Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 29, No.

4, December 2009

The C
ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

ELEFTHERIA K. MANTA
Abstract
The C
ams are a little known Albanian Muslim group that lived in northwestern
Greece until 1944and so is their history: their trajectory during the first half of
the twentieth century remains to this day one of the least known subjects of relatively
recent Greek history. It is an issue which for quite a few decades remained under a
shroud of silence and virtually ignored by Greek historiography. The filling in of this
gap and the need for an approach as objective as possible to this theme is what the
present work aspires to accomplish. The chronological point of departure for this
work is the year 1923, a year in which, due to the important issue of the population
exchange, the Greek state had discovered the Albanian C
ams in Epirus and was
obliged for the first time to draw out a specific and systematic policy towards them.
The terms by which they were incorporated into the Greek state, their living
conditions, the problems that emerged during the inter-war period and, indeed,
the dramatic escalation of the issue which took place simultaneous to the Greek
Italian War, occupy the central part of the present work.
Introduction
The C
ams are a little-known Albanian Muslim group that lived in northwestern Greece,
in Epirus, until 1944. Their historical trajectory during the twentieth century remains to
this day one of the least known subjects of recent Greek historyleast known does not
mean uneventful, however. And one of the initial problems the researcher is called to
address is the determining of the numerical strength of their population, at least for
the first half of the twentieth century.
For the period before 1928, one of the few reliable documents at our disposal comes
from the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations, whose members went on
a tour throughout Epirus in June 1925. According to this, the Muslims of Epirus were at
that time about 20,160 inhabitants, who were dispersed within 63 cities and villages.
Subsequently, according to the results of the official census of 15 16th May 1928,1
there were a total of 312,634 inhabitants in Epirus; of them 17,008 were Albanophone Muslims, who may be identified as C
ams. This population was concentrated
mainly in the provinces of Filiates and Paramythia, which then belonged to the prefecture of Ioannina, and in the province of Margariti of the prefecture of Preveza. Nevertheless, combining this information with that available from various sources of the same
period, we can estimate with relative accuracy that the number of about 17,000
Muslim Albano-phones appearing in the census is a bit conservative. It is certain that
many of the bilingual inhabitants of Epirus hesitated to declare a language other than
Greek. Thus, we are obliged to consider that the data gleaned from reports and censuses
from local authorities of the era are closer to the truth. According to these, the number of

ISSN 1360-2004 print/ISSN 1469-9591 online/09/040523-13 # 2009 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
DOI: 10.1080/13602000903411424

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Eleftheria K. Manta

Muslim Albanians residing in the province of Paramythia, Margariti and Filiates was
about 19,618 people.
From then on the numbers offered from time to time by the Greek sources for all of the
1930s do not differ significantly. Thus, in 1932 the General Administration of Epirus,
collecting data from local authorities estimated the Muslim Albanians at 19,135,
whereas that same year the provincial governor of Filiates spoke of 19,437 Muslims
who resided in a total of 55 Muslim and mixed villages. In 1936, the number of
Muslim C
ams amounted to about 17,311. One however must surmise with relative
certainty that this number is not commiserate with reality and that during those years,
also given the natural increase in population, the Albanians of Epirus must have
amounted to over 22,000.
For the same reasons, it seems that the number of Albanian Muslims reported by the
census of October 16, 1940, which incidentally is not analytic, is similarly reduced.2
According to this report, there resided within the whole of Greek territory 16,890
Muslims who declared the Albanian language as their mother tongue and according to
a second estimation, 15,015 Muslims who usually spoke Albanian in their everyday
life. But, if we were to draw a picture of the population of the Albanian Muslims in
Epirus that would approach reality as much as possible, we would be obliged to return
to the statistical data cited in the mid-1930s and to estimate their number to be
between 23,000 and 24,000, which the Albanians themselves cite. The validity of this
data is corroborated also by subsequent assessments from the war period when British
officers, based on data they collected on location, estimated the Albanian population
of Epirus at about 25,000.3

The C
ams and the Greek State during the Interwar Period
The Exchange of Populations
The roots of the Muslim C
ams question in Epirus must be sought in the population
exchange policy. The agreement between the Greek and Turkish states for the compulsory exchange of Orthodox Christian inhabitants of Turkey with Muslim inhabitants of
Greece, which was signed on January 30th, 1923 in Lausanne, made no specific reference to the Muslim inhabitants of Epirus, who for the most part were automatically considered to be of Albanian origin. This fact made especially problematic their mass
inclusion into the other Muslim exchangeable populations. Nevertheless, on January
19, 1923 the Greek delegation which had participated in the negotiations in Lausanne
had declared, through Dimitrios Caclamanos, official representative of Greece at the
negotiations, that Greece has no intention to proceed to an exchange of Muslims of
Albanian origin. The Albanians reside in a region clearly defined in Epirus and
despite the fact that their religion is the same as that of the Turks, they are of a different
nationality.
In practice, however, things were not as simple as it seemed from the start, for a definitive assessment of the ethnic origin of the C
ams proved to be a difficult task. The issue
emerged when the Council of the League of Nations formed a Mixed Commission in
Istanbul, which would be responsible for the implementation of the exchange of populations, but also for the Albanian Muslims, and granted it the responsibility of gleaning
the necessary information. In its March 14th, 1924 session the Mixed Commission
decided that the Muslims of Epirus who had Albanian ancestry should be exempted
from the exchange. For the implementation of the decision the Mixed Commission

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ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

525

appointed a special three-member delegation, which was assigned the task of local
investigation of the issue. The delegation visited Epirus in May of that same year,
where they met groups of people from the villages of the region, people who had been
chosen by the Greek authorities and by the Muftis. Their conclusions were that the
vast majority of Muslims residing in Epirus declared that they were of Turkish origin
and wished to be included in the exchange. Only certain limited groups claimed that
they were of Albanian origin and therefore requested to be exempted from the measure.
According to the conclusions of the Greek authorities, at that time the C
ams of Epirus
did not yet have a clearly developed ethnic consciousness. Perhaps they felt themselves
more Muslim than Albanians or Turks; it was religion that played the prime role in
their self-determination. This also explains the general confusion which initially
prevailed amongst them regarding what their position should ultimately be, i.e. if they
should take part in the exchange and depart for Turkey or remain in the regions
where they were living.4
The conclusions that the three-member delegation arrived at, together with the incessant disagreements and mutual recriminations exchanged between the Greek and the
Albanian sides, ultimately led to the Council of the League of Nations September
1924 decision. This called for the treatment of the whole matter as an issue connected
with the implementation of the Treaty on the Protection of Minorities and required
the gathering of more information. Thus, the three neutral members of the Mixed
Commission decided to visit Epirus in order to examine the situation from up close, a
visit which took place in June, 1925. In the end what the three members ascertained
through meetings they had with various representatives of the C
ams did not differ
essentially from the conclusions which the three-member delegation had come to a
year earlier: the situation was indeed chaotic, the people had little idea about their
descent, they were above all Muslims, and their desire to migrate issued more from a
feeling of uncertainty about the future, disquiet about what fate that the Greek state
had in store for their properties and a hope for a better future in Turkey than from a
clear expression of their ethnic consciousness.
In the end, internal political developments in Greece brought the final solution to the
issue: on June 25, 1925 General Theodoros Pangalos overturned the legal government
with a military coup and seized power in Greece. He was a declared friend of the
Albanians but, above all, he was determined to improve relations between the two
states, hoping that good relations would bring significant economic benefits to Greece,
primarily the economic and commercial development of Epirus. On January 18, 1926
the Albanian ambassador in Athens, Midhat Frasheri, was promised by the Greek
Minister of Foreign Affairs that he would take up the issue of the exchange of C
ams,
whereas Pangalos himself declared that the Muslim C
ams would be exempted from
the exchange.5 A month later, in February 1926, this decision for the exemption of all
Albanians of Epirus from the compulsory exchange was communicated officially to
the Albanian government, thus providing a definitive solution to the problem. In view
of these developments, the Council of the League of Nations expressed its satisfaction
regarding the Greek decision, and the issue was from then on considered resolved.6
The Land Issue
The existence of vast land ownership already constituted a major problem for the Greek
state. The arrival of about 1.5 million refugees from Asia Minor in 1922, however, and
the obligation assumed by the state for the immediate rehabilitation and granting of five

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Eleftheria K. Manta

million square meters of land to them necessitated a radical rearrangement of the land,
through which not only large but also middle sized properties were expropriated. Also
included in this measure were the estates of the Albanian landowners who resided in
Epirus, and who had departed for Albania before 1922. Many of them had in the
meantime become significant political figures capable not only of influencing but also
of compelling the Albanian government to work for the serving of their interests.
Later on, added to these properties of Albanian citizens were the vast estates belonging
to Albanians who were exempted from the exchange and remained on Greek territory,
estates which fell under the general implementation of the measure of expropriation.
Under the government of Theodoros Pangalos, four treaties between Greece and
Albania were signed of which one was On the Establishment of a Consular Service.
Unfortunately, Article 3 of this treaty made provisions that in the case of compulsory
expropriation on the part of one of the two states, the citizens of the other state will
not be subject to a re-compensation program less favorable than that which the
natives or citizens of any third power enjoyed,7 which meant that Albanian citizens
obtained the right to get better treatment than the Greeks. However, keeping in mind
the fact that the total extent of Albanian lands which had been expropriated was
especially largethe Greek Ministry of Agriculture estimated it at one million square
kilometers, to which a significant amount of urban properties, houses, mills, etc. had
also to be addedthe economic load for the Greek state would have been unbearable
if not totally catastrophic. For this reason the Greek parliament did not vote in favor
of this treaty, a fact which negatively influenced the relations between the two states.
When the military regime of Pangalos was finally overturned, in 1926 the next legal
government was not disposed to be so yielding to the Albanians or to be plunged into
exorbitant economic sacrifices, especially because the Albanian state seemed not to be
complying with the promises it had made regarding the rights of the Greek minority
which resided in her southern territories.8
The presence of the C
ams in Thesprotia constituted a powerful card in the hands of
the Albanian government for the exertion of pressure, which they hastened to exploit.
Their efforts evolved around two basic axes: the first concerned the C
ams living conditions and the purported implementation of economic and administrative measures
to their detriment by the Greek authorities and the second concerned the petition that
schools be opened for the teaching of the Albanian language in villages where there
was an Albanian population. More specifically, the Greek state was constantly accused
of violating the fundamental right to ownership, for it had proceeded to extended expropriations of C
am properties from the time when the issue of whether they would be
included in the exchange of populations or not was still unsettled. In reply to all accusations the Greek side clarified that the expropriation was of general character and
implemented in the same way for all citizens of the state. Not only was there no
special discrimination against the properties of the C
ams, but the government took
care to implement the measure more leniently in their case and, especially in Epirus,
to limit the influx and establishment of refugees. In any case, according to the 1928
census, in all of Epirus there resided only a total of 8,179 refugees, of whom 323 were
in the province of Paramythia, 720 in Filiates and 275 in the province of Margariti,
numbers that cannot support the Albanian accusations on privileged treatment of
refugees to the detriment of the Albanians.9
Despite Greek assurances, Albania appealed to the League of Nations regarding the
issue, an appeal which was ultimately discussed in the 50th Meeting of the Council in
the first days of June 1928. The Albanian delegate, Midhat Frasheri, repeated once

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ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

527

again the Albanian governments demands regarding the expropriated lands and even
submitted a proposal for the forming of a mixed committee that was to have been
entrusted with the task of a definitive settlement. In reference to the C
ams, Greece
was accused of applying restrictive measures and various pressures against them,
especially in the vital areas of ownership, their representation in communal and provincial councils, the running of schools and military recruitment. In its decision, which was
announced just a few days later, the League of Nations initially relegated the settlement
of the issue of restitution or re-compensation of expropriated lands to bilateral negotiations. Regarding the treatment of the Albanian minority in Greece, it was stressed
that the League of Nations prime concern was the avoidance of foreign meddling in
the internal affairs of a state regarding minority issues as well as the concern that such
problems do not develop into hot beds for strife between neighbouring states. So, the
Council of the League of Nations was not to deal with the matter anymore, especially
since many of the issues referred to, had already been the subject of relevant discussions
and reports in the past.10 As one may ascertain, the decision of the League of Nations
was a clear vindication of the Greek position.
Despite the crisis in relations between Athens and Tirana and the broader problems this
caused, the Venizelos government (19281932) seemed determined to intensify efforts for
the improvement of the C
ams situation on the economic and social levels. The first issue
that had to be dealt with was definitely the land one and the government made efforts to
settle the issue of reimbursement, for this constituted a permanent source of grievances
for the Albanian population. Thus, by mid 1931 a law was passed which provided for
the direct payment of reimbursement to Greek citizens through their granting of analogous
bonds and the direct return of improperly expropriated urban properties.11 Indeed, some
Albanian families began to respond to these new favorable regulations and to accept the
reimbursement determined by the state. On the other hand, the Albanian state accepted
the Greek proposal for the payment of indemnification in bonds, thus freeing the way
for the promulgation of the relevant legislation on June 15, 1933 and the hastening of
the process of paying indemnification to the Albanian citizens.12 According to information
from the Greek embassy in Tirana, by the middle of 1935 a great number of Albanian
demands had been satisfied and consequently one of the most chronic problems for
GreekAlbanian relations seemed at least to be coursing towards settlement.13
The Metaxas Regime
The alteration of the internal and political scene in Greece during the second half of the
1930s was unavoidably to influence the living conditions of the Muslim C
ams of Epirus
as well as of all other Greek citizens. The Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship (1936 1940)
imposed an undisguised repressive policy in Epirus, which to a great extent also affected
the other minority groups residing in the state, including not only the Slavo-phones of
Western Macedonia and the Muslims of Thrace but also the Greek communists and generally all those of different opinion. The practices of the new regime were characterized
by an increase in authoritarian police tactics applied contrary to laws then in force. In this
context, the C
ams, just as the communists and the Slavo-phones of Macedonia, were to
be viewed by the new leaders of national security as potential internal enemies and
were suddenly found to be the object of intimidation and various repressive measures.
Already from the first months of the founding of the so-called New State, as the
Metaxas dictatorship was officially called, information and reports on the use of
methods of intimidation on the part of the gendarmerie against the Albanians of

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Eleftheria K. Manta

Chamuria increased. Amongst those methods were included: arbitrary arrests and
imprisonments; house searches for the discovery of arms; beatings and violence; also,
above all, measures connected to the prohibition of the use of Albanian mother
tongue in public as well as in private places and even the prohibition of Albanian
books and newspapers which were distributed by the Albanian consulate in Ioannina.14
Particularly regarding this latter measure, one must note that the prohibition to speak
any foreign language in all commercial transactions and gatherings by police decree was
universally applied in all of Northern Greece and its implementation had been delegated
to the gendarmerie. Penalties imposed on violators ranged from a simple scolding to a
heavy monetary fine and imprisonment. In any case, according to information regarding
the application of this measure in Greek Western Macedonia, the Slavo-phones of
that region particularly suffered the brunt of this wave of state terrorism whereas in
comparison the Albanians of Epirus were treated with relative elasticity.

The Role of the Italians

What characterizes the 1930s more than anything else was the parallel operation of
Albanian and Italian propaganda regarding the destiny of the C
ams and C
hamuria.
Italian policy was known from very early on to have made efforts for the enforcement of
a nationalistic attitude within Albania and to cultivate the idea of non-liberated Albanian
territories, i.e. Kosovo and C
hamuria. These activities spread even into Epirus itself. The
main aim of the Albanian propagandists there was the cultivation of an Albanian national
consciousness among the Muslim population and the strengthening of the irredentist
spirit.15 This resulted, on the one hand, in a prevalent feeling of insecurity amongst the
Greeks inhabitants of Epirus and especially those living in mixed communities and, on
the other hand, the intensification of general suspicion regarding the ultimate aims of
their activities. Active figures were mainly local leaders who were economically prominent
and had influence over the population and who believed in the notion of territorial union
with Albania. The intensity of their hopes for the realization of their expectations, i.e. the
unification with the motherland, ultimately reached its zenith when the Italian army
occupied Albania on April 1939. Of course the Italian side did whatever was in its
power to further cultivate this feeling of expectation for her own strategic reasons: the
assurance that Italy had come to realize the national aspirations of the Albanians and to
extend the borders of their country towards C
hamuria and Kosovo was repeatedly iterated
at every possible opportunity by Italian officials.
As was to be expected, propagandistic activity and the preparations that had been
scheduled already from 1939 took on a more organized form from the summer of
1940, when Mussolini had already definitively reached the conclusion that for political
and strategic reasons he absolutely needed a war against Greece. Provocations fabricated
by the Italians were successive. Amongst these is included the renowned Daut Hoxha
incident, the notorious criminal hailing from Thesprotia who sought refuge in Albanian
territory in order to escape arrest in Greece. His murder near the Greek Albanian
borders in June 1940 constituted the ideal opportunity for the transformation of a
secondary event into a propagandistic fireball. Mussolini himself decided on 11th
August to incite and further promote the issue. References were made to the heroic
figure Daut Hoxha, that distinguished and zealous partisan of the Albanian liberation
movement, and to the trials and hardships of his compatriots that were piling up to
become an avalanche. In a meeting he had in Rome on the next day, the 12th August

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ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

529

1940, with Ciano and others, Mussolini announced that the seizure of Chamuria and
Corfu was to be part of his political and military actions against Greece.
The Events of World War II
The first signs of some C
ams collaborating with the Italian forces date from the very first
days of the Italian attack against Greece, in 1940. About one thousand irregulars were
amongst the first to accompany the Italians who entered Thesprotia, and information
also exists on the use of C
am guides within the first groups of Italian scouts and sabotage
forces from the second day of the attack.16 Up until November 13, when the descent of
the Italians into Epirus continued along with the retreat of the Greek army south of the
Kalamas River, groups of armed C
ams accompanied the Italian army and entered the
cities of Thesprotia as liberators. That initial brief period of Italian presence in Epirus
constituted a foretaste of what was to follow: Filiates, Igoumenitsa, Mourtos were
burnt, villages were pillaged, houses stripped, stores looted, murders were recorded,
which were considered as acts of revenge for land disputes.17 In Filiates especially, the
sacking and destruction committed, in which Italian soldiers participated together
with the Albanian irregulars, was of such an extent that the Italian command of the
Siena Division was compelled to promulgate an order for the curtailment of these
outrages and the general anarchy that was prevailing.18
The Greek counterattack began on the 14th of November; from that time up to the
German attack in April 1941 the situation in Thesprotia underwent a turnabout. The
Greek army recaptured the territories of that region and advanced northward within
Albania. The Christians who had fled returned to their villages and found their
houses sacked and burnt. Then many Albanian men of the region were arrested by
the authorities and banished to Korinth, Chios and Mytilini where they remained
until the Germans came to Greece. Those men for whom there was proof of their
armed activities during the brief period of the Italians stay in Epirus were shot. On
their part the Greek inhabitants of the villages, who had suffered the consequences of
that first occupation movement of the Albanians, did not neglect to commit acts of
retaliation against the Albanians, and there followed murders of Albanians or their
mysterious disappearances.19
The German attack of April 1941 against Greece and the Greek surrender signaled the
retreat of the Greek army from Albania and Epirus and the return of the Italians, now as
sovereigns over that region. Up until the middle of May that year their establishment in
Paramythia and other Epirote cities and the organization of their services, were completed. The return of the C
ams who had been exiled to the Greek islands also took
place, which in many cases took on a festive air. When the festivities had ended, with
the tolerance and in some cases the urging of the Italians, the organization of the
C
ams themselves in Thesprotia commenced. Attempts were also made to introduce
the Albanian language into everyday life; the Albanian flag was hoisted on public
buildings some civil centers.20 These organizational efforts took on a more centralized
character when the Italian authorities appointed Xhemil Dino as High Commissioner
of Thesprotia. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Albanian puppet government, installed after the seizure by the Italians in 1939 and he was known in the past
for his activities in Epirus.21 The C
ams hastened to organize the administration of the
region by founding the infamous Xilia, in June 1942. This was a mechanism for
self-government with local committees-councils in cities and villages of Thesprotia,
which essentially replaced the Greek administration and seized judicial, administrative,

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Eleftheria K. Manta

and police authority. It seems that in implementing this system their ultimate goal was to
secure a kind of administrative autonomy for Thesprotia, which could more easily lead
to its independence from Greece and its incorporation into the Albanian state.
At the same time Count Ciano commenced his efforts for the creation of a Greater
Albania, which aspired to include within her borders all Albanian inhabitants of the
Balkans. In discussions held with the Germans on 21 22 April 1941 it was agreed
that Albania would be granted the territories claimed by Ciano, excepting regions
around Ohrid which passed into Bulgarian possession; and a portion of Kosovo in the
region of Mitrovica, which the Germans wanted to maintain under their direct
control.22 Greek Thesprotia was not included amongst the territories annexed to
Albania and remained under the control of the High Command of Athens because of
the German reaction. It seems that, amongst other factors which worked against such
an annexation was the fact that, in contrast to Kosovo, the inhabitants of Epirus were
by a vast majority Greeks, which could not justify any administrative reorganization in
that region.
Returning to that first period of the Italian occupation of Epirus, which set the tone for
the first phase of the activities of the Albanian C
ams, the consolidation of the Italian
authorities went hand in hand with the intentional use of the C
ams as the best means
for control and intimidation of the native population. At times with the tolerance and
at other times even with the active support of the Italians, the Albanian Muslims gradually acquired total freedom of movement in the cities and the countryside, and a peculiar
regime of impunity was granted them, which allowed for the coarsening of their behavior
towards the Greek Epirotes. The perpetrators of this type of terrorist authority were the
Albanian military groups set up by the Italians and other groups of armed C
ams formed
under the leadership of known local figures. The guarantee of Italian tolerance and
support allowed in most cases full rein to the C
ams to resolve the squabbles of the
past in their own way and to vindicate the injustices they had suffered themselves in
the past.23 In most cases the differences were resolved by rifle or with false accusations
to the Italian authorities who resorted to arbitrary arrests and imprisonments.24 Despite
the fact that the vast majority of the Albanian population did not participate in these acts,
nevertheless, suspicion, division, mutual plotting and hatred had spread their roots in
the soils of Thesprotia. Thus, the chasm, which had begun to develop between the
two communities, constantly widened.
The C
ams were active in supporting the efforts of the Italian, and subsequently the
German forces either during the cleansing operations in the region for the bending of
the opposition on the part of the population or afterwards in armed combat against
Greek guerillas which, from the first months of 1943, had began to make their
appearance in the mountains of Epirus. In both cases the losses suffered by both sides
and the destruction in the wider region, especially the countryside, were extensive and
retaliation against the population for their support of the guerillas was bloody.
Today we must admit that certainly not all of the Albanian population of Thesprotia
was involved in the criminal activities perpetrated throughout the occupation of Epirus.
These activities were assumed by those recruited by the Italian and the German military
corps and the armed irregulars. It is also certain that amongst the Albanian C
ams there
were also moderate elements who did not agree with these actions. They opposed
violence and arbitrary high-handedness, and did not harbor a smoldering hatred for
their Greek compatriots. Indeed, there is much information on cooperation with the
Greek inhabitants for the protection of their villages from the criminal elements or for
the granting of asylum to persecuted Christians.25 On the other hand, though, it has

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ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

531

been admitted by all sides that the Albanian population as a whole, even though it did not
actively collaborate with the occupiers, they accepted them with hope and expectation
for the materialization of the promises which had been cultivated for decades; they
benefited from their presence in the region and provided them with indirect support
with guides, connections, informants etc. A German officer was to admit later that the
Albanians were favorably disposed towards them while the Greeks fought against
them.26
The Role of Resistance Organizations
The collaboration of the C
ams with the occupiers was an issue that worried the headquarters of both of the two most significant resistance organizations that were active in
Epirus, ELAS and EDES. The position held by each of them, however, and their
views regarding this issue were diametrically opposed, a fact which had to do very
much with the ideological stance of these two powers and their political orientation.
Regarding the leftist EAM, the primary principle upon which its activities were based
was the unification of all powers against the occupier, and the right of all minorities to
self-determination. In the summer of 1943, EAM oriented towards confronting the situation in Epirus through cooperation with the resistance organization of like ideological
and political orientation in Albania, Enver Hoxhas National Liberation Front
(Fronti Nacionalclirimtar, FNC
). On the Greek side of the border, efforts were made
by EAM to approach the Albanian population of Thesprotia, with little encouraging
results though. As those responsible for the propaganda campaign to enlighten the
Albanian population were to admit themselves, the difficulties caused by racial hatred
were great.27
At the opposite pole of the EAM position regarding how to include the minorities in
the anti-fascist struggle and, especially, on the right of self-determination was EDES
under Colonel Napoleon Zervas. As a patriotic organization with a nationalistic
ideology and obviously anticommunist orientation, it categorically rejected EAMs
cautious policies regarding the C
ams. Additional annoyance was caused by the fact
that the activities of the C
ams were implemented solely on the coastal region of
Thesprotia, which provoked various inconveniences for EDES. It seems that Zervas
had no desire to cooperate with the C
ams, whereas efforts to have them on his side
seem to have been made due to instructions and pressure of the British officers.
In the summer of 1943, the Germans decided to assume direct control over Epirus in
order to restrict the spread of the activities of Greek resistance forces. In the battles conducted, mainly for control of the main Epirote routes groups of C
ams fought on the side
of the German forces whom the Germans used effectively against the guerillas. New
armed groups were formed and the Albanians in these groups wore military uniforms,
Italian or German, as well as the armband with the word Cham, which gave them
the right to circulate freely in the cities and countryside while armed.28 As noted by
the command of the German regiment in a report, the Albanian population have
sided with the German armed forces and have provided valuable help in the struggle
against the guerillas, and a little further on added that in the campaigns conducted
to this point against the guerillas the Muslims have proved to be very capable due to
their knowledge of the region, especially in reconnaissance operations. The Albanians
await the incorporation of Chamuria into a liberated and self-reliant Albania.29
The operations of the summer of 1943 proved catastrophic from all points of view for
Epirus. Many villages were destroyed by bombing or burned; others were sacked as well

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Eleftheria K. Manta

as the crops looted. The losses in human lives were great and the destruction that was
brought about was inestimable. Most saved themselves only by seeking refuge in the
surrounding forests and swamps. The greatest destructions occurred in July in the
Fanari region with the excuse that the inhabitants were harboring guerillas. As a
rule all German operations were inevitably followed by looting and by acts of revenge
perpetrated by armed C
ams, for all they themselves had suffered during the Metaxas
dictatorship in the previous years.30
The summer of 1944 was destined to be tragic and also bloody for Epirus. The
conflicts began with an unprecedented savagery already from the beginning of June
with the EDES forces taking the lead on the one side and the Germans assisted by the
C
ams on the other. Amongst the first objectives of the guerilla operations was the
seizure of Paramythia and its greater area, where the General Headquarters Middle
East desired to create a bridge so as to facilitate supplying the combatants with provisions
by sea. The liberation and securing of the coast from the occupiers was considered a
prime necessity, and Zervas, under whose military jurisdiction that region belonged,
assumed its execution.31 In the end of June the majority of the Germans abandoned
the city of Paramythia; a small garrison remained in the town along with the C
am
units, which were charged with the responsibility of protecting it. In the morning of
27th June the forces of EDES entered the city; the Germans retreated in time without
significant losses, while the remaining armed Albanians were disarmed. At noon many
of the Christian inhabitants gathered at the center of the city. The intensity of feelings
was effusive as was the determination to avenge all they had suffered before. Quickly
all control was lost and chaos prevailed. The accumulated hatred nurtured all kinds of
violent acts which landed on the heads of the Albanian Muslims of the city, men and
women indiscriminately. The victims were hundreds and all who managed to escape
fled terrified towards regions west of the Kalamas River. Also many who lived in the
city were initially gathered in a concentration camp guarded by EDES forces and later
transferred to various locations from where they were dispatched to Albania.
The EDES operations against the Germans and the Albanians continued in the next
days also. A decree of the EDES 10th Division was promulgated which invited the C
ams
to abandon the Germans and hand over their weapons; nothing resulted from this,
though.32 After this repeated attempts were made to approach the leaders of the
C
ams; the Allied Military Mission also participated in these attempts which, however,
had no practical outcome.33 The instructions of the Allied Military Mission to Zervas
at this point were clear: in order to facilitate operations it was necessary that the
region of Thesprotia be evacuated of Albanians.34
In actuality the C
ams were not willing to abandon their activity in Epirus; the
Autonomous Administration of C
amuria promulgated a decree through which the
four fronts where the struggle was to continue against the Zervas powers were
determined. Simultaneously the local commanders in the rearguard were to concern
themselves with the ceaseless dispatching of enforcements and supplies for the units at
the fronts.35 Also, the General Defense Headquarters was to be responsible for the
evacuation of the families, children up to 16 years of age and men of 60 and above.
The population was to be accompanied by armed men of recruit able age (16 60
years), who were obliged to return within two days to the front.36
In the first days of August 1944, EDES continued its operations. The resistance proffered by the armed C
am forces was quickly overcome. In the meantime, the evacuation
operations had begun and already the Albanian population had crossed the borders and
established itself in Albanian territory.37 On the 21st of September the German forces

The C
ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

533

started to withdraw. The British Mission gave orders for the EDES forces to prevent the
Germans from going to Corfu.38 The EDES 10th Division ordered its units to a general
attack, and the whole region was liberated in only a few days.
The groups of C
ams, who had remained in the city of Filiates to defend the area, were
quickly overcome. All who were imprisoned were tried by the court-martial and executed
the next day. Their leaders Mazar and Nuri Dino had earlier abandoned the area passing
onto Albanian territory together with the Germans who were retreating. The Albanian
population, which had not crossed the borders together with the others, was persecuted
relentlessly. The victims were many, Albanian houses were pillaged and set aflame and
mosques were destroyed. For about five days chaos and destruction prevailed in the
city. Tens of women and children were locked in the school building and only due to
the intervention of officers from the Allied Mission and the Greek inhabitants of the
city, who did not agree with the practices of the EDES groups, were saved and set free
after many days.39 Within only a few days all of the countryside was totally devoid of
the Albanian population previously there.
The Albanians who had escaped from Epirus were initially received and cared for
by the units of ELAS who were on the Albanian side of the borders, by the local FNC

organizations of Albania and by the Muslim Relief Committee. During this initial
period they were temporarily housed in Southern Albania under miserable conditions.
In the ensuing months they were advanced further northward. Their exact number is
impossible to ascertain definitively, but was estimated to be about 22,000 to 25,000.
These numbers also coincide with estimations of the C
ams themselves from that
period.40
After the promulgation of the first Greek legislation regarding the penal procedures
against all collaborators and war criminals, the Special Collaborators Court of Ioannina
tried the C
ams cases synoptically: with its No. 344/23-5-1945 decision condemned
en masse 1,930 C
ams, many with the death penalty, and 179 more in 1946.41
A few years later, Enver Hoxha also gave his coup de grace: on April 19, 1953
Decree No. 1654 was promulgated with which he granted Albanian citizenship to all
C
ams living in the Peoples Republic of Albania. All who resisted its implementation
were persecuted or imprisoned. It is however a fact that Enver Hoxha was later criticized
by the C
am organizations and by Albanian political circles for his tactics in the early postwar years.42 The least that can be said is that for Hoxha and generally for the
Albanian communists, the C
ams comprised a controversial if not suspect community,
mainly due to their collaboration with the German and Italian occupiers during World
War II.43
Conclusion
The historical trajectory of the C
ams could not be more emblematic of the dark continentthe twentieth-century Europe. This is a history that included the collapse and
dismemberment of multinational empires and the emergence of nation states; world
wars; occupation; mobilization of grievances by occupiers; and, ultimately, violence
and mass displacement. The particular issues which were catalytic for the course of
events, considered in their totality, they all produce a picture of an unsuccessful
process of incorporating the C
ams into state structures and Greek society, of their
treatment as foreign body, of the central authorities and state institutions lack of
accepting them. The events which marked the Second World War were the inevitable
consequence of the developments which occurred in the previous decades.

534

Eleftheria K. Manta

NOTES
1. Statistical Results of the Census of the Population of Greece 15 16th May 1928, Athens: General Statistical
Service of Greece, 1935.
2. The Population of Greece According to the Census of 16 October 1940, Athens: General Statistical Service
of Greece, 1950 and Results of the Population Census of 7 April 1951, Athens: General Statistical Service
of Greece, 1961.
3. PRO/FO, 371/48094, Report by LT Col C. A. S. Palmer on visit to Northern Greece, 914 April
1945.
4. Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece (hence AYE), 1925, G/68/X, no. 2345, General
Administration of Epirus to MFA, Ioannina 12-1-1925 and no. 45666, Dendramis to MFA,
Geneva 21-11-1924.
5. H. Isufi, Policy of the Greek State for the Expulsion of the Cham Population in the Years 1914 1928
and the Albanian Resistance, Studime Historike, Vol. 14, 1993, pp. 61 77.
6. Societe des Nations, C.179.1926.I, Gene`ve 15-3-1926.
tablissement et le Service Conulaire entre
7. AYE, 1928, A/4/I, no number, Convention Concernant lE
la Republique Hellenique et la Republique Albanaise (Convention Concerning the Establissment and
the Consular Service Between the Hellenic Republic and the Albanian Republic), Athe`nes 13-101926.
8. AYE, October 1927 1928, A/4/I, no. 207, MFA to Tirana Embassy, Athens 11-1-1928.
9. Statistical Results, op. cit.
10. Societe des Nations, C.314.1928.VII, Gene`ve 8-6-1928.
11. Law 5136 On the Modification and Amendment Fulfilling the Provisions of Law 4816 On the
Determination of Reimbursement of Expropriated Lands in Margariti and Paramythia, 18-7-1931.
12. Dokumente per C
amerine (Documents on C
ameria), Tirana: Drejtoria e Pergjithshme e Arkivave,
1999, pp. 626630.
13. AYE, 1935, A/4/3/I, no. 20473, Tirana Embassy to MFA, Tirana 15-8-1935.
14. Dokumente per C
amerine, op. cit., pp. 674 681.
15. AYE, 1932, A/2/II, no. 1116, General Staff to MFA, Athens 9-1-1932.
16. I. Archimandritis, Chams. Pain and Tears of Thesprotia, Athens: Georghiadis Publ., n.d.
17. PRO/FO, 371.38094, no. 7643/ST/8/a/45, Greek Embassy to Foreign Office, London 4-12-1945.
18. Lieutenant-General Ch.Katsimitros, Embattled Epirus. The Activities of the VIII Division during the War
of 1940 1941, Athens: General Staff, 1982.
19. AYE, 1945, 46/8, no. 15564, General Administration of Epirus to MFA, Ioannina 3-5-1945 and 81/
1, no. 16308, MFA to all Embassies, Athens 6-6-1945.
20. Ibid.; AYE, 1945, 81/1, no. 16308.
21. AYE, 1945, 45/2, no number, Supreme Court of Rome, 16th Hearing of 14-2-1945.
22. G. B. Fischer, Albania During the War 1939 1945, Tirana: Cabej, 1999.
23. PRO/WO, 204/9348, Albanian Minority in Epirus, 1940 1944.
24. Ibid.; AYE, 1945, 81/1, no. 16308.
25. N. Ziagos, British Imperialism and Ethnic Resistance 194045, Athens: no publisher given, 1978.
26. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg, RH 19 XI, 37a, no. 5402/44, Southeastern Europe High
Command, Office II, Belgrade Headquarters 7-7-1944.
27. GES/DIS, 924/A/1, G. Priftis to the Echelon of Epirus and Western Sterea, VIII Division, 20-11944, and AYE, 1944, 42/6, no 262, Pan-Epirote Committee to the Central Committee of EAM,
Doliana 6-11-1944.
28. AYE, 1945, 63, no. 23634, MFA to all Embassies, 5-8-1946.
29. NADS, T315 70, no. 561/43, Mountain Army Corps Headquarters, Office II, 27-8-1943 and no.
653/43, Mountain Army Corps Headquarters, Office II, 25-9-1943.
30. Ziagos, British Imperialism, op. cit.
31. PRO/WO, 204/9348, Albanian Minority in Epirus 1940 1941.
32. B. Krapsitis, The Truth About Muslim Chams, Athens: no publisher given, 1992.
33. AYE, 1944, 42/6, no number, Commander of the 10th Division and Allied Delegation to the
Ottoman Communication Committee, 24-7-1944.
34. PRO/FO, 371/48094/18138, Note by Woodhouse, 16-10-1945.
35. PRO/FO, 371/48094, R20573, Greek Embassy of London to FO, London 4-12-1945, Attached
circular by Nuri Dino, 10-7-1944.
36. AYE, 1944, 42/6, no number, Leader of the General Defense Headquarters Nuri Dino, 31-7-1944.
37. AYE, 1944, 42/6, no number, Zervas to Lambert, 15-8-1944.

The C
ams of Albania and the Greek State (1923 1945)

535

38. AYE, 1945, 46/8, no number, EAM Pan-Epirote Committee to the Secretariat, Ioannina 26-1-1945.
39. GES/DIS, 907/G/3, no number, Journal of Routes and Operations of the 10th Battalion of the 16th
Regiment of the 10th Division of EOEA, Commander F. Kitsos, 12-2-1945; also 907/H/3, no
number, Brief Report of battles from 1940 to 1941 and until the liberation, Lieutenant-Colonel
Ar. Kranias to the Headquarters of Armed Forces, 30-7-1970.
40. NADS, 768.75/4-2045, C. Offie to State Department, 20-4-1945.
41. Al. K. Papadopoulos, Albanian Nationalism and Ecumenical Hellenism. Infinite Country, Athens: Nea
Synora, 1994.
42. Al. Kotini, Chamuria Denounces, Tirana: Fllad, 2002. National Political Association C
ameria,
Press Declaration by the Chairman Bedri Myftari, Tirana 9-10-2000.
43. PRO/WO, 204/9562, Force 399 Political Review, October 21 December 24, 24-12-1944.

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