G.R. No.

104768
July 21, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q.
RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November
1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The
first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated
items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the
second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the
reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following
the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO
No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the
PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order"
and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated
various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the
reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant
part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the
owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and
lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.

of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the

name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy,
MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the
possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and
communications equipment, the raiding team was also
able to confiscate money in the amount of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit,
Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed
at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the
alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives,
Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car
went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four
(4) attache cases filled with money and owned by
MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that
Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a
mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could
not have used the military equipment/items seized in
her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of
income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money
because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of
the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge,
Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of
these money would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent
were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the
Boards
consultant.
Although
the
amount
of
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima
facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00
and $50,000 US Dollars.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may

be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

The equipment/items and communication facilities

which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano
and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus

Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,

otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property."3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No. 1379")
4 against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintif
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also
impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as codefendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential
agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1
January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended
Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds,
assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and
close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP
Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA
No. 1379.6 The Amended Complaint prayed for, among
others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds
and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended
that his property consisted only of a residential house
at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at
P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary
and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of
any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications
equipment
and
other
items
confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended
Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978
only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the
case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment
of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial
and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to
support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and
18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to

amend the complaint in order "to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture
as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan
proceeded
with
petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion
for leave to amend complaint did not state when
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The
Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter
of the amended complaint was on its face vague and
not
related
to
the
existing
complaint.
The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the
case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked
for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the
trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to
trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack
of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner
reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to
conform to the evidence already presented or to
change the averments to show that Dimaano alone
unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of
the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already
delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its
many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want
the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact
the case had long been ready for trial. The
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again
admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further
evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to its
evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May
1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the resetting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed
its inability to proceed to trial because it had no further
evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice,
the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within
which to file an appropriate pleading.
The
Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic
action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss
based on Republic v. Migrino.9 The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position held without a showing that they are
"subordinates" of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to
costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack
of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and
referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No.
1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private
respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which
petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME

COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474
AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and
Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to
this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their
respective answers with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently
improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of
the petitioner and even before the latter was allowed
to formally ofer its evidence and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF
MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND
LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF
RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND
THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Courts Ruling

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint
on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11
which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private

Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already
decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan13
and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG
has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing
of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not

constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the
items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT
MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS
NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY
AND
BETWEEN
RESPONDENT
RAMAS
AND
RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED
AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER,
INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the

unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.15
The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate government agencies
on the action to be taken based on its findings.16 The
PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the
PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order."
EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task
of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover and sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public

office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,

connections or relationship.

Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black

on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and

corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.

[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2

refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate
the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos
by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x;17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President
assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas
case should fall under the first category of AFP
personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was
undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos
because of his position as the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas
position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO
No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not
automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing
that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive
orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No.
1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.

xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent
is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former President Marcos. There must
be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the
Philippine Army with the rank of Major General19 does
not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its
amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie
showing that Ramas was a close associate of former
President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former
President Marcos were close to him. Such close
association is manifested either by Ramas complicity
with former President Marcos in the accumulation of illgotten wealth by the deposed President or by former
President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to diferentiate the instant case
from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the
instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the
investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in
relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is
a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft
and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate
of the former President. However, the same AFP Board
Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the
following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the

Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs.

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus

Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property."20
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and
prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of
Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation
to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a
specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its

powers must be construed to address such specific and

limited purpose.

contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order

No. 1.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the

Amended Complaint do not show that the properties
Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in
his capacity as a "subordinate" of his commander-inchief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties
Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these
properties were disproportionate to his salary and
other legitimate income without showing that Ramas
amassed them because of his close association with
former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that
the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding
that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his
close association with former President Marcos, thus:

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
categories, require a previous authority of the
President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and
prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive
Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is
vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor
and his assistants and the state prosecutors.
(Emphasis supplied)

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft

Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did
not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing
that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth
by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that
such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the AntiGraft Board should be read in the context of the law
creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above,
pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;21
(Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is
precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO
No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on
the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the
PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the
cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive
Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of
the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act
No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them, during his administration, directly or through
his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority and
influence, connections or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such ofenses
committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG,

should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions
not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth
amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to
file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General.27 The Ombudsman Act or Republic
Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the
PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a
prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of
former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed
with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of
authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since
there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its
amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board
Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that
there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus,
the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to
the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained
wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the
PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any
action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of
government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have
waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition
by
submitting
their
respective
Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents.
Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place.
The
PCGG
cannot
exercise
investigative
or
prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs
powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional
assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only
to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
relatives and cronies.29 Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and

jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as
they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in
Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990,
which explains why private respondents only filed their
Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we
have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction
at any stage of the proceeding.30 Thus, we hold that
there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case.
Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to
an action.31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the
proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No.
1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file
the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.32 The
right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under
RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.33
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred
in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the
records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation
of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for
four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.
Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August
1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17
April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare
its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of
its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date
set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed,
on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of
petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture
as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x."
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the
presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner
did not state when it would file the amended
complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set
the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 2829 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner
ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28
September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on
the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a
narration of the above events because this case has
been ready for trial for over a year and much of the
delay hereon has been due to the inability of the

government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial

and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon
the failure of the military to supply them for the
preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of
equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held
to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases
such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when,
in view of the developments such as those of today,
this Court is now faced with a situation where a case
already in progress will revert back to the preliminary
stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate
action could have been undertaken by the plaintif
Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that
it was conducting a preliminary investigation on the
unexplained wealth of private respondents as
mandated by RA No. 1379.36 The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29
March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly
conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner
until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of
its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead
insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x."37
Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its
evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its
Re-Amended
Complaint.38
The
Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for
years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court
were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has
only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended
the long-string of delays with the filing of a ReAmended Complaint, which would only prolong even
more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino
and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute the case against private respondents.
This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for
the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case
against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in
declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. This issue bears a significant efect on
petitioners case since these properties comprise most
of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its
case against private respondents if these properties
are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team

served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding
team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search
warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of
5.56
ammunition;
one
pistol,
caliber
.45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that
the raiding team conducted the search and seizure "on
March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution."39 Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino
and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the
name and by the will of the Filipino people."40
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government
efectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right
arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under
the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic
stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items
taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February
1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA
Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government
was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the
de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary
government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after
the actual and efective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded
to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained
in efect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to

individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration

remained in efect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of
the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of
such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there
was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during
the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete
overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject
to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change
in the government or political system, usually efected
with violence or at least some acts of violence." In
Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is
defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order
. . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a
relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people
tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of
the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of
revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or
efect radical reforms in their system of government or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the
legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed
as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people of
the state" and from there is derived "the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing
form of government without regard to the existing
constitution."
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the
presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the
winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be
said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control of
the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the
departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where
the legal system then in efect, had ceased to be
obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution
remained
operative
during
the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders

issued by the Philippine Commission on Good

Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which
direct the freezing and even the take-over of private
property by mere executive issuance without judicial
action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies
assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill
of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government,43
petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum, questioned the
continued validity of the sequestration orders upon
adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due
process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that
the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987
Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of
sequestration orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the
foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders,
it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular
remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them
have received constitutional approbation and sanction.
As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom"
Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the
President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate
of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime and protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." And as also already adverted to, Section 26,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and
ratifies the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze
orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the
1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights.
Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include
specific language recognizing the validity of the
sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner
Joaquin
G.
Bernas
during
the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:

major portion of his lecture developing that argument.

On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says
that in the end what matters are the results and not
the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG
should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts,
another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it
asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer
is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of
ordinary due process, hence they are asking for
protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes
remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say
grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not
an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give
the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and
give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of
the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional
normalization. Very much at the heart of the
constitutional normalization is the full efectivity of the
Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
constitutional normalization and at the same time ask
for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at
the heart of constitutionalism. That would be
hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian
protestation of due process and rule of law. The New
Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when
we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend
to become ingrained. The committee report asks for
extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six
months after the convening of Congress, and Congress
may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds
repeated become vice. What the committee report is
asking for is that we should allow the new government
to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to
shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that
they have a vested right to its practice, and they will
fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would
be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a
democratic revolution.

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something

schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results

and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very
disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like
Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated
verbatim
by
another
staunch
Christian
like
Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing
and even discombobulating. The argument makes the
PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the
auction block. If the price is right, the search and
seizure clause will be sold. "Open your Swiss bank
account to us and we will award you the search and
seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe."

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas

lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,
of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one
hand, he argues that everything the Commission is
doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by
Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present

government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if
the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the
Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search
and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively

revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is

not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to
ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and
grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the
values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is
beyond monetary estimation.

Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the

generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.46 Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law
to observe the rights47 of individuals under the
Declaration.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the

Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8
of the committee report and allow the new Constitution
to take efect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the
PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga
and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has
been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be
able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If
not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one
honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill
of Rights.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the

Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did
not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the
de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the States good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by

staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another
Christian replied when asked to toy around with the
law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give
the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I
ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for
our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas
against the amendment excepting sequestration orders
from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission
still adopted the amendment as Section 26,44 Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26,
sequestration orders would not stand the test of due
process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent
a
constitutional
provision
excepting
sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would
clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum.
Nevertheless,
even
during
the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the
same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as
the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
States good faith compliance with the Covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the
present Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty
to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although
the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional

Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became
subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The
Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional
Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the
absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and
orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant
since the revolutionary government did not repudiate
it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items
not included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners
witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not
included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed
to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine
currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to
be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you

know the reason why your team also seized other

properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of
said raid, I was informed that the reason why they also
brought the other items not included in the search
warrant was because the money and other jewelries
were contained in attach cases and cartons with
markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three (3) vaults
or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the
steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open
these containers only to find out that they contained
money.
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do
you know the reason why your team seized this money
instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two
officers assisting him decided to bring along also the
money because at that time it was already dark and
they felt most secured if they will bring that because
they might be suspected also of taking money out of
those items, your Honor.49

equipment and money. However, I did not include that

in the application for search warrant considering that
we have not established concrete evidence about that.
So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you
had reason to believe that only weapons were in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along
with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with
the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged
Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

Cross-examination
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Atty. Banaag
Q. In the fiscals office?
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in
connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as

the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the
name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for

the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles
M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. There were other articles seized which were not

included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you
conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance
together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons
deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for
the search warrant, any other properties or contraband
which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about
some hidden items, for instance, the communications

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader

and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and
other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken
but they brought along also these articles. I do not
really know their reason for bringing the same, but I
just learned that these were taken because they might
get lost if they will just leave this behind.
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team,
they were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken
considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases.1wphi1 These attach
cases were suspected to be containing pistols or other
high powered firearms, but in the course of the search
the contents turned out to be money. So the team
leader also decided to take this considering that they
believed that if they will just leave the money behind,
it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other
articles that were seized by your raiding team, like
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the

vaults that were opened.51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian
that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant
did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority.
The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these
items without showing that these items could be the
subject of warrantless search and seizure.52 Clearly,
the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se,53 and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these
items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these
items from the possessor. We thus hold that these
items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil
Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to
the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice
Vitug in his concurring opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official
leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the
separate opinion of J. Reynato Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintif-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for
accused-appellant.

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,

the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee,
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two
feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready
for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn,
pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He
was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3)
NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation
of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's

packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p.
38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution

are as follows:

The package which allegedly contained books was

likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the

package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana

leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said efects
(tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but
to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport
being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security.
On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail
at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to
shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized
dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of
the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned
out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops
as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief,
pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed
decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following
errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS
CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW
THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject
of the imputed ofense had been obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and
3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3
(2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers
and efects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,

and particularly describing the place to be searched

and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1)
The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin
in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and efects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp
v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643,
81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in
Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as
inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v.
People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not afected by the
illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2],
Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the
1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility
of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];
Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v.
Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et
al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases
adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities.

Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant

validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA
345 [1972]:
1.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd
v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis
supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct.
547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly
served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457
P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner
thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was
declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429
S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966);
State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d
517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was

made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in
which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left
behind a travel case containing the evidence***
complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became
suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the
bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do
not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in
the prosecution of the ofense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe
that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of
the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case
which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to
be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack
of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar
readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly
indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes
as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of
Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8;
Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box
containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his
place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the
NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal
one,
contrary
to
the
postulate
of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search efected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429
SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US

23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d

122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was
likewise held that where the property was taken into
custody of the police at the specific request of the
manager and where the search was initially made by
the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure
within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional
Commission.
True,
the
liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against
whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech
in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself
posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any
power
holder.
(Sponsorship
Speech
of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter,
expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the

constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re:
Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search
warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility
of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v.
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13
[October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as
to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against.
The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to
anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable
search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an
act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by
an individual efected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, nongovernmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional
rights to privacy and communication.
2.
In his second assignment of error, appellant
contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have
carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights
or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel.
The
law
enforcers
testified
that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear
from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant
refused to give any written statement while under
investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes.
What about the accused here, did you investigate the
accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with
the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution

was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. As borne out by the records, neither was
there any proof by the defense that appellant gave
uncounselled confession while being investigated.
What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of
error is therefore misplaced.
3.
Coming now to appellant's third assignment of
error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not
the owner of the packages which contained prohibited
drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national,
whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila:
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave
him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the
next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find
appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to
entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily
accede to comply with the undertaking without first
ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court,
"(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other
hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to
take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19,
Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the
errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237
[1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect
considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the
Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national,
was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about
an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original
Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968],
citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also
People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga,
123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567

[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not

even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the
merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40).
On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him
(Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is
therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the
trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168081
October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an
international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight
standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To
buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal
does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)
continuing adherence to the weight standards of the
company is not a bona fide occupational qualification;
and (3) he was discriminated against because other
overweight employees were promoted instead of being
disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro
and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor
of the employee as an act of social justice or based on
equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for
serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former
international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58") with a
large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his
height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984.
Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4,
1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the companys weight
standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was
allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight

problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay

from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43
pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company
policy, he was removed from flight duty efective May
6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to
trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight
checks on several dates. He was also told that he may
avail of the services of the company physician should
he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be
evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight
check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of
losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds,
which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his
of-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria
Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to
check on the progress of his efort to lose weight.
Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from
his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a
commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to
Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter,
in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a
weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today
until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a
reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal
weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at
the designated time schedule you will set for my
weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to
reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight.
On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
decision for him to remain grounded until such time
that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite
that, he was given one more month to comply with the
weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report
for weight check on diferent dates. He was reminded
that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory
compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks,
although he was seen submitting his passport for
processing at the PAL Staf Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that
a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be
dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of

weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the

directive and did not report for weight checks. On June
26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal
to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he
weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over
his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until
he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the
latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on
August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5,
1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a
Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. He was
given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within
which to file his answer and submit controverting
evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his
Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight.
What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any,
had already been condoned by PAL since "no action
has been taken by the company" regarding his case
"since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated
against him because "the company has not been fair in
treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held
where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a
weight reduction program to lose at least two (2)
pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by
PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
"and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him
"which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
(5) years," his services were considered terminated
"efective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes
ruled13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The
dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal
illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to
his former position or substantially equivalent one, and
to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his
dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for
purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up
to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00;
b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total
award.

SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL
are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not
be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would
not be a negative factor.17 Notably, other overweight
employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios,
were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).19
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its
motion to quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in
the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of
the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by
our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part
of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning
complainants entitlement to backwages shall be
deemed to refer to complainants entitlement to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply
backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual
reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined
to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the
reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or
through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing
which, the same shall be deemed as complainants
reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of
non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter.
Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to
gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of
food intake, is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence,
there can be no intentional defiance or serious
misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for
him to lose weight.27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight
standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found
as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his
duties as flight steward despite being overweight.
According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have
limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of
petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful
defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31
the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT
the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared
NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private
respondents complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong
and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the
evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling,
the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a
continuing qualification for an employees position.34
The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an
analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to
Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC
seemed to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of
willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant
consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the
dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the
relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but
one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or
not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify
under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held
that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.38
Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards.39 It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for
being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the
CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona
fide occupational qualification which, in case of
violation, "justifies an employees separation from the
service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues
are posed for resolution:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN
BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)
OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES;
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR
OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE
OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS
DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN

ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR

PROMOTED;

the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an

analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."

IV.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS
FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR
BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring
supplied)

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in subparagraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in
the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of
the employee. How Naduras illness could be
considered as "analogous" to any of them is beyond
our understanding, there being no claim or pretense
that the same was contracted through his own
voluntary act.48

Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal
under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to
no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to
keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the
CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not
mere "orders" of the employer; they were the
"prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain
in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in
the company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employees
position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these
standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose
express terms require the element of willfulness in
order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet
the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground
that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and
is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the
"other causes analogous to the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms
that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They
apply prior to employment because these are the
standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to
be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee
must continue to meet these standards while on the
job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a
violation is not one of the faults for which an employee
can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article
282; the employee can be dismissed simply because
he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of
whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or
intentional. x x x45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting
argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical
abnormality and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is
illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be
made to fall squarely within the specific causes
enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet
invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says
that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is
a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under
consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as

The reliance on Nadura is of-tangent. The factual

milieu in Nadura is substantially diferent from the case
at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor
Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act
(RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is
absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot
apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a
miner, was laid of from work because of illness, i.e.,
asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure
to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not
dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is
whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to
separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers
on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his
failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in
Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process.
Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was
given more than four (4) years to comply with the
weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates
against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and
self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing
on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that
"[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing
him "a lot of expenses."50 However, petitioner has
only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of
PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he
repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo
weight checks, without ofering a valid explanation.
Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of
willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island,
Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of
Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from
1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional
attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center
that was being operated by respondent. She twice
resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even
respondent admitted that her performance met the
Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook reapplied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood
52" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent
claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintif
compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of

emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious

diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent
amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap.
This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the
remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid
obesity could never constitute a handicap within the
purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others,
obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintif could
simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant
disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid
obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and
that respondent discriminated against Cook based on
"perceived" disability. The evidence included expert
testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological
disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic
system and the neurological appetite suppressing
signal system, which is capable of causing adverse
efects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and
cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the
substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given
impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those
conditions that an individual can easily and quickly
reverse by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese.
In the words of the District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at
least one hundred pounds more than what is
considered appropriate of her height." According to the
Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in
1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest,
petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal
weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when
placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
"[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized
just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and
(d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the
bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United
States, there are a few federal and many state job
discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing

an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form

of prohibited discrimination when the action is based
on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a
business or enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It
does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.57
Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could
justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No.
727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons62
contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee
Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia
Government
and
Service
Employees
Union
(BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted
the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an
employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the
employer must show that it adopted the standard for a
purpose rationally connected to the performance of the
job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard
is
reasonably
necessary65
to
the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3)
the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the
legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star
Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in
order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related
to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2)
that there is factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the
job.67
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is
valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably
necessary
for
satisfactory
job
performance."69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate
to pass upon the validity of a company policy which
prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a
rival company. It was held that the company policy is
reasonable considering that its purpose is the
protection of the interests of the company against
possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and
procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ
cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too,
the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in
holding that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.74 It is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.75

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the

part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold
that the weight standards of PAL show its efort to
comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it
by law by virtue of being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it
has committed itself to safely transport its passengers.
In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of
PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the
imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to
inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for
the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not
farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all
common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on
their safety records. People, especially the riding
public, expect no less than that airline companies
transport their passengers to their respective
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance
is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not
limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and
caprices of the passengers. The most important
activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of
passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an
emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core
of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need
cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to
open emergency doors, the agility to attend to
passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a
cabin attendant are important factors to consider in
case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin
space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the
arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the airlines
flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct
relation to its mission of transporting passengers to
their destination"; and that the weight standards "has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondents
airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied
upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was
involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were
denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching
the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to
retire at age 60. They sued the airline company,
alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not
the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is
another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and
narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane,
any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have
difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their
ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin

attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an

unquestionable fact which courts can judicially
recognize without introduction of evidence.77 It would
also be absurd to require airline companies to
reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and
exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin
attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin
attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers
from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call
for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies
is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft
safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility.
Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what
cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three
lost seconds can translate into three lost lives.
Evacuation might slow down just because a widebodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles.
These possibilities are not remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that
the weight standards of PAL were made known to him
prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the
weight limit that he must maintain at all times.78 In
fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when
he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona
fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands
that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao
ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate
weight limitations based on height and body frame for
both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive
discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin
attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight
standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any
possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary
action on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he
was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger
safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against
him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold
otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of
discrimination came into play in this case as a
secondary position for the private respondent in order
to escape the consequence of dismissal that being
overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance
position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal,
including the reasonableness of the applicable
standard and the private respondents failure to
comply."80 It is a basic rule in evidence that each party
must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who
asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to
prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing
on the records which could support the finding of
discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish
discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin
attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with
him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and
why they are similarly situated and the diferential
treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity
of his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the

supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner
miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal
weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods
they were allowed to fly despite their being
overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other
relevant data that could have adequately established a
case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words
of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of
discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of
administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The
reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts
in matters within their specific and specialized
jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast
rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly
supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown
that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion
to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily
be reversed. Factual findings of administrative
agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside
when they fail the test of arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably
misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes
the equal protection clause guaranty86 of the
Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put diferently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal
protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the
equal protection erects no shield against private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private
actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and
wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims
for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted.
He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages,
"from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the
time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.92
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds
relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting
of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution
for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of

reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a
writ of execution,93 the option to exercise actual
reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the
employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the
labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did
everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate
return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence
that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a
substantially equivalent position in accordance with the
order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly
received the return to work notice on February 23,
2001, as shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of
the Court in a case97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of
the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee
entitles him to payment of his salaries efective from
the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite
the issuance of a writ of execution"98 and ""even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed
on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer
to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during
the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court."99 He failed to prove that he complied with the
return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on
record that he actually rendered services for PAL from
the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the
payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position
despite being overweight, petitioner in efect wants to
render the issues in the present case moot. He asks
PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the
Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance
with the impossible.100
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled
to separation pay. This may be deduced from the
language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is
not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally
dismissed employee as an act "social justice,"101 or
based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is required
that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct;
and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the
employee.103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to
one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of
service.104 It should include regular allowances which
he might have been receiving.105 We are not blind to
the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious

misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his

moral character. We also recognize that his
employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner
Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in
an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for
every year of service, which should include his regular
allowances. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112983
March 22, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR
MAQUEDA
@
PUTOL,
and
RENE
SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR
MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William
Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino
wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a
country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or
its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain
of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a
veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly
distractions and trouble when in the early morning of
27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home,
Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered
with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient
prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the
victimsformer houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of
the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially
included one Richard Malig y Severino in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious
physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet
at La Trinidad, Benguet.
Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992,
prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the
prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2
to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol
because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently
submitted established his complicity in the crime, and
at the hearing of the motion the following day, the
Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be
dropped from the information because further
evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient
evidence against him. 3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for
the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were
issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4
March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an
application for bail. 4 He categorically stated therein
that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he
is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended
Informations 5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda as
the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi;
Upper Tadiangan Municipality of Tuba, Province Of

Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable
Court,
the,
above-named
accused,
Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain
and against the will and consent of the owners thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM
HORACE BARKER and with violence against and
intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place
and take and carry away the following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND
TWO
HUNDRED
FIFTY
PESOS
(P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the
said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that on the
occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly
strike Teresita Barker and William Horace Barker with
lead pipes on the diferent Parts of their body, leading
to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting
various physical injuries on the former which required
medical attendance for a period of more than thirty
(30) days and have likewise incapacitated her from the
performance of her, customary labor for the same
period of time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and
has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea
of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the
trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical
Injuries and sentenced him to Sufer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim,
Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of William Horace Barker, court found accused
Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs.
Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and
Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco
Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel
Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo
Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in
chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando
Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the
witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in
his evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as
his sour-rebuttal witness.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial
court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as
follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the
spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza
Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had
checked, as washer wont, the main doors of their
house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August
1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who

shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp,

Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the
garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and
proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of
the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene
Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because
he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps
of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva had
replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her
on her chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was
fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she
saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged
nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the
trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from
Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and
shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled
her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of
Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of
her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short
pants with 'his right hand brandishing a lead pipe
standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She
pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she saw
then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door.
Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing
his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for
help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She
rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving
behind her husband who was still asleep; She went
down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining room. She
saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete
stranger to her. Suddenly the two rushed towards her
and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to
get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued
to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial,
she pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's
companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her
back and at theback of her right hand. She fell to the
concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran tothe garage and hid under the car. After a few
seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and
because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta
opened the door and they rushed to their room and
closed the door. When they saw that the door knob was
being turned, they braced themselves against the door
to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their
room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the
shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough,
that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and
Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet
and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike
Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed
beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which
is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers.
They saw two men approaching them from a curve.
When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark
noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left
hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index

finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right

shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and
Mark whether the road they were following would lead
to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five
minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio
City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at
the waiting shed. The two men bearded it, Mike again
noticed that the taller man had the defects above
mentioned because the latter used his right hand with
only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney
as he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the
Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter
man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to
Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta
gathered bough courage to leave the room where they
had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the
kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the
dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own
blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and
ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After
requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the
Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they
had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College
Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City
Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio
Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the
City Health Department, also arrived. The team
conducted an initial investigation only because it found
out that the scene of the crime was within the
jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however,
was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr.
Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the
Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit
"JJ") showing its location.' They went around the house
and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a
black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel
(Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe
(Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He
then interviewed the two househelps who provided him
with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left,
leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and
a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his
initial investigation (Exhibit "KK").
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the
master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry
scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He
noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly
at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it
was parted as if someone had passed through and
created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin
road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security
guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker
house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after
Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba
Police Station arrived at theBarker house to conduct
their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was
called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.

The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel
recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City
Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and
then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the
Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City,
where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje,
MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H, found in it
twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused
by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death
as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death
certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R").
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she
was treated and confined for eight days. The attending
physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her
at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a
comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she
sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side
of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and
bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her
eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only
after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's
injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead
pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left
unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27
August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba
Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of
Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons,
and asked her to identify the persons who had
assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out
to be Richard Malig. When informed of the
investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the
team that it was improper for them to conduct it
without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not
yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her
eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was
impaired, and she had double vision.
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were
cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the
hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the
items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen
Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the
Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to
Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her
Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"),
and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were
missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was
P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these
missing items (Exhibit "X.).
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's
Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she
sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which
could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at
the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit
"L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation.
She likewise received treatment at the New York
Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive
Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go

to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police

in determining the, whereabouts of accused Rene
Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to
obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio
Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a
certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they
already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza,
and three others went back to Guinyangan to find out
whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon
being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the
two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify
him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned
to Guinyangan,
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up
Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none other
than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in
Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran,
Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another
policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan
Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran
who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial
Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan,
Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the
235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria,
Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio
F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get
Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him,
he informed Maqueda of his rights under the
Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27
August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention,
Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6").
He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto
be a State witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a
talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked
him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27
August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After
he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate
told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail
since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial
(Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the
Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission
from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led
Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to
Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in
order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante
then brought him to the Barker house and it was only
when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante
revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to
Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected
to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in
the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps
was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe
and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down,
forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe
providedhim by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs.

Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker

who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were
already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went
upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing
with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then
changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward
the road where they Saw two persons from whom they
asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney
stopped and they were informed by the two Persons
that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante
bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano
Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the
Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus
for Manila. 8

asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up

in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied
Rosely home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed
to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was
not able to as he was arrested by members of the
CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought
her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan
municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba,
Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the
police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay
long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if
he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be
freed and he could also become a state witness: He
told them that he could attest to the fact that he
accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the
cassette recorder.

Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial

and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the trial court
in this wise:

On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet

Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has
remained under detention up to the present. 9

Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do

with the crime. He stated that O" August 27, 1991 he
was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense
located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview
Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was
employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he
worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It
was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job
as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise
the employees in the factory and whenever his
employer was not around, he was in charge of the
sales. He and his 8 co-employees all Sleep inside the
factory.

The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector

Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and
SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the
polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that
she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and
thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda
on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed
Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda
was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and
freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10

On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he

could not recall what he did that day. He slept inside
the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was
teaching the new employees how to make the
seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas,
Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his vacation
time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be
back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon
alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw
accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused
Salvamante as they were childhood playmates, having
gone to the same elementary school. He had no
chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so
they just waved to each other. He again saw accused
Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside
their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to
go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He
agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose
Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon.
When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante
asked Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante) in
selling a cassette recorder which he said came from
Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante
worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about
it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to
Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and then went
to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion,
he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his
Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the
polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his coworkers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his

Although the trial court had doubts on the identification

of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus
disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed
a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of
corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It
stated thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification
theory of the prosecution pinpointing accused
Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction
based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti
as well as on circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through
circumstantia1 evidence, the following requisites must
be present: 1) there must be more than One
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No.
82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must
be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author
of the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285,
September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which
tend to show the guilt of the accused are:
1.
A physical demonstration to which the accused
and his counsel did not ofer any objection shows that
despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda
could well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a
cement post with such force that it produced a

resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to

conclude that accused Maqueda could have easily beat
Mr. Barker to death.

. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED. 12

2.
His presence within the vicinity of the crime
scene right after the incident in the company of
accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan,
the only prosecution witness who noticed the defective
hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions
from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they
were strangers to the place

Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are

devoted to his arguments which are anchored on his
alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was
not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution
to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when
investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig
as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when
initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted
Richard Malig.

3.
Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with
accused Rene Salvamante as they from the same town.
By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has
established that he Salvamante are close friends to the
point that they went out together during the Christmas
vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied
Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder.
4.
His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains
this statement that he is willing and volunteering to be
State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused
in appearing that he is the least guilty along This in
efect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade to the
police at Although he claims that he did not his
signature would lean his as he was just told that
release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which
cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant,
he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law
what it meant seeing that their signatures up already
affixed on the motion.
5.
This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate
that he was at the Barker house that fateful morning
and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean
Salvosa as to what he actually did can be considered
as another circumstance to already bloster the
increasing circumstances against the accused.
6.
The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a
long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense and
easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No.
92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to
be given credence, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at some other place
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
(People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992,
215 SCRA 247). This defense easily crumbles down as
Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the
crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus
extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof
beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused
Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the
Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken
by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was
arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In
his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him
because the trial court committed this lone error:

We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown,

the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility
of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps
identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced
because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita
Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara
and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively
identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction
on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus
delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He
should have focused his attention and arguments on
these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a
distinction between an extrajudicial confession the
Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission
the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray
Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There
is a distinction between. the former and the latter as
clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which read as follows:
Sec. 26.
Admission of a party. The act,
declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 33.
Confession. The declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the ofense
charged, or of any ofense necessarily included therein,
may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt.
The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases
to statements of fact by the accused which do not
directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of
the criminal intent to commit the ofense with which he
is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from
an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms,
by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime
charged, while an admission is a statement by the
accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is

something less than a confession, and is but an

acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial
confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
accused Maqueda although it was taken without the
assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion
that since an information had already benefited in
court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a
warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang
Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial
investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an ofense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot aford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was "
no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation."
It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this
Court elucidated on the rights of a person under
custodial investigation and the rights of an accused
after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to
state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already
facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to
refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice
whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already
been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not
have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the
aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution.
Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the
burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and,
hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible
against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted
their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their
conversation but not to prove the truth of the
admission because such testimony was objected to as
hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is
presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of
the statement or the fact that such statement was
made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No.
83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18

While we commend the eforts of the trial court to

distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his
rights after a criminal complaint or information had
been filed against him, we cannot agree with its
sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no
longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel
but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not
to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in
the criminal justice process where an accused is
deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such
a view would not only give a very restrictive application
to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the
Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to
that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a
person is "under investigation for the commission of an
ofense." The direct and primary source of this Section
12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II
of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of
an ofense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows
refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The incorporation of the second
paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
constitution was an acceptance of the landmark
doctrine laid down by the united States Supreme Court
in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court
explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an
innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of
principles long recognized and applied in other
settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in
the pages which follow but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards efective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully efective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive

efectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage
of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he
may have answered some question or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him of
the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to a questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the
second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20,
the word custudial, which was used in Miranda with
reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view
thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly
observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not
choose to use the term "custodial" by having it
inserted
between
the
words
"under"
and
"investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the
phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not
adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has
even broadened the application of Miranda by making
it applicable to the investigation for the commission of
an ofense of a person and in custody. 22 Accordingly,
as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20
changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the
rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment,
Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this
Court laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24
7.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means by telephone
if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting
officer to inform the person to be arrested of the
reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of
arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means
that a case had been filed against him in a court of
either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the
court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain

silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under
the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a
person at any time before arraignment whenever he is
investigated for the commission of an ofense. This
paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article
III of the present Constitution with the following
additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be
competent and independent, preferably of his own
choice, (b) if the party cannot aford the services of
such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c)
the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it
did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section
12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides
that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People
vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our
Constitution is that "no person shall be-held to answer
for a criminal ofense without due process of law", and
that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of
the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is
for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel
is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under
our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it
is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of
an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is
poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly
limited to custodial investigation and that it does not
apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or
information has already been filed because after its
filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel.
If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police
authorities and other law enforcement agencies would
have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions
from accused persons after they had been arrested but
before they are arraigned because at such stage the
accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the
enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in
court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue
of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer
must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge,
27 and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person, it would be improper for any public

officer Or law enforcement agency to investigate him in

connection with the commission of the ofense for
which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to
such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be
faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02
Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable
violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof,
Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional
rights under the said section. The statement was also
taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled
Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant
to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution which reads:
(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to
Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a
diferent footing. These are not governed by the
exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights.. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate
not in the course of an investigation, but in connection
with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness;
and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that
exist without governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has
the duty to protect; 28 or restriction on the power of
government found "not in the particular specific types
of action prohibited, but in the general principle that
keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of
arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of
authority. In laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people,
the Constitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean
Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence
against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this Court held
that the declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the ofense may be given in
evidence against him and any person, otherwise
competent to testify as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance
of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The
said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By
analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial
admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his
Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly .stated that
"he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in
the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the
least guilty among the accused in this case."

In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and

Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state
witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of
the crime charged was established beyond moral
certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his
own admission he was not only at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted
his participation therein. Even if we disregard his
extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and
Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial
court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial
evidence. The following circumstances were duly
proved in this case:
(1)
He and a companion were seen a kilometer
away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in
question was committed there;
(2)
Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was
positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and
Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who
committed the crime;
(3)
He and
friends;

co-accused Rene

Salvamante

are

(4)
He and Rene Salvamante were together in
Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime
in September 1991;
(5)
He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4
March 1992; and
(6)
He freely and voluntarily ofered to be a state
witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)

There is more than one circumstance;

(b)
The facts from which the inferences are derived
are
proven; and
(c)
the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do not
hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of
alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court
correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that
for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to
prove that the accused was somewhere else when the

crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was

physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through
the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which
Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
positively established that Maqueda and a companion
were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely
a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was
not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to
have been at the Barker house at the time the crime
was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence
categorically declared that Maqueda started working in
her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991,
thereby belying his, testimony that he started working
on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of Branch 10 of
the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case,
No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @
PUTOL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157870
November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY
(PDEA),
respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633
November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain ofenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.

as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory

test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x
x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices. - Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained
in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall
be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with a criminal ofense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed
or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this
Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of
this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino
Commission on Elections)

Q.

Pimentel,

Jr.

v.

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May
10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The
pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the
national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as

follows:

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

provides that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug

testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo

mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured
that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
be elected

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the

authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165
and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it
hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing
to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office,
both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored
and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3.
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates
filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices
and employees concerned shall submit to the Law
Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied
with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates
who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Efect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test
and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed
with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the
drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis
supplied.)

undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional

qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.
And for a third, a person's constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v.
Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the

Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May
10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486
dated
December
23,
2003
for
being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3,
Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes
a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC,
by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to

First of, we shall address the justiciability of the cases

at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners
SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA
assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights
mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy
which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But
even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has sufered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of
procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional
plaintifs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of

overarching significance to society, or of paramount

public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as
senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing
since he has substantial interests in the subject matter
of
the
petition,
among
other
preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court
is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily
to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36
of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA
9165
unconstitutional?
Specifically,
do
these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge
the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
efect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they
may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has

defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power

in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the
ocean,
are
unlimited.
In
constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash,
but over which it cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense
that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the
power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11
The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such
as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by
the assailed COMELEC resolution, efectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to
be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like efect, a condition sine qua non to
be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator
- elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain
with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership
in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non - compliance with the drug - testing
requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug
test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work
to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may
be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without

exception, made drug - testing on those covered

mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to sufer the adverse consequences for
not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure
jargon without meaning and efect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable,
for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May
10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates
running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate
repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review
and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that
the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA
9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f)
of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory, is
a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in
the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful efects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the
policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved
via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of
dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti drug abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The
primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as
those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of
this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on
this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of
this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x
for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order
that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If
the examination x x x results in the certification that
the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be
ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x
x.

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under

the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent
under the voluntary submission program, who is finally
discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to
the following conditions:
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive
efects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the
young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and
are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery
is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16
under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while
the right to privacy has long come into its own, this
case appears to be the first time that the validity of a
state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium
of mandatory random drug testing among students
and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal
point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of
persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v.
Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon
wanted to address the drug menace in their respective
institutions following the discovery of frequent drug
use by school athletes. After consultation with the
parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing
for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school
student, was denied participation in the football
program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis
drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the
Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the
issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1)
schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2)
school children, while not shedding their constitutional
rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3)
athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes
since the former observe communal undress before
and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports
activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves
to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade
a student's privacy since a student need not undress
for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for
the drug testing because of the dangerous efects of
illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held
that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the
random drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a

school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for
high school students desiring to join extra - curricular
activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir,
marching band, and academic team declined to
undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing
policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the
Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike
athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court
made no distinction between a non - athlete and an
athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in
place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding
that the school could implement its random drug testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a
kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might
need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the
above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis
with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject
to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court
is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is
within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To
be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject
to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well
- being of the people,21 particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more efective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is
not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless
a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia,
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact
that the efects of a drug - infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student
body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against

the idea that the testing aims

unsuspecting individual students.

to

incriminate

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level

students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes
in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has
failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes
unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner
Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of
Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school
and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy
and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as
to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
27 And while there has been general agreement as to
the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract
prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28
Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and
defers to the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government - mandated
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the
criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a
judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing
what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal
disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard
is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may,
the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which efects a search

within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,

intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness
of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy
interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed
by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation
in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople
v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
"narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For
one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage
drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations
x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that
the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e.,
the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of
the results. But the more important consideration lies
in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued
by the DOH provides that access to the drug results
shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential
subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to
the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165,
is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to

stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious efects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium,
among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider
that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age
group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be
amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking
of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an
investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem
has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can
no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to
this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
efective way of preventing and deterring drug use
among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to
schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices should
be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the
testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing
shall take into account the company's work rules. In
either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test

shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And

in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons'

right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the

DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR
necessary to enforce the law. In net efect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug
tests shall be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition

in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and
COMELEC
Resolution
No.
6486
as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the
petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently
enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA
9165. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164815
September 3, 2009
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a

quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as
here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector
(Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our
February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008
Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered
acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA

9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

We find the situation entirely diferent in the case of

persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal ofenses punishable with six (6) years and
one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the said accused without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial
no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without
first
having
secured
the
necessary
license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on

the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses:
Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco
(Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the
Central Police District Command; and Epifanio
Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms
and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco
received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a
Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador,
against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary
surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in

Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team

members proceeded to the Integrated National Police
(INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City,
where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle.
Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put
him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional
rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter
Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5)
pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for
questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito
presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was
not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of
a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc,
Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol,
Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense.
Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room
in the boarding house of his children located at Sagana
Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was
awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian
attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out
of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and
placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then
went back inside, searched and ransacked the room.
Moments later, an operative came out of the room and
exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was
not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a
Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering
the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the
verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and
sentenced him to sufer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun
subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in
favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the
RTC decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years
and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA
decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18
which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this LetterAppeal20 imploring this Court to once more take a
contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case,
focusing on his breached constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
failed to timely file its Comment on Valerosos Motion

for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in

Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous
position and now recommends Valerosos acquittal.
After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG
considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the
defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More
importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the
subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in
violation of Valerosos constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded
from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly,
assuming that the subject firearm was admissible in
evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the
crime, since he was able to establish his authority to
possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt
issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through
his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSGs position
recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that
substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration. While a second motion for
reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court
to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served
thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending
its own rules or excepting a particular case from the
operation
of
the rules.
In De
Guzman
v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzmans
motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his
Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion
for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our
earlier decision and remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitioners evidence. In that case, we said that if we
would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the
disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which
he might not have committed after all.26 Also in
Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for
reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, reexamined the records of the case, then finally
acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc
Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First
Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to
consider and resolve respondents second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral
arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the
case,
we
granted
the
second
motion
for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave
the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact
and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without
basis.

We would like to stress that rules of procedure are

merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They are conceived and promulgated to
efectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts
have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it
would always be within our power to suspend the rules
or except a particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as
to where Valeroso was arrested, is diferent from the
version of the defense. The prosecution claims that
Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police
Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to
board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest,
the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they
found the subject firearm and ammunition. The
defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After
serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping
with ransom), some of the police officers searched the
boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where
they discovered the subject firearm.

evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The
following are the well-recognized instances where
searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements
are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;

After a thorough re-examination of the records and

consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by
Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more
credence to the version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting
police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated
firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures
is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and efects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be
gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly
search or seize the person, house, papers, or efects of
any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the
fundamental
right
of
an
individual
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution
succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement
of
fire,
sanitary
and
building
regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not
necessary to efect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the
test of reasonableness laid down above, is the
warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and
ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified
as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures
incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or

constitute proof in the commission of an ofense

without a search warrant.

cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that

room itself.46

We would like to stress that the scope of the

warrantless search is not without limitations. In People
v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v.
Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure
as an incident to a lawful arrest.

It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception

(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is
to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by
the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception,
therefore, should not be strained beyond what is
needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us,
search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
be said to have been within Valerosos immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what
may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the

arresting officer to search the person arrested in order
to remove any weapon that the latter might use in
order to resist arrest or efect his escape. Otherwise,
the officers safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty
and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latters reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area
of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in
the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of
a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with
ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the
boarding house of his children. He was awakened by
the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the
faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put
him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police
officers remained inside the room and ransacked the
locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm
and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was
charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily
conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant
of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They
placed him immediately under their control by pulling
him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room
with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which,
according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an "area within his immediate control"
because there was no way for him to take any weapon
or to destroy any evidence that could be used against
him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in
searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables
or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon
that might be used against the former. But under the
circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified

under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to
find evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that
the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last
emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding
house of Valerosos children, because they were
supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against
Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior
justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may
be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the
police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firearm and ammunition; they actually
searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of
Valerosos right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace
against which the constitutional guarantees aford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at

times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be

exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indiference to the basic principles of
government. Those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official
functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional
government. If people are stripped naked of their rights
as human beings, democracy cannot survive and
government becomes meaningless. This explains why
the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the
Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos
conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of
Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was not enough to overcome the presumption of
innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would
be better to set free ten men who might probably be
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need
to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always
insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights
as a condition sine qua non against the awesome
investigative and
prosecutory
powers
of
the
government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22,
2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso
is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition. SO ORDERED.
APO
FRUITS
CORPORATION
and
HIJO
PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners, versus LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164195
Promulgated: October 12, 2010
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petitioners motion for
reconsideration addressing our Resolution of December
4, 2009 whose dispositive portion directs:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners
second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the
denial of the award of legal interest and attorneys
fees), and reiterates the decision dated February 6,
2007 and the resolution dated December 19, 2007 of
the Third Division.

For a fuller and clearer presentation and appreciation

of this Resolution, we hark back to the roots of this
case.
Factual Antecedents
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc.
(HPI), together also referred to as petitioners, were
registered owners of vast tracks of land; AFC owned
640.3483 hectares, while HPI owned 805.5308
hectares. On October 12, 1995, they voluntarily ofered
to sell these landholdings to the government via
Voluntary Ofer to Sell applications filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On October 16, 1996, AFC and HPI received separate
notices of land acquisition and valuation of their
properties from the DARs Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO).
At the assessed valuation of
P165,484.47 per hectare, AFCs land was valued at
P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued at
P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these
valuations for being very low.
In its follow through action, the DAR requested the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit
P26,409,549.86
in
AFCs
bank
account
and
P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which amounts
the petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and
HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and new
ones were issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines.
On February 14, 1997, AFC and HPI filed
separate
petitions
for
determination
of
just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). When the DARAB failed to act on these
petitions for more than three years, AFC and HPI filed
separate complaints for determination and payment of
just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagum City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court. These
complaints were subsequently consolidated.
On September 25, 2001, the RTC resolved the
consolidated cases, fixing the just compensation for
the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares of land[1] at
P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at the
prevailing market interest rates, computed from the
taking of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully
paid, minus the amounts the petitioners already
received under the initial valuation. The RTC also
awarded attorneys fees.
LBP moved for the reconsideration of the
decision. The RTC, in its order of December 5, 2001,
modified its ruling and fixed the interest at the rate of
12% per annum from the time the complaint was filed
until finality of the decision. The Third Division of this
Court, in its Decision of February 6, 2007, affirmed this
RTC decision.
On motion for reconsideration, the Third Division
issued its Resolution of December 19, 2007, modifying
its February 6, 2007 Decision by deleting the 12%
interest due on the balance of the awarded just

compensation. The Third Division justified the deletion

by the finding that the LBP did not delay the payment
of just compensation as it had deposited the pertinent
amounts due to AFC and HPI within fourteen months
after they filed their complaints for just compensation
with the RTC. The Court also considered that AFC had
already collected approximately P149.6 million, while
HPI had already collected approximately P262 million
from the LBP. The Third Division also deleted the award
of attorneys fees.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the
modified ruling. The Court uniformly denied all the
motions in its April 30, 2008 Resolution. Entry of
Judgment followed on May 16, 2008.
Notwithstanding the Entry of Judgment, AFC and
HPI filed the following motions on May 28, 2008: (1)
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration;
(2)
Second
Motion
for
Reconsideration, with respect to the denial of the
award of legal interest and attorneys fees; and (3)
Motion to Refer the Second Motion for Reconsideration
to the Honorable Court En Banc.
The Third Division found the motion to admit the
Second Motion for Reconsideration and the motion to
refer this second motion to the Court En Banc
meritorious, and accordingly referred the case to the
Court En Banc. On September 8, 2009, the Court En
Banc accepted the referral.

the 12% interest), dissented from the Court En Bancs

December 4, 2009 Resolution.
On the issue of immutability of judgment, Justice ChicoNazario pointed out that under extraordinary
circumstances, this Court has recalled entries of
judgment on the ground of substantial justice. Given
the special circumstances involved in the present case,
the Court En Banc should have taken a second hard
look at the petitioners positions in their second motion
for reconsideration, and acted to correct the clearly
erroneous December 19, 2007 Resolution.
Specifically, Justice Chico-Nazario emphasized the
obligation of the State, in the exercise of its inherent
power of eminent domain, to pay just compensation to
the owner of the expropriated property. To be just, the
compensation must not only be the correct amount to
be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time
from the time the land is taken from the owner. If not,
the State must pay the landowner interest, by way of
damages, from the time the property was taken until
just compensation is fully paid. This interest, deemed a
part of just compensation due, has been established by
prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum.
On these premises, Justice Nazario pointed out that the
government deprived the petitioners of their property
on December 9, 1996, and paid the balance of the just
compensation due them only on May 9, 2008. The
delay of almost twelve years earned the petitioners
interest in the total amount of P1,331,124,223.05.

The Court En Banc Resolution

On December 4, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a
majority vote, denied the petitioners second motion
for reconsideration based on two considerations.
First, the grant of the second motion for
reconsideration runs counter to the immutability of
final decisions. Moreover, the Court saw no reason to
recognize the case as an exception to the immutability
principle as the petitioners private claim for the
payment of interest does not qualify as either a
substantial or transcendental matter or an issue of
paramount public interest.
Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not entitled
to recover interest on the just compensation and
attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the
payment of the just compensation due them; they
erroneously filed their complaints with the DARAB
when they should have directly filed these with the RTC
acting as an agrarian court. Furthermore, the Court
found it significant that the LBP deposited the pertinent
amounts in the petitioners favor within fourteen
months after the petitions were filed with the RTC.
Under these circumstances, the Court found no
unreasonable delay on the part of LBP to warrant the
award of 12% interest.
The Chico-Nazario Dissent
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[2] the ponente of
the original December 19, 2007 Resolution (deleting

Despite this finding, Justice Chico-Nazario did not see it

fit to declare the computed interest to be totally due;
she found it unconscionable to apply the full force of
the law on the LBP because of the magnitude of the
amount due. She thus reduced the awarded interest to
P400,000,000.00, or approximately 30% of the
computed interest.
The Present Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion to reconsider the Court En Bancs
December 4, 2009 Resolution (the present Motion for
Reconsideration), the petitioners principally argue that:
(a) the principle of immutability of judgment does not
apply since the Entry of Judgment was issued even
before the lapse of fifteen days from the parties
receipt of the April 30, 2008 Resolution and the
petitioners timely filed their second motion for
reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt of
this resolution; (b) the April 30, 2008 Resolution cannot
be considered immutable considering the special and
compelling circumstances attendant to the present
case which fall within the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of judgments; (c) the legal interest due is
at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the
taking of the subject properties and this rate is not
subject to reduction. The power of the courts to
equitably reduce interest rates applies solely to
liquidated damages under a contract and not to
interest set by the Honorable Court itself as due and
owing in just compensation cases; and (d) the
Honorable Courts fears that the interest payments due
to the petitioners will produce more harm than good to

the system of agrarian reform are misplaced and are

based merely on conjectures.
The Comment of the Land Bank of the
Philippines
The LBP commented on the petitioners motion
for reconsideration on April 28, 2010. It maintained
that: (a) the doctrine of immutability of the decisions of
the Supreme Court clearly applies to the present case;
(b) the LBP is not guilty of undue delay in the payment
of just compensation as the petitioners were promptly
paid once the Court had determined the final value of
the properties expropriated; (c) the Supreme Court
rulings invoked by the petitioners are inapplicable to
the present case; (d) since the obligation to pay just
compensation is not a forbearance of money, interest
should commence only after the amount due becomes
ascertainable or liquidated, and the 12% interest per
annum applies only to the liquidated amount, from the
date of finality of judgment; (e) the imposition of 12%
interest on the balance of P971,409,831.68 is
unwarranted because there was no unjustified refusal
by LBP to pay just compensation, and no contractual
breach is involved; (f) the deletion of the attorneys
fees equivalent to 10% of the amount finally awarded
as just compensation is proper; (g) this case does not
involve a violation of substantial justice to justify the
alteration of the immutable resolution dated December
19, 2007 that deleted the award of interest and
attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petitioners arguments meritorious and
accordingly
GRANT
the
present
motion
for
reconsideration.
Just compensation a Basic Limitation on the States
Power of Eminent Domain
At the heart of the present controversy is the Third
Divisions December 19, 2007 Resolution which held
that the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest on
the balance of the just compensation belatedly paid by
the LBP. In the presently assailed December 4, 2009
Resolution, we affirmed the December 19, 2007
Resolutions findings that: (a) the LBP deposited
pertinent amounts in favor of the petitioners within
fourteen months after they filed their complaint for
determination of just compensation; and (b) the LBP
had already paid the petitioners P411,769,168.32. We
concluded then that these circumstances refuted the
petitioners assertion of unreasonable delay on the part
of the LBP.
A re-evaluation of the circumstances of this case and
the parties arguments, viewed in light of the just
compensation requirement in the exercise of the
States inherent power of eminent domain, compels us
to re-examine our findings and conclusions.
Eminent domain is the power of the State to take
private property for public use.[3] It is an inherent
power of State as it is a power necessary for the
States existence; it is a power the State cannot do

without.[4] As an inherent power, it does not need at

all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is
mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting
what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is
found in the Bill of Rights[5] that part of the
Constitution whose provisions all aim at the protection
of individuals against the excessive exercise of
governmental powers.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which
reads No private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.) provides two essential
limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely,
that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use
and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner
of the private property.
It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that
compensation should be just as the safeguard is
there to ensure a balance property is not to be taken
for public use at the expense of private interests; the
public, through the State, must balance the injury that
the taking of property causes through compensation
for what is taken, value for value.
Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted
liberally in favor of the individual and strictly against
the government. The protection of the individual is the
reason for the Bill of Rights being; to keep the exercise
of the powers of government within reasonable bounds
is what it seeks.[6]
The concept of just compensation is not new to
Philippine constitutional law,[7] but is not original to
the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American
Constitution.[8] It found fertile application in this
country particularly in the area of agrarian reform
where the taking of private property for distribution to
landless farmers has been equated to the public use
that the Constitution requires. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Orilla,[9] a valuation case under our
agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state:
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between the one who receives and the one who desires
to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government. Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is
used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be given for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.[10] [Emphasis supplied.]
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the
petitioners landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02,
[11] the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court,
determined the actual value of the petitioners
landholdings to be P1,383,179,000.00. This valuation,
a finding of fact, has subsequently been affirmed by
this Court, and is now beyond question. In eminent

domain terms, this amount is the real, substantial, full

and ample compensation the government must pay to
be just to the landowners.
Significantly, this final judicial valuation is far removed
from the initial valuation made by the DAR; their values
difer by P1,131,799,897.00 in itself a very
substantial sum that is roughly four times the original
DAR valuation. We mention these valuations as they
indicate to us how undervalued the petitioners lands
had been at the start, particularly at the time the
petitioners landholdings were taken. This reason
apparently compelled the petitioners to relentlessly
pursue their valuation claims all they way up to the
level of this Court.
While the LBP deposited the total amount of
P71,891,256.62
into
the
petitioners
accounts
(P26,409,549.86 for AFC and P45,481,706.76 for HPI)
at the time the landholdings were taken, these
amounts were mere partial payments that only
amounted to 5% of the P1,383,179,000.00 actual value
of the expropriated properties. We point this aspect out
to show that the initial payments made by the LBP
when the petitioners landholdings were taken,
although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could
not by any means be considered a fair exchange of
values at the time of taking; in fact, the LBPs actual
deposit could not be said to be substantial even from
the original LBP valuation of P251,379,103.90.
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for
purposes of the immediate taking of the landholdings
but cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse
the LBP from the payment of interest on the unpaid
balance of the compensation due. As discussed at
length below, they were not enough to compensate the
petitioners for the potential income the landholdings
could have earned for them if no immediate taking had
taken place. Under the circumstances, the State acted
oppressively and was far from just in their position to
deny the petitioners of the potential income that the
immediate taking of their properties entailed.
Just Compensation from the
Prism of the Element of Taking.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for
expropriated land must be fair and reasonable,
compensation, to be just, must also be made without
delay.[12] Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" if the property is
immediately taken as the property owner sufers the
immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or
income.
This is the principle at the core of the present case
where the petitioners were made to wait for more than
a decade after the taking of their property before they
actually received the full amount of the principal of the
just compensation due them.[13] What they have not
received to date is the income of their landholdings
corresponding to what they would have received had
no uncompensated taking of these lands been
immediately made. This income, in terms of the
interest on the unpaid principal, is the subject of the
current litigation.

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the

need for prompt payment and the necessity of the
payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the
payment of compensation for property already taken.
We ruled in this case that:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the
fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if
property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s]
on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.[15]
[Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably
overturned the Courts previous ruling in National
Power Corporation v. Angas[16] which held that just
compensation due for expropriated properties is not a
loan or forbearance of money but indemnity for
damages for the delay in payment; since the interest
involved is in the nature of damages rather than
earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil Code,
which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just
compensation due to the landowners for their
expropriated property amounted to an efective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the
Eastern Shipping Lines ruling,[17] the Court fixed the
applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed
from the time the property was taken until the full
amount of just compensation was paid, in order to
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time. In the
Courts own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision,
was correct in imposing interest[s] on the zonal value
of the property to be computed from the time
petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and
took the property in September 1969. This allowance
of interest on the amount found to be the value of the
property as of the time of the taking computed, being
an efective forbearance, at 12% per annum should
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time.[18]
[Emphasis supplied.]
We subsequently upheld Republics 12% per annum
interest rate on the unpaid expropriation compensation
in the following cases: Reyes v. National Housing
Authority,[19] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,
[20] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[21] Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial,[22] Philippine Ports Authority v.

Rosales-Bondoc,[23] and Curata v. Philippine Ports

Authority.[24]
These were the established rulings that stood before
this Court issued the currently assailed Resolution of
December 4, 2009. These would be the rulings this
Court shall reverse and de-establish if we maintain and
affirm our ruling deleting the 12% interest on the
unpaid balance of compensation due for properties
already taken.
Under the circumstances of the present case, we see
no compelling reason to depart from the rule that
Republic firmly established. Let it be remembered that
shorn of its eminent domain and social justice aspects,
what the agrarian land reform program involves is the
purchase by the government, through the LBP, of
agricultural lands for sale and distribution to farmers.
As a purchase, it involves an exchange of values the
landholdings in exchange for the LBPs payment. In
determining the just compensation for this exchange,
however, the measure to be borne in mind is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss[25] since what is
involved is the takeover of private property under the
States coercive power. As mentioned above, in the
value-for-value exchange in an eminent domain
situation, the State must ensure that the individual
whose property is taken is not shortchanged and must
hence carry the burden of showing that the just
compensation requirement of the Bill of Rights is
satisfied.
The owners loss, of course, is not only his property but
also its income-generating potential. Thus, when
property is taken, full compensation of its value must
immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the
property and the potential income lost.
The just
compensation is made available to the property owner
so that he may derive income from this compensation,
in the same manner that he would have derived
income from his expropriated property.
If full
compensation is not paid for property taken, then the
State must make up for the shortfall in the earning
potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the
absence of replacement property from which income
can be derived; interest on the unpaid compensation
becomes due as compliance with the constitutional
mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure
of fairness.
In the context of this case, when the LBP took the
petitioners landholdings without the corresponding full
payment, it became liable to the petitioners for the
income the landholdings would have earned had they
not immediately been taken from the petitioners. What
is interesting in this interplay, under the developments
of this case, is that the LBP, by taking landholdings
without full payment while holding on at the same time
to the interest that it should have paid, efectively used
or retained funds that should go to the landowners and
thereby took advantage of these funds for its own
account.
From this point of view, the December 19, 2007
Resolution deleting the award of 12% interest is not
only patently and legally wrong, but is also morally
unconscionable for being grossly unfair and unjust. If

the interest on the just compensation due in reality

the equivalent of the fruits or income of the
landholdings would have yielded had these lands not
been taken would be denied, the result is efectively
a confiscatory action by this Court in favor of the LBP.
We would be allowing the LBP, for twelve long years, to
have free use of the interest that should have gone to
the landowners. Otherwise stated, if we continue to
deny
the
petitioners
present
motion
for
reconsideration, we would illogically and without
much thought to the fairness that the situation
demands uphold the interests of the LBP, not only at
the expense of the landowners but also that of
substantial justice as well.
Lest this Court be a party to this monumental
unfairness in a social program aimed at fostering
balance in our society, we now have to ring the bell
that we have muted in the past, and formally declare
that the LBPs position is legally and morally wrong. To
do less than this is to leave the demands of the
constitutional just compensation standard (in terms of
law) and of our own conscience (in terms of morality)
wanting and unsatisfied.
The Delay in Payment Issue
Separately from the demandability of interest because
of the failure to fully pay for property already taken, a
recurring issue in the case is the attribution of the
delay.
That delay in payment occurred is not and cannot at all
be disputed. While the LBP claimed that it made initial
payments of P411,769,168.32 (out of the principal sum
due of P1,383,179,000.00), the undisputed fact is that
the petitioners were deprived of their lands on
December 9, 1996 (when titles to their landholdings
were cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines), and received full payment of the principal
amount due them only on May 9, 2008.
In the interim, they received no income from their
landholdings because these landholdings had been
taken. Nor did they receive adequate income from
what should replace the income potential of their
landholdings because the LBP refused to pay interest
while withholding the full amount of the principal of the
just compensation due by claiming a grossly low
valuation. This sad state continued for more than a
decade. In any language and by any measure, a
lengthy delay in payment occurred.
An important starting point in considering attribution
for the delay is that the petitioners voluntarily ofered
to sell their landholdings to the governments land
reform program; they themselves submitted their
Voluntary Ofer to Sell applications to the DAR, and
they fully cooperated with the governments program.
The present case therefore is not one where substantial
conflict arose on the issue of whether expropriation is
proper; the petitioners voluntarily submitted to
expropriation and surrendered their landholdings,
although they contested the valuation that the
government made.

Presumably, had the landholdings been properly

valued, the petitioners would have accepted the
payment of just compensation and there would have
been no need for them to go to the extent of filing a
valuation case. But, as borne by the records, the
petitioners lands were grossly undervalued by the
DAR, leaving the petitioners with no choice but to file
actions to secure what is justly due them.
The DARs initial gross undervaluation started the cycle
of court actions that followed, where the LBP
eventually claimed that it could not be faulted for
seeking judicial recourse to defend the governments
and its own interests in light of the petitioners
valuation claims.
This LBP claim, of course,
conveniently forgets that at the root of all these
valuation claims and counterclaims was the initial
gross undervaluation by DAR that the LBP stoutly
defended. At the end, this undervaluation was proven
incorrect by no less than this Court; the petitioners
were proven correct in their claim, and the correct
valuation more than five-fold the initial DAR valuation
was decreed and became final.
All these developments cannot now be disregarded and
reduced to insignificance.
In blunter terms, the
government and the LBP cannot now be heard to claim
that they were simply protecting their interests when
they stubbornly defended their undervalued positions
before the courts.
The more apt and accurate
statement is that they adopted a grossly unreasonable
position and the adverse developments that followed,
particularly the concomitant delay, should be directly
chargeable to them.
To be sure, the petitioners were not completely correct
in the legal steps they took in their valuation claims.
They initially filed their valuation claim before the
DARAB instead of immediately seeking judicial
intervention. The DARAB, however, contributed its
share to the petitioners error when it failed or refused
to act on the valuation petitions for more than three (3)
years. Thus, on top of the DAR undervaluation was the
DARAB inaction after the petitioners landholdings had
been taken. This Courts Decision of February 6, 2007
duly noted this and observed:
It is not controverted that this case started way back
on 12 October 1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily
ofered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view of the
failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the
properties, the Complaint for Determination of Just
Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14
February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than three
years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB failed
to render a decision on the valuation of the land.
Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI
had already been cancelled and in their place a new
certificate of title was issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9
December 1996. A period of almost 10 years has
lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this
case has truly languished for a long period of time, the
delay being mainly attributable to both official inaction
and indecision, particularly on the determination of the
amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC
and HPI, which to date, have yet to be fully

compensated for the properties which are already in

the hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the
lapse of time, may have already converted or sold the
land awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been
disposed with dispatch were it not for LBPs counsel
causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this
case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was
commissioned by law to determine just compensation,
sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason
that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We
underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that the
delay by DARAB in the determination of just
compensation could only mean the reluctance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of
the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation
by corporate landowners.
To allow the taking of landowners properties,
and to leave them empty-handed while government
withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
[Emphasis supplied.]
These statements cannot but be true today as they
were when we originally decided the case and awarded
12% interest on the balance of the just compensation
due. While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken
in initially seeking recourse through the DAR, this
agency itself hence, the government committed a
graver transgression when it failed to act at all on the
petitioners complaints for determination of just
compensation.
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related
circumstances of this case, delay should be laid at the
doorsteps of the government, not at the petitioners.
We conclude, too, that the government should not be
allowed to exculpate itself from this delay and should
sufer all the consequences the delay caused.
The LBPs arguments on the applicability of cases
imposing
12% interest
The LBP claims in its Comment that our rulings in
Republic v. Court of Appeals,[26] Reyes v. National
Housing Authority,[27] and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Imperial,[28] cannot be applied to the
present case.
According to the LBP, Republic is inapplicable because,
first, the landowners in Republic remained unpaid,
notwithstanding the fact that the award for just
compensation had already been fixed by final
judgment; in the present case, the Court already
acknowledged
that
pertinent
amounts
were
deposited in favor of the landowners within 14 months
from the filing of their complaint. Second, while
Republic involved an ordinary expropriation case, the
present case involves expropriation for agrarian
reform. Finally, the just compensation in Republic
remained unpaid notwithstanding the finality of
judgment, while the just compensation in the present
case was immediately paid in full after LBP received a
copy of the Courts resolution

We find no merit in these assertions.

As we discussed above, the pertinent amounts
allegedly deposited by LBP were mere partial payments
that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value of
the properties expropriated. They could be the basis
for the immediate taking of the expropriated property
but by no stretch of the imagination can these nominal
amounts be considered pertinent enough to satisfy
the full requirement of just compensation i.e., the full
and fair equivalent of the expropriated property, taking
into account its income potential and the foregone
income lost because of the immediate taking.

We likewise find no basis to support the LBPs theory

that Republic and the present case have to be treated
diferently because the first involves a regular
expropriation case, while the present case involves
expropriation pursuant to the countrys agrarian reform
program. In both cases, the power of eminent domain
was used and private property was taken for public
use. Why one should be diferent from the other, so
that the just compensation ruling in one should not
apply to the other, truly escapes us. If there is to be a
diference,
the
treatment
of
agrarian
reform
expropriations should be stricter and on a higher plane
because of the governments societal concerns and
objectives. To be sure, the government cannot attempt
to remedy the ills of one sector of society by sacrificing
the interests of others within the same society.
Finally, we note that the finality of the decision (that
fixed the value of just compensation) in Republic was
not a material consideration for the Court in awarding
the landowners 12% interest. The Court, in Republic,
simply affirmed the RTC ruling imposing legal interest
on the amount of just compensation due. In the
process, the Court determined that the legal interest
should be 12% after recognizing that the just
compensation due was efectively a forbearance on the
part of the government. Had the finality of the
judgment been the critical factor, then the 12%
interest should have been imposed from the time the
RTC decision fixing just compensation became final.
Instead, the 12% interest was imposed from the time
that
the
Republic
commenced
condemnation
proceedings and took the property.
The LBP additionally asserts that the petitioners
erroneously relied on the ruling in Reyes v. National
Housing Authority. The LBP claims that we cannot
apply Reyes because it involved just compensation that
remained unpaid despite the finality of the
expropriation decision. LBPs point of distinction is that
just compensation was immediately paid in the present
case upon the Courts determination of the actual
value of the expropriated properties. LBP claims, too,
that in Reyes, the Court established that the refusal of
the NHA to pay just compensation was unfounded and
unjustified, whereas the LBP in the present case clearly
demonstrated its willingness to pay just compensation.
Lastly, in Reyes, the records showed that there was an
outstanding balance that ought to be paid, while the
element of an outstanding balance is absent in the
present case.

Contrary to the LBPs opinion, the imposition of

the 12% interest in Reyes did not depend on either the
finality of the decision of the expropriation court, or on
the finding that the NHAs refusal to pay just
compensation was unfounded and unjustified. Quite
clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals that x x x if
property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s]
on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.[29]
This is the same legal principle applicable to the
present case, as discussed above.
While the LBP immediately paid the remaining
balance on the just compensation due to the
petitioners after this Court had fixed the value of the
expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact
from the time that the State took the petitioners
properties until the time that the petitioners were fully
paid, almost 12 long years passed.
This is the
rationale for imposing the 12% interest in order to
compensate the petitioners for the income they would
have made had they been properly compensated for
their properties at the time of the taking.
Finally, the LBP insists that the petitioners
quoted our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Imperial out of context. According to the LBP, the Court
imposed legal interest of 12% per annum only after
December 31, 2006, the date when the decision on just
compensation became final.
The LBP is again mistaken. The Imperial case
involved land that was expropriated pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27,[30] and fell under the
coverage of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 13.[31]
This AO provided for the payment of a 6% annual
interest if there is any delay in payment of just
compensation. However, Imperial was decided in 2007
and AO No. 13 was only efective up to December
2006. Thus, the Court, relying on our ruling in the
Republic case, applied the prevailing 12% interest
ruling to the period when the just compensation
remained unpaid after December 2006. It is for this
reason that December 31, 2006 was important, not
because it was the date of finality of the decision on
just compensation.
The 12% Interest Rate and
the Chico-Nazario Dissent
To fully reflect the concerns raised in this Courts
deliberations on the present case, we feel it
appropriate to discuss the Justice Minita ChicoNazarios dissent from the Courts December 4, 2009
Resolution.
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the
petitioners were entitled to the 12% interest, she saw it

appropriate to equitably reduce the interest charges

from P1,331,124,223.05 to P400,000,000.00. In
support of this proposal, she enumerated various cases
where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil
Code,[32] equitably reduced interest charges.
We difer with our esteemed colleagues views on the
application of equity.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of
interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those
cases involved interest that was essentially consensual
in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements
between the contracting parties. In contrast, the
interest involved in the present case runs as a matter
of law and follows as a matter of course from the right
of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as
money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.[33]
Furthermore, the allegedly considerable payments
made by the LBP to the petitioners cannot be a proper
premise in denying the landowners the interest due
them under the law and established jurisprudence. If
the just compensation for the landholdings is
considerable, this compensation is not undue because
the landholdings the owners gave up in exchange are
also similarly considerable AFC gave up an aggregate
landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPIs gave up
805.5308 hectares. When the petitioners surrendered
these sizeable landholdings to the government, the
incomes they gave up were likewise sizeable and
cannot in any way be considered miniscule. The
incomes due from these properties, expressed as
interest, are what the government should return to the
petitioners after the government took over their lands
without full payment of just compensation. In other
words, the value of the landholdings themselves should
be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due; interest is due and should be paid
to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal
sum after taking has been completed. This is the
compensation arrangement that should prevail if such
compensation is to satisfy the constitutional standard
of being just.
Neither can LBPs payment of the full compensation
due before the finality of the judgment of this Court
justify the reduction of the interest due them. To rule
otherwise would be to forget that the petitioners had to
wait twelve years from the time they gave up their
lands before the government fully paid the principal of
the just compensation due them. These were twelve
years when they had no income from their
landholdings because these landholdings have
immediately been taken; no income, or inadequate
income, accrued to them from the proceeds of
compensation payment due them because full
payment has been withheld by government.
If the full payment of the principal sum of the just
compensation is legally significant at all under the
circumstances of this case, the significance is only in
putting a stop to the running of the interest due
because the principal of the just compensation due has
been paid. To close our eyes to these realities is to
condone what is efectively a confiscatory action in
favor of the LBP.

That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to

the principal to be paid is not per se an inequitable or
unconscionable situation, considering the length of
time the interest has remained unpaid almost twelve
long years. From the perspective of interest income,
twelve years would have been sufficient for the
petitioners to double the principal, even if invested
conservatively, had they been promptly paid the
principal of the just compensation due them.
Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be,
cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because it
resulted directly from the application of law and
jurisprudence standards that have taken into account
fairness and equity in setting the interest rates due for
the use or forebearance of money.
If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it
only has itself to blame, as this interest piled up
because it unreasonably acted in its valuation of the
landholdings and consequently failed to promptly pay
the petitioners. To be sure, the consequences of this
failure i.e., the enormity of the total interest due and
the alleged financial hemorrhage the LBP may sufer
should not be the very reason that would excuse it
from full compliance. To so rule is to use extremely
flawed logic. To so rule is to disregard the question of
how the LBP, a government financial institution that
now professes difficulty in paying interest at 12% per
annum, managed the funds that it failed to pay the
petitioners for twelve long years.
It would be utterly fallacious, too, to argue that this
Court should tread lightly in imposing liabilities on the
LBP because this bank represents the government and,
ultimately, the public interest. Suffice it to say that
public interest refers to what will benefit the public, not
necessarily the government and its agencies whose
task is to contribute to the benefit of the public.
Greater public benefit will result if government
agencies like the LBP are conscientious in undertaking
its tasks in order to avoid the situation facing it in this
case. Greater public interest would be served if it can
contribute to the credibility of the governments land
reform program through the conscientious handling of
its part of this program.
As our last point, equity and equitable principles only
come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.[34]
As we have shown above,
established rulings of this Court are in place for full
application to the present case. There is thus no
occasion for the equitable consideration that Justice
Chico-Nazario suggested.
The Amount Due the Petitioners
Compensation

as Just

As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is

only on the diference between the price of the
expropriated lands (determined with finality to be
P1,383,179,000.00)
and
the
amount
of
P411,769,168.32 already paid to the petitioners. The
diference between these figures amounts to the
remaining balance of P971,409,831.68 that was only
paid on May 9, 2008.

As above discussed, this amount should bear interest

at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the
petitioners properties were taken on December 9,
1996 up to the time of payment. At this rate, the LBP
now owes the petitioners the total amount of One
Billion Three Hundred Thirty-One Million One Hundred
Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Three and
05/100 Pesos (P1,331,124,223.05), computed as
follows:
Just
P971,409,831.68

Compensation

Legal Interest from 12/09/1996

To 05/09/2008 @ 12%/annum
12/09/1996 to 12/31/1996
7,345,455.17
01/01/1997 to 12/31/2007
1,282,260,977.82
01/01/2008 to 05/09/2008
41,517,790.07

23

days

11

years

130

days

P1,331,124,223.05[35]

The Immutability of Judgment Issue

As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law
and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of
the land, rendered it.[36] In the past, however, we
have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing
judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of
substantial justice and where special and compelling
reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[37] Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
[38] Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National
Telecommunications Commission,[39] and Republic v.
de los Angeles,[40] we reversed our judgment on the
second motion for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen
Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[41] we did so on a third motion
for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v. Romillo[42]
and Cosio v. de Rama,[43] we modified or amended our
ruling on the second motion for reconsideration. More
recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals,[44]
Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico,[45] Manotok IV v.
Barque,[46] and Barnes v. Padilla,[47] we recalled
entries of judgment after finding that doing so was in
the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can
no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to
serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or

negligence of the party favored by the suspension of

the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself had already declared to be final.[48]
[Emphasis supplied.]
That the issues posed by this case are of
transcendental importance is not hard to discern from
these
discussions.
A
constitutional
limitation,
guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of
Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation
in an eminent domain be just when the payment for
the compensation for property already taken has been
unreasonably delayed?
To claim, as the assailed
Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in
this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the
government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that
under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or
standards apply to government who carries the burden
of showing that these standards have been met. Thus,
to simply dismiss this case as a private interest matter
is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court
should not leave uncorrected.
As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not
one of first impression in our jurisdiction; the
consequences of delay in the payment of just
compensation have been settled by this Court in past
rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone
accords this case primary importance as a contrary
ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all
the rulings we have established in the past.
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter
before us is of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the subject matter involved agrarian
reform, a societal objective that the government has
unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.
This reform program and its objectives would sufer a
major setback if the government falters or is seen to be
faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good
faith in implementing the needed reforms.
Truly,
agrarian reform is so important to the national agenda
that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked
agricultural lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea
of revolution.[49] This linkage, to our mind, remains
valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is
at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian
reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure
should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override, substantial justice.[50] As we explained in
Ginete v. Court of Appeals:[51]
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the

attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,

which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the
instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to
aford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again,
this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
[52] [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[53]
we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to
set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but
not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering justice have always
been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by
the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take
a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the
appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give
way to the realities of the situation.[54] [Emphasis
supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes,[55] on the
underlying premise that a courts primordial and most
important duty is to render justice; in discharging the
duty to render substantial justice, it is permitted to reexamine even a final and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the
patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that the
petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find
that we are duty-bound to re-examine and overturn the
assailed Resolution. We shall completely and
inexcusably be remiss in our duty as defenders of
justice if, given the chance to make the rectification,
we shall let the opportunity pass.
Attorneys Fees
We are fully aware that the RTC has awarded the
petitioners attorneys fees when it fixed the just
compensation due and decreed that interest of 12%
should be paid on the balance outstanding after the
taking of the petitioners landholdings took place. The
petitioners, however, have not raised the award of
attorneys fees as an issue in the present motion for
reconsideration. For this reason, we shall not touch on
this issue at all in this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court En
Bancs Resolution dated December 4, 2009, as well as
the Third Divisions Resolutions dated April 30, 2008

and December 19, 2007, are hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE.
The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby
ORDERED to pay petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation and
Hijo Plantation, Inc. interest at the rate of 12% per
annum on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation,
computed
from
the
date
the
Government took the properties on December 9, 1996,
until the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines paid
on May 9, 2008 the balance on the principal amount.
Unless the parties agree to a shorter payment period,
payment shall be in monthly installments at the rate of
P60,000,000.00 per month until the whole amount
owing, including interest on the outstanding balance, is
fully paid.
Costs against the respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189127
April 25, 2012
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES
BERNARDO
AND
MINDALUZ
SALUDARES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition questions the 21 July 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),1 which affirmed
the 10 September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),2 Branch 31, Tagum City. The RTC had ruled
that respondent spouses are entitled to P 4,920,750 as
just compensation for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by petitioner National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).
Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed hightension transmission lines to implement the DavaoManat 138 KV Transmission Line Project.3 These
transmission lines traversed a 12,060-square meter
portion of a parcel of agricultural land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15343 and
owned by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras,
Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.
In
1981,
NAPOCOR
commenced
expropriation
proceedings covering TCT No. T-15343 in National
Power Corporation v. Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano
Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.4
These proceedings culminated in a final Decision
ordering it to pay the amount of P 300,000 as just
compensation for the afected property.5
The trial court issued an Order6 subrogating Tahanan
Realty Development Corporation to the rights of the
defendants in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras.
Pursuant to this Order, NAPOCOR paid the corporation
the judgment award of P 300,0007 and Tahanan Realty
Development Corporation executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the former.8 This Deed covered Lot
481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481,
Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum,
Davao.9
Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz PereyrasSaludares are registered owners of a 6,561-square-

meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109865,10

more particularly described as follows:

January 01, 1982, until said amount is fully paid, or

deposited in Court;

A parcel of land (Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.), being a

portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd51550; H-148559 & 463-A-2 (LRC) Psd-150796,
situated in the Barrio of Magugpo, Mun. of Tagum,
Province of Davao, Island of Mindanao. x x x11

Second: To pay plaintifs-spouses Bernardo and

Mindaluz Saludares attorneys fees of Fifty Thousand (P
50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus appearance
fee of P 2,000.00 per appearance and litigation
expenses which shall be supported in a Bill of Costs to
be submitted for the Courts approval;

On 19 August 1999, respondents filed the instant

Complaint against NAPOCOR and demanded the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that it had
entered and occupied their property by erecting hightension transmission lines therein and failed to
reasonably compensate them for the intrusion.12

Third. To pay the costs of the suit.

Fourth. For utter lack of merit, the counterclaim is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner averred that it already paid just

compensation
for
the
establishment
of
the
transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the
final and executory Decision in National Power
Corporation v. Pereyras. Furthermore, assuming that
respondent spouses had not yet received adequate
compensation for the intrusion upon their property,
NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just compensation
and damages may only be filed within five years from
the date of installation of the transmission lines
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6395.13
Pretrial terminated without the parties having entered
into a compromise agreement.14 Thereafter, the court
appointed Lydia Gonzales and Wilfredo Silawan as
Commissioners for the purpose of determining the
valuation
of
the
subject
land.15
NAPOCOR
recommended Loreto Monteposo as the third
Commissioner,16 but later clarified that its conformity
to the appointment of commissioners was only for the
purpose of determining the exact portion of the subject
land, and that it was not admitting its liability to pay
just compensation.17
After
the
proceedings,
the
Commissioners
recommended the amount of P 750 per square meter
as the current and fair market value of the subject
property based on the Schedule of Market Values of
Real Properties within the City of Tagum efective in the
year 2000.18

NAPOCOR appealed the trial courts Decision to the

CA.20 After a review of the respective parties Briefs,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision on
21 July 2009, denying NAPOCORs appeal and affirming
the trial courts Decision, but reducing the rate of
interest to 6% per annum.21
Aggrieved, petitioner then filed the instant Rule 45
Petition before this Court.
The Issues
The pivotal issues as distilled from the pleadings are as
follows:
1. Whether NAPOCOR has previously compensated the
spouses for establishing high-tension transmission
lines over their property;
2. Whether the demand for payment
compensation has already prescribed;

of

just

3. Whether petitioner is liable for only ten percent of

the fair market value of the property or for the full
value thereof; and
4. Whether the trial court properly awarded the amount
of P 4,920,750 as just compensation, based on the
Approved Schedule of Market Values for Real Property
in Tagum City for the Year 2000.

Trial on the merits ensued. On 10 September 2002, the

Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent
spouses, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The Courts Ruling

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintifs, and against the
defendant-National Power Corporation, ordering the
latter to pay the plaintifs the Just Compensation as
herein fixed which they claimed for the use, occupation
and utilization of their land from which it benefited and
profited since January 1982, as follows:

I
NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately
compensated respondents for the establishment of
high tension transmission lines over their property

First: To pay plaintif Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz

Saludares as just compensation of their 6,561 square
meters, more or less, titled land covered by TCT No. T109865 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte
hereby fixed in the amount of FOUR MILLION NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY
(P 4,920,750.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from

We uphold the Decisions of the CA and the RTC.

NAPOCOR argues that the parcel of land involved in the

instant Petition had already been expropriated in
National Power Corporation v. Pereyras.22 In support of
this argument, it alleges that one of the sources of the
spouses TCT No. T-109865 is TCT No. 39660; and that
TCT No. 39660 is a transfer from TCT No. T-15343, the
subject land in National Power Corporation v.
Pereyras.23 Thus, having paid just compensation to
Tahanan
Realty
Development
Corporation,
the
successor-in-interest of defendants Pereyras in the
aforementioned case, petitioner submits that it should

no longer be made to pay just compensation in the

present case.
We disagree.
While it is true that respondent spouses TCT No. T109865 was indeed indirectly sourced from TCT No. T15343, the CA correctly ruled that NAPOCOR failed to
prove that the lands involved in National Power
Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant Petition are
identical. One cannot infer that the subject lands in
both cases are the same, based on the fact that one of
the source titles of TCT No. T-109865 happens to be
TCT No. T-38660, and that TCT No. T-38660 itself was
derived from T-15343.
Furthermore, the evidence before us supports
respondent spouses contention that the lands involved
in both cases are diferent. National Power Corporation
v. Pereyras involved Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which
was a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo,
Municipality of Tagum, Davao.24 On the other hand,
the instant Petition involves Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704,
Amd., which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718;
480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2 (LRC), Psd150796, in Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum,
Davao. Clearly, these lots refer to diferent parcels of
land.25
We rule, therefore, that NAPOCOR failed to prove its
previous payment of just compensation for its
expropriation of the land in question.
II
The demand for payment of just compensation
has not prescribed
Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent
spouses have not been adequately compensated for
the entry into their property, their claim for just
compensation would have already prescribed,26
pursuant to Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended
by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758, 938, 1360
and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do
as follows:
x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful
performance or prosecution of its business or purposes,
including the construction of the transmission lines
thereon; Provided, that the owner of such private
property shall be paid the just compensation therefor
in accordance with the provisions hereinafter provided;
Provided, further, that any action by any person
claiming compensation and/or damages shall be filed
within five (5) years after the right-of-way, transmission
lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have
been established; Provided, finally, that after the said
period no suit shall be brought to question the said
right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or
other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or
damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
NAPOCORs reliance on this provision is misplaced.
The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in
no less than our Bill of Rights, which states in clear and
categorical language that "[p]rivate property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation."27

This constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by

statutory prescription.28 Thus, we have ruled that the
prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395
does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation.29 It would be a confiscatory act on the
part of the government to take the property of
respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive
them of their right to just compensation, solely
because they failed to institute inverse condemnation
proceedings within five years from the time the
transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it
was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for
just compensation. Rather, it was the duty of NAPOCOR
to institute eminent domain proceedings before
occupying their property. In the normal course of
events, before the expropriating power enters a private
property, it must first file an action for eminent
domain30 and deposit with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property.31 Due to its omission, however,
respondents were constrained to file inverse
condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of
just compensation before the trial court. We therefore
rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory
prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses
constitutional right to just compensation.
III
NAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market value
of the afected property
NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten
percent (10%) of the fair market value of the
landowners property because, under its Charter,32 it
is only authorized to acquire easements of right-of-way
over agricultural lands.33
Petitioners arguments fail to convince.
We have ruled that "when petitioner takes private
property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to
pay the full market value upon proper determination by
the courts."34
In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,35 the
petitioner likewise argued that it should only be made
to pay easement fees instead of the full market value
of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In
striking down its argument and ruling that the property
owners were entitled to the full market value of the
land in question, we ruled:
While it is true that plaintif [is] only after a right-ofway easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by
the imposition by the plaintif upon defendants that
below said transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of
the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be
caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be
discounted, and to cap it all, plaintif only pays the fee
to defendants once, while the latter shall continually
pay the taxes due on said afected portion of their
property.36
Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could
still utilize the area beneath NAPOCORs transmission

lines provided that the plants to be introduced

underneath would not exceed three meters,37 danger
is posed to the lives and limbs of respondents farm
workers, such that the property is no longer suitable for
agricultural production.38 Considering the nature and
efect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines,
the limitation imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually
deprives respondents of the ordinary use of their land.
Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No.
6395, as amended, is not binding upon this Court.39
"[T]he determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function and . . . any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the
statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation but it
may not substitute the court's own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount."40
We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay
respondents the full market value of the afected
property as determined by the court a quo.
IV
The trial court did not err in awarding just
compensation based on the Approved Schedule of
Market Values for
Real Property for the Year 2000
As its final argument, petitioner contends that the
amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court is
unjust, unlawful and contrary to existing jurisprudence,
because just compensation in expropriation cases must
be determined from the time of the filing of the
complaint or the time of taking of the subject property,
whichever came first.41 It therefore posits that since
the taking of the property happened in the 1970s, the
trial court erred in fixing the amount of just
compensation with reference to real property market
values in the year 2000.42
Petitioners contention holds no water.
We have ruled in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay43 that the reckoning value of
just compensation is that prevailing at the time of the
filing of the inverse condemnation proceedings for the
following reason:
[c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value
prevailing at the time either when NPC entered x x x
would not be just, for it would compound the gross
unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's
entering without the intention of formally expropriating
the land x x x. NPC's entry denied elementary due
process of law to the owners since then until the
owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the
necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from
its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the
owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary
fairness
to
them,
therefore,
reckoning
just
compensation on the value at the time the owners
commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings
is entirely warranted.1wphi1

Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their

right to just compensation if the value of the property
is pegged back to its value in the 1970s. To reiterate,
NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain
proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses
property. Because it failed to comply with this duty,
respondent spouses were constrained to file the instant
Complaint for just compensation before the trial court.
From the 1970s until the present, they were deprived
of just compensation, while NAPOCOR continuously
burdened their property with its transmission lines.
This Court cannot allow petitioner to profit from its
failure to comply with the mandate of the law. We
therefore rule that, to adequately compensate
respondent spouses from the decades of burden on
their property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the
value of the property at the time of the filing of the
instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a
judicial demand for just compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81098 dated 21 July 2009 is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31195
June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS
EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR
TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO
RUFINO,
ROXAS
MARIANO
DE
LEON,
ASENCION
PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas &
Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private
respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of
the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod
are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided
to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the
first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.
and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they
informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of
the parties parties
3.
That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the

Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first

shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4.
That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and
(6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5.
That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting.
Pagcu
explained
further
that
the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;
6.
That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
7.
That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked Company represented
by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was
composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod,
Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this
afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives
that while all workers may join the Malacaang
demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining
the demonstration and should report for work; and thus
utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not
to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article
XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will
not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning
that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to change their
plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will
be held the following morning; and
8.
That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of

which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE

DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge
against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13
and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No.
875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was
accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and
Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.).
Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated
April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex
"C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners
claim that they did not violate the existing CBA
because they gave the respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise
of their constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike
because it was not directed against the respondent
firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found
herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo
Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the
said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence,
considered to have lost their status as employees of
the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on
September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.);
and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated
September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary
to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10)
days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on
October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company
averred that herein petitioners received on September
22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be
September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the
amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations,
herein petitioners had five (5) days from September
22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to

file their motion for reconsideration; and that because

their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late,
it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for
extension of the five-day period for the filing of a
motion for reconsideration should be filed before the
said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64,
rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14,
1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969,
in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex
"I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent
en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed
beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners
received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October
9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76,
rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and
17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be
filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or
order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution
or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the
respondent court a petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure
to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due
to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the president of the petitioner Union and
of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto
the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes
"K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for
relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the
Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 8889, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and
principles which underlie the issues posed by the case
at bar.
(1)
In a democracy, the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected
to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his
beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2)
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the
ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the
scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles." 3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the

purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and
property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the
State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to
be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to
the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3)
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as
well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the
liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4)
The rights of free expression, free assembly
and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely
in the periodic establishment of the government
through their sufrage but also in the administration of
public afairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so
that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees.
(5)
While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights

is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the
law and its object or purpose that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional
or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in
Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech
and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when
directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by
whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice
Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief
Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule
formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz.
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression
as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after
opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their
"concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage
of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad
faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing
principles governing a democratic society, such
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration
held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacaang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen,
not against their employer, herein private respondent
firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom expression in general and of
their right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances
in
particular
before
appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual
aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein
private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members fro the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report
to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even ofer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it
also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage
the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged
oppressive police who might have been all the more

emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to

further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition
against
alleged
persecution
of
local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons aforded them by
the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would sufer loss or damage by reason
of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the
diference between the life and death of the firm or its
owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves
vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally afected their right to individual existence as
well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement
of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.
The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate
him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property
rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of
this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social
justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the
working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in efect imposes
on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working
hours." The strain construction of the Court of
Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts
deny the workers the right to stage mass
demonstration against police abuses during working
hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and
life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated
on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on

March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon
the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The
respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at
bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex
"F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for
all its employees to participate in the demonstration
and that they suggested to the Union that only the first
and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for
work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non
of an efective demonstration especially by a labor
union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediately action on the part of the corresponding
government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one
of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that
much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration
is
diminished.
The
more
the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third
of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever
losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the
Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on March 4,
1969 which request the Union reiterated in their
telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass
demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the
firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse
from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its
mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair
labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress
of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as

the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8

guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section
Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual
aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial
of which was interference with or restraint on the right
of the employees to engage in such common action to
better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shift should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and
protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a
letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in
the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23
We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case,
supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section
4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining
be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is
for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in
the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly
acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the
Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who
belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the organizers
of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an
illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of
dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the
employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to
proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to
lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work
on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means
much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to
support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day
salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not

find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of
the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the
local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of
such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their
complaint and to whom such complaint may be
referred by the President of the Philippines for proper
investigation and action with a view to disciplining the
local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the
fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm
did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for
failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or
that penalties were exacted from it by customers
whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled
by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the
materials ordered; or that its own equipment or
materials or products were damaged due to absence of
its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and
electric consumption that day. Such savings could have
amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and assembly as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the
dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently
being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social
justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
aford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance
to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the
working man; for otherwise these constitutional
safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to efect
the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the
exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the
promotion of their moral, social and economic wellbeing." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its

avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and

directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and
as a consequence its judgment is null and void and
confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas
corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an
individual, who is convicted by final judgment through
a forced confession, which violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the
right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26
even after the accused has already served sentence for
twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and
private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed
they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself
of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in
the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and
protection of such freedoms are imperative on all
public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment
of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations
exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when
even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There
is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The
right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of
one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be
denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated
by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal.
The battle then would be reduced to a race for time.
And in such a contest between an employer and its
laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend
his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft
as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that
motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that
the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed
within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such
motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above
intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated
by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a
legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September
29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September

22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two

(2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have
filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration
was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and
concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply
with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural
rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated
pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy
to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet
of
constitutional
government
that
the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate
rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural
reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should
be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights afected,' but
instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said
Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was
pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority
granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of
five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case
of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a
period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing
of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See.
10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised
Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for
reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on
the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is
not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an
extension of ten (10) days within which to file
arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G",
pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually
filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969
(Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day
period required for the filing of such supporting
arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on
October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969
dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro
forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary
period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a
motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the

10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court

of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision
subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action
and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of
action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional
issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no
final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of
Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural
rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of
Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human
freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a
most compelling reason to deny application of a Court
of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such
human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has
the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever
the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with
all situations without concerning itself about procedural
niceties that do not square with the need to do justice,
in any case, without further loss of time, provided that
the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an
appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words,
when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of
judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there
render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down
in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases,
to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment
of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized
as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt,
which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors
this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds
should it choose to reverse said decision here and now
even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes
of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of
jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of
this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of

pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis

supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court
industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural
niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers,
whose basic human freedoms, including the right to
survive, must be according supremacy over the
property rights of their employer firm which has been
given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in
the case at bar, no actual material damage has be
demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires
it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clash with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the
specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant
case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of
petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the
record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the
Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which
enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine
which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking
for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs.
Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being ofered by the
petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such
criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its,
rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the
Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities
applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even
restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties
but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to

future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496,

Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil.
Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that
this provision is ample enough to have enabled the
respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v.
Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule
in efect that the poor workers, who can ill-aford an
alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the
sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel
erroneously believing that he received a copy of the
decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September
22, 1969 - filed his motion for reconsideration
September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day
late considering that September 28, 1969 was a
Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure
technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of
justice, for the attainment of which such rules have
been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this
score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous
Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in
Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor
decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court
of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243,
June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as
1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as
an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has
remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco
v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind.
For him the interpretation of procedural rule should
never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural
laws are no other than technicalities" view them in
their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which courts have
organized and function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of justice
(Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed,
in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the
sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of
Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put
by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the
realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379,
Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon,
(1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968,
Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial
to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules
of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations

orders and rule were to be given efect, the dismissal
or termination of the employment of the petitioning
eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did
not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees
who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself
and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's
Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.).
Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the
400 or so employee participated in the demonstration,
for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13)
officers were specifically named in the unfair labor
practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were
so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular
shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as
a consequence, the firm continued in operation that
day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at
all should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to
dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism,
while at the same time strengthening the oppressive
hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not
from those who consciously seek to destroy our system
of Government, but from men of goodwill good men
who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the
fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an
impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable.
What we must remember, however, is that
preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same efect whether the
suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only
protection against misguided zeal is a constant
alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty
contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty
to the demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of
us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own
liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a
group that is important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for

the less fortunate that we in all honor and good

conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or
good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim
that they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve
its income or profits than to assist its employees in
their fight for their freedoms and security against
alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is
sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency
resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure
and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic
Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and
published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of
immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of
bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We
ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission
of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in
their individual capacities when they wrote the lettercharge they were nonetheless protected for they were
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some
members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated,
the joining in protests or demands, even by a small
group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests
as such, is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union
activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure,
the right of self-organization of employees is not
unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S.
793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge
for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil.
Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied.
The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select his
employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely
against the abuse of that right by interfering with the
countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in
unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of selforganization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment of

section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis

supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and
protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the
morality and integrity of the bank president no less,
such recognition and protection for free speech, free
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the
more justifiable and more imperative in the case at
bar, where the mass demonstration was not against
the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1)
setting aside as null and void the orders of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2)
directing the re instatement of the herein eight
(8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one
day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation
from the service.
With costs against private
Blooming Company, Inc.

respondent

Philippine

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
G.R. No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs .THE
HONORABLE
CITY
MAYOR
OF
MANILA,
respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for
intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment
of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed,
there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain
an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of
its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu,
who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the
City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
"charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was
alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the

interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels

and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses
duly licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood
to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was
then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as
Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the
ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the
revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other
law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of
the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter
to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given
name and middle name, the date of birth, the address,
the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of
stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
coupled with a certification that a person signing such
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature
in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative, with such registration
forms and records kept and bound together, it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process
grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room,
a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
ofends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring
second class motels to have a dining room; that the
provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern
or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter

to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and

for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for
in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the ofended party, in
efect causing the destruction of the business and loss
of its investments, there is once again a transgression
of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower
court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July
8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory
or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the
petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid
and proper exercise of the police power and that only
the guests or customers not before the court could
complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being ofered by both parties,
there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are
duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while
the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor
Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having
the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in
the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate
and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of
the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila

besides inserting therein three new sections. This

ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex
B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal
Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual
income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the
105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners)
operating in the City of Manila.1wph1.t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on
January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged
ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity
to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks
later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set
forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are
members of the petitioners association, and referring
to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the
party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining
issue here being purely a question of law, the parties,
with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda
and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the
Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed
upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of
the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged
lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate
motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction
issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question."
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed.
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the
lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto
been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is
the absence of any evidence to ofset the presumption
of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or

ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice

Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x
x . The action of the elected representatives of the
people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must,
in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in efect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance
is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in
the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintif of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.
This particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely
on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending
as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the
very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in

Manila traceable in great part to the existence of

motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times,
and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack
against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently
for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer
as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9
prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked
or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to
protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may afect
the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power
may be considered as either capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost
shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which the governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then
is the standard of due process which must exist both as
a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for
that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo,
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in

sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any

official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for
justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19
decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases.21
It would thus be an afront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication
of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To
be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It
provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records,
and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted
here to attach to an ordinance of such character the
taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to
single out such features as the increased fees for
motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance
for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over
200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to
pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as
far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
classified
into
those
imposed
for
regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and
for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for
non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from
the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases
than in the former, and aside from applying the wellknown legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon
the number of persons who might otherwise engage in
non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in
the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the

sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have

rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that
taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the
Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities
is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects
with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for
public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one
case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if
it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26
The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintifsappellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could
deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of
livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintifs are also dealers
in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which
outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a
living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power.
As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest
be afected by the exercise of the police power embark
in these occupations subject to the disadvantages
which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract,
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a
proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
call for a diferent conclusion. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable
nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then
be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of
an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware
that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice
Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which
runs through all these diferent conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society and the general well-being. No

man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must

renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual
is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good x x x The liberty of
the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel:
"Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should
achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer
"retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations afected with
public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is
that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed afects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principles
of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a
recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the
gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than
vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the
requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or
entering the room With him at about the same time or
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a
proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is
dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint
would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may

be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the

ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From
Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld
that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge
is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and difer as to its
application. Is this the situation before us? A citation
from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands,
with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with
such vigor and determination, the attack against the
validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
G.R. No. L-20387
January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMELITO
R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiffappellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendantsappellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees
from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the
tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be
the state policy "in line with the principle that a public
office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor
was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a
grave problem in the public service that unfortunately
has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An
earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the
State of any property found to have been unlawfully
acquired by any public officer or employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval
or after his assumption of office "and within the month
of January of every other year thereafter", as well as
upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and
file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a
true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and

family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid

for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical
submission "within the month of January of every other
year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared
his financial condition upon assumption of office was
challenged for being violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit
in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against selfincrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed
from sustained plaintif, then as well as now, a judge of
repute of a court of first instance. For it, such
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus
ofensive to the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly
reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in
this action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962,
plaintif, after asserting his belief "that it was a
reasonable requirement for employment that a public
officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon
assumption of office and thereby make it possible
thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his
position in the public service, he accumulated assets
grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the
herein plaintif [having] filed within the period of time
fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the
prescribed sworn statement of financial condition,
assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that
the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn
statement of financial condition, assets, income and
liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared
his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is
oppressive and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process
and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as
may be inferred from the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination
were relied upon. There was also the allegation that
the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials,
premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory
assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and unless
thus restrained by this periodical submission of the
statements of "their financial condition, income, and
expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from
committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was
further asserted that there was no need for such a
provision as "the income tax law and the tax census
law also require statements which can serve to
determine whether an officer or employee in this
Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his
reported income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the
then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of
Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting

the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion

of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses
set forth: "1. That when a government official, like
plaintif, accepts a public position, he is deemed to
have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give
information about his personal afair, not only at the
time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust. The private life of
an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
. . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights against selfincrimination as well as unreasonable search and
seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in
question cannot be attacked on the ground that it
impairs plaintif's normal and legitimate enjoyment of
his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks
to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest
or general welfare in honest and clean public service
and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police
power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintif filed a Motion for
judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his
material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10,
1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty
days within which to submit memoranda, but with or
without them, the case was deemed submitted for
decision the lower court being of the belief that "there
is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having
admitted] all the material allegations of the complaint."
11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962,
the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and
void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
required periodical submittal of sworn statements of
financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official
or employee of the government after he had once
submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming
office; . . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association
v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding of this
Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the
lower court deciding the matter purely "on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise
there was no factual foundation on which the
nullification of this section of the statute could be
based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court
could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate
however, for as likewise made clear in the above
Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom
of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed afects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly
affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a
situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order,
or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the
threat to constitutional rights, especially those

involving the freedom of the mind, present and

ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should
not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that
evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution,
Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when
property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment
that commands respect. This dual standard may not
precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality
in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a
hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the
above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion
of liberty protected by the due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of
policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an
enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law. They include persuading,
inducing, or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an ofense in connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
ofense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly
any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself, or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the government and
any other party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or
other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer,
in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or
will secure or obtain, any Government permit or
license, in consideration for the help given or to be
given; accepting or having any member of his family
accept employment in a private enterprise which has
pending official business with him during the pendency
thereof or within one year after its termination; causing
any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on any matter pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his
own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party;
entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby; having
directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interests;

becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal

gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or
act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of
which he is a member, and which exercises discretion
in such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in such action; approving or
granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or
benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not
legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of
one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging
valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office or by him on account of his
official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
such information in advance of its authorized release
date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private individuals,
19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and prohibition
on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this
requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities,
that portion requiring periodical submission being
challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal
with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference
being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for
violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the
Court of First Instance as the competent court, 25 the
prescription of ofenses, 26 the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation,
criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27
suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception of
unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant
value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of
one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the
separability clause, 30 and its efectivity. 31
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended
to further promote morality in public administration. A
public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can
cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands
the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called
for norms of such character. The times demanded such
a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is
comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and
explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices
were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an
efort was made, so evident from even a cursory
perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes.
One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it
becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take
advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft
and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and
undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only
question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring
periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an
officer or employee had previously done so upon

assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it

cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a
valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid
Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a
reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth
by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power
in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the
power to promote the general welfare and public
interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons
and property as may promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare of each
inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent
ofenses against the state and to establish for the
intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent
conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott
38 stated that the term police power was first used by
Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American
decisions then, police power legislation usually has
reference to regulatory measures restraining either the
rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is
undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions,
valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's
successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope
to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property
of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police
powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And
whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to
punish ofenses, or to establish courts of justice, or
requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to
regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case
it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power
of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things
within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like
Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under
the police power of the state to promote morality in
public service necessarily limited in scope to
officialdom. May a public official claiming to be
adversely afected rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answer
must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends
to regulatory action afecting persons in public or
private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can
invoke the protection of due process which permits
deprivation of property or liberty as long as such
requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public
office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can
be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the
Constitution the mantle of protection aforded by due

process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly

held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then
pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due
process in the form of an investigation at which he
must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to
defend himself must be observed before a civil service
officer or employee may be removed. There was a
reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language
when this Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v.
Roque 44 declared that even without express provision
of law, "it is established by the great weight of
authority that the power of removal or suspension for
cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be
exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise
the import of a statement from the then Justice, now
Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in
Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement
directed in the decision appealed from does not bar
such appropriate administrative action as the
behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon
compliance with the requirements of due process."
To the same efect is the holding of this Court
extending the mantle of the security of tenure
provision to employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations entrusted with governmental
functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v.
Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard,
guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold
their office or employment during good behavior and
would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be
determined in an investigation, where an opportunity
to be heard and defend themselves in person or by
counsel is aforded them, would bring about such a
desirable condition." Reference was there made to
promoting honesty and efficiency through an
assurance of stability in their employment relation. It
was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador
in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could
categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was
made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void. . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding
of the applicability of due process guaranty to be
forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Via, 48 where the
opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the
following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having
these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the
constitutional provision of due process of law for the
removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the
pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled to
conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees
were not primarily confidential in nature so as to make
their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence
reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that
respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., were not
subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause
specified by law and within due process. . . ." 49 In a
still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court,
through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality
of the constitutional principle of due process cannot be
allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an
employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service
without hearing upon a doubtful assumption that
he has admitted his guilt for an ofense against Civil

Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observation

from the same case: "A civil service employee should
be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has
clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by
now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court,
due process may be relied upon by public official to
protect the security of tenure which in that limited
sense is analogous to property, could he not likewise
avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike
down what he considers to be an infringement of his
liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the
answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official
has certain rights to freedom the government must
respect. To the extent then, that there is a curtailment
thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process
mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the
rule and restraint the exception, the question raised
cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine
case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed
by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the
rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the
warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is
not license. Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good, the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as
quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do
right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and
the upright and honorable conscience of the
individual."
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by
Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social organization, 52
implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions
imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was
Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice
some measure of individual liberty, no matter how
slight the restraints which the society consciously
imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton
however, should be understood in the sense that
liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or
safety, of general welfare, in other words through the
proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated.
The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out,
has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot be
touched by government or law at all, whether the
command is specially against him or generally against
him and others." 55

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn

statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one
upon assumption of office beyond the power of
government to impose? Admittedly without the
challenged provision, a public officer would be free
from such a requirement. To the extent then that there
is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is
afected. It cannot be denied however that under the
Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as
due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is
an observance of due process. That leads us to an
inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform
in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter,
from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell
its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively
put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those
strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a
narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions
based on such a clause requiring a 'close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases."
56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to
ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done
so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged
deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way
in disposing of the objections raised by plaintif that
the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the
constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said
for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let
alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most

comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does
not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly
stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they
are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He
cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation,
which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is
private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others,
he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will
of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot
believe that a man no longer master of himself is in
any real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express
recognition
of
privacy,
specifically
that
of
communication and correspondence which "shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when
public safety and order" 60 may otherwise require, and
implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the
liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such
statutory requirement of further periodical submission
of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves
to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression,
no previous decision having been rendered by this
Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the
leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and efects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him
to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." After
referring to various American Supreme Court decisions,
64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
ofense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has
wider implications though. The constitutional right to
privacy has come into its own.1wph1.t

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy

as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of
the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual
has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the diference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be
said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of
a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the
rational relationship such a requirement possesses with
the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character.
This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection;
it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a
further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and
sources of income, the amounts of personal and family
expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next
preceding
calendar
year,
there
is
no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be
a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintif contends, that
insofar as the challenged provision requires the
periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial
condition, it would be violative of the guarantees
against unreasonable search and seizure and against
self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States.
67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted under
an information charging him with unlawfully having in
his possession a number of gasoline ration coupons
representing so many gallons of gasoline, an ofense
penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted
both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of
Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful
search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and
that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme
Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a
finding that he consented to the search and seizure.
The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding
although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming
however under the view that such seized coupons were
properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure

being incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable

regardless of petitioner's consent.

periodical submission of one's financial condition as set

forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme

Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the
Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers
or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which
never became the private property of the holder but
remained at all times the property of the government
and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made
it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as
suggesting
"that
officers
seeking
to
reclaim
government property may proceed lawlessly and
subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the
right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer
to a general search of his papers for the purpose of
learning whether he has any coupons subject to
inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is
important here merely as indicating that the officers
did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in
obtaining them." 71

Nor does the contention of plaintif gain greater

plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to
the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself." 74 This constitutional
provision gives the accused immunity from any
attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by
coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence
necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he
voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only
if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent,
and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk.
76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be
documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may
constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover,
there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers
or efects for the purpose of locating incriminatory
matter. 78

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice

Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of
what it considered "a process of devitalizing
interpretation" which in this particular case gave
approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and
expressing the regret that the Court might be "in
danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects
experience with police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every
man is under obligation to give testimony. But that
obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions
which are deemed precious to Anglo-American
civilization. Merely because there may be the duty to
make documents available for litigation does not mean
that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain
them. This protection of the right to be let alone except
under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what
the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to
safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an
allegation that this statutory provision ofends against
the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be
futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of
the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno,
73 where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion,
after stressing that the constitutional requirements
must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a
legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of
a violation of certain statutes without reference to any
of its determinate provisions delimited its scope as
"one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure has been
shown to exist by such requirement of further

In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection

based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far
from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason
stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79
Necessarily then, the protection it afords will have to
await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or
administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage, there is no
pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear
sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the
non-incrimination clause. What was said in an
American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a
statutory provision requiring any person operating a
motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused
a person or property, to stop and give his name,
residence, and his license number to the injured party
or to a police officer was sustained against the
contention that the information thus exacted may be
used as evidence to establish his connection with the
injury and therefore compels him to incriminate
himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which
exacts this information is invalid, because such
information, although in itself no evidence of guilt,
might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the
informant, then all police regulations which involve
identification may be questioned on the same ground.
We are not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial
inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a
constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to
invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this
particular case, the constitutional privilege justified the
refusal to give the information exacted by the statute,
that question can be raised in the defense to the
pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are
not called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the
allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its
face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being
unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in
the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is

not the province of the courts to supervise legislation
and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then
to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as
laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the
Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they,
according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into
the wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86
that only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there
ought to be, the last ofender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise
insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19,
1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section
7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires
periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial
conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or
employee of the government after he had once
submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed."
Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC
Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN,
respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary
Restraining
Order
dated
September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la
Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained
petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of

the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of

respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No.
90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No.
3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from
proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent
judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his
Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his
person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino
citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment
to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian
as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to
the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana
Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the
Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu
Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin
Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelveyear old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all
surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates
of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing
the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Afairs,
Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and
Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino
citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence
thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on
August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the
ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen.
Among those cases was that of William and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after

a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the
latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant
of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging
that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory
(Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the
Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or
July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the
1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein
this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the
new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated
on July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for
review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as
the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board
of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against
them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counterpetition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued
an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counterpetition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National
Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with
the other applicants covered by the warrant of
exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation
of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c),
and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940
(Annex "G", petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed
the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action
(Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo
of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation *
issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counterpetition). The latter appeared before Commissioner
Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the
same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by
respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54214.

On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to

dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the
assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the
motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent
Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br.
172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case
No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
the institution of deportation proceedings against
William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued
the questioned temporary restraining order restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions:
1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the
subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2)
assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting
petitioners in the exercise of the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case
against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process
determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge
dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that
the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners,
thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and
Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6,
1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that
respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4)
respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges
among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on
record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen,
petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
deportation case until the courts shall have finally
resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners
can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the
question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation
case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice
against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought
to be deported has already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be
referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is
the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasijudicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the
Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special
Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that
petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not
in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.

Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the

Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the
RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
(3)
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the
third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies
whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law,
Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals
(Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of
Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic
Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC),
the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural
Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
(supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic
Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent
with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are
as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any
provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final
ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment of the
Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor
under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred
and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the
Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as
the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration
Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the
Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the

manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves

questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or
questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From
final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals,
the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the
abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently,
determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the
National Labor Relations Commission are final and
executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court
through a petition for certiorari and not by way of
appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the
Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate
Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from
decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court
of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with
the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor
Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law,
as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the
Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said
commissions or boards may be considered co-equal
with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically
beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not
among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law
whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its
decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance
with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25.
Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions
shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with
this chapter and applicable laws.
(6)
The review proceeding shall be filed in the
court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules
of Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is
subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies
the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like
the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review
by the court specified by the statute or in the absence

thereof, it is subject to review by any court of

competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial
bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except
those specifically provided for under the law as
aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of
equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable
to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action
for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration
has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531 [1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases
admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to
citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory?
Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to
continue or should the question of citizenship be
ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court
answered the question in the affirmative, and We
quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is
conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen
is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from
any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable
right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by
a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal
ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a
citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no
sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only
after the Board has finished its investigation of his
undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable
at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or
misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be
availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name
before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board
of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33
SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155
[1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be
granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the
remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a

competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong

vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation
Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the
records that respondent's claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention
should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could
properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted
by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the
Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in
view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the
former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of
this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.
Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by
the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it
proper to decide the controversy right at this instance.
And this course of action is not without precedent for
"it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from
there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74;
Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265
[1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135
SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146
[1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by the remand of the case or when
public interest demands an early disposition of the
case or where the trial court had already received all
the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112
SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et
al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance
Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic
vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100
[1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory
which avoids waste of time, efort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay
in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92
Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial
set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act
with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of

appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs.

Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only
before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On
the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in
his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p.
298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration
already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce
evidence in support of the deportation charges against
respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this
Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca
(supra), has already settled respondent's alienage.
Hence, the need for a judicial determination of
respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is
not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines
(for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled
(Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has
been conclusively settled by this Court in the Arocha
and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in
said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the
actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of
the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20,
1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was
erased and over it was superimposed the figure "6"
thereby making the decision fall within the one-year
reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which the
decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely
pass upon any question of citizenship, much less that
of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid
cases. The said cases originated from a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario
Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the
rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound
by a decision rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of
Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding
respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not
satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one
thing, said decision did not make any categorical
statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs.
Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41
SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in
Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:

We declare it to be a sound rule that where the

citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by
a court or by an administrative agency, as a material
issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof
of such party's citizenship in any other case or
proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will
a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases
be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the
procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by
this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions
set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo
cases relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent
William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the
arrest of respondent follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued
on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo
cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid
of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of
1940, reads:
Sec. 37.
(a) The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him
for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by
the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
(Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in
matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner
of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after
a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be
valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final
order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void
for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang,
67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62
SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155;
Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board

(supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative
proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed
a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable
cause against him, by a judge, why should one
suspected of a violation of an administrative nature
deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that
the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of
investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the same
(Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated
August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates
that the same was issued only for purposes of
investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian
included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order
directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
1.
Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of
the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46
Administrative Code;
3.
Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division
and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent
and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of
respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on.
The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention
that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of
deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against
petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which
petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their
petition or comment to the counter-petition of
respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others
previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of
Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after
giving due course to the motion for re-hearing,
submitted a memorandum to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counterpetition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the
July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and
2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very
basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a
forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign
Afairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry
concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the
issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took

the place of a passport for their authorized travel to

the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could
have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are
citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in
the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda
issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision
dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian
and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962
warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification
Certificates.
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino
citizen is the last official act of the government on the
basis of which respondent William Gatchalian
continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to
the present. Consequently, the presumption of
citizenship lies in favor of respondent William
Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian,
grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen.
As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July
6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is
an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino.
The opening paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed
applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized
by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July 12,
1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the
applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that
they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a
Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra)
where advertence is made to the "applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at
p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before
the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1"
to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born
in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued
Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign
Afairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961
(Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his
claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his
petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was
granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and
that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate
No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens,
Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of
Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it
is not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated
above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show
that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been

declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision

that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later.
Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's
Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for
determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by
the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight
(28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be efected . . . unless the arrest
in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5)
years after the cause of deportation arises." In Lam
Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down
the consequences of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which
places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the
mother of the minor when she admitted that she
gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of
the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than
that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother
can no longer be the subject of deportation
proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5
years had elapsed from the date of her admission.
Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the
mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials
in the investigation conducted in connection with the
landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not
through any efort on the part of the immigration
authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus
the fact that the mother was found to be married to
another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased,
who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at
P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month,
the immigration officials then must have considered
the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire of
that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a
properly documented preference quota immigrant"
(Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two
years later the immigration officials would reverse their
attitude and would take steps to institute deportation
proceedings against the minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we
believe that much as the attitude of the mother would
be condemned for having made use of an improper
means to gain entrance into the Philippines and
acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late,
not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having
allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the
extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus
allowing the period of prescription to set in and to
elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this
late hour would be to condemn him to live separately
from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving
him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support
and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight
on the part of immigration officials has created an
anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity,
should be resolved in favor of the minor herein
involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action
and deportation against herein respondent arose in

1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent

was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August
15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and
by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by
petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian.
Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6,
1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs.
Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which
was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was
not a party to said case. They also opined that under
Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years
limitation is applicable only where the deportation is
sought to be efected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b)
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no
period of limitation is applicable in deportations under
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration
Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings
should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of
the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of
the ofenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not
more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more
than two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien."
Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45.

Any individual who

(a)
When applying for an immigration document
personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the
immigration laws by appearing under an assumed
name; fictitious name; or
(b)
Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration
document, to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or
(c)
Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration
document, knowing it to be false; or
(d)
Being an alien, enters the Philippines without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials,
or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or
misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or
(e)
Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose
represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f)
In any immigration matter shall knowingly
make
under
oath
any
false
statement
or
representations; or
(g)
Being an alien, shall depart from the
Philippines without first securing an immigration

clearance certificates required by section twenty-two of

this Act; or

and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act;

and

(h)
Attempts or conspires with another to commit
any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an ofense,
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more
than two years, and deported if he is an alien.
(Emphasis supplied)

2.
When deportation or exclusion is efected
under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of
Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the deportation or
exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.

Such ofenses punishable by correctional penalty

prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code);
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art.
92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No.
3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances)
"violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight
years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently,
no prosecution and consequent
deportation for violation of the ofenses enumerated in
the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eightyear prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a
special legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of efecting
deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are
not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period
of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or
loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the ofender
after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of
the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government
of the right to execute the final sentence after the
lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1,
1974, at p. 855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering
that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding afecting the freedom and liberty of a
person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on
criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final
judgment may not be executed after the lapse of five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the
statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil
Code, an action based on judgment must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the
rule, therefore, is:
1.
Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be
initiated within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation or exclusion arises when efected under
any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the

BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings
against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990.
Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or
enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted
after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961,
respondent William Gatchalian has continuously
resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on
July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom
he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract
shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He
holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino
(Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a
registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he
has long resided and exercised his right of sufrage
(Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in business in
the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14",
counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims
that the companies he runs and in which he has a
controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He
continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship
and discharged his responsibility as such until
petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings
against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It
is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose presence in the country is found to be injurious
to the public good and domestic tranquility of the
people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could
one who has helped the economy of the country by
providing employment to some 4,000 people be
considered undesirable and be summarily deported
when the government, in its concerted drive to attract
foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any
alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country?
Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien,
his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and
unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed
to settled government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is
an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point
out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim
Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco
(father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok,
likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence
other than their own self-serving testimony nor was
there any showing what the laws of China were. It is
the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said
marriages to be valid in this country, it should have

been shown that they were valid by the laws of China

wherein the same were contracted. There being none,
petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages
cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children,
including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their
mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage.
Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson
followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese
national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument,
We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court
held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the
same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot
be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelveyear old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating
to marriage, having been content with the testimony of
Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected
to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular
and immigration authorities regarding their marriages,
birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving
but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in
matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore,
this salutary rule of evidence finds support in
substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 267.
In the absence of a record of birth,
authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned
are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation
(Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to
marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code
(now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to
the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as
to how far the validity of such marriage may be

extended to the consequences of the coverture is

answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner:
"In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority
of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of
unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in
mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in
Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of
proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship
of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child
of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who
(the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the
class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the
Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo
(13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The
ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the
case at bar for the simple reason that the parties
therein testified to have been married in China by a
village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those
authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56
of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary
to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino
citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined
from continuing with the deportation proceedings
docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over
respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil
Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before
respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10280
September 30, 1963
QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE
PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM
PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION
BOARD, respondent-appellee.
Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T.
Oben for petitioners-appellants.

Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037) denying the
petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition,
certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan,
James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu,
Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and
Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as
follows:.
On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang
charged the above-named petitioners before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars
in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary
license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of
having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong
and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose
Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe
officers of the Philippine and United States
Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the
Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A.
P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S.
dollars.1
Following the filing of said deportation charges, a
warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the
presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their
filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for
P10,000.00,
herein
petitioners-appellants
were
provisionally set at liberty.
On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a
joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against
them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among
others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for
deportation of aliens from this country, and that said
Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges.
This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of
the Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants
filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or
prohibition, which petition was given due course in our
resolution of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The
case was docketed in the lower court as Special
Proceeding No. 20037.
At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a
bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining
the respondent Deportation Board from hearing
Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners,
pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or
prohibition proceedings.
On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer
to the original petition, maintaining among others, that
the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President,
has jurisdiction over the charges filed against
petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and
that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of
the ofense of attempted bribery of a public official, he
was found in the same decision of the trial court that
he did actually ofer money to an officer of the United
States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain
from assisting the Central Bank official in the

investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the

Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was
involved.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January
18, 1956, upholding the validity of the delegation by
the president to the Deportation Board of his power to
conduct investigations for the purpose of determining
whether the stay of an alien in this country would be
injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the
State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
bonds for the alien's temporary release pending
investigation of charges against him, on the theory
that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond
of the arrested alien is essential to and complement
the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the
petitioners instituted the present appeal. .
It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were
provisionally released on bail, but before the charges
filed against them were actually investigated,
petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction
of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in
the Court of First Instance, and now before us.
Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the
President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary
power to investigate, on the ground that such power is
vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed,
for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be
a legislation authorizing the same.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of
1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was
empowered to efect the arrest and expulsion of an
alien, after previous determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds
therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law,
however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or
concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the
Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its
Section 52, it provides:.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes
all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the
Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and
repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section
sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and
eleven which shall continue in force and efect: ..."
(Comm. Act No. 613).
Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative
Code) referred to above reads:.
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A
subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the
President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his
authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such
action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than these
days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to

produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses."
While it may really be contended that the aforequoted
provision did not expressly confer on the President the
authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the
express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration
under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays
down the procedure to be observed should there be
deportation proceedings, the fact that such a
procedure was provided for before the President can
deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared
exempted from the repealing efect of the Immigration
Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the
existence of such power in the Executive. And the,
exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been
sanctioned by this Court in several decisions.2
Under the present and existing laws, therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may be efected in
two ways: by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of
Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613.
Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that
the President is invested with power to deport, still he
may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no
other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic
to hold that an alien may be deported upon an
unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the
unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. This
contention is not without merit, considering that
whenever the legislature believes a certain act or
conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably
enacts a law to that efect. Thus, in a number of
amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those
originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as
well as other laws which provide deportation as part of
the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation
thereof.
Be this as it may, the charges against the herein
petitioners constitute in efect an act of profiteering,
hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation
of the Central Bank regulations an economic
sabotage which is a ground for deportation under
the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section
37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The
President may therefore order the deportation of these
petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have
committed the act charged.
There seems to be no doubt that the President's power
of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a
reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides for a "prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive (the President) or his
authorized agent." The first executive order on the
subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy
(No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take
action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct
investigations and thereafter make recommendations.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29,

1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board
primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged
to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the
rules and regulations therein provided, and make the
corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the
Deportation
Board
has
been
conducting
the
investigation as the authorized agent of the President.
This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of
the power of the President to conduct investigation,
i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to
order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it
does, whether the same may be delegated to the
respondent Deportation Board.1awphl.nt
Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No.
613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was
specifically granted authority, among others, to make
arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific
power to be exercised in connection with such
investigation. It must be for this reason that President
Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his
Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing

For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens

charged before the Deportation Board created under
Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and
facilitating the execution of the order of deportation
whenever the President decides the case against the
respondent. I, Manuel Roxas, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, do hereby order that all respondents in
deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and
containing such conditions as he may prescribe. .
Note that the executive order only required the filing of
a bond to secure appearance of the alien under
investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the
respondent.
It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino
reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his
Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was
authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal
charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to
issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional
release in such amount and under such conditions as
may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the
President's power to deport is predicated, does not
provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the
Solicitor General argues that the law could not have
denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely
necessary to carry into efect the power of deportation
granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest
of the foreigner charged as undesirable.

In this connection, it must be remembered that the

right of an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution in the following
language:.
3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and efects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
(Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring
opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et
al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as
that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee
is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our
Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of
the people and, of course, indisputably it equally
applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.
Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is
found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides
that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest
may be issued, must be determined by the judge after
examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to
be determined by the judge" is not found in the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the
Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not
specify who will determine the existence of a probable
cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make such
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of
arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it
is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than
the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation. The Constitution does not
distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.
And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause
against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is diferent if the order of arrest
is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,
either by an executive or legislative officer or agency
duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is
not that mentioned in the Constitution which is
issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example,
would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order
of deportation, or to efect compliance of an order of
contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest
of a foreigner is necessary to carry into efect the
power of deportation is valid only when, as already
stated, there is already an order of deportation. To
carry out the order of deportation, the President
obviously has the power to order the arrest of the
deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is
not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is
enough, as was true before the executive order of
President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the

appearance of the alien during the investigation, as

was authorized in the executive order of President
Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to
rule, in this proceeding - and nothing herein said is
intended to so decide on whether or not the
President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for
purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive
order of deportation has been issued. We are merely
called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding
without deciding that the President can personally
order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power
can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the
arrest of an individual demands the exercise of
discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine
whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment
of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that
the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied
upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may
be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of
such warrant dependent upon conditions the
determination of the existence of which requires the
use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In
other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of
arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon
whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to
the efect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated.
Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no
express authority was granted by the law on the
matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a
person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be
viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so,
then guarantee a delegation of that implied power,
nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the
liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights
and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on
such a shaky foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this
Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R.
No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however,
that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that
proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein
petitioner's proposition that the President had no
inherent power to deport and that the charges filed
against him did not constitute ground for deportation. .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398,
series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation
Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of
formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix
bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary
release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a
consequence, the order of arrest issued by the
respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void
and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest,
decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So
ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

G.R. No. 82544
June 28, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN
and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and
72 years, respectively, are both American nationals
residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van
Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners
on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences
by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of
the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID
Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected
alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three
months of close surveillance by CID agents in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or
on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two
(22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have
left the country. One was released for lack of evidence;
another was charged not for being a pedophile but for
working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the
original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners
have chosen to face deportation.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of
photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys
and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also
posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes.

Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for

deportation, as undesirable aliens, in that: they, being
pedophiles, are inimical to public morals, public health
and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by
respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections
37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the
Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against
petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition
for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was
being seriously afected by their continuous detention.
Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
for their provisional release, respondent ordered the
CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that
petitioners were healthy.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail
which, however, respondent denied considering the
certification by the CID physician that petitioners were
healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered
petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort
Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial
due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from
the CID where trial was on-going.
On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a
Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally
agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be
"provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed
under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily
departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of
Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of five
(5) days only under certain conditions. However, it
appears that on the same date that the aforesaid
Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his copetitioners had already filed the present petition.

ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two

young boys.

On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners

availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A
Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and
the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April
1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by
petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor
General.

RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys

inside his room.

Petitioners question the validity of their detention on

the following grounds:

In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission

Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part:

1)
There is no provision in the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause
leading to an administrative
investigation.

The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard

Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated:

Noted:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject
readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for
quite sometime.
On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were
instituted against petitioners for being undesirable
aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code (Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge
Sheet" read inter alia:

2)
Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed
with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as
required by the said provision.

3)
Mere confidential information made to the CID
agents and their suspicion of the activities of
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their
association with other suspected pedophiles, are not
valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless
they are caught in the act. They further allege that
being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine
Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold
respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor
General.
There can be no question that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is
available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court,
80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such
facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce
a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance
thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez
vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that
an arrest wit a warrant may be efected by a peace
officer or even a private person (1) when such person
has committed, actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an ofense in his presence; and (2) when an
ofense has, in fact, been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance for
three (3) months during which period their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant
(See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22
SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in
CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest
and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12,
Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records
show that formal deportation charges have been filed
against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988.
Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7
March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of
the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the
Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint
against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The
Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is
being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February
25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention
was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation
to criminal cases subsequently filed against the
detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot
and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30,

1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a

writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the
confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs.
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with
John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances
the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as
"psychosexual perversion involving children" (KraftEbbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or
unusual sexual activity) in which children are the
preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor
General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a
crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior
ofensive to public morals and violative of the declared
policy of the State to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth
(Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be
released on bail should be considered as a waiver of
any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal
vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA
525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent
Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section
37(a) provides in part:
(a)
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation or any other officer designated by him for
the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien;
The foregoing provision should be construed in its
entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature
of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very
purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated.
Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano
vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The
specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2
Constitutions, which are substantially Identical,
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in
nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand,
are administrative in character. An order of deportation
is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive,
not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings
do not constitute a criminal action. The order of
deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264
U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an
alien who has broken the conditions upon which he

could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De

los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings
are administrative in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker
307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary
court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155).
It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall
give the alien sufficient information about the charges
against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl
211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair
hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires,
before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris,
55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153).
However, all the strict rules of evidence governing
judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only
such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of
cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14;
Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence
may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the
opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker,
270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao
Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29,
1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of
arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for
purposes of investigation and before a final order of
deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3,
Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to
the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein.
Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued
on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear
and show cause why they should not be deported.
They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections
37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of
the Revised Administrative Code." Before that,
deportation proceedings had been commenced against
them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the
arrest was a step preliminary to their possible
deportation.
Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers
the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for
the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The
arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the
aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in
this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority
given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of
the State.
The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613,
as
amended,
which
gives
authority
to
the
Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an
alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation
for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay, is
not unconstitutional.
... Such a step is necessary to enable the
Commissioner to prepare the ground for his
deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act
613. A contrary interpretation would render such power
nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng Hua To vs.
Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA
411).

"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined

by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun
Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no
"truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative
warrants in a single deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R. No. 10280,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in
Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms
of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is
therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than
a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the
existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before
the warrants of arrest were issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section
37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and
that the charge be substantiated by competent
evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code explicitly provides:
Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A
subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the
President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his
authorized agent, of the ground upon which such
action is contemplated. In such a case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges
against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3
days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners'
release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is
not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the
part of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under
arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released
under bond or under such other conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use
of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the
grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory
on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the
power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February
28,1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to
provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs.
Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail
may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong
Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to

exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act
done by or under the authority of the sovereign power
(In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the
public good and the domestic tranquility of the people
(Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]).
Particularly so in this case where the State has
expressly committed itself to defend the tight of
children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV,
Section
3[2]).
Respondent
Commissioner
of
Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests
of the State.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of
Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-83882
January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner, vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P.
ALANO,
JR.,
MAJOR
PABALAN,
DELEO
HERNANDEZ,
BLODDY
HERNANDEZ,
BENNY
REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A.
Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez,
Hechanova
&
Lim
Law
collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

Offices

PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for
habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988
seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.
1 After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor
General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of
the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner
thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the parties
were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to
file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7
November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc.
In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the
petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the
pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a
naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer
for restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29
November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with
finality the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and
further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance
of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
with prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order

was issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6
Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on
13 December 1988, the basis of which is a summary
judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID
Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7
Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral
argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from
arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13
December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said
motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was filed
on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous
opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought
by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to
cease and desist from immediately deporting petitioner
Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board
of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case,
the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5
December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from
arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release
dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for
oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining
order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December
1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining
order dated 15 December 1988, 14 the Court resolved
to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three
(3) days from notice within which to explain and prove
why he should still be considered a citizen of the
Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15
December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by
an earnest request for temporary release on 22
December 1988. Respondent filed on 2 January 1989
her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply
thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was
originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17
valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same
period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese
consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a
Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the
Philippines
who
had
renounced,
upon
his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong
sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered

together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners
us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to
mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23
and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance
of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending
hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after
the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown
that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The material facts are not only established
by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner.
A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due
process was obviated when petitioner was given by the
Court the opportunity to show proof of continued
Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person
has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be
heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this
Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to
look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves
adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification
and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph,
page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion
for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's
motion to lift the temporary restraining order is
GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564
August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC
AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the
Commission on Elections from looking into the question
of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as
Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a
foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to
conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that

the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed
on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the
alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the
payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends
was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously
enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the
popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was
lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed
filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no
question that this petition must be granted and the
challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed
mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The
petition for quo warranto was filed by the private
respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was
paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February
10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As
the petition by itself alone was inefectual without the
filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee
was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary
period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter
contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is
required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural
Rules of the COMELEC providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due
course without the payment of a filing fee in the
amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the
legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence
holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to
the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He
cites many rulings of the Court to this efect,
specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the
filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was
flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his
"Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate
Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or
Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated
it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as
SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected
although it was ofered. It was only on February 8,
1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition
as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC
Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10,
1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the
period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a
pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an
election protest or quo warranto proceeding was
deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus

Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section

5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became efective only on November 15,
1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in
the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44
thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January
26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

court may allow the payment of the said fee within a

reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the

Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment
of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996
and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent
COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and
February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private
respondent counters that the latter resolution was
intended for the local elections held on January 30,
1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections,
which were supposed to be governed by the firstmentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took
efect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of
seven days after its publication as required by RA No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
1987, which became efective on January 5, 1988. Its
Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 18.
Non-payment of prescribed fees. If
the fees above prescribed are not paid, the
Commission may refuse to take action thereon until
they are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 30.
Efectivity of Regulations and Orders of
the Commission. The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall take efect on
the seventh day after their publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue

originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of
the quo warranto proceedings against him. However,
as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
considering the necessity for an early resolution of that
more important question clearly and urgently afecting
the public interest, we shall directly address it now in
this same action.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties

and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed
on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee
was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the
pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did
not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we
reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the
requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already efective. There is
no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and
as for Res. No. 1996, this took efect only on March 3,
1988, seven days after its publication in the February
25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he
argues that the resolutions became efective
"immediately upon approval" simply because it was so
provided therein. We held in that case that publication
was still necessary under the due process clause
despite such efectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee
was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is
not imputable to the private respondent's fault or
neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we
required the timely payment of the filing fee as a
precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case
itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5
however this Court, taking into account the special
circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of

the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20,
1988, thus:

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point

that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed
for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner
would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of
citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to
say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a
qualification for public office can be so demeaned.
What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less
important consideration than the reglementary period
the petitioner insists upon.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of

cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the
instant case, it would appear that our sole function in
this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should
indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the
extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is
immediately impressed that substantial justice may not
be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon
such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read
all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very
ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently
knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and
we feel we can better serve the interests of justice by
broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record
before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for
us to end the basic controversy between the parties
here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural
steps which would not anyway afect substantially the
merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to
the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for
appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for
the respondent court to forward the case to the proper
court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action. Considering, however, the length of time that
this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the
case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and

follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

quo warranto filed by private respondent still pending

before it? 9

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to

always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate
Court and from there to this Court. (p. 43)

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to
rule directly on the merits of this case.

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v.

Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29,
1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this
Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict
in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in
referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The
facts and the legal propositions involved will not
change,
nor
should
the
ultimate
judgment.
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve
the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is
finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733;
Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v.
Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of
Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12
SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
162).lwph1.t
Sound
practice
seeks
to
accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time,
efort and expense, both to the parties and the
government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of
the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A
marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu
Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v.
CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In
this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this
Court act, and act with finality. 7
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by the remand of the case or when
public interest demands an early disposition of the
case or where the trial court had already received all
the evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in
the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is
claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent
COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private
respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no
longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not
respondent COMELEC efectively disqualified itself, by
reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for

Going over the record, we find that there are two

administrative decisions on the question of the
petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found
the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The
second was rendered by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988,
and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC
Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners
Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and
Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of
the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the
respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper
case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote,
while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision
until representations shall have been made with the
Australian Embassy for official verification of the
petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by
Chairman
Miriam
Defensor-Santiago
and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to
observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had
been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This
conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely
inferred from the fact that he had married an
Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and
registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to
this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into
account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul
in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an
Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is
reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the
Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment
signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State
for Foreign Afairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized
as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the
Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Afairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following
statement in response to the subpoena Testificandum
dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO
(SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the
statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A)
RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23
December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an
Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian
citizen, he was not required to meet normal

requirements for the grant of citizenship and was

granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July
1976.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of Foreign
Afairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant
Secretary

B)
Any person over the age of 16 years who is
granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The
wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing
all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily
have any efect on his former nationality as this would
depend on the citizenship laws of his former country.

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by

every naturalized Australian reading as follows:

C)
The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on
the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D)
According to our records LABO is still an
Australian citizen.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by
Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen
of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law,
and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia
and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

E)
Should he return to Australia, LABO may face
court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian
Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false
or misleading information of a material nature in
respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If
such a prosecution was successful, he could be
deprived of Australian citizenship under Section 21 of
the Act.
F)
There are two further ways in which LABO
could divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i)
He could make a declaration of Renunciation of
Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the
Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii)
If he acquired another nationality, (for
example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other
than marriage, then he would automatically lose as
Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY
HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT
MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1,
1988, addressed to the private respondent by the
Department of Foreign Afairs reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I
wish to inform you that inquiry made with the
Australian Government through the Embassy of the
Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:
1)
That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian
citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2)
That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for
Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which
carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and

sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the
Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian
citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the
above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained
Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in
coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he
declared before the immigration authorities that he
was an alien and registered as such under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later
asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a
returning former Philippine citizen and was granted
Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He
also categorically declared that he was a citizen of
Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily
made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction
of the barangay court on the ground that he was a
foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly
dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not
divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as
earlier noted, not all the members joined in this
finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The
petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not
aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the
fact that he was assisted by counsel when he
performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the
COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political
affiliation with the party in power then, but we need
not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer
be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but
this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not
apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled
in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that
it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private
respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites

of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present

in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no
claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen
of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his
case because he was married to an Australian citizen.
As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took
the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen
of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian
citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in
Australia made him at worst only a dual national and
did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a
specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among
these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to
the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts,
his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was
found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous,
that
circumstance
alone
did
not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern
us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship
of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have
been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim,
that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. He does not point to any judicial
decree of naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has
he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine
citizenship
may
reacquire
Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter
of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall

be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.

The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation
of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also
the reason we must deny his present claim for
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the
local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage.
21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor
of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three
years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city
or province where he proposes to be elected, a
resident therein for at least one year at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read
and write English, Filipino, or any other local language
or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of
citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who
elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority."
To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his
lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100
votes. In any event, the people of that locality could
not
have,
even
unanimously,
changed
the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the
petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was
qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the
results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications
for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost
during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the
election. The petitioner was disqualified from running
as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the
private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He
cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only
the second highest number of votes in the election, he
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.

Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that
case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed
elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a noncandidate, were all disregarded as stray. In efect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with
three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so
holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier
case of Geronimo v. Ramos, 27 Which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members
of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two
others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
sufrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are
filled by those who have received the highest number
of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental Idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and
no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines
must take pride in his status as such and cherish this
priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other
nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having
been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this
precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that
may ofer him material and other attractions that he
may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the
right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and
transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements
for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his
adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned
by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that

can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may
be restored only after the returning renegade makes a
formal act of re-dedication to the country he has
abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total
and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
This may not be accomplished by election to public
office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City,
once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is
LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Gri;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 83820
May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP
Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA,
respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for
the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio
"Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial
Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being
a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal
Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu
Provincial
Board
of
Canvassers
from

tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private

respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc
resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but
to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the
petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to
show that private respondent is an American citizen:
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the
Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C");
Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21,
1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance
dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that
he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is
a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport
No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has
been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth
and has not gone out of the country for more than six
months; and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed
the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. Having obtained the highest number of
votes, private respondent was proclaimed the
Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not
having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning
the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for
the office for which his certificate of candidacy was
filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1)
Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof
which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
and

(2)
viz:

After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof,

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter

contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and
that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification
of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since
the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the
twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was
filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private
respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is
unquestionably premature, considering that private
respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to
ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification
to hold the public office to which he has been
proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule
directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did
below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running
for and being elected to the office of Provincial
Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and
convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner
failed to present direct proof that private respondent
had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these
are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the
evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea
did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the
three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been
naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America,
the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration
and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a

person is considered an American under the laws of the

United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al,
(G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v.
COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are
not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was
naturalized in the United States but claimed that he
was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect
himself from the persecution of the Marcos
government. The Court, however, found this
suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing
out that there were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo
was married to an Australian citizen and that he was
naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per
certification from the Australian Government through
its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by
the Department of Foreign Afairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not
disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the
Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of
Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact
that by their own admissions, they are indubitably
aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines since they have sworn their total
allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently
denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid
and
subsisting
Philippine
passport
and
has
continuously participated in the electoral process in
this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a
voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus,
private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of
his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American
citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and
the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as

having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To

Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea
was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that
he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose
and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother
named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have
a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as
student simultaneously in two universities, namely
University X and University Y, presents a Certification
that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification
that he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
'citizenship when there is no renunciation either
"'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution
that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV,
Sec. 5) has no retroactive efect. And while it is true
that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual
citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed.
Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso,
the efect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be
dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-20119
June 30, 1967
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST
MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN ORGANIZATION, INC.,
respondents.
Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Mariano Abaya
for petitioner.
Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction, with preliminary injunction, against an order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction
bond in the amount of P3,000.00, let a writ of
preliminary preventive and/or mandatory injunction
issue, restraining the respondents, their agents or
representatives, from further searching the premises
and properties and from taking custody of the various
documents and papers of the petitioner corporation,
whether in its main office or in any of its branches; and
ordering the respondent Central Bank and/or its corespondents to return to the petitioner within five (5)
days from service on respondents of the writ of

preventive and/or mandatory injunction, all the books,

documents, and papers so far seized from the
petitioner
pursuant
to
the
aforesaid
search
warrant.1wph1.t
Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the
requisite bond, we issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining and prohibiting
respondents herein from enforcing the order above
quoted.
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual
Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. hereinafter
referred to as the Organization is a registered nonstock corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated
February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and implement
savings and thrift among its members, and to extend
financial assistance in the form of loans," to them. The
Organization has three (3) classes of "members,"1
namely: (a) founder members who originally joined
the organization and have signed the pre-incorporation
papers with the exclusive right to vote and be voted
for ; (b) participating members with "no right to vote
or be voted for" to which category all other
members belong; except (c) honorary members, so
made by the board of trustees, "at the exclusive
discretion" thereof due to "assistance, honor,
prestige or help extended in the propagation" of the
objectives of the Organization without any pecuniary
expenses on the part of said honorary members.

Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank

directed the coordination of "the investigation and
gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings
and loan associations which are operating contrary to
law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member of
the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the
Municipal Court of Manila a verified application for a
search warrant against the Organization, alleging that
"after close observation and personal investigation, the
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" in which
the offices of the Organization were housed "are
being used unlawfully," because said Organization is
illegally engaged in banking activities, "by receiving
deposits of money for deposit, disbursement,
safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of a
savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan
association . . . without having first complied with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 337" and that the
articles, papers, or efects enumerated in a list
attached to said application, as Annex A thereof.3 are
kept in said premises, and "being used or intended to
be used in the commission of a felony, to wit: violation
of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic Act No. 337."4 Said
articles, papers or efects are described in the
aforementioned Annex A, as follows:
I. BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRY
(1) General Journal
(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book

On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the

Central Bank of the Philippines hereinafter referred
to as the Bank rendered an opinion to the efect that
the Organization and others of similar nature are
banking institutions, falling within the purview of the
Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the
Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the
following:
ANNOUNCEMENT
To correct any wrong impression which recent
newspaper reports on "savings and loan associations"
may have created in the minds of the public and other
interested parties, as well as to answer numerous
inquiries from the public, the Central Bank of the
Philippines wishes to announce that all "savings and
loan associations" now in operation and other
organizations using diferent corporate names, but
engaged in operations similar in nature to said
"associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE
MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE
PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS
NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR
FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book

Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General

Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage
in the "lending of funds obtained from the public
through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds,
securities or obligations of any kind" without authority
from the Monetary Board. Their activities and
operations are not supervised by the Superintendent of
Banks and persons dealing with such institutions do so
at their risk.

(6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

(11) I n d o r s e m e n t

(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement

Book
II. BOOKS OF FINAL ENTRY
(1) General Ledger
(2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers
(3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers
III. OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS
(1) Application for Membership
(2) Signature Card
(3) Deposit Slip
(4) Passbook Slip
(5) Withdrawal Slip

(7) Application for Loan Credit Statement

(8) Credit Report
(9) Solicitor's Report
(10) Promissory Note

(12) Co-makers' Statements

(13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts
(14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts
(15) Trial Balance
(16) Minutes Book Board of Directors
IV. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(1) Income and Expenses Statements
(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and Liabilities
V. OTHERS

mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte,

ordering the preservation of the status quo of the
parties, as well as the immediate return to the
Organization of the documents and papers so far
seized under, the search warrant in question. After due
hearing, on the petition for said injunction, respondent,
Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila to which
said Case No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on July
2, 1962, the order complained of.
Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved
for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied on
August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in
the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge
Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent
Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in
question.

(1) Articles of Incorporation

(2) By-Laws
(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.
(4) And other documents and articles which are being
used or intended to be used in unauthorized banking
activities and operations contrary to law.
Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962,
Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal
court, issued the warrant above referred to,5
commanding the search of the aforesaid premises at
No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the
foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient
reasons to believe" upon examination, under oath, of a
detective of the Manila Police Department and said
intelligence officer of the Bank that the Organization
has under its control, in the address given, the
aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the
ofense adverted to above or intended to be used as
means for the commission of said of ofense.
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization
commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari,
prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
municipal court, the Sherif of Manila, the Manila Police
Department,
and
the
Bank,
to
annul
the
aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that,
in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted
"with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction
and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said
search warrant is a roving commission general in its
terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the
search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search
and seizure of documents which have no relation
whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c)
"no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a
criminal case against a corporation . . ."
The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending
hearing of the case on the merits, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ex parte restraining the
aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the
alternative, if the acts complained of have been
partially performed, that a writ of preliminary

At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken

by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to
be made and the articles above listed to be seized, was
predicated upon the theory that the Organization was
illegally engaged in banking by receiving money for
deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise, or
transacting the business of a savings and mortgage
bank and/or building and loan association, without
first complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and
that the order complained of assumes that the
Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act.6
Yet respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures
in question to be unreasonable, through the following
process of reasoning: the deposition given in support of
the application for a search warrant states that the
deponent personally knows that the premises of the
Organization, at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,7 were
being used unlawfully for banking and purposes.
Respondent judge deduce, from this premise, that the
deponent " knows specific banking transactions of the
petitioner with specific persons," and, then concluded
that said deponent ". . . could have, if he really knew of
actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to
search and seize only books" or records:
covering the specific purportedly illegal banking
transactions of the petitioner with specific persons who
are the supposed victims of said illegal banking
transactions according to his knowledge. To authorize
and seize all the records listed in Annex A to said
application for search warrant, without reference to
specific alleged victims of the purported illegal banking
transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and its
officers with a roving commission or fishing expedition
for evidence which could be discovered by normal
intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of
books and records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic
Act No 337 . . ."
The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the
civil liberty involved is, certainly, in line with the
function of courts, as ramparts of justice and liberty
and deserves the greatest encouragement and
warmest commendation. It lives up to the highest
traditions of the Philippine Bench, which underlies the
people's faith in and adherence to the Rule of Law and
the democratic principle in this part of the World.

At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the

Constitutional
injunction
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely
abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete
ones. Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much the
same way as the question whether or not "probable
cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light
of the conditions obtaining in given situations.
Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear
from the order complained of whether respondent
Judge opined that the above mentioned statement of
the deponent to the efect that the Organization was
engaged in the transactions mentioned in his
deposition deserved of credence or not. Obviously,
however, a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino,
who issued the warrant, on the credibility of said
statement, would not justify the conclusion that said
municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess
of jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, the failure of the
witness to mention particular individuals does not
necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge
of specific illegal transactions of the Organization, for
the witness might be acquainted with specific
transactions, even if the names of the individuals
concerned were unknown to him.
Again, the aforementioned order would seem to
assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the kind
contemplated in the contested action of the officers of
the Bank, must always connote the existence of a
"victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose
interests have been actually injured, then the
assumption is not necessarily justified. The law
requiring compliance with certain requirements before
anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to
protect the public against actual, as well as potential,
injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting
the use of warrants to papers or efects which cannot
be secured otherwise.
The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might,
perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the
Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct
and diferent from the type of business in which it is
generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary
to specify or identify the parties involved in said
isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure be
limited to the records pertinent thereto. Such, however,
is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest
clearly that the transactions objected to by the Bank
constitute the general pattern of the business of the
Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof,
according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial
assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with
funds deposited by them.
It is true, that such funds are referred to in the
Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws as their
"savings." and that the depositors thereof are
designated as "members," but, even a cursory
examination of said documents will readily show that
anybody can be a depositor and thus be a
"participating
member."
In
other
words,
the
Organization is, in efect, open to the "public" for

deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent

by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose
of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of
the "founder members," and "participating members"
are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for,
their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to
those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion,
determine from time to time. As a consequence, the
"membership" of the "participating members" is purely
nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely,
with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No.
337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the
requirements of said Act, before the transactions in
question could be undertaken.
It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization
does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which
the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue
raised by the Organization is predicated upon the
theory that the aforementioned transactions of the
Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term
is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied,
however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in
this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was
probable cause that the Organization had violated
Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the
warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line
with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the
search and seizure complained of have not been
proven to be unreasonable.
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2,
1962, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in compliance therewith are hereby annulled,
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on August 14, 1962, accordingly, made
permanent, with costs against respondent First Mutual
Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN
J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON.
JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as
Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO
ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,
respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer,
Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government

named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on diferent dates,3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to
the any peace officer, to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the ofense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the ofense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the ofense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tarif and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were
issued
to
fish
evidence
against
the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made
in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers
and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the efects
seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due
course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1)
that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
efects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of

preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under
the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners
herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized efects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession
of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to
nor did it afect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of
the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one
whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a
seizure, if unlawful, could not afect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been
seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the
benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation,
if any, was with reference to the rights of another.
Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It
follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility
of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co.
vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things
seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the

writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this

Court, 12 thereby, in efect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.

so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine

what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely
to wrest it, even though by legal means.

In connection with said documents, papers and things,

two (2) important questions need be settled, namely:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority
thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed

in connection with the disputed search warrants, that
this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122
of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that
"a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific ofense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific ofense."

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search

warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures efected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and efects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tarif and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific ofense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
ofense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a
matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do
not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest
order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tarif and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would
be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the

application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the
efects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things
to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however,
we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," 16
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of
evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the commonlaw action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already
given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional

injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege.
In earlier times the action of trespass against the
ofending official may have been protection enough;
but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal
Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an ofense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far
as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The eforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and sufering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened
in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20
After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's
constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the
only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has
been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of
exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule
the assurance against unreasonable federal searches
and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule
the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court
held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of
this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its

provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that

proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was
logically and constitutionally necessarily that the
exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential
ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only efectively
available way by removing the incentive to disregard
it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the
State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest. Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
secure against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no
longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like efect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only
to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason
why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other
hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of
those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or

make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice

to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof
are, in general, committed By agents of the party in
power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually but, understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose
sight of the fact that the psychological and moral efect
of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of
the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room
No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included
among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers
and other efects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal
belongings of said petitioners and other efects under
their exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under the
latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of
the United States. 22

seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby

made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
efects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is
dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards
the documents, papers and other efects seized in the
twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 81561
January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs .ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for
accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the
Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation
of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution
are as follows:

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding

their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and efects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced,
not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in
said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration,
or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent
with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,

the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita,
Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation
to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee,
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the

allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration,
and
the
contents
of
the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted
in support of said motion, have sufficiently established
the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied
upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At
any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our
opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could

examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two
feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box was
sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready
for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the

Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences
of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other efects thus

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of

Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening

one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper

protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers
and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn,
pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He
was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment
was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3)
NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's
packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p.
38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that
dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of
the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said efects
(tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but
to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport
being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents
requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security.
On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail
at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to
shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized
dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of
the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned
out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops
as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief,
pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant
for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed
decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following
errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE

THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS
CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW
THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject
of the imputed ofense had been obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and
3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3
(2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers
and efects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1)
The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin
in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and efects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp
v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643,
81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in

Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as

inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v.
People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not afected by the
illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2],
Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is
carried over up to the present with the advent of the
1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility
of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
(Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];
Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v.
Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145
SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et
al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases
adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar
character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA
345 [1972]:
1.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd
v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis
supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct.
547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against

unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his
property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly
served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457
P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner
thereof found marijuana instead, without the
knowledge and participation of police authorities, was
declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429
S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966);
State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d
517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was
made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in
which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left
behind a travel case containing the evidence***
complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became
suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the
bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do
not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in
the prosecution of the ofense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe
that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of
the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case
which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to
be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack
of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case
readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
conducted an illegal search and seizure
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case

at bar
agents
of the
clearly

indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the

forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes
as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of
Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8;
Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box
containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the
same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his
place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the
NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an
illegal
one,
contrary
to
the
postulate
of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search efected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429
SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559,
71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US
23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d
122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was
likewise held that where the property was taken into
custody of the police at the specific request of the
manager and where the search was initially made by
the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure
within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional
Commission.
True,
the
liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must
always be subject to protection. But protection against
whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech
in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself
posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any
power
holder.
(Sponsorship
Speech
of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies

tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could

only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so
as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter,
expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the
constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re:
Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search
warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility
of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v.
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13
[October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987].
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as
to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against.
The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to
anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable
search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise
of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an
act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an
absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by
an individual efected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, nongovernmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional
rights to privacy and communication.
2.
In his second assignment of error, appellant
contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have

carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights
or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel.
The
law
enforcers
testified
that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear
from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant
refused to give any written statement while under
investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes.
What about the accused here, did you investigate the
accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with
the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution
was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. As borne out by the records, neither was
there any proof by the defense that appellant gave
uncounselled confession while being investigated.
What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while
under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of
error is therefore misplaced.
3.
Coming now to appellant's third assignment of
error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not
the owner of the packages which contained prohibited
drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national,
whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila:
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation,
Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave
him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the
next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find
appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to
entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily
accede to comply with the undertaking without first
ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court,
"(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other
hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to
take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19,

Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the

errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171
SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237
[1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect
considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the
Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national,
was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about
an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original
Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968],
citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also
People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga,
123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567
[1979]). As records further show, appellant did not
even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the
merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the
contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40).
On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him
(Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is
therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the
trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149454
May 28, 2004
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE LEONARDO
T. YABUT, respondents.
G.R. No. 149507
May 28, 2004
CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE, petitioner,
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By the nature of its functions, a bank is required to take
meticulous care of the deposits of its clients, who have
the right to expect high standards of integrity and
performance from it.
Among its obligations in furtherance thereof is knowing
the signatures of its clients. Depositors are not

estopped from questioning wrongful withdrawals, even

if they have failed to question those errors in the
statements sent by the bank to them for verification.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions for Review1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 23, 2001
Decision2 and the August 17, 2001 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 63561. The
decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that
defendant bank [Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)] is
held liable only for one-half of the value of the forged
checks in the amount of P547,115.00 after deductions
subject to REIMBURSEMENT from third party defendant
Yabut who is likewise ORDERED to pay the other half to
plaintif corporation [Casa Montessori Internationale
(CASA)]."4
The assailed Resolution denied all the parties Motions
for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
"On November 8, 1982, plaintif CASA Montessori
International5 opened Current Account No. 0291-008101 with defendant BPI[,] with CASAs President Ms. Ma.
Carina C. Lebron as one of its authorized signatories.
"In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintif
discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been
encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in
the total amount of P782,000.00, on the following
dates and amounts:
Check No.
Date
Amount
1. 839700
April 24, 1990 P 43,400.00
2. 839459
Nov. 2, 1990
110,500.00
3. 839609
Oct. 17, 1990 47,723.00
4. 839549
April 7, 1990
90,700.00
5. 839569
Sept. 23, 1990 52,277.00
6. 729149
Mar. 22, 1990 148,000.00
7. 729129
Mar. 16, 1990 51,015.00
8. 839684
Dec. 1, 1990
140,000.00
9. 729034
Mar. 2, 1990
98,985.00
Total -P 782,600.006
"It turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at
BPIs Greenbelt Branch [was] a fictitious name used by
third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as
external auditor of CASA. Third party defendant
voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms.
Lebron and encashed the checks. "The PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9)
checks and concluded that the handwritings thereon
compared to the standard signature of Ms. Lebron were
not written by the latter.

amount of P782,500.007 in the current and savings

accounts of the plaintif with interest at 6% per annum.
"On February 16, 1999, the RTC rendered the appealed
decision in favor of the plaintif."8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
the CA apportioned the loss between BPI and CASA.
The appellate court took into account CASAs
contributory negligence that resulted in the undetected
forgery. It then ordered Leonardo T. Yabut to reimburse
BPI half the total amount claimed; and CASA, the other
half. It also disallowed attorneys fees and moral and
exemplary damages.
Hence, these Petitions.9
Issues
In GR No. 149454, Petitioner BPI submits the following
issues for our consideration:
"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding
this case NOT in accord with the applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court to the efect that forgery cannot
be presumed; that it must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence; and that the burden of proof
lies on the party alleging the forgery.
"II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding
this case not in accord with applicable laws, in
particular the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) which
precludes CASA, on account of its own negligence,
from asserting its forgery claim against BPI, specially
taking into account the absence of any negligence on
the part of BPI."10
In GR No. 149507, Petitioner CASA submits the
following issues:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled
that there is no showing that [BPI], although negligent,
acted in bad faith x x x thus denying the prayer for the
award of attorneys fees, moral damages and
exemplary damages to [CASA]. The Honorable Court
also erred when it did not order [BPI] to pay interest on
the amounts due to [CASA].
"2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it
declared that [CASA] was likewise negligent in the case
at bar, thus warranting its conclusion that the loss in
the amount of P547,115.00 be apportioned between
[CASA] and [BPI] x x x."11
These issues can be narrowed down to three. First, was
there forgery under the Negotiable Instruments Law
(NIL)? Second, were any of the parties negligent and
therefore precluded from setting up forgery as a
defense? Third, should moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and interest be awarded?
The Courts Ruling

"On March 4, 1991, plaintif filed the herein Complaint

for Collection with Damages against defendant bank
praying that the latter be ordered to reinstate the

The Petition in GR No. 149454 has no merit, while that

in GR No. 149507 is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Forged Signature Wholly Inoperative
Section 23 of the NIL provides:
"Section 23. Forged signature; efect of. -- When a
signature is forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, it is
wholly inoperative, and no right x x x to enforce
payment thereof against any party thereto, can be
acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is
precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority."12
Under this provision, a forged signature is a real13 or
absolute defense,14 and a person whose signature on
a negotiable instrument is forged is deemed to have
never become a party thereto and to have never
consented to the contract that allegedly gave rise to
it.15
The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the
signing of anothers name with intent to defraud, is
forgery.16
In the present case, we hold that there was forgery of
the drawers signature on the check.
First, both the CA17 and the RTC18 found that
Respondent Yabut himself had voluntarily admitted,
through an Affidavit, that he had forged the drawers
signature and encashed the checks.19 He never
refuted these findings.20 That he had been coerced
into admission was not corroborated by any evidence
on record.21
Second, the appellate and the trial courts also ruled
that the PNP Crime Laboratory, after its examination of
the said checks,22 had concluded that the
handwritings thereon -- compared to the standard
signature of the drawer -- were not hers.23 This
conclusion was the same as that in the Report24 that
the PNP Crime Laboratory had earlier issued to BPI -the drawee bank -- upon the latters request.
Indeed, we respect and affirm the RTCs factual
findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, since
these are supported by substantial evidence on
record.25
Voluntary Admission Not Violative of Constitutional
Rights
The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his
constitutional rights (1) on custodial investigation, and
(2) against self-incrimination.
In the first place, he was not under custodial
investigation.26 His Affidavit was executed in private
and before private individuals.27 The mantle of
protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution28 covers only the period "from the time a
person is taken into custody for investigation of his
possible participation in the commission of a crime or
from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime although not yet in custody."29

Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted

above, there must be an arrest or a deprivation of
freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the
police authorities for the purpose of eliciting
admissions, confessions, or any information."30 The
said constitutional provision does "not apply to
spontaneous statements made in a voluntary
manner"31 whereby an individual orally admits to
authorship of a crime.32 "What the Constitution
proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of
incriminating facts."33
Moreover, the right against self-incrimination34 under
Section 17 of Article III35 of the Constitution, which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions,
extends to all other government proceedings -including civil actions, legislative investigations,36 and
administrative proceedings that possess a criminal or
penal aspect37 -- but not to private investigations done
by private individuals. Even in such government
proceedings, this right may be waived,38 provided the
waiver is certain; unequivocal; and intelligently,
understandingly and willingly made.39
If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed,
all the more is it so in private investigations. It is of no
moment that no criminal case has yet been filed
against Yabut. The filing thereof is entirely up to the
appropriate authorities or to the private individuals
upon whom damage has been caused. As we shall also
explain later, it is not mandatory for CASA -- the
plaintif below -- to implead Yabut in the civil case
before the lower court.
Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of
Rights40 does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It
governs the relationship between the individual and
the State."41 Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter
of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the
power of the [S]tate."42 These rights43 are guaranteed
to preclude the slightest coercion by the State that
may lead the accused "to admit something false, not
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."44
Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere
invocation of the aforesaid rights "does not
automatically entitle him to the constitutional
protection."45 When he freely and voluntarily
executed46 his Affidavit, the State was not even
involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted
without violating his constitutional rights while under
custodial investigation and against self-incrimination.
Clear, Positive
Evidence

and

Convincing

Examination

and

The examination by the PNP, though inconclusive, was

nevertheless clear, positive and convincing.
Forgery "cannot be presumed."47 It must be
established by clear, positive and convincing
evidence.48 Under the best evidence rule as applied to
documentary evidence like the checks in question, no
secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively
be introduced, as the original writing itself must be

produced in court.49 But when, without bad faith on

the part of the oferor, the original checks have already
been destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
secondary evidence may be produced.50 Without bad
faith on its part, CASA proved the loss or destruction of
the original checks through the Affidavit of the one
person who knew of that fact51 -- Yabut. He clearly
admitted to discarding the paid checks to cover up his
misdeed.52 In such a situation, secondary evidence
like microfilm copies may be introduced in court.
The drawers signatures on the microfilm copies were
compared with the standard signature. PNP Document
Examiner II Josefina de la Cruz testified on crossexamination that two diferent persons had written
them.53 Although no conclusive report could be issued
in the absence of the original checks,54 she affirmed
that her findings were 90 percent conclusive.55
According to her, even if the microfilm copies were the
only basis of comparison, the diferences were
evident.56 Besides, the RTC explained that although
the Report was inconclusive, no conclusive report could
have been given by the PNP, anyway, in the absence of
the original checks.57 This explanation is valid;
otherwise, no such report can ever be relied upon in
court.
Even with respect to documentary evidence, the best
evidence rule applies only when the contents of a
document -- such as the drawers signature on a check
-- is the subject of inquiry.58 As to whether the
document has been actually executed, this rule does
not apply; and testimonial as well as any other
secondary evidence is admissible.59 Carina Lebron
herself, the drawers authorized signatory, testified
many times that she had never signed those checks.
Her testimonial evidence is admissible; the checks
have not been actually executed. The genuineness of
her handwriting is proved, not only through the courts
comparison of the questioned handwritings and
admittedly genuine specimens thereof,60 but above all
by her.
The failure of CASA to produce the original checks
neither gives rise to the presumption of suppression of
evidence61 nor creates an unfavorable inference
against it.62 Such failure merely authorizes the
introduction of secondary evidence63 in the form of
microfilm copies. Of no consequence is the fact that
CASA did not present the signature card containing the
signatures with which those on the checks were
compared.64 Specimens of standard signatures are not
limited to such a card. Considering that it was not
produced in evidence, other documents that bear the
drawers authentic signature may be resorted to.65
Besides, that card was in the possession of BPI -- the
adverse party.
We have held that without the original document
containing the allegedly forged signature, one cannot
make a definitive comparison that would establish
forgery;66 and that a comparison based on a mere
reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results.67 We have also said,
however, that a judge cannot merely rely on a
handwriting experts testimony,68 but should also
exercise independent judgment in evaluating the
authenticity of a signature under scrutiny.69 In the

present case, both the RTC and the CA conducted

independent examinations of the evidence presented
and arrived at reasonable and similar conclusions. Not
only did they admit secondary evidence; they also
appositely
considered
testimonial
and
other
documentary evidence in the form of the Affidavit.
The best evidence rule admits of exceptions and, as we
have discussed earlier, the first of these has been
met.70 The result of examining a questioned
handwriting, even with the aid of experts and scientific
instruments, may be inconclusive;71 but it is a non
sequitur to say that such result is not clear, positive
and convincing. The preponderance of evidence
required in this case has been satisfied.72
Second Issue:
Negligence Attributable to BPI Alone
Having established the forgery of the drawers
signature, BPI -- the drawee -- erred in making
payments by virtue thereof. The forged signatures are
wholly inoperative, and CASA -- the drawer whose
authorized signatures do not appear on the negotiable
instruments -- cannot be held liable thereon. Neither is
the latter precluded from setting up forgery as a real
defense.
Clear Negligence in Allowing Payment Under a Forged
Signature
We have repeatedly emphasized that, since the
banking business is impressed with public interest, of
paramount importance thereto is the trust and
confidence of the public in general. Consequently, the
highest degree of diligence73 is expected,74 and high
standards of integrity and performance are even
required, of it.75 By the nature of its functions, a bank
is "under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care,76 always having in
mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship."77
BPI contends that it has a signature verification
procedure, in which checks are honored only when the
signatures therein are verified to be the same with or
similar to the specimen signatures on the signature
cards. Nonetheless, it still failed to detect the eight
instances of forgery. Its negligence consisted in the
omission of that degree of diligence required78 of a
bank. It cannot now feign ignorance, for very early on
we have already ruled that a bank is "bound to know
the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged
check, it must be considered as making the payment
out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the
amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose
name was forged."79 In fact, BPI was the same bank
involved when we issued this ruling seventy years ago.
Neither Waiver nor Estoppel Results from Failure to
Report Error in Bank Statement
The monthly statements issued by BPI to its clients
contain a notice worded as follows: "If no error is
reported in ten (10) days, account will be correct."80
Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if
CASA failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped

from questioning the mistake after the lapse of the tenday period.
This
notice
is
a
simple
confirmation81
or
"circularization" -- in accounting parlance -- that
requests client-depositors to affirm the accuracy of
items recorded by the banks.82 Its purpose is to obtain
from the depositors a direct corroboration of the
correctness of their account balances with their
respective banks.83 Internal or external auditors of a
bank use it as a basic audit procedure84 -- the results
of which its client-depositors are neither interested in
nor privy to -- to test the details of transactions and
balances in the banks records.85 Evidential matter
obtained from independent sources outside a bank
only serves to provide greater assurance of
reliability86 than that obtained solely within it for
purposes of an audit of its own financial statements,
not those of its client-depositors.
Furthermore, there is always the audit risk that errors
would not be detected87 for various reasons. One,
materiality is a consideration in audit planning;88 and
two, the information obtained from such a substantive
test is merely presumptive and cannot be the basis of a
valid waiver.89 BPI has no right to impose a condition
unilaterally and thereafter consider failure to meet
such condition a waiver. Neither may CASA renounce a
right90 it has never possessed.91
Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While
the active subject is entitled to demand its
enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to sufer
such enforcement.92
On the one hand, BPI could not have been an active
subject, because it could not have demanded from
CASA a response to its notice. Besides, the notice was
a measly request worded as follows: "Please examine x
x x and report x x x."93 CASA, on the other hand, could
not have been a passive subject, either, because it had
no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose
not to respond.
Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or
asserting, by their own deed or representation,
anything contrary to that established as the truth, in
legal contemplation.94 Our rules on evidence even
make a juris et de jure presumption95 that whenever
one has, by ones own act or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot
-- in any litigation arising from such act or omission -be permitted to falsify that supposed truth.96
In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or
representation that misled BPI. The formers omission,
if any, may only be deemed an innocent mistake
oblivious to the procedures and consequences of
periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel
will not arise.97 A person who has no knowledge of or
consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it.98
"Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or
doubtful inference x x x."99 CASA is not barred from
questioning BPIs error even after the lapse of the
period given in the notice.

Loss Borne by Proximate Source of Negligence

For allowing payment100 on the checks to a wrongful
and fictitious payee, BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes
liable to its depositor-drawer. Since the encashing bank
is one of its branches,101 BPI can easily go after it and
hold it liable for reimbursement.102 It "may not debit
the drawers account103 and is not entitled to
indemnification from the drawer."104 In both law and
equity, when one of two innocent persons "must sufer
by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be
borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss or who put it into the power of the
third person to perpetrate the wrong."105
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of the
case.106 "It is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."107
Pursuant to its prime duty to ascertain well the
genuineness of the signatures of its client-depositors
on checks being encashed, BPI is "expected to use
reasonable business prudence."108 In the performance
of that obligation, it is bound by its internal banking
rules and regulations that form part of the contract it
enters into with its depositors.109
Unfortunately, it failed in that regard. First, Yabut was
able to open a bank account in one of its branches
without privity;110 that is, without the proper
verification of his corresponding identification papers.
Second, BPI was unable to discover early on not only
this irregularity, but also the marked diferences in the
signatures on the checks and those on the signature
card. Third, despite the examination procedures it
conducted, the Central Verification Unit111 of the bank
even passed of these evidently diferent signatures as
genuine. Without exercising the required prudence on
its part, BPI accepted and encashed the eight checks
presented to it. As a result, it proximately contributed
to the fraud and should be held primarily liable112 for
the "negligence of its officers or agents when acting
within the course and scope of their employment."113
It must bear the loss.
CASA Not Negligent in Its Financial Afairs
In this jurisdiction, the negligence of the party invoking
forgery is recognized as an exception114 to the
general rule that a forged signature is wholly
inoperative.115 Contrary to BPIs claim, however, we
do not find CASA negligent in handling its financial
afairs. CASA, we stress, is not precluded from setting
up forgery as a real defense.
Role of Independent Auditor
The major purpose of an independent audit is to
investigate and determine objectively if the financial
statements submitted for audit by a corporation have
been prepared in accordance with the appropriate
financial reporting practices116 of private entities. The
relationship that arises therefrom is both legal and
moral.117 It begins with the execution of the
engagement letter118 that embodies the terms and
conditions of the audit and ends with the fulfilled

expectation of the auditors ethical119 and competent

performance in all aspects of the audit.120
The financial statements are representations of the
client; but it is the auditor who has the responsibility
for the accuracy in the recording of data that underlies
their preparation, their form of presentation, and the
opinion121 expressed therein.122 The auditor does not
assume the role of employee or of management in the
clients conduct of operations123 and is never under
the control or supervision124 of the client.
Yabut was an independent auditor125 hired by CASA.
He handled its monthly bank reconciliations and had
access to all relevant documents and checkbooks.126
In him was reposed the clients127 trust and
confidence128 that he would perform precisely those
functions and apply the appropriate procedures in
accordance
with
generally
accepted
auditing
standards.129 Yet he did not meet these expectations.
Nothing could be more horrible to a client than to
discover later on that the person tasked to detect fraud
was the same one who perpetrated it.
Cash Balances Open to Manipulation
It is a non sequitur to say that the person who receives
the monthly bank statements, together with the
cancelled checks and other debit/credit memoranda,
shall examine the contents and give notice of any
discrepancies within a reasonable time. Awareness is
not equipollent with discernment.
Besides, in the internal accounting control system
prudently installed by CASA,130 it was Yabut who
should examine those documents in order to prepare
the bank reconciliations.131 He owned his working
papers,132 and his output consisted of his opinion as
well as the clients financial statements and
accompanying notes thereto. CASA had every right to
rely solely upon his output -- based on the terms of the
audit engagement -- and could thus be unwittingly
duped into believing that everything was in order.
Besides, "[g]ood faith is always presumed and it is the
burden of the party claiming otherwise to adduce clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary."133
Moreover, there was a time gap between the period
covered by the bank statement and the date of its
actual receipt. Lebron personally received the
December 1990 bank statement only in January
1991134 -- when she was also informed of the forgery
for the first time, after which she immediately
requested a "stop payment order." She cannot be
faulted for the late detection of the forged December
check. After all, the bank account with BPI was not
personal but corporate, and she could not be expected
to monitor closely all its finances. A preschool teacher
charged with molding the minds of the youth cannot be
burdened with the intricacies or complexities of
corporate existence.
There is also a cutof period such that checks issued
during a given month, but not presented for payment
within that period, will not be reflected therein.135 An
experienced auditor with intent to defraud can easily
conceal any devious scheme from a client unwary of
the accounting processes involved by manipulating the

cash balances on record -- especially when bank

transactions are numerous, large and frequent. CASA
could only be blamed, if at all, for its unintelligent
choice in the selection and appointment of an auditor -a fault that is not tantamount to negligence.
Negligence is not presumed, but proven by whoever
alleges it.136 Its mere existence "is not sufficient
without proof that it, and no other cause,"137 has
given rise to damages.138 In addition, this fault is
common to, if not prevalent among, small and
medium-sized business entities, thus leading the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), through the
Board of Accountancy (BOA), to require today not only
accreditation
for
the
practice
of
public
accountancy,139 but also the registration of firms in
the practice thereof. In fact, among the attachments
now required upon registration are the code of good
governance140 and a sworn statement on adequate
and efective training.141
The missing checks were certainly reported by the
bookkeeper142 to the accountant143 -- her immediate
supervisor -- and by the latter to the auditor. However,
both the accountant and the auditor, for reasons
known only to them, assured the bookkeeper that there
were no irregularities.
The bookkeeper144 who had exclusive custody of the
checkbooks145 did not have to go directly to CASAs
president or to BPI. Although she rightfully reported the
matter, neither an investigation was conducted nor a
resolution of it was arrived at, precisely because the
person at the top of the helm was the culprit. The
vouchers, invoices and check stubs in support of all
check disbursements could be concealed or fabricated
-- even in collusion -- and management would still have
no way to verify its cash accountabilities.
Clearly then, Yabut was able to perpetrate the wrongful
act through no fault of CASA. If auditors may be held
liable for breach of contract and negligence,146 with
all the more reason may they be charged with the
perpetration of fraud upon an unsuspecting client.
CASA had the discretion to pursue BPI alone under the
NIL, by reason of expediency or munificence or both.
Money paid under a mistake may rightfully be
recovered,147 and under such terms as the injured
party may choose.
Third Issue:
Award of Monetary Claims
Moral Damages Denied
We deny CASAs claim for moral damages.
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission,148 or of
fraud or bad faith,149 moral damages cannot be
awarded.150 The adverse result of an action does not
per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for
it. One may err, but error alone is not a ground for
granting such damages.151 While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary therefor -- with the amount
to be awarded left to the courts discretion152 -- the
claimant must nonetheless satisfactorily prove the
existence of its factual basis153 and causal relation154
to the claimants act or omission.155

Regrettably, in this case CASA was unable to identify

the particular instance -- enumerated in the Civil Code
-- upon which its claim for moral damages is
predicated.156 Neither bad faith nor negligence so
gross that it amounts to malice157 can be imputed to
BPI. Bad faith, under the law, "does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence;158 it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature
of fraud."159
As a general rule, a corporation -- being an artificial
person without feelings, emotions and senses, and
having existence only in legal contemplation -- is not
entitled to moral damages,160 because it cannot
experience physical sufering and mental anguish.161
However, for breach of the fiduciary duty required of a
bank, a corporate client may claim such damages
when its good reputation is besmirched by such
breach, and social humiliation results therefrom.162
CASA was unable to prove that BPI had debased the
good reputation of,163 and consequently caused
incalculable embarrassment to, the former. CASAs
mere allegation or supposition thereof, without any
sufficient evidence on record,164 is not enough.
Exemplary Damages Also Denied
We also deny CASAs claim for exemplary damages.
Imposed by way of correction165 for the public
good,166 exemplary damages cannot be recovered as
a matter of right.167 As we have said earlier, there is
no bad faith on the part of BPI for paying the checks of
CASA upon forged signatures. Therefore, the former
cannot be said to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.168 The
latter, having no right to moral damages, cannot
demand exemplary damages.169
Attorneys Fees Granted
Although it is a sound policy not to set a premium on
the right to litigate,170 we find that CASA is entitled to
reasonable attorneys fees based on "factual, legal,
and equitable justification."171
When the act or omission of the defendant has
compelled the plaintif to incur expenses to protect the
latters interest,172 or where the court deems it just
and equitable,173 attorneys fees may be recovered. In
the present case, BPI persistently denied the claim of
CASA under the NIL to recredit the latters account for
the value of the forged checks. This denial constrained
CASA to incur expenses and exert efort for more than
ten years in order to protect its corporate interest in its
bank account. Besides, we have already cautioned BPI
on a similar act of negligence it had committed
seventy years ago, but it has remained unrelenting.
Therefore, the Court deems it just and equitable to
grant ten percent (10%)174 of the total value adjudged
to CASA as attorneys fees.
Interest Allowed
For the failure of BPI to pay CASA upon demand and for
compelling the latter to resort to the courts to obtain

payment, legal interest may be adjudicated at the

discretion of the Court, the same to run from the
filing175 of the Complaint.176 Since a court judgment
is not a loan or a forbearance of recovery, the legal
interest shall be at six percent (6%) per annum.177 "If
the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity
for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary,
shall be the payment of x x x legal interest, which is six
percent per annum."178 The actual base for its
computation shall be "on the amount finally
adjudged,"179 compounded180 annually to make up
for the cost of money181 already lost to CASA.
Moreover, the failure of the CA to award interest does
not prevent us from granting it upon damages awarded
for breach of contract.182 Because BPI evidently
breached its contract of deposit with CASA, we award
interest in addition to the total amount adjudged.
Under Section 196 of the NIL, any case not provided for
shall be "governed by the provisions of existing
legislation or, in default thereof, by the rules of the law
merchant."183 Damages are not provided for in the
NIL. Thus, we resort to the Code of Commerce and the
Civil Code. Under Article 2 of the Code of Commerce,
acts of commerce shall be governed by its provisions
and, "in their absence, by the usages of commerce
generally observed in each place; and in the absence
of both rules, by those of the civil law."184 This law
being silent, we look at Article 18 of the Civil Code,
which states: "In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied" by its provisions. A perusal of these
three statutes unmistakably shows that the award of
interest under our civil law is justified.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 149454 is hereby
DENIED, and that in GR No. 149507 PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with modification: BPI is held liable for
P547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the
amount already recovered by CASA from Leonardo T.
Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum -- compounded annually, from the filing of
the complaint until paid in full; and attorneys fees of
ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to reimbursement
from Respondent Yabut for the entire amount,
excepting attorneys fees. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulation Commission for such action as
it may deem appropriate against Respondent Yabut. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
Pruneyard Shopping Center vs. Robins
Brief Fact Summary. Students wanted to distribute
literature at a large shopping center, but the owners
wanted to deny them access to the property.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state law which requires
owners of large shopping enters to allow members of
the public to enter their property to distribute petitions
does not constitute a taking of property, even though
the law limits the property owners right to exclude
others from its property.
Facts. PruneYard (Appellant) is a shopping center open
to the public. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or
tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity,

including the circulation of petitions, which is not

directly related to its commercial purposes. High school
students (Appellees) set up a table in a corner of
Appellants courtyard and distributed pamphlets in
support for their opposition to a United Nations
resolution against Zionism. A security guard told them
to leave. Appellees seek to enjoin Appellants from
denying them access to the property to circulate their
petitions. Appellants content that their constitutionally
established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
exclude Appellees from adverse use of their private
property cannot be denied by invocation of a state
constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of
a states laws.
Issue. When a large shopping center is required to
allow free expression and petition on its property, will
that amount to a taking?
Held. No.
The determination of whether a state law unlawfully
infringes a landowners property in violation of the
taking clause requires an examination of whether the
restriction on private property forces some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be born by the public as a whole. This
includes inquiring into such factors as the character of
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its
interference
with
reasonable
investment-backed
expectations.
The requirement that appellants permit the students to
exercise their protected rights of free expression and to
petition on shopping center property clearly does not
amount to an unconstitutional infringement of
appellants property rights under the taking clause. It
will not unreasonably impair the value or use of their

property as a shopping center. The shopping center

may restrict expressive activity by adopting time,
place, and manner regulations that will minimize any
interference with its commercial functions.
Appellants have failed to show that the right to exclude
others is so essential to the use or economic value of
their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a taking.
Concurrence.
(Justice Thurgood Marshall) Justice Marshall did not
understand why the Court suggested that rights of
property are to be defined solely by state law, or that
there is no federal constitutional barrier to the
abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a
state government. Quite serious constitutional
questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to
abolish certain categories of common-law rights in
some general way.
(Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) The state may not compel a
person to affirm a belief he does not hold. A property
owner may be faced with speakers who wish to use his
premises as a platform for views that he finds morally
repugnant. The strong emotions evoked by speech in
such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to
respond.

Discussion. The property in

public, very large, and the
temporary and confined to a
the owners of the shopping
to the right of expression.

this case is open to the

physical invasion is only
small area. The interest of
center is small compared