Acta Politica, 2007, 42, (252270)

r 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0001-6810/07 $30.00

www.palgrave-journals.com/ap

Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist

Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from
Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynicism
Andre Krouwela and Koen Abtsb
a

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Political Science, De Boelelaan 1081, Amsterdam 1081 HV,
The Netherlands.
E-mail: APM.Krouwel@fsw.vu.nl
b
Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Van Evenstraat 2B, Leuven 3000, Belgium.
E-mail: koen.abts@soc.kuleuven.be

Eurosceptics may differ in intensity, and in their arguments for opposing the
European Union (EU), by focusing their critiques on different political targets and/
or aspects of Europeanization. The generic label of Euroscepticism may
incorporate sceptical, cynical or oppositional attitudes. We try therefore to develop
a two-dimensional conceptualization by combining both the targets and the degree
of popular discontent towards the EU and European integration. The first axis
differentiates between attitudes towards the authorities, the regime and the
community, while the second axis differentiates attitudes according to their degree
of reflexivity and negativism. Investigating simultaneously both dimensions of
political discontent, we can chart different types of Euroscepticism on a sliding
scale of political attitudes, which runs from trust, over scepticism to political
distrust, cynicism and alienation. In the final section, we show how political
entrepreneurs are able to tap into mass attitudes towards the EU and European
integration. Given that most citizens do not have fixed views on Europe, populism
is capable of feeding a downward spiral from Euroscepticism to more diffuse
discontent like Eurocynicism.
Acta Politica (2007) 42, 252270. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500187
Keywords: Euroscepticism; European integration; populism; political attitudes

Introduction
If a permissive consensus among European citizens in favour of European
integration ever existed in the first decades of the European project, it is now
no longer present. European political leaders are increasingly confronted with
an environment, where political actions at the European Union (EU) level are
tightly constrained by an, at best, ambivalent public opinion towards the
accelerated process of European integration. More than ever before, European

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leaders have to compete for public support for the European Union (EU),
while citizens attitudes towards European integration, EU institutions and EU
policies are increasingly important (Hix, 2005). As Franklin et al. (1994) noted:
the anti-Europe bottle has been uncorked. The ongoing erosion of popular
consensus regarding European integration results in two main research
questions. First, how can the decline and variation in general support for
integration and the EU be explained? Second, how exactly is popular
opposition to be Europe be understood?
Several explanations have been suggested as to why some citizens embrace
the European integration project, whereas others reject it. First, utilitarian
models posit that attitudes towards European integration are shaped by socioeconomic situations resulting in different costs from integration policies.
Winners of economic globalization tend to be more supportive of European
integration than those who lose out in the process of economic integration.
A second approach suggests that EU-attitudes are a function of citizens feelings
of national identity, their perceptions of cultural threats to the nation-state as
well as anti-immigrant sentiments. The stronger these feelings, the more they
perceive Europeanization as a cultural threat to their (ethnic) national
community, and the less supportive they will be of European integration.
A third approach links Euroscepticism to evaluations of domestic governments
and national democracy. The more citizens are dissatisfied with their national
government and institutions, the more likely they will be reluctant to support
EU integration (Gabel, 1998; McLaren, 2002, 2005, and in this issue).
We argue that these studies have not unearthed a satisfactory explanation
for the widely varying attitudes citizens adopt because of a lack of analytical
differentiation of these attitudes. A frequently used concept like Euroscepticism denotes both critical and negative attitudes and even outright opposition
towards Europe, while the target of dissatisfaction seems to vary from the very
idea of European integration, to EU institutions, EU policies or its politicians.
Thus, we need a more sophisticated typology to adequately capture the varying
degrees and targets of public discontent. We place the rise of Euroscepticism in
relation to the two broader trends of contemporary politics: a declining trust in
democratic institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2000) and an increased mobilization of all kinds of cultural, economic and political discontent by populist
entrepreneurs. The latter combine popular anti-immigrant and anti-European
integration stances with a broader criticism of the political establishment
(Meny and Surel, 2002). By delving deeper into the structure of political
discontent and its effects on political trust, we are able to link political
discontent with populism. We argue that populism is not simply a response to
declining political trust, but that populists mobilize, generate and generalize
feelings of political discontent. In addition, populism replaces system trust with
personal trust in the populist leader (Offe, 1999).
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This article is divided into four sections. First, we review existing definitions
of party-based Euroscepticism and draw attention to several problems existing
in its conceptualization. We argue that the concept of Euroscepticism is
inappropriate for grasping the complexity of EU attitudes at the mass level.
Second, we offer an alternative conceptual framework through which the
variety of citizens attitudes on Europe can be analysed. Our formal typology
distinguishes two axes that structure support or rejection of the EU and
European integration. The first axis refers to the targets of supportive or
rejective attitudes. Attitudes may be directed towards specific authorities, the
regime or the political community. The second axis differentiates attitudes
according to their degree of reflexivity, which includes three elements: (a) the
level of monitoring of the political environment, (b) the degree of openness to
evaluating relevant information and (c) the extent of differentiation between
the targets. Third, this two-dimensional conceptualization allows us to
investigate simultaneously both targets and degree of popular discontent
towards the EU. By combining the two dimensions, we can chart different
types of political support or discontent on a sliding scale of political attitudes,
which runs from trust in the main political institutions and goals of the EU, via
scepticism to more negative orientations ranging from political distrust,
cynicism to alienation. This scale represents more adequately a wide range of
political attitudes individuals can adopt towards the complex phenomenon of
European integration. Fourth, we show how political entrepreneurs are able to
tap into the structure of mass attitudes towards the EU and European
integration. Given that most citizens do not have fixed views on Europe,
populism is capable of feeding a downward spiral that is operating via two
mechanisms. On the one hand, populist entrepreneurs generalize dissatisfaction
with specific politicians or policies to more diffuse discontent with EU
institutions and EU membership. On the other hand, populists transform the
degree of reflexivity of citizens by negatively framing citizens observations and
evaluations in the direction of cynicism, even alienation. While issues of
European integration are often portrayed as secondary or irrelevant to
domestic politics, the dynamics between increasing levels of political discontent
and populist mobilization of latent negative evaluations of European
integration can actually have significant impact in national and European
politics.

Euroscepticism: Whats In a Name?

The concept of Euroscepticism connotes a wide range of meanings. According
to Taggart (1998, 366), party-based Euroscepticism expresses the idea of
contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and
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unqualified opposition to the process of European integration. In a later

elaboration, Taggart breaks down his broad definition into hard and soft
varieties: Hard Euroscepticism implies outright rejection of the entire project
of European political and economic integration, and opposition to ones
country joining or remaining a member of the EU (Taggart and Szczerbiak,
2004, 3). In this sense, hard Euroscepticism refers to principled rejection of the
very idea of any European integration, but also to outright objection to the EU
and the current form of integration in the EU on the grounds of deeply held
values. Soft Euroscepticism, by contrast, involves contingent or qualified
opposition to European integration related to national-interest and/or policyoriented concerns (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004, 4). In contrast to hard
Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism seems to be compatible with support for
the European project in itself. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) emphasize the
conceptual weaknesses of this distinction: the criteria remain unclear; the
difference is blurred in practice; and soft Euroscepticism is defined too broadly.
More importantly, the categories of Euroscepticism fail to do enough justice
to the subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas of European
integration, on the one hand, and the European Union as the current
embodiment of these ideas, on the other hand (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002, 300).
The authors offer an alternative two-dimensional typology of Euroscepticism
that distinguishes between diffuse and specific support for European
integration. Diffuse support refers to the general ideas of European integration
underlying the EU, while specific support denotes support for the general
practice of European integration, that is, the EU as it is and as it is developing
(Kopecky and Mudde, 2002, 300). These two dimensions lead to a matrix of
four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe, namely Euroenthusiasts, Euro-pragmatists, Eurosceptics and Euro-rejects, which also
introduces a positive stance as a specific political attitude. While the distinction
between diffuse and specific support for European integration is useful for
categorizing formal party positions on Europe, the Kopecky and Muddes
categorization remains imprecise. Public evaluations of the EU and Europeanization are far more complex and dynamic than the two models above allow
for. In general, the concept of Euroscepticism does not tap the diversity of EU
pessimism at the mass level. Indeed, as Taggart (1998, 365) himself asserts
opposition to and support for the EU are rarely either binary or absolute.
Mass attitudes towards Europe display a wide variety of forms and shapes on
multiple levels, ranging from different evaluations of European integration and
divergent opinions on how the EU is or should function.
Euroscepticism is a complex phenomenon, and a framework should allow
for such variation. So-called Eurosceptics may first of all differ in the precise
arguments for opposing the EU. Attitudes towards Europe can be directed
against the very idea of European integration; the actual integration process of
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enlargement and/or deepening; the perceived impact of particular developments within this process; the EU and its officials, performance, output and
policies; and, last but not least, politics in general. Secondly, Eurosceptics may
differ in the degree of opposition. The generic label of Euroscepticism may
incorporate sceptical, distrustful, cynical or oppositional attitudes. Therefore,
we try to expand the existing research on popular Euroscepticism by
developing a two-dimensional conceptualization that allows us to investigate
simultaneously both the targets and the degree of popular discontent towards
the EU and European integration.

A Formal Anatomy of European Discontent

Political discontent is a generic term encompassing a broad range of
unfavourable attitudes that people might have towards political targets and
processes. The level of negative affect is a function of the perceived match
between citizen expectations or demands, and the performance of different
parts of the political regime (Craig, 1993).
Political support for Europe needs to be understood as a multi-dimensional
phenomenon. Our two-dimensional framework distinguishes between the
targets of political support and the degree of reflexivity, that is to say the extent
to which individuals are able to differentiate evaluations between different
actors and institutions in a political system.

Targets of discontent: authorities, regime and community

The first axis refers to the targets of (dis)content. Our classification
differentiates three main targets: the European authorities; the European regime
including institutions, performance and regime principles and the European
community (Easton, 1965; Norris, 1999). In the European context, these levels
range on a continuum from support for specific EU politicians, EU
institutions, EU policies and the practice of Europeanization to more diffuse
support for the general ideas underpinning the entire project of European
integration (Figure 1).
The first target of support consists of the political actors and authorities,
including evaluations of politicians as a political class and the performance of
particular leaders. At the level of authorities two elements are important for the
evaluation of citizens: the integrity and the competence of politicians (Levi and
Stoker, 2000). This actor-oriented trust comprises attributes that refer to
normative and performance-related evaluations of EU politicians and the EU
Commission officials. The moral dimension taps into judgements about
integrity. Are actors committed to and motivated by the public interest? Are
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Targets

Sub-targets
Morals

Criteria of evaluation
Integrity of actors

European Union

Authorities

(specific support)

(actors)

Actions

Competence of actors

Regime

Institutions

Responsiveness Equity

(institutions)

Performance

Output Outcomes

European integration
(diffuse support)

Community

Practice of European integration

Widening Deepening

Liberal-democratic society

European democracy

European integration

National sovereignty

European project

EU membership legitimacy

Figure 1 Targets of European evaluation.

actors reliable in terms of keeping their promise? Are they predictable and
consistent in their behaviour? The second element relates to the competence of
political actors. Here political support is dependent on whether the EU
authorities are seen as capable of acting, and whether they are perceived as
efficient, effective, skilful and productive in bringing about the policies and
goods that citizens expect.
The second cluster of targets refers to support for the political regime. It
encompasses specific political institutions like the EU commission and
European Parliament, the performance of the EU in terms of policy outcomes,
and the underlying principles of widening and deepening. With respect to the
institutions, citizens evaluate a political system on its equity (fairness)
and its responsiveness to their needs. Equity concerns evaluations whether
the EU constitutes an impartial arena for resolving political conflicts.
Responsiveness refers to the extent to which citizens feel they can influence
politics and the extent to which politicians are aware of citizens needs
and interests and take these into account.1 A second element of regime
evaluation is concerned with policy performance. There is substantial evidence
that people consider value-oriented as well as instrumental outcomes
when making trust judgements about government. As Scharpf has argued,
European trust will not persist if the EU and its political system do not
deliver certain goods (Scharpf, 1999; see also Olson, 1965). Finally, attitudes
are also directed towards the general practice of European integration, that is
to say, the process of widening and deepening transnational cooperation,
and its effect on national identity, domestic market, welfare-state and political
sovereignty.2
A third target for citizens is the political community, which has to do with the
attachment to or identification with a community to which citizens may or may
not want to belong. First, this target includes the general idea of European
integration, that is to say, the basic political principles and values that underpin
transnational European democracy. Second, it includes attitudes towards
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Degree of reflexivity
Degree of negativism

Monitoring

Differentiation

Receptivity

Confidence/trust

Fairly Low

Low

Fairly Closed

High

Very High

Open

Fairly High

High

Fairly Closed

Scepticism
Distrust
Cynicism

Low

Low

Closed

Alienation

Low

Very Low

Closed

Figure 2 Reflexivity and negativism of evaluation.

European integration as a project for the common good for Europe. Third, and
most crucially, people may fundamentally oppose or favour the basic idea of
European integration and the EUs role in securing peace, prosperity or
democracy because of its (in)compatibility with national sovereignty.

Degree of discontent: reflexivity and negativism

The degree of political discontent with European integration is not only
connected to the different targets, but it also depends on the degree of reflexivity
(Figure 2). To investigate reflexivity, we draw attention to three aspects of
political evaluations: the level of monitoring of the political environment, the
receptivity or open-mindedness towards observation and the extent to which
targets are differentiated. Citizens differ substantially in their motivations and
arguments to oppose or support European integration, and we argue that it is
important to distinguish varieties of discontent. Building on social theories about
trust (Luhmann, 1979; Govier, 1997; Sztompka, 1999), we conceptualize the
degree of negativism or discontent as a typology of five political orientations
ranging from trust, scepticism, distrust and cynicism to alienation.

Trust: confident and observant citizens

Trust or confidence is the belief that the political regime will work according to
our expectations as prior experiences have not provided evidence to the
contrary. Confidence, despite its conditionality, frees individuals from the need
of constant monitoring and thus can ultimately take the form of a naive and
unquestioned leap of faith. Trusting citizens do not differentiate between the
various targets; the system in its entirety is evaluated.
Political scepticism: alert and critical citizens
Scepticism denotes a profoundly questioned belief. Scepticism is about
matching belief to evidence and thus sceptics remain very alert: they actively
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monitor their political environment and do not automatically accept the

truthfulness of political claims. Sceptics differentiate between the various
political actors, institutions, processes and output. Essential is the ceaseless
search for new facts as well as the postponement of final conclusions.
Scepticism is an attitude of reserve, where both trust and distrust are
temporarily suspended (Lom, 2000). That is why scepticism could be defined as
reluctant (dis)trust of political power, meaning that sceptics can always revoke
their confidence in specific political actors and institutions. Since (dis)trust
never becomes unconditional, scepticism is a matter of doubt rather than
denial. It implies also keeping an open mind. Sceptics do allow for the
possibility that the political system will act on their behalf and take their values
and interests into account, although they never assume this happens as a rule.
So, scepticism is a position of responsible criticism: it is a critical-reflexive
stance towards both politics and system-performance. As a relatively impartial
attitude without clear prior expectations, scepticism oscillates between
unqualified confidence and active distrust.
Political distrust: alert and pessimistic citizens
Political distrust can develop when a sceptic is frequently disappointed or feels
betrayed by political actors or malfunctioning institutions. While confident
citizens have positive expectations, distrusting citizens make reflexive assessments of political realities, which may result in negative expectations about the
actions of others as well as negative and defensive commitments towards the
political system. Distrust is an attitude of suspicion and wariness, a feeling of
uncertainty and lack of confidence in others. Distrustful people constantly feel
the need to watch their backs and check all relevant information, which restrict
them severely to act socially leading up to negative engagements (Luhmann,
1979; Barber, 1983; Govier, 1997; Lewicki et al., 1998; Sztompka, 1999).
Distrusting citizens have a suspicious mind that forces them to constantly
monitor the various political actors and activities, yet they have a biased, and
usually pessimistic worldview. However, despite the fact that distrusting
citizens are not entirely open-minded when observing politics, they can
differentiate among actors or activities, and this makes it possible for them to
mobilize to change the system. This combination of a negative bias, active
monitoring as well as democratic commitment provides the possibility that
disappointment in politics and the negative spiral of distrust can be broken
(Easton, 1975; Luhmann, 1979; Putnam, 1993).
Political cynicism: harsh and prejudiced negativism
As long as citizens monitor the authorities and democratic process, they may
still be persuaded to participate and support representative democratic
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institutions and actors. However, if distrust is no longer based upon

knowledge, observation or informed argumentation, it becomes cynicism (Litt,
1963; Erber and Lau, 1990; Craig, 1993). Whereas scepticism and distrust
require a relatively open mind, cynicism lacks any reflexivity. A cynic is
someone who has already made up his or her mind and in a negative
direction. Cynics follow politics irregularly, and then see what they want to see.
Cynicism could be defined as a condition of lost belief (Chaloupka, 1999, xiv).
Cynics are incapable of differentiating between political actors and institutions,
and they have a tendency to generalize negativism about particular leaders to
the entire political process. Cynicism is a pre-reflexive and obsessive lack of
trust, combined with an outright disbelief in positive motives and actions of
others (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Govier, 1997; Sztompka, 1999). Rooted
in the conviction that self-interest motivates human behaviour, cynics believe
that political elites are selfish, insincere and incompetent, while the political
system must be profoundly corrupt. Principally based on stereotypes, more
than the expression of genuine discontent, cynicism constitutes largely
ritualistic expressions of fashionable cliches (Citrin, 1974, 984). Consequently,
cynicism has the inherent tendency to endorse and reinforce itself in social
interactions. The contemptuous attitude of political cynicism tends to deepen
negativism and suspicion, and it does not provide much opening to reverse the
negative spiral of cynicism.

Political alienation: disconnected citizens

Once citizens turn away from politics, they cease to pay attention to democratic
institutions. They develop an aversion to political life and the process of
alienation sets in. Alienated citizens abandon not only specific support, but
also diffuse support as a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that
helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed
(Easton, 1965, 273, 1975, 444). To put it another way, political alienation
denotes the loss of both procedural trust and systemic trust in democracy.
Alienated people do not differentiate between actors and institutions; they no
longer trust institutionalized democratic practices and procedures like
elections, representation, checks and balances, and rule of law as good
instruments to achieve binding decisions, to satisfy the common good and to
reach reasonable compromises among conflicting interests (Finifter, 1970).
They also no longer trust the functionality of the liberal democratic system as
the only equitable regime (Sztompka, 1999). And they lack the willingness to
cooperate within the existing political community (Easton, 1965). Thus,
politically alienated citizens withdraw from the democratic system, an attitude
characterized by a negligible level of monitoring and a predetermined aversive
evaluation of democratic politics.
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A Sliding Scale of European Discontent

By combining targets and degree of discontent, the structure of European
discontent can be operationalized as a sliding scale of political attitudes
ranging from confidence and scepticism at the positive pole to distrust,
cynicism and alienation at the negative end of the scale (Figure 3).
This combination of targets and degree of discontent makes it possible to
differentiate more precisely between various attitudes towards the EU and
European integration.
Euroconfidence refers to a preconceived and pre-reflexive generalized
attitude of obedient assent to EU politics. Euroconfidents do not feel
the need to monitor closely, are relatively close-minded, and do not
distinguish between European targets. They trust European authorities, the
European regime and the idea of European integration; they believe in
the competence and integrity of European politicians; they expect the
regime to function well; they feel that the EU institutions are responsive
and fair; they evaluate EU policy output as satisfactory; and they
support further development of European integration; they subscribe
fundamentally to both the underlying principles of the political community
of Europe and the general ideas of European integration. They believe
that the European project is democratic, and they recognize themselves

Degree of reflexivity
trust

Targets

skepticism distrust cynicism alienation

Level of monitoring

Fairly low -------high-------- fairly high----------low--------very low

Open-mindedness in evaluation
Fairly closed------open------ fairly closed--------closed-------closed

Morals

Integrity of actors

Actions

Competence of
actors

Institutions

Responsiveness &
fairness

Performance

Output and
outcomes

Practice of
European
integration

Widening and
deepening

Liberal democratic society

Democracy in EU

European
integration

National sovereignty

European project

EU membership
legitimacy

European Integration
(Diffuse support)

European Union
(Specific support)

Authorities

Regime

Community

Differentiation of Targets
low----------very high----------high-----------low----------very low

Figure 3 A typology of European (dis)content.

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in an integrated Europe based on pooled sovereignty and a common

market economy.
Euroscepticism reflects a trade-off between some dissatisfaction with current
EU performance and confidence in the overall project of European integration.
Eurosceptics are ambivalent about European authorities and the regime. They
feel the need for closer scrutiny, and are not automatically persuaded that the
EU institutions are responsive or that the output is adequate. Eurosceptics
need periodic supportive evidence and are able to differentiate between the
various targets. Unlike confident citizens, Eurosceptics adopt a critical attitude
towards particular EU policy initiatives, and they may be sceptical about
deepening or widening. Different subgroups of Eurosceptics may actually
differ in their motivations and arguments concerning their (dis)content for the
EU and the European integration process (Lindstrom, 2002; Sorensen, 2004).
To sum up, Eurosceptics do not support the EU unconditionally in its current
incarnation and have doubts about its future developments. However, they do
not question the principle of EU cooperation or the underlying principles of
European integration.
The roots of Eurodistrust lie in frustrations with the perceived failure of the
EU to meet the expectations and demands of citizens. Distrusting citizens are
frequently disappointed, which results in a negative evaluation of the current
operation as well as pessimism about the future performance of the EU.
However, confidence in the general ideas of European integration remains.
Political distrust is the product of citizens perception of discrepancies between
actual EU performance and the democratic ideal. Therefore, distrusting
citizens need almost constant monitoring of various aspects of the political
system and they probe deep into political affairs. Similar to sceptics, distrusting
citizens display variation in their evaluation and attitude towards different
targets, even though their mindset is more closed since they are pretty
convinced they will find incompetent politicians, unresponsive institutions,
inadequate output and failures in the development of European integration.
Nevertheless, this general negative predisposition is combined with some level
of reflexivity, which allows them to evaluate some targets positively and remain
supportive of European integration.
Eurocynicism combines a generalized disdain for European authorities with
outright disbelief in the virtuous functioning of the EU institutions and fatalism
about the future of the European project. Eurocynics do probe into the political
system, yet with a closed mindset, totally lacking reflexivity. Unable to
differentiate between political targets, they reject the whole project of European
integration. In spite of this generalized negativism, cynics regard themselves as
enlightened free thinkers, who believe in their own competence to see the real
problems. However, since cynics feel that nothing can be changed, political
action is pointless. Nevertheless, they can be convinced that radical political
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change is possible by voting the rascals out. Populists, with an outspoken antiestablishment rhetoric, can capitalize political cynicism and even increase it.
Euro-alienation, the most extreme attitude of European dissociation and
dissatisfaction, is the enduring and profound rejection of the EU. Alienated
citizens outright oppose the general principles, institutions and processes of
European integration and do not want to belong to the supra-national
community. We can distinguish two subgroups: the Euro-estranged and the
Euro-rejects. The milder form of Euro-estrangement indicates a loss of diffuse
support for European integration and favourable attitudes towards the
European project, as well as a lack of identification with the European
political community. Euro-rejects are principled and ideologically opposed to
European integration, because they may be nationalists, socialists, or isolation
lists, or simply because they believe the idea of European integration is a folly
in the face of the diversity existing among European states (Kopecky and
Mudde, 2002, 301).
In sum, attitudes of scepticism and distrust denote active civicness, including
an (relative) observant, reflexive and open-minded stance towards politics.
Both attitudes express the idea of contingent or qualified opposition towards
the European regime. Their criticism towards the practice of European
integration does not mean that they perceive the idea of European integration
in itself as a bad thing. Sceptic and distrustful citizens may well contest some
elements of European integration while accepting other aspects. Rather than
viewing Eurosceptic or Euro-distrustful attitudes incompatible with or in
opposition to pro-European positions, they should be considered as reconcilable with positive evaluations of the larger European project. Cynicism
and alienation, on the other hand, are in strict opposition to the EU and
incompatible with the idea of European integration. Generally, cynic and
alienated citizens disengage from politics, they adopt a low degree of
observation and they have an outlook of pre-reflexive dissent. Cynics oppose
the EU as an adjunct of their general opposition to contemporary political
systems. Based on ideological opposition, alienated citizens take an antiintegration position and they outright reject EU membership as well as the very
idea of European integration.

The Populist Mobilization of Political Discontent

Populists can tap into these attitudes of discontent and more negative
evaluations of the process of Europeanization. We argue that populist do not
simply mobilize negative stances such as distrust and cynicism, but they
actively transform and funnel attitudes towards more negative and rejective
positions. Populists influence both the degree of negativism and the degree of
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reflexivity. It is our assertion that populism is able to transfer political attitudes

from one referent to the other, from one politician to the whole political
establishment, from one institution to the whole system and also to the wider
political environment of transnational actors and institutions. Indeed, anti-EU
attitudes are often highly related to distrust or a cynic perception of the
functioning of the national political system in general (Taggart, 1998, 368). As
citizens are generally uninformed about the EU, their political opinions are
strongly influenced by the domestic political context. In this manner, attitudes
toward supranational actors and institutions can simply be transferred from
the national establishment to the European political class and from national
institutions to the EU-level. How do populists transfer attitudes from one
target to the other and how do they transform the degrees of reflexivity of
citizens?
Populist ideologies consist of minimally two elements: (a) a desire for the
sovereign rule of a homogeneous people whose will has to be expressed directly
by a single leader or movement and (b) an aversion against political
intermediaries, which results in an antagonism between the people and the
established elite (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000; Meny and Surel, 2002). In the
eyes of the populist, the established elites have hijacked representative
democracy, and it is the task of the populist to give back the power to the
people and restore popular sovereignty. Although the people can be defined
ethnically, civically or as a silent majority, central to populism is the
monolithic-antagonistic interpretation of a singular, united and organic
people, which is pitted against those ruling in their name. As Cas Mudde
(2004, 543) puts it: populism is an ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure
people vs the corrupt elite. Clearly, the populist leader sides with the people on
this divide, while the entire political establishment, whether in government or
opposition, is recoded to a homogeneous political class (Schedler, 1996, 295).
The establishment is attacked for its alleged privileges, corruption, nonresponsiveness, lack of representativeness and incompetence. In this manner,
populists de-legitimize their political opponents. Opposing parties are no
longer perceived as legitimate adversaries with whom to compete for power,
but as illegitimate enemies who should be removed from the political domain.
Populism is, however, not an anti-system ideology in the sense that it amounts
to a wholesale rejection of the current order: populist parties do not propose a
comprehensive alternative organization of the society, as the radical left once
did. On the other hand, populists attack politics as usual, since they see
differences between government and opposition as meaningless.
Because politics should be an expression of the general will, populists agitate
against all political intermediary organizations that obstruct the true, direct
and uncorrupted expression of the will of the people. That is why populists
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attack the specific organizational and institutional elements of representative

democracy and they present the incumbent elite as a monolithic entity that
perverts democracy. In practice, populist disapproval of representative
democracy is mostly a reaction against elitist democracy (Mair, 2002). The
populist critique focuses particularly on political parties that are seen as
divisive, while the bureaucratic and institutional structures are presented as
mechanisms to complicate and obscure responsibilities in policy-making.
Therefore, the intermediary structures and procedures need to be broken down
to be replaced by a more direct link between the will of the people and actions
of the leader. By means of popular acclamation, the supremacy of the will of
the people has to be restored. In the populists view, democracy as it functions
is attacked in the name of democracy as an ideal (Meny and Surel, 2002).
Populism is then an expression of dissatisfaction with existing modes of
organization of elite-mass political intermediation (Kitschelt, 2002, 179).
The populist transfer of distrust
We expect populism to be successful in a situation where the incumbent
government is distrusted by a substantial number of citizens who nevertheless
feel politically competent to voice their disapproval and act upon it.
Elaborating on Gamson (1968), we state that a combination of high political
efficacy and low political trust is the optimal combination for the rise of
populism when citizens believe that influence is both possible and necessary.
The justification for linking attitudes of distrust and cynicism with the rise of
populism is derived from the robust empirical finding that generalized distrust,
combined with political efficacy, can become an independent determinant of
political attitudes and activities (Easton, 1975; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981;
Levi and Stoker, 2000). Negative political attitudes such as distrust and
cynicism can be used to mobilize voters. Evidence from the USA suggests that
those who evaluate the incumbent government as untrustworthy are more
likely to vote when they have the option to vote for an outsider candidate
(Lukes and Citrin, 1997).
Yet, populism is not simply the mobilization of existing political attitudes.
Populists create, transfer and transform various forms of political discontent
towards the direction of cynicism. Capitalizing on the ever-present concern of
individuals about their future and a rudimentary idea that, with the right
government, things could be much better, populists insist that the people do
not have the government they deserve. At the same time, populists present
themselves as political outsiders that can oust the incumbent elite, sweep the
institutions clean of corruption and deliver what the people really want. In this
way, populists tap into the fiduciary obligation (Craig, 1993) to change
things. The populist appeal for a change of government is an amalgamation of
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elements of democratic competence, integrity, equity, responsiveness and

performance. Populist rhetoric devotes little attention to the complexities and
incremental nature of democratic decision-making. Populists frame public
enthusiasm for radical reform in such a way that it seems merely designed to reestablish the balance between elected officials and ordinary people. Important
within this populist strategy is the suggestion that traditional politicians merely
created the existing system for themselves and can therefore not be trusted.
Instead, the people should trust the populist politician. Thus, populists transfer
distrust and discontent to the entire political elite, all institutions of
representative democracy and all bureaucratic processes. Populists use specific
criticisms and then extend it to the entire spectrum of targets. At the same time,
they attempt to diminish system-trust by trying to transfer trust towards a
single individual: the populist leader. In Weberian terms, populism supplants
legal legitimacy based on institutional and procedural trust into charismatic
legitimacy based on personal trust (Sztompka, 1999, 45).

The populist transformation of reflexivity

Populists tap into, generate and amplify a mix of high political efficacy among
voters and distrust of the incumbent elite, as well as popular discontent with
the intermediary collectives, procedures and institutions that the establishment
utilizes (Craig, 1993; Hayward, 1996; Kitschelt, 2002; Linz, 2002). Effective
populist strategies boost the general level of distrust in the entire system. What
we are describing, of course, is the Eastonian scenario: the possibility that if
discontent with perceived performance continues over a long enough time, it
may result in an unyielding political cynicism or gradually erode even the
strongest underlying bonds of attachment (Gamson, 1968, 148; Easton, 1975,
444445).
Populists generalize obvious shortcomings into radical criticism and
rejection of the system as a whole or even the principles of representation
itself (Urbinati, 1998; Canovan, 1999; Mouffe, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2002;
Taggart, 2002). By framing critique of specific actors or institutions in this
populist logic, populists become crucial transformers of popular dissatisfaction
in terms of levels of reflexivity. Populists provide citizens with a closed
framework of observation: citizens do no longer need to observe political
actors and processes closely as they are all wicked and dysfunctional according
to the populist gospel. The populist tactic of presenting the entire elite as
corrupt and incompetent, the institutions as generally dysfunctional allows
citizens to close their minds and embrace the populist interpretation. Thus,
populists do not only transfer negative evaluations from one target to the
other, but they also provide citizens with a perspective that allows them to
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decrease the level of monitoring and to become more closed-minded in their

evaluations.
Where populists are successful, the established parties can no longer remain
indifferent and traditional politicians will also be tempted to use rhetorical and
discursive elements of the populist ideology (Mair, 2002; Surel, 2002). To
distinguish themselves from other traditional political actors, some established
parties are even using a pronounced anti-establishment rhetoric. By adopting
populist strategies and rhetoric, the traditional actors legitimize the populist
observational framework. In this sense, populist movements can distort
representative democracy over and beyond their movement. There is yet
another risk. Populism creates also an alliance between two types of outsiders:
the cynical voter and the populist entrepreneur. The adoption of a closed
mindset, the transfer of discontent towards the entire political system and the
transfer of hope into a single populist leader may eventually lead to alienation
and hostility if the populist movement fails to deliver on its promises. Given
that the political system has lost meaning, it is not longer we against the rest,
but we on our own. Although this kind of ultimate disillusionment does not
turn automatically into political alienation, generalized political cynicism is a
potential breeding ground for anti-democratic attitudes as well as antidemocratic entrepreneurs. Therefore, political cynicism could be the entrance
ticket to political alienation. When the transforming power of populism
appears minimal and populist promises turn out to be hot air, it will prove
difficult to reconnect citizens to the political system. If citizens decreased their
level of reflexivity, have stopped observing, at least with a minimal openness
and possibility for positive evaluations, and they have been taken down the
road of political negativism, the transformative power of populism may well
prove too strong to curb with traditional political strategies.

Conclusion and Discussion

Above we developed a two-dimensional model of political discontent that
enables us to construct a more precise understanding of political trust,
scepticism, distrust, cynicism and alienation. Citizens attitudes towards
various aspects of the political system are complex and subject to change over
time. Simple and static concepts such as Euroscepticism fail to grasp this
complexity. By distinguishing the degree of reflexivity and negativism on the
one hand, and by differentiating the targets of individual evaluations on the
other, we shed light on the variety of negative attitudes towards politics. To
demonstrate that this model is theoretically useful and can unearth the
dynamics of political trust, we linked our gliding scale of political discontent to
the rise of populism. We argued that populists not merely tap into existing
dissatisfaction, but that they increase the level and scope of discontent by
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transforming the level of reflexivity and by transferring negative evaluations of

singular actors or institutions to the entire national and supra-national political
system. Instead of using a catch-all concept like Euroscepticism for a wide
range of attitudes towards various actors, institutions, processes, outputs and
outcomes of European integration, we suggest a more detailed analysis of these
attitudes, which can gain an insight into Euro-supportive and Euro-rejective
attitudes.
Some readers might frown upon our positioning of political scepticism at the
more positive end on this continuum. Clearly, most literature associates
Euroscepticism with negative attitudes towards Europeanization. However, we
do not regard scepticism to be a negative political attitude and would argue,
with Mischler and Rose, that democracy requires trust but also presupposes
an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and a
willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and to assert control over
government at a minimum by replacing the government of the day. Whereas
insufficient trust presages the disintegration of civil society, excessive trust
cultivates political apathy and encourages a loss of citizen vigilance and control
of government, both of which undermine democracy (Mischler and Rose,
1997, 419). In a sense, Euroscepticism might be more adequately understood as
a response to the practice of European integration, rather than a manifestation
of deep-seated perspectives and evaluations of European integration. Eurosceptics may seek more substantive political debate on national sovereignty
and independence, while Eurocynics and Euro-opponents promote reactionary
and exclusionary forms of politics.
To a certain extent, political discontent is a positive feature for democracy.
A democratic polity requires criticism, competition and contestation based on
democratic allegiance (Dahl, 1998). Democratic systems are characterized by
scepticism toward politicians and conditional trust in political institutions.
Democracy, in nuce, is basically organized distrust. In this sense, some distrust
is essential for a viable and vibrant European democratic order (Barber, 1983,
8081). Citizens who are sceptical or distrustful of incumbents will voice
discontent, participate in the political debate and mobilize themselves against
the government of the day. They are the paragons of democratic virtue.
Consequently, we must depart from the idea that political scepticism and
distrust are negative attitudes and rather perceive the relationship between
trust and distrust as alternative and complementary control mechanisms for
the political system (Barber, 1983, 69). Nevertheless, political discontent may
be vulnerable to populist transformation into more inflexible and broadranging negative evaluations of politics. If populists succeed in transforming
critical attitudes into more cynic or alienated stances, citizens may disengage
from democratic politics entirely. They will dramatically decrease their level of
observation and adopt an outlook that is characterized by pre-reflexive
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negativism and dissent. When levels of reflexivity and negativism decline too
far, a critical threshold may be reached beyond which the democratic system
may destabilize.
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Notes
1 This assessment is usually referred to as political efficacy, the belief that citizens can influence the
political process (Craig and Maggiotto, 1981).
2 Here, the target is the perceived impact of incremental processes by which European social,
economic and political dynamics become part of the logic of national discourse, identities,
political structures and public policies (Borneman and Fowler, 1997).
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