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Above the Law: Violations of International Law by the U.S.

Government from Truman to


Reagan
Author(s): Jon Frappier
Source: Crime and Social Justice, No. 21/22, INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1984), pp. 1-36
Published by: Social Justice/Global Options
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766228 .
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Global Lawlessness

and

Justice

Above the Law:


Violations of International Law
by the U.S. Government
from Truman to Reagan
Jon Frappier
The purpose of this article is to examine the violations of international law
by theUnited States government sinceWorld War II, with a particular focus
on theReagan administration. We detail both violations of international law
and the refusal to negotiate treaties in the following areas of international rela?
tions: 1) Intervention andWar; 2) Arms Control; 3) Economics; and 4) Human
Rights. In addition, two appendices are included: Appendix A listsU.S. inter?
ventions and theuse of armed force as a political instrument;Appendix B cites
the relevant articles from established international treaties and charters that
pertain to the findings of this article.
The charges of violations of international law cited in the article are
gathered from a variety of sources. The Nicaraguan government, for example,
has brought formal charges against theReagan administration, and this case
isbeing heard by the International Court of Justice.Other violations cited have

been drawn from law journals and publications of congressional organizations


such as theArms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus. Some of the examples
of violations used in theArms Control section of the article represent charges
made against theUnited States by the Soviet Union; in these cases we have
tried to obtain documentation and expert opinion from independent sources.
Finally, in other cases we have documented violations based on our own

reading of the international laws.


The authors of this article are not lawyers, and the article does not purport
to be a legal brief for charges contained herein. Our purpose is to document

is a member of the research staff of the Institute for the Study of Militarism
JON FRAPPIER
2701 Folsom Street, San Francisco, CA 94110. This research was
and Economic Crisis (ISMEC),
conducted in preparation for the Permanent People's Tribunal, Session on Nicaragua, Brussels,
Belgium, October 5-8, 1984, at which ISMEC's Director, Marlene Dixon, presented the case
against the U.S. government's Central America policy. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance

of June Kress

and Sara Theiss.

CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICENo. 21-22

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2 Frappier
the consistent pattern of disregard for international law by theU.S. govern?
ment sinceWorld War II, and to emphasize in particular the dangerous and
often lawless attitude and actions of the Reagan administration.
One of themost striking contradictions that surfaced during our research
is the difference between the rhetoric of the various U.S. administrations
about the need for international law and the often total disregard for themost
basic principles of international law, such as nonintervention in the affairs
of other

countries.

In 1945, participants at the United Nations Conference heard President


Truman say, "You have created a great instrumentfor peace and security and
human progress in the world." He added that the powerful nations must
"assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world of peace....
By
their own example the strong nations of the world should lead the way to
international justice" (Friedlander, 1984: 47). Indeed, the Nuremberg
judgments were meant to punish the aggressors and violators of international
law; however, we must admit that the lessons have been forgotten.
AfterWorld War II, diplomat George Kennan took the position that itwas

to put the principles of international law above national interest.


Secretary of State Dean Acheson chided his fellow international lawyers that
the "survival of states is not a matter of law" (ibid.: 51). Neither Acheson
nor Kennan placed much faith in the United Nations. More
recently,
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continuously disregarded the role of inter?

wrong

national law in favorof his "balance-of-power politics" (ibid.: 56-57). Today,


however, the disregard for and violation of international law by the Reagan
administration has reached an alarming dimension. Reagan has invaded one
of the smallest nations on earth, refused to negotiate treaties of vital concern
to all theworld's people, decided unilaterally that theUnited States will not
abide by the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and violated
numerous international and U.S. laws pertaining to international relations.
Our concern is generated not only by the violations cited below but also

by the attitude behind these violations. During previous administrations there


has been more of a willingness (or a responsiveness to pressure) to negotiate
with the other side even though violations of international law were being
committed. However, theReagan administration has refused to negotiate, and
in fact, those in his administration who have advocated negotiation have been
removed. There has also been a concerted effort on the part of Reagan to
undermine international organizations such as the United Nations, which

embody the principles of international law he is violating. Further, Reagan


is reinterpreting international agreements previously accepted by theUnited
States. He has said, for example, that theUnited States "rejects any inter?
pretation of theYalta Agreement that suggests American consent for the divi?
sion of Europe into spheres of influence" (New York Times, August 18, 1984).
We would argue that there has been a significant shift in attitude toward inter?
national law under the Reagan administration, which has been reflected in
its foreign policy.

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US.

International

Lawlessness

A Note About

International Law

term international law refers to various treaties, agreements,


customary law principles, and general legal principles that serve to judge the
actions and behavior of various nation-states that have agreed to them. There
are many instances of apparent or alleged violations thatdo not come before
any legal forum or, if they do, have no real consequence for the violators.
Yet international law, while not as codified as the laws of individual states,
and lacking any ultimate arbiter, is still a force in theworld and has potential
The

as a mechanism for world order and justice.


The International Court of Justice looks at treaties, customary laws, and
general principles of law inmaking itsdecisions, and these are the standard
bases for international law (Statute of the International Court of Justice,Arti?
cle 31 [1]; Akehurst, 1982: 23). Customary law is either determined from the

actual practices of states or is inferred from U.N. resolutions, for example,


or certain principles that have been repeated inmany treaties. As in legal
systems of nations, parties to a dispute will cite differentauthorities, or inter?
pret doctrines or precedents indifferentways, to justify their position. Unlike
or
legal systems of nation-states, however, there is no ultimate prosecutor
system

of

sanctions.

Treaties are a major part of international law. The laws governing treaties
were codified at the Vienna Convention of 1969, which came into force in
1980. However, neither theUnited States nor the Soviet Union are parties
to this treaty; and it applies only to treaties coming into effect after 1980
(ibid. : 121).Despite these limits, itdoes represent the customary international

law regarding treaties.


Article 18 of this Convention is significant for this discussion of inter?
national law. It requires a state to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty it has signed but not yet ratified (ibid.: 127).
The argument can be made, therefore, that theU.S., which signed but never
ratified the SALT II accords, is nevertheless obliged to abide by them.
At different times, nations use the doctrine of "jus cogens" to justify
actions. This refers to the concept of a "peremptory norm of general inter?
national law," e.g., a basic principle thatmay override particular treaty
obligations. Most experts agree thatwhile there has been much legal debate,
the prohibition against aggression is a universally applicable doctrine
(ibid.: 41).
(See Appendix B for relevant texts of significant international legal
documents referred to in this article.)
I. Intervention and War

A. Latin America
1. Introduction
The history of U.S. military, political, and economic intervention inLatin
America is an extremely long one, beginning with the conflicts with Spain

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Frappier

and other European countries over the control and annexation of territory,fol?
lowed by direct U.S. intervention in theLatin American countries and more
recently the covert and full-scale military operations against established

governments inCentral America and theCaribbean.


The following list details instances of U.S.
interventions specifically
involving theuse of U.S. armed forces prior toWorld War II for the purpose
of "protecting American lives and property" and "maintaining order." It

includes: Argentina (1833), Peru (1835-36), Argentina (1852-53), Nicaragua


(1853-54, 1857), Uruguay (1858), Paraguay (1859), Mexico (1859), Colom?
bia (1860), Panama (1865), Mexico
(1867), Uruguay
(1866), Nicaragua
(1873), Panama (1885), Haiti
(1868, 1873), Mexico
(1868), Colombia
(1888), Argentina (1890), Haiti (1891), Chile (1891), Brazil (1894),
Nicaragua (1894), Colombia (1895), Nicaragua (1896, 1898-99), Colombia
Panama
(1903-04),
(1903), Dominican Republic
(1901-02), Honduras
(1903-14), Cuba (1906-09), Honduras (1907), Nicaragua (1910), Honduras
(1912-25), Mexico
(1911-12), Panama (1912), Cuba (1912), Nicaragua
(1913-19), Haiti (1914-34), Dominican Republic (1914, 1916-24), Cuba
(1917-22), Panama (1918-21), Honduras (1919), Guatemala (1920), Hon?
duras (1924-25), Panama (1925), Nicaragua (1926-33), and Cuba (1933)
1975: 59-63).
(Foreign Affairs Division,
these
While
interventions did not necessarily represent violations of
specific treaties, they are violations of customary international law, which
upholds the principles of national sovereignty, self-determination, and
nonintervention. This article centers on violations afterWorld War II, when
theUnited States became a party to theUnited Nations Charter, theOrganiza?
tion of American States Charter, and the Rio Pact (as well as numerous

bilateral agreements).
In an earlier period of our history, it is important to point out, the original
the
doctrine followed by the United States in theWestern Hemisphere,
Monroe Doctrine, was not, as is often asserted, a justification for intervention
in the internal affairs of other countries. The original doctrine as outlined by
President Monroe in 1823 stated that theAmerican continents should not be
seen as the area of colonization for European powers. The beginning of a
"legal"
justification for interventionist policies came when President
Theodore Roosevelt added a corollary to theMonroe Doctrine in 1904 giving
theUnited States the right to intervene to collect the debts Latin American
countries owed to European countries. The proclaimed rights of U.S. inter?
vention included installing governments to administer the countries' public
finances, and if this did not result in debt repayment, seizing control of the
customs houses (Boyle, 1984: 5-7).
We have chosen to present this section on Latin America separately
because of the special history theUnited States has had in this region of the
world and also because of the alarming number of violations currently being
committed by theReagan administration inCentral America.

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U.S.

International Lawlessness

2. Violations fromWorld War II to theReagan Administration


Before the end ofWorld War II, theUnited States called together its allies
to form an internationalorganization which would not only promote peace but
also assist theU.S. to take a world leadership role after thewar. In 1945, most
of the other nations of the world signed theUnited Nations Charter in an
attempt to establish a world order free from themassive devastation and cost

in human lifewrought byWorld War II. At the time of the founding of the
member nations not only signed a charter which established the
organizational structure tomaintain world order, but also put their names to
a document thatendorsed the principles of nonintervention. Shortly after the
establishment of theU.N., theUnited States and the other countries of the
Americas created theOrganization of American States to serve as a regional

U.N.,

body consistent with the principles of theU.N.


This section documents violations by theUnited States of the principles of
nonintervention since World War II and, in particular, theReagan admini?
stration's low regard for the rule of international law. Shortly afterWorld War

II, theUnited States pursued theCold War policy towards the Soviet Union.
Consequently, the primary justification forU.S. interventionistpolicy was the
premise thatcommunists were trying to take over a particular country, which
threatened the national security of theUnited States.
In most instances, very little concrete evidence was presented to sub?
stantiate these charges (e.g., the charge that theNicaraguan government is
supplyingweapons to theguerrillas inEl Salvador). Inmany cases of interven?

tion,U.S. private economic interests faced the threatof social and economic
reforms implemented by new governments for the benefit of their peoples.
Many of the corporations active inLatin America have historically been able
to control and directly influence the governments in power. Whenever there
was threatof revolutionary changes or even reforms, the charge of communist

takeover became the battle cry of theU.S. government and corporations.


We would argue that the following examples of interventions in the post
World War II period through theReagan administration constitute violations
of international law by theUnited States. Many of the examples cited below
are violations either of Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter or of Articles 18 and
20 of theOAS Charter. These contain provisions stating thatno country has

a right to intervene in the internal affairs of another country.


Costa Rica (1953): After the election of President Jose (Pepe) Figueres in
1953, theCIA worked through opposition forces in the country to attempt to
overthrow the government. The U.S. was concerned with Figueres's policy
of granting asylum to communists and other leftists.Figueres left the govern?
ment after his candidate lost the presidential election in 1958 (Grimmett,
1975:4). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter and Article 18 of the
OAS Charter.
Guatemala

(1954): The CIA under President Eisenhower overthrew


democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz and installed a military die

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Frappier

tatorship. President Arbenz had been elected in 1951 after Guatemala had
been ruled formany years by a U.S.-supported military dictatorship. One of
Arbenz's early policies was an agrarian reform program which affected the
United Fruit Company. After public charges in theU.S. thatArbenz had com?
munist tendencies, theCIA recruited a colonel from theGuatemalan military
and supplied arms, planes, and pilots to overthrowArbenz (Jonas, 1983:4-5).
Violation: Article 2(4): of theUN. Charter and Articles 18 and 20 of the

OAS Charter (Rowles, 1983: 399-400).


Cuba (1961): In early 1960, President Eisenhower approved a CIA-spon?
sored operation to trainCuban exiles for the purpose of overthrowing Fidel
Castro. In mid-April 1961, under President Kennedy, the CIA directed the
unsuccessful attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. During a two-year
period there were six attempts by CIA-recruited organized crime figures

to assassinate Castro (Grimmett, 1975: 6-7). Violation: Article 2(4): of the


U.N. Charter and Articles 18 and 20 of theOAS Charter and theNeutrality
Act (ibid.).
Ecuador
(1961): The CIA began efforts to topple the regime of President
Jose Velasco Ibarra when he refused to end diplomatic relations with Cuba.
1961. His
Julio
He was overthrown in November
successor, Carlos
Arosemena, also met with disfavor from the United States, and the CIA
"destabilized" his government in July 1963. According to CIA agent Phillip
to gain economic and political control over
the CIA managed
Agee,
movement
Ecuador's labor
during this period (Grimmett, 1975: 7). Violation:

Article 2(4): of the U.N. Charter and Article 18 of the OAS Charter.
Cuba (1962): During themissile crisis, theU.S. imposed a naval blockade
to prevent the further importation of war materiel. The U.S. had used Article
6 of theRio Treaty (collective self-defense against aggression): to justify the
arms embargo. However, no armed attack had taken place against Cuba and
therefore the treaty gave no authorization to the U.S. to "defend" Cuba
against intervention. In the 1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty,
therewas a change inArticle 6 providing the following: "Any assistance the
organ of consultation may decide to furnish a State Partymay not be provided
without the consent of that State." Therefore itwas made explicit that the
only legal way a country could be invaded was if it so requested for the pur?
pose of protecting itself from another aggressor (Rowles, 1983: 394-95).
Dominican Republic (1965): Under President Johnson, theU.S. military
sent 23,000 troops to theDominican Republic to prevent the democratically
elected government of JuanBosch from resuming power after a military coup
in 1963. Violation: Article 2(4): of theU.N. Charter and Articles 18 and 20

of the OAS Charter (ibid.: 400).


Chile (1973): Under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, the
CIA channeled over $8 million intoChile to "destabilize" the democratically
elected government of President Salvador Allende. The money was used to
support opposition groups inChile. The CIA also infiltratedthe Socialist Par?
ty, and among other activities, organized street demonstrations against the

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US.

International

Lawlessness

government. Also, at least one U.S. corporation made contributions to the


destabilization effort. In September 1973, amilitary coup overthrew and killed
Allende (Grimmett, 1975: 12; Kegley, 1984: 269). Violation: Article 2(4) of
theU.N. Charter, Articles 18 and 20 of theOAS Charter, and theNeutrality
Act (Kegley, 1984: 269).
3. Violations by theReagan Administration
Grenada (1983): On October 25, 1983, after the overthrow and assassina?
tion of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard
Coard, 1,900 U.S. Marines and Army airborne Rangers invaded the island.
The United States overthrew the existing government and installed a govern?
ment

more

favorable

to U.S.

interests.

The Reagan administration argued that ithad been requested to intervene


by theOrganization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); however, theOECS
invasion of Grenada. Article 8 of the
could not lawfully authorize theU.S.
OECS requires unanimous agreement among themember states before action
can be taken and that condition was never fulfilled.Moreover,
if theOECS
thoughtGrenada was a threat, the appropriate resolution would have been to
raise it to theOrganization of American States. Violation: Articles 2(4) and
51 of the U.N. Charter and Articles 18, 20, and 21 of the OAS Charter
(Joyner, 1984: 132; Boyle et al., 1984: 173).
(1981 to the present): Since 1981, theUnited States has been
Nicaragua
using military force against Nicaragua and intervening in its internal affairs

inviolation ofNicaragua's sovereignty, territorial integrity,and political inde?


pendence. The U.S. has recruited, trained, armed, equipped, financed, sup?
plied, and directed military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua.
The U.S. has violated the sovereignty of Nicaragua with armed attacks by air,
land, and sea; incursions intoNicaraguan territorialwaters; aerial trespass
intoNicaraguan airspace; and by efforts through direct and indirectmeans to
coerce and intimidate theGovernment of Nicaragua (International Court of
Justice, Order, 1984: 5-6).
This particular case has been brought before the International Court of Law
by theGovernment of Nicaragua. The U.S. has announced that itwill refuse
to accept jurisdiction of the International Court in this case or any case regard?
ingCentral America for the next 2 years (New York Times, April 26, 1984).
Violation: The Nicaraguan government has charged that theU.S. government
has violated the following laws: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter, Articles 18,
20 of theOAS Charter, Article 8 of theConvention on Rights and Duties of
States, Article I, Third, of theConvention Concerning theDuties and Rights
of States in the Event of Civil Strife, and breaches of its obligation under
general and customary international law (International Court of Justice,
Order, 1984:
Additional
? 22 U.S.
in operations

4).
violations that could be cited include the following:
Code, Section 2422, which states that theCIA may not engage
in foreign countries (except as necessary to gather intelligence)

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Frappier

unless and until the President makes a finding that each such operation is
important to the national security of theUnited States (Application, Annex
A., p. 13).
? 50 U.S.
Code, Section 413, which states that the President must fully
inform the Committees on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives of any such operations. This is the law thatwas violated when
the committees were not briefed on themining operation (ibid.: 3; New York
Times, April 16, 1984).
? Article
36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and
Resolution of August 2, 1946 of the Senate of theUnited States of America,
which establish the recognition by theU.S. of the jurisdiction of the Inter?
national Court of Justice. President Reagan declared theU.S. would not abide
by the jurisdiction of the Court (Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus,

1984: 37).
? U.S. Constitution
(Article 2 section 2), which states that the "President
shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, tomake
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." President
Reagan never sought the advice and consent of the Senate regarding his deci?
sion to not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (Con?
gressional Record, 1946: 10709).
? The Boland Amendment
(passed inDecember 1982), which states that
funds cannot not be used by theDefense Department or theCIA to "furnish
military equipment, military training or advice, or other support formilitary
activities, to any group or individual," for the purpose of overthrowing the

Government of Nicaragua. Violation: Continuing Resolution forFiscal Year


1983, Section 793 (ACFPC: 4).
? The Convention Relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines was signed by both theUnited States and Nicaragua at The Hague in
1907; themining of theNicaraguan harbors was a violation of this law (New
York Times, April 21, 1984).
? The
Neutrality Act has been violated by theReagan administration "by
planning, recruiting for, and assisting in attacks by Nicaraguan contras on
Nicaragua." There have also been reports of bases inCalifornia identifiedas
training facilities for persons preparing to go to fightwith the contras against
Nicaragua. The most recent violation is the activities of theCivilian Military
Assistance organization in theU.S., two ofwhose members were recently shot
down and killed in a helicopter inside theborders of Nicaragua. Violation:
18

U.S.

Code 959, 858 (Harvard Law Review, 1982: 1955; Washington Post
25).
September 6, 1984; ACFPC:
? The CIA
is violating firearms laws by "employing unlicensed
individuals and corporations to ship weapons and ammunition toNicaraguan
contra trainingcamps within theUnited States. . .." Violation: Transactions
inFirearms: Unlicensed Dealers, Section 922(a) (ACFPC: 27).
? U.S. law was violated because theCIA
spentmore than the $24 million
authorized for Fiscal Year 1984 for the covert operations against Nicaragua.

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U.S.

International

Lawlessness

The excess included funding for the "mother ship" used tomine Nicaraguan
harbors and certain agency overhead costs. Violation: Defense Appropria?
tionsAct of 1984: Limit on spending inNicaragua, Section 775 (ACFPC: 5).
? Acts of terrorism have been carried out
by the contras against people
(foreign nationals, mariners, and international travelers) protected by OAS
Convention. Violation: Organization of American States Convention on Ter?

rorism: Commitment toCombat Terrorism, Articles 2 and 8 (ACFPC: 42).


Honduras: According to theGeneral Accounting Office and others, the
Department of Defense used funds for purposes other than those forwhich
theywere authorized. Monies were used to trainHonduran military forces, for
the4 'provision of civic and humanitarian assistance,'' and for the construction
of facilities and transportation for private organizations. Violation: 31 U.S.
Code 1301(a) states that "appropriations shall be applied only to the objects
"
and appropriations were not
forwhich the appropriations were made....
made in the Defense Department budget for the activities cited above
1-2).
(ACFPC:
Senator Sasser

(D-Tenn.), Representative Alexander (D-Ark.), and the


General Accounting Office (GAO) have charged that theDefense Department
used unauthorized fundswhen itconstructed "airfields, access roads, camps
and other facilities" at nine locations inHonduras in 1983-84. The Depart?
ment of Defense has argued that the construction was temporary and therefore
10 U.S.
Code
exempt from the appropriation requirement. Violation:
over
states
should
construction
thatmilitary
2802 (b), which
$200,000
only
be funded by military construction accounts (ibid.: 5).
Senator Sasser charged that theDefense Department was required to file
a complete report, according to law, stating itsconstruction plans forCentral
America, which it failed to do. Violation: Military Construction Appropria?
tionsAct of 1984 (ibid.: 31).
El Salvador: The Reagan administration "has introduced U.S. military
personnel into hostilities or imminenthostilities inCentral America without
reporting these introductions toCongress. ..." U.S. military advisers have
come under fire in at least 8 incidents and U.S. Army pilots flew recon?
naissance missions over Salvadoran battlefields providing combat operations
information.U.S. Navy ships have engaged in"locating and trackingpossibly
hostile ships for interdiction by the Salvadoran Navy." U.S.
troops par?
ticipated inHonduran operations in close proximity to Salvadoran rebel bases.
Violation: War Powers Resolution: Reporting Requirements on Hostilities,

Section 4(a) (ACFPC: 33).


The Salvadoran government sold food aid to local consumers and then ille?
gally used the funds for thewar effort instead of for agricultural development.
Violation: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act: Use of Local

19).
Currencies, Section 106(b)(2), 206 (ACFPC:
The Reagan administration has allowed El Salvador to deposit local cur?
rencies from imported commodities through the Economic Support Fund
directly into itsdomestic budget rather than into a Special Account, which is

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Frappier

10

required by law. Violation: Foreign Assistance Act: Use of Local Currencies,


Section 609(a): Special Account (ACFPC: 21).
B. Intervention and War?

The Rest of theWorld

1. Introduction
The examples that are cited here represent themore blatant and public
examples of violations; however, a case could be made that theUnited States
is constantly violating international law through the activities of theCIA sta?
tions and U.S. military missions which conduct operations affecting the inter?
nal affairs of many countries.
The history of theUnited States sinceWorld War II is one of intervention
into the affairs of other countries throughout theworld. From 1946 to 1975,
there have been 215 instances inwhich theU.S. armed forces were used as
a political instrument.This does not include the actual interventionsand wars

inwhich theU.S. was involved. Rather than using peaceful means of settling
disputes, as outlined in theU.N. Charter, theU.S. has tended to rely on its
armed might to police theworld.
Rules for the conduct of war have evolved through customary law and have
been codified in various treaties and conventions since themid-1800s. The
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are importantagreements, still in effect,
which prescribe humane treatment of prisoners and civilians. In addition,
chemical warfare, weapons which cause unnecessary suffering,and the attack?

ing of undefended towns were banned.


The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited chemical weapons; theU.S. did
not ratify ituntil after theworldwide outcry against the use of Agent Orange
inVietnam. The Geneva Convention of 1949 adopted additional provisions for
treatmentof thewounded and prisoners, and, most relevant to this article, it

called for theprotection of civilians. During and after theVietnam War, there
has been much debate about how theConvention applies to the case of a local
conflict involving an insurgent force (Trooboff, 1975: 13, 15-16).
The following are representative examples of interventions and wars con?
stituting violations

of

international law by

the Reagan

and previous

administrations.

Chad: The CIA secretly supplied funds and military equipment to the
forces of Hissen Habre (starting in 1981), who was fighting to overthrow the
coalition government of President Goukouni Oueddei
Libyan-backed
1984:
1). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
(Peterzell,
In 1981 an administration plan was presented to the House
Intelligence Committee which included "a 'disinformation' plan to embarrass
Muammar Qaddafi, the creation of a 'counter government' of Libyan exiles,
and escalation of paramilitary and sabotage operations inside Libya intended
to demonstrate thatQaddafi faces active internal opposition.'' The goal was
Libya:

to remove Qaddafi once and for all. Itwas reported later thatan administration

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International

Lawlessness

11

official was in direct contact with anti-Qaddafi Libyan exiles inEurope. The
oil companies withdraw their
administration then requested that U.S.
an
after
initial
refusal,
theycomplied. The administration plan also
employees;
called for a U.S. boycott of Libyan oil and B-52 raids on Libyan training
camps (Peterzell, 1982: 1-4). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
to Lebanon
Lebanon: The Reagan administration deployed Marines
war
civil
without
that
be
the
"imminent
there
might
during
notifyingCongress
involvement with hostilities." Even after the first twoMarines were killed,
the Pentagon testified that theywere not really involved in hostilities. Viola?
tion: War Powers Resolution: Reporting Requirements on Hostilities, sec?
tion 4(a).

Iran: In 1981, theReagan administration started giving support to anti


Khomeini forces in Iran, includingmillions of dollars' worth of arms to two
Iranian paramilitary groups inEastern Turkey. The administration also tried
to unify anti-Khomeini forces inFrance and Egypt. One of themain purposes
of the operation was to create an anti-Soviet opposition which would be an
alternative to theTudeh Party in Iran (Peterzell, 1982: 5). Violation: Article
2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
Another aspect of theReagan administration's disregard for international
law is the refusal to negotiate. The Soviets, for example, have submitted a
draftproposal for banning chemical weapons and received a negative response
from theUnited States (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

2. Violations Prior to Reagan


Shortly afterWorld War II, theTruman Doctrine became the established
foreign policy of theUnited States, and theCold War with the Soviet Union
and all other communist forces throughout the world became the focus of
confrontations.

Greece: During World War II the Greek Communist Party had grown
politically and was themain organization fighting the fascists. After thewar,
itwas in a strongposition to assume power in the country. This state of affairs
did not fit inwith U.S. plans to rebuildWestern Europe through theMarshall
Plan and to oppose the Soviet Union and its allies in other countries. Itwas

inGreece that theTruman Doctrine was firstarticulated; theU.S. and Britain


intervened in theGreek civil war to oppose the communists and prevent them
fromcoming topower. Besides bringing themilitary intopower, theU.S. was
able to establish an importantmilitary base inGreece. In 1952 theCIA started

channelingmoney toColonel George Papadopoulos, who later led themilitary


coup of 1967 (Grimmett, 75: 2). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
Korea: The U.S. entered the Korean War (1950-53) and engineered a
U.N. resolution authorizing the invasion ofNorth Korea, which was inviola?
tion of theU.N. Charter itself.The U.N. Security Council was not convened
until after theU.S. had intervened. The U.S. claimed thatNorth Korea had
invaded South Korea. Justprior to the conflict, however, JohnFoster Dulles,

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Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson met
with General Douglas MacArthur. Dulles went on to South Korea and told the
National Assembly that theU.S. was ready to supply themwith materiel to
fight communism (Kim, 1968: 75-76). Violation: Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.

Iran: In 1953, under President Eisenhower, the CIA organized a coup


against progressive Premier Mossadegh, who had nationalized some of the oil
holdings of theBritish. The CIA operation was led by Kermit Roosevelt. After
and the installation of the Shah of Iran, Roosevelt
the fall of Mossadegh
became the "government relations" director and vice president of one of the
companies?Gulf Oil Company?that
gained direct benefits under the new
government (Wise,

1964:

110-13).

Violation:

Article

2(4)

of the U.N.

Charter.

Lebanon: President Eisenhower deployed 14,000 U.S. troops to support


the government of Chamoun inLebanon; the invasion was meant towarn the
new Iraqi government against nationalizing U.S. oil interests (Spanier, 1973:
125). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
Vietnam War: The history of theVietnam War is one of gradual escala?
tion. First, theU.S. aided theFrench during theirwar against theViet Minh.
Following theFrench defeat, theU.S. violated theGeneva Accords by intro?
ducing military personnel and by opposing the elections thatwere scheduled
to be held in 1956. U.S. advisers were then sent and the escalation of ever
increasing numbers of combat troops began. Incidents like theGulf of Tonkin
were created to justify the deployment of more troops until itbecame a full
used a variety of weapons
scale war. The U.S.
including fragmentation

bombs, napalm, and extensive bombing of civilian populations. Agent Orange


defoliant was dropped over large tracts of the land and population. Project
Phoenix, theCIA program directed byWilliam Colby, assassinated thousands
ofVietnamese civilian leaders suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers (Pen?
tagon Papers, 1971: 1-2, 80, 234).
In response to the brutality of the war, the International War Crimes
Tribunal was called in Stockholm in 1967 and over the course of its pro?

ceedings issued the following findings against theUnited States:


1) Violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Article 6 of the
Nuremberg Charter, theU.N. Resolution of 1960, and theGeneva Accords
for committing acts of international aggression.
2) Violation of Articles 23, 25, and 27 of The Hague Convention of 1907
and Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Tribunal for deliberately waging war

against civilian populations (Wells, 1984: 102-07).


3) Violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the use of chemical
napalm. The Hague Convention of 1907 also prohibits
warfare?specifically
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and this protocol is recognized as
customary international law regardless of signature. (The U.S. had not signed
it at the time of theVietnam War.)

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International

13

Lawlessness

4) Violation of theHague Convention of 1899 for theuse of fragmentation


typeweapons. This is also customary international law even though theU.S.
is not a party to this convention (U.N. International Law Convention, 1954
Draft Code ofOffenses Against Peace and Security ofMankind). (See Myrdal,
1976: 232-33, 240, 367-68.)
Angola: After thewar forAngolan independence from thePortuguese, the
U.S. spentmillions of dollars to support two factions trying to overthrow the
new government. The CIA supplied weapons, mercenaries, and planes
(McGehee, 1983: 60). Violation: Article 2(4) of theU.N. Charter.
IL Arms Control: Agreements,

Compliance,

and the Arms Race

A. World War II to the 1960s


This section looks briefly at the history of arms control talks and treaty
violations, which helps give a perspective on the actions of theReagan admin?
istration.During World War II, itwas theU.S. which developed the atomic
bomb in secret. The U.S. remains the only country to have actually used
nuclear weapons. The Truman administration followed up thisbellicose begin?
ning by rejecting those (including Secretary ofWar Stimson) who wanted to
approach the Soviets in a straightforwardway to avoid an arms race. Instead,
the atom bomb was seen as a key to controlling Soviet behavior and asserting

U.S. power in the post-war world.


The Baruch Plan (1946) was thefirstmajor U.S. proposal on arms control
after thewar. It proposed internationalmanagement and inspection of nuclear
production. Sanctions were tobe set in a way thatbypassed theSecurity Coun?
cil, thusdepriving the Soviets of veto power. According to theplan, however,
theU.S. was not scheduled to give up itsmonopoly for two or three years,

and would have retained itsbombs while the Soviets would have been forbid?
den to produce them. The Soviets rejected the Baruch Plan, and the U.S.
rejected theircounterproposal. This scenario, inwhich theSoviets were either
locked intoan inferiorposition, or were asked to cut a major military program
with no reciprocal action by theU.S., was repeated many times over the next
four decades as the following brief outline illustrates.
The U.S. made thenext quantum leap inweapons production when itaccel?
erated hydrogen bomb development in the early 1950s. The Soviet position
during this period (as well as later) was for total disarmament. In 1952, one
of the next major U.S. proposals suggested linking the reduction of conven?
tional forces and weapons (where the Soviets are stronger) to the elimination

of nuclear weapons and again proposed international inspection. This proposal


was also rejected by the Soviets.
In 1953, Eisenhower presented theAtoms forPeace plan, along with a pro?
posal to limitmilitary and security forces. Again, thiswould have locked the
Soviets into a militarily inferiorposition, so they rejected this plan.
In 1954, the U.S. proposed a comprehensive three-stage disarmament
made significant concessions on key issues (including
plan. The U.S.S.R.

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international control, partial disarmament, and ceilings on conventional


forces) and came very close to accepting the U.S. position. The Soviet
response was clearly unexpected by theU.S., and theEisenhower administra?
tion (with JohnFoster Dulles as Secretary of State) did an about-face and pro?
claimed that disarmament was no longer feasible. Eisenhower proposed
instead the "open skies" plan, which even he later admitted had to be totally

unacceptable to theSoviets. This would have opened up the skies of both coun?
tries for inspection by the other country and again would have given theU.S.
an advantage. Another round of talks ended in failure in 1957, and thereafter
therewas little discussion of total disarmament.
The Cuban Missile Crisis renewed interest in serious arms talks, since the
threatof a nuclear war was very real. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed
in 1963. There was some discussion during this period of strategic weapons
control, but the Soviets would not discuss strategic freezes until parity began
to be achieved in the late 1960s (Blacker, 1984: 96-112).

B. Treaties and Compliance


1. Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTB) (1963)
This treatybanned testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer
space, underwater, and any underground tests thatwould cause fallout outside
the territoryof the testing country. The LTB was signed by theU.S. and the

(Blacker, 1984: 130). Violations: Soviets charge fallout has leaked


outside the territorialU.S., violating Article I, Paragraph B of the LTB.
Retired U.S. officials admit to technical violations (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

U.S.S.R.

2. Outer Space Treaty (1967)


This treaty stipulated that outer space was not subject to national appro?
priation. It prohibits military installations and weapons testing on celestial
bodies and putting nuclear weapons into orbit. The U.S. has ratified this
treaty. Violations: There are no major violations of this treaty charged
(Blacker, 1984).
3. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968)
This treatyprohibits the transferof nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.
At the insistence of the non-nuclear states, the superpowers agreed towork
toward stopping thearms race and creating a treatyfor complete disarmament.
They also promised to transfer peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear

weapons

states.

The

right

to

create

nuclear-free

zones

was

assured.

Nonweapon parties are required to accept monitoring by the International


Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes inspections and audits to
assure compliance (Blacker, 1984: 156-157). An importantpart of the regula?
tion of proliferation is the control of nuclear weapons fuel, plutonium, and
uranium. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
have ratified this treaty (Levanthal,
1984:1,6). Violation: The failure of the nuclear powers to negotiate toward
an end to the arms race and toward disarmament is well known. The non
nuclear weapons states have also become resentful because, in practice, they

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International

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15

have not received any benefits in terms of technology transfers for having
signed the treaty (Dunn, 1982: 144).
The U.S. has also used the treaty to suit its own political aims. Aid was
suspended to Pakistan in late 1976 and 1979 for violations of the treaty.But
in 1981, when Reagan wanted to bolsterWestern security in the region, sanc?
tions against Pakistan were lifted (Dunn, 1982: 105). The Ford and Carter
administrations had taken a strong approach to stopping the plutonium trade.
The Ford administration took a strong position on the need to control the
reprocessing and recycling of plutonium, but did nothing about it.The Carter
administration declared an indefinitedeferral of U.S. commercial reprocess?
ingand recycling of plutonium and stopped federal funding for several of these
projects, including theClinch River Breeder Reactor. Carter did retreat some
on thispolicy, in the face of resistance fromEurope and Japan, who saw this
as denying them the energy sources theyneeded. In fact, allowance for a low
enriched uranium fuel was made (Levanthal, 1984: 7). The Reagan admin?
istration,however, immediately rescinded the ban on commercial reprocess?
ing and promoting of plutonium use in other countries. In 1983, Reagan

announced a plan to get all nuclear-supplier nations to require "comprehen?


sive safeguards" before exporting to any nation. However, the administration
then arranged the sale of nuclear materials to India, Argentina, and South
Africa, none of whom have signed theNPT. It got around theban against sell?
ing to non-NPT nations by arranging the sales through other suppliers. The
administration has insisted that itneeds to be a "reliable supplier" of nuclear
materials and technology in order to be able to control possible proliferators.
But, in selling to non-NPT nations, it goes against this treaty,which was

supposed to give favored status to those that signed the treaty (Levanthal,
1984: 8,9,13).
Additionally, the administration has been charged with violating theNPT
through thenuclear cooperation agreements ithas made. These give long term
(30-year) approvals to foreign reprocessing of plutonium from nuclear fuel
supplied by theU.S. The NPT requires that reprocessing requests be evaluated
and approved on a case by case basis. Members of Congress and some public
interestgroups filed a lawsuit against the administration inMay 1984 to stop
these

practices.

4. Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974)


This treaty limited nuclear underground explosions to 150 kilotons. Itwas
linked with the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty but neither were ever
brought up for a vote. One criticism is that it allowed such a high level of
explosion as to be almost meaningless. Another criticism was that the
allowance of "peaceful nuclear explosions" (those outside specified areas)
was in itselfa major loophole. This agreement was signed by Nixon in 1974,
never ratified, then abandoned by Carter in 1977 in favor of negotiations on
a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Reagan inherited these CTB negotiations,
but killed them in 1982 (Blacker, 1984: 137). Violation: The Soviets charge

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repeated violations of this (Longstreth, 1984: 11).

5. Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET)(1976)


This treaty limited "peaceful nuclear explosions" to 150 kilotons and
also spelled out inspection procedures (Blacker, 1984: 137-138). This was
linked to theThreshold Test Ban Treaty, then never brought up for a vote in
the Senate.

6. Agreement Governing theActivities of States on theMoon


and Other Celestial Bodies (Negotiated 1970-79)
This proposal tried to give legal detail on questions arising from space
exploration, and included prohibitions against using themoon as a military
base. It declares that the natural resources on themoon are the "common
heritage of mankind." The U.S. has not ratified this treaty (nor have many
other countries). The U.S.
objects to the "common heritage" limits to
in
Sea treatyand in this treatyas well. The Soviets
Law
of
the
the
development
common
to
the
heritage concept until 1978 (Blacker, 1984: 123).
objected
7. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) (1972)
This Treaty was a product of the SALT I talks. The ABM Treaty bans
deployment of nationwide systems to defend against ballistic missile attack.
An interimagreement set ceilings on certain strategicweapons for five years
(Carnesale, et al., 1983:92). The ABM Treaty halted another destabilizing and
expensive spiral in the arms race. The 1974 Protocol to theABM Treaty limits
toone ABM site of 100 interceptorsand 100 launch?
theU.S. and theU.S.S.R.
ers. It also limits the number of ABM radars. Research on all types of ABM
systems and components is permitted but not advanced development, testing,
and deployment of certain types of ABM systems and components. It estab?
lished the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as the forum for dis?
cussion ofABM treaty issues. Both theU.S. and the Soviets have ratified the

ABM

Treaty (Longstreth and Pike,

C. Compliance

Issues

1984: 6-7).

(Violations)

The U.S. had been putting small "environmental shelters" over ICBM
silos since the 1960s. In 1973, the size of these shelterswas increased. In 1973
and again in 1977-78, the Soviets charged that thiswas deliberate conceal?
ment, which impeded verification as prohibited by Article XII of theABM
Treaty. In 1979, theU.S. finally stopped using large shelters. In the SALT
II negotiations, the two countries reached an agreement thatno shelters that
impede verification could be used (Longstreth, 1984:9; Longstreth and Pike,
1984: Appendix, 3). The U.S. is testingMinuteman ICBMs to give themABM
capabilities, in violation of Article VI of the Treaty (Longstreth, 1984: 11).
Phased array radar systems: These are radar systems that can have func?
tions both for an ABM system and also for early warning. As part of an ABM
system theywould track ballistic missiles coming into the country at various
locations as well as provide battle management support. For early warning

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International

Lawlessness

17

purposes the radars would be placed at borders, facing outward, towarn of


attack. The latter is permitted under the treaty. This type of radar can take
several years to put up and is the "long lead time" component of an ABM
system. The concern is that these radars will be put in place (under the guise
of being part of an early warning system), then otherABM components could
be deployed quickly. The ABM Treaty allowed for these radars for early

warning purposes only (Pike and Rich, 1984: 5).


In 1978, the Soviets charged that two large phased array radar systems
being built by theU.S were in violation of theABM Treaty. The U.S. denied
this, saying the use was for early warning and therefore consistent with the
Treaty. Currently, theU.S. is constructing twomore of these systems, which

increases the likelihood that the systems could be used forABM purposes. The
U.S. is also charging the Soviets with violating theABM Treaty through con?
struction of its own phased array radar system (Longstreth, 1984: 11).
1. StarWars Weapons System (Nationwide Strategic Defense Initiative)
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) aims at establishing defenses against
a nuclear attack, by intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles in various
stages of attack (Longstreth and Pike, 1984: 1). On January 6, 1984, Reagan
signed National Security Decision Directive 19,which began themultibillion
dollar SDI research and development effort. It consolidated many programs
relating to ballistic missile defense and ordered a number of demonstrations

defense technologies before 1990. Critics, including the


Soviet Union, charge that the SDI is banned by theABM Treaty (Longstreth,
1984: m). The administration maintains that the program is permitted under
have never agreed on a definition
theABM Treaty. The U.S. and U.S.S.R.
The Reagan administration has elaborate justifica?
of theword "develop."
and "component" to allow it to
tions for interpreting thewords "develop"
of
the
SDI system. The justification is
various
and
demonstrate
parts
develop
that since each component is not capable of standing on its own as an ABM
weapons component, to develop such components does not violate the
of critical missile

ABM Treaty.
The currentReagan administration's interpretationof theword "develop''
is at odds with theway development was conceived during the 1972 Senate
Armed Services Committee hearings on SALT I, which stated that develop?
ment was prohibited once it entered the stage of field testing (Longstreth and
Pike, 1984: 16-19).

2. SALT II (1979)

This treaty took six and one-half years to negotiate. It permitted many
weapons developments of the 1970s (including super-accurate counterforce
warheads and multiple warheads on a single missile [MIRVs]), but put a cap
on the number of warheads that could be installed on a missile, and limited
ICBM development. This treatywas never brought up for a vote in the Senate
(Carnesale,

1983: 99).

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Violations: Article IV, paragraph 9 of Salt II limitseach side toone new type
of ICBM. The development of theMX and Midgetman ICBMs would violate
this limit. (Both are currentlyunder development by theAir Force.) The U.S.
says that this is permitted since actual deployment of theMidgetman will come
after SALT II expires (Longstreth, 1984: 10). The Soviets charge a "spirit of

the law'' violation of theSALT II Protocol, which expired in 1981. This Protocol
banned deployment but not development of long-range sea- and land-launched
cruise missiles and said thatparties were towork out mutually acceptable solu?
tionswith respect to theseweapons. The U.S. has been deploying cruisemissiles
since theProtocol expired. The U.S. contends that itdid not ratifySALT II and
is not bound by an expired Protocol (Longstreth, 1984: 10-11).
D.

The Reagan Administration and Arms Control

The section above has shown some of the compliance issues raised by the
currentadministration's actions on arms treaties.These and other actions taken
by theReagan administration raise questions as towhether the administration
would ratherbe free of all treaties and obligations to negotiate. The attitude of
the administration toward the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is a
case in point. The SCC was used under Nixon, Ford, and Carter as a forum

to discuss and resolve alleged violations of theABM treaty.During thisperiod,


all U.S. charges against the Soviets were satisfactorily resolved through this
process. An interagency committee consisting of stafffrom theDepartment of
Defense, JointChiefs of Staff,CIA, State Department, and National Security
Council testifiedduring the debates on SALT II that the "specific charge that
theSoviets cheated on SALT I is inaccurate.We raised a number of issueswith
the Soviets in SALT I?as they did with us?but in every case the activity in
question either ceased or subsequent information clarified the situation and
allayed our concern" (Longstreth, 1984: 3, 5, 9).

Reagan has undercut thisprocess of compliance diplomacy and has instead


taken a prosecutorial stand. In January of 1984, he issued a report toCongress
citing seven arms control violations by the Soviets (Pike and Rich, 1984: 1).
Many of thesewere the types of violations that in the past had been dealt with

quietly thru the SCC. Other allegations were premature, since all the technical
evidence was not in, and Reagan had notwaited for a response from theSoviets
to the inquiries theU.S. had made in the fall session with theSCC. Four of the
asserted violations dealt with "political commitments" tounratified agreements
that the administration refused to ratify (Krepon, 1984: 159). Reagan declared
that the Soviets are "liars and cheats," and key members of his administration
have displayed the same attitude.Former Secretary of State Haig told theSenate
Foreign Relations Committee in 1982 that SALT II was dead. Secretary of

Defense Caspar Weinberger declared thatU.S. defense programs conformed


with SALT I and II constraints by coincidence rather than design; and White
House counsel Ed Meese stated that the administration had no moral or legal
commitment to abide by expired or unratified SALT agreements. Secretary of
State Schultz expressed similar reservations about extending SALT II beyond

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U.S.

International

Lawlessness

19

its expiration date of 1985 (Krepon, 1984: 164).


A review of the status of the recentmajor weapons negotiations reveals that
theU.S. has stopped all serious negotiations and indeed, as the "Star Wars"
proposal shows, seems intenton destroying themajor treaties thatexist.

In 1979, the "two track" decision to simultaneously plan for, deploy, and
negotiate around thePershing II and cruise missiles inEurope was announced.
The IntermediateRange Nuclear Force talks (INF) started in 1981 with deploy?
'
ment tobegin in 1983. Reagan proposed his 'zero option plan'' to cancel deploy?
ment if the Soviets dismantled all their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles
worldwide. The Soviets wanted theNATO nuclear weapons counted in any
agreements,which theU.S. would not accept. The Soviets wanted all long-range
nuclear weapons in a certain area counted. The U.S. wanted only land-based
weapons counted?which were theSoviets' military strength.Though therewas
some lastminute negotiating, theU.S. insisted to theend on some deployment of

1984: 287-289).
theweapons and the talksbroke down (Barnaby andWindpass,
The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) are also at a standstill. The
Soviets did not set a date for resumptionwhen the last round ended in 1983. The
U.S. proposal had called fora big cut in theSoviet ICBMs, along with other basic
changes in their strategic forces. The Soviets proposed thatboth sides cut their
launchers below SALT II limits, so that the Soviets would have had to reduce
700 launchers and theU.S. only 200 (DefenseMonitor, 13: 4, 1984: 11).
Three treaties require theU. S. toactively work fora ban on all nuclear explo?
sions testing(the 1963 LTB, the 1967Non-Proliferation and the 1974 Threshold
Test Ban). Despite this, the Reagan administration decided in 1982 to stop
negotiations then inprogress on a comprehensive testban (DefenseMonitor, 13:
4, 1984: m).
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. discussed limitedanti-satelliteweapons in space from
1977 to 1979 (Blacker, 1984: 122). The U.S. broke off the talks toprotest Soviet
actions inAfghanistan. The Reagan administration has shown no interest in
resuming these talks,despite several high level Soviet treatyproposals (Deudny,
1984: 105), includingproposals for sweeping bans and demilitarization of space

(Zhukov, 1984: 56-57, U.N. Press Release WS 1185, June 22, 1984: 2).
In January 1984, Reagan reported toCongress on seven Soviet arms control
violations, but few ifany of these can be proven. The charges included findings
of probable SALT violations which even SALT critics had previously considered
unverifiable or within the permissive boundaries of SALT II. With regard to
violations of the 150 kiloton limitof theThreshold Test Ban Treaty, Carter and
Reagan officials drew differentconclusions from the same evidence. Reagan also
charged violations of chemical warfare bans inAfghanistan and Asia, but scien?
tificevidence is still divided on this issue (Krepon, 1984: 159-160).
The recent new stories of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
reporton 17 Soviet violations seem to be another part of the administration's
plan to evade its treatyobligations, by proving that the Soviets have violated
treaties so many times that theU.S. should no longer be obligated to respect
the treaties it has signed with the Soviets (Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1984).

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Of the 17 violations alleged, however, seven are repeats from the January
report, four have been raised and resolved in the SCC, and the remaining six
involved "spirit of the law" type violations which cannot be proven.
The report has not been released but its contents have been thoroughly
leaked. The staffmembers responsible for it are not intelligence and defense
experts but Reagan staffpeople, known for their anti-arms control attitudes.
They have found violations using the same data threeprevious administrations
have failed to find conclusive.
III. International Economics
A. Introduction
International economics is an arena which, until fairly recently, has been
tightlycontrolled exclusively by theworld capitalist powers. Consequently,
there has been a scarcity of international law to regulate the activities of the
large

transnational

corporations.

AfterWorld War II, theBrettonWoods Agreement established the Inter?


national Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), theOrganization forEconomic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and theGeneral Agreement forTariffs and Trade
(GATT). Since the 1960s, with the convening of the U.N. Conference on

therehave been attempts to address the


Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
North-South polarity in the economic sphere. This is a result of the influence
and the development of the New
of the nonaligned nations in UNCTAD,
International Economic Order perspective. In addition, the U.N. has been
trying for almost ten years to create a code for transnational corporations,
since legal action at the national level is inadequate. The transnational cor?
porations

"have

created

for themselves

a new,

transnational

economic

space,

which transcends traditional legal, i.e., territorial, boundaries. The corpora?


tions possess an increased capability to evade, disregard or subvert national
law and policy in any one of the countries inwhich theyoperate" (Fatouros,
1984: 102-03).
As has been seen in so many other instances of foreign policy, theUnited
States decides when itwill abide by international law and specific international
treaties towhich it is a party. The area of economics is one where theUnited
States wields a great deal of power since it is thewealthiest nation in theworld.
For example, many of the laws that do exist in international economics are

written to benefit U.S. economic interests; and at the same time, laws which
the poorer nations have tried to get implemented, such as a Code of Conduct
forTransnational, have still not been negotiated because theU.S. and other
capitalist world powers do not want to abide by them.
In addition, economic relations and influence are often used for political
purposes. This can be seen in the example of the U.S.
voting against
international loans forNicaragua even when all the economic requirements
are met. The legislation of the various international financial institu?
tions (IFIs) prohibits the politicization of the loan process and the U.S.

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U.S.

International Lawlessness

21

has been the primary violator of this prohibition.


What follows is a listing of the violations of various treaties including
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
agreements as well as examples of treaties theU.S. has refused to sign (such
as theLaw of the Sea). Also included are examples of U.S. government and
corporate violations of U.N. sanctions against South Africa.
B. Violations by theReagan Administration
The IFIs have played an importantrole inU.S. foreign policy. The Depart?
ments of State and Treasury maintain an informal list of countries that they
try to prevent from obtaining loans from the IFIs. This "hit list" includes
until recently, it included
Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua;
Grenada (ibid.: 2). Currently, there is a stepped-up campaign to use the IFIs
to supportU.S. political objectives inCentral America and theCaribbean. The
IMF, World Bank, and IDB have been pressured to lend to El Salvador and
to cut off Nicaragua's
loans. Grenada was opposed in the IMF and World

Bank, and Cuba in the International Fund for Agricultural Development


(IFAD) (ibid.: 2-3). The following case studies detail the role played by the
internationalfinancial institutionswith respect to theReagan administration's
foreign policy.
1. Nicaragua

Starting in 1981, the U.S. officially adopted a position of opposing all


development projects inNicaragua. It has succeeded in suspending World
Bank lending and slowing down a number of projects in the other IFIs. Since
theU.S. holds veto power over the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank's "soft
loanwindow," Nicaragua has not received any loans of development capital.
The U.S. rationale is that "Nicaragua's macroeconomic policies are so bad

thateven thebest development project would be a waste ofmoney" (ibid.: 4),


a position similar to the one taken during the time of theAllende government
inChile, when theU.S. was successful in cutting off lending. However, other
members of the IDB's executive board disagree with thispolicy and at a recent
a
meeting, "members of the IDB bitterly took theU.S. to task for vetoing
routinedisbursal toNicaragua for the completion of a successful development
project initiated in 1978" (ibid.).
Criticisms have come fromwithin the IDB from representatives of Canada,
Brazil, and Central American countries. "Sources in the executive branch
indicate thatU.S. actions in theMDBs
(multilateral development banks) are

a component of a plan toplace severe pressure on, and perhaps destabilize and
overthrow, Nicaragua's government" (ibid.). Moreover, "they indicate that
theUnited States would block any attempt by Nicaragua to improve its poor
relations with the IMF in hopes of obtaining a loan" (ibid.).
In October 1983, theU.S. reduced Nicaragua's annual import quota of
sugar from 58,000 to 6,000 short tons without negotiation. This violated the

GATT's

nondiscrimination policy;

the GATT's

88-member Council

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voted

22 Frappier
unanimously against theU.S. action. Violation: GATT: Non-Discrimination,
1984: 44).
Article XIII(2)
(ACFPC,
The Reagan administration vote to deny five loans toNicaragua from the
Inter-American Development Bank, and to act on political grounds instead of
economic criteria, is a violation of the IDB charter. Critics charge that the
administration's motivation is clear since the loan applications were for non
controversial projects. Violation: Inter-American Development Bank Articles
ofAgreement: Non-Politicization, Article VIII(5)(f)
(ibid.: 45). International
Non
Articles
of Agreement:
Fund for Agricultural
Development

Politicization, Article 6(8)(e),(f)


(ibid.: 46).
The Reagan administration has opposed every Nicaraguan loan application
to theWorld Bank. A 1982 loan request by Nicaragua was considered
economically sound by the Bank's staff, but the administration blocked the
loan. Violation: World Bank Articles ofAgreement: Non-Politicization, Arti?
cle IV(10): Political activity prohibited (ibid.: 49).

2. El Salvador
In 1981, the IMF sponsored a $36 million loan to El Salvador; itwas the
only loan in the IMF's history to have been brought before the IMF's board
without the approval of its staff.Another $36 million loan was approved in
1982, and at the same time, El Salvador received a $48 million standby loan

from the IMF. "It qualified for the loan only because theUnited States had
deposited nearly one hundred million dollars thatyear directly into thegovern
ment's treasury" (Rossiter, February 1984: 3).
The U.S. has become a powerful advocate forEl Salvador to receive loans
from theWorld Bank and the IDB. Concerned with the safety of its staff, the
World Bank stopped lending money to El Salvador in 1980. However, the
U.S. has pressured theWorld Bank to resume itsprojects. Because of holding
a higher percentage of votes in the IDB, theU.S. has been able to convince
the IDB to continue with major projects in El Salvador (ibid.).
3. Cuba
Cuba belongs to one IFI, the International Fund forAgricultural Develop?
ment (IFAD). Here, theU.S. Congress has mandated thatU.S. contributions
to IFAD not be used for projects inCuba. This' 'earmarking'' of funds violates
IFAD's charter. According to one source in the administration, "We hit them
hard, and we don't ever let up" over Cuba (ibid.: 4-5).
4. Grenada

executive director of the IMF and his staffopposed two loans


the
IMF's staff forMaurice Bishop's government in 1981 and
proposed by
1983. Under criticism was Grenada's plan to build an international airport
which theU.S. government claimed would be used formilitary purposes by
Cuba and the Soviet Union. The U.S. was unsuccessful in its attempt to put
pressure on the European economic community not to directly fund the air?
port. At that time, the U.S. had already stopped its aid to the Bishop
The U.S.

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U.S.

International

Lawlessness

23

government and had also tried to decrease the amount of income from tourism
by persuading countries near Grenada to cut thenumber of touristsusing their
international airports to get to Grenada. Reported one State Department
source: "Haig pounded the table inhis office and ordered his toppolicymakers
forLatin America to ensure that therewould be 'not one penny forGrenada'

coming from the IFIs" (ibid.: 4).


Eventually, U.S. pressure resulted in the loan being cut from $9 million
over three years (as recommended by the IMF staff) to $3 million over one
year. This was a unique case of a violation because theU.S. position "was
based on a critique of a particular project which was a breach of IMF rules
(that IMF loans are conditional only on countries meeting macroeconomic

targetsdirectly related to the balance of payments)" (ibid.).


In August 1983, the U.S. again tried to block or reduce a $14 million,
three-year, IMF agreement with Grenada. U.S. opposition was based on the
argument that themoney had macroeconomic targets thatwere too lenient. But
thiswas rejected by other executive directors, who supported the IMF staff
in approving the loan.
After theU.S. invadedGrenada
the "hit list" for the IFIs (ibid.).

inOctober

1983, itremoved Grenada from

5. South Africa
U.S. transnational corporations and financial institutions have increased
collaboration with the South African government in violation of theU.N.
imposed sanctions against the apartheid regime (U.N. Centre Against Apar?
theid,Resolutions, pp. 5, 7, 12).
Seven U.S. corporations recently decided to provide technological and
maintenance service to South Africa's nuclear installation. The U.S.
is
to
the
African
South
armaments
its
and
government
assisting
develop
industry
nuclear weapon capability. Since 1981, theU.S. has exported $28 million in
military technology to South Africa. Space Research Corporation has supplied
155mm artilleryweapons and shells. Violation: U.N. Arms Embargo Against
South Africa (UNCAA, Resolutions, pp. 24-25; UNCAA, Apartheid, pp.
30-31).
6. Namibia
In 1974, theUnited Nations issued Decree No. 1 prohibiting themining
ofNamibian natural resources until therewas an end to theSouth African rule
of thecountry. The Reagan administration has decided not to honor thedecree
and has given the go-ahead toU.S. mining corporations to extract minerals
fromNamibia. Violation: U.N. Decree No. 1 for the Protection of Natural
Resources

inNamibia

(Roberts, 1982: 2; Zinn,

1984).

7. Law of the Sea


The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea resulted from 14
years of work involving 150 countries, including the United States. It
addresses many aspects of regulating the ocean, including access to the sea,

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24 Frappier
protection ofmarine life, research, and sea-bed mining. It ison the issue of sea?
bed mining thattheReagan administration refused to sign the treatybecause the
'
'common heritage" concept in the treatymeant that theU.S. would not be able
to exploit themineral rights at will. Instead, in 1983, Reagan declared a
200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone for theUnited States (Law of the
Sea,

1984:ix-xxix; Malone,
IV. Human

A. Reagans

1984: 44-45;

Rights Violations

Johnson, 1984: 234-35).

by the Reagan

Administration

Human Rights Policy

The earliest statements fromwithin theReagan administration on human


rightspolicy were no more than attacks on theCarter administration's human
rightsprogram. Indicative of the differences between Reagan and Carter with
respect to human rightswas the former's nomination of Ernest Lefever as
assistant secretary of theBureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(Rossiter, Sept., 1984: 22). Lefever, known inWashington as a "right-wing

ideologue,'' urged that theadministration's priority be national security rather


than human rights. After his nomination was challenged and subsequently
withdrawn, theWhite House did not offer a furthernomination to the post for
several

months.

For most of its first year, the Reagan administration did not define its
human rights policy. In October 1981, policy was finally addressed in the
Clark-Kennedy Memorandum, which established theReagan administration's
concept of human rights policy and appointed Elliott Abrams to the post of
assistant secretary of the Bureau. Abrams then set up guidelines for human
rights policy, which in effect stipulated that focusing on the human rights
abuses of U.S. allies was "an unfair use of influence" (ibid.: 24). Instead, the
priorities were to "attack Soviet abuses at every opportunity and to avoid the

tendency to highlight and punish violations in friendly countries" (ibid.).


Abrams is reported to have sought improvements inhuman rights in countries
likeChile, Guatemala, and Romania. However, the bureau under Reagan has
inno way made progress in the area of human rights and, in fact, has engaged
in human rights violations by disregarding a number of human rights laws,
especially in the region of Central America, as the following section describes.
B. Violations ofHuman Rights Laws

1. Certification forMilitary Aid to El Salvador


Numerous members of Congress and human rights organizations have
charged that Reagan falsely certified the government of El Salvador for
military aid on four occasions on the basis of that country having made pro?
gress in the area of human rights. The Salvadoran human rightsmonitors,
"Socorro Juridico" and "Tutela Legal,"
reported that during the period
covered by the law in question, over 10,000 civilians were killed by govern?
ment forces or death squads and that the Salvadoran government failed to
seriously investigate or terminate the killings. Organizations

like theACLU

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U.S.

International

Lawlessness

25

have argued thatsince only a few Salvadorans were ever arrested inconnection
with these killings and none were ever convicted, certain conditions set out in
the lawwere notmet. Further, the fact thatReagan vetoed an extension of part
of the law inNovember 1983 has been interpretedtomean that the administra?
tionwas increasingly aware that conditions for certification were not being

met (Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, 1984: 9). Violation:
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981: Certifica?
tion forMilitary Aid to El Salvador, Section 728(b).

2. Human Rights Conditions on Security Assistance


The Reagan administration has also been charged with providing aid to
Guatemala ($2 million in helicopter parts) and to El Salvador ($325 million
inmilitary equipment and services and $345 million in economic aid) without
certifying that extraordinary circumstances justified the aid. The charges are
based on the belief that both Guatemala and El Salvador have engaged in
human rights violations: the Guatemalan Army has executed over 10,000
Guatemalans, mostly Indians, while government forces in El Salvador have
killed 24,178 civilians without thegovernment seriously investigating or stop?
ping such killings (ibid.: 14). Violation: Foreign Assistance Act: Human
Rights Conditions on Security Assistance, Section 502B(a)(2).
3. Human Rights Conditions on Loans
The administration has also been charged with voting for loans from the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank toGuatemala and El
Salvador despite theirviolation of human rights. In the case ofGuatemala, the
administration reversed a policy ithad previously followed of opposing such
loans. Since thatchange, ithas voted for 12 loans toGuatemala. Critics charge
that 10 of these loans, totaling over $250 million, were for projects such as

thatdo notmeet the defini?


"industrial recovery" and "telecommunications"
tionof service to basic human needs. In the case of El Salvador, since taking
office, the Reagan administration has voted for all 9 World Bank and IDB
loans, totaling over $150 million. These were for construction projects that
critics also say do not meet the definition of service to basic human needs
(ibid.: 16). Violation: International Financial InstitutionsAct: Human Rights
Conditions on Loans, Section 701(f).
4. Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance
Critics returning from El Salvador have charged thatU.S. food aid is
being withheld from camps for displaced people in an attempt to force them
back to theirhomes in contested areas. The evidence shows that in one area
of El Salvador, thedecision to cut back food delivery to displaced people was

made by senior AID officials. Critics are claiming that "the decision to cut
back on food aid turnshumanitarian food aid into a weapon inEl Salvador's
civil war"
(ibid.: 18). Violation: Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act: Distribution ofHumanitarian Assistance, Sections 201(a) and

202(b)(3).

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26

Frappier
V. Conclusion

Since World War II, the United States government has consistently
violated international law in the pursuit of itsown national interests.Various
administrations and government officials have made a rhetorical commitment
tomaintaining international peace and justice throughout theworld; but the
U.S. government has often placed power politics over and above theprinciples
of international law and the rights of the entire world community.
The Reagan administration has not only been a violator of established inter?
national law but, more significantly, has refused to participate in the process
of negotiation and treaty-building to ensure a more secure world free from the
threat of conventional and nuclear war. Moreover, President Reagan has
attacked institutions like theUnited Nations which embody some of thehighest
principles of international law. There are also many indications from theviola?
tions cited in this article that the Reagan administration may indeed be
preparing for an increased war inCentral America, which represents a threat
not only to the peoples of Central America but to the global community of
nations

as well.

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APPENDIX A:
HISTORY OF THE USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT
force occupies parts of China with U.S. Air Force support
1945- 49 CHINA?Expeditionary
to suppress the liberation of the Chinese people.
aircraft is shot down; six B-29's
1946 YUGOSLAVIA?U.S.
carrying strategic nuclear
weapons are deployed to Germany and fly along the border of Yugoslavia.
and other warships are sent to Turkey in
U.S.S. Missouri
1946- 47 TURKEY?Battleship
response to a Soviet presence.
Truman orders the augmentation of U.S.
1946-48
ITALY,
Security of Trieste?President
troops along the zonal occupation line and the reinforcement of air forces in northern Italy after
over Venezia Giulia.
Yugoslav forces shoot down an unarmed U.S. Army transport plane flying
Earlier U.S. naval units are dispatched to the scene.
and Britain intervene to crush communist partisans and establish
1946-49 GREECE?U.S.
repressive rule of colonels, securing Greece as key U.S. military base.
of President
takes place;
1947 URUGUAY?Inauguration
strategic nuclear forces are
are flown in to
long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command
deployed; U.S.
reassure U.S. allies.
take place; U.S.
force (an aircraft carrier) is initiated against the
1947 ITALY?Elections
Left preceding the elections. Truman's principal objectives in using armed forces to influence
in power and to caution the
political developments are to maintain the de Gasperi government
Italian Communist Party against engaging in large scale violence.
Marine consular guard is sent to Jerusalem to protect theU.S. Con?
1948 PALESTINE?A
sular General.
break a Soviet blockade of surface routes intoWest Berlin, a massive
1948 GERMANY?To
airlift is mounted to carry foodstuffs, fuel, and other supplies to Berlin. B-29 bombers are
deployed toGermany and fly along the border.
are dispatched to Nanking to protect the American Em?
Marines
1948-49 CHINA?U.S.
to Shanghai to aid in the protection
bassy when the city falls to the popular forces led by Mao, and
a change of government occurs.
and evacuation of Americans;
CIA begins operating on Formosa under the cover of Western
1950 INDOCHINA?The
on themainland of China.
Enterprises, Inc., training Nationalist Chinese commandos for raids
sends two divisions of U.S. ground troops to aid South Korean
1950-53 KOREA?Truman
resolution to authorize
also engineers U.N.
forces attempting to take over North Korea. U.S.
authorization is not sought.
invasion of North Korea in violation of U.N. Charter. Congressional
In the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S.
strategic bombers are stationed in
Europe.
1950-53

the early 1950s until 1953, Air Force Colonel Edward


PHILIPPINES?From
to Philippine
leader Ramon
under CIA
gives advice and assistance
auspices,
in his struggle against the local Huk guerrillas. Millions of American dollars are pro?
Magsaysay
use in this program. The program is instrumental in
vided by theU.S.
secretly for Landsdale's
bringing about the defeat of the guerrillas.
theGreek
CIA begins to provide a subsidy toGeorge Papadopoulos,
1952 GREECE?The
colonel who later leads themilitary coup inGreece in 1967. The CIA also gives subsidies tomany
Greek military and political figures for years after 1952. The subsidies apparently end in 1972.
the early 1950s, CIA Special Operations Division agents make attempts
1952 CHINA?In
to develop resistance movements
inside the People's Republic of China. On November 9, 1952,
Landsdale,

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30 Frappier
CIA agents John Thomas Downey and Richard George Fecteau are captured inChina where they
have been organizing and training two teams of Nationalist Chinese agents to stir up mainland
Chinese against the government.
1953 IRAN?U.S.-backed
coup to overthrow progressive Mossadegh
government. U.S.
gains access to oil and reinstates Pahlevi as Shah to rule Iran as a sub imperialist client regime.
Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt
is the CIA agent who masterminds the downfall of Mossadegh.
AND CHINA?CIA
1953 SOVIET
UNION
Director William E. Colby stated that from
1953 until February 1973, theCIA "conducted several programs to survey and open selected mail
between theUnited States and two communist countries.'' According to a secret Senate memoran?
dum, the CIA survey focused on mail sent to and received from the Soviet Union and China and
was centered inNew York City and San Francisco. Colby states that the purposes of the programs
are "to

identify individuals in active correspondence with communist countries for presumed


to attempt4 'to learn the foreign contacts of a number of Americans
counterintelligence purposes,''
of counterintelligence
interests," and "to determine the nature and extent of censorship

techniques."
1953 COSTA
RICA?After
the election of Jos6 (Pepe) Figueres as President of Costa Rica
in 1953, theCIA works with opposition forces in the country in attempts to overthrow the govern?
ment. Of particular concern to the CIA is Figueres's policy of granting asylum inCosta Rica to
communists and noncommunists alike. Figueres, a moderate socialist, steps down from power
after his candidate loses the Presidential election in 1958.
1953 KOREA?U.S.
strategic combat aircraft is deployed to theWestern Pacific to reassure
South Korea and Japan in connection with the end of theKorean War.
1954 GUATEMALA?Using
the fact thatGuatemala
is receiving arms from Soviet bloc
countries, among other sources, theU.S.
implements a longstanding plan to overthrow the pro?

supplies arms, planes, and pilots and


gressive, nationalist Jacobo Arbenz government. The U.S.
installs the first of a string of brutal military dictatorships. (Actions include themovement of an
aircraft carrier task group, a reinforced Marine amphibious battalion, and air-wing, land-based
patrol aircraft squadrons, and several related actions.) The coup is led by the CIA; Frank G.
Wisner, CIA Deputy Director for Plans, has themajor responsibility for carrying out the opera?
tion. CIA agents train and support the forces of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who assumes

power after the defeat of Arbenz. Agency support includes the provision of CIA-piloted World
War II fighter-bombers, as well as guns and ammunition.
to overthrow the Arbenz government
1954 NICARAGUA?In
connection with maneuvers
in Guatemala, U.S.
long-range bombers assigned to the Strategic Air Command are flown to
Nicaragua,
apparently to reassure U.S. allies.
CHINA/TAIWAN?U.S.
strategic aircraft is deployed, and naval units evacuate
civilians and military personnel from the Tachen Islands.
1956 EGYPT?Egypt
nationalizes the Suez Canal; two U.S. aircraft carriers are positioned
nearby and strategic forces go on worldwide alert; a Marine battalion evacuates U.S. nationals
and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis. An overt and explicit threat is directed
1954-55

U.S.

at theU.S.S.R.
through global actions of U.S.
strategic forces.
ofU.S. military personnel and bases inMorocco
1956 MOROCCO?Security
is undertaken.
U.S. Marine ground forces and transport aircraft are placed in the area.
1956-57 JORDAN?British
influence in Jordan is threatened. British General Glubb
is
ousted; political-military crisis occurs and U.S. uses force in the area (two aircraft carriers).
1957 SYRIA?Political
allies is allegedly
developments occur in Syria; security of U.S.

threatened. Marine ground forces, three aircraft carriers and transport aircraft engage in transport
and exercise activities in the area.
1958 VENEZUELA?Coup
and civil strife inVenezuela;
security of Vice President Nixon
inVenezuela
is undertaken; U.S. Army ground forces and Marine ground forces are present, in
addition to one aircraft carrier and transport aircraft.
1958 INDONESIA?In
early 1958 the CIA gives direct aid to rebel groups on the island of
Sumatra that are attempting to overthrow Indonesian President Sukarno. CIA pilots fly B-26
bombers on missions in support of the insurgents. On May
18, 1958, during such a bombing mis?

sion, CIA pilot Allen Lawrence Pope is shot down and captured by the Indonesians.
1958 LEBANON?Eisenhower
sends 14,000 troops to support pro-Western government of
Chamoun and to crush pro-Nasser nationalist Lebanese opposition. An overt and explicit threat
is directed at the U.S.S.R.
through global actions of U.S.
strategic forces.
1958 JORDAN?Political
crisis occurs in Jordan; Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers, then playing

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U.S. International Lawlessness

31

a key role inU.S.


strategic strike plans, are used to help attain political objectives.
U.S. naval force is deployed in the area
and Matsu?A
1958 CHINA-TAIWAN?Quemoy
and a world-wide alert is ordered for American strategic forces.
CIA establishes a secret base at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado,
1958 TIBET?The
where the agency gives training to troops of theDalai Lama. The Tibetan guerrillas are trained
forces against
and re-equipped by the CIA in order to support the struggle of the Dalai Lama's
thePeking government. Guerrilla raids intoTibet by these forces do occur, sometimes led by CIA
contract mercenaries and supported by CIA planes. The training program appears to have ended

inDecember
1961.
of Berlin is undertaken; Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers,
1959 EAST GERMANY?Security
then playing a key role inU.S.
strategic strike plans, are used to help attain political objectives.
war in Laos takes place; Marine ground forces, three aircraft carriers,
1959 LAOS?Civil
and transport aircraft are deployed.
1959 PANAMA?Fixed-wing
maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft from theU.S. and two

naval surface combatant units are used for surveillance.


in 1956, CIA pilots begin flying high-altitude U-2 spy
1960 SOVIET
UNION?Beginning
planes over the Soviet Union to photograph a variety of missile and defense-related installations.
On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Powers, a CIA pilot, has his U-2 plane shot down over Sverdlovsk
in the Soviet Union, provoking Khrushchev
dent Eisenhower.
1960 CUBA AND GUATEMALA?In
to a CIA-sponsored
project to trainCuban

to cancel his scheduled conference at Paris with Presi?

early 1960, President Eisenhower gives his approval


exiles for the purpose of overthrowing Fidel Castro.
The Guatemalan president, Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, permits the CIA to use his country for its
1960, a rebellion breaks out inGuatemala against Ydigoras. Because
training camp. InNovember
of his assistance to the CIA to that point, the agency secretly comes to his aid, sending itsB-26
bombers against the rebels. The insurgency is crushed and Ydigoras stays in power. Throughout
the Caribbean, Second Marine Ground Task Force is deployed to protect U.S.
nationals; the
security of the Guantanamo base is undertaken.
the Congo's
air and sea sup?
1960-61 CONGO
(ZAIRE)?Following
independence, U.S.

force sent to replace Belgium's


colonial
port is provided for the United Nations peacekeeping
Army; U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, one aircraft carrier, and transport aircraft are
deployed for evacuation and transport purposes.
to the scheduled invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles inApril 1961, theCIA
1961 CUBA?Prior
the CIA enlists Robert
attempts to have Castro assassinated. To help set up the assassination,
a former FBI agent, who
Nevada
is later to direct billionaire Howard Hughes's
Maheu,
businesses. Maheu recruits John Roselli to arrange for themurder attempt. The CIA assigns two
and William Harvey, to accompany Roselli on his trips toMiami
operatives, James O'Connell
to put together the assassination teams. The first attempt to kill Castro, made inMarch or early

April 1961, is a failure. Five more assassination teams are subsequently sent against Castro in
the next two years. All end in failure. The last attempt ismade in late February or early March
1963.
A force of Cuban exiles that have been trained and equipped by theCIA make an unsuccessful
invasion of Cuba at theBay of Pigs inmid-April 1961, inan attempt to overthrow Castro's regime.

The person responsible for the overall supervision of the operation isRichard M. Bissell, Jr., the
CIA's Deputy Director for Plans. Four Americans flying CIA planes, and nearly 300 Cubans die
during the invasion. Over 1,200 survivors are captured by Castro's forces. Following the Bay of
Pigs invasion, Cuban exiles are directed and paid by CIA agents to compile secret files on and
watch over other Cubans and Americans "who associated with individuals under surveillance."
It is estimated that at the height of these activities, roughly 150 informants are on the payroll of

a Cuban "counterintelligence"
office located in Florida.
1961 DOMINICAN
is assassinated; Trujillos
refuse to leave the
REPUBLIC?Trujillo
Dominican Republic; U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, Marine combat aircraft, and three
aircraft carriers are deployed for exercises.
to former CIA agent Philip Agee, the agency begins efforts
1961 ECUADOR?According
in 1961 to bring down the regime of President Jos6 Velasco
Ibarra of Ecuador after he refuses
to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. Ibarra is overthrown inNovember
1961. His successor,
soon falls out of favor with theUnited States and once again the CIA
Carlos Julio Arosemena,
uses "destabilizing
tactics" to overthrow his government in July 1963. Agee notes thatwhile on
assignment

in Ecuador,

he and five other CIA

agents manage

to gain economic

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and political

32 Frappier
over Ecuador's
labor movement. His CIA team, says Agee, ultimately "owned almost everybody
who was anybody." Also in June 1961, there is an unidentified submarine found off Ecuador.
1961 EAST GERMANY?During
theBerlin crisis, the planned withdrawal of B-47 bombers

from Europe is delayed.


1961 KUWAIT?Iraq
threatens to invade Kuwait; Marine ground forces and two aircraft
carriers are deployed in the area.
1961- 64 CONGO?In
the early 1960s theCIA becomes involved in the political struggle in
the Congo. The agency pays cash to selected Congolese
politicians and gives arms to the sup?
and Cyril Adoula.
and
the CIA
sends mercenaries
porters of Joseph Mobutu
Eventually
paramilitary experts to aid the new government. In 1964, CIA B-26 airplanes are being flown in
theCongo on a regular basis by Cuban-exile pilots who are under CIA contract. These pilots and

planes carry out bombing missions against areas held by rebel forces. The Church Committee
Report of 1975, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, deals at length with the
murder or attempted murder of five individuals, including Patrice Lumumba. The report con?
cludes thatwhile the CIA was not directly responsible for Lumumba's
death, it certainly tried.
Mobutu and Adoula handed Lumumba over to his arch-enemies to be murdered.
war takes place; communist gains occur. U.S. Army ground forces
1962 VIETNAM?Civil
and a transport helicopter are placed in the area for tactical support and transport.
1962- 75 LAOS?From
October
1962 until 1975, the U.S. plays a role of military support
inLaos. Beginning in 1962, theCIA becomes involved in a "secret war" against the communist
forces inLaos. The CIA recruits and trains a private army of at least 30,000 Meo and other Lao?
tian tribesmen. This group is known as L'Armee Clandestine. Pilots hired by the CIA fly supply
and bombing missions
inCIA-owned
airplanes in support of this secret army. Expenditures by
to assist this army amount to at least $300 million a year. Forty or fifty CIA officers
theU.S.
run this operation, aided by several hundred contract personnel. U.S. Army and Marine ground
forces, one aircraft carrier, a submarine, transport aircraft, and a transport helicopter are placed
in the area.
1962 THAILAND?The
3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit lands on May
17, 1962, to support

that country during the "threat of communism"


from outside; by July 30, the 5,000 Marines are
withdrawn.
on the shipment of offensive
1962 CUBA?President
institutes a "quarantine"
Kennedy
missiles to Cuba from the Soviet Union. He also warns the Soviet Union that the launching of
any missile from Cuba against any nation in theWestern Hemisphere would bring about U.S.
nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union. A negotiated settlement is achieved in a few days. Here,
an overt and explicit threat is directed at the U.S.S.R.
through global actions of U.S.
strategic
forces.
Juan Bosch is inaugurated; conflict with Haiti
1963 DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC?President
occurs; coup then occurs inDominican Republic; Marine ground forces and less than a squadron
of aircraft intervene.
1963 TURKEY?Following
the withdrawal of U.S.
intermediate-range ballistic missiles
from Turkey, theU.S.S.
Sam Houston visits Izmir. That port visit, the only such visit to a foreign
retains a
port by a U.S.
strategic submarine, ismeant to demonstrate to Turkey that the U.S.

strategic presence in the region.


1964 PANAMA?Security
of Panama Canal Zone
is undertaken; elections are held in
Panama.
1964-73 VIETNAM?U.S.
military advisers have been in South Vietnam for a decade, and
their numbers have been increased as military position of the Saigon government becomes
weaker. After attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf, President Johnson asks for a Con?
in
gressional resolution expressing U.S. determination to "support freedom and protect peace"
Southeast Asia. Congress responds with theTonkin Gulf Resolution, expressing support for "all
the President might take to repel armed attack against U.S.
forces and pre?
necessary measures"
vent further aggression. Following this resolution, and following an attack on a U.S.
installation
in central Vietnam, theU.S. escalates itsparticipation in thewar. The stage is set for involvement
of 8.7 million American troops in an Indo-China war over 9 years. Actions include the dropping
of 3 million tons of bombs, wide-spread use of chemical herbicides, and a CIA assassination pro?
in
gram which alone kills 20,587 civilians. In January 1964, a coup occurs in South Vietnam;

November
1964, theViet Cong attack Bien Hoa barracks in South Vietnam. U.S. armed forces
that are deployed include: in 1964, Army and Marine ground forces and less than a squadron of
aircraft, an aircraft carrier, and transport aircraft; in 1965, air force combat aircraft, and three

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U.S. International Lawlessness

33

aircraft carriers; in 1972 (on two occasions), air force combat aircraft and seven aircraft carriers
for bombing and blockading.
1964 CONGO?The
United States sends four transport planes to provide airlift for Con?
golese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners;
hostages are held in Stanleyville.

1964 CHILE?The
CIA, with the cooperation of theAgency for International Development
and the State Department, secretly funnels up to $20 million intoChile to aid Eduardo Frei in his
successful attempt to defeat Salvador Allende for the Presidency of the country. Richard Helms,
as chief of the Clandestine Services (Directorate of Plans), is actively involved in planning the
efforts by the CIA to defeat Allende.
1964 DOMINICAN
maritime reconnaissance/patrol aircraft and
REPUBLIC?Fixed-wing
a ship are sent by theU.S.
for surveillance activity.
Mid-1960s
themid-1960s
the CIA secretly aids the government of Peru in
PERU?During
its fightagainst rebel guerrilla forces. The agency flies in arms and other equipment. Local Peru?
vian troops are trained by personnel of the Special Operations Division of the CIA as well as by

Green Beret instructors loaned by theU.S. Army. Because of the assistance the Peruvian govern?
ment is soon able to crush the revolt against it.
worsen with Tanzania. Tanzania accuses theU.S. of planning
1965 TANZANIA?Relations
a coup. This is seen as a hostile but nonviolent political act directed at theUnited States. U.S.
naval surface combatant unit has a presence in the area.

1965 VIETNAM?The
Viet Cong attack Pleiku air base and Qui Nhon barracks in South
Vietnam; troops are withdrawn from Europe (see Vietnam, 1964-73 for details about activity of
U.S. armed forces in Vietnam in 1965).
1965 DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC?Some
40,000 U.S. Marines
suppress mass rebellion
which aims to restore a democratically elected government. Balaguer dictatorship is imposed.
1965 GREECE?It
is reported that in 1965, JohnM. Maury, theCIA station chief inAthens,
becomes directly involved inGreek politics. He is reported to help King Constantine buy Deputies
of theGreek Center Union Party, thus bringing about the downfall of the George Papandreou
government.
1965 VENEZUELA?A
U.S.
ship has a presence in the region.
1967 GREECE?It
is reported that the CIA engineers theGreek military coup of 1967 that
to power. It is further reported that theCIA is able tomain?
brings Colonel George Papadopoulos
"wartime col?
tain control of themilitary regime because ithas documentation of Papadopoulos's
laboration with the Nazis."
1967 CONGO?The
U.S.
sends three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the
central government with logistical support during a revolt.
Congolese
1967 CYPRUS?Political
crisis in Cyprus. A U.S.
aircraft carrier has a presence in the
region.
1967 BOLIVIA?The

CIA gives assistance to Bolivian soldiers in their successful effort to


the revolutionary leading a guerrilla movement
track down and capture Ernesto "Che" Guevara,
is captured on October 8 by CIA-advised
Bolivian rangers. He
against the government. Guevara
is executed shortly thereafter.
1967 SOUTH
VIETNAM?The
CIA's Far East Division of Clandestine Services develops
a program that comes to be known as Phoenix. The program entails a coordinated attack by all
South Vietnamese and American military, police, and intelligence units against the infrastructure
of theViet Cong. CIA funds serve as the catalyst for the project. William E. Colby plays the key

supervisory role in its implementation. In 1971, Colby reveals thatbetween 1968 and May 1971,
the Phoenix program leads to the death of 20,587 persons in Vietnam.
1968 NORTH
KOREA?The
Pueblo
U.S.S.
is seized by North Korea. This is seen as a
violent attack on U.S.
armed forces. U.S.
air force combat aircraft and 3 aircraft carriers are
deployed to theWestern Pacific. North Korea attacks South Korean fishing boats.
1969 NORTH
KOREA?An
EC-121
is shot down by North Korea. This is seen as a violent
attack on U.S. armed forces. U.S. Army and Marine ground forces, air force combat aircraft,
one battleship, six aircraft carriers, fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol
aircraft, and
transport aircraft have a presence there and are used in surveillance activity.
1970 JORDAN?As
after the
Jordan moves to crush the Palestine Liberation Organization
hijacking of three airliners, U.S. planes and ships are deployed and troops are alerted to deter
Soviet and Syrian intervention.
1970 ISRAEL?An
Arab-Israeli

cease-fire agreement

(Rogers Plan)

is accepted

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by Egypt,

34 Frappier
in
aircraft engages
Israel, and Jordan. A U.S.
fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol
surveillance activity in the region.
this is seen as a hostile
1970 CUBA?The
Soviets establish a submarine base at Cienfuegos;
but non-violent political act directed at theU.S. Fixed-wing maritime reconnaissance/patrol air?
craft and a naval surface combatant unit engage in escort and surveillance activities.
to clean out "communist sanc?
1970 CAMBODIA?U.S.
troops are ordered intoCambodia
forces
tuaries" fromwhich Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attack U.S. and South Vietnamese
inVietnam. The object of this attack, which lasts from April 30 to June 30, is to ensure the conti?
and assist the program of
of American
forces from South Vietnam
nuing withdrawal

Vietnamization.
1970-73 CHILE?Under
CIA direction over $8 million is channeled into Chile from 1970
to 1973 to "destabilize"
the government of Salvador Allende. The money is used to support
various groups within Chile who are opposed toAllende. CIA agents infiltrate the Socialist Party
in Chile, and organize street demonstrations against the regime (see 1973 below).
a demonstration of support for Pakistan (a U.S. ally) inwar with
1971 BANGLADESH?In
Nixon
carrier task force moves into waters off East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
India, a U.S.
Enterprise to the Indian Ocean as a deterrence of an Indian attack on West
deploys the U.S.S.
Pakistan.
1973 LAOS?A

civil war occurs

in Laos;

U.S.

Air Force

combat aircraft is deployed

for

bombing activities.
1973 LEBANON?There
is civil strife between Lebanon and Palestinians; a U.S. ship is sent
to have a presence in the region.
1973 ISRAEL?An
Arab oil embargo occurs; after an attack on Israel by Egypt, a massive
U.S. airlift ismounted. An overt and explicit threat is directed at theU.S.S.R.
through global
actions of U.S.
strategic forces.
1973 CHILE?The
CIA backs the overthrow of President Allende; Allende dies within hours
after the coup begins. The CIA establishes Pinochet's bloody military dictatorship with an
estimated 40,000 killed.
1974 CYPRUS?U.S.

civilians during hostilities between


naval forces evacuate U.S.
Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces.
1975 SOUTH
naval vessels,
VIETNAM?The
U.S.-supported
regime collapses; U.S.
helicopters, and Marines are sent to assist in the evacuation of refugees and U.S. nationals from

Vietnam.
1975 CAMBODIA?The
regime collapses; President Ford orders U.S. military forces to
a mer?
proceed with the planned evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cambodia. The S.S. Mayaguez,
chant vessel en route from Hong Kong toThailand with a U.S. citizen crew, is seized by Cambo?
dian naval patrol boats in international waters and forced to proceed to a nearby island; President
Ford also orders military forces to retake theMayaguez.
to finance an attempt to overthrow the
1975 ANGOLA?U.S.
authorizes $14 million
Angolan government.
1978 ZAIRE?A

renewed guerrilla offensive erupts inmineral-rich Shaba province; U.S.


transports airlift Belgian and French troops to crush the uprising.
1979 IRAN?After
the seizure of hostages in theU.S. Embassy inTeheran, two carrier task
forces are sent into theArabian Sea.
1980 PERSIAN
GULF?In
response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, joint military
exercises are staged with Middle East nations, and U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean are fur?

ther augmented.
AND PERU?To
1981 ECUADOR
monitor a cease-fire ending fighting between Ecuador
and Peru over disputed border territory, 30 military observers and several helicopters are sent to
the region.
1981 CHAD?CIA
begins supplying funds and military equipment to the forces of Hissen
coalition government of President Goukouni
Habre, fighting to overthrow the Libyan-backed
Oeddei.
1981-84

involv?
NICARAGUA?U.S.
begins destabilization campaign against Nicaragua,
isolation, and financing and equipping
strangulation, attempts at diplomatic
ing economic
counterrevolutionaries who are trained and supervised by the CIA.
Nicaraguan
the first contingent of 670
1982 SINAI?To
monitor the Egypt-Israeli
peace accord,
American soldiers arrives in Sinai to bolster an international force.
1982 LEBANON?To
facilitate the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut under Israeli

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35

U.S. International Lawlessness

serve for 12 days in a multinational peacekeeping


force; they return in
guns, 800 Marines
in Palestinian refugee camps.
September following a massacre
1983 EGYPT?To
intimidate Libya's Qaddafi from backing anti-government forces in the
Sudan, fourAW ACS aircraft are sent toEgypt and a carrier task force is stationed in the vicinity.
1983 GRENADA?U.S.
Marines
invade and occupy Grenada.
1983 EL SALVADOR?U.S.
military advisers direct military operations of the Salvadoran
Army against guerrilla insurgents and thousands of civilians.

SOURCES
Blechman,
1978

Kaplan, et al.
Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces
The Brookings Institution, pp. 47-49,

Dixon, Marlene
"The
1984

Suez

Syndrome: U.S.

as a Political Instrument. Washington


59-63, 95-98.

Imperialism

in Decline."

D.C:

Contemporary Marxism

(Winter).
Foreign Affairs Division,
1975
"Background

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress


Information on theUse of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries"
U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 58-66.
(1975 Revision). Washington, DC:
Grimmett, Richard F.
1975
"Reported Foreign and Domestic Covert Activities of the United States Central
1950-1974." Washington, DC:
Center for Defense
Infor?
Intelligence Agency:
mation (February 25).
U.S. News & World Report
"When Military Muscle
1983
pp. 7-8F.

Accompanies

the U.S.

Flag"

(Main Edition)

(April 5),

APPENDIX B:
CHARTERS AND TREATIES
Charter

of the Organization

of American

States:

Chapter IV?Fundamental
Rights and Duties of States:
Article 18: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.
Article 19: No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or
political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from itadvan?
tages of any kind.
Article 20: The territoryof a State is inviolable; itmay not be the object, even temporarily,
ofmilitary occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly,
on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by
force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

Settlement of Disputes:
Chapter V?Pacific
Article 23: All international disputes thatmay arise between American States shall be submit?
ted to the peaceful procedures set forth in thisCharter, before being referred to the Security Coun?
cil of theUnited Nations.

Charter of the United Nations


and Statute of the International Court of Justice:
and Principles:
Chapter
I?Purposes
Article 2, No. 4: All Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or

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Frappier

36

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
to Threats
to the Peace,
with Respect
Chapter VII?Action
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression:
Breaches
Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or col?
lective self-defense ifan armed attack occurs against a Member of theUnited Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
Measures
taken by Members
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order tomaintain or restore international peace and security.

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,


Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947 (Rio Treaty)
Article 1: The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their interna?
tional relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.
Article 2: As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, theHigh Con?
tracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them tomethods
of peaceful settlement to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of
the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to theGeneral Assembly
or the Security Council of the United Nations.
Article 3(1): The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an

American State shall be considered as an attack against all theAmerican States and, consequently,
each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist inmeeting the attack in the exercise
of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of theCharter
of the United Nations.

Vienna

Convention

on the Law

of Treaties

IV?Fundamental
Chapter
Rights and Duties of States
Article 18: Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into
force.
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when:
instruments constituting the treaty or has
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) ithas expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.

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