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Aquintey vs.

Tibong

case Background
-Spouses Felicidad and Rico Tibong (Respondents) secured several loans from
Agrifina Aquintey (Petitioner) at monthly interest rates of 6% to 7%.
-Despite demands, the respondents failed to pay their outstanding loan,
amounting to 773,000php
-Respondent issued a check to the petitioner for an amount of 50,000php that
was dishonoured. Respondent was ordered by the court to pay the amount and
did so.
-Petitioner presented copies of the promissory notes and acknowledgement
receipts executed by respondents covering the loaned amounts.
-Petitioner stated that she had lost the receipts signed by respondent for the
following amounts: 100,000php, 34,000php, and 2,000.
-Respondents admitted that they had secured loans from petitioner and the
proceeds of the loan were then re-lent to other borrowers at higher interest
rates.
-Respondents specifically denied the material averments in paragraph 2 and 2.1
of the complaint. However, they did not state the total amount of their loans
and declared that they did not receive anything from petitioner without any
receipt.
-Petitioner sought the assistance of Atty. A-ayo who advised her to require
respondent to execute deeds of assignment over respondents debtors.
-Atty. A-ayo also suggested that respondents debtors execute promissory notes
in petitioners favour, to turn over their loans from respondent.
-Petitioner agreed to the proposal and petitioner, respondent, and the
respondents debtors had a conference where Atty. A-ayo explained that
petitioner could apply her collections as payments of the respondents account.
-Respondent executed deeds of assignment of credits notarized by Atty. A-ayo,
in which respondent transferred and assigned to petitioner.
-Petitioner tried to collect the balance on respondents account but respondent
told her to wait until her debtors had money.
-When respondent reneged on her promise, petitioner filed a complaint for the
collection of 773,000php.

-The Court of Appeals found that 585,659php was covered by the deeds of
assignment and promissory notes.
-Respondents other debtors were able to pay 103,500php to the petitioner.
Statement of the Problem
Whether the obligation of the respondents to pay the balance of their loans, including
interest, was partially extinguished of the deeds of assignment in favour of petitioner.
Objectives
Determine the total amount of the loan.
Determine if the respondents obligation is extinguished by novation or dation in
payment (dacion en pago)

Determine if the decision of the Supreme Court is in accordance to the principles of


fairness, equity and justice.
Areas for Consideration (codals, other sc decisions)
Rule 8, SEC. 10 Specific Denial - A defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as
is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial.
SEC. 11 Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material averment in
the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to
recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (Rules of
Civil Procedure)
The answer should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleaders
adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and what
is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a brief. (Kirchmam vs.
Eschman, 127 N.E. 328)

Art. 1245 Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in


satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales. (Civil Code of
the Philippines)
Dation in payment is the delivery and the transmission of ownership of a thing by the
debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation.
Novation by change of the object. (2 Castan 525; 8 Manresa 324; Filinvest Credit
Corporation vs. Philippine Acetylene Co., 111 SCRA 421)
The theory of novation is that the new debtor contracts with the old debtor that he will
pay the debt, and also to the same effect with the creditor, while the latter agrees to
accept the new debtor for the old. A novation is not made by showing that the
substituted debtor agreed to pay the debt; it must appear that he agreed with the
creditor to do so. Moreover, the agreement must be based on the consideration of the
creditor's agreement to look to the new debtor instead of the old. It is not essential that
acceptance of the terms of the novation and release of the debtor be shown by express
agreement. Facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and the subsequent
conduct of the parties may show acceptance as clearly as an express agreement, albeit
implied [City National Bank of Huron, S.D. v. Fuller 52 F.2d 870.; Babst v. Court of
Appeals, 403 Phil. 244, 259-260 (2001)]
An assignment of credit is an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit,
known as the assignor, by a legal cause, such as sale,dation in payment, exchange or
donation, and without the consent of the debtor, transfers his credit and accessory
rights to another, known as the assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the
same extent as the assignor could enforce it against the debtor. (Manila Banking
Corporation v. Teodoro, Jr., G.R. No. 53955, January 13, 1989, 169 SCRA 95, 102.
See also Lo v. KJS Eco-Formwork System Phil., Inc., 459 Phil. 532, 539 (2003);
Project Builders, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 264, 273 (2001); Rodriguez v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84220, March 25, 1992, 207 SCRA 553, 558; and Nyco
Sales Corp. v. BA Finance Corp., G.R. No. 71694, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 637,
641.)
The requisites for dacion en pago are: (1) there must be a performance of the
prestation in lieu of payment (animo solvendi) which may consist in the delivery of a
corporeal thing or a real right or a credit against the third person; (2) there must be
some difference between the prestation due and that which is given in substitution

(aliud pro alio); and (3) there must be an agreement between the creditor and debtor
that the obligation is immediately extinguished by reason of the performance of a
prestation different from that due. (Lo v. KJS Eco-Formwork System Phil., Inc., 459
Phil. 532, 539)
In an assignment of credit, the consent of the debtor is not essential for its perfection;
the knowledge thereof or lack of it affecting only the efficaciousness or
inefficaciousness of any payment that might have been made. The assignment binds
the debtor upon acquiring knowledge of the assignment but he is entitled, even then,
to raise against the assignee the same defenses he could set up against the assignor.
[National Investment and Development Co. v. De Los Angeles, No. L-30150, August
31, 1971, 40 SCRA 487, 496 (1971)]
Even if the debtor had not been notified, but came to know of the assignment by
whatever means, the debtor is bound by it. If the document of assignment is public, it
is evidence even against a third person of the facts which gave rise to its execution
and of the date of the latter. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1959
ed., pp. 168-1969)
Case law is that, an assignment will, ordinarily, be interpreted or construed in
accordance with the rules of construction governing contracts generally, the primary
object being always to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. This
intention is to be derived from a consideration of the whole instrument, all parts of
which should be given effect, and is to be sought in the words and language
employed. (GA C.J.S. Assignments, p. 709)
Art. 1291 Obligations may be modified by:
(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;
(2)Substituting the person of the debtor;
(3)Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. (Civil Code of the
Philippines)
Unlike other modes of extinction of obligations, novation is a juridical act of dual
function in that at the time it extinguishes an obligation it creates a new one in lieu of
the old. (Government vs. Bautista, (C.A.) 37 Off. Gaz., 1880; Pascual vs. Lacsamana
(S.C.) 53 Off. Gaz. 2467, April, 1957; 2 Castan 566)

16.Sandico vs. Piguing (novation)


Held: Reduction of the amount of money to be paid does not amount to novation. The
payment by the respondent of the lesser amount of P4,000, accepted by the petitioners
without any protest or objection and acknowledged by them as "in full satisfaction of the
money judgment", completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the
respondent from his pecuniary liability.
In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or modified obligation arose out of the
payment by the respondent of the reduced amount of P4,000 and substitute the

monetary liability for P6,000 of the said respondent under the appellate court's
judgment. Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates that the same be so declared in
unequivocal terms clearly and unmistakably shown by the express agreement of the
parties or by acts of equivalent import or that there is complete and substantial
incompatibility between the two obligations. 5
Facts: The appellate court's judgment obliges the respondent to do two things: (1) to
recognize the easement, and (2) to pay the petitioners the sums of P5,000 actual and
P500 exemplary damages and P500 attorney's fees, or a total of P6,000. The full
satisfaction of the said judgment requires specific performance and payment of a sum of
money by the respondent. The parties entered into an agreement reducing the payment
to P4000, and was subsequently paid by respondent. Was there a novation?

14.NPC vs. Dayrit (novation)


Held: It is elementary that novation is never presumed; it must be explicitly stated or
there must be manifest incompatibility between the old and the new obligations in every
aspect. Thus the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes
the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and
the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.

In the case at bar there is nothing in the May 14, 1982, agreement which supports the
petitioner's contention. There is neither explicit novation nor incompatibility on every
point between the "old" and the "new" agreements.
Facts: Daniel Roxas sued NPC to compel the NPC to restore the contract of Roxas for
security services which the former had terminated. However, they reached a
compromise agreement, and the court approved it. One of the stipulations of the
agreement was that the parties shall continue with the contract of security services
under the same terms and conditions as the previous contract effective upon the signing
thereof. Parties entered into another contract for security services but NPC refused to
implement the new contract for which Daniel filed a Motion for Execution. The NPC
assails the Order on the ground that it directs execution of a contract which had been
novated by that of the new contracts. Upon the other hand, Roxas claims that said
contract was executed precisely to implement the compromise agreement for which
reason there was no novation.

15.Kabankalan Sugar Co. vs. Pacheco (novation)


Held: When an easement of right way is one of the principal conditions of a contract,
and the duration of said easement is specified, the reduction of said period in a
subsequent contract, wherein the same obligation is one of the principal conditions,
constitutes a novation and to that extent extinguishes the former contractual obligation.
In the contract of November 1, 1920, the duration of the right of way which the
defendant bound herself to impose upon her estate in favor of the plaintiff was twenty
years, while in the contract of September 29, 1922, that period was reduced to seven
crops which is equivalent to seven years. There can be no doubt that these two contracts,
in so far as the duration of the right of way is concerned, are incompatible with each
other, for the second contract reduces the period agreed upon in the first contract, and
so both contracts cannot subsist at the same time. The duration of the right of way is one
of the principal conditions of the first as well as of the second contract, and inasmuch as
said principal condition has been modified, the contract has been novated, in
accordance with the provision quoted above.

Facts: Josefa Pacheco binds herself to acknowledge in favor of the Kabankalan Sugar
Co., Inc., all the easements which the Kabankalan may consider convenient and
necessary for its railroad on the Hilabagan estate belonging to the Pacheco; the only
differences being that the term of the contract of November 1, 1920, is twenty years,

while that of the contract entered into on September 29, 1922, is seven crops (one of the
stipulations of the contract).

18.ROMEO GARCIA VS. DIONISIO LLAMASG.R. No.


154127. December 8, 2003
Facts: A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Dionisio Llamas against
Petitioner RomeoGarcia and Eduardo de Jesus alleging that the two borrowed Php 400,
000 from him. They boundthemselves jointly and severally to pay the loan on or before
January 23, 1997 with a 15% interest permonth. The loan remained unpaid despite
repeated demands by respondent.Petitioner resisted the complaint alleging that he
signed the promissory note merely as anaccommodation party for de Jesus and the
latter had already paid the loan by means of a check and thatthe issuance of the check
and acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note.The trial court rendered a
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent and directed petitioner topay
jointly and severally respondent the amounts of Php 400, 000 representing the
principal amount plusinterest at 15% per month from January 23, 1997 until the same
shall have been fully paid, less theamount of Php 120,000 representing interests already
paid.The Court of Appeals ruled that no novation, express or implied, had taken place
when respondentaccepted the check from de Jesus. According to the CA, the check
was issued precisely to pay for the loanthat was covered by the promissory note jointly
and severally undertaken by petitioner and de Jesus.
Respondents acceptance of the
check did not serve to make de Jesus the sole debtor because first, theobligation
incurred by him and petitioner was joint and several; and second, the check which had
beenintended to extinguish the obligation bounced upon its presentment.
Issues: (1) Whether or not there was novation of the obligation(2) Whether or not the
defense that petitioner was only an accommodation party had any basis
.Held: For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: (1) There must
be a previous validobligation; (2) the parties concerned must agree to a new contract;
(3) the old contract must beextinguished; and (4) there must be a valid
new contract.The parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had been
extinguished by the issuanceand the acceptance of the check or that the check
would take the place of the note. There is noincompatibility between the promissory
note and the check.
Neither could the payment of interests, which in petitioners view also constitutes
novation, chang
e theterms and conditions of the obligation. Such payment was already provided for in
the promissory noteand, like the check, was totally in accord with the terms thereof.
Also unmeritorious is petitioners argument that the obligation was novated by the
substitution of debtors. In order to change the person of the debtor, the old must
be expressly released from the

obligation, and the third person or new debtor must assume the formers place in
the relation. Well
-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed. Consequently, that which
arises from a purportedchange in the person of the debtor must be clear and express. It
is thus incumbent on petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally that novation has
indeed taken place. Note also that for novation to be valid andlegal, the law requires that
the creditor expressly consent to the substitution of a new debtor.In a solidary
obligation, the creditor is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation
fromany or all of the debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to
enforce collection. Havingmade himself jointly and severally liable with de Jesus,
petitioner is therefore liable for the entireobligation.(2) By its terms, the note was made
payable to a specific person rather than bearer to or order

a requisite

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