University

of San Carlos
Student Supreme Court
En Banc



Tingog Carolinian, Petitioner, vs. University of San Carlos Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Respondent.


D E C I S I O N

ALO, CJ:

Before us is a petition by the Tingog Carolinian Party (Tingog) assailing the
validity of Section 6 of Article 8 of the 2014 Election Code and seeking for the nullity
of the resignations tendered by incumbent officers pursuant to said provision.

The Facts

The essential facts of the case can be summarized as follows:

On November 2014, the 2014 Election Code (referred to as Code hereafter)
was duly approved by the Supreme Student Council upon recommendation of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) after having gone through the process of
preliminary drafting by the Ad Hoc committee and final deliberation. Among other
changes to the previous Election Code, Section 6 of Article 8 was added to the Code,
which provides that an incumbent officer shall be required to tender his resignation
as one of the requirements for filing his Certificate of Candidacy.

On February 5, a formal complaint was filed by Tingog with the COMELEC
questioning the validity of Section 6 of Article 8 of the Code. Tingog contends that
the said provision is contrary to our laws, specifically BP 881, known as the
Ominibus Election Code, and the 1987 Philippine Constitution, and is violative of the
2001 Constitution of the University of San Carlos Supreme Student Council
(hereafter referred to as Constitution). It argues that a hierarchy of laws ought to be
respected, and therefore the USC-SSC Constitution takes precedence over the 2014
Election Code; and that the latter must be submissive to the spirit and intent of the
former. Specifically, Tingog argues that forcing incumbents to resign in order to seek
re-election is unconstitutional being contrary to Article VII which says The
president, vice president, and the twenty-one councilors shall hold office during a
term of one year and shall be elected by a popular vote of the students of the
University. The term of office of the president, vice president, and twenty-one
councilors shall end by the time the new set of officers shall have taken their oath.

For its part, COMELEC contends that BP 881 or the 1987 Philippine
Constitution finds no application since the University, being a private institution,
can promulgate its own rules as to the conduct of its internal affairs. Such can be
said the same for the student body and organizations incorporated within.
COMELEC advanced its argument by stating that the purpose of the contested
provision was to promote fairness during election. The provision seeks to prevent
an incumbent running for re-election to spearhead any SSC project during election
time and use such avenue to solicit votes. Furthermore, COMELEC raises the point
that the council duly approved the Code by majority vote.


COMELEC, recognizing that it has no power or jurisdiction to interpret the
law, then raised the issue before this court for resolution.

Issue

Competent authority would tell us that the Omnibus Election code and the
1987 Philippine Constitution find no direct application in the case before us since
what the court is dealing with is a student election and thus a purely internal matter.

The sole issue of this case before us is whether or not Section 6 of Article 8
violates the 2001 Constitution of the University of San Carlos Supreme Student
Council.


This Courts Ruling

On the issue of Constitutionality

We find the petition to be meritorious. Section 6 of Article 8 may seemingly
appear innocent on its face, but a deeper inspection of the provision and its effects
will tell us that it is indeed unconstitutional. We agree with Tingog that such
provision has the effect of a forced resignation thus reducing the term of office
provided for under our Constitution.

Our Constitution recognizes instances wherein the term provided may be
prematurely terminated, they are: removal, death, resignation, and incapacity. What
is common among these instances is that it recognizes the inability of an elected
official to further carry out his/her function for one reason or another. It is clear
therefore that the term of an elected officer under our constitution begins from the
time he/she takes his oath and ends by the time the new set of officers are elected
and shall have taken their oath; this is the general rule. The exception to the rule
would then be the inability or incapacity of the elected officer to carry out his/her
official functions; such inability or incapacity shall terminate the term before its
prescribed end. In the case at bar, the resignation under the contested provision is
no way grounded on ones incapacity to further exercise his functions, but rather by

his/her desire to continue public service for another term. Therefore, to recognize
such provision as valid and constitutional would be tantamount to adding another
exception to the general rule, which would be re-election. This cannot be done, for it
is sound legal principle that the law can in no way amend the Constitution; a spring
can never rise higher than its source. Our Constitution provides the proper
procedure for amendment, and such ought to be followed.

As pointed out by Tingog, the implementation of the assailed provision can
have dangerous implications. Theoretically, if all incumbent officers decide to run
for another term, they would all have to resign upon submitting their Certificate of
Candidacy. In such an instance, there would be no SSC throughout the election
season and a vacuum of office would be created for approximately a month. This is
contrary to the spirit and intention of the Constitution, which mandates that there
should be a Supreme Student Council sitting in office to represent the student body.
Though the situation is highly hypothetical and seemingly unlikely, but one cannot
deny that in at least theory, it is a possibility. Nor can we discount the possibility
that even losing half of the officers due to resignation under this provision can
already greatly cripple the function of the council, especially when theres a need to
address a contingency or other pressing matters that may arise during the election
season.

Though the intent behind the provision is commendable, but its implication
and possible consequences far outweigh any benefit that can be derived from it.


On the nullity of the resignations


Though we find the contested provision to be unconstitutional, we cannot
rule in favor of the Petitioners request to nullify the resignations of the incumbent
officers seeking re-election.

It was brought to this courts attention during the hearing that there had
been enough time and opportunity to question this provision before its passage into
law. Therefore it begs the question from this court why Petitioner has only seriously
raised this up as an issue at this late hour when elections are already upon us. The
filing of a formal complaint was raised only on February 5, 2015, a day before the
supposed deadline for submission for certificates of candidacy.

According to COMELEC, the ad hoc committee furnished a copy to the
proposed Code to political parties, including Tingog Carolinian, during the
preliminary stages of drafting this Code. With regards to Section 6 of Article 8, no
question or issue was raised at this stage. Petitioner did not object to this fact nor
did it attempt to present contrary testimony.

During the final deliberation and voting for the now-approved Code held
some time during November, this section was questioned by one of the Petitioners

incumbent councilors. But as both parties admit, COMELEC was able to justify and
explain its position, which the councilors then agreed and approved without any
issue, with the belief that the resignation is after all a mere formality.


In light of the foregoing, this court believes that those who have submitted
their resignation pursuant to this provision ought to be bound by it, as if they were
already estopped from taking an opposition. The theory of Estoppel in our legal
system is said to be a principle based on equity and fairness; and though what we
are dealing with in this case is not estoppel in its strictest legal sense, but we find no
cogent reason not to apply a similar effect to that of estoppel in this instance.


It is clear to this court that Petitioner had ample opportunity and time to
question the said provision since its inception. The events that transpired during the
deliberation in November leads this court to believe that whatever opposition
Petitioner had regarding this provision were quelled by COMELECs reasoning and
the Councils subsequent approval. Therefore, those who signed their resignations
ought to be bound by the same. After all, these officers are presumably the same
persons that were present during the deliberation and approved the said provision.
This court is of the belief that the Election Code (and all provisions therein)
approved by the Council shall be the same Code which shall be binding upon those
council members seeking re-election in this years election.


We believe this to be the just and equitable solution given the circumstances.
Had Petitioners been timely and firm on their opposition of Section 6 of Article, this
court would have been inclined to rule differently. But such is not the case here. We
cannot allow Petitioners to be fickle-minded as to their opposition now that were at
the threshold of elections. Petitioner ought to be precluded from now opposing
something they were fully aware of and initially approved, especially at this late
hour. The court also sees that such solution poses no grave threat to the current
operations of council since only 5 officers are seeking re-election.


A Final Word

We commend COMELEC for its earnest efforts to improve the SSC elections
by ensuring that it is fair and equitable. But imposing a compulsory resignation
would be a far too extreme measure; there are other means in which the same end
can be derived. This court suggests that if COMELEC truly wants to ensure that no
officer spearheads an SSC project during election season, perhaps in future drafts of
a revised Election Code a provision can be provided that would specifically prohibit
such. It may recommend such provisions to the same effect as long as it remains
within the frame of the Constitution. For no matter how earnest or purest the
intentions may be, any law passed should not violate the present Constitution.

As to Petitioner, though we sympathize with them that the possible adverse

effects were only made apparent to them recently, we cannot agree with Petitioner
to hold such as a valid justification to nullify their resignations. This court would
like to make it clear not only to Petitioner but any persons seeking office that the
passing or revision of any law ought not to be taken lightly. It is of the earnest hopes
of this court that this case serve as lesson and reminder to all future councils and
officers to be scrutinizing and thorough whenever passing a law or resolution. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines has reiterated in numerous cases that public
office is a public trust. The same can be said of our own student government. The
student body has entrusted the great responsibility of representation to the hands
of the elected officers of the SSC. Therefore it is imperative that these officers
exercise due diligence in the conduct of the affairs of the SSC. We do not expect the
Council to be privy with all the complexities of the law and its principles, but we do
however expect that Council posses some foresight, to a reasonable extent, as to the
implications and effects of any law or resolution it may pass, especially when it
affects rights and obligations. In short, we urge the Council and all its members to
be constantly cautious and prudent, because in life there is no undo button;
and not everything can always be reversed by the swish of a magical wand.


WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted. Section 6 of Article 8 is
deemed unconstitutional from the promulgation of this decision and therefore
should be stricken off from the 2014 Election Code. However, any resignation
tendered by an incumbent officer seeking re-election for the 2015 elections should
still be upheld and such officers are still deemed effectively resigned.

SO ORDERED.


(sgd.)
Kyle Joseph A. Alo
Chief Justice


WE CONCUR:




(sgd.)




(sgd.)

Russell Randall L. Gocuan

Zachary Walter Mari Z. Selma

Associate Justice


Associate Justice





The two other justices were unavailable as of the resolution of the case.