Sasan To Davao

G.R. No.
176240
October 17, 2008
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO

ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and
CESAR
PACIENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4 TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
and HELPMATE, INC.,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which
affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate
independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work;
and the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006 of the same court denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services 4 with
HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and
messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to EPCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was
impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., 5 Leonilo
Dayday,6 Modesto
Aguirre,7 Alejandro
Ardimer,8 Eleuterio
Sacil,9 Wilfredo
10
11
12
Juegos, Petronilo Carcedo, and Cesar Peciencia were among those employed and
assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as
to its other branches in the Visayas.13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City
separate complaints14against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for
separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorneys fees and
costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and
raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper
disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners 15 amended their complaints
to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still
failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered
that they submit their respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of EPCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously
rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that EPCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they
were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the
latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an
independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform
janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners wages,
monitored petitioners daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control
and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their
services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had
committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the
business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and EPCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of
janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and EPCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI
and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able
Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter
refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or
constructively, thus, petitioners complaints before the NLRC were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were
regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their
employment; and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties position papers and documentary
evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate
job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or
investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and
responsibility as required under the Labor Code. 16 HI is therefore a labor-only contractor
and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.
According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez:
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only as
janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician.
For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the principal but are,
likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent Equitable-PCI Banks principal
business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are employees of
respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank
for more than one (1) year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore,
EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO
be removed from employment without cause and without due process, which is wanting in
this case. Hence, the severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract
is illegal.17
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded
to petitioners the following amounts:
I. CESAR PACIENCIA
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
= P190.00 per day
= P25,840.00
= 5 months and 6 days

= 136 days x P190.00
b)
Separation
Pay
June
10,
1996
to
July
15,
2001
=
5
years
=P190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
c)
13th Month
Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
II Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended Complaint)
a)
Backwages
July
15,
2001
to
January
15,
2002
same as Paciencia
b)
Separation
Pay
Feb.
2,
1999
to
July
15,
2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
Total
III Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended Complaint)
a)
Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Pay
March
8,
1998
to
July
15,
2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
Total
IV Petronillo Carcedo
a)
Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Pay
Sept.
16,
1984
to
July
15,
2001
=P12,350.00
= P4,940.00
P43,130.00
= P25,840.00
= P6,175.00
= P32,015.00
= P25,840.00
= P7,410.00
= P33,250.00
= P25,840.00
= P41,990.00
= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2

c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
V Rolando Sasan, Sr.
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
October
1989
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VI Leonilo Dayday
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Feb.
8,
1983
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VII Eleuterio Sacil
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
June
2,
1992
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VIII Mario Juntilla
a)
(same as Pacencia)
b)
Separation
October
7,
1987
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
IX Wilfredo Juegos
a)
(same as Pacencia)
b)
Separation
July
23,
1990
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
Pay
= P4,940.00
= P72,770.00
Backwages
Pay
2001
15,
Pay
= P25,840.00
= P29,640.00
= P4,940.00
= P60,420.00
Backwages
15,
Pay
2001
Pay
= P25,840.00
= P44,460.00
= P4,940.00
= P75,240.00
Backwages
15,
Pay
2001
Pay
= P25,840.00
= P22,230.00
= P4,940.00
= P53,010.00
Backwages
15,
Pay
2001
Pay
= P25,840.00
= P34,580.00
= P4,940.00
= P65,360.00
Backwages
= P25,840.00
Pay
2001
= P27,170.00
15,
Pay
= P4,840.00
= P57,950.00
X Modesto Aguirre
a)
(same as Paciencia)
Backwages
= P25,840.00
3. Roland Mosquera
33,250.00
4. Petronilo Carceda
72,770.00
5. Roland Sasan, Sr.
60,420.00
6. Leonilo Dayday
75,240.00
7. Eleuterio Sacil
53,010.00
8. Mario Juntilla
65,360.00
9. Wilfredo Juegos
57,950.00
10. Modesto Aguirre
54,245.00
11. Alejandro Ardimer
59,185.00
TOTAL
P606,575.0018
b) Separation Pay
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001
= P23,465.00
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2

c)
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
13th Month
Pay
= P4,940.00
= P54,245.00
XI Alejandro Ardimer
= P25,840.00
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
=
Jan.
20,
1990
to
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
July
15,
Pay
2001
Pay
= P28,405.00
= P4,940.00
= P59,185.00
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing
the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the
complainants as follows:
1. Cesar Paciencia
2. Dominador Suico, Jr.
P 43,130.00
32,015.00
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI
appealed the same to the NLRC, 4 th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were
docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its allegation that it was a
legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not
present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing
Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI
showing therein that it increased its authorized capital stock from P1,500,000.00
to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100 (P43,472.00), broken down
as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto
P 5,434.00
2. Ardimer, Alejandro
5,434.00
3. Carcedo, Petronilo
5,434.00
4. Dayday, Leonilo
5,434.00
5. Juegos, Wilfredo
5,434.00
6. Juntilla, Mario
5,434.00
7. Paciencia, Cesar
5,434.00
8. Sacil, Eleuterio
5,434.00
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets

of P20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582
registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value
of P1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that
it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso
Avenue, Cebu City with market value of P2,515,170.00.19
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor
Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented
by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly
capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in
"labor-only contracting."
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight
(8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a temporary "off-detail,"
they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their complaints on 22 August
2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their services were already
terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrezs award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the 13th month pay, to the petitioners.21Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003
Decision, the payment of the following reduced amounts to petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated
7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally 22 pay
the complainants of their 13 th month pay and attorneys fees in the aggregate amount of
TOTAL
P43,472.0023
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1
July 2003.24
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of
Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC
that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor,
respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired
on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI offered the
petitioners new work assignments to various establishments which are HIs clients. The
petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating status." They simply refused,
without justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was
tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not entitled to
backwages or separation pay.26
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however,
and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases 29 allowing the NLRC to admit evidence,
not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on
appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should
use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. 30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules
of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In
keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the
latter could submit counter-evidence.31
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again

emphasized that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC, Fourth
Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003 promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF
THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISIONS DECISION AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB
7S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED
DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB
7 THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues raised
by petitioners.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as
technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are
mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure,
all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol
Laboratories Employees Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was
not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the
NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of
falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on
appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the
basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently,
petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the
Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.
Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of
Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere
photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the
technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical
rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an
examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in
position papers and other documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this
Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence presented
by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about
these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is
also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is not
the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes
violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be
heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every
opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to
controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the
Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying
on the weakness of the adverse parties evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for our
consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be
deemed petitioners principal employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed
from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal
agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or
completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period,
regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or
outside the premises of the principal. 35 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job
contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the
contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health
standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and
welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor
or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal.37 In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. 38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only
contracting,39 we elucidated inVinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 that it is
not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or not
the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work;
the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the
performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to
another; the employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the
contractors workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools,
appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of payment. 41 Simply
put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be
considered.42 Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the
relationship are to be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Certificate of Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate
states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own
responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and
direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except
as to the results thereof;
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the activities they performed such as
those of messengerial services are directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City

for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as
amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769, dated October
16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and its
Implementing Rules specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto
set my hand and affixed the Official on this 23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that
it was issued in the regular performance of official duty.46 In the absence of proof,
petitioners bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being
the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job
contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly
evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the
Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent
business from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform
janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from the banking services in
which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job
contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited laboronly contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or investment to actually
perform the job, work or service under its own account or responsibility. Both the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in
the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises,
actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or
completion of the job, work or service contracted out. 47 An independent contractor must
have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries,
work premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital and
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is enough that it has
substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has
substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it
does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting. 49 There is even no need for HI
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners
as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the principal
business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the
conduct of its (E-PCIBANKs) principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it
holds office and it has been engaged in business for more than a decade now. 51 As
observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business entity cannot
be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement
of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence
of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative
employees conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control
test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship
to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was HI
which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified
by the provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection,
engagement, investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees. 53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners
their wages and who provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials
necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for
petitioners claims for wages and other employees benefits. Precisely, the contract of
services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries,
allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including
withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employees conduct, and the fourth
requisite regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to
control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which their work was to be
accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that EPCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or
malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between
E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may
be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its
employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which regular supervisor shall exclusively
supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1 hereof. x x x. 55
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its
own responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and
direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only to the result of the
work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between EPCIBank and HI is definitely a case of permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as
well as in government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to
perform special services,56 ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services, we
can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor,
the law creates an employer-employee relationship between HI and petitioners 57 which
renders HI liable for the latters claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of
E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the latter.58
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of
the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to
work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal
since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled
out from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI
and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners
were not even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment by
HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other
clients,59 petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners
complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated 24 April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180291
July 27, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F.

GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the
GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL
RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE
LEGARDA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution No. 062177.
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth
Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco,
and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative
Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to
Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,
marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS
premises;
xxx
xxx
xxx
That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS
management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred
by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from
appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution
No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on
Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened
some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.2
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum
dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD),
Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit
(GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7)
respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days
why they should not be administratively dealt with.3
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two
others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that
there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to
the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former
union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support,
they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part,
respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate
supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were
not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the
respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their
written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof.5 None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions
finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of
one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the
lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced
the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right
to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness
a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants'
(respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their
Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS
management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a
constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be
punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service.
Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office,
joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees, now respondents in this
case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the
belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial
disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing
in the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner
GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered
at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering
was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the
handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his
administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and
convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand or force
concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the
government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents,
petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared simultaneously
at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of
protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset
that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show
support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated
assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the
operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina
and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR

LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
VI
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE

PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER,
WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT
FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR

POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE
OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF
VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
II
WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE
EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL
PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF
THE CASE RECORD.
III
WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON
EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE
RECORDS IS VALID.
IV
WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS GATHERING
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN
OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE
PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of

explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue
that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed
should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages,
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically
and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to
Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own
rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No.
178-04, specifically provides:
WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING

FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE
PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE,
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the
Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered
to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in
10
proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an
answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing
in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with
the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing
evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in
a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." 10 It means
that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an
insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules
of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly
stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and
evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this
case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed
admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and
incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint.11 Thus, even if
respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in
the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the
forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget
that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the
petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint or in the formal charges.12
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was
resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents' evidence, but
on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the
respondents' respective answer to the separate formal charges in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding
and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their responsive
answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous
position to prove the merit of their allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner
Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly
submitted and justly considered independent of the weakness of respondent's
evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to the one who
alleges and not the one who denies."13
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of
whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316.
Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to
a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or
mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their
respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts,
pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be deemed
an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no
cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass
action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with
them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards
and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all
collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government
service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
11
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he
himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so
GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there or
just simply appeared there simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure
if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005
was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the
basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the Investigation
Unit during this time. The rest abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this
incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the protesters, some
of whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this illegal action as evident
in their behavior of arrogance, defiance and provocation, the presence of various
recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad
mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the
collusion regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as
reported earlier.15
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents'
unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed to show that
their purpose was to demand a force concession.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, 16 the Court
upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between
300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or
demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for
the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to
the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would
most certainly be unfair and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's
right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a
broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First
Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. 17 In said case, the New York
Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit
service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their
uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition
to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule
and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though
recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the
NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."
In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital

District,18 it was held that,
A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union
organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the county's
proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was
outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and
associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button.19
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's
Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action
has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape
with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes
12
against her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the
victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim
with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
Contrary to Law. 1
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,

approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left
AAL.
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion
Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year
student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her
school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.

3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He
used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne
agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know
that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet
at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne,
who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a
six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the
vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her
moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of
the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered.
She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck.
Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.

3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline
lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries"
sustained as follows:
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of

1st and 2nd incisors.
1. Abrasions:
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear,
generally oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both
labia, introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
2.2 cheek, right.
13
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed

negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994,
by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions
due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of
Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where
Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained
with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes
which were identified as Marianne's. 4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of
the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from
Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but
that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles
consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a
towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside
the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos,
Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced
appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the
police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of
Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's
clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors,
Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also
said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police
took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise
brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over
a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other
suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day,
February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health
Officer,
Dr.
Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the
one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but
since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In
the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and
son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show
them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he
falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the
devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to
help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27,
more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he
affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the
afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the
birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked
dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next
day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son
went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife
joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked
up by the police.16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms,
the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to
confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet
bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime.
Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and
Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two
bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to
death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the
victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with
abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along
index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police
headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to
the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a
14
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y

Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt
of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized
in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8,
classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne
Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra
and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00
as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision
becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE
WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen
of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave
his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of
appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the
news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of

counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his
own
choice;
and
(3)
to
be
informed
of
such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the
presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado
character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the
suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include
investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the
death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found
him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police
chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did
this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at
the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other
companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
15
A: Yes, sir.
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he

covered the canal, he really showed where the bags
were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from
information we learned that his parents live in Barangay
Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he
admitted that he was the culprit.26
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are
tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad
visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They
went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for
forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when
there were already many people from the media, Andan
whispered something to me and requested that he be
able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police.
It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when
he was investigated and interrogated. 27His confession is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar
Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened

inside the office of the Chief of Police, mayor?
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to
recover these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1
because accused pointed to them, where did he point
these bags?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told

me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I
am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was
telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I
opened the door to allow the media to hear what he
was going to say and I asked him again whether he
was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was
even covered by a television camera. 30
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the

two (2) bags beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information
where these two (2) bags were located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags
could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the
accused so that we would know where the two (2) bags
were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before
the accused pointed to the place where the bags were
located?
xxx xxx xxx

Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you
that he will tell you something and then you responded
by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police
and you stated that he admitted that he killed
Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words
"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay
Marianne," was that the only admission that he told
you?
16
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was,

when we were alone and the second one was before
the media people, sir.
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and

interview inside the police station of Baliuag and I
identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned
earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one
who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from
him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the
room of the Chief of Police?
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I

stopped him from making further admissions because I
wanted the media people to hear what he was going to
say, sir. 31
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and

that he was responsible for raping and killing the victim,
sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was
voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or
violence that was committed on his person because I
knew that there were five other suspects in this case
and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the
influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang,"
sir.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before
the
mayor
is
inadmissible.
It
is
true
that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the
mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence,
we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused

was present, was the uncle beside him at the time that
you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain
whose name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay
captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the
crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra
resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the
office of the Station Commander, there was no air of
any force or any threatening nature of investigation that
was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able
to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he
admitted to me that he was the one who raped and
killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying
me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment
and everything that transpired during the killing of
Marianne Guevarra.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7,
interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed
that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child
and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were
able to reach the place where the body of Marianne
was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or

ask permission from the accused Pablito Andan that
you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
17
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at

the office of the Baliuag PNP, you also went to the
scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the
proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own

inquiries?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen

including Mayor Trinidad and some of the relatives of
the accused.
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt

their own investigation so that we can have a direct
interview with the suspect.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused,

Pablito Andan?
Q: Were there people?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of

Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were
present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many
wailing, weeping and crying at that time when he was
already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police,
sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the
crime in Concepcion, Baliuag, Bulacan, what
transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig
deeper on how the crime was committed by the
accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and
asked him to narrate to me and show me how he
carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra,
sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your
interview at the PNP Baliuag up to the scene of the
crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A: The people present before the crowd that included

the mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the
policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several
other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor
presented the suspect to us and after the suspect
admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I
reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware
that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with
murder is a capital offense? And you could be
sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you
really admit that you were the one who did it and he
repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you
mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my
camera to take some pictures of the suspect, the
mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the
group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from
the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you
mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as
the accused answered you affirmatively, what was the
answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
18
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the

question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at
pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam
mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay at
pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26,

1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused
Pablito Andan give you the permission that you asked
from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?

A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me
was because a devil gripped his mind and because of
that according to him, your Honor, were the
pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which
he, according to him, reads almost everyday before the
crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr.
Reporter, will you tell the court and the public what was
the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his
body that he was really down physically and I think he
was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were

present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad,
policemen from Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4
Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when
you interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was
crowded with people. There were people from the PNP
and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the
media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived
late and there were people from the radio and from TV
Channel 9.
Court: He was happy?

Q: How about Channel 7?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop
first, sir.
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only

apparent but there was no tear that fell on his face.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview

him, was his wife also present?
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not
very sure if she was really the wife but they were
hugging each other and she was crying and from the
questions that I asked from the people there they told
me that she is the wife, sir.
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 41
19
Q: How about the other members of the family of the

accused, were they around?
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that

interview?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many

people there, sir.
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 43
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about

the interview. May we know what question did you ask
and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his
answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that,
he saw the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up.
She entered the house and he boxed her on the
stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the
reason why he killed the victim was because he was
afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that
you made a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence
from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there
to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an
interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in
the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news
reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in
the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
protect. 47Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations
to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against
him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the
first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the
hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L.
Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the
absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of
the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of
Marianne to the other side of the fence?
Hymen contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6
and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been
caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive,
indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His testimony is as follows:
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
20
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found

lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position
corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is

the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot
at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges
of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.

Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because
within the edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot,
that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that
what you did on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy,
that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before
you did you re-autopsy?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is

forcibly inserted into that small opening of the hymen
causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she
sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found
in the vagina could have been sustained on account of
the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted
the autopsy on the victim which was already dead, no
amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more
circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I
presumed that when the doctor examined the victim
with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor,
then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it
is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen
were caused by those instruments because the victim
was already dead and usually in a dead person we do
not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the
lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock
positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could
have been inflicted or could have been sustained while
the victim was alive?
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate
the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the
hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how
slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the
victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the
first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by
other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the
crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's
house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house;
58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away
from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of
appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat
rough surface.60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to
where her body was found;
A: Yes, sir.
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the
edges of the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go
over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the
edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the
clotted blood?
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the
presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type
was not determined but her parents had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had
bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
21
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain;
64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later
found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence
justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even
stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay
Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less
than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in
Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is
found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to imposereclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
22
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the
ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the
youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of
the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human
dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has
yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the
"intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of
death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there
exist any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on
November 20, 1953. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was
under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a
compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located
10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 510).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian
Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play
inside the compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children.
While they were playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes.
Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 2931; September 6, 1995, pp.17; 20-22).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's

store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none
left of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep
thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed
manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then
he left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 48; 12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was
missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown
belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady
sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the
following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded
a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant
alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter
disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp.
14-17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma.
Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the
victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without
underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the
following findings:
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a

drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was
already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out
with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store

fronting the compound, saw Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four
times catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went
to his in-law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding
changes on the trip of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws
was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met
appellant along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock
p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished
house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye,
lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral
aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5
cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area,
right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0
x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows,
right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm, forearms, left, posterior aspect,
lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right
antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect,
lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right,
lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left,
dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
23
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.

Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath
subpleural petechial hemorrhages.
nailmarks,
neck,
subepicardial,
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.

Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip

addressed to the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1
Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN,
August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in
Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty.
Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein
he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when
appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided
to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to
Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head

Injury, Contributory.
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information which
reads: 2
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00
o'clock position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with
blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126).
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with
said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without
her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named
accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO
as a result of which, said victim died.
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro
were informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was
missing. According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from
the apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on
the same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6,
1995, pp. 6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of
appellant was working in apancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan
City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to
them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his
present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed
them that appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park,
Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the
house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of
dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was
identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also
found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that
of appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic
tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a
pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings. These items
were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August
18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
Contrary to law. 3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further
sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act
No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
24
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
(RPC), as amended, 5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his
testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as
follows:
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since "there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe . . . than the termination
of a human life." 7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored.
In order therefore, that appellant's guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as
the records are not shy, for him to verify.
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in
a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellant's
employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was
summoned by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at
12 o'clock noon. Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a movie. He also asked
for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5).
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence 8 and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend,
opted to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They
consumed one case of red horse beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a coworker, fetched him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to Zaldy's house
and bought a bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m.
After consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of
gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they
were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of
gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store
and proceeded to Isip's apartment. But because it was already closed, he
decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house. Around 10
o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed
the body inside the room where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood
up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the
dead body of the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to follow.
Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing the dead
body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him
again, they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the following morning, he left the
compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN,
October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house
somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer's plan to
salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed
the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed
that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to
sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11). 6
1. there is
circumstance;
more
than
one
2. the facts from which the

inferences are derived are proven;
and
3. the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 10 Facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its
effect upon the court. 11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant's guilt beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip,
owner of the unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic
tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of
June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the
evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located
in front portion of the compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the
unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she
noticed the accused's hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be
25
thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked
worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni, categorically
testified that on June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his
way to his in-laws house, he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the
road leading to his in-law's residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away
to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria
Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house
where victim's body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused
Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the
morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from
her to leave. That after finishing some work she asked him to do accused
Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to
return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next morning.
That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in
Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney
driver plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian
St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused
Larry Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his passenger
jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the
overpass of the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big
house of Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the
incident. This is a clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the
said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic)
fabricated or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the
accused. The absence of any evidence as to the existence of improper
motive sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that
the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and
credit. (People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276,. 284;
People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and
after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of
Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of
accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes
is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not
complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person
(People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA 311). He did not
even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his
statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of
reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details know only to
him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty.
Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and
explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all
throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given
by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be
watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the
investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem
findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation;
Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the
testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit
the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa
kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama iyong ulo
niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos ni-rape ko
na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the
statement. There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to
sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said
confession were obtained as a result of violence,
torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of
reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer
could have been motivated to concoct facts narrated in
said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to
be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People
v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA
431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol
35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was
notable to enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already
closed and he proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and
slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver
of the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the
two ordered him to have sex with the dead body but he refused. That the
two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the
septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is unbelievable
and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and not in
the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that
night of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was
26
already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he
(Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet
in the room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver
upstairs only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank located in the
ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in
the septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room
where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have
sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except
it's conformity to aver knowledge observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16,
1979)
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious:
and
3.) When the woman is under
twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have
apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who
interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural.
An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an
accusation of crime as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence therefore,
particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not
innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by

two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his

consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after
the incident and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7,
1995. 12
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed

the penalty shall be death.
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 13

1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized
with extreme caution; and
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the parent of the
victim.
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
27
2.) When the victim is under the

custody of the police or military
authorities.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven.
This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination
on the child's body:
3.) When the rape is committed in

full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
Q: And after that what other parts or the victim did you
examine?
4.) When the victim is a religious or

a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that
he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any
member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement
agency
7.) When by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered
permanent
physical
mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity, 15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and
the
victim
may
even
be
a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes
immaterial 18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, 19 but the absence of a
free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie,
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time
she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven
but also the other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the offended party was done
through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are
present in this case.
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.

Q: And what did you find out after you examined the
genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at
4:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock position and that the
edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic)
caused by a penetration of an organ.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of
a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: I am very sure of that. 20
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he
had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA,
yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos dumating
yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto
hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya.
Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na,
nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na siya.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi
mo?
28
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short

placed atop this investigator's table. Subject evidence
were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig

sabihin ng "NAKARAOS", maaari bang ipaliwanag mo
ito?
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang

ginagawa ko.
26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na katawan ng

batang babae yung iyong ari?
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan

ng lasing?
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.

19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo
ni rape yung batang babae?.
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN,

ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos

mong itulak sa terrace?
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo,

hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa, basta araw
ng Linggo.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na sinasabi mo?
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA.

VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.

S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni
rape mo?
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
S: Natatakot po ako.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang

pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at pinatay
ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ha ito?
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Oho.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
S: Naka-isa po.
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama,

natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo
siya sa poso-negra?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay
ko na siya sa poso-negra.
29
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon

ka kasama?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis

and other investigator inside the investigation room and
the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.

35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA.
VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay na?
Q And when you reached the investigation room do

you notice whether the accused already there?
A The accused was already there.
S: Buhay pa po.
Q Was he alone?
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
A He was alone, sir.
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace. 21
In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of
the pudendum of the woman's private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed
upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's own account, he pushed the victim
causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that he
ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the
time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he, however,
claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied
by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him
his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the
assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call
about?
A We went to the station, police investigation
together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by
Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would
like to confess of the crime of, I think, rape with
homicide.
Q And upon reaching the investigation room of
Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present?
Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold

Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did they tell
you, if any?
A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this
Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime
charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's
Office.
Q Was he also present at the start of the question
and answer period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was
left alone.
Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the
question and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995
in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question and answer period
started, what was the first thing that you did as
assisting lawyer to the accused?
30
A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under

the constitution.
Q What are those right?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has
the right of a counsel of his own choice and that if he
has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and
that he has the right to refuse to answer any question
that would incriminate him.
A I was then present when he signed.

Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after
the enumeration, before and after there are two (2)
signatures, will you please recognize the two (2)
signatures?
A These were the same signatures signed in my
presence, sir.
Q The signature of whom?
Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights

of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether this
constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in
writing?
A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by
one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this constitutional right which you
said were reduced into writing, will you be able to
recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court
whether that is the same document you mentioned?
A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into
writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be
marked as our Exhibit A. proper.
A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.

ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures
identified by my compaero be encircled and marked
as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q After you said that you apprised the accused of
his constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino, in
local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his
statement.
Q What was the reply?
A He said "Opo".
Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this

constitutional right of the accused whether you asked
him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
Q In your presence?
A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police

Officer Alabastro.
Q And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the

question started?
Q But you were present?
A Yes, sir.
A In my presence, sir.
31
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver

of rights, were you present also when he signed this
waiver?
A Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A I had also explained to him, sir.
Q In Filipino?
A In Tagalog, sir.
Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in
Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay,
"Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that?
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures.
The first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed and
sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize
this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a
Certification that you have personally examined the
accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary
executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do you
recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir. 23 (emphasis
supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and
forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey, 24
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself - such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
We have no test or the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to
our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to
these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule
that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts. 25 In this case, the trial court's findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, 26 the same being
supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have
affected the outcome of this case 27 or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of
the court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses
for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists. 28 Neither
was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 "when by reason or on occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." This special complex crime is
treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape - that is, when any of the 7 (now 10)
"attendant circumstances" enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the
penalty is death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the
penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of
the proper penalty in accordance with Article 53 of the RPC However, if any of those
circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance
under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63
of the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and
15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint,
it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as
an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject to the usual proof
of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
"rape with homicide", the court has no option but to apply the same "regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime" 29 in
accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries
with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the
RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed
under existing laws,except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than
seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case
32
by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the
imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to
alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime. 31 Again, the
record rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20
years of age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00). 32 In addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral
and exemplary damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided
in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is "recognized that the victim's
injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to
warrant per se the award of moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape
carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one
or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code 38 after proof that
the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages. 39 Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against
an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the
people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be informed in a language
known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
any;
Every
other
warnings,
information
or
communication must be in a language known to and

understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent and that anystatement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a
lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in
the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has
been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any
time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or
messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or
be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive
any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to
a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he
must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist
on his waiver and chooses to speak;
33
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he

may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be questioned with
warning that once he makes such indication, the police
may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has
already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial
waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel
or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at
any time during the process, regardless of whether he
may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or
evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of
any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed inPeople v. Echegaray 42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote,
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
34
35
information for libel was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City
against petitioner Torralba. The information states:
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses
CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of maligning,
impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late
CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and
a man of good reputation and social standing in the community and for the purpose of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio
program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station DYFX,
openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING MGA HONTANOSAS,
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA
PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN." X X
X. "DUNAY DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING
HONTANOSAS," which in English means: "THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE
WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH." X X
X. "THE FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and
other words of similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge
Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas, 3 one of the legitimate children
of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor, discredit,
contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment,
wounded feelings and mental anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L.
Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005

CIRSE
FRANCISCO
"CHOY"
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TORRALBA, Petitioners,
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 355 of the same Code.
DECISION
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 promulgated on 22 May 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial
courts2 decision finding petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba guilty of the crime of
libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.
City Prosecutor II
Culled from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" which
was aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an
APPROVED:
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
City Prosecutor4
36
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he
was charged with.5
On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where
Crim. Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation 6 alleging therein that
private complainant Atty. Manuel Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4)
criminal cases for libel against petitioner Torralba, three of which Crim. Cases No. 8956,
No. 8957, and No. 8958 were then pending with the RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City. As
the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were substantially the same,
petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be consolidated with the three other
cases so as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases.
In its order dated 25 May 1998, 7 the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba
was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.
During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as
witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.
Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc.
(TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According
to him, sometime during the Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs
sponsorship of his radio program. This request was approved by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the existence of said sponsorship
agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently
attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his
brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that
TMSI was behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI
decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio show. In effect, the TMSI
sponsored "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at the cost of P500.00.
Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that
petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said
corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect.
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner
Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however,
petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner
Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record
petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were introduced in
evidence by the prosecution, to wit:
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410

During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder
and that he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record
petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio
whenever the recording took place and had actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio
program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing
objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by
the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings,
Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted
the tape recordings subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the
proper authentication of said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to
the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three
tape recordings into evidence.11
It was revealed during Lims cross-examination 12 that petitioner Torralba previously
instituted a criminal action for libel 13 against the former arising from an article published in
the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol.
In said case, Lim was found guilty as charged by the trial court 14 and this decision was
subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court of Appeals in its decision
promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, "People of the Philippines
v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." 15In our resolution of 04 December 1996, we denied
Lims petition for review on certiorari.16
For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the
chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape
recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during which
petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him and stated that he was a person who could not
be trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that
"he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had a sad experience with someone
who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a collaborator"; that on
12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio
program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas
were traitors to the land of their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor
Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed
his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba. 17
When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts
and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them
to be genuine.18
Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC,
Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in
1994 upon the request of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.
37
The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba
maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and
other civic organizations in Cebu. In the course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he
allegedly received complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with respect to
the laborers low pay and exhorbitant rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he
was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner Torralba requested TMSI to send a
representative to his radio show in order to give the corporation an opportunity to address
the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas
on
17 December 1993.
When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas,19 he denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his
11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17
December 1993 appearance of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program,
he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to the late CFI Judge Hontanosas.
Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere backgrounder on his
interviewee.
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision 20 acquitting petitioner
Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the
crime of libel in Crim. Case No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal
liability herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal
Cases Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-defense, as aforediscussed. Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said cases as
shown by OR No. 5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000,
issued by the Clerk of Court of Multiple Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each
representing cash deposits therefore are hereby cancelled and released.
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim.
Case No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge
Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program resulting to the dishonor
and wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close
associates. For this, the Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision
Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the
Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in
the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their
good reputation and high social standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor
and public humiliation caused.21
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the
challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional and to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.22
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL
FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING PETITIONERAPPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON
THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT HE TESTIFIED
ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONERAPPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD
OF A RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D") ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONERAPPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED
FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL.
III
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA]
MADE UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D,"
THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE
TO THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL
VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD
38
FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED

WITH UBERIMA FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW
CIVIL CODE).23
This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower courts
admission
in
evidence
of
the
11
April
1994
tape
recording.
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
comment.
Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given
considerable weight on the tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by
Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said authentication, petitioner Torralba
continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to
tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper
foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper
safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection
against tampering.30
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of
the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in
the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording 31 and
that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio
broadcasts, thus:
ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form 24 where a
proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. 25 In our
jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in
evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to
wit:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
inducement.26
In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as
regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the
identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the
recordings.27 Likewise, a witness declaration that the sound recording represents a true
portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication. 28 The
party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of going
forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the
conversation recorded.29
a Yes, sir.
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of Choy
Torralba.32
Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas radio show on 11
April 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper
foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording for said date. Without the
requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording
Exhibit "D" in evidence.
In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to
examine the records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked
against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused
can only be sustained upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco,
wrote that "[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is
admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is established either by the
testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness
recognition of the voice of the speaker."33
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba
broadcast the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while
petitioner Torralbas radio program on that date was being tape recorded by his adopted
daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even touch the same. 34 In effect, Lim was
39
implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare
assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails to meet
the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the voice of the speaker." Being
near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the
voice of the speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device
without necessarily listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio
commentator is saying over the airwaves.
of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to the
usual auditing and accounting procedures. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he had an ax to
grind against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime
of libel and for which he was found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could
not present himself as an "uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from
this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant
Atty. Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner
Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording
handed over to him by Lim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional
presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. 35 As we have so stated
in the past
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the
prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such
an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner
Torralba, this Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to
insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of
the Court of Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a
new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba of the crime
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
40
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita SalcedoOrtanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong" to and

from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made
an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course
of trial. This we cannot sanction.
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby

DISMISSED. 1
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94,
RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A"
to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9
June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor
previous decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent
judge, the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court as the question of admissibility in evidence of
tape recordings has not, thus far, been addressed and
decided squarely by the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law
and with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present
petition, which in part reads:
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in

nature, the same can still be [the] subject of a petition
for certiorari. 2
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic
reasons:
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant
thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how
they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in
the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of
justice.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of
a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed

error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility
is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the
ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits
and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming
gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly
correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.Otherwise, we will have the sorry
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered
by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with
unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent
allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
41
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as
follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act
shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the
inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for
violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of
American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are
inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168644
February 16, 2010
BSB GROUP, INC., represented by its President, Mr. RICARDO BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside
the September 13, 20042 and November 5, 20043 Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 364 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The said orders, in turn,
respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the
testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security Bank account, and denied
reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein
representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as
Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as
a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made by
the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or
qualified theft5 against respondent, alleging that several checks 6 representing the aggregate
amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in payment of their obligation
were, instead of being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by respondent who
deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust
Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. 7 Upon a finding that the evidence
adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing of the
Information for qualified theft against respondent.8
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an
Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and]
October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50
42
belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the

damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine
currency.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order. 19 A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated November 5,
2004.20 These two orders are the subject of the instant case.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence,
being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission of the said
offense and as such she was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it did,
respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed orders of
the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.21The decision reads:
Contrary to law.9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. 10 The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding
amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or records
custodians of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch. 11 The
trial court granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to
Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was
no mention made of the said bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security Bank
account identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the supposed
checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the
case, she, in the same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the
Security Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was
admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.13
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on
the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent
allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. 14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental
motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405. 15 The trial court did not sustain respondent; hence, it
denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.16
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan
(Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to
prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group,
Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its customers, endorse the
same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with Security
Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for
identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then
deposited in her personal account with Security Bank. 17 But before the testimony could be
completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, 18 seeking the exclusion of Marasigans
testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank
account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality
under R.A. No. 1405.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13,
2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC
representative is ordered stricken from the records.
SO ORDERED.22
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 23 petitioner is now before the Court pleading the
same issues as those raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had
seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out
Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security Bank. 25 It
asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter
of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the
coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the
subject matter in litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the information and, in this
respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial court, which declared to
be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the
information.27
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was
neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested
that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. She invited particular
attention to that portion of the criminal Information which averred that she has stolen and carried
away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term
"cash money" stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported
to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks
which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan,
should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondents right to due
process.28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well
as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under
R.A. No. 1405.29
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for
qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits
that through Marasigans testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the checks
involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had
indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to
43
her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash
money stolen by respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash
amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks
themselves.30
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether
the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and
whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence,
excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence thus
comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be
indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of
the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is
the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the
personal property of another without the latters consent. It is qualified when, among others, and
as alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. 32 The prosecution of this
offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of
personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking
was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence. 33 In
turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness,
is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and competency in accordance with Section
334 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in respondents
Security Bank account are relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether they have such
direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or whether
they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to
the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.35
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to
establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent, at
several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her personal account
with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of
cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the
checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon
the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another
with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already ensued from
such act of execution.36 The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that evidence
presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection
between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information
by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But this line
of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the
commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In
estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in
relation to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check, after all, while not
regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for cash,
and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it
is in this respect that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully
taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.37 In other words, in
pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of
the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their
contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the
offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case
accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has
actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her
personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigans testimony on the particulars
of respondents account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the
checks allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically
addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our
jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this right
of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405, 39otherwise known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1955. 40
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same
time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be
utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic development. 41 Owing to this
piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic state policy in the
Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely
confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial institutions
in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
44
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.1avvphi1
Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the
secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally
recognized zones of privacy.44 There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary and
supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether
governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into
bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.45
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation
v. Ortega.46That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an
examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on
that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank
Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at
protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the
deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will
be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and
House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee
on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being
held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring
the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank
deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by
this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or
garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a
preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited
belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open
the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for the purpose of
satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government;
but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation,
then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the
deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case
posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of
the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under one of the
exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said account is the subject
matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank
and Trust Co.,48 that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or
personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted,
which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the Security Bank account. 49 On
the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment
tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain
what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the
class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405
has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,50 in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No.
1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject
of the action.51 Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in the
case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense,
and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the
criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain language, is
charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence and stealing cash in the
amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some
material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to
be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention of the supposed
bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account
is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of
what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this case is the
money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by respondent, and not the
money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that,
which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of
such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution at
an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is
45
protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was
raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents supposed
bank account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks
adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A.
No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any
logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find
full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to include an
individuals financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or
heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing such rights. 52 Should there
be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the
authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former.
This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting
the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
46
Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused
police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's
testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide
against Webb, et al.1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at
large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household,
police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
G.R. No. 176389
December 14, 2010
ANTONIO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
LEJANO, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of
witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her
testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed
by significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a
relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators
who helped her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support
and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
Brief Background
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez,
and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4,
2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of
eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages
to Lauro Vizconde.3
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and
Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense
investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions.
But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the
identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests
were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of
damages to Lauro Vizconde. 4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by
publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that
rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a
part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed
that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five
members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
47
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence 6 to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen
taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward
or financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of
identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb,
then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to
determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however,
that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in
the case.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen
at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland 9 that he cites has long be
overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should
acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI
found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy
with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed
Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others
as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut
Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet
exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping
the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen
in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a
motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal.
This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test.
Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed
put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some
future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
The
Right
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
to
Acquittal
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this,
semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as
Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his
friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio
"Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at
a shabu house in Paraaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in
December 1990.
48
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him
to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their
shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF
Homes, Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who
rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a
Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about
Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro
gave her Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could
not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes.
Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but
only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda
pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their
garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave
the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave
the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked.
Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian
gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro
trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions
to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot,
Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male
companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes,
Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako
ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all
left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the
third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to
alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the
transformer near the Vizcondes residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang
transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama
mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others
again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige,
dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of
the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw").
The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela
opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in
the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she
was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through
the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the
garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino yan?"
Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling
around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the
same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the
kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked
him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him
what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng
susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but
none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to
the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had
signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came,
opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked
in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied
bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was
gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the
dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the
sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go.
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone
and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in
the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already
locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got
near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where
the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the
Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?"
Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him,
bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall,
49
and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
Q. And what did you say?

xxxx
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and
clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered,
"Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We dont know each other. We
havent seen each otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers
house.12
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and
she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we
will try to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the
case.
1. The quality of the witness
xxxx
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by
her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No.
She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon,
one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI
handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and
vices.
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and
Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since
November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against
drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of
notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the
arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the
task force gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege
of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real
story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that
someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified
thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder
case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man
to me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"
COURT:
How was that?
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the
circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. Thats what
she told me, Your Honor.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
xxxx
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."
50
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na
lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.
2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with
the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody
was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations
about them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and charged them
with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled
these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who
were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the
NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary
details and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang,
condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how
crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the
physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by breaking the glass
panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use
this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no
reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out
of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled
front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration,
Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they
wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a
tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the
Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this
physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at
another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the frontdoor key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of
the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him
when they left Carmelas house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the
front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story
made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and
his companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them
climbed the parked cars hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they
were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front
door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she
claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the
Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened
garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for
them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be seen in such
an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative
work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a
stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she
needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an
asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer
and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of
Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given
the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the
Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from
51
the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed
him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How
can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then
that you will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some
score with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic
vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people
will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb
proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they
(including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal.
But when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the
house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which
was parked on the street between Carmelas house and the next. Some of these men sat on top
of the cars lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who
cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby
house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did not figure in a
planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger, using
her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro
to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that
Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro.
Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to
report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in
drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she
remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her
that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight.
Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her
up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was
Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make
sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason
for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight,
she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open.
Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He
decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why
would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play
in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would
only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to
her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was
supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in
the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So
that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela
on the floor of the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and
her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she
got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly
gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and
Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada,
her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not
know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to
know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with
her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the
victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained 14 and the presence of semen in Carmelas
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of
June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something
untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the
52
masters bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a
television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify,
go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they
entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the
kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And
he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He
actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were
not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the
second time in the direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed
the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not
notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the
early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webbs
orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit
that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but
White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually
discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the threevehicle convoy,17White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy
since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in
it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw
Webb around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the
Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the
entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb
said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF
Homes sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan
had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman
Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing
the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without
being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security
guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the
incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the
visitors entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter
of seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes
Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house on the morning of June
30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at
about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house
in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the way out.
Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from
the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly
remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not
remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to
have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about
it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt.
Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs
only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to
collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged
with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months
to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up
children at four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so
careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the
evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the
hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took
place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29,
1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him,
according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked
him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his
fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife
with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get
into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His
departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had
cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on
the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police
investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde
residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
53
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde
residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving
around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to
Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two
daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a
Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on
finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who
testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed,
Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door
open so he could enter the house.
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their
son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and
money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San
Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt
used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy,
Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on
March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave. 23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure,
he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them.
They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were
his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24
5. The missing corroboration

b. The two immigration checks
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela
and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this
reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would
be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even
those who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her,
trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if
they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends
would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular
hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely
and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the
surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of
their personal histories. It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male
passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmelas lover. This was the
all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas
relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life.
Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the
gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented
himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist,
a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria
on board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the
Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped.
Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his
passport, and let him pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger
Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that
country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Nonimmigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb
presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9,
1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter, Maria Teresa
Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his
aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb,
Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San
Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe
to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a
week with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-laws pest control company.35 Webb
presented the companys logbook showing the tasks he performed, 36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and
other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and wrote three
letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
a. The travel preparations
54
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On
the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit. 40 On the
following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside,
California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car. 41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the
purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle 43 and a
car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon, 46 bought a bicycle at
Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4,
1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside
picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On
August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja
Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on
weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing
artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the
Rodriguezs house.52 He left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and
stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on
October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine
immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same
certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department
of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations,
Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and
accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine
Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the
arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This
was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs
reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and
Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason
is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist
and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister.
Because of this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused
penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of
alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most
judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate.
This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the
accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into
hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A
positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not
automatically cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as
positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly
and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is
credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her
word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had
been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a
man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include
in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass
frames even when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door
key that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered
contents. And she had Ventura climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward
position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front doorjust so to
explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their
indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to
neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it
was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to
55
Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically
strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to
watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played
the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gangrape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal
knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the
house and of absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a
grim scene is also quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable,
testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to
jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence 57 that (a)
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the
Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992;
and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the
crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal
way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage
into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on
his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation
since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb
fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the
U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system
those two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has
come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the
original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original,
this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge
to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent, 59 the practice when a party does
not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked
as exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations
in the course of trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure
from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and
the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the
reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But
this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government,
which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is
issued. The entries in that passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival
and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same
evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty
attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the
U.S. Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous
first certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice
Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995
finding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed
erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim,
Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification
did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on
protocol and standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly
communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the
Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler,
Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and
erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L.
Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response
to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally
does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as
immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist
visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the
data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of
NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and
arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly
return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back
56
to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the
U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what
they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence.
Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in
Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding
his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown
that it planted in the lower courts minds.
7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if
the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros
testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it,
the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but
whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an
NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another
lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With all due respect to my colleagues, I dissent from the majority decision acquitting all the
accused-appellants.
In the middle part of 1991, the gruesome deaths of 19-year old Carmela Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita and 7-year old sister Jennifer in the hands of unknown assailants inside their home in a
57
private subdivision shocked our countrymen and alarmed the authorities of the rise in heinous
crimes, particularly those committed by individuals under the influence of drugs. Investigations
conducted by the police and other bodies including the Senate, and even the arrest of two (2)
sets of suspects ("akyat-bahay" gang and former contractor/workers of the Vizcondes), failed to
unravel the truth behind the brutal killings until an alleged eyewitness surfaced four (4) years
later. The ensuing courtroom saga involving sons of prominent families had become one (1) of
the most controversial cases in recent history as the entire nation awaited its long-delayed
closure.
The Case
Subject of review is the Decision 1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 affirming with modifications the Decision dated January 4, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 finding the accused-appellants
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada and Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals, and accused-appellant Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
The petition for review on certiorari filed earlier by accused Lejano (G.R. No. 176389) is hereby
treated as an appeal, considering that said accused had in fact filed a notice of appeal with the
CA.2 In view of the judgment of the CA imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, such appeal
by notice of appeal is in accord with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)3 which provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a
lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 176389 was consolidated with the present appeal by all accused (G.R.
No. 176864) except Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart who are still at large. 4 Only Webb and
Gatchalian filed their respective supplemental briefs in compliance with our April 10, 2007
Resolution.5
The Facts
The Information filed on August 10, 1995 reads:
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991, in the
municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring and confederating with accused
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio
"Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one
another, while armed with bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd
design, with abuse of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of Carmela Vizconde against her
will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter, the abovenamed accused with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together, mutually helping one
another, did then and there, and with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime, with the use of motor vehicle, assault and stab with bladed instruments Carmela
Vizconde, Estrellita Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby inflicting upon them numerous stab
wounds in different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
That accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the commission of
the above-mentioned crime, and without having participated therein as principals or
accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by assisting, with abuse of authority as a
police officer, the above-named principal accused, to conceal or destroy the effects or
instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence and allowing their destruction in
order to prevent the discovery of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The RTC and CA concurred in their factual findings based mainly on the testimony of the
prosecutions principal witness, Jessica M. Alfaro who is a confessed former drug user, the
declarations of four (4) other witnesses and documentary exhibits.
Alfaro testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, she drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer and, with her then boyfriend Peter Estrada, went to the Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center parking lot to get her order of one (1) gram of shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There
she met and was introduced to Venturas friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy"
Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian and Joey
Filart (she had previously seen them in a shabu house located in Paraaque which they
frequented as early as January 1991,7 while she had known Ventura since December 1990 8).
After paying for hershabu and while she was smoking it, Webb approached her and requested a
favor for her to relay a message to a certain girl who happened to be Carmela, to which she
agreed. After the group finished their shabu session, they proceeded to Carmelas place at No.
80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. She and Estrada in
her car followed the two (2) vehicles: Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez and Gatchalian on
board a Nissan Patrol car; while Filart and Rodriguez rode a Mazda pick-up.9
Upon reaching the area, Alfaro parked her car along Vinzons St. and approached the gate of the
house pointed to by Webb. She pressed the buzzer and when a woman came out, she asked for
Carmela. When she was able to talk to Carmela (an acquaintance she had met only twice in
January 199110), Alfaro relayed Webbs message that he was around. However, Carmela said
she cannot make it as she had just arrived home and told Alfaro to come back after twenty (20)
minutes. She relayed the answer of Carmela to Webb who then instructed the group to return to
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.11
At the same parking lot, the group had another shabu session before proceeding again to
Carmelas residence in a convoy. Alfaro went to Vinzons St. alone while the Nissan Patrol and
Mazda parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Upon seeing Carmela who was at their
garden, Alfaro was approached by Carmela saying she was going out for a while. Carmela told
Alfaro that they come back before 12:00 midnight and she would just leave the pedestrian gate,
as well as the iron grill gate leading to the kitchen door, open and unlocked. 12 Carmela further
58
instructed Alfaro to blink her cars headlights twice before reaching the pedestrian gate to signal
her arrival. Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmelas car to get out of the gate. Carmela
drove ahead and Alfaro likewise left Vinzons St. Upon reaching the main road, Aguirre Avenue,
she saw Carmela drop off the man who was with her in the car (whom she thought to be her
boyfriend13). Alfaro looked for the group and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. Thereafter,
they all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.14
At the parking lot, Alfaro relayed to the group what transpired during her last conversation with
Carmela. She also told Webb about Carmelas male companion; this changed his mood for the
rest of the evening ("bad trip"already15). Webb then gave out complimentary cocaine and all of
them used shabu and/or cocaine.16 After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided it was time to
leave, declaring: "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said: "Ako ang
susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot and their convoy of
three (3) vehicles entered Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at the
Vizconde residence between 11:45 to 11:55 p.m.17
Alfaro parked her car in between the Vizconde house and its adjacent house. While waiting for
the rest of the group to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached her suggesting that they
blow up the transformer near the pedestrian gate of the Vizconde residence in order to cause a
brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). She shrugged off the idea and told
Fernandez "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano and Ventura were already
standing infront of the Vizconde residence, Webb repeated to the boys that they will line up for
Carmela but he will be the first, and the others said, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang
kami."18
Alfaro entered first the pedestrian gate which was left open, followed by Webb, Lejano and
Ventura. At the garage, Ventura pulled out a chair to get on top of the hood of the Vizcondes
Nissan Sentra car and loosened the electric bulb ("para daw walang ilaw"). They proceeded to
the iron grill gate which was likewise left open, and passed through the dirty kitchen. It was
Carmela who opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them to enter. Carmela and
Webb for a moment looked at each other in the eye, and then proceeded towards the dining
area. As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out of the house. Lejano
asked where she was going and she told him she will smoke outside. On her way to the screen
door, she saw Ventura pulling a drawer in the kitchen. At the garden area, she smoked a
cigarette. After about twenty (20) minutes, she was surprised upon hearing a female voice
uttered "Sino yan?" and she immediately walked out towards her car. She found the others still
outside around her car and Estrada who was inside the car said: "Okay ba?" After staying in her
car for about ten (10) minutes, she returned to the house passing through the same iron grill
gate and dirty kitchen. While it was dark inside the house, there was light coming from outside.
In the kitchen, she saw Ventura searching a ladys bag on top of the dining table. When she
asked Ventura what was it he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi."
She asked him what particular key and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door
pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the
main door of the house but none of them fitted the lock; she also did not find any car key.19
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro walked back towards the kitchen but upon reaching the
spot leading to the dining area, she heard a very loud static sound (like that coming from a
television which had signed off). Out of curiosity, she went to the door of the masters bedroom
where the sound was coming from and peeped inside. She pushed the slightly ajar door with her
fingers and the sound grew even louder. After pushing the door wider, she walked into the room.
There she saw a man on top of Carmela who was lying on the floor, two (2) bloodied bodies on
top of the bed and Lejano who was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. She turned
her eyes on Carmela who was gagged, moaning and in tears while Webb was pumping her, his
bare buttocks exposed. Webb gave her a look and she immediately left the room. At the dining
area, she met Ventura who told her: "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked by what she
saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house and found the rest of the group outside, in her car and on
the sidewalk.20
Alfaro boarded her car and started the engine but did not know where to proceed. She saw
Webb, Lejano and Ventura leaving the house already. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and
threw it to the main door, breaking its glass frame. When the three (3) were near the pedestrian
gate, Webb told Ventura that he left behind his jacket. But Ventura said they cannot make it
anymore as the iron grills were already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until
they reached Aguirre Avenue. Near an old hotel in the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro saw the
Nissan Patrol slow down and something thrown out into a cogonal area. They went to a large
house with high walls and concrete fence, steel gate and long driveway located at BF Executive
Village. They parked their cars inside the compound and gathered in the lawn area where the
"blaming session" took place. It was only at this point that Alfaro and the others came to know
fully what happened at the Vizconde house. The mother was the first one (1) killed, then Jennifer
and the last, Carmela.21
Ventura was blaming Webb telling him: "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" According to Webb, the
girl was awakened and upon seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his
shoulders and pulled his hair. Webb got mad and grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall and
stabbed her several times. Lejano excused himself and used the telephone inside the house,
while Webb called up someone on his cellular phone. At around 2:00 in the morning, Gerardo
Biong arrived and talked to Webb who ordered him to clean up the Vizconde house, and said
"Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered "Okay lang." Webb addressed the group and
gave his final instructions: "We dont know each other. We havent seen each other...baka maulit
yan." She and Estrada then departed and went to her fathers house.22
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of the victims, testified on his findings as stated in
the autopsy reports he submitted to the court. The bodies were photographed showing their
condition before the start of the post-mortem examination.23 Considering that they were almost in
complete rigor mortis, the victims must have been dead for twelve (12) hours. Carmelas hands
were on her back hogtied with an electric cord and her mouth gagged with a pillow case. She
had contusions on her right forearm and thighs, ligature marks on her wrists and nine (9) stab
wounds on her chest (five [5] wounds are "connecting" or reaching to the back of the body).
Further, specimen taken from her genitalia tested positive for the presence of human
spermatozoa, which is indicative of complete penetration plus ejaculation of the male sex organ
into the female sex organ. The contusions on her thighs were probably due to the application of
blunt force such as a fist blow.24
Dr. Cabanayan further testified that Estrellita was also hogtied from behind and her wrists bore
ligature marks from an electric cord with a plug. She sustained twelve (12) stab wounds, eight
59
(8) of which are "communicating" or perforating (through and through stab wounds) which are
fatal since vital organs are involved. 25 As to Jennifer, her stab wounds, nineteen (19) in all, had
the characteristics of one (1) which is extremely blunt, the other extremely sharp. These wounds
are located in different parts of her body, most of which are on the left anterior chest. But unlike
Carmela and Estrellita, Jennifer had two (2) stab wounds on her back and incise wounds on her
left and right forearms, the latter usually referred to as defense wounds. Seven (7) of the nine (9)
stab wounds on her chest were perforating, hence fatal wounds. 26 Judging from the
characteristics of the stab wounds sustained by the victims, Dr. Cabanayan concluded that they
could have been inflicted using sharp-edged, pointed and single-bladed instruments such as a
kitchen knife.27
White, Jr. further testified that on the night of June 30, 1991, policemen took him from the Pitong
Daan Subdivision Homeowners Association and brought him to the Paraaque Municipal
Building. Biong was forcing him to admit that he was one (1) of those who killed the Vizconde
women. Biong boxed him insisting he was among the perpetrators and had no mercy for the
victims. He and Mendez were later fetched by the Chief of Security of Pitong Daan Subdivision
Homeowners Association, Nestor Potenciano Jr., and OIC Justo Cabanacan.31 Biong had also
taken their logbook where they list down the names of visitors, plate number of vehicles, name
and street of the homeowner they were staying at, etc. However, when presented with the
alleged logbook, White, Jr. said it was not the same logbook, he could not recognize its cover
and could not categorically confirm the entries supposedly made in his own handwriting.32
Normal E. White, Jr., one (1) of four (4) security guards assigned at Pitong Daan Subdivision
which is part of the United BF Homes, testified that he and Edgar Mendez were the guards on
duty on the night of June 29, 1991, starting at 7:00 oclock in the evening until 7:00 oclock in the
morning of June 30, 1991. On June 30, 1991, at around 6:00 a.m., a homeowner called his
attention on the incident the previous night at the Vizconde house. He immediately proceeded to
said house where there were already many people. The housemaids of the Vizcondes led him to
the entrance at the kitchen and pointed to the masters bedroom. Upon entering the room, he
saw the bloodied bodies of the victims: two (2) were on top of the bed, and one (1) lying down
on the floor. He is familiar with Mrs. Vizconde, Carmela and Jennifer because they were kind to
the guards and usually greeted them. Mrs. Vizconde was gagged and her hands tied, while
Jennifer was also lying on top of the bed. Carmela was lying on her back with one (1) of her legs
raised, her dress pulled up and her genitals exposed. He also noticed that the TV was still on
with loud sound. He went out to call the police but he met their Security Chief whom he informed
about the killings at the Vizconde house. He then proceeded directly to the entrance/guard post
of the subdivision and was told by Mendez that there were already policemen who had arrived.28
Justo Cabanacan, another security guard assigned at the Pitong Daan Subdivision and the one
(1) supervising his co-guards White, Jr., Mendez and Tungo, testified that when he reported for
duty on June 30, 1991 at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, he was met by Mendez who told him
about the killing of a homeowner and her family. When he asked Mendez if he and White, Jr.
noticed anything unusual during their tour of duty the previous night, Mendez said everything
was alright except for Mike and his friends who had gone in and out of the subdivision ("labasmasok") until the wee hours in the morning of June 30, 1991. White, Jr. also reported to him that
on the night of June 29, 1991, while doing his roving duty around the subdivision, he noticed
vehicles parked along Vinzons St. near the house of Mr. Almogino where there seemed to be a
drinking party, and that Mike was "labas-masok" through the subdivision gate. He confirmed it
was indeed their policy that if one (1) is a son/daughter of a homeowner, or accompanied by a
homeowner or any relative of homeowner, he/she will no longer be stopped or queried by the
guards. In particular, he knows Mike and had seen him visit the house of Lilet Sy, another
homeowner. He often goes to Lilet Sys house because of the various complaints of
homeowners against her like the presence of too many people at her house until midnight and
the vehicles of her visitors running over her neighbors plants. This Lilet Sy is also a suspected
drug pusher within the subdivision.33
Having been apprised of the arrival of the police, White, Jr. returned to the Vizconde house to
observe what was going on. He saw the policemen already investigating the crime scene and
one (1) of them he later came to know as Gerardo Biong. There was also a woman who was
with Biong when he was conducting the investigation inside the Vizconde premises at the
garage area. The maids were being asked if they were able to hear the breaking of the main
doors glass frame, and he saw Biong in the act of further breaking the remaining glass. He
recognized other homeowners who were also there, including Michael Gatchalian who passed
by infront of the house. Afterwards, he returned to their guard post where their Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Justo Cabanacan, probed him and Mendez on anything they had observed the previous
night. He and Mendez told Cabanacan that they did not notice anything unusual except "Mike"
(Michael Gatchalian) and his friends entering and exiting the subdivision gate ("labas-masok").29
White, Jr. recounted that Mikes group entered the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991.
Upon approaching the gate, Mikes car slowed down on the hump. He was about to flag down
and verify ("sisitahin") but Mike (who was at the right front seat) immediately opened his window
to show his face and pointed to two (2) vehicles behind him as his companions. Because of their
policy allowing outsiders to enter the subdivision as long as they are accompanied by a
homeowner, he and Mendez just let the three (3) vehicles in (Mike was in the first car). That was
actually the second time he saw Mike and his "barkada" that night because he had earlier seen
them at Vinzons St. near the Gatchalian residence. However, he could no longer remember the
precise time he saw the group on these two (2) instances.30
Cabanacan further testified that around the last week of May or first week of June 1991, he
came to know Hubert Webb because he had stopped his car at the subdivision gate as it had no
local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. It was around 7:00 oclock in the evening when Webb
arrived. He greeted Webb and asked about his destination. Webb replied he was going to see
Lilet Sy. When he asked Webb to leave an identification card, Webb pointed to his car sticker
saying he is also a BF Homes resident. He explained to Webb that the sticker on his car was for
United BF Homes and not the local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. Webb then said: "Tagadiyan lang ako sa Phase III...saka anak ako ni Congressman Webb." He insisted on seeing
Webbs ID card and grudgingly Webb obliged and pulled out his wallet. Webb gave him a
laminated ID card with Webbs picture and with the name "Hubert Webb" written on it. After
seeing the ID card, he returned the same to Webb and allowed him to enter the subdivision.
However, he did not anymore record this incident in their logbook because anyway Webb is the
son of the Paraaque Congressman, a well-known personality.34
In the morning of June 30, 1991, Cabanacan said he also went to the Vizconde house upon
being told by Mendez and White, Jr. of the killings. By afternoon of the same day, he came to
meet Biong who was conducting the investigation. Based on the information given by Mendez
and White, Jr., he prepared a written report on the incident which he submitted to Nestor
Potenciano, Jr. After the incident, Biong frequented their place to investigate and asserting he
had no female companion while conducting his investigation at the Vizconde house on June 30,
60
1991. Aside from taking their logbook, Biong also took his two (2) guards (Mendez and White,
Jr.) to the police headquarters on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 p.m. The said guards also
related to him what Biong did to them. They said Biong punched them and forced them to admit
having participated in the Vizconde killings.35
Mila Solomon Gaviola, a laundrywoman who worked at the Webb residence located at Aguirre
Avenue, BF Homes, Paraaque from January to July 1991 36 testified that on June 30, 1991 at
around 4:00 in the morning, she went to the room of Hubert to get his and his brothers (Jason
and Michaels) dirty clothes, using the small "secret door" at the second floor near the servants
quarters. She noticed that Michael and Jason were still asleep while Hubert was sitting on the
bed wearing only his pants. When she finished collecting dirty clothes including those of Senator
Webb, she brought them down to the laundry area. She ate breakfast and rested for a while.
Afterwards, she started washing first Senator Webbs clothes and then those of the sons. She
washed Huberts white shirt with round neck and found it had fresh blood stains at the stomach
area and also splattered blood ("tilamsik lang") on the chest. She had difficulty removing the
blood stains and had to use Chlorox. After she finished washing the clothes, she hanged them to
dry on the second floor. Returning to the servants quarters, she peeped into Huberts room
through the "secret door." She saw Hubert pacing the floor ("di mapakali"); this was about 9:00
a.m. already. She saw Hubert again around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon as he left the house
passing through the "secret door"; he was clad in t-shirt and shorts. Hubert was back at the
house by 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. She never saw him again until she left in July 1991.37
Gaviola further testified that on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, she saw
Senator Webb at the sala reading a newspaper.38
Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer, a widow and resident of United Paraaque Subdivision 5,
testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Biong who was then her boyfriend, asked
her to come to the Paraaque police station to play "mahjong" at Aling Glos canteen located at
the back of their office. They started playing at 6:30 in the evening. Between 1:00 and 2:00 in the
morning of June 30, 1991, the radio operator at the police station went down to the canteen
telling Biong he has a call. She took Biongs place at the game while Biong went to the
headquarters. After a while, she followed Biong to ask if he was joining the next bet. Biong was
on the telephone talking with someone and visibly irked. She heard Biongs words: "Ano?...
Saan?... Mahirap yan ah! O sige, dadating ako... Ano?... Saan?... Dilaw na taxi?" Biong then told
her he was leaving and shortly thereafter a taxicab arrived with a man seated at the back seat.
Biong bade her good-bye saying he was going to BF Homes. She continued playing "mahjong"
until morning. At around 7:00 a.m., Biong came back and went straight to the washing area of
the canteen. She followed him and saw him cleaning blood stains on his fingernails. After wiping
his face and hands with a handkerchief, he threw it away and when she asked why, Biong said it
smelled stinky. Biong was in bad mood ("aburido") and complained, "Putang inang mga batang
yon, pinahirapan ako nang husto". Afterwards, Biong took out a knife with aluminum cover from
his drawer and put it in his steel cabinet. She invited him for lunch but another policeman,
Galvan, came and told Biong to proceed to BF Homes and investigate the three (3) dead
persons there. Biong answered, "Oo, susunod na ako" and then proceeded to Capt. Bartolomes
office. With Capt. Bartolomes permission, she joined them in going to the Vizconde residence. 39
Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, Biong asked that the victims relatives and the
homeowners association President be summoned. A certain Mr. Lopez and Ms. Moreno arrived
and also a security guard named White, Jr. who pointed to the location of the victims bodies.
They entered the masters bedroom and she saw the mother and a small girl on top of the bed,
and a young woman sprawled on the floor. After inspecting the bodies, Biong went to the toilet
and turned on the faucet; the running water washed out the blood on the flooring of the toilet.
Biong searched the drawers using his ballpen. She saw him took a round pendant watch and
pocketed it. They went out of the room and on the top of the dining table they saw a shoulder
bag and scattered next to it were various items such as Carmelas ATM card, her drivers license
and calling cards. Biong proceeded to the main door and removed its chain lock. When they
came out towards the garage area, Biong saw a stone by the window. He then asked Capt.
Bartolome to go inside the room of the two (2) maids to see for himself if indeed the noise of the
breaking glass could not be heard. When Capt. Bartolome was already inside the middle room,
Biong shattered the remaining glass of the main door with the butt of his gun. When Biong asked
if he could hear it, Capt. Bartolome answered in the affirmative. Biong next inspected the garage
where he saw the footmarks on the cars hood; Biong also found fingerprints on the electric bulb.
She was just beside Biong at the time. They followed Biong towards the back of the house but
upon seeing another shoe print on the ground just outside the masters bedroom, he directed
them not to proceed any further. They left the Vizconde house at around 10:00 a.m. and
proceeded to the Paraaque Municipal Building.40
Birrer further testified that on July 1, 1991 at 10:00 oclock in the morning, Biong arrived at her
house bringing along with him the two (2) maids of the Vizcondes. He asked her to cook
something for the maids to eat. Biong also instructed her to interview the maids on what they
know about the killings. She did as told but the maids said they do not know anything as they
were asleep. After they had lunch, Biong told her to let the maids rest. While she and the maids
were resting at the sala, Biong requested to use her bathroom. Before taking a bath, Biong took
out the contents of his pockets which he put on the dining table. She saw Carmelas ATM card
and drivers license, bracelet, earrings and the round pendant watch Biong had taken from a
jewelry box while they were inside the Vizconde house. When Biong left her house, he brought
all said items with him.41
On July 2, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Birrer was at the Paraaque Municipal Building inside
Biongs office. She saw Biong open his steel cabinet and took out a brown leather jacket which
she thought was imported. When she asked him where it came from, Biong initially just said it
was given as a gift but when she further queried, he answered: "Natatandaan mo ba yong
nirespondehan ko noong gabi sa BF Homes? Doon galing yon." She asked Biong whether
those were the youths he had mentioned earlier and he said yes. As to the jewelries taken by
Biong from the Vizconde house, she was with Biong when the latter pawned them at a
pawnshop near Chow-Chow; Biong got P20,000.00 for the pawned items.42
Birrer further testified that two (2) weeks after they went to the Vizconde residence to
investigate, Biong on two (2) occasions brought her along to a certain house. It was only Biong
who went inside the said house as she waited in a taxicab. In both instances, Biong came out of
the house with an envelope containing an undisclosed amount of money. She remembered this
because when she was already staying in Pangasinan on December 7, 1995, she saw flashed
on ABS-CBNs TV Patrol News 7:00 p.m. newscast on television, a video footage of the house of
Senator Webb. She was certain it was that house where Biong went and came out carrying cash
in an envelope.43
61
Lauro G. Vizconde, husband of Estrellita and father of Carmela and Jennifer, testified on the
personal circumstances of the victims. At the time of their deaths, Estrellita was engaged in
business (at one [1] time or another she was a garment manufacturer, taxi operator, canteen
owner and local employment recruiter), Carmela was a graduating B.S. Psychology student at
the University of Santo Tomas, while Jennifer was a Grade I pupil at Bloomfield Academy at BF
Resort, Las Pias, Metro Manila. He left the Philippines in November 1989 to work in the United
States of America. He had not since returned to the country -- until this unfortunate tragedy
befell his family -- but communicated with his wife through telephone once or twice a month.44
October 25, 1992. On the eve of his departure, he, Rael, Tina and his then girlfriend Milagros
Castillo went out and had dinner at Bunchchums. Later that night, they went to Faces Disco at
Makati Avenue where his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega followed. They went home at
3:00 oclock in the morning already. After driving around in the city and bringing Milagros home,
he arrived at his house at around 5:00 a.m. His parents were already preparing to leave and so
they headed to the airport. 48 Webbs friend Rafael Jose, Paulo Santos, Senator Webbs security
staff Miguel Muoz, Webbs secretary Cristina Magpusao and house girl Victoria Ventoso
corroborated Webbs testimony that he departed from the Philippines on March 9, 1991.49
Lauro G. Vizconde further testified that his daughter, when she was still alive, was so close to
him that she confides her daily activities, dreams, ambitions and plans in life. She intended to
pursue further masteral and doctoral degrees in business psychology in the U.S.A. In fact, that
was the reason he transferred from one (1) state to another looking for a school where Carmela
could enroll. However, he had to come home in July 1991 and bury his wife and daughters
whose violent deaths he was informed of only upon arriving in the country and when he saw
their bodies with stab wounds at the funeral parlor just before burial. He spent burial expenses in
the amount of P289,000.00, plus P103,000.00 incidental expenses, P300,000.00 paid for
memorial lots and around P100,000.00 for the construction of the mausoleum - with a grand
total of P793,950.00. He likewise incurred litigation expenses in the amount of P97,404.50.45
Webb further testified that he stayed at the house of her Auntie Gloria and Uncle Dinky at San
Francisco until late April to May 1991. Upon the invitation of her aunt Susan Brottman, sister of
his mother, he rode a train and went to Anaheim where he stayed until mid-July 1991.
Thereafter, he rented a nearby place but did not complete the one (1) month pre-paid lease
period as he proceeded to Longwood, Florida. He stayed at the residence of his Uncle Jack and
Sonia Rodriguez for almost a year (August 1991-August 1992). He went back to Anaheim and
stayed at the house of his godmother and sister of his mother, Imelda Pagaspas, until October
1992. He met his relatives and other personalities while in the US; visited Lake Tahoe with the
Wheelock family; toured Disneyland where Luis Wheelock filmed them and attended a concert
with Christopher Esguerra who also took him out to the malls.50
In one (1) of their telephone conversations when he was still in the U.S.A., Lauro Vizconde
recounted that Carmela mentioned to him that she had turned down a suitor whom she called
"Bagyo," who is a son of politician in Paraaque and comes from an affluent family. He also
expressed his mental anguish, wounded feelings, emotional suffering due to the untimely
demise of his family. It actually cost him his life, his heart bled all the time and only time can tell
when he can fully cope with the situation. He is presently totally displaced and jobless; he
misses his family and he now lives an abnormal life with no inspiration and no more challenge to
work for. When asked how much compensation he will ask for moral damages, he answered
saying he leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the court as in truth, no amount can truly
compensate him for the loss of his loved ones. He sought justice for the death of his family and
hoped that the culprits, whoever they were, will be punished so that the souls of his departed
loved ones may rest in peace.46
Webb further testified that in the later part of June 1991, his parents joined him in the US. He
applied for and was issued a drivers license on June 14, 1991. He also worked at the pest
control company of his cousin-in-law Alex del Toro. Aside from his passport and airline ticket for
return flight to the Philippines, Webb presented before the court the logbook of jobs/tasks kept
by del Toro, in which he pointed to the entries therein which were actually performed by him; and
also his purported pay check ($150 "pay to Cash"), ID and other employment papers. He also
identified some handwritten letters he mailed while he was in the US and sent to his friend
Jennifer Cabrera in the Philippines; photographs and video tape clips taken during his cousin
Marie Manlapits wedding to Alex del Toro which wedding he attended in the US together with his
mother; and receipt issued for the mountain bicycle he bought on June 30, 1991 from the
Orange Cycle store in Anaheim.51
Defense Evidence
The accused chiefly assailed the credibility of prosecution star witness Alfaro, in particular her
execution of two (2) allegedly inconsistent affidavits (one on April 28, 1995 and another on May
22, 1995) and raised alibi and denial as defenses to the charge of rape with homicide attended
by conspiracy. During the trial, no less than 95 witnesses 47 were presented, and voluminous
documentary exhibits were submitted.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the defense are summarized as follows:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb testified that at the time of the killings between June 29 and 30, 1991,
he was still in Anaheim Hills, California, U.S.A., having departed from the Philippines on March
9, 1991 on board a United Airlines flight bound for San Francisco. He was accompanied by
Gloria Webb, whose husband Richard Webb is the eldest brother of his father Senator Freddie
Webb. It was the first time he traveled to the US and he returned to the Philippines only on
Webb denied having met Carmela Vizconde and neither does he know Jessica Alfaro. He had
been jailed since August 9, 1995. When asked about his co-accused, Webb said the only ones
he had met before June 29, 1991 were Fernandez and Rodriguez. He used to play basketball
with Fernandez at BF Homes Phase III, during which he also met Rodriguez. While he admitted
having gone out on a group with Fernandez to the houses of their basketball buddies, he denied
having gone out with Rodriguez at any time. 52 He also denied knowing Biong who is neither a
driver nor security aide of his father.53
Gloria Webb testified that on March 9, 1991, she traveled with Webb on a United Airlines flight
to San Francisco. Webb stayed at her residence at 639 Gellert Boulevard, Daly City, California
until May 1991 when he left to be with his mothers sister and relatives in Anaheim. Webb and
her grandson attended a "concierto" in the evenings and he also joined and helped her son-inlaw with his business. Webb went with them to church, to the malls and in shopping. In April
1991, Webb went on a trip to Lake Tahoe with Mr. Wheelock and family.54
62
Dorothy Wheelock testified that she became a US citizen in 1974 and has been residing at 877
Las Lomas Drive, Milpitas, California. Webbs mother is her childhood friend and schoolmate.
When she heard that Webb was in the US looking for a job, she invited him, and her husband
Louis Wheelock picked him up at Daly City in April 1991. To reciprocate the Webbs hospitality
while they visited the Philippines in 1990, she and her family took Webb to a trip to Lake Tahoe
in Nevada during which they even took a video tape. Senator Freddie and Mrs. Webb also
visited and stayed with them for four (4) days in July 1991. They took them to a trip to Yosemite
Park, also with video footages taken by her husband.55
Steven Keeler testified that he had been an American citizen since 1982 and resident of 4002
River Street, Newport Beach, California. He met Webb at a dinner in the house of Webbs aunt
Susan Brottman in Anaheim Hills around May or June 1991. Brottmans son, Rey Manlapit, was
his good friend. They played basketball with Webb, went to bars, shopped and watched TV. He
also knew that Webb bought a car and worked for Alex del Toro for Environment First Termite
Control. He believed that Webb left for Florida towards the end of summer (July 1991). He could
not recall any specific dates he was with Webb.56
Honesto Aragon testified that he went to the US in 1967 and became a US citizen in 1989. On
June 28, 1991, he met then Congressman Freddie Webb at the house of the latters sister-inlaw, Susan, at Anaheim. Congressman Webb introduced to him his son Hubert Webb. He,
Congressman Webb and Hubert went to some stores to go shopping for a bicycle for Hubert.
But they only bought bike accessories. He invited them to snack before he brought them to his
own house where he introduced to them his son Andrew. The following day, June 29, 1991, they
went to Riverside, California to shop for a car for Hubert; though they found a Toyota MR2, they
did not buy it because it has questionable ownership. Early morning the next day, he picked up
Congressman Webb and they played tennis from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m. He and Congressman
Webb were close friends, as both of them were members of a basketball team in Letran. The
first time he saw Hubert was when he was still a small kid and the other time on June 28, 1991
at the Brottmans residence in Anaheim.57
Senator Freddie Webb testified that his son Hubert left for the US on March 9, 1991, the first
time he had gone out of the country. Hubert stayed with his sister-in-law Gloria. They wanted to
show Hubert the value of independence, hard work and perseverance, and for him to learn how
to get along and live with other people. Hubert resigned from his job at Saztec before departing
for the US. He and his wife also went to the US on June 28, 1991. They stayed at the house of
his sister-in-law, Susan Brottman at Anaheim. From San Francisco, they went to Orlando,
Florida, then back to Los Angeles and returned to the Philippines on July 21, 1991. Among the
places he visited while in the US were the Yosemite Park, Nordstrom, Disneyland, Disneyworld.
Upon arriving at Anaheim, he saw his son Hubert and also informed Honesto Aragon regarding
their plan to procure a bicycle for Hubert. Hubert was with them again on June 29, 1991 at
dinner in the residence of his sister-in-law. On July 1, 1991, they went shopping for some
clothes. Together with Aragon, he and Hubert looked for a Toyota MR2 car and paid for it with a
check (the car was priced at $6,000-$7,000).58
Senator Webb further testified that he knows Mila Gaviola who used to be their "labandera." She
left their house but returned to work for them again about a couple of months after the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption. As to Alfaros statements implicating his son Hubert in the Vizconde killings,
he said the statements were not accurate because it was physically impossible for Hubert to
have participated in the crime as he was abroad at the time.59
Louis Whitaker testified that he left the Philippines and resided in the US since September
1964. He met Jack Rodriguez when the latter fetched him and his wife Sonia at the Los Angeles
International Airport on June 28, 1991 upon their arrival from the Philippines. They proceeded to
the house of a mutual friend, Salvador Vaca, at Moresbay Street in Lake Forest. They went to
see Congressman Webb at a house in Anaheim. That was the first time he met Congressman
Webb, Mrs. Webb, the sister-in-law and a Mr. Aragon. On June 29, 1991, he and Rodriguez
invited Congressman Webb to see Mr. Vaca perform at La Calesa Restaurant in the City of
Testin. When they fetched Congressman Webb at his sister-in-laws house, he met again Mrs.
Webb, and also Hubert. He saw Hubert for the second time at Orlando, Florida when he went to
the house of Jack Rodriguez there; this was about July or August 1991.60
Sonia H. Rodriguez testified that she was appointed UNESCO Commissioner by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. She has known accused Webb since he was a child. On June 28,
1991, she and her husband boarded a plane for Los Angeles, California. They were fetched at
the LA airport by old-time friend Salvador Vaca and proceeded to the latters house in Orange
County, California. They had dinner that evening with spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb at
the house of Susan Brottman. The next day, in the afternoon of June 29, 1991, her husband and
Salvador Vaca picked up Senator Webb from the house of Susan Brottman and then came back
to fetch her and Mrs. Vaca to go to La Calesa, a restaurant owned by Mario Benitez, also a
Filipino. However, she and Mrs. Vaca decided to stay home. On June 30, 1991 at around 8:00
p.m., she and her husband went to the house of Susan Brottman, together with Salvador and
Mrs. Vaca and Louis Whitaker. She recalled that Hubert was there at the time. She saw Hubert
again on July 4, 1991 when they went on a lakeside picnic with the Webb family, Brottmans and
Vacas. After watching the fireworks, they went to Sizzler Restaurant. The next day, she and her
husband stayed overnight at San Francisco where they also met Senator and Mrs. Webb. On
August August 4, 1991, Hubert arrived in her home in Florida with her son Tony, daughter-in-law
Ana, and stayed with them for almost one (1) year. The last time she saw Hubert was when he
left Orlando, Florida on January 27, 1992.61
Webb presented other witnesses to buttress his defense of alibi: Victor Yap (who took video
shots of Congressman Webb during a boat ride in Disneyland); 62 Armando Rodriguez (who
testified seeing Hubert in Orlando either August or September 1991); 63 performing artist Gary
Valenciano (who testified meeting Hubert at a dinner at the Rodriguez residence in Orlando on
November 24, 1991, Jack Rodriguez being the father of his high school classmate Antonio
Rodriguez;64 and Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra (grandson of Gloria Webb who went with
Hubert Webb to watch the concert of the Deelite Band in San Francisco in the later part of April
1991 and saw Hubert Webb for the last time in May 1991).65
Then a practicing lawyer, Atty. Antonio T. Carpio (now an Associate Justice of this Court)
testified that on June 29, 1991 between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock in the morning, he had a
telephone conversation with former Congressman Webb who said he was calling from Anaheim,
U.S.A., where he and his wife went to look for a job for their son Hubert. They also talked about
bills to be drafted as his law office had been engaged by Congressman Webb for bill drafting
services as well as preparation of his speeches and statements. When asked if he had personal
knowledge that Congressman Webb was really in the US at that time, he replied that since
63
Webb had told him he was leaving for the US, he just presumed it was so when Webb said he
was then at Anaheim. Neither did he have personal knowledge that Hubert Webb was in the US
at the time of his conversation with Congressman Webb.66
Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his sojourn in the US:
1) Video Tape recording of Disneyland trip on July 3, 1991;67
2) Official Receipt issued by Orange Cycle Center dated June 30, 1991, 68 photographs
of the bicycle purchased by Webb from said store;69
Lejano further testified that with the exception of Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Michael "Mike"
Gatchalian who are his former schoolmates, he does not know any of his co-accused. They left
the house of Syap brothers early morning of June 30, 1991; it was Cas Syap who brought him
and Mike home. On July 5, 1991, he and Cas Syap went to the police station where Mike, who
was picked up as a suspect by the police on July 4, was detained. When they met Biong there,
they told him they are willing to vouch for Mikes innocence and even volunteered to give
statements. Biong told them to return the following day. However, when he returned in the
morning of July 6, 1991, Biong wanted his fingerprints taken right away but he told Biong he
needed to consult someone first. He eventually submitted himself for fingerprinting after his
name came out in the media. Lejano pointed out that Alfaro failed to identify him even as she
passed by him three (3) times, and was able to do so only when she was coached by the
prosecution camp.89
3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb";70

4) Passport with Philippine Immigration arrival stamp;71
5) Photographs of Webb with Rodriguez family;72
6) California Drivers License of Webb, 73 Original License Card of Webb issued on
June 14, 1991;74
7) Statement of Account issued to Environment First Termite Control showing Check
No. 0180;75 Bank of America Certification on Check Nos. 0122 and 0180;76
8) Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle on sale to Webb of
Toyota MR2 car;77 Traffic citations issued to Webb;78 Import documents of said car into
the Philippines;79
9) Certification issued by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and
correspondence between US and Philippine Government; 80 computer-generated printout of the US-INS indicating date of Webbs entry in USA as March 9, 1991 and his
date of departure as October 26, 1992;81 US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting the earlier
August 10, 1995 Certification;82
10) Certification issued by Agnes Tabuena; 83 Passenger Manifest of PAL Flight No.
103;84 PAL ticket issued to Webb, 85 Arrival in Manila Certification issued by the
Philippine Immigration,86 Diplomatic Note of the US Department of State with enclosed
letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of
Records of the US-INS stating that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true
and accurate statement;87 and Certificate of Authentication of Philippine Consul
Herrera-Lim.88
Accused Antonio Lejano and Michael Gatchalian likewise raised the defense of alibi claiming
that they spent the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991 watching video
tapes at the house of Carlos Syap at Ayala Alabang Village.
On the part of Michael Gatchalian, he presented nine (9) witnesses: Atty.

Porfirio "Perry" Pimentel, RPN 9 broadcast executive who testified that he personally took
video footages of Mon Tulfos interviews with some persons in America (including Honesto
Aragon and the bicycle shop owner) who attested that Hubert Webb was there at the time of the
Vizconde killings, but which segment was edited out in the program he produced (Action
9);90 Mark Anthony So, a former NBI intelligence agent who was tasked to confirm photos of
Hubert Webb (his classmate at DLSU St. Benilde) to familiarize Alfaro with his facial
features;91 Matthew John Almogino, a childhood friend and neighbor of Gatchalian, who
testified that he was among those who went inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June
30, 1991 and Biong even asked him to take pictures; thereupon at around 9:30 a.m., he saw
Gatchalian in front of the Vizconde residence telling him that he just woke up and exchanged
pleasantries with him; and that as far as he knows, Webb, Fernandez, Lejano and Gatchalian
are not "magbabarkada";92 Atty. Leny Mauricio and Ana Marie Pamintuan of The Philippine
Star wherein a news article was published stating that Michael Gatchalian had rejected
governments offer for him to turn state witness in the Vizconde case; 93 Atty. Camilo
Murillo who accompanied Gatchalian on July 19, 1991 when he gave his statement to the NBI,
testified that Atty. Pete Rivera relayed to Gatchalian the request of then NBI Director Honesto
Aragon for him to turn state witness and which offer was refused by Gatchalian and his
father;94 andAtty. Manuel Sunga who accompanied Gatchalian to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) when he submitted his counter-affidavit (where there were already media people),
testified that they were invited to the conference room where State Prosecutor Zuo in the
presence of then Secretary Guingona made the offer for Gatchalian to turn state witness but it
was rejected.95
Atty. Francisco C. Gatchalian confirmed that the NBI and later the DOJ made offers for his son
to turn state witness in this case but they refused for the reason that his son was innocent of the
crime charged. Michael had told him that on the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of
June 30, 1991, Michael was with his friends at Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa at the
residence of the Syaps. Gatchalian narrated that when he woke up to jog in the morning of June
30, 1991 around 7:00 to 7:30, he passed by the Vizconde house and saw people milling in front.
At about 8:30 a.m., he saw the crowd getting bigger and so he instructed Michael who had
wakened up, to find out and check what happened to their neighbor. Michael rushed out towards
the Vizconde residence and when he came back about 10:00 oclock that same morning, he
reported that the house was robbed and people were killed inside the house. Both of them
stayed in their house that day. He denied Alfaros claim that she was their distant relative.96
64
Accused Miguel Rodriguez maintained he was at home when the killings took place. He
presented as witness his first cousin Mark Josef Andres Rualo who testified that at around 1:00
in the morning of June 30, 1991, he called up Rodriguez asking why he has not yet proceeded
to the birthday party of Rualo at their house. Rodriguez replied that he could not make it
because he was not fetched by his brother Art (who was the one with a car). So he handed the
telephone to Art (who had arrived at the party around 9:30 to 10:00 p.m.) for them to talk. From
Rodriguezs residence at Pilar Village, it will take about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by car.
It was a big party attended by some eighty (80) guests and which ended by 3:30 to 4:00 a.m.
But it was only the first time he had invited Rodriguez to his birthday party. He knows Lejano,
Rodriguezs close friend and classmate, because Rodriguez used to bring him along when
Rodriguez comes to his house.97
The other witnesses presented by Rodriguez, Col. Charles Calima, Jr. and Michael Rodriguez,
testified on the alleged incident of "mistaken identity" wherein Alfaro supposedly pointed to one
(1) "Michael Rodriguez," a drug dependent who was pulled out by Col. Calima from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center on the basis of the description given by NBI agents. They testified that
when Alfaro confronted this "Michael Rodriguez," she became very emotional and immediately
slapped and kicked him telling him, "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." Contrary to the physical
description given by the NBI, the accused Miguel Rodriguez he saw inside the court room had
no tattoo on his arm and definitely not the same "Michael Rodriguez" whom Alfaro slapped and
kicked at the NBI premises. Michael Rodriguez testified that he was blindfolded and brought to
the comfort room by NBI agents and forced to admit that he was Miguel Rodriguez; he identified
Alfaro and Atty. Figueras from a collage of photographs shown to him in court.98
Accused Gerardo Biong testified that the last time he handled this case was when General
Filart announced the case as solved with the presentation of suspects sometime in October
1991. However, he was subpoenaed by the NBI for the taking of his statement because Lauro
Vizconde complained that he had stolen jewelries at the Vizconde house. He had sought the
examination of latent fingerprints lifted from the crime scene but the suspects turned out
negative when tested. He denied the accusation regarding the destruction of evidence as well as
missing items during his investigation at the Vizconde residence. The bloodied bed, mats,
pillows and bed sheets were burned by people at the funeral parlor as ordered by Mr.
Gatmaitan. Among the suspects he had then were Michael Gatchalian, Tony Boy Lejano and
Cas Syap. As to the testimony of Birrer that they played "mahjong" on the night of June 29,
1991, he said it was not true because the place was closed on Saturdays and Sundays. After a
surveillance on Birrer, he discovered she had in her possession Carmelas drivers license and
was driving a car already. He denied Birrers account that he went to a place after receiving a
telephone call at 2:30 in the morning of June 30, 1991. As to Alfaro, he met her for the first time
at the NBI on June 23, 1995. His brown jacket was given to him long ago by a couple whose
dispute he was able to settle. He only met Webb and Estrada at the NBI. Biong denied the
accusations of Birrer, saying that she was angry at him because they separated and he had hit
her after he heard about her infidelity. Neither has he seen Alfaro before the filing of this case.
He was administratively charged before the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Grave
Misconduct due to non-preservation of evidence. He was offered by the NBI to turn state witness
but he declined as he found it difficult to involve his co-accused whom he does not really know.99
Biong admitted that Birrer went along with him, Galvan and Capt. Bartolome to the Vizconde
residence in the morning of June 30, 1991. Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, he looked for
the victims relatives and the homeowners association president; Atty. Lopez and Mrs. Mia
came. In going inside the house, they passed through the kitchen door which was open already.
On top of the kitchen table, there was a ladys bag with things scattered; he later inspected them
but did not think of examining the bag or taking note of the calling cards and other items for
possible relevance to the investigation. Upon entering the masters bedroom, he saw the
bloodied bodies. Mrs. Vizcondes hands were hogtied from behind and her mouth gagged while
Jennifers body was also bloodied. Carmela who was lying on a floor carpet was likewise
gagged, her hands hogtied from behind and her legs spread out, her clothes raised up and a
pillow case was placed on top of her private part. He had the bodies photographed and prepared
a spot report.100
Biong also admitted that before the pictures were taken, he removed with his bare hands the
object, which was like a stocking cloth, that was wrapped around Carmelas mouth and neck. As
to the main door glass, it was the upper part which he broke. There was a red jewelry box they
saw where a pearl necklace inside could be seen; he remembered he had it photographed but
he had not seen those pictures. They left the Vizconde house and brought the cadavers to the
funeral parlor. He did not take steps to preserve the bloodied carpet, bed sheets and blankets
because they have been previously told by NBI that no evidence can be found on such items. As
for the footprint and shoe print found on the hood of the car and at the back of the house, he
also could not recall if he had those photographed. It was only the following day that he brought
an employee of the Paraaque police to lift fingerprints from the crime scene; he was the one (1)
giving instructions at the time. However, no latent fingerprints had been taken; despite attempts,
no clear fingerprint had been lifted and he did not any more ask why.101
Biong further admitted that he was so angry with the Vizconde housemaids as he did not believe
they did not hear anything despite the loud sound of the breaking of the main door glass. He
also admitted mauling Normal E. White, Jr. because he thought he was withholding information
during the investigation. Edgar Mendez did not tell him about the entry of a three (3)-vehicle
convoy into the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. As for Michael Gatchalian, he knows
him because on July 3, 1991 at 4:30 a.m., they caught him at Vinzons St. at the entrance of
Pitong Daan Subdivision for possession of marijuana. However, he does not know any more
what happened to that case he filed against Gatchalian as he was already dismissed from the
service.102 He also admitted having mauled Gatchalian while interrogating him for his
participation in the Vizconde killings.103
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision 104 finding all the accused guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND HEREBY
SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA. This Court likewise finds the accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, AND HEREBY SENTENCES
HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF ELEVEN (11) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS.In addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to
65
jointly and severally pay the victims surviving heir, Mr. Lauro Vizconde, the following sums by
way of civil indemnity:
1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;
2. The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr. Lauro
Vizconde;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
4. The amount of P97,404.55 as attorneys fees;
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the accused Artemio "Dong" Ventura and Joey
Filart for their eventual apprehension so that they can immediately be brought to trial.
SO ORDERED.105
The trial court found Alfaro as a credible and truthful witness, considering the vast details she
disclosed relative to the incident she had witnessed inside the Vizconde house. The trial court
noted that Alfaro testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
has remained consistent in her narration of the events despite a lengthy and grueling crossexamination conducted on her by eight (8) defense lawyers. Neither was her credibility and
veracity of her declarations in court affected by the differences and inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, which she had satisfactorily explained during the trial
considering the circumstances that she initially desired to protect her former boyfriend Estrada
and her relative Gatchalian, the absence of a lawyer during the first taking of her statements by
the NBI, her distrust of the first investigators who took her statements and prepared her April 28,
1995 affidavit, and her uncertainty if she could obtain adequate support and security for her own
life were she to disclose everything she knows about the Vizconde killings.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that principal accused Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez and
Gatchalian failed to establish their defense of alibi, the accused having been positively identified
by Alfaro as the group who conspired and assisted one (1) another in plotting and carrying out
on the same night the rape of Carmela, on the occasion of which Carmelas mother and sister
were also stabbed to death. The trial court held that Alfaro gave a clear, positive and convincing
testimony which was sufficiently corroborated on its material points by the testimonies of other
witnesses and confirmed by the physical evidence on record.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
By Decision of December 15, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274 of
Paraaque City in Criminal Case No. 95-404, finding accused-appellants Hubert "Jeffrey" Webb
y Pagaspas, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
as principals, and Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of RAPE with HOMICIDE, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as indicated:
1). We AFFIRM the sentence of accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
corresponding accessory penalties under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code;
2). We MODIFY the penalty of Gerardo Biong who is an accessory to the crime.
Accused-appellant Biong is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and absolute perpetual disqualification under Article 58 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
3). We MODIFY the civil indemnity. Accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada and Rodriguez are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the
surviving heir of the victims, Mr. Lauro Vizconde. the amounts of P200,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P762,450.00 as actual damages, P2,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P97,404.55 as attorney's fees, with the corresponding subsidiary liability against
accused-appellant Biong pursuant to Article 110, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.106
The CA upheld the trial court in giving full weight and credence to the eyewitness testimony of
Alfaro which was duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who had not been shown to
have ill-motive and malicious intent in revealing what they know about the Vizconde killings. It
disagreed with the appellants view that they were victims of an unjust judgment upon their mere
allegations that they were tried by publicity, and that the trial judge was biased whose
discriminatory and hostile attitude was demonstrated by her rejection of 132 out of 142 exhibits
of the defense during the bail hearings and her refusal to issue subpoenas to prospective
defense witnesses such as former Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Antonio Calvento.
The CA also fully concurred with the trial courts conclusion that all the principal accused failed to
establish their defense of alibi after carefully evaluating the voluminous documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by the defense. On the issue of conspiracy, the CA found that
the prosecution was able to clearly and convincingly establish its presence in the commission of
the crime, notwithstanding that appellants Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Estrada and Fernandez did
not actually rape Carmela, nor participated in killing her, her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration filed by the appellants, the CAs Special Division of Five, voting 32, affirmed the December 15, 2005 Decision. 107 In the Resolution dated January 26, 2007, the
majority reiterated that it has fully explained in its Decision why the US-INS Certifications
submitted by appellant Webb deserve little weight. It stressed that it is a case of positive
identification versus alibi founded on documentary evidence. On the basis of the rule that alibi is
accepted only upon the clearest proof that the accused was not and could not have been at the
crime scene when it was committed, the CA in resolving the appeal considered the weight of
documentary evidence in light of testimonial evidence -- an eyewitness account that the accused
66
was the principal malefactor. As to the issue of apparent inconsistencies between the two (2)
affidavits executed by Alfaro, the CA said this is a settled matter, citing the Joint Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 42285 and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 entitled "Rodriguez v. Tolentino" and "Webb, et
al. v. Tolentino, et al.," which had long become final.
THE DISSENTING JUSTICES CORRECTLY REJECTED JESSICA ALFARO FOR NOT BEING
A CREDIBLE WITNESS AND FOR GIVING INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
Appellants Arguments
THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DISCARDING EACH AND EVERY PIECE
OF THE ACCUSEDS EVIDENCE AND PRACTICALLY REDUCING THE APPEAL BELOW
INTO AN EXERCISE OF FINDING GROUNDS TO DOUBT, SUSPECT AND ACCORDINGLY
REJECT THE PROOF OFFERED BY THEM IN THEIR DEFENSE INSTEAD OF GIVING DUE
WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO EACH IN ORDER TO THOROUGHLY SATISFY ITSELF
OF THE "MORAL CERTAINTY" REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Appellants Webb and Lejano set forth the following arguments in their Supplemental Appeal
Brief as grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision and their acquittal in this case:
I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT WEBB'S ABSENCE FROM PHILIPPINE
TERRITORY BETWEEN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992 ENGENDERS A
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PRECLUDES AN ABIDING CONVICTION, TO A MORAL
CERTAINTY, OF HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. THUS, AS CORRECTLY
APPRECIATED BY JUSTICES TAGLE AND DACUDAO IN THEIR SEPARATE DISSENTING
OPINIONS A. THE PASSPORT OF APPELLANT WEBB, AS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL
DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HIM, IS
STAMPMARKED AND INITIALED WITH THE DEPARTURE DATE OF 9 MARCH
1991 AND ARRIVAL DATE OF 27 OCTOBER 1992, SHOWING THAT HE WAS NOT
IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ABROAD AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME ON 29 JUNE 1991.
II
III
IV
IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC TENETS UNDERLYING OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHICH
ESCHEW A FINDING OF GUILT UNLESS ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AND ORDAIN THE RESOLUTION OF ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, THE
COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
APPELLANT WEBB WHEN THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI HE ESTABLISHED BY
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ENGENDER REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO
HIS GUILT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED. THE SCALES OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TILTED IN
HIS, AND NOT THE PROSECUTIONS, FAVOR.108
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates the arguments he had raised in his appeal brief and motion for
reconsideration filed before the CA, as follows:
B. THE CERTIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER PRINTOUT ISSUED BY THE UNITED

STATES INS NON-IMMIGRANT INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH INDICATE
EXACTLY THE SAME DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES OF 9 MARCH 1991 AND
27 OCTOBER 1992, CONFIRM THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
APPELLANT WEBB TO HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME.
C. THE RULING THAT APPELLANT WEBB WAS "SMUGGLED" INTO AND OUT OF
THE PHILIPPINES WITHIN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, WITH THE US
INS CERTIFICATIONS BEING THE PROBABLE PRODUCT OF "MONEY, POWER,
INFLUENCE, OR CONNECTIONS" IS BASED ON PURE SPECULATION AND
BIASED CONJECTURE AND NOT ON A CONCLUSION THAT ANY COURT OF LAW
SHOULD MAKE.
II
D. NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO TESTIFIED

IN OPEN COURT THAT IN THE MORNING OF 29 JUNE 1991, OR BEFORE THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, HE HAD AN OVERSEAS CONVERSATION WITH
SEN. FREDDIE N. WEBB ON THE LATTERS PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
WITH HIS WIFE AND APPELLANT WEBB.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

TESTIMONY OF SUPPOSED EYEWITNESS JESSICA ALFARO AND CORROBORATING
WITNESSES NORMAL WHITE AND JUSTO CABANACAN.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVED
THE CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN CONVICTING HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON SUCH CONSPIRACY.
THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS ATTENDED BY IRREGULARITIES SHOWING PARTIALITY

ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN VIOLATION OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
67
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
upholding the right of accused persons to a speedy trial where there was delay in the preliminary
investigation.110
xxxx
Totality
of
Evidence
Guilt of Appelants Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Established
the
I
BY ALL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE TESTIMONY OF JESSICA ALFARO
CANNOT BE JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED.
II
Appellants assail the lower courts in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly Jessica Alfaro despite inconsistencies and contradictions in
her two (2) affidavits, and the alleged "piece by piece discarding" of their voluminous
documentary exhibits and testimonies of no less than ninety-five (95) witnesses. They contend
that the totality of evidence engenders a reasonable doubt entitling them to acquittal from the
grave charge of rape with homicide.
THE CRIMINAL CONNECTION OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN TO THE GRUESOME VIZCONDE

MURDERS HAS NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY SHOWN TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR
CONVICTION.
After a thorough and conscientious review of the records, I firmly believe that the CA correctly
upheld the conviction of appellants.
III
Credibility
Witnesses
IN THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL EVALUATION PROCESS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL

CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE RECORD OF THIS CASE POINT UNERRINGLY TO THE
INNOCENCE OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN.
IV
THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND OF THE STANDING
PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW HAVE BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED.
V
MICHAEL GATCHALIAN RESPECTFULLY INVOKES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS ON THE GROUNDS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE, AND FOR ALL THAT IT IS
WORTH, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND A SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF HIS CASE.109
Additionally, Gatchalian assails the denial by the trial court of his motion (and also appellant
Webbs) for DNA testing despite a certification from the NBI that the specimen semen remained
intact, which Justice Tagle in his dissenting opinion also found as unjust. He further argues that
the right to a speedy trial is violated even if the delay was not caused by the prosecution but by
events that are not within the control of the prosecution or the courts. Thus, the length of time
which took Alfaro to come forward and testify in this case is most conspicuous. Her delay of four
(4) years in reporting the crime has to be taken against her, particularly with the story behind it.
She volunteered to come forward only after the arrests of previous accused did not lead
anywhere. Moreover, it is clear that she adopted the version previously advanced by an "akyatbahay" gang, as noted by Justice Dacudao in his dissenting opinion. Gatchalian thus contends
that the delay occurred even before a preliminary investigation was conducted and cites cases
of
Prosecution
The determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial
court, because it has the unique position of observing the witness deportment on the stand
while testifying.111 It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings.112 When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.113
Reexamining the testimony of Alfaro, who underwent exhaustive and intense cross-examination
by eight (8) defense lawyers, it is to be noted that she revealed such details and observations
which only a person who was actually with the perpetrators could have known. More importantly,
her testimony was corroborated on its material points by the declarations of other prosecution
witnesses, to wit: [1] that their convoy of three (3) vehicles repeatedly entered the Pitong Daan
Subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991 was confirmed by the security guard on duty, Normal
White, Jr., who also testified that he had seen Gatchalian and his group standing at the vicinity
of the Almogino residence located near the end of Vinzons St., which is consistent with Alfaros
testimony that on their first trip to the subdivision she parked her car infront of the Vizconde
house while appellants parked their respective cars near the dead end of Vinzons St.; [2] that
Ventura climbed on the hood of the Nissan Sentra car and loosened the light bulb to turn it off
was confirmed by the testimony of Birrer and appellant Biong that they found a shoe print on the
hood of the car parked inside the garage of the Vizconde house; even defense witnesses Dennis
Almogino (neighbor of the Vizcondes) and SPO2 Reynaldo Carbonnel declared that the garage
was totally without light; [3] that a ladys bag was on top of the dining table in the kitchen was
likewise confirmed by Birrer and Biong; [4] that a loud static sound coming from the TV set inside
the masters bedroom which led Alfaro to the said room, matched with the observations of the
Vizconde housemaids, Birrer and Biong that when they went inside the Vizconde house in the
morning of June 30, 1991, the TV set inside the masters bedroom was still turned on with a loud
sound; [5] the positioning of the dead bodies of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer and their
physical appearance or condition (hogtied, gagged and bloodied) was correctly described by
68
Alfaro, consistent with the declarations of White, Jr., Birrer and Biong who were among those
who first saw the bodies in the morning of June 30, 1991; [6] that Carmela was raped by Webb
and how the three (3) women were killed as Alfaro learned from the conversation of the
appellants at the BF Executive Village house, was consistent with the findings of Dr. Cabanayan
who conducted the autopsy and post-mortem examination of the cadavers in the morning of
June 30, 1991 showing that the victims died of multiple stab wounds, the specimen taken from
Carmelas vaginal canal tested positive for spermatozoa and the approximate time of death
based on the onset ofrigor mortis, which would place it between midnight and 2:00 oclock in the
morning of June 30, 1991; [7] that Webb, just before going out of the gate of the Vizconde
house, threw a stone which broke the glass frame of the main door, jibed with the testimony of
Birrer who likewise saw a stone near the broken glass panel at the living room of the Vizconde
house, and Biong himself testified that he even demonstrated to Capt. Bartolome and the
housemaids the loud sound by again hitting the glass of the main door; 114 and [8] that after Webb
made a call on his cellular phone, Biong arrived at around 2:00 oclock in the morning of June
30, 1991 at the BF Executive Village house where she and appellants retreated, was consistent
with the testimony of Birrer that Biong left the "mahjong" session to answer a telephone call
between 1:00 to 2:00 oclock in the morning of June 30, 1991 and thereafter Birrer asked where
he was going, to which Biong replied "BF" and shortly thereafter a taxicab with a man at the
backseat fetched Biong.
Indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she did not really join
the group of Webb in going to the Vizconde residence and witness what happened during the
time Webb, Lejano and Ventura were inside the house and when the group retreated to BF
Executive Village. Contrary to appellants contention, Alfaros detailed testimony appears clear
and convincing, thus giving the Court the impression that she was sincere and credible. She
even opened her personal life to public scrutiny by admitting that she was addicted toshabu for
sometime and that was how she came to meet Webbs group and got entangled in the plot to
gang-rape Carmela. Her being a former drug user in no way taints her credibility as a witness.
The fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does not per
se affect her credibility.115
Alfaros ability to recollect events that occurred four (4) years ago with her mental condition that
night of June 29, 1991 when she admittedly took shabu three (3) times and even sniffed
cocaine, was likewise questioned by the appellants. When the question was posed to Alfaro on
cross-examination, she positively stated that while indeed she had taken shabu at that time, her
perception of persons and events around her was not diminished. Her faculties unimpaired by
the drugs she had taken that night, Alfaro was able to vividly recall what transpired the whole
time she was with appellants. Alfaro testified that even if she was then a regular shabu user, she
had not reached that point of being paranoid ("praning"). It was the first time Alfaro sniffed
cocaine and she described its initial effect as being "stoned," but lasting only five (5) to seven (7)
minutes. However, she did not fall asleep sinceshabu and "coke" are not downers.
Alfaro further explained her indifference and apathy in not dissuading Webb and her group from
carrying out their evil plan against Carmela as due to the numbing effect of drugs, which also
enabled her to dislodge from her mind the harrowing images of the killings for quite sometime.
Eventually, the chance to redeem herself came when she was invited to a Christian fellowship,
and with her childs future in mind, her desire to transform her life grew stronger. As she cast off
her addiction to drugs, its desensitizing effect began to wear off and her conscience bothered
her no end. Under such circumstances, the delay of four (4) years in admitting her involvement
in the Vizconde killings cannot be taken against Alfaro. In fact, she had to muster enough
courage to finally come out in the open considering that during her last encounter with
appellants at a discotheque in 1995, she was threatened by appellant Rodriguez that if she will
not keep her mouth shut, she will be killed. He even offered her a plane ticket for her to go
abroad. Coming from wealthy and influential families, and capable of barbaric acts she had
already seen, appellants instilled such fear in Alfaro that her reluctance to report to the
authorities was perfectly understandable.
I find that the circumstances of habitual drug use and delay in reporting a crime did not affect the
competence and credibility of prosecution witness Alfaro. It bears stressing that the fact of delay
alone does not work against the witnesses. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation
does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.116
Besides, appellants failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may
have impelled Alfaro to falsely testify against them, other than their allegation that she regularly
associated with NBI agents as one (1) of their informants. The absence of evidence of improper
motive on the part of the said witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.117 Neither had appellants established any ill-motive on the part of the other prosecution
witnesses.
Inconsistencies and Discrepancies in Alfaros April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 Affidavits
Appellants, from the start of preliminary investigation, have repeatedly harped on the
discrepancies and inconsistencies in Alfaros first and second affidavits. However, this Court has
repeatedly ruled that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of
a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. 118 With greater relevance should this
rule apply in situations when a subsequent affidavit of the prosecution witness is intended to
amplify and correct inconsistencies with the first affidavit, the discrepancies having been
adequately explained. We held in People v. Sanchez119
...we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and
testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses. Sworn
statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations
because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state
as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired.
Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence
carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.120
Alfaro explained the circumstances surrounding her execution of the first Affidavit dated April 28,
1995 which was done without the presence of a lawyer and at the house of agent Mario Garcia
where she was brought by Atty. Sacaguing and Moises Tamayo, another agent of task force AntiKidnapping, Hijack and Robbery (AKHAR). The unusual questioning of these men gave her the
impression that she was merely being used to boost their career promotion and her distrust was
even heightened when they absolutely failed to provide her security. She was aghast upon
discovering the completed affidavit which falsely stated that it was made in the presence of her
lawyer of choice (Atty. Mercader who was not actually present). Agent Tamayo also incorporated
69
inaccurate or erroneous information indicating that she was a college graduate even if she tried
to correct him. Tamayo simply told her to just let it remain in the statement as it would not be
noticed anyway.121 Moreover, on account of her urgent concern for her own security and fear of
implicating herself in the case, Alfaro admitted down playing her own participation in her
narration (including the circumstance that she had previously met Carmela before the incident)
and those of her ex-boyfriend Estrada and her relative, Gatchalian.
A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecutions case, not on the weakness of
the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the
elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt,
the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of the
prosecutions case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused
could not have committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting
doubt on the guilt of the accused.126
Prosecution Evidence Sufficient to Convict Appellants

Appellants Alibi and Denial
This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial courts appreciation of evidence must
bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, and this presumption must prevail
unless overturned by competent and credible proof. 122Thus, we are tasked to consider two
crucial points in sustaining a judgment of conviction: first, the identification of the accused as
perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made
the identification as well as the prosecutions compliance with legal and constitutional standards;
and second, all the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be
present.123
There appears to be no question about the fact that a horrible and most unfortunate crime has
been committed. It is, in this case, indeed a given fact, but next to it is the pivotal issue of
whether or not the prosecution has been able to discharge its equal burden in substantiating the
identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. As well said often, conviction
must rest on the strength of the prosecutions case and not on the weakness of the defense.
Positive
of Accused-Appellants
Identification
We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it
is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.127 To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that
he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the
distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." 128 Due to its
doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.129
"Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it.
Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have
been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two
places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene,
the alibi will not hold water. 130[emphasis supplied.]
Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success
or failure of the prosecution.124 Both the RTC and CA found the eyewitness testimony of Alfaro
credible and competent proof that appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez
and Estrada were at the scene of the crime and that Webb raped Carmela as the bloodied
bodies of her mother and sister lay on top of the bed inside the masters bedroom, and right
beside it stood Lejano while Ventura was preparing for their escape. At another house in BF
Executive Village where the group retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed
the blaming session, particularly between Ventura and Webb, and thereupon learned from their
conversation that Carmelas mother and sister were stabbed to death before she herself was
killed. Alfaro likewise positively identified appellant Biong, whom somebody from the group
described as the driver and bodyguard of the Webb family, as the person ordered by Webb to
"clean the Vizconde house."
The claim of appellant Webb that he could not have committed the crime because he left for the
United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on October 26, 1992 was
correctly rejected by the RTC and CA. These dates are so distant from the time of the
commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it would not have been
impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel back to the country and again fly to the US
several times considering that the travel time on board an airline from the Philippines to San
Francisco, and from San Francisco to the Philippines takes only about twelve (12) to fourteen
(14) hours. Given the financial resources and political influence of his family, it was not unlikely
that Webb could have traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991 and then
departed for the US again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. There clearly exists,
therefore, such possibility of Webbs presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and his excuse cannot be deemed airtight.
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr. Cabanayan, White,
Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants presence at the scene of the crime before, during and
after its commission was duly established. Their respective participation, acts and declarations
were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible witness. It is axiomatic that a
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.125
This Court in People v. Larraaga131 had similarly rejected the defense of alibi of an accused,
involving a shorter travel distance (Quezon City to Cebu) and even shorter period of time
showing the least possibility of an accuseds presence at the time of the commission of the crime
(a matter of hours) than in the case at bar (March 9, 1991 to June 29, 1991 which is three [3]
months). In denying the motion for reconsideration of accused Larraaga, we held that accused
Larraaga failed to establish his defense of alibi, which is futile in the face of positive
identification:
70
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi
supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other
end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were
not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that
the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants
failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place. They failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the
evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all
within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by
plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route.
One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu
each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July
16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified
Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July
16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw
Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she
knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified
that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and
Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2)
men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone,
located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard
then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In
addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at
Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood
of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the
participes criminis.132 [emphasis supplied]
In the light of relevant precedents, I find no reversible error committed by the RTC in refusing to
give credence to appellant Webbs argument that he could not have committed the crime of rape
with homicide because he was still in the US on June 29 and 30, 1991. The RTC thus correctly
ruled:
Granting for the sake of argument that the claim of departure for the United States of the
accused Webb on March 9, 1991 and his arrival in the Philippines on October 26, 1992 had
been duly established by the defense, it cannot prove that he remained in the United States
during the intervening period. During the long span of time between March, 1991 to October,
1992, it was not physically impossible for the accused Webb to have returned to the
Philippines, perpetrate the criminal act, and travel back to the United States.
It must be noted that the accused Webb is a scion of a rich, influential, and politically powerful
family with the financial capacity to travel back and forth from the Philippines to the United
States. He could very well afford the price of a plane ticket to free him from all sorts of trouble.
Since there are numerous airlines plying the route from Manila to the United States, it cannot be
said that there was lack of available means to transport. Moreover, the lapse of more than three
(3) months from the time the accused Webb left the Philippines for the United States on March
9, 1991 to June 29 and 30, 1991 when the crime was committed is more than enough time for
the accused Webb to have made several trips from the United States to the Philippines and
back. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it only requires the short period of
approximately eighteen (18) hours to reach the Philippines from the United States, with
the advent of modern travel.
It must likewise be noted that the father of the accused Webb, besides being rich and influential,
was at that time in 1991, the Congressman of Paraaque and later became a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the Webb money and connections were at the disposal of the
accused Webb, and it is worthy of belief that the accused Webb could have departed and
entered the country without any traces whatsoever of his having done so. In fact, defense
witness Andrea Domingo, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
testified on the practice of "human smuggling" at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
On this point, the Supreme Court has declared in a case that even the lapse of the short period
of one (1) week was sufficient for an accused to go to one place, to go to another place to
commit a crime, and then return to his point of origin. The principal factor considered by the
Supreme Court in denying the defense of alibi in People vs. Jamero (24 SCRA 206) was
the availability to the accused of the means by which to commit a crime elsewhere and
then return to his refuge. x x x133 [emphasis supplied]
There is likewise no merit in appellant Webbs contention that the CA misappreciated his
voluminous documentary evidence and numerous witnesses who testified on his stay in the US.
The CA, after a meticulous and painstaking reevaluation of Webbs documentary and testimonial
evidence, sustained the RTCs conclusion that these pieces of evidence were either
inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant. I quote with approval the CAs findings which are wellsupported by the evidence on record:
(a) U.S. INS Certifications
xxxx
The Court seriously doubts that evidentiary weight could be ascribed to the August 31, 1995 and
October 13, 1995 Certifications of the U.S. INS and computer print-out of the Nonimmigrant
Information System (NIIS) which allegedly established Webbs entry to and exit from the United
States. This is due to the fallibility demonstrated by the US INS with regard to the certifications
which the said office issued regarding the basic information under its direct control and custody.
It is to be remembered that as part of his evidence, Webb presented the explanation of one
Steven P. Bucher, Acting Chief of Records Services Branch of the U.S. INS, who admitted that
the U.S. INS had previously reported on August 10, 1995, erroneously, that it had no record of
the arrival and departure of Webb to and from the United States. The said office later on
admitted that it failed to exhaustively study all information available to it. We are not convinced
71
with this explanation. It is to be noted that the U.S. INS is an agency well known for its stringent
criteria and rigid procedure in handling documents relating to ones travel into and out of its
territory. Such being the case, it would therefore be hard to imagine that the said agency would
issue a certification that it had no record of a persons entry into and exit from the United States
without first conducting an efficient verification of its records.
We do not also believe that a second search could give rise to a different conclusion,
considering that there is no showing that the records searched were different from those viewed
in the first search. The later certifications issued by the U.S. INS modifying its first certification
and which was issued only a few weeks earlier, come across as a strained effort by Webb at
establishing his presence in the United States in order to reinforce his flimsy alibi.
It is not amiss to note that a reading of the first Certificate of Non-existence of Record (Exhibit
"212-D") subscribed by Debora A. Farmer of the U.S. INS would show that the U.S. INS had
made a "diligent" search, and found no record of admission into the United States of Webb. The
search allegedly included an inquiry into the automated and non-automated records systems of
the U.S. INS. Be it also noted that the basis of the U.S. INS second certification (Exhibit "218")
was a printout coming also from automated information systems.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its appeal brief, "how it became
possible for the U.S. INS Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download
and copy the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have an entry on accusedappellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such record was never sufficiently
addressed by the defense."
It is with this view that the Court recognizes little if not nil probative value in the second
certification of the U.S. INS.
xxxx
(b) Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight
The purported passenger manifest for the United Airlines flight that allegedly conveyed accusedappellant Webb for the United States, was not identified by the United Airlines personnel
who actually prepared and completed the same. Instead, the defense presented Dulcisimo
Daluz, the supervisor of customer services of United Airlines in Manila, who had no hand in the
actual preparation or safekeeping of the said passenger manifest. It must be stressed that to
satisfactorily prove the due execution of a private document, the testimony of the witness with
regard to the execution of the said document must be positive. Such being the case, his
testimony thereto is at most hearsay and therefore not worthy of any credit.
Likewise, we note that the said passenger manifest produced in court is a mere photocopy and
the same did not comply with the strict procedural requirement of the airline
company, that is, all the checking agents who were on duty on March 9, 1991 must sign
or initial the passenger manifest. This further lessens the credibility of the said document.
...the alleged United Airline ticket of accused-appellant Webb offered in evidence is a mere
photocopy of an alleged original, which was never presented below. Other than the
submission that the original could no longer be produced in evidence, there is no other proof that
there ever was an original airline ticket in the name of Webb. This does not satisfy the
requirements set forth under Section 5 of Rule 130. x x x we find that the photocopy presented
in evidence has little if no probative value. Even assuming there was such an original ticket in
existence, the same is hardly of any weight, in the absence of clear proof that the same was
indeed used by accused-appellant Webb to go to the United States.
(d) Philippine passport
The passport of accused-appellant Webb produced in evidence, and the inscriptions appearing
thereon, also offer little support of Webbs alibi. Be it noted that what appears on record is
only the photocopy of the pages of Webbs passport. The Court therefore can only rely on
the appreciation of the trial court as regards the authenticity of the passport and the marks
appearing thereon, as it is the trial court that had the exclusive opportunity to view at first hand
the original of the document, and determine for itself whether the same is entitled to any weight
in evidence.
(e) Video footage of accused-appellant Webbs parents in Disneyland and Yosemite Park.
The video footage serendipitously taken by Victor Yap allegedly of Senator Webb and his family
while on vacation at Disneyland in Anaheim, California on July 3, 1991 does little to support
the alibi of accused-appellant Webb for it is quite interesting to note that nowhere did accusedappellant Webb appear in this footage. None of the people shown in the film was identified as
the accused-appellant Webb. Moreover, the records disclose that just before the segment of the
film that showed Senator Webb, there was a gap or portion of static that appeared which did not
appear in any other portion of the footage. We find that this supports the conclusion that the
videotape was possibly tampered as an additional support to the alibi of accused-appellant
that he was in the United States.
xxxx
(f) Video footage at Lake Tahoe and the del Toro-Manlapit Wedding
...the video footage showing accused-appellant Webb seemingly on holiday at Lake Tahoe with
the Wheelocks, to our mind does not disprove that Webb was in the country at the time of the
Vizconde killing. Firstly, the date being shown intermittently in the footage was not the
same or near the date of the Vizconde killing. As we have earlier stated, we do not discount
the possibility that Webb was in the Philippines during the time he was supposed to have been
in the United States, especially, when there are eyewitnesses who testified to the effect that
Webb was in the Philippines only a couple of weeks before the killing and who also testified of
Webbs participation in the crime. In any case, we take judicial notice that modern electronic and
photographic advances could offer a means to splice or modify recorded images to configure to
a desired impression, including the insertion or annotation of numeric figures on a recorded
image.
(c) United Airline Ticket
72
Likewise, the videotape and photographs taken on Alex del Toros wedding also fail to convince,
as this wasallegedly taken on October 10, 1992 well after the fateful days of June 29 and
30, 1991.
(g) Photograph of Webb and Christopher Esguerra before the Dee Lite Concert
The photograph of accused-appellant Webb with Esguerra allegedly taken in late April 1991
before they went to a band concert has little probative value. It must be pointed out that the
image in the picture itself does not depict the date or place it was taken, or of any Dee
Lite concert allegedly attended by Webb. Likewise, we observed that the photograph appears
to have been trimmed down from a bigger size, possibly to remove the date printed therein. It
is also to be noted that Esguerra admitted that the inscription appearing at the back of the
photograph of, "Hubert and I before the Dee Lite Concert, April 1991" was only written by him in
1995, after it was given to him by accused-appellants mother, Elizabeth, before he took the
witness stand. The Court cannot therefore but cast suspicion as to its authenticity.
(j) Bicycle/Sportscar
The Toyota MR2 sportscar and Cannondale bicycle allegedly purchased by accused-appellant
Webb and his father in the United States appear to have been purchased with great haste, and
under suspicious circumstances.
Consider that immediately after the accused-appellants father, former Senator Freddie Webb,
arrived in the United States, the first thing he did was go out with his friend Honesto Aragon and
accused-appellant to look for a bicycle and a car to be used by the latter in going to and from
work. The car was bought sometime in early July 1991 and the bicycle sometime on June 30,
1991. It is a wonder to this Court that the accused-appellant and his father would buy a bicycle
and a sportscar at practically the same time to provide the accused-appellant transportation to
his work. Would not just a car or a bicycle do for him? Also, the hurried purchase of the car right
after the arrival of Freddie Webb appears at the very least, suspicious, as a prospective carbuyer would understandably want to make a canvas first for the best car to buy, and not just to
purchase the first car he sees.
(h) Webbs Drivers License

We agree with the trial court's observation that the Drivers License allegedly obtained by
accused-appellant from the California Department of Motor Vehicle sometime in the first
week of June 1991 is unworthy of credit, because of the inconsistencies in Webbs
testimony as to how he obtained the same. In one testimony, Webb claimed he did not make
an application but just walked in the licensing office and he did not submit any photograph
relative to his application. In a later testimony, he claimed that he submitted an ID picture for his
drivers license, and that the picture appearing on his drivers license was the very same picture
he submitted together with his application for the drivers license. These are two inconsistent
testimonies on the same subject matter, which render the said drivers license and the alleged
date when the same was obtained, unworthy of credit.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the trial court, though it was made clear that the purpose of
purchasing the said bicycle and car was for accused-appellants convenience in going to and
from his work -- we find, that this contradicts the other evidence presented by accused-appellant
because it appears from his evidence that other than his brief stint in del Toros pest control
company business and his employment as a gasoline station attendant which incidentally was
not sufficiently proven, all that accused-appellant did in the United States was to go sightseeing,
shopping and meet with family and friends.
Lastly, the fact that the car and the bicycle were allegedly purchased in close proximity to the
date of the rape and killing of the Vizconde women does little to dissuade the perception that the
car and bicycle were purchased only for the purpose of providing a plausible defense of alibi for
Webb.
(i) Logbook of Alex del Toro and Check Payments of Webbs salary
(k) Letters to Jennifer Claire Cabrera
The employment records of accused-appellant, which include the alleged logbook of del Toro in
his pest control business, and check payments to Webb were also offered to support the latters
alleged presence in the United States on the dates near the day of the Vizconde killings. A
review of the logbook shows that the same is unworthy of any evidentiary weight. The entries
where the accused Webb were indicated to have performed work for del Toro, showed
that the name of Webb ("Hubie"/"U.B.") was merely superimposed on the actual entries
and could have been easily fabricated to create the impression that Webb had some
participation in the business of del Toro, and therefore, are not reliable proofs of Webbs
presence and occupation in the United States around the time of the Vizconde killing.
The alleged check payments of Webbs salary are also unreliable. The check dated June 13,
1991 was made payable to "Cash", while the other check which appeared to be payable to
"Hubert Webb" was however dated only July 10, 1991. Neither of the said checks squarely
placed accused-appellant Webb in the United States at the time of the Vizconde killings.
Simply put, neither check is therefore clear proof to support Webbsalibi.
Cabrera, a friend and neighbor of accused-appellant in BF Homes, Paraaque, produced four

(4) letters allegedly written and sent to her by Webb while he was in the United States, in order
to support the accused-appellantsalibi. These were allegedly the only letters sent by Webb to
her.
The letters were allegedly written and posted at around the same time the Vizconde rape and
killing happened, such that, if the letters were to be duly considered, they would place Webb in
the United States at the same time the June 30, 1991 killings occurred; thus, bolstering Webbs
defense of alibi.
However, the said letters, to our mind, are not convincing proof of alibi, inasmuch said letters
were produced only in 1995 at the time she gave a statement, and the same time Webb was
charged. However, Cabrera admitted that she knew Webb was being involved or accused in the
Vizconde killings as early as 1991 and that she was shocked upon learning that he was being
implicated therein.
73
The Court finds it incredible that despite being shocked in 1991, about the involvement of her
friend, accused-appellant in the Vizconde rape-slay, Cabrera would wait until 1995 to "produce"
the letters that could have cleared her friends name. An interregnum of four years before
coming out with valuable proof in support of a friend is to our mind, a telling factor on the
credibility of the alleged letters.
Also, the impression that may be inferred from reading the letters was one of a man who was
pining away for his ladylove. Webb was quite expressive with his feelings when he wrote that he
missed Cabrera, "a lot," yet after only four letters that was conveniently written sometime in June
1991, he thereafter stopped writing letters to Cabrera as if the whole matter was already
forgotten. It is highly suspicious therefore that the only letters of accused-appellant Webb to
Cabrera were written and sent at the exact opportune time that the Vizconde killings occurred
which conveniently supplied a basis for his defense of alibi.
Moreover, from the contents of the letters, we can deduce that there was some sort of romantic
relationship with the accused-appellant Webb and Cabrera. In fact, Webb in his letters referred
to Cabrera as his "sweetheart" and "dearest", and confessed to her that all he thinks about was
her, and he was hoping he would dream of her at night. It is not improbable, therefore, that
Cabrera could have prevaricated herself to save her friend.
In sum, accused-appellant tried vainly to establish his defense of alibi with the presentation of
not only a substantial volume of documentary evidence but also testimonies of an overwhelming
number of witnesses which were comprised mostly of relatives and family friends who obviously
wanted him to be exonerated of the crime charged. It is for this reason that we regard their
testimonies with an eye of suspicion for it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close
relative or friend to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs
especially when a criminal case is involved.134 [emphasis supplied]
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 135 As to appellant Webbs voluminous documentary
evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously examined each exhibit and concluded that these do
not pass the test of admissibility and materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of
his presence at the Vizconde residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30,
1991.
Appellant Webb cites the opposite view taken by Justices Tagle and Dacudao in their dissenting
opinions and urges this Court to accord the US INS certification and other documents relative to
his arrival and departure in the US on the dates March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992,
respectively, the presumption of regularity being official documents issued by US authorities.
Justices Tagle and Dacudao concurred in stating that the conclusion of their three (3) colleagues
(majority) that the US INS certifications did not exclude the possibility of Webb traveling back to
the Philippines and again departing for the US between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992 -is nothing but speculation and conjecture. Webb further mentions that since a Justice of this
Court "confirmed appellant Webbs alibi of being in the United States on 29 June 1991[,] [a]t the
very least, such exculpatory testimony coupled with the plethora of appellant Webbs other
documentary and testimonial evidence on his presence in the United States on 29 June 1991
raises reasonable doubt as to appellant Webbs guilt of the crime charged."136
I find the contentions bereft of merit.

In the first place, let it be emphasized that Justice Carpios testimony before the trial court
confirmed merely the fact that his conversation with then Congressman Webb took place on
June 29, 1991 and what the latter relayed to him about his location at the time such telephone
call was made, who was with him in the US (his wife and appellant Webb) and the purpose of
their US trip (to find a job for appellant Webb). Said witness even admitted that he had no
personal knowledge that appellant Webb was in fact in the United States at the time of his
telephone conversation with Congressman Webb.137
As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certifications and other
evidence presented by appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that such
presentation of passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can serve as proof that he was
indeed out of the country at the time of the Vizconde killings, 138it must still be shown that the
evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such evidence constitutes an airtight excuse
as to exclude the least possibility of his presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb
failed in this regard and the RTC and CA did not err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of
evidence, particularly so on the strength of the positive identification of appellant Webb as
Carmelas rapist and one of those who actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her
mother and sister between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991.
Indeed, alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but also
where it does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence
at the place and time of the commission of the crime. 139 Against positive evidence, alibi becomes
most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness.140 Appellant Webb was placed at the crime scene by Alfaro who positively identified him
as the one (1) who plotted and committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her
mother and sister, aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and Cabanacan gave
corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here in the country, as he was just in his
house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on June 29 to 30,
1991.
Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is
inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the situation in the case at
bar where the identification of the perpetrators by a lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty
standard.
It is the prosecutions burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but
such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of
the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when -after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the
[judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.141
74
That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of certifications of entry into and
exit from the US, passport with stamp marks of departure and declarations of witnesses who are
mostly relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can be gleaned from the fact that passports and
plane tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not necessarily prove that the very
same person actually took the flight. This Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and
tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable
passports. In fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps,
assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify the
necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239) as proposed in the
Senate, "x x x to rally for the issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest data
encryption technology; and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake passports." 142
It is worthy of note I note that the original of Webb's passport was not offered in evidence and
made part of the records, which only gives credence to the prosecutions allegation that it bore
signs of tampering and irregularities. And as earlier mentioned, the much vaunted US-INS
second certification dated August 31, 1995 based on a mere computer print-out from the Nonimmigrant Information System (Exhibit "213-1-D") retrieved from the US- INS Archives in
Washington, and the accompanying certifications, have little probative value, the truth of their
contents had not been testified to by the persons who issued the same. Moreover, the issuance
of this certification only a couple of weeks after the August 10, 1995 US-INS Office in San
Francisco was issued, only raised questions as to its accuracy. Said earlier certification through
Debora A. Farmer stated that:
[a]fter diligent search no record is found to exist in the records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The search included a review of the Service automated and
nonautomated records system; there is no evidence of any lawful admission to the United
States as an immigrant, or as a nonimmigrant, relating to Hubert P. Webb, born November
7, 1968, in the Philippines. The records searched are current as of July 1, 1995 for the
immigrants and nonimmigrants.143 [emphasis supplied]
The above finding was relayed by Thomas Schiltgen, District Director of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, San Francisco to Ms. Teresita V. Marzan, Consul General of the
Philippines:
SUBJECT: WEBB, HUBERT
RE: Hubert Jeffrey Webb
Dear Requester:
YOUR REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON 07/10/95.
WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR SEARCH FOR RECORDS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUEST

BUT DID NOT LOCATE ANY. IF YOU STILL BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE RECORDS WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST, AND CAN PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION, WE WILL CONDUCT ANOTHER SEARCH. IF YOU ELECT TO REQUEST
ANOTHER SEARCH, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT FOLLOW THE APPEALS
PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BELOW UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED THAT SEARCH.
YOU MAY APPEAL THE FINDING IN THIS MATTER BY WRITING TO THE OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUITE 570,
1310 G. STREET, N.W., FLAG BUILDING, WASHINGTON D.C., 20530 WITHIN THIRTY (30)
DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER. YOUR LETTER SHOULD REFERENCE THE INS
CONTROL NUMBER ABOVE AND THE LETTER AND THE ENVELOPE SHOULD BE
CLEARLY MARKED FOIA/PA APPEAL.
SINCERELY,
(SGD.) DISTRICT DIRECTOR144 [emphasis supplied]
To show that the August 10, 1995 US-INS Certification was erroneous, appellant Webb
presented the Memorandum addressed to Secretary Domingo L. Siazon signed by Consul Leo
M. Herrera-Lim, the Diplomatic Note dated October 30, 1995 and the letter of Debora Farmer
stating that the San Francisco certification was erroneous. 145 The prosecution, however,
presented another document which indicated that an appeal to the U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Information and Privacy yielded a negative result on any record on file that one (1)
Hubert Webb arrived in the United States on March 9, 1991, and further that Richard L. Huff, CoDirector of the Office of Information and Privacy had in effect sustained as correct the US-INS
San Francisco report that there is no such data on Hubert Webb in the San Francisco database
so that the Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. should instead ask the assistance of other
U.S. government agencies in their search for data on appellant Webb.146
The defense endeavored to explain why the US-INS Archives in Washington could have made
the "mistake" of stating that it had no data or information on the alleged entry of appellant Webb
on March 9, 1991 and his exit on October 26, 1992. However, it had not satisfactorily addressed
the nagging question of how it became possible for the US-INS Archives in Washington, which is
supposed to merely download and copy the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have
an entry on appellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such record. Considering that
many visitors (nonimmigrants) are admittedly not entered into the NIIS database, and that
diligent search already yielded a negative response on appellant Webbs entry into the US on
March 9, 1991 as per the August 10, 1995 Certification, as to what US government agency the
alleged computer-generated print-out in the August 31, 1995 certification actually came from
remains unclear.
Appellant Webbs reliance on the presumption of regularity of official functions, stressing the fact
that the US-INS certifications are official documents, is misplaced. The presumption leaned on is
disputable and can be overcome by evidence to the contrary. 147 In this case, the existence of an
earlier negative report on the NIIS record on file concerning the entry of appellant Webb into and
his exit from the US on March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had raised serious
doubt on the veracity and accuracy of the subsequently issued second certification dated August
75
31, 1995 which is based merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991
and departure on October 26, 1992.
As to the testimony of former Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, the same cannot be
given due credence since he is incompetent to testify on the contents of the August 31, 1995
US-INS Certification, having merely received the said document in his capacity as the head of
the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lims testimony
likewise did not carry much weight considering that its significance is confined to the fact that the
document from the US-INS was transmitted and received by the DFA. It is to be noted that the
certification issued by the Philippine Embassy with respect to the US-INS Certifications
contained a disclaimer, specifically stating that the Embassy assumed no responsibility for the
contents of the annexed document.148 The same observations regarding the "consularized
certifications" was reflected in the Decision dated April 16, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42285
("Miguel Rodriguez v. Amelita Tolentino") and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 ("Hubert P. Webb v.
Amelita Tolentino").149
Appellant Webbs travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in the US are
unreliable proof of his absence in the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime
charged. The non-submission in evidence of his original passport, which was not formally
offered and made part of the records, had deprived the RTC, CA and this Court the opportunity
to examine the same. Such original is a crucial piece of evidence which unfortunately was
placed beyond judicial scrutiny.
IWe quote the following observations made by the prosecution on Webbs passport from the
appeal brief of the OSG:
In tandem with the presentation of the various U.S. INS certifications to bolster appellant Webbs
story of a U.S. sojourn before, during and after the commission of the offense charged, he
further anchors his defense on his passport (Exh. AAAAAA and 294) ostensibly to show, among
others, that the grant by the United States government granted him a visa effective from April 6,
1989 to April 6, 1994 and the U.S. Immigration in San Francisco stampmarked it on March 9,
1991 (Exh. AAAAAA-6) on page 30 thereof (Exh. AAAAAA-2 and 294-D).
On its face, what the entries in the passport plainly suggest is that appellant Webb violated U.S.
immigration laws by "overstaying" beyond the usual six-(6) month period allowed for tourists.
However, he being the son of a Senator would not unnecessarily violate U.S. immigration laws.
It would be quite easy for him to apply for and secure an extension of his authorized stay in the
U.S., if only he requested. But why did not he or his parents secure the extension? Why was
there no evidence to show that he ever requested an extension? Did he really overstay in the
U.S. or could he simply enter and leave the U.S. and the Philippines without marking his
passport? These raise serious questions on the integrity of the passport.
Is appellant Webb really untouchable that even U.S. authorities in various states would let him
get "off the hook" without much of a fuss after his alleged brushes with the law (TSN - Hubert
Webb dated September 10, 1997, p. 82)? This is especially incredible considering that he was
allegedly apprehended in the United States near the U.S. border (Ibid., pp. 82-83) where
authorities are always on the look out for illegal aliens.
The questions involving appellant Webbs passport are not limited to the stamp marks (or lack of
stamp marks) therein. There are unusual things about his passport which he has been unable to
explain satisfactorily.
The passport of her mother, Elizabeth Webb, for example, appears to be well preserved despite
having been used more frequently than that of appellant Webb who supposedly used it in only
one trip abroad. Not only do some of the pages appear smudged or untidy, but more
significantly, the perforations on the passport pages indicating the serial number of appellant
Webbs passport no longer fit exactly on the pages -- that is, they are no longer aligned. The
perforations are intended not only to indicate the serial number of the passport but more
importantly to countercheck intercalations and tampering. The "non-alignment" of the
perforations is thus significant.
In addition to the over-all shabby appearance of appellant Webbs passport, what is evident is
the torn plastic portion of the dorsal page thereof near the holders signature. There is also the
matter of the marked difference in the signatures of appellant Webb as appearing on the dorsal
side of the passport (Exh. AAAAAA-3 and 294-A-1) as compared with that appearing on his
laminated photograph (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C-1). Of course, he tried to offer an explanation
on the variance in the two (2) signatures. All he could reason out, however, was that he wrote his
name using his normal penmanship when in a lazy mood (TSN -- Hubert Webb dated August 14,
1997, p. 27), implying that the signature appearing on his laminated photograph is his real
signature. A review of his other documentary evidence supposedly bearing his signature shows
that what appears therein is his name written in his "normal penmanship," and that it is only in
the laminated picture (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C) that such "real signature" appears. Following
appellant Webbs explanation, it means that he was in a lazy mood all the time! 150
Two (2) more documents presented by appellant Webb deserve a close look -- his US Drivers
License supposedly issued on June 14, 1991, and the Passenger Manifest. The RTCs
evaluation of said documents revealed their lack of probative value, thus:
On August 14, 1997, [Webb] testified that he did not make any application since the procedure in
California provides for a walk-in system, that he did not submit any photograph relative to his
application for a Californian Drivers License, inasmuch as a photograph of him was taken, and
that, his drivers license was issued sometime on the first week of June, 1991. On the other
hand, on September 1, 1997, the accused suddenly and completely changed his testimony while
still on direct examination. He claims that the picture appearing on the drivers license was the
very same he submitted together with his application for the drivers license. Thus, the
discrepancy as to the source of the photograph (Exhibit "334-E") between the testimony given
on August 14, 1997 where the accused Webb said that the California Department of Motor
Vehicle took his picture, and the testimony given on September 1, 1997 where he said that he
submitted it to the California DMV as an attachment to his supposed drivers license application
renders the accused Webbs testimony as unbelievable and unworthy of credence.
It is beyond belief that the same picture submitted by the accused Webb became the picture in
the drivers license allegedly issued on June 14, 1991. Moreover, it is contrary to human nature
and experience, aside from the fact that it is likewise contrary to the procedure described by the
accused Webb in obtaining a drivers license in the State of California. Since a drivers license is
one of the principal means of identification in the United States as well as in the Philippines, to
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allow the applicants to produce their own pictures would surely defeat the purpose in requiring
them to appear before the Department of Motor Vehicle, that is, to ensure the integrity and
genuineness of the drivers license.
The defense presented Agnes Tabuena, Vice-President for Finance and Administration of the
Philippine Airlines for the purpose of establishing that Hubert Webb arrived in the Philippines
only on 26 October 1992.
The Court takes note that the accused Webb, in his fervent desire to exculpate himself from
criminal liability, earlier offered in evidence the letter dated January 10, 1992 of Mr. Robert L.
Heafner, Legal Attache of the Embassy of the United States to the then Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Alfredo S. Lim, (Exhibit "61") which stated in very clear terms
that the accused Webbs California Drivers License Number A8818707 was issued on
August 9, 1991. Furthermore, the said letter states the listed address of the accused Webb at
the time of the issuance of the drivers license was 532 So. Avenida Faro Ave., Anaheim,
California 92807. The said listed address of the accused Webb at the time his drivers license
was issued has demolished the testimony of the defense witness Sonia Rodriguez that the
accused Webb was supposed to be already living with the Rodriguez family in Longwood,
Florida by the first week of August, 1991.
Like witnesses Daluz and Nolasco, Tabuenas statements on the witness stand and the
Certification was based exclusively on the Passenger Manifest of PALs PR 103. Unfortunately
for the defense, the said testimony is of no probative value and of doubtful veracity considering
that the witness did not prepare the same, nor did the witness identify the persons who prepared
the same other than that they were "airport staff", nor did she had any idea when the document
was transmitted to her office. In fact, the witness could not even interpret the contents of the said
Passenger Manifest, much more testify as to the due execution and genuineness thereof.
The accused Webb likewise offered in evidence the official communication coming from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation dated December 31, 1991 (Exhibit "MMM" and submarkings;
Exhibit "66-C" and submarkings) which likewise gave the information that the accused Webb
was issued California Drivers License No. 8818707 on August 9, 1991, and that as of
August 9, 1991, the address of the accused Webb was 532 South Avenida Faro, Anaheim,
California 92807. The fact that the alleged Drivers License No. A8818707 was issued on two (2)
different dates (August 9, 1991 and June 14, 1991) casts a serious doubt on its provenance and
authenticity.
xxxx
In order to establish that the accused Hubert Webb departed from the Philippines on 09 March
1991 on board UA flight 808 the defense also presented witness Dulcisimo Daluz, Station
Manager of United Airlines for Manila who in turn presented a document purporting to be
the Passenger Manifest for the flight departing on 09 March 1991 (Exhibits "233-A" to "233N").
This document merits outright rejection considering that the defense witness Daluz confirmed
that the same was prepared by the UA departure area personnel and not by himself. Thus, this
document is merely hearsay and is devoid of any merit whatsoever.
In respect of the plane ticket of the accused Hubert Webb, what was likewise offered as part of
the testimony of Daluz was a mere photo copy, wherein Daluz also admitted not having any
direct participation in its preparation.
The spurious nature of the document was observed by the witness Daluz himself who admitted
that there wereirregularities in the Passenger Manifest presented by the defense. According
to Daluz, it is a strict procedural requirement that all the checking agents who were on duty on
March 9, 1991 were supposed to initial the Passenger Manifest, However, he admitted
that Exhibits "223" and "223-N" did not contain the initials of the checking agents who
were supposed to initial the same.
In view of the vital necessity to the other accused of establishing accused Webbs alibi, it is
important to note that Atty. Francisco Gatchalian, father of the accused Michael Gatchalian was
then a high ranking PAL Official and a colleague of Tabuena. This makes the source of the
document, even ignoring the fact of its inadmissibility, suspicious. 151 [emphasis supplied.]
The alibi of appellants Gatchalian and Lejano, who claimed they were at the Syap residence at
Ayala Alabang Village watching video tapes the whole night of June 29, 1991 until early morning
of June 30, 1991, was even less plausible considering the distance of that place from Pitong
Daan Subdivision, which is just a few minutes ride away. The RTC noted the manifestation of the
defense on Andrew Syaps refusal to testify on Gatchalian and Lejanos whereabouts during the
night in question, despite their efforts to convince him to do so. It further noted the testimony of
Assistant NBI Director Pedro Rivera that Carlos Syap upon seeing Gatchalian with their group
even berated Gatchalian for dragging him into his (Gatchalians) own problem. Aside from Alfaro,
security guard Normal White, Jr. also testified that the presence of Gatchalian (son of a
homeowner), who pointed to the other appellants in the two (2) cars behind him as his
companions, was the reason they allowed his friends to enter the subdivision on the night of
June 29, 1991. White, Jr. also categorically declared he had, earlier that same night, seen
Gatchalian with his friends standing at Vinzons St. Thus, other than the hearsay declaration of
his father who merely testified on what his son told him about spending the night watching video
tapes at the Syap residence on June 29, 1991, Gatchalian presented no corroborative evidence
of his alibi.
As to appellant Lejano, he was positively identified by Alfaro as the first to express approval of
Webbs plan to gang-rape Carmela by saying, "Ako ang susunod." Lejano was also with Alfaro,
Webb and Ventura in going inside the Vizconde house, and whom she later saw inside the
masters bedroom, at the foot of the bed where the bloodied bodies of Estrellita and Jennifer lay,
and just standing there about to wear his jacket while Webb was pumping the hogtied and
gagged Carmela on the floor. His alibi is likewise feeble, as he could have easily gone to the
Vizconde house within a few minutes from the Syap residence where he and Gatchalian
allegedly watched video tapes.
Appellant Fernandez, on his part, insisted that Alfaros story was simply fabricated by her
"hidden mentors" who considered the sworn statement of Roberto D. Barroso taken on
November 4, 1991. Barroso was one (1) of the members of the "Akyat Bahay" gang who were
earlier charged before the Makati City RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 91-7135-37 for Rape with
Homicide and for Robbery with Homicide in connection with the Vizconde killings. There is an
77
uncanny congruence in the details of the incident as testified to by Alfaro, with the sworn
statement of Barroso particularly pertaining to the manner by which the garage light of the
Vizconde house was put out, the smashing of the glass panel of the main door, and the
appearance of a woman who opened the main door saying "Sino kayo?"152
Such submissions are inane, in view of the dismissal of those cases filed against the first set of
suspects based on lack of evidence. Contrary to Fernandezs insinuation of a fabricated
eyewitness account, Alfaro gave much more minute details than the limited narration given by
Barroso. More important, Alfaros testimony was sufficiently corroborated on its material points,
not only by the physical evidence, but also by the testimonies of four (4) disinterested witnesses
for the prosecution: White, Jr., Cabanacan, Gaviola and Birrer.
Fernandez also cited as among the reasons why Alfaros declarations were far from positive, the
non-recovery of the fatal weapons used in the killings. He contended that a crucial link in the
prosecutions physical evidence was thus missing, as Alfaro could not even say what was the
"object" or "thing" which she saw thrown out of the Nissan Patrol while the group was on their
way to the BF Executive Village. Hence, her suggestion that what she saw Ventura took from the
kitchen drawer may have been kitchen knives used to kill the victims must fail. 153
A. First, he introduced me to Hubert Webb, then Fyke Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,

and then Tonyboy Lejano, Michael Gatchalian.158
Alfaro was again asked to enumerate the members of the "group" when the prosecution asked
her to name the members of the group, in the later part of her direct examination during the
same hearing.159 She also testified that after everyone, including Rodriguez, took part in
a shabu session, they left the parking lot.160 It thus logically follows that whenever Alfaro made
reference to the "group" in her entire narration, it necessarily included those she had
enumerated she had met and had a shabu session with at the Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center parking lot. This same group was with her from their first trip to the Vizconde residence
until the time they left Pitong Daan Subdivision and retreated to a house at BF Executive Village
early morning of June 30, 1991. Alfaro had specifically mentioned Rodriguez when asked by
Prosecutor Zuo to describe their relative positions at the lawn area of the BF Executive Village
house, thus establishing his presence during the "blaming session":
A. x x x kalat kami, sir, pero hindi kami magkakalayo x x x
xxxx
Such proposition fails to persuade. The failure to present the murder weapon will not exculpate
the accused from criminal liability. The presentation and identification of the weapon used
are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused, much more so where the perpetrator has
been positively identified by a credible witness.154
Q. How about Miguel Rodriguez, how far was he from Hubert?
Appellant Rodriguez denies being a conspirator with Webbs group in the commission of the
crime, asserting that his presence and participation in the Vizconde killings, from the time of its
inception up to its consummation, was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the
failure of Alfaro to mention his name as part of the "group" twice in her testimony. These
instances refer to Alfaros direct examination when she was asked to name the persons riding
the convoy of three (3) vehicles when they left Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to
proceed to the Vizconde residence at Pitong Daan Subdivision,155 and the second time when
she was asked to enumerate the members of the "group" who were waiting along Aguirre
Avenue during their second trip to the Vizconde residence. 156 Thus, when Alfaro testified that the
rest of the group acted as lookouts while she, Webb, Lejano and Ventura went inside the
Vizconde house, it must be understood as limited only to those she had previously enumerated,
which definitely did not include Rodriguez.157
xxxx
The argument is untenable. The mere fact that Alfaro missed out naming Rodriguez in two (2)
instances during her direct examination does not give rise to the conclusion that he was not
positively identified by Alfaro as among those present and participated prior to, during and after
the commission of the crime as lookouts along with the rest of the group. Contrary to
Rodriguezs claim, the first time that Alfaro referred to and enumerated the members of the
"group" which she had unexpectedly joined that night, was at the beginning of her narration on
how she met Venturas friends when she got her order of shabu at the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center parking lot.
Q. And you said that Dong Ventura introduced you to this group, will you name the
group that was introduced to you by Dong Ventura?
A. Two meters away.
A. Mike is very very near Ging Rodriguez.161

It must be stressed that Alfaro categorically declared it was Rodriguez who approached her at
Faces Disco on March 30, 1995 and told her to shut up or she would be killed. Aside from
making that threat, Rodriguez also offered Alfaro a plane ticket so she could leave the
country.162 Rodriguezs bare denial cannot be given any evidentiary weight. We have ruled that
denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.163
Rodriguezs attempt to set up an alibi through the testimony of his cousin Mark Rualo was
equally frail. Even assuming as true Rualos testimony that he had indeed invited Rodriguez to
attend his birthday party on June 29, 1991 but Rodriguez opted to stay in his house and even
talked to him on the phone when he called Rodriguez to ask why he was not yet at the party, it
cannot serve as proof of Rodriguezs whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime. It
did not rule out the actual presence of Rodriguez at the crime scene.
Appellant Estrada, just like Rodriguez and Fernandez, did not take the witness stand and simply
relied on the alibidefense of his co-accused, principally that of Webb. Alfaro testified that it was
Estrada, then her boyfriend, who was together with her in her car throughout the night of June
29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991. Estrada was among those who acted as lookouts
78
outside the Vizconde house after they all concurred in the plan of Webb to gang-rape Carmela
while they were still at the parking lot of the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
Conspiracy among appellants duly proven
The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Rodriguez and Filart was satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith decide to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence.164 Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution,
as conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in its
commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim Carmela, her mother Estrellita and sister
Jennifer, were killed, each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable for rape with
homicide.
Indeed, appellants by their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they were acting in
unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective, even if it was only Webb,
Ventura and Lejano who actually went inside the Vizconde house while Estrada, Fernandez,
Rodriguez, Gatchalian and Filart stood as lookouts outside the house. Under these premises, it
is not even necessary to pinpoint the precise participation of each of the accused-appellants, the
act of one being the act of all.165
One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral
support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the
latter. There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their participation.166
Biong guilty as accessory after the fact
Appellant Biong contends that he cannot be convicted as accessory to the crime of rape with
homicide because the acts imputed to him did not result in the hiding of the case. There was no
evidence that such indeed was his intent or motive. He points out that the bodies of the victims
were found at their respective places where they were assaulted and there was no evidence that
they had been moved an inch from where they breathed their last. He asserts that nonpreservation of the evidence is not an accessory crime under the Revised Penal Code.167
The contentions have no merit.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the
commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but
took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body
of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3)
harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.168
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are two (2)
classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the
escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions,
and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant
Biong is one (1) such public officer, and he abused his public function when, instead of
immediately arresting the perpetrators of the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb
to "clean the Vizconde house," which means he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking
them to the crime, and not necessarily to prevent the discovery of the bodies in such actual
condition upon their deaths. Hence, such "cleaning" would include obliterating fingerprints and
other identifying marks which appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the scene
of the crime.
Contrary to Biongs assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene such as
fingerprints on the doors and objects inside the masters bedroom where the bodies were found,
the bloodied floor of the toilet, the actual material used in gagging Carmela and Estrellita, the
bloodied blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of the broken glass panel of the main
door, the shoe print and foot prints on the car hood and at the back of the house, fingerprints on
the light bulb at the garage -- was a form of assistance to help the perpetrators evade
apprehension by confusing the investigators in determining initially what happened and the
possible suspects. Consequently, Biongs unlawful taking of the jewelries and Carmelas ATM
card and drivers license, his act of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass , the
washing out of the blood on the toilet floor and permitting the relatives to burn the bloodied bed
sheets and blankets -- had in fact misled the authorities in identifying potential suspects. Thus,
the police had a difficult time figuring out whether it was robbers who entered the Vizconde
house and perpetrated the rape-slay, or drug-crazed addicts on the loose, or other persons
having motive against the Vizconde family had exacted revenge, or a brutal sexual assault on
Carmela by men who were not strangers to her which also led to the killings.
On the basis of strong evidence of appellant Biongs effort to destroy crucial physical evidence at
the crime scene, I hold that the RTC did not err in convicting him as an accessory to the crime of
rape with homicide.
Penalty
The CA was correct in affirming the sentence imposed by the RTC upon each of the accusedappellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, Fernandez and Estrada. The proper penalty
is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death penalty under the Revised Penal Code
(in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111, when by reason or on
79
the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was prohibited by the Constitution at the time
the offense was committed.169 At any rate, the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law
on June 24, 2006, would have mandated the imposition on accused-appellants the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
As to the penalty imposed by the CA on appellant Biong as accessory after the fact to the crime
of rape with homicide, we find the same proper and in order.
DNA Testing
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webbs motion for DNA testing of the semen
specimen taken from the vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy conducted by Dr.
Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack of available scientific expertise and
technology at the time.
With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws, American courts
allow post-conviction DNA testing when its application has strong indications that the result could
potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a convicted felon has the right to avail of new
technology not available during his trial.
On October 2, 2007, this Court approved the Rule on DNA Evidence 170 which took effect on
October 15, 2007.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule, the court may at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing
after due notice and hearing. Such order shall issue upon showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.171
Research Institute (UP-NSRI), Diliman, Quezon City; and (2) the NBI and UP-NSRI to report to
this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice regarding compliance with and implementation of
the said resolution.
In his Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, NBI
Deputy Director for Technical Services, informed this Court that the semen specimen/vaginal
smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and all original documents (autopsy and
laboratory reports, and photographs) are no longer in the custody of the NBI as these were
submitted as evidence to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 by then
NBI Medico-Legal Chief, Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D., when the latter testified on direct and
cross-examination on January 30, 31, February 1, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Attached thereto are
certified true copies of Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 (stating positive result for the presence
of human spermatozoa), Autopsy Report No. N-91-1665 (with remarks: "Smear for presence of
spermatozoa"), copy of the sworn statement of Dr. Cabanayan and certified true copy of the
envelope bearing his signed handwritten notation that all original photographs have been
submitted as evidence during the aforementioned hearing dates.172
On May 11, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
our Resolution dated April 20, 2010 on grounds that (a) the DNA testing order was issued in
disregard of Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which requires prior hearing and notice; (b)
a determination of propriety of DNA testing at this stage under the present Rule, separate from
that filed by Webb before the trial court on October 6, 1997, is necessary as there was no
opportunity back then to establish the requisites for a DNA testing order under the Rule which
took effect only in 2007; (c) the result of the DNA testing will constitute new evidence, which
cannot be received and appreciated for the first time on appeal; and (d) this Court failed to
elucidate an exceptional circumstance to justify its decision to consider a question of fact, as this
Court itself acknowledged in its April 20, 2010 Resolution that the result of DNA testing is not
crucial or indispensable in the determination of appellant Webbs guilt for the crime charged. 173
On May 21, 2010, Atty. Roberto Makalintal, Jr., Branch Clerk of RTC Paraaque City, Branch
274, submitted his Comment on The Compliance and Manifestation Dated April 27, 2010 of the
NBI stating that: (a) There is no showing of actual receipt by RTC Branch 274 of the
specimen/vaginal smear mentioned in Dr. Cabanayans affidavit dated April 27, 2010; (b) Based
on available records such as the TSN of January 31, 1996 and February 7, 1996 during which
Dr. Cabanayan testified, no such specimen/vaginal smear was submitted to RTC Branch 274; (c)
The TSN of January 31, 1996 on pages 57, 58 and 69 suggest that marked in evidence as
Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" by then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo were only the
photographs of the three slides containing the semen specimen; (c) In the hearing of February 7,
1996, Dr. Cabanayans last testimony before RTC Branch 274 in this case, he testified that the
last time he saw those slides was when he had the photographs thereof taken in 1995 (the first
time was when he examined them in 1991), and as far as he knows between 1991 and 1995,
those slides were kept in the Pathology Laboratory of the NBI; and (d) The entire records of the
cases were already forwarded to this Court a long time ago, including the evidence formally
offered by the prosecution and the accused.174
By Resolution dated April 20, 2010, this Court granted appellant Webbs request to submit for
DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde under the
custody of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). We ordered (1) the NBI to assist the
parties in facilitating the submission of the said specimen to the UP-Natural Science and
80
Under our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we required the NBI to (a) show proof of the release of
the semen specimen to the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 274 in 1996; and (b) comment on
the alleged conflicting representations in its Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010,
both within ten days from notice. However, the NBI has not complied with said directive.
In his Comment on the OSGs motion for reconsideration, appellant Fernandez argued that
when this Court, in the higher interest of justice, relaxed the Rule on DNA Evidence to afford
Webb the fullest extent of his constitutional rights, the prosecution was not thereby denied its
equally important right to due process. Contrary to the OSGs claim that this Court immediately
granted DNA testing without observing the requisites under Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence, and without due notice and hearing, appellant asserts that the Resolution dated April
20, 2010 clearly defines the parameters of the DNA analysis to be conducted by the UP-NSRI
assisted by the NBI. Indeed, there are ample safeguards in the Rule to assure the reliability and
acceptability of the results of the DNA testing. Fernandez, however, objected to the statement of
the OSG that "in the light of positive identification" of appellant Webb by the principal witness for
the prosecution, Jessica Alfaro, the existing circumstances more than warrant the affirmation of
Webbs guilt. Alfaros cross-examination exposed her as an "out-and-out perjurer, a bold and
intentional liar under oath" and a "fake witness" whose account of the incident is "shot-through
with fatal omissions, self-contradictions, inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities." 175
Webb further underscored that where the evidence has not been offered, it is the prosecution
who should have the legal custody and responsibility over it. 178 The NBIs letter dated April 23,
1997 confirmed that the semen specimen was in its custody. The NBIs repudiation of such fact
is belied by the records; the Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence shows that Exhibits "S", "T"
and "U" were merely photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear. Also, nowhere in
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Dr. Cabanayans testimony was it shown that
he turned over the actual slides to the trial court. On the contrary, when Dr. Cabanayan was
asked on February 6, 1996 to produce the slides, which he had promised to bring during the
previous hearing, he admitted that he "forgot all about it" when he came to the hearing. Thus, it
appears from the record that from the time the semen specimen was taken from Carmela
Vizcondes cadaver, it has always been in the custody of the NBI.179
Evidently, the NBI could no longer produce the semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the
cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and consequently DNA analysis of said physical evidence can no
longer be done. Hence, this Court set aside the April 20, 2010 resolution and forthwith
proceeded to resolve the present appeal on the basis of existing evidence which have been
formally offered by the parties and/or made part of the records.
Appellant Webbs Urgent
Appellant Lejano likewise filed his comment, pointing out that the trial court denied Webbs
motion to direct the NBI to submit semen specimen for DNA analysis on November 25, 1997
only after lengthy exchange of pleadings between the defense and prosecution, the latter having
properly opposed said motion. Hence, the People cannot now rightfully claim that there was no
notice or hearing on the issue of submitting the semen specimen for DNA analysis. Citing Brady
v. Maryland,176 Lejano contended that the suppression of exculpatory evidence or evidence
that will show reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence
been disclosed grossly violates an accuseds right to due process. In this case, the evidence
needs only to be subjected to DNA analysis to establish the innocence of appellant Webb, as
well as of petitioner and appellant Lejano. It was further asserted that the semen specimen was
already existing at the time of the trial, and hence can hardly be considered as "new evidence"
and that DNA testing of said semen specimen taken from the victim Carmela Vizconde "has the
scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case" (Sec. 4 (d), Rule on DNA Evidence).177
Motion To Acquit
On his part, appellant Webb stressed that there are exceptional circumstances that justify this
Courts order to immediately conduct the DNA analysis. He has been behind bars for more than
fifteen (15) years. He has filed a motion for DNA analysis as early as 1997 or thirteen (13) years
ago. The result of such test could yield evidence that could acquit him while no damage will be
suffered by the prosecution considering that this Court emphasized in its Resolution of April 20,
2010 that the prosecutions evidences and concerns regarding the proper preservation of
evidence in the custody of the NBI would have to be addressed in the light of the requirements
laid down by the Rule on DNA Evidence. As to the prosecutions argument that this Court cannot
receive and appreciate "new evidence," Section 4 of the Rule states that "the appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing"; DNA testing is even available post-conviction (Ibid,
Sec. 6). This Court in accordance with proper procedure thus decided to receive DNA evidence
in order not to further delay the case, appellants after all, were convicted more than ten (10)
years ago in 2000 and have been incarcerated for fifteen (15) years now.
Webb maintains that the semen specimen extracted from the cadaver of Carmela had
exculpatory value, as even NBIs Dr. Cabanayan testified during the hearing of February 7,
1996, that it was still possible to subject the same to DNA analysis to identify the person to
whom the sperm belonged. Thus, a DNA analysis of said semen specimen excluding appellant
Webb as the source thereof would disprove the prosecutions evidence against him. Further,
Webb points out that the prosecution considered the presence of spermatozoa on the body of
Carmela as evidence that she was raped, offering the photographs of the glass slides containing
the sperm cells as proof that she was in fact raped on or about the late evening of June 29, 1991
or early morning of June 30, 1991. But the only evidence of the prosecution that it was Webb
who raped Carmela was the testimony of Alfaro which was given full credit by the RTC and CA
despite all its inconsistencies, and despite all documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by the defense proving that Webb was at the United States at the time the crime was committed.
With the recall of the order for DNA testing, appellant Webb moved for his acquittal on the
ground of violation of his constitutional right to due process by reason of the States failure to
produce the semen specimen, either through negligence or willful suppression. Webb argues
that the loss or suppression by the prosecution of the semen specimen denied him the right to
avail of the latest DNA technology and prove his innocence. Citing American jurisprudence
(Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,180 California v. Trombetta181 and Brady v. Maryland182), Webb
contends that in disallowing the DNA examination he had requested, the RTC denied him from
presenting a "complete defense" through that "singular piece of evidence that could have
definitively established his innocence," the trial court relying instead on the identification of
Jessica Alfaro, a "perjured witness." The constitutional duty of the prosecution to turn over
exculpatory evidence to the accused includes the duty to preserve such evidence.
81
On the matter of preserving DNA evidence, Webb cites Section 12 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
which authorizes the court to order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA
evidence during trial and even when the accused is already serving sentence, until such time the
decision of the court has become final and executory. While this Court has given Webb the best
opportunity to prove his innocence in the order granting DNA analysis of the sperm specimen
taken from Carmelas cadaver, such potentially exculpatory evidence could not be produced by
the State. Webb now claims that as a result of the destruction or loss of evidence under the
NBIs custody, he was effectively deprived of his right to present a complete defense, in violation
of his constitutional right to due process, thus entitling him to an acquittal.
Loss
Not
Acquittal of Webb
of
Semen
Ground
Specimen
For
Webbs argument that under the facts of this case and applying the cited rulings from American
jurisprudence, he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of violation of his constitutional right to
due process,is without merit.
In Brady v. Maryland183 it was held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." In said
case, the petitioner was convicted of murder committed in the course of robbery and sentenced
to death. He later learned that the prosecution suppressed an extrajudicial confession made by
his accomplice who admitted he did the actual killing. The US Supreme Court granted a new trial
and remanded the case but only on the question of punishment.
In Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,184 the court ordered DNA testing of specimen taken from a rape
victim after the sexual assault and from the accused who was convicted, DNA testing being
unavailable at the time of the trial. Accused therein was identified by the victim as her attacker.
The court found the factual circumstances clearly showed that the semen specimen could have
come only from the accused. It noted that the witness testified that accused acted alone, had
ejaculated and she did not have sexual intercourse with any other person within 24 hours prior
to the sexual assault. DNA testing ultimately revealed that petitioners DNA composition did not
match with that found on the victims underwear. Consequently, the court granted petitioners
subsequent motions to vacate the judgment of conviction.
In California v. Trombetta,185 a case involving the prosecution for drunk driving, the US Supreme
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not require that law
enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis tests at
trial.
Given our precedents in this area, we cannot agree with the California Court of Appeal that the
States failure to retain breath samples for respondents constitutes a violation of the Federal
Constitution. To begin with, California authorities in this case did not destroy respondents breath
samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v.
Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers
here were acting "in good faith and in accord with their normal practice." x x x The record
contains no allegation of official animus towards respondents or of a conscious effort to
suppress exculpatory evidence.
More importantly, Californias policy of not preserving breath samples is without constitutional
defect. Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty
must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspects
defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, x x x evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a
nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means. Neither of these conditions is met on the facts of this case. [italics supplied.]
From the above cases, it is clear that what is crucial is the requirement of materiality of the
semen specimen sought for DNA testing. Appellant Webb must be able to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the DNA sample would prove his innocence. Evidence is material
where "there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."186
In People v. Yatar,187 decided before the promulgation of the Rule on DNA Evidence, the Court
expounded on the nature of DNA evidence and the factors to be considered in assessing its
probative value in the context of scientific and legal developments. The proper judicial approach
is founded on the concurrence of relevancy and reliability. Most important, forensic identification
though useful does not preclude independent evidence of identification.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA
is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a
persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of
hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because
of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would
82
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on
the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the assault. Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied
exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of
the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that
of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11,
which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
unchartered waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated
by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the
house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty
white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left
when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in
a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by
a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding
from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed
sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibits "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibits "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.188 [emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in other jurisdictions it has been recognized that DNA test results are not always
exculpatory.
Postconviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition, exculpatory test results will
not necessarily free the convicted individual. If the evidence does exclude the petitioner, the
court must weigh the significance of the exclusion in relation to all the other evidence. Convicted
offenders often believe that if crime scene evidence does not contain their DNA they will
automatically be exonerated. Not finding the petitioners DNA does not automatically indicate the
case should be overturned, however. In a rape case, for example, the perpetrator may have
worn a condom, or not ejaculated. In some cases, the absence of evidence is not necessarily
evidence of the defendants absence or lack of involvement in the crime.189
We hold that the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased victim is
immaterial in determining Webbs guilt. From the totality of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively identified as Carmelas rapist.
As the records bear out, the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmelas rapist
satisfied the test of moral certainty, and the prosecution had equally established beyond
reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer on
the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA analysis of the semen specimen taken from
Carmelas body hours after her death excludes Webb as the source thereof, it will not exonerate
him from the crime charged. Alfaro did not testify that Webb had ejaculated or did not use a
condom while raping Carmela. She testified that she saw Webb rape Carmela and it was only
him she had witnessed to have committed the rape inside the Vizconde residence between late
evening of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not testify that
Carmela had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that time. On the
other hand, a positive result of DNA examination of the semen specimen extracted by Dr.
Cabanayan from Carmelas cadaver would merely serve as corroborative evidence.
83
As to the loss of the semen specimen in the custody of the NBI, appellant Webbs contention
that this would entitle him to an acquittal on the basis of Brady v. Maryland is misplaced.
In Arizona v. Youngblood,190 a 10-year old boy was molested and sodomized by the accused, a
middle-aged man, for 1 hours. After the assault, the boy was examined in a hospital where the
physician used swab to collect specimen from the boys rectum and mouth, but did not examine
them at anytime. These samples were refrigerated but the boys clothing was not. Accused was
identified by the victim in a photographic lineup and was convicted of child molestation, sexual
assault and kidnapping. During the trial, expert witnesses had testified that timely performance
of tests with properly preserved semen samples could have produced results that might have
completely exonerated the accused. The Court held:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and Agurs here. The State disclosed
relevant police reports to respondent, which contained information about the existence of the
swab and the clothing, and the boys examination at the hospital. The State provided
respondents expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police criminologist,
and respondents expert had access to the swab and to the clothing.
xxxx
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the
good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material
exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we
deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant. x x x We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police
both limits the extent of the polices obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and
confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those
cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a
basis for exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can
show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.
In this case, the police collected the rectal swab and clothing on the night of the crime:
respondent was not taken into custody until six weeks later. The failure of the police to
refrigerate the clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as
negligent. None of this information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence
such as it was was made available to respondents expert who declined to perform any tests
on the samples. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted in its opinion and we agreethat there
was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police. It follows, therefore, from what we have
said, that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause. [emphasis supplied.]
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police investigators, specifically
the NBI, for the non-production of the vaginal swab and glass slide containing the semen
specimen, during the trial and upon our recent order for DNA testing. The prosecution did not
conceal at anytime the existence of those vaginal swab and glass slide containing the vaginal
smear. Curiously, despite Dr. Cabanayans admission during the hearing that it was still possible
to subject the semen specimen to DNA analysis, the defense never raised the issue thereafter
and resurrected the matter only in October 1997 when Webbs counsel filed his motion.
It bears to stress that the vaginal smear itself was not formally offered by the prosecution, but
only the photographs of the glass slide containing the semen specimen for the purpose only of
proving that Carmela was in fact raped and not that Webb was the source of the sperm/semen.
As noted by the RTC when it denied Webbs motion for DNA on November 25, 1997, prevailing
jurisprudence stated that DNA being a relatively new science then, has not yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. The RTC also considered the more than six (6) years that have
elapsed since the commission of the crime in June 1991, thus the possibility of the specimen
having been tampered with or contaminated. Acting on reasonable belief that the proposed DNA
examination will not serve the ends of justice but instead lead to complication and confusion of
the issues of the case, the trial court properly denied Webbs request for DNA testing.
We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely
corroborated Alfaros testimony that Carmela was raped before she was killed. Indeed, the
presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape. The important
consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful penetration of the
female genitalia by the male organ. 191 On the other hand, a negative result of DNA examination
of the semen specimen could not have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his identity as
a principal in the rape-slay of Carmela was satisfactorily established by the totality of the
evidence. A finding that the semen specimen did not match Webbs DNA does not necessarily
negate his presence at the locus criminis.
Civil Liability of Appellants
The Court sustains the award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant to current
jurisprudence that in cases of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00
should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. 192Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the
heirs of the victims without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. For the deaths
of Estrellita and Jennifer, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto to their heirs, was likewise in
order, in the amount of P50,000.00 each.193 Following People v. Dela Cruz,194 P75,000.00 civil
indemnity and P75,000 moral damages in rape cases are awarded only if they are classified as
heinous.195As the rape-slay of Carmela took place in 1991, R.A. No. 7659 entitled "AN ACT TO
IMPOSE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which was approved on December 13, 1993 and was to
become effective fifteen (15) days after its publication in two national newspapers of general
circulation, was not yet effective.196
As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence allows the amount of P75,000.00 to be awarded in
cases of rape with homicide.197 We find the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages
awarded by the RTC as affirmed by the CA, rather excessive. While courts have a wide latitude
84
in ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the award should not be to such an extent
that it inflicts injustice on the accused. 198 The award of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages to the
heir of the victims should accordingly be reduced to P500,000.00. The rest of the awards given
by the trial court are affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully vote that the appeals in the above-entitled cases
be DISMISSED and the Decision dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 00336 be AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only as to the award of damages.
MARTIN
Associate Justice
S.
VILLARAMA,
JR.
85
G.R. No. 72883 December 20, 1989

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
AURELIO ESPINOSA @ "ROLLY" and JESUS FLORO y JUNDOY, accused. JESUS FLORO
y JUNDOY,accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Raul Austria Bo for accused-appellant Jesus Floro.
CRUZ, J.:
Ariel Mamucod got a black eye and his father wanted to know why. But he never did find out. On
his way to the barangay chairman, he was accosted by two persons, who hit him in the head
and stabbed him in the chest and back. The following day, Jaime Mamucod was dead.
The incident happened on May 6, 1981 but an information for murder was filed only on July 19,
1983. 1 Accused were Aurelio Espinosa and Jesus Floro. Espinosa was never tried and remains
at large. Only Floro is appealing the decision of the trial court sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and payment of P 30,000.00 civil indemnity to the victim's heirs. 2
The chief witnesses for the prosecution were the victim's two sons, Arnold and Ariel. Both of
them were with their father when the jeep he was driving was blocked by the killers at Almeda
Street, in Santa Cruz, Manila, at about 9 o'clock in the evening. The brothers identified the
culprits as Espinosa and Floro. It was Floro who first attacked Jaime, hitting him in the head with
a hard object about a foot long and wrapped in a newspaper. When the victim fell off the jeep as
a result of the blow, Espinosa stabbed him repeatedly in the back with a fan knife. Floro, using
an ice pick, stabbed Jaime several times in the chest. Jaime ran for his life but his attackers
pursued and continued stabbing him until the latter fell into a ditch. The two assailants then
walked away fast. Ariel boarded his dying father on a tricycle and brought him to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital, where he expired from his wounds the next day. 3
The testimonies of the brothers were corroborated by Manuel Buenaventura, who said he saw
the stabbing while he was on a tricycle waiting to cross Abad Santos Street. He also identified
Jaime's killers as the two accused. 4The necropsy report submitted by Dr. Luis Larion, medicolegal officer of the Western Police District, (which was admitted by the defense without his
testimony) declared that Jaime Mamucod died as a result of "profuse hemorrhage and shock
due to multiple stab wounds penetrating the chest and piercing the right lung and branches of
the right pulmonary artery and vein." 5 Another witness for the prosecution, Sgt. Juanita Yang of
86
the Western Police District, testified that it was he who investigated the killing and took the
statements of the victim's two sons implicating Espinosa and Floro. 6
The defense invoked alibi. Testifying for himself, Floro admitted that he was at the basketball
court earlier in the evening of May 6, 1981, as he was coaching one of the competing teams. But
he left later because the games had been called off and at the time of the stabbing he was in his
house on Almeda Street. On cross examination, he declared that his house was only about two
hundred meters or two or three minutes walk from the scene of the crime. 7
A prosecution witness, Lilia Silva, was also asked to testify for the defense because she said
she saw Espinosa chasing and stabbing Jaime when the latter stumbled but made no mention of
Floro. When asked by defense counsel if she saw Floro stabbing the victim, she said she did
not. 8
The appellant's brief faulted the trial court for accepting the testimonies of the Mamucod brothers
despite their inconsistencies and contradictions. The defense stressed that whereas Arnold said
Floro hit Jaime in the nape of the neck, Ariel said it was on the top of the head, and that while
Arnold said Jaime was stabbed while lying on the ground, Ariel said it was while his father was
standing. It was also unbelievable that after the stabbing Ariel should say, "Tatay, let us go
home," when the natural thing to do was to rush the dying man to the nearest hospital for
immediate treatment.
Noting that the necropsy report spoke only of stab wounds and not punctured wounds, the
defense also stressed that this proved the brothers were lying when they swore that their father
had been stabbed by Floro with an ice pick.
The Court has examined the evidence of the parties and sees no reason for overturning the
findings of Judge Rosalio A. de Leon, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
stand and assess their credibility by the various indicia available to the trial court but not
reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the
flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch-these can reveal if the
witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth. Absent then a showing that the conclusions of the
trial court are arbitrary or without basis, they must be regarded with respect and accepted as
conclusive on appeal.
The discrepancies in the declarations of Arnold and Ariel are not unnatural or evidence of
perjury. When their father was attacked, Arnold was seated at the front of the jeep beside Jaime
and Ariel was sitting behind them. 9The two brothers had therefore different vantage points that
gave each of them a separate view of the incident. Moreover, it should also be considered that
the man being stabbed before their very eyes was their father. Under this traumatizing and
shocking circumstance, the two sons, who were then only sixteen and fifteeen respectively, can
hardly be expected to remember the grisly stabbing in perfect detail.
As for Lilia Silva, her testimony is less than conclusive of Floro's innocence. The mere fact that
she did not see Floro at the scene of the crime does not prove he was not there as she
obviously was narrating only the latter part of the incident. Besides, she added that there were
many people around, which could be the reason she did not notice Floro. At any rate, her
testimony cannot cancel the sworn declarations of Arnold and Ariel that they actually saw
Espinosa and Floro killing Jaime Mamucod.
The two sons could hardly have made a mistake regarding this matter. Indeed, the memory of
these men is not easily blurred and must have been indelibly imprinted in their young and
impressionable minds. They had no motive for falsely Identifying Espinosa and the accusedappellant. The only reason for naming them is the logical one: that Espinosa and Floro were the
men who killed their father.
The contention that the necropsy report did not mention any punctured wounds must be
rejected. The phrase "stab wounds" is used generically to include all wounds that may be
caused "by weapons such as knives, scissors, three-cornered files, or ice picks with a circular
shaft all possessing a sharp point but having blades of different shapes." 10 Stabbing may be
done with an ice pick and the puncture is correctly called a stab wound.
The appellant's brief did not dispute the finding of the trial judge that Floro was in hiding for more
than two years,11 which may explain why the information against him could not be filed in 1981,
when Jaime Mamucod was killed. It would also suggest that the accused-appellant is not
innocent as he claims, for as we have repeatedly observed, unexplained flight is an indication of
guilt. 12 "The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold as a lion."
Finally, there is the question of conspiracy. Floro would distance himself from Espinosa and
impute the whole blame to his absent co-accused for the killing of Jaime Mamucod. The
evidence shows, however, that they acted in concert in pursuit of a common design. Floro and
Espinosa together blocked Jaime's jeep and told him not to disturb the basketball game
(although there was none in progress). Floro first hit Jaime with the foot-long stick or pipe earlier
concealed in a newspaper. Then Espinosa drew his fan-knife and stabbed Jaime in the back.
Then Floro drew his ice pick and stabbed Jaime in the chest. When Jaime ran away from them,
they pursued him and continued stabbing him. Finally, with their victim dying in the ditch, both
assailants fled together and disappeared. It is clear from their acts that the two had come to an
agreement concerning the attack on Jaime and decided to commit it. There was thus a
conspiracy that made each conspirator liable for the other's acts.
We agree that the killing of Jaime Mamucod was attended with treachery, qualifying the crime to
murder. The victim was totally defenseless. He was caught by surprise when Espinosa and
Floro, whom he considered his friends, suddenly attacked him. Without warning, he was hit in
the head, then stabbed in the back. Thus disabled, he was stabbed in the chest. And even as he
ran for his life, he was pursued and stabbed some more when he stumbled. He never had a
chance to save his life.
What prompted the vicious attack must remain a mystery to this Court. Proof of motive is, of
course, not necessary for the conviction of the accused-appellant in view of his positive
identification as one of the killers. Even so, one may well wonder why a human life was taken for
no apparent reason and another life must now be needlessly spent in the shadow of the prison
bars.WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the
accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.
87
G.R. No. 129807 December 9, 2005

DAVAO
LIGHT
&
POWER
CO.,
vs.
CRISTINA OPEA and TEOFILO RAMOS, JR., Respondents.
INC., Petitioner,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 35114 dated 29 May 1997 affirming, with modification, the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, in Civil Case No. 19,648-89 declaring as null and void the
documents presented by petitioner with regard to respondents unbilled consumption.
The records establish the following facts:
In their complaint filed on 19 July 1989 before the RTC of Davao City, respondents, as plaintiffs
below, alleged that petitioner Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), defendant below, is a
franchise holder authorized to operate an electric and power plant in Davao City. Respondents,
on the other hand, are petitioners customers as electric meter nos. 47019 and 1587 were
attached to respondent Teofilo Ramos, Jr.s (respondent Ramos, Jr.) office and residence,
respectively. Under the agreement between respondents, respondent Ramos, Jr. was supposed
to pay the electric bills to petitioner although both electric meters were under the account name
of his mother-in-law, respondent Cristina Opea (respondent Opea).
Sometime in 1988, petitioner, through its fieldmen or inspection team, examined the electric
meter in respondent Ramos, Jr.s office allegedly in response to a report of an alleged "broken
Davao Light seal." As a consequence of said inspection, both electric meters were removed and
eventually replaced. Respondents purportedly observed that their electric consumption a few
months after the installation of the replacement meters were relatively similar with their usage as
recorded by the previous electric meters. Thus, they were taken aback when petitioner charged
them the amount of P 7,894.99 for one billing month. After they complained about this excessive
amount, petitioner made an adjustment and subsequently reduced said electric bill to P5,625.55
which respondents paid under protest.
On 17 May 1989, petitioner wrote respondent Opea charging her P84,398.76 for the alleged
unbilled electric consumption of respondent Ramos, Jr.s office from September 1983 to
September 1988.3 The amount was allegedly arrived at based on the highest recorded
consumption from 1983 to 1988.
On 17 June 1989, petitioner sent another letter 4 to respondent Opea reiterating its demand for
the payment of the unbilled electric consumption. This time, the letter contained a threat that
respondents failure to settle their obligation within ten days would compel petitioner to take the
necessary legal action before the proper court and would result in the immediate disconnection
of the electric supply to respondents.
On 23 June 1989, petitioner again wrote respondent Opea demanding the amount
of P49,512.63 allegedly representing the amount of unbilled electric consumption of respondent
Ramos, Jr.s residence.5 As was stated in the 17 May 1989 letter, petitioner claimed that this
amount was computed based on the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988.
Respondents asserted in their complaint that these demands by petitioner were without proper
and correct basis as they had paid all their electric bills for the period 1983 to 1988. They also
stated that the charges for unbilled electric consumption could have emanated from fraudulent
manipulations executed by petitioner itself.
Respondents, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs from the trial court:
a) Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order before notice and a writ of preliminary
injunction, directing the defendants or any person acting for and in its behalf to desist and refrain
from doing any act that would disconnect the electrical light connection at plaintiffs house and
office, and also desist in enforcing the so-called "Computations" referred to.
b) Order the defendants to adjust correctly or calibrate the electric meters by competent men or
persons.
c) To declare null and void the documents (Annexes "C" to "C-*" and "G" to "G-*") denoted as
"Computation of Tampered Meter".
d) Order the payment of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P 200,000.00
and P 50,000.00 respectively.
e) Direct defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the amount of P 2,000.00 as initial expenses in the
preparation and filing of the complaint; and to further pay the amount of P 33,477.86 in concept
of attorneys fee.
f) To make the preliminary injunction final.
PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other relief that may be just and proper in the premises.6
Traversing the allegations of the complaint, petitioner declared in its answer 7 that at the time of
the institution of this suit, petitioner continuously supplied electrical services to respondents
pursuant to the service contracts it entered into with respondent Opea. One of these service
contracts was dated 30 May 1977 8 under account number 510-4019 with meter number 47019.
The other service contract was dated 07 November 1950 9 under account number 510-4020 with
meter number 1587.
On 16 September 1988, petitioners representatives, together with an energy regulation analyst
of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and a photographer, went to respondents office building
and residential house to examine and test the electric meters installed thereat. The examination
and testing of electric meter number 47019 was allegedly witnessed by respondent Ramos, Jr.s
employee named Myrna Galagar (Galagar). In the case of electric meter number 1587, Joy
88
Perucho (Perucho),10 another employee of respondent Ramos, Jr., purportedly observed the
procedure.
According to petitioner, the examination of electric meter number 47019 showed that petitioners
murray seal, otherwise known as the outer seal, was already broken while the government seal
or inner seal was deformed. In addition, the meter testing conducted by the ERB regulation
analyst Engr. Carlos V. Reyes (Engr. Reyes) revealed that electric meter number 47019 was not
registering any electric consumption at light load and, when it was tested at full load, the same
only recorded a 27.57% consumption.
On the other hand, the examination of electric meter number 1587 indicated that its murray seal
was no longer attached thereto and had been substituted with an unauthorized lead seal and the
government seal which should be attached to said electric meter was already missing. The
inspection team also noticed that said electric meters second and third dials from the right were
misaligned. Just like electric meter number 47019, Engr. Reyes also subjected electric meter
number 1587 to a test which revealed that it was not registering any electric consumption at light
load and recorded only 33.53% of electricity utilized at full load.
As the two electric meters in question were already inaccurate, Engr. Reyes and petitioner
decided to remove them and had them individually wrapped, sealed, and brought to petitioners
office for safekeeping.
Pursuant to the procedure adopted by petitioner in cases of meter tampering, respondents were
required to make a deposit for the repair and replacement of the two electric meters. The
amount of deposit required in this case was pegged at P4,000.00 for each account which was
paid by respondent Ramos, Jr. on 19 September 1988. With this payment, petitioner
immediately installed "good meters" at respondents residence and office.
Everything seemed back to normal following the replacement of the allegedly tampered electric
meters on 19 September 1988. Problem, however, arose anew when in January 1989,
respondents received from petitioner an electric bill charging them with the amount of P7,894.99
for account number 510-4019 prompting respondents to file a complaint with petitioner. On
verification, it was discovered that electric meter number 7168 which replaced electric meter
number 47019 erroneously recorded respondents electric consumption beginning November
1989. Accordingly, respondents January electric bill was revised to only P5,625.55 and credit
memorandum no. 38711 dated 07 February 198911 was issued in favor of respondents.
On or about 17 March 1989, petitioners customer relations department received a lettercomplaint from Konsumo Dabaw regarding respondents recomputed electric bill for account
number 510-4019. Petitioner thereafter conducted another verification of electric meter number
7168 and it was then discovered that said meter was running backwards, and that no error was
committed by petitioner in respondents meter reading on 14 January 1989. Accordingly,
petitioner sent a letter12 to Konsumo Dabaw explaining this matter and on 30 March 1989,
petitioner replaced electric meter number 7168 with electric meter number 24305.
In the third week of June 1989, petitioner adjusted respondents December 1988 to May 1989
electric bills based on the latters monthly consumption as registered by electric meter number
24305 and taking into consideration credit memorandum no. 3887.
Petitioner likewise claimed in its answer that respondents unbilled consumption amounting
to P84,398.76 relative to account number 510-4019 13 and P49,512.63 for account number 510402014 covered the period September 1983 to September 1988 and was based on the highest
registration of the electric meter for each account - 1,047 kilowatthours for account number 510401915 and 963 kilowatthours in the case of account number 510-4020. 16The amounts claimed
as unbilled consumption, however, merely represented petitioners initial bargaining position with
respondents in the hope that the latter would come clean and submit proof as to when they had
the electric meters tampered and made additions to their connected load.
Also, petitioner asserted in its answer that its letter dated 16 June 1989 17 giving respondents the
period of ten days within which to settle the matter with petitioner was designed to bring
respondents to the bargaining table for a fair and just settlement of petitioners claim and that the
threatened actions contained in said letter were never implemented by petitioner.
Furthermore, based on the summaries of respondents monthly electric consumption from
September 1983 to June 1989 18 it would appear that the tampering of electric meter number
47019 occurred between late December 1983 or early January 1984 when said meter registered
only 302 kilowatthours a drastic drop in consumption considering its recording of 708
kilowatthours for the previous billing period. As regards electric meter number 1587, its
tampering allegedly occurred sometime in late July or early August 1985 when this electric meter
registered only 170 kilowatthours which was way below its previous recording of 663
kilowatthours for the previous billing period.
In its answer, petitioner moreover presented another method of computing respondents unbilled
consumption which was arrived at using respondents daily average consumption registered by
the new electric meters and multiplying this by thirty days. Thus, for account number 510-4019,
petitioner charged respondents the amount ofP65,918.13 as of September 1988 plus 2%
monthly surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989 totallingP8,636.12. In addition, this amount
was supposed to carry the 2% monthly surcharge until fully paid. With respect to account
number 510-4020, petitioner claimed the amount of P28,328.45 for the period August 1985 to
September 1988, plus P4,028.74 representing 2% monthly surcharge from October 1988 to July
1989. Similarly, this amount would carry the 2% surcharge until fully settled by respondents.
Ultimately, petitioner prayed that judgment in its favor be given ordering respondents to jointly
and severally pay:
(1) The sum of P74,554.25 as unbilled consumption under Account No. 510-4019 inclusive of
2% monthly surcharge up to July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989
until fully paid.
(2) The sum of P32,357.19 as unbilled consumption under Account No. 510-4020 inclusive of
2% monthly surcharge up to July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989
until fully paid.
89
(3) The sum of P50,000.00 as damages for attorneys fee and expenses of litigation, plus an
additionalP30,000.00 should there be an appeal or petition for certiorari.
Petitioner next presented ENGR. REYES on the witness stand. Essentially, he testified that his
work involved using standard metering instrument and conducting inspections and investigations
of alleged tampering of electric meters both in residential and commercial buildings.
(4) The sums of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages.19
On 20 July 1989, Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, considering the nature of the complaint
and the urgency of the provisional remedy prayed for, ordered petitioner from doing any act
complained of within twenty days from receipt of said order and scheduled the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on 01 August 1989.20
After the pre-trial, the continuous trial of the case proceeded in reverse order as agreed upon by
the parties in order for petitioner, as defendant below, to prove its allegation of meter tampering.
JOSE ROBERTO A. SARDINIA (Sardinia) testified that at the time material to this case, he was
the legal assistant in petitioners Legal Affairs and Public Relation Department. On 16
September 1988, petitioners system department ordered the conduct of inspection and
examination of alleged tampered electric meters. Relative to said directive, two teams were
formed, one of which was headed by Sardinia himself. The other members of his team were an
instrument technician from petitioners laboratory department named Alfredo Lucero (Lucero);
driver; lineman; photographer; a representative of the city electrician office; and Engr. Reyes.
In the afternoon of said date, his team proceeded to the place where the electric meters in
question were installed. There, they were met by respondent Ramos, Jr.s employees Perucho
and Galagar. Perucho and Galagar informed Sardinia that it was their employer, respondent
Ramos, Jr., who actually paid the electric bills under the account name of respondent Opea. In
addition, Perucho and Galagar told the team that respondent Ramos, Jr., was in Manila during
that time. Despite this information, the inspection team proceeded with their planned
examination of the two electric meters. Engr. Reyes conducted the meter testing which was
witnessed by Perucho and Galagar. The photographer who accompanied the inspection team
likewise took photos of the two electric meters while these were being examined. 21
As part of his duty as the team leader, Sardinia made written reports of the results of the meter
testing. According to Sardinia, the government seal (inner seal) of the electric meter bearing
serial number 47019 was deformed and its DLPC seal (outer seal) was broken. 22 As for electric
meter number 1587, the inspection revealed that its government seal was missing while its
DLPCs seal was substituted with a deformed lead seal which was not the type used by
petitioner.23
After the electric meters were tested by Engr. Reyes, Sardinia had them wrapped with manila
paper. Sardinias name and signature as well as those of Engr. Reyes and an employee of
respondent Ramos, Jr. were written on the tape used for sealing the wrapping paper. Thereafter,
the electric meters were taken to petitioners office.
When asked by the court, Sardinia stated that the information regarding the existence of
tampered electric meters was relayed to petitioner by an informant whose identity he refused to
divulge. Moreover, due to the alleged urgency of the situation, his team could not afford to wait
for respondent Ramos, Jr. to return from Manila; hence, they continued with the inspection.
According to Engr. Reyes, on 16 September 1988, he inspected two electric meters as

evidenced by the reports he accomplished and marked as Exhibits "4" and "5" for petitioner.
Using a standard equipment of his office, he discovered that the two electric meters were not
accurately registering the electricity consumed by respondent Ramos, Jr. Particularly, electric
meter number 47019 did not record electric consumption at light load and 27.57% consumption
at full load.24 Similarly, electric meter number 1587 did not register any rotation when tested at
light load; at full load, it reflected only a 33.53% accuracy.25
Further, Engr. Reyes corroborated Sardinias testimony that the government seal of electric
meter number 47019 was deformed or tampered with. In his report as regards electric meter
number 1587, Engr. Reyes shared Sardinias observation that its DLPCs seal was deformed
while its government seal was missing.
Lucero testified that he was assigned in the laboratory section of petitioner. He maintained that it
was the standard procedure observed by petitioner that electric meters acquired by the latter are
tested26 using a standard testing instrument and thereafter, the meters are turned over to the
representatives of the Board of Energy (BOE) 27 who subject the meters to their own
examination. After the BOE establishes the accuracy of an electric meter, it attaches thereto a
seal which is known as the BOE seal. This seal protects the meter from being opened such that
one cannot get into the internal component of an electric meter without breaking the BOE seal.
Once an electric meter bearing the BOE seal is installed, petitioner attaches to its bottom portion
an outside seal which prevents the meter from being pulled out anytime.
In addition, Lucero averred that on 16 September 1988, he was a member of the inspection
team which examined the electric meters issued under the account name of respondent Opea.
As part of the team, it was his task to make a load inspection report 28 for each electric meter
listing therein the various electrical items connected to every meter.
Another witness for petitioner was ARSENIO SACAMOS, JR. (Sacamos, Jr.), head of
petitioners billing and collection department. Sacamos, Jr. stated in the witness stand that he
was requested by Atty. Oscar Breva, petitioners counsel, to prepare a summary of kilowatt
consumption for account numbers 510-4019 and 510-4020. In the case of account number 5104019, his department collated the material data from September 1983 to June 1989. His
analysis of the data established a drastic drop in electric consumption recorded by electric meter
number 47019 commencing in January 1984 until September 1988 when the replacement meter
registered a high consumption.
As regards account number 510-4020, Sacamos, Jr. averred that they gathered the pertinent
information from September 1983 to June 1989 and data revealed a severe drop in electric
consumption from July 1985 until September 1988 when electric meter number 1587 was
replaced.
90
As the two electric meters were not accurately registering the amount of electricity used by
respondent Ramos, Jr., petitioner demanded from the latter payments of unbilled consumption
for the two accounts. For account number 510-4019, he prepared a computation of unbilled
consumption of respondents indicating that as of 19 September 1988, a total unpaid
consumption amounting to P65,918.13 for the period January 1984 to September 1988 inclusive
of P22,737.49 cumulative surcharge.
In account number 510-4020, the unbilled consumption prepared by their department indicated a
total unbilled consumption to be P28,328.45 which includes P8,184.72 in surcharges.29
Over the vigorous objection by respondents counsel, the trial court received in evidence the
updated summary of kilowatthour consumption prepared by Sacamos, Jr.s department for the
period July 1989 to March 1990 of account number 510-4019 as recorded by electric meter
number 24305.30 A similar summary was prepared for account number 510-4020 as registered
by electric meter number 45908 which replaced electric meter number 1587.31
trip to Manila. Soon thereafter, he went to petitioners office to clarify what transpired in the
afternoon of 16 September 1988 and was told by Atty. Braganza that the inspection team
removed the electric meters because they were defective. In addition, he was informed that the
electric supply to his residence and his office would be reconnected upon his payment of
theP2,000.00 deposit for each electric meter. Respondent Ramos, Jr. also declared in court that
he had no participation in the alleged tampering of the electric meters nor did he cause anyone
else to tamper the same.
On cross-examination, respondent Ramos, Jr. admitted that at the time he paid the deposit to
petitioner,
he
was
made
to
sign
a
letter
dated
19 September 198835 which, in part, reads:
September 19, 1988
The Manager
In the course of his testimony, Sacamos, Jr. also explained the processes of computing a
consumers actual electric consumption. The first method simply involves computing the average
consumption of electric power while the second involves calculating the average monthly
reading at a certain period of time after a defective electric meter was replaced.
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
Petitioner then presented as its witness the head of its customers relation department in 1983,
JOSELITO ORTIZ. Ortiz testified regarding a letter-complaint of respondent Ramos, Jr. coursed
through Konsumo Dabawcomplaining of the abnormal reading of the replacement meter for
account number 510-4019. In his response to said letter-complaint, Ortiz wrote separate letters
to Konsumo Dabaw32 and to respondent Ramos, Jr.33explaining that the erroneous meter
reading was because the meter installed in lieu of the purported tampered one was registering
electric consumption backwards. Because of this finding, another electric meter was installed
under account number 510-4019 and a credit adjustment was made on the electric bills under
the name of respondent Opea.
Dear Sir:
The last witness for petitioner was MANUEL ORIG, vice-president of petitioner who stated in his
testimony that petitioner suffered damages because of the filing of this case by respondents, to
wit: moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00; exemplary damages amounting
to P10,000.00; attorneys fees of P40,000.00; and litigation expenses of P10,000.00.34
On the other hand, respondents presented for their first witness GALAGAR. Galagar testified
that after the removal of the two electric meters involved in this case, the inspection team
requested her and her former fellow employee Perucho to observe the meter testing and
examination conducted by the team despite their lack of knowledge about the whole procedure.
After the testing, she and Perucho signed the inspection reports prepared by Sardinias team
which were marked during the trial as Exhibits "7" and "AA." In addition, Galagar stated that
during the entire period of her employment with respondent Ramos, Jr., she never saw anyone
tinker with the subject electric meters.
The second witness presented by respondents was respondent RAMOS, JR. himself who
declared that he learned about the removal of the two electric meters upon his return from his
Davao City
This has reference to kilowatthour Meter No. 47019/1587 under Account Nos. 510-4019/-4020
connected to the electrical installation in the name of my mother-in-law CRISTINA OPENA which
I understand has been reported to you as having been tampered.
...
Very truly yours,
(SGD)TEOFILO RAMOS, JR.
After the trial, the court a quo issued its decision dated 01 October 199036 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of plaintiff, sufficient by preponderance, to sustain relief in
the enforcement of defendants computation of alleged tampered meters, marked as plaintiffs
[Annexes] "C," to "C-8" up to "G" and "G-8," finding the evidence of defendant in the reverse
order of trial, not sufficient by preponderance of evidence, to warrant enforcement of
[defendants] so-called unbilled electrical consumption against plaintiff, the above-documents,
are declared null and void, without any effect, against plaintiff.
As a consequence of the filing of this case, on account of the trouble, worries, mental agony,
suffered by plaintiff due to defendants unreasonable imposition of the so-called unbilled
consumption, without any factual and legal basis, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the
91
amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages, including exemplary damages, by way of example to

the public, in the amount of P5,000.00 and cost against defendant.
3. Consumption record of respondents show a significant drop in consumption.

4. Failure to disclose tipster does not destroy presumption.
As a result of this decision, defendants counterclaim, is denied.37

The trial court dismissed as without basis petitioners claim that electric meter numbers 1587
and 47019 were tampered with. The trial court pointed to the fact that petitioners evidence and
testimonies given by Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero failed to bolster its position that the
subject electric meters were indeed tampered particularly since the identity of the purported
perpetrator of the misdeed was never established by petitioner. Petitioners recalcitrance to
reveal its confidential source did not also escape the trial courts perceptiveness, thus:
Indeed, why defendant cannot reveal the identity of the source of its information, as to the defect
of the subject meters, when precisely, it was because of the said information, that prompted
defendant to inspect and test the subject [meters]? There is nothing urgently dangerous to
protect the identity of said informant because anyway, he or she, can be safely protected by
defendant and that anyway everything was known, so that plaintiff or anybody else, cannot do
anything to run after the alleged informant. As it [turned-out], said information, could have
provided sufficiently, a key to [plaintiffs] involvement [to] the alleged "tampering," . . . 38
Another point taken against petitioner was its insistence to conduct the examination of the
electric meters in question despite the absence of respondent Ramos, Jr. As the trial court
observed, both Galagar and Perucho did not know anything about electricity and the procedure
undertaken by petitioners inspection team. Moreover, the presence of respondent Ramos, Jr.
could have presented petitioner with the opportunity to confront him on the matter of electric
meter tampering.
As for the amount of unbilled consumption, it was the trial courts finding that the procedure
adopted by petitioner in computing the amounts being claimed from respondents were
"unreliable and highly speculative"39 as the factors considered such as average monthly
consumption seemed to have been arbitrarily arrived at.
5. Concern of the Court of Appeals over possible defect of electric meters or that the tipster was
responsible for the tampering is misplaced.
6. Manner of computation of the amount and period of the unbilled consumption (now called
differential billing under R.A. No. 7832) is legal and reasonable. 42
Essentially, petitioner raises the issues of: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
retroactively applying Republic Act No. 7832 and (2) whether the appellate court erred in not
finding respondents liable for unbilled consumption.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The law in force at the time of the institution of the present case was Presidential Decree No.
401 or the law Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters, and Other Acts. The pertinent
portion of this statute provides:
. . . [A]ny person who installs any water, electrical or telephone connection without previous
authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company
or the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, as the case may be; tampers and/or uses
tampered water or electrical meters or jumpers or other devices whereby water or electricity is
stolen; steals or pilfers water and/or electric meters or water, electric and/or telephone wires;
knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water and/or electrical meters as well as stolen or
pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, shall, upon conviction, be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or
both. . .
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner elevated its case to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, to wit:
On 08 December 1994, Rep. Act No. 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994" was approved. Section 2 of this law
enumerates the acts constitutive of illegal use of electricity, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, except for the deletion therefrom of the
award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, the appealed judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects.40
SEC. 2. Illegal Use of Electricity. - . . .

...
Petitioner is now before this Court, through the instant petition for review, relying upon the
following arguments:
1. Passage of R.A. No. 783241 vindicates petitioner.
(c) Tamper, install or use a tampered electrical meter, jumper, current reversing transformer,
shorting or shunting wire, loop connection or any other device which interferes with the proper or
accurate registry or metering of electric current or otherwise results in its diversion in a manner
whereby electricity is stolen or wasted;
2. Broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence of meter-tampering.
92
(d) Damage or destroy an electric meter, equipment, wire, or conduit or allow any of them to be
so damaged or destroyed as to interfere with the proper or accurate metering of electric current;
and
(e) Knowingly use or receive the direct benefit of electric service obtained through any of the
acts mentioned in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.
On the other hand, Section 4 of the same law lists the circumstances which shall establish
the prima facieevidence of illegal use of electricity. Among these are:
(iii) The existence of any wiring connection which affects the normal operation or registration of
the electric meter;
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered, or
tampered meter recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph or log;
(vi) The mutilation, alteration, reconnection, disconnection, bypassisng or tampering of

instruments, transformers, and accessories;
(vii) The destruction of, or attempt to destroy, any integral accessory of the metering device box
which encases an electric meter or its metering accessories; and. . .
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it did not apply the presumption of meter
tampering in this case. It argues that the broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima
facie evidence of meter tampering and, when taken together with the significant drop in the
registered electric consumption of respondents, establishes that the latter clearly benefited from
the inaccuracy of electric meters 47019 and 1587. We do not agree.
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendants. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.46
In other words, the proof of the existence of the prima facie evidence is still the burden of the
plaintiff. Moreover, as will be shown later, Rep. Act No. 7832 cannot apply because it was only
approved on 08 December 1994; hence, the general rules on evidence must be applied.
In this case, petitioner anchors its claim of meter tampering on the result of the examination
conducted by its inspection team. Its witnesses
Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero - all testified that a plain view of the electric meters in
question showed that the inner and outer seals which were supposed to be attached thereto
were either deformed, missing, or replaced with ordinary lead wire. Furthermore, the meter
testing conducted by Engr. Reyes revealed that the two electric meters were not accurately
recording the electric consumption of respondents.
We hold that petitioners evidence is insufficient for us to rule in its favor.
While it is true that respondent Ramos, Jr. merely offered a categorical denial of the accusation
hurled against him and his co-respondent Opea, nevertheless, the records of this case present
other factors which should tilt the scale of evidence in favor of respondents.
As established by petitioners witnesses Sardinia and Lucero, the allegedly tampered electric
meters were installed in conspicuous portions of respondent Ramos, Jr.s residence and office.
In his cross-examination Sardinia testified in the following manner:
ATTY. CADIENTE:
In the case of United States v. Luling,43 this Court recognized "that no constitutional provision is
violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for
the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful
intention."44
Q - You are familiar with the place of Cristina Opea and/or Teofilo Ramos?
In Jison v. Court of Appeals,45 we declared
A - Yes, sir.
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in
light of the burden of proof in civil case, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the
burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with
Q - The meter is located also in front of the building facing Quezon Boulevard?
A - I am not really that familiar, but I have seen the place when I inspected.
Q - It is located along Quezon Boulevard in this city, is that correct?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And it is located about 2-1/2 to 3 meters high?
A - I think, it is higher than that.
93
Q - And the place is surrounded by residential houses?
A - I cannot remember.
A - Yes, sir.
Q - But it is above the ground?
Q - It is also a busy street?
A - It is above the ground.
A - I think.
Q - Can it be reached by a hand without stepping on a certain object or you have to step on a
ladder?
Q - We said busy, because several trucks, several jeepneys, several cars and even pedestrian
passed the street?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Would you agree with me, that if somebody opened or touched the meter, just facing the
Quezon Boulevard street, this is very visible to people around?
A - I dont think, I can agree with you, because the location of meter is quite higher, considering
that this is beyond [reach of] ordinary people.
Q - But it can be seen by people around or even by the pedestrian [passing] by?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - In fact, even the passing passengers inside the jeep, it can be seen?
A - I cannot remember.
Q - And you admit that Quezon Boulevard is a very busy street whereby trucks, jeeps and
several pedestrians pass from time to time?
A - Yes, Sir.48
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, the electric meters were
mounted in notable places within the premises owned by respondent Opea. More than that, the
building itself was situated along a busy street in Davao City. This being the case, it becomes
highly inconceivable that no one witnessed the alleged tampering of the subject electric meters
considering the surroundings where they were set up. Indeed, any person tinkering with the
meters could have easily attracted the attention and suspicion of neighbors and passers-by.
Even if this Court indulges petitioner in its claim that it received a confidential information from
an unidentified source regarding the claimed meter tampering, still, such allegation cannot
support a finding against respondents. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
A - It can be seen.
Q - In other words, if somebody touches or opens [tinkers] with that meter, it can be easily visible
to the people around?
A - I think.47
Appellants49 (petitioner herein) admit that they have no direct evidence to show that appellees
(respondents herein) caused the meter to be tampered, claiming that in cases such as this, it is
well nigh impossible to secure such kind of evidence because it is a clandestine operation.
On the other hand, Luceros cross-examination proceeded thus:
However, appellants contradicted their own stand when they claim that they have their own
source which furnished them information regarding the alleged tampering. Appellants witness
Jose R. Sardinia in answer to the courts query testified
Q - On September 16, 1988, when you went to the place of plaintiff, you knew that the electric
meter was installed outside the residence?
Q - Did the Court understand from you Mr. Sardinia that the source of this alleged tampering
were submitted to your [field] office confidentially?
A - The installation of the meter?
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Q - The meter was outside the residence fronting Boulevard Avenue?
Q - As Assistant Legal Officer of the Davao Light, this confidential matter is not even known to
you?
A - Yes, Sir.
A - It was given to me in confidentially (sic) and I am not going to divulge it.
Q - And it is elevated about three meters high from the ground?
94
Q - Meaning that confidential has something to do with the business of Davao Light or
confidentially in the sources of information itself?
the discovery and employing the highest recorded monthly consumption within four (4) months
after the time of discovery.53
A - Yes, I think, this is confidentially taken in order for the company to protect it safeguard also
the person.
Petitioners argument fails to convince.
Q - Meaning you are safeguarding the identity of the informer?

A - Yes, Your Honor.
Notwithstanding the fact that appellants have the best or complete evidence entirely within their
control, they refused to produce or at least, refrained from producing the same. Thus appellants
failed to prove their claim with the best evidence obtainable their informer/source.
On this matter, it has been held that where a party fails to present a fact necessary to his case
when it is within his power to do so, it will be presumed that such fact does not exist. 50
On this point, petitioner relies heavily on this Courts holding in the case of People of the
Philippines v. Lopez51where we ruled that the testimony of an informer is not indispensable in
view of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who participated in the "buy-bust" operation.
Such reliance is misplaced.
In the Lopez case, we held that there was no need for the prosecution to present the confidential
informer as the poseur-buyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who sold to
him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then properly relied
on the testimonies of the police officers despite the prosecutions decision not to present the
informer.
In this case, as the testimonies of petitioners witnesses failed to directly link respondents to the
alleged meter tampering, it was essential for petitioner to present, as its witness, the supposed
informer instead of simply relying on the testimonies of some members of the inspection team.
As the records show, the testimonies of Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero were bereft of any
indication that respondents either tampered or caused the claimed tampering of the electric
meters.
Anent the issue of unbilled consumption, petitioner contends that the amount to be charged to a
consumer for unbilled consumption cannot be calculated with exactitude. Thus, even Rep. No.
7832 itself provides for five different methods of computing the sum of unbilled consumption and
two modes of determining the period of back-billing 52 and that the two methods it employed in
determining respondents unbilled consumption in this case are now incorporated into the said
legislation. This, petitioner maintains, proves that there was nothing arbitrary in its determination
of the unbilled consumption it seeks from respondents. These techniques involve the use of the
highest recorded monthly consumption within the five-year billing period preceding the time of
It is a basic rule in our jurisdiction that laws do not have retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.54 In the present case, Rep. Act No. 7832 is bereft of any indication that the legislature
intended to give it a retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 17 of said law clearly
provides that it "shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in
any two (2) national papers of general circulation." As the Rep. Act No. 7832 plainly states its
prospective application, we cannot give credence to petitioners argument that its passage
validates the amounts it imposed on respondents for unbilled consumption. 55
Moreover, petitioner, as a public utility corporation, "has the imperative duty to make a
reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not
malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair the defects therein." 56
As claimed by petitioner, the sudden "drastic" drop in the registered electric consumption
commenced sometime in December 1983 or January 1984 for account number 510-4019 and
July 1985 or August 1985 for account number 510-4020.57 Inexplicably, petitioner allowed
several years to lapse before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric meters involved in
this case. Such failure on its part to detect the extended unusual pattern in the recorded electric
consumption clearly demonstrates gross negligence on its part and palpable violation of its duty
"to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they
do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to
perform such duties constitutes negligence."58
Indeed, it is highly inequitable if we are to allow a public utility company to be continuously
remiss in its duty and then later on charge the consumer exorbitant amount for the alleged
unbilled consumption or differential billing when such a situation could have been easily averted.
We simply cannot sanction petitioners utter neglect of its duty over a number of years as this
would undoubtedly be detrimental to the interest of the consuming public.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals decision
dated 29 May 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35114, affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City in Civil Case No. 19,648-89, is hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
95

Sasan To Davao

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G.R. No.

October 17, 2008

ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

= 5 months and 6 days

= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

5. Roland Sasan, Sr.

10. Modesto Aguirre

11. Alejandro Ardimer

= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2

2. Dominador Suico, Jr.

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

G.R. No. 180291

July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F.

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR

WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE

WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR

Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of

WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,

2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.

2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.

3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.

5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of

2.2 cheek, right.

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

A: After he removed the broken pots with which he

Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened

A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told

A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the

xxx xxx xxx

EVIDENCE: SASAN TO DAVAO

A: The admission was made twice. The first one was,

Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and

Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I

A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and