Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the

Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the
CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO,
JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU
SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for
petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for

restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November
1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the
urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28
November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with
prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent
Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988,
the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation
against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for
oral argument on 8 December 1988.

PADILLA, J.:

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary

detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated
14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together
with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas

corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release
from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from
filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the

Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent
Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of
hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated
5 December 1988, 9urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December

1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8

December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order
(issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988,13 and
the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15
December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a
non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within
which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a
citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15
December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an
earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating
her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order.
Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally
issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years
and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically,
the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board
of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express

renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made

known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal
of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such
in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings
with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings
submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO
have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not
only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by
petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process
was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship,
but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a
trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity
or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the
second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for
release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift

the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is

immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of

due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized
principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied
upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the
conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express
evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition
at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness
envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being
effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a
summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence
that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative
for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his
dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications
of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law
must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f,
however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims
citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he
is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as
distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949
citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68
Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66
Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial
under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court
proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised
by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said

I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case

to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr.
Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we
would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason,
I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been
filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the
shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I
must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause,
and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of
government power find their fullest expression when invoked
by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the
correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu
is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand
in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport
him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has
never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die
if thrown out of the country, he deserves at the very least a
full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored
and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a
person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so
momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to
summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on
such informal evidence as that presented in this case are

allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship

and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another
country (assuming that other country does not reject him
because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he
became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the
Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign
passport is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino
citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for
convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa
requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do
so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship.
Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law
where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative
determination of a most summary nature.
There are allegedly high government officials who have applied
for and been given alien certificates of registration by our
Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in
the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express
renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of
a commercial document where a different citizenship has been
typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the
respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they
be immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay
here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or
even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is
likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and
to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship
cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any
other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of
citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore,
regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring

I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed

to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status
as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese
passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its
nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under
the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport
despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do
not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting
I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino
citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso
facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to
judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in
this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been
established. The evidence on record, consisting of the
photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular
Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese
passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies
of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as
Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate
Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial
evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino
citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima
facie case of such renunciation.

I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case

to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition
at bar does not meet the traditional standards of fairness
envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being
effectively deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a
summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary evidence
that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative
for the purpose and conclusion they were offered.
The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his
dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the serious implications
of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law
must be applied," is appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f,
however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien claims
citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he
is entitled to have his status finally determined by a judicial, as
distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949
citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68
Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 US 276, 66
Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial
under the more rigid rules of evidence prescribed in court
proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised
by this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said
powers of review cannot be a substitute for the demands of
due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized
principle that this Court is not a trier of facts.
As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied
upon by the majority to be inadequate to support the
conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino
citizenship, Renunciation must be shown by clear and express
evidence and not left to inference or implication.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr.

Willie Yu is far from being the desirable kind of Filipino we
would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason,
I believe that a petition for denaturalization should have been
filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of the
shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I
must emphasize that the Bill of Rights, its due process clause,
and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of
government power find their fullest expression when invoked
by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable characters.
Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the
correct procedures according to law must be applied. If Mr. Yu
is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand
in the way of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport
him. But where a person pleads with all his might that he has
never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die
if throw out of the country, he deserves at the very least a full
trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and
all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person
(not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to be a Filipino is so
momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to
summary proceedings.
I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on
such informal evidence as that presented in this case are
allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship
and has, therefore, become stateless or a citizen of another
country (assuming that other country does not reject him
because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he
became a Filipino) and to immediately throw him out of the
Philippines.
I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign
passport is ipso facto express renunciation of Filipino
citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for
convenience, employment, or avoidance of discriminatory visa
requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do

so because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship.

Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained in a court of law
where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative
determination of a most summary nature.

with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do

not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting

There are allegedly high government officials who have applied

for and been given alien certificates of registration by our
Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in
the past, performed acts even more indicative of "express
renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or the signing of
a commercial document where a different citizenship has been
typed or entered. Are we ready now to authorize the
respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they
be immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay
here as resident aliens? Can a summary administrative
determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or
even millions of voters who put them in public office? It is
likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and
to arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship
cases.
The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any
other Filipino being denaturalized or otherwise deprived of
citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore,
regretfully dissent on grounds of due process.
CRUZ, J., concurring
I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed
to overcome the presumption that he has forfeited his status
as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese
passport. Passports are generally issued by a state only to its
nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes under
the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport
despite his Philippine citizenship.
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act

I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino

citizenship in deportation proceedings does not ipso
facto deprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID) of jurisdiction over a case, its findings being subject to
judicial review.
However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in
this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino citizenship has been
established. The evidence on record, consisting of the
photocopy of a memorandum from the Portuguese Consular
Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a Portuguese
passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies
of commercial papers manifesting petitioner's nationality as
Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate
Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial
evidence that under the law petitioner has lost his Filipino
citizenship by express renunciation.
I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima
facie case of such renunciation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in
Cebu), petitioner,
vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO

RENNER OSMEA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private
respondent.

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988,
which dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private
respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for
the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council
(Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose
B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying
that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on
March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers
from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private
respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the
main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the
proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the
petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that
private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien
Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed
by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B");
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C");
Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January
3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr.
Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for
more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the
Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates.
Having obtained the highest number of votes, private
respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been
timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for
which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78
thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after the notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253
thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any
voter contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial,
or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with
the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of

candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed
its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on
January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was
filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was
filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent
cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warrantounder
Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain
the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public
office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is
enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case,
as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being
elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed
to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a
foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it
is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as
a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely
relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit

to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration

and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to
the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization
Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is
considered an American under the laws of the United States
does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private
respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R.
No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et
al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized
as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was
naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was forced
to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the
persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however,
found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing
out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to
abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was
married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as

an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the

Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines.
This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by
Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the
Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City,
respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have
sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies
having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81,
Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral
process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a
voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained Certificates of
Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958
when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he,
Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non
sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and
Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this
does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario;
or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not

necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y.

In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is,
of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no
express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to
tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.
When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason
that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when
there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that
"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the
1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually
existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso,
the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt
with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED
and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of
Justice Sarmiento.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has
acquired American citizenship, only that he did not necessarily
lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however,
inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that
there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by
naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989;
Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus
soli it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he
does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born
of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had
ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is,
at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be
a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact
that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration,
standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

Cortes, J., concur in the result.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and
Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from

accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving
as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958,
at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear
and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past
regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for
the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his
alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that
"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That
statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared
by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for
one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an
alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The
terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the
viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the
case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the
basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under

C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case
of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took
an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which
he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case
of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1,
1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his
naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents
in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also
invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express
renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship
and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign
country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a
second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his
desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for
another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests
he married a second time simply for material convenience and
that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At
worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the
Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to
me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less
than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone,
let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no
naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims
to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States.
The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent
when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with

the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in

1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No.
83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in
a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do
not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that
Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an
alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to
simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts
could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation
of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did
more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did
was register with the Philippine government as an alien within
its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the
jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary
act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own
free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic
of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a
Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to
consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection
with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign
country. Renunciation may be made independently of
naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of

Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical

enough and the preference for the foreign state is
unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is
lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but
this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is
involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The
Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of
other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding
total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that
the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what
is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to
improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the
commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the
administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not
the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is
not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot
ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio
Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship,
i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother.
However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration
authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his

Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration

Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual
citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with
full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies
with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien,
insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the
Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the
Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and
Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3
January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine
immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native
Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November
1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a dulyregistered align (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the
Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private
respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified
from the records at the CID wherein private respondent
expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not
have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is
the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the
Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent

executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of

which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant
proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private
respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA
562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines
shall, within thirty days after the approval of
this Act, apply for registration, in the case of
those residing in the City of Manila, at the
Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those
residing in other localities at the office of the
city or municipal treasurers, or at any other
office designated by the
President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been
issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28
March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when
he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years
old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was
an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the
Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private
respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on
the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that
he (private respondent) was born in 1934 hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an
alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he reregistered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private

respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in

1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is
the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his
alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien,
he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as
an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be
taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years
old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the
applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or
over has to register in person (and not through his parents or
guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is
less than fourteen years of age, shall have the
duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth
birthday in the Philippines he shall, within
fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for
registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual
nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an
alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent
(although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in
favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent
elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the
Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced
his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation
were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in
the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private
respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to
discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status
assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at
the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16
September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following
reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of
which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly.
Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle
jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance
which in the long run would be detrimental to
both countries of which such persons might
claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution
which now provides
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed.
While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of
birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual
citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having
two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle
and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both
compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an
undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results

in questionable loyalties and leads to

international conflicts. Dual nationality also
makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided
loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of
citizenship and allegiance. A person should
have a right to choose his own nationality, and
this choice should be honored by all countries.
However, he should not be entitled to claim
more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when
he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other
countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or
public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore,
unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro
tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The
choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable
act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who
must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is
that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent
decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al.) I see no valid justification for
holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority
states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7,
Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a
number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen
of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian,"
yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements
that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those
sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose,
as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis
of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on
distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the
private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of
express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
andRamon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564,
August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot
participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is
my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has
acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily
lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however,

inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that

there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by
naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989;
Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus
soli it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he
does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born
of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had
ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is,
at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be
a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact
that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration,
standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958,

at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear
and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past
regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for
the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his
alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that
"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That
statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared
by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for
one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and

Teodoro R. Padilla.

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from

accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving
as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an

alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The
terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the
viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the
case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the
basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under
C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case
of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took
an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which
he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case

of Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1,

1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his
naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents
in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also
invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express
renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship
and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign
country," which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a
second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his
desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for
another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests
he married a second time simply for material convenience and
that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At
worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the
Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to
me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less
than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone,
let alone extol.

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner

has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do
not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that
Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an
alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to
simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts
could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation
of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did
more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did
was register with the Philippine government as an alien within
its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the
jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary
act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own
free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic
of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a
Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to
consider him its own.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no

naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims
to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States.
The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent
when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in
1979?

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express

renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection
with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign
country. Renunciation may be made independently of
naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical
enough and the preference for the foreign state is
unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is
lost.

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No.

83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in
a separate opinion:

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but
this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is

involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The

Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of
other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding
total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that
the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what
is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to
improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the
commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the
administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not
the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is
not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot
ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio
Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship,
i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother.
However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration
authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. As held inBoard of Immigration
Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual
citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with

full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies

with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien,
insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the
Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the
Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and
Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3
January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine
immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native
Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November
1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a dulyregistered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the
Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private
respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified
from the records at the CID wherein private respondent
expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated. For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not
have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is
the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the
Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent
executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant
proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private

respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA
562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines
shall, within thirty days after the approval of
this Act, apply for registration, in the case of
those residing in the City of Manila, at the
Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those
residing in other localities at the office of the
city or municipal treasurers, or at any other
office designated by the
President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been
issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28
March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when
he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years
old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was
an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the
Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private

respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on
the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that
he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an
alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he reregistered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private
respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in
1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is
the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his
alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien,
he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as
an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be
taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years
old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the
applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or
over has to register in person (and not through his parents or
guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is
less than fourteen years of age, shall have the
duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth
birthday in the Philippines he shall, within
fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for
registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual
nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an
alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent
(although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in
favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent
elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the

Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced

his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation
were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in
the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private
respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to
discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status
assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at
the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16
September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following
reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of
which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly.
Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle
jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance
which in the long run would be detrimental to
both countries of which such persons might
claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution
which now providesSec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed.
While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of
birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual
citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having
two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle

and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both
compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an
undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results
in questionable loyalties and leads to
international conflicts. Dual nationality also
makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided
loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of
citizenship and allegiance. A person should
have a right to choose his own nationality, and
this choice should be honored by all countries.
However, he should not be entitled to claim
more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when
he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other
countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or
public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore,
unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro
tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The
choice must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable
act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who
must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is
that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent
decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid justification for
holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority
states: "In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7,
Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a

number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen

of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian,"
yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements
that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those
sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose,
as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander The doctrinal basis
of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on
distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the
private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of
express renunciation of such citizenship.

For, if the private respondent became an American by

naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No.
63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989;
Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he,
however, became one by the application of the principle of jus
soli it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he
does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he were otherwise born
of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had
ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is,
at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be
a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact
that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration,
standing alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
andRamon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564,
August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot
participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is
my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.

Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has
acquired American citizenship, offly that he did not necessarily
lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however,
inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I find that
there is a dearth of facts here.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and
Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from
accident of birth, a choice will have to be made by the
individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving
as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958,
at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien
Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear
and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen.
If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past
regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for
the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his
alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that

"dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That
statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared
by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for
one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a

second marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his
desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for
another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly
transferred his troth It does him no credit when he protests he
married a second time simply for material convenience and
that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At
worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an
alien, he is in effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The
terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the
viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in the
case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the
basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under
C.A. No. 63 is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took
an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which
he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of
Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1,
1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath after his
naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents
in which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also
invalidate his disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express
renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship
and is not necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign
country," which is another and different mode.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the

Philippines after renouncing it because of its meager
resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to
me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less
than plain and simple hypocrisy that we should not condone,
let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no
naturalization is involved here as the private respondent claims
to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States.
The question I think we must answer is: Was there an express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent
when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in
1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No.
83882, January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in
a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner
has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The
evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing citizenship
under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act
with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do
not think the "commercial documents he signed" suggest such
categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that

Yu did not ask the Philippine government to register him as an
alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to
simply seeking and using an American passport, these acts
could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation
of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did
more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did
was register with the Philippine government as an alien within
its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the
jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary
act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own
free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the Republic
of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a
Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to
consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express
renunciation of Philippine citizenship be made in connection
with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign
country. Renunciation may be made independently of
naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words
are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical
enough and the preference for the foreign state is
unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is
lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but
this can never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is
involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The
Philippines for all her modest resources compared to those of
other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding
total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that
the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what
is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other
state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to

improve the province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the
commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the
administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not
the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public
office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is
not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot
ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio
Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship,
i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother.
However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration
authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration
Commissioners vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual
citizenship holder-like the private respondent of age, and with
full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies
with the Philippine Government for registration as an alien,
insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit
manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in the
Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to
private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re- enter the
Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and

Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3

January 1980 (Exh E) 2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine
immigration authorities to the private respondent at his
request are predicated on the proposition that private
respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be
mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native
Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21 November
1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again
predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a dulyregistered align (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the
Application for Re-entry Permit executed and signed by private
respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified
from the records at the CID wherein private respondent
expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not
have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is
the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the
Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent
executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again an abundant
proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the
Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private
respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau
of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA
562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines
shall, within thirty days after the approval of
this Act, apply for registration, in the case of
those residing in the City of Manila, at the
Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those

residing in other localities at the office of the

city or municipal treasurers, or at any other
office designated by the
President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor Santiago (Exh.
A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been
issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28
March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when
he was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years
old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the
Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was
an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the
Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private
respondent, a clarification should be made. In his Comment on
the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that
he (private respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an
alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he reregistered as an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private
respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in
1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is
the correct year of birth of private respondent (and that his
alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien,
he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as
an alien, he was 41 years old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be
taken, in my view, as an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years
old the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the
applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an alien 14 years or
over has to register in person (and not through his parents or
guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is

less than fourteen years of age, shall have the
duty of registering such alien: Provided, That
whenever any such alien attains his fourteenth
birthday in the Philippines he shall, within
fifteen days thereafter, apply in person for
registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual
nationality holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an
alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent
(although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in
favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine
citizenship had been made or filed by private respondent
elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could
perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a- vis the
Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced
his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation
were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in
the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private
respondent's aforesaid representations, and registered and
documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to
discourage dual citizenship, because this condition or status
assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at
the same time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16
September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following
reason, among others:
... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of
which is allegiance, must not be taken lightly.
Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle
jus soli to persons born in this country of alien

parentage would encourage dual allegiance

which in the long run would be detrimental to
both countries of which such persons might
claim to be citizens. 4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution
which now providesSec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed.
While having the "best of two (2) words" maybe the result of
birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual
citizen" has to make a choice at one time or another. Having
two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to
having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle
and sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both
compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an
undesirable phenomenon. It inevitably results
in questionable loyalties and leads to
international conflicts. Dual nationality also
makes possible the use of citizenship as a
badge of convenience rather than of undivided
loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of
citizenship and allegiance. A person should
have a right to choose his own nationality, and
this choice should be honored by all countries.
However, he should not be entitled to claim
more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when
he asked the Philippine Government which, like many other

countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or

public interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore,
unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto
was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice
must be respected as a conscious and knowledgeable act of a
discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be
presumed to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is
that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent
decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al., I see no valid justification for
holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Ph. Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority
states: "In fact,, in a number of sworn statements, Labo
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia"(p. 7,
Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a
number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen
of the United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian,"
yet to the private respondent, despite such sworn statements
that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those

sworn statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose,
as the saying goes, is sauce for the gender The doctrinal basis
of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on
distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the
private respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of
express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24, 1989)
andRamon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564,
August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot
participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is
my relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.