

The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he
intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social functions
with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the principles

underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused of any crime. On
the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire period of residence in Camarines Sur, in his relations with
the constituted authorities as well as with the community.

Although he could have lived in ease by maintaining good relations with the enemy
by reason of his being Russian-born during the years preceding the declaration of
war by Russia against Japan, the applicant of his own volition chose to cast his lot
with the guerrilla movement and fought the enemy in several encounters in the
Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with
rank of major. Upon the arrival of the forces of liberation he was attached to the
American Army from April to June, 1945.

Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims


allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a
stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the present
Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is
not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds
and teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does not believe in
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the
practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable
contagious disease.

Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed resolution. We will consider them
separately.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a
basis for the petition of naturalization. The question calls for the application of the
following provision of section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law:

No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has
been issued.

Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to


establish the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence.

In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be
read:

I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as shown by
the attached certificate of arrival or landing certificate of residence.

The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become
a Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the
liberation of Manila, and the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.

Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the


validity of a declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the abovequoted section 5 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.

Appellee suggests that we would not consider the question here raised by appellant,
the latter having failed to raise it in lower court and points out that there is
testimonial evidence showing appellee's arrival March, 1923, and that he was
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and the testimony of petitioner has not
been refuted. Appellee's alleges that the office of the President has certified that it
is a matter of record that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered
the Philippines under the command of Admiral Stark, the facts regarding arrival of
the latter fleet being a matter of common knowledge, widely publicized in the
newspapers at the time, of which this Court may properly take judicial notice under
section 5 of Rule 123. When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a
Governor General Wood who, later, took the matter up with the authorities in
Washington in lengthy correspondence, and the 1,200 persons manning the fleet
were allowed to land and to remain in the Philippines or proceed to other countries,
except about 800 who were allowed to go to the United States and given free

transportation on the naval transport "Merritt." The ships of the fleet were sold in
the Philippines.

The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the
Philippines for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities,
who are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties and would have
arrested petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can
be taken as evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. That a
certificate of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the
petitioner's undisputed statement in his declaration of July, 1940, that the
certificate cannot be supposed that the receiving official would have accepted the
declaration without the certificate mentioned therein as attached thereto.

We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the


Naturalization Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding.
What an unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other
competent evidence.

II

The second assignment of error touches upon two questions, that the lower court
erred (1) in not finding that appellee has not established a legal residence in the
Philippines, and (2) in not finding that he cannot speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages.

The first question has already been disposed of in the above discussion. Perusal of
the testimonies on record leads to the conclusion that petitioner has shown legal
residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years as
required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.

As to the next question, appellant alleges that in the oral test at the hearing, it was
demonstrated that petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the Filipino language
that petitioner alleges to know, and he cannot speak it as he was not able to
translate from English to Bicol questions asked by the court and the provincial fiscal,
although, in the continuation of the hearing on September 30, 1947, "surprisingly
enough, he succeeded answering correctly in Bicol the questions propounded by his

counsel, however, he fumbled and failed to give the translation of such a common
word as 'love' which the fiscal asked of him.

The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English
and Bicol and there seems to be no question about the competency of the judge
who made the pronouncement, because he has shown by the appealed resolution
and by his questions propounded to appellee, that he has command of both English
and Bicol.

The law has not set a specific standard of the principal Philippine languages. A great
number of standards can be set. There are experts in English who say that
Shakespeare has used in his works 15,000 different English words, and the King's
Bible about 10,000, while about 5,000 are used by the better educated persons and
about 3,000 by the average individual. While there may be persons ambitious
enough to have a command of the about 600,000 words recorded in the Webster's
International Dictionary, there are authorities who would reduce basic English to a
few hundred words. Perhaps less than one hundred well selected words will be
enough for the ordinary purposes of daily life.

There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken
considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the
Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in
encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla
until the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of
Bicol was able to get along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the
resistance movement, we believe that his knowledge of the language satisfies the
requirement of the law.

But appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support


petitioner's allegation that he can write too in the Bicol language. There, is,
however, on record circumstantial evidence from which it can be concluded that
petitioner ought to know also how to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the
important Philippine languages, uses the same alphabet used in English, and it is
much easier to write Bicol than English, because it is phonetic. Vowels and
consonants have in them single and not interchangeable phonetic values, while
English words deviate very often from the basic sounds of the alphabet. The ability
to write cannot be denied to a person like petitioner, who has undergone the
exacting technical training to be able to render services as flier in the Russian Naval

Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the British Air Forces during the first World War.
The difference between the Cyrillic alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our
Roman alphabet, cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the ability to use the latter.
A person who has shown the command of English which can be seen in his
testimony on record can easily make use of an alphabet of twenty or more letters
universally used in this country where he has been residing continuously for 25
years.

III

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee stateless and not a
Russian citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not
disqualified for Philippine citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised
Naturalization Law.

It is contended that petitioner failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee
has lost his Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the
right to become a naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. The controversy centers
on the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.

Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no
citizenship. His testimony supports the lower court's pronouncement that petitioner
is a stateless refugee in this country.

Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is
citizen or subject of the Empire of Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to
exist since the Czars were overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and the petitioner
disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government established after the
overthrow of the Czarist Government.

We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless.
Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known
fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the
world a large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country
and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all
opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and

blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to
escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the
hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of
stateless refugees.

Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history,
nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to
humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further
evidence of petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes
no allegiance to the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been
at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After
finding in this country economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family
by marrying a Filipina with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the
freedoms and blessings of our democratic way of life, and after showing his
resolution to retain the happiness he found in our political system to the extent of
refusing to claim Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese
and of casting his lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes
of our guerrillas, it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner
could feel any bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

IV

The fourth and last assignment of error need not be discussed, it being only a
sequel of the other assignments and has necessarily been disposed of in their
discussion.

The appealed resolution is affirmed.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were


candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano

103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado

100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III

54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition


for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of


Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration
and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he
is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was
born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United

States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an


American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios


Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The


motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,


California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he


registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four
thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the


Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a


candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office
of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1.
He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when
he was already 37 years old; and,

2.
He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be

declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent


Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure
of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and,
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for
intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene
in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for


intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vicemayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of

Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.
The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race
at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in
several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner
filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action,
so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification


even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention
was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the
case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners
motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the


Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.
This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General,
who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance


of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce

which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan.
And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of


allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens
with dual allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual


citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to

citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the


Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship
including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for
national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as
a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of
these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary
of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine
and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double
allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate
what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double
citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional


Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because
we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a
child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear


allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his

foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)


between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No
one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship.

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he


renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed
by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation
is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the
law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the
Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but
what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is
absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the
parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of
the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in

Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively


renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old,
it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his


American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
. . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election
or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this
provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v.
Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March
27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED)


NATURAL-BORN

....

10.
I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11.
COUNTRY.

I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN

12.
I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT
AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS
AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY
CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American


citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation of his American citizenship.
Equally without merit is
petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and
that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate
of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him
can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.
When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must
be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino


citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction
can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119976

September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and


suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that
an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this
provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is
the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the


position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY


PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of

Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration


Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,


changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the
amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte
informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy


on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same
having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with


the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner
averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy
was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register
as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After
respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month
actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a
move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed
a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another
legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve
his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such

moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely,
the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake"
on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has
always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is
a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead
implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest


mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on

the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none
in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,


therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she


cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the
case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations
which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended
primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in
that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant
case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which
determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress,
accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects
the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy
of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy
can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for
6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the

last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's
contention that it was an error.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be


admitted by this Commission.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs.
Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she
chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied
and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived
in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she

filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed
to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters
that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became
a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior
to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District
of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose
to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she
has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to
prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has
not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on

January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC
en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995
Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to


DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's


proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District
of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the


congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:

I.

The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District
of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II.

The Jurisdictional Issue

a)

Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying


petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b)

After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive


jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.

I.

Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling


confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of

determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives


as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an


individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile
of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to


indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous
with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in
a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile"
to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is
the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and
a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx

xxx

xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes:

Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded


that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given
to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate
of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven
(7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought


to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in


jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner
then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa,
Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A
close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence
in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7.

RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8.

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven


Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual


residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should
not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution
of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that
petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades
except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in
1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in
San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not,
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature
does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she
filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places"
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In
Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in
another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding
his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having
been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that
he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held,
the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities;
so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is
not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements


supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations
of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact
of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second
Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy
in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban,
where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her

husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is


inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during
the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the
country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic)
therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by
merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's

being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of


domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1.

An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.
A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and

3.

Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for
a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of
a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil
Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or


residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This
part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in
the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence,"
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring
from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit

to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention
of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference
could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix
a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:

Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty,
and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each
other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that
of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile
(apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this
Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband
has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances
where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the
Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for
the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice

was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders,
and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in
appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in
the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil
Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea
of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have


affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return
to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control
of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,


petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix

as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these
places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters,
the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in
civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to
mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile"
after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband
died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she
not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost
by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in
her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot,
Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She
could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary
or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion
pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it

would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one
where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife
gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II.

The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of
the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a


specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that noncompliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds
of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this
court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on


grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a


limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,

are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential
to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential
act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial
bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78
of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of


jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution


for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis
of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on
such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election
laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We
renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves
bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or
she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat
the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence


qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and

May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
G.R. No. 160869

May 11, 2007

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS


AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003, reads:

SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary


notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,


illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the


armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held


unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act
No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of dual allegiance?

We shall discuss these issues jointly.

Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not
dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either
natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance
because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their
foreign allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is
inimical to the national interest.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that
the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the
supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress
is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed
law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow

dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:

xxxx

Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations
exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is
inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual
allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said
that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual
citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the
latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a
matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over.

Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.

Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of
the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires
this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the
foreign country concerned, he explained.

xxxx

Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce
his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government,
and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that
there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.

Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not
a matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a
foreign parliament but a Member of the House.

xxxx

Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the
dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of
Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what
the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.

Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created
wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to
another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all
allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The
original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of
allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no
longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from naturalborn Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign

country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet
passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not
be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that
while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme
Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how
to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and


it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would
be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.

Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed
since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual
allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and

passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether
the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.12 The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has
clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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