EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK,
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARY ANN V. MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK,
JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B.
SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE
CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE
MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Petitioners, - versus - HEIRS OF
HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE- HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez
filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon
City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owners duplicate
certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution
Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996, 1 addressed to
Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty. Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a
certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated
letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR). 2
In his reply dated 7 November 1996,3 Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Lands
Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28 November 1996, 4 Engineer
Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed
Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of their office.
The letter of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D conflicted
with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent
another letter dated 2 December 19965 to Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter
dated 5 December 1996,6 Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENRNCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engineer Dalire wrote:
In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting
Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan
FLS-3168-D (microfilm) issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on

September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR)
from where the Chief of Technical Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he
issued to LRA for our evaluation.
In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the copy of that
office issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate from this
Office. The stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the Chief of
Geodetic Surveys is not the same stamp we are using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.
A letter dated 2 January 1997,7 purportedly from Engineer Dalire, addressed to the LRA
Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records Section on 7 January
1997. The letter states:
SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D
Caloocan, M.M.
02 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of the
subject plan was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per
verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was found out that they are
identical and bore the same stamps and initials used in this office.
In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we
indicated the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then for
our last result, hence, this case be given due course for Administrative
reconstitution (sic).
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J. G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division

Interestingly, Engineer Dalire wrote another letter dated 5 January 19978 addressed to the Regional
Technical Director, LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:
This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that Office in
connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting
Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to the
certified reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that office (signed by
Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records and Statistics Section) on September 23,
1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have
no records of Fls-3168-D.
The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with machine copy of Fls3168-D reproduced from the copy issued by that Office and we found out that the copy
of Fls-3168-D file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this Office. We reiterate that
we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.
May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on
file in your office for our evaluation and comment.
Engineer Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 9 to the LRA Administrator. The letter
states:
31 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution of the Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L.
Barque, Sr., Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested us to
clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our
office does not have a record of the same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the
following:
1. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
3. Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29, 1996
In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR
about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in
that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our
office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment.
Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic)

of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is
regretted, they did not respond.
Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is
certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in
the file. We requested for the copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997
but until this writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication as required by DENR
Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The
reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans
available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we
cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and
the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates
(sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp,
their (sic) is Survey without the "s" plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for Registration/Titling For
Reference Only" is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in
addition to [the] above is "of _________".
5) The copy bears forged initials of my action officer and myself. I sign
completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master
copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the
alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from
spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D
with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the
reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or portion
thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau:

(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
In a letter dated 13 February 199710 to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire explained that the 2
January 1997 letter was forged. Thus:
13 February 1997
The Administrator
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be informed
that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the
locator cards, the microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions, that
are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our file. The
non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our file, hence there is none to decentralize to our
National Capital Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November
1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your letter,
this letter definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document. The
statement that the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records
Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over
the plan they reproduced in compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January
1996 and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies
attached).
With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your letter of
December 2, 1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been
discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation and/or
validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division

Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997,11 Engineer Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls3168-D for being spurious, thus:
19 February 1997
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Bustos:
In reply to your query whether or not
a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823, Piedad Estate as
surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;
b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and
c) the letter dated 02 January 1997
are authentic and really coming from this office.
The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no records
of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list
of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we
have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued
by this Office.There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB.
Reasons, among others, are:
1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan
that is non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is not
our practice;
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and
another for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the
letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of
my action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not
present in the spurious copy of plan;
5) The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR
REFERENCE ONLY" is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp
"GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF

___________________ "This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because

all microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have shown you our
rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious
plan.
I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating that
copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records
and Statistics Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is identical to
the microfilm and that the case be given due course for administrative reconstitution.
Certainly this is not true. This is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be when NCR
has never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The forwarding of the
copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of
our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997
(copies attached). Definitely this letter was never prepared and issued by this Office.
Our record books and file attest to this. We do not use letterheads for letters involving
this topic.
Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did not reach
you.
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02
January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents.
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer
In an Order dated 30 June 1997,12 Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative reconstitution of
TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472,
respectively,covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad
Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in
the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No.
Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by
Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management
Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.13 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10 February 1998, 14 Atty.
Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin. Recons. No. Q547-A [97].
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998,15 the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The LRA ruled that
under LRA Circular No. 13,16 only the owners or co-owners duplicate of an original or transfer
certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred
in requiring the submission of documents other than the owners duplicate TCT. The LRA further
ruled that Engineer Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of
2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official communication from
Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined that the Manotoks TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:
It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at
Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by oppositors
particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real
estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong,
and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79", "84" and "85" of Opposition] which is
grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners Position Paper] would
show that there is no such barrio as Payong. It must likewise be noted that there is a Barrio
Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio Matandang Balara and they do not
adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for
payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June 1988 would show
that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara [Annexes
"91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to
"114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in
question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax
receipts also reflect the tax declaration of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular
that the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations
which appear to have been canceled would again be revived.
The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that
the property in question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same
is being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of the tax map over the property in
question issued by the Quezon City Assessors Office [annex "H" of Petitioners Position
Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the
property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot
823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of
original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot
822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time of the
original survey, there were no such Psds yet.
Examination of the technical decription and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical
description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which are
the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands
[Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas
Estate nor Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does
not at all adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per
certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners Position Paper]. As

correctly pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not it was Lot 822 of the
Piedad Estate.17
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a court of competent
jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks. The dispositive
portion of the LRA Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.18 (Emphasis supplied)
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June 2001, 19 the LRA denied
the motion.
The Manotoks filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the Court of
Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying for the
modification of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA. The Barques prayed
for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA-G.R. No. 66642
CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001 20 for failure to show
that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in
behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Manotoks, the petition
was reinstated in the Resolution of 27 November 2001. 21
In its Decision of 29 October 2003,22 the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks petition and affirmed
the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration of the Barques, the
Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004,23 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this
Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the
LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T-210177.
SO ORDERED.24
The Manotoks came to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 162335.
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700

In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 25 the Court of Appeals dismissed the Barques
petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Barques moved for reconsideration of
the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003,26 the Court of Appeals reconsidered its
13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of
private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners valid,
genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.27
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its Resolution of 12
March 2004,28the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Manotoks filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
The cases were consolidated in the Courts Resolution of 2 August 2004.
In a Decision dated 12 December 2005,29 the First Division of this Court denied the petitions and
affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution,30 the Special First Division of this Court denied the
Manotoks motion for reconsideration. No proceeding of any kind took place before any trial
court assailing the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the
Barques simple petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this
Court cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not only
reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others, granted the Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court referred the cases to the
Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the Court en banc accepted the cases. In the Oral
Argument on 24 July 2007, the Court en banc considered the following issues:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481
without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a proceeding directly assailing the
validity of petitioners title?
2. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No.
210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481
of the petitioners over the same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners TCT No. RT22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?

4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the
disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
The Ruling of This Court
We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court.
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns well-entrenched
doctrines of this Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al.
v. Pedro Balanon.31Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques title because of
the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct
proceeding assailing its validity is filed before the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques
submitted patently forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their title, and even in
the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts." First, it is the first decision
in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution of title resulted in the cancellation
of the Torrens title of another person without a direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court.
Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to reconstitute
administratively a Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the
same property in the name of another person. Third, it is the firstdecision in Philippine jurisprudence
where the issue of ownership of land is decided with finality in a petition
foradministrative reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence
where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying for a simple reconstitution of title received
an unexpected and undeserved windfall the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the
cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the same
property.
LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines firmly established in numerous
decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them landmark rulings. To name a few
of these decisions starting in the year 1915: Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,32 Magay, etc. v.
Estiandan,33 Republic v. Court of Appeals,34Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela,
etc., et al.,35 MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al.,36 Liwag v. Court of Appeals,37 Ybaez v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,38 Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals,39 Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco,40 Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,41 and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.42
The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division has overturned are:
1. A Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly attacking the titles validity
before the proper regional trial court.43 This is the bedrock principle that provides enduring
stability to Torrens titles.
2. A reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or administrative, cannot proceed once it
is shown that another Torrens title has already been issued to another person over the same
property. The reconstituting body or court has no jurisdiction to issue another Torrens title
over the same property to the petitioner.44The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the

reconstitution proceedings.45 The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before

the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other person.
3. The reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership over
the property or the validity of the title.46 The purpose of reconstitution is solely to replace a
certificate of title that was lost or destroyed in the same legal status it existed at the time of
the loss or destruction. The validity of a Torrens title, reconstituted or not, is a separate issue
from the reconstitution of title.
DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE
The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division has already
become final and executory, and thus has become immutable and unalterable. The dissenting
opinion states that there is no compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of decisions.
On the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of decisions necessarily applies only to final and executory
decisions. If the decision never became final and executory, the doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of decisions has no application. Before finality of a decision, a court has "plenary power
to alter, modify or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before
the decision becomes final."47
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First
Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a
doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division. The Court en banc has ruled in Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar 48 that a decision of a
division is void if it overturns a doctrine established by the en banc or another division. There, the
Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its
Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of the above constitutional
provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.49 (Emphasis
supplied)
A void decision vests no right, creates no obligation, grants no title, and settles no issue. A void
decision protects no one and is subject to attack, directly or collaterally,50 at any time. A void decision
has no existence in law. Therefore, a void decision cannot become final and executory against, or in
favor of, any one.
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or
hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing
officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory.
Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of
judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.51

In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques
because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens
title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree52 states that a "certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack." The LRA, or
even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack 53 on a Torrens title.
The Manotoks prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through
collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.54
THE MANOTOKS PRIOR TITLE NULLIFIES RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS OF BARQUES
In fact, the existence of a prior Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person
ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings and renders the reconstituted title
void.55 Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,56penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, is instructive and
summarizes the law on this matter:
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but
also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v. Court of
Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a
certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person,
the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired
jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No.
26, 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be found or
recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore,
error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the
petitioners.57 (Emphasis supplied)
Even before Demetriou, this Court had already ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals58 that the
existence of a prior Torrens title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings, thus:
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso
facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said
proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombasi cannot be given any
credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such
humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate
rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens
certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a
patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the
registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are void because
they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the
titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require
reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are
void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow
Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J.
G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner

of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the
Torrens system of registration.59 (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court are so essential in providing stability to land titles that overturning them
now would be catastrophic to our Torrens system of land registration.
A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN A DIRECT ACTION ASSAILING ITS
VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
The LRA has also no jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks because the exclusive
original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title belongs to the Regional Trial Court. The LRA, moreover,
has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership dispute over a parcel of land60 between the Barques and
the Manotoks because jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of disputed real properties belongs to
courts of justice.
Two specific provisions of law confer exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts to cancel
a Torrens title. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of the Judiciary Act61 provides that the "Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to x x x real property."
That the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain any action to
cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of the Property Registration Decree. Section 108
states that "no erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title x x x,except by order of the proper Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court)."
LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to decisions that are capable
of becoming final and executory. Decisions of the LRA on administrative reconstitutions of title never
become final and executory. An administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or
replacement of a lost or destroyed title in its original form at the time of the loss or destruction. 62 The
issuance of a reconstituted title vests no new rights and determines no ownership issues. 63 At any
time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or destroyed title is
subsequently found.64 The issuance by the LRA of a reconstituted title is an executive function, not
a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata.
This Court stated in A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals:65 "[T]he doctrine of res
judicataapplies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination."66
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques much more than what
the Barques prayed for in their petition for administrative reconstitution of title. In their petition before
the LRA, the Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of their allegedly destroyed title. The
Decision of the First Division grants the reconstitution, declares the reconstituted title valid, awards
ownership over the disputed property to the Barques, and cancels the Torrens title of the Manotoks.

This violates the "cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than what is prayed
for"67 in the petition.
A SURFEIT OF FORGERIES AND BADGES OF FRAUD
Equally disturbing, there are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and other dubious
circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed aside in its Decision. These forgeries
alone are more than sufficient grounds to deny the reconstitution of the Barques title. These
forgeries provide compelling reasons for this Court to require compliance with Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree in determining the validity of the Manotoks title. Section 48 requires a
proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Torrens title
before such title can be cancelled.
First: Forged Plan Fls-3168-D
The Barques submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer patently forged documents in support of
their petition. On 31 January 1997, Engineer Dalire wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the copy
of the Barques plan Fls-3168-D submitted to the LRA "bears forged initials of my section officer
and myself,"68 and that the Lands Management Bureau National Office "does not have copy of
Fls-3168-D."69 Engineer Dalire urged the LRA that plan Fls-3168-D and the accompanying
authentication letter "be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources."70
Plan Fls-3168-D is vital in establishing the authenticity of the Barques Torrens title, which contains
two lots as subdivided by plan Fls-3168-D from the original Lot 823. The Manotoks title covers only
one lot, Lot 823, without subdivision. Both the Manotoks and the Barques claim the same original Lot
823. If there is no record in the Lands Management Bureau National Office of plan Fls-3168-D
showing the subdivision of Lot 823 into two lots, then the Barques title is spurious.
During the oral argument of these cases, counsel for the Barques was asked if the Barques have
ever secured a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National
Office. Counsel for the Barques showed the Court a copy of what purported to be plan Fls-3168-D
but on closer examination the copy was certified not by the Lands Management Bureau National
Office but by the NCR Regional Office. What counsel for the Barques showed was the same copy of
plan Fls-3168-D that Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National Office, had rejected as a forgery in his 31 January 1997 and 19
February 1997 letters to Atty. Bustos. In his letters, Engineer Dalire stated that there is no plan Fls3168-D in the files of the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
Second: Forged 2 January 1997 Letter
On 13 February 1997, Engineer Privadi J. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the
Lands Management Bureau National Office, wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2 January
1997 letter, purportedly coming from Engineer Dalire, "definitely did not come from this office; it
is a forged document."71
In his 19 February 1997 letter, Engineer Dalire also informed the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2
January 1997 letter purportedly coming from him was the "handiwork of forgers."72 In the
questioned 2 January 1997 letter73 addressed to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire
allegedly stated that the Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics of the National Capital RegionLands Management Bureau (NCR Regional Office) had forwarded a copy of Fls-3168-D to Engineer
Dalires office. Engineer Dalire has repeatedly denounced this 2 January 1997 letter as a

forgery, not only because he never signed this letter, but also because his office never
received a copy of Fls-3168-D from the NCR Regional Office.
Third: Plan Fls-3168-D Is Void Unless Validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques then undertook to present to the Court a copy of
plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. In their
Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, counsel for the Barques explained why they could not
present a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office:
Following the order of the Honorable Justice Carpio for respondents to secure a certified true
copy of Fls-3168-D from the Land Management Bureau, National Office, they went to said
National Office to secure said certified true copy of Fls-33168-D but were instead given a
copy of a form letter (Annex "J") issued in reply to a prior request for transmittal of Plan FLS3168-D with the information that records of said plan had already been turned over to the
National Capital Region.
The form letter (Annex "J") from the Records Management Division of the Lands Management
Bureau National Office, that the Barques attached to their Memorandum, states
x x x plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of and situated in Caloocan Rizal was among those
survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR),
Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR-199, for their
reference/file purposes.
The form letter bears the printed name of Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division,
Lands Management Bureau National Office although someone whose signature is not legible signed
for Rainier D. Balbuena.
The Barques also submitted a Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D.
Balbuena,OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, stating:
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records Management Division,
Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDPs Listing has available record with Fls3168-D, Lot 823, Xerox copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (Now
Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.
In sharp contrast, the Manotoks attached to their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007 a certification
signed by three persons from the Lands Management Bureau National Office, namely, Bienvenido
F. Cruz, Chief,Geodetic Surveys Division; Rodel Collantes, Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section; and Teodoro A. de Castro, researcher. This certification, dated 2
August 2007, states:
August 2, 2007
LUISA T. PADORA
2830 Juan Luna St. Tondo
Manila
S i r /M a d a m:

This is in connection with your request on the verification of survey plan. As per our inventory
we found out the following:

Survey No.
Location

Accession No.

Fls-3168-D

Not listed in EDP listing.

Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section

Researched by:
(Sgd)
TEODORO A. DE CASTRO

Very truly yours,

(Sgd)

BIENVENIDO F. CRUZ
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division

OR#: 3041650
Date: 08/02/07
Amt. Php 40.00
The certification of the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division prevails over the certification of the OIC,
Records Management Division. Under paragraph 2.4 of Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92
dated 17 August 1992, "no copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans

shall be issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division." The same paragraph 2.4 further states that unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Divisions, copies of such plans "should be temporarily expunged from the records of the
Records Division until they are validated and returned for official file."
Thus, no secondary copies of plans, like the Barques Fls-3168-D plan, can have any evidentiary
value unless validated by the Geodetics Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau
National Office. More importantly, copies of plans, like the Barques Fls-3168-D plan, which have not
been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division, are deemed "expunged from the Records of the
Records Division." The inescapable conclusion is that the form letter (Annex "J") issued by the
Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, and the
Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, both of which refer to the
existence of the Barques Fls-3168-D plan, are absolutely worthless and are mere scraps of
paper.
The Barques explanation is further belied by the 19 February 1997 letter of Engineer Dalire, Chief of
the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, that:
x x x Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially filed
in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records or
information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
xxx
x x x How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for
validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our
validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January
1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). x x x.74 (Emphasis supplied)
As pointed out by Engineer Dalire, under DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, the
copy of plan Fls-3168-D must be forwarded by the NCR Regional Office for validation by the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. No copy of the
survey plan can be issued by the NCR Regional Office without the validation of the Geodetic
Surveys Division. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49 states:
Section 4. Preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans. The following
considerations on the preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans shall be
observed:
xxx
4.3 Decentralized whiteprints or photographic copies of plans especially those marked
"SGD" (i.e. SIGNED) shall not be used for the issuance of patent or certified true copy or
titling purposes, EXCEPT, upon or prior authentication by the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) after diligent comparison with the records of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and other depository of surveys records.
xxx

4.5 The Chief of the Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service in the
concerned Regional Office shall certify all copies for land registration and for other purposes
as true, correct and exact replica of the original plan. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement of validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated and amplified in Lands
Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, thus:
2.4 No copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be
issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division (see paragraph 4.3, DENR A.O. 49, s-1991). The Survey Records Section shall
turn over all print (white, blue, xerox) copies and photographic copies in its file to the
Geodetic Surveys Division for examination, investigation and/or validation. These copies
should temporarily be expunged from the records of the Records Division until they
are validated and returned for official file. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National
Office, secondary copies of survey plans, such as the Barques plan Fls-3168-D, have no
evidentiary value because they are "temporarily x x x expunged from the records of the Records
Division."
The Geodetic Surveys Division validates the survey plans based on the "back-up file in the Central
Records Office." Despite the decentralization of the records of survey plans, the Lands
Management Bureau National Office retained "back-up files" of the decentralized records. Lands
Memorandum Order No. 368-92 states:
1. General Policy
1.1 It is the general policy that all isolated survey plans and other survey records be
decentralized immediately to the Lands Management Sector for their reference and file after
establishing a back-up file in the Central office for records preservation. The latter can
be done thru microfilming or reproduction of the original records. (Emphasis supplied)
The NCR Regional Office failed to submit to the Geodetics Survey Division a copy of plan Fls-3168D despite repeated requests from Engineer Dalire. In his 31 January 1997 letter to the reconstituting
officer, Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire stated:
x x x please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your
letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office
from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA (sic) did not emanate from our office. We
requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment.
Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no
records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation
and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.75 (Emphasis supplied)
This repeated and manifest failure by the NCR Regional Office is echoed by the glaring failure of the
Barques to submit, as they had promised to the Court during the oral argument, a copy of plan Fls3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
This Court has already recognized that copies of survey plans are void unless validated by the
Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991.
In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,76 the Court held:

Finally, private respondents cause of action against petitioner is defeated by the

findings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Bureau of
Lands, contained in his letters to the Regional Technical Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15
December 1992, respectively:
12 November 1992
xxx
MEMORANDUM:
15 December 1992
FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands
The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard
Manila
FROM: L M B
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certified by Engineer
Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared from a tracing cloth plan on file in the
NCR" for validation. We returned the white print plan prepared by Engineer
Pangyarihan because we should examine the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the tracing
cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies sent by the Central Records Division
to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated 27 November 1992, Engineer Pangyarihan explained that he
prepared the copy which he certified from a white print plan on file in the region as
the applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth. While the explanation may be
considered, yet the preparation of the plan is not yet in accordance with Sections 1.3
and 4.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49, s-1991 which requires that the white
prints or photographic print of the plan other than the original plan which have been
decentralized must first be authenticated by this Bureau before a certified true copy
is issued by the region. It is evident therefore that the issuance of a certified true
copy of Psu-201 from a white print is premature, and considered void ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print copy is
subjected to field ocular inspection of the land and on the basis of the findings, the
region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as usual. Certified copies may now
be issued based on the reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201
should therefore be subjected to ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed
covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila. That plan was heavily damaged and its
reconstruction was not finalized. This should be included in the investigation.

For the Director of Lands:

(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division.77 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, in the present cases the copy of the Barques plan Fls-3168-D issued by the NCR Regional
Office is likewise void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR
Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, as amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 36892. Up to this time, the Barques have failed to submit a copy of their plan Fls-3168-D as
certified by the Geodetic Surveys Division. The inescapable conclusion is that the Barques
plan Fls-3168-D is void ab initio.
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to the Court a copy of plan
Fls-3168-D,certified by the NCR Regional Office, to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168D that the Barques had earlier submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (microfilm) duly certified by Carmelito A. Soriano for the
Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR, Annex "H" hereof. This microfilm copy is exactly the
same as the Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.
First, there does not appear in Annex "H" a signature over the printed name Carmelito A. Soriano,
Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National Office.
Second, Annex "H" is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, Lands
Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as required by Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 49.
Third, Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly originated from the office of
Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management
Bureau. Annex "H" is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the Barques showed to
the Court during the oral argument.Engineer Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy
of Fls-3168-D as "spurious" in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this
Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons,
among others, are:
1. We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is
non-existing?
2. The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is not
our practice;
3. The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for th certification and another
for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the
letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4. The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of
my action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not
present in the spurious copy of plan;

5. The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR
REFERENCE ONLY" is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6. The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp
"GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF
___________________ "This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because
all microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have shown you our
rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious
plan.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Engineer Dalire ended his letter by advising Atty. Bustos to "disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the
letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents."79
Again, in his 31 January 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire reiterated that plan Fls-3168-D,
which purportedly was certified by him, did not come from his office. Engineer Dalire stated in his 31
January 1997 letter:
x x x We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer
list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this
plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious
copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification
and the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the
syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys
Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the "s" plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for Registration/Titling
For Reference Only" is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an
(sic) Stamp, in addition to [the] above is "of _________".
5) The copy bears forged initials of my action officer and myself. I sign
completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the
master copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the
alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from
spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D

with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the
reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area. 80 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Barques have the temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan Fls-3168-D which has
been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by Engineer Dalire, the very person whom the
Barques claim certified their copy of Fls-3168-D. Engineer Dalire is the best person to determine
the authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because he allegedly signed it as claimed by the Barques, but
also because he is the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau
National Office, the office that has the "inventory of approved plans x x x (and) Microfilm Computer
list of plans available for decentralization."
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No.
Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the Barques had written the LRA Administrator complaining against the LRA
reconstituting officers alleged "pattern of effort to delay the administrative reconstitution." 81 The
Barques attached to their 7 February 1997 letter an alleged order of reconstitution signed by
Atty. Bustos approving the reconstitution of the Barques TCT No. 210177. In his 14 February
1997 reply to the LRA Administrator, Atty. Bustos exposed the alleged order of reconstitution
submitted by the Barques as a "tampered document."
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there was a "recommendation dated
January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila,
to give due course to the said reconstitution." However, in his 13 February 1997 letter82 to the
LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire, the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management
Bureau, disowned this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the LRA reconstituting officer wrote the LRA Administrator that: 83
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What we
are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the submitted documents;
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of Homer L.
Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document. For your
comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as
annex "A";
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached for your reference is
a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received by
the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMBDENR, marked as annex "B";
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq.
m., respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823,
Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302,
registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached
as annex "C." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

In his 14 February 1997 letter, the LRA reconstituting officer complained to the LRA Administrator
that "there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents."
The tampering refers to the insertion of (1) the name of "Homer L. Barque," and (2) the title
number "210177" in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). The Barques justified the
authenticity of the copy they presented by claiming that their copy was "initialed in each and every
page."84 However, the Barques copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) differed from the
original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that the LRA reconstituting officer himself
signed on 27 January 1997. To repeat, the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q535(96) was an order issued and signed by the LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos.
Indeed, the Barques copy85 of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) shows that it was signed
by the same LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, handling the Barques then pending petition for
administrative reconstitution.
The Barques also failed to explain why they still pursued their petition for administrative
reconstitution of their title if indeed they had already obtained an approved reconstitution on 27
January 1997 under their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96). On 13 August
1998, the LRA reconstituting officer filed before the LRA Administrator the following Comment:
2. That we maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the
grounds stated in our Order dated June 30, 1997, and on the following additional grounds, to
wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased the subject property in the year
1975, why did he not take possession of it upon purchase, and up to now his
descendants, the Petitioners, are not in possession of the property, but the
Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of
Barque, only in the year 1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors
have been paying realty taxes on the property since the year 1965;
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of
Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)?86 (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA reconstituting officer ended his Comment by urging the LRA Administrator that "this case
be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission for investigation."
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques explained the circumstances of the
order of reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in this manner:
The said resolution was issued on January 27, 1997 when there was, as yet, no opposition
from anyone to the Barques petition for reconstitution and after the Barque had already
submitted their Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 210177 which entitled them, like the
several other petitioners listed in Mr. Bustos aforesaid Resolution, to a reconstitution thereof
under R.A. 6732.
In his letter, Atty. Turgano surmised that:
"The animosity and bias of Mr. Bustos against petitioners may be explained by the
fact that he was responsible in giving due course and approving with dispatch the

administrative reconstitution of the Manotok title which is TCT No. RT-22481

(372302).
Mr. Bustos bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of the Barques Petition
for Reconstitution which prompted them to file their opposition to the Barques petition on
April 14, 1997. He, therefore, apparently had the motive to delete the title and name of
the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the LRA proceedings since
it is his Order denying Barques petition for reconstitution that was raised on appeal before
the LRA Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. as one of the titles
approved for reconstitution by Atty. Bustos, is authentic, genuine and untampered. This is contrary to
the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos that the copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q535(96) submitted by the Barques is a "tampered document," and that the original
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself signed, which original
is on file in his office in the LRA, does not include TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L.
Barque, Sr.
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing) the title and name of the
Barques from the resolution." The Barques are now accusing Atty. Bustos of falsification by
deleting the Barques name and title in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such
deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) included the Barques
name and title, which is the copy that the Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to include the Barques title and
name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27
January 1997, he was still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery found in the Barques
plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31 January 1997. On 14
February 1997, Atty. Bustos even wrote the LRA Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us
(LRA) into favorable action by submitting forged documents." Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have
included the Barques title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame excuse that
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now "completely irrelevant" because what was raised
on appeal to the LRA was the order of Atty. Bustos denying the Barques petition for reconstitution. If
their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic and untampered,
the Barques should insist that their petition for administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by
the reconstituting officer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not claim or even mention this now, instead
they agree that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their claim that Atty. Bustos granted
their petition by including the Barques title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered or forged documents.
These patent forgeries are grounds to render the Barques reconstituted title void ab initio. Section
11 of Republic Act No. 6732 (RA 6732),87 the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles,
provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination
is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court would never countenance these blatant and glaring forgeries. The present cases involve
34 hectares of prime land located beside the Ayala Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Its value is
estimated conservatively at P1.7 billion.
Fifth: The Barques Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
The Barques filed their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22 October 1996, eight years
after the original of their Torrens title was allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed
the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds. In contrast, the Manotoks administratively
reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February 1991,three years after the fire and just one year
after the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732 allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles
under certain circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in the tax declarations they
submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer: "Memo: This property appear (sic) to duplicate the
property of Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under TD No. B-067-02136 with area of 343,945
sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202."88 In their Petition For Review dated 30 March 2004, the Manotoks submitted
certified true copies of the Barques Tax Declarations 0689289 and 0689590 containing this notation. In
their Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted copies of the Barques tax
declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of the notation on the
Barques tax declarations. However, counsel for the Barques admitted that he has not seen the
original tax declarations on file with the Assessors Office, thus:
Justice Carpio:
x x x The Manotoks are claiming that the Barques erased, removed annotation in the
tax declaration of the Barques that in the tax declaration on file with the Assessors
Office the tax declaration of the Barques is supposed to contain annotation that this
property appears to be registered in the name of Manotok Realty Inc., is that correct?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, that is a serious accusation, Your honor and I have no knowledge about that.
Justice Carpio:
But does the tax declaration of the Barques contain that notation?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There is none that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
How about the tax declaration on file with the Assessors Office?
Atty. Flaminiano:

I have not seen those, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio:
You have not seen those?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I have not seen those. 91
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques ignored completely the
Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the notation.
Seventh: The Barques Paid Realty Tax only for 1987 to 1996
The Barques first paid real estate tax on the property only in 1996, 92 for realty taxes for the
years 1987 to 1996, because the Barques were required to pay the current and preceding
years realty taxes before they could file their petition for administrative reconstitution. The
Barques have not paid any realty tax after 1996, or before 1987.93 In contrast, the LRA
reconstituting officer found that the Manotoks have been paying realty taxes on the property since
1965. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks claim that they paid their realty
taxes on the property from 1933 until the present, attaching to their Memorandum representative
copies of their realty tax payments.
Eighth: The Barques Have Never Set Foot on the Property
The Barques have never set foot on the property since the time Homer L. Barque, Sr. allegedly
purchased the property in 1975. Counsel for the Barques admitted this when he stated during the
oral argument that the Barques merely "went around" the walled property. On the other hand, the
Manotoks assert that the property is publicly known in their neighborhood as the Manotok
Compound. The Manotoks further claim:
[A]s owners of said Lot 823, oppositors (Manotoks) had introduced substantial
improvements, amounting to several millions, thereon consisting of, among others, high wall
hollow block fence; their respective houses, apartments; offices and employees
quarters, as early as in 1960, photographs of which are hereto attached as Annexes "115"
to "134";94 (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen the pictures of the various
houses, buildings and concrete perimeter fence that the Manotoks constructed on the property since
1960.
Ninth: LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In calling the Manotoks title "sham and spurious," the LRA Administrator cited the non-existence of
Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The LRA Administrator stated: "The map of Quezon City [Annex
"N" of Petitioners Position paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong."95 This
is a finding of fact that is based not only on self-serving and suspect evidence, but also on a patently
erroneous claim.

The LRA Administrator relied on Annex "N" of "Petitioners," that is, the map of the Barques who
were the petitioners before the LRA Administrator assailing the LRA reconstituting officers denial of
their reconstitution on the ground of pre-existence of the Manotoks title and the submission of a
spurious document by the Barques. Obviously, this Court should not rely on the LRA Administrators
findings which were admittedly based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted
forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been judicially acknowledged almost
three decades ago in the Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses
Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya,96 involving the same property under dispute in
these cases. In Spouses Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection of
Barrio Payong in Quezon City, thus:
On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to conduct an
ocular inspection of the landholding in question, which is as follows:
"Conformably with Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection filed with this Court on
even date and as stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed
to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong,
Quezon City, which as agreed upon between them is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30
oclock A.M. (sic), wherein the parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to
determine:
(a) Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the plaintiff and/or his
children;
(b) Portions of the property where the rice paddies are located;
(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and vegetables;
(d) Portions of the property where the houses of the plaintiff and/or his
children are built and located;
(e) Portion of the property which, according to the defendants, had been,
before the filing of the complaint in this case, worked on by Victorino Macaya
and returned by him to the defendants, through Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra,
with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f) Portions burned by the plaintiff."
Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit his
report as well as his sketch plan for further disposition of the Court.
On June 27, 197[8], the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT", which is as follows:
"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated June 20, 1978,
undersigned together with Mr. Victor Flores of this Branch, proceeded
to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23, 1978, to conduct an ocular
inspection of the landholding involved in this case. x x x"97 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)

The recognition of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Barrio Payong exists in Quezon City is based
on the ocular inspection conducted on 23 June 1978 by the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Agrarian Relations. In contrast, the statement of the LRA Administrator that there is no Barrio
Payong in Quezon City is based merely on the map that the Barques submitted in their petition
for administrative reconstitution, which was filed only on 22 October 1996.
In Spouses Tiongson, there were 28 petitioners.98 Of these 28 petitioners, at least sixteen
are petitioners composing part of the Manotoks in these cases. Of these sixteen petitioners, eight
Miguel A.B. Sison, Ma. Cristina E. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Philipp Manotok, Maria Theresa
Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Jose Maria Manotok were then
minors at the time of Spouses Tiongson and were thus represented by judicial guardians. These
eight are now of age in these cases.
Tenth: The Barques Bought the Property Knowing the Manotoks Had Constructed Buildings
and Perimeter Wall on the Property
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen a picture of the 34-hectare
Manotok compound completely surrounded by a high concrete perimeter wall. When counsel
for the Barques was asked if his clients made an ocular inspection of the property at the time his
clients purchased it in 1975, Barques counsel answered as follows:
Justice Velasco:
Did your client prior to buying the lot from Mr. Setosta go to the land to investigate
the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The one who bought the property was the father of Barques now.
Justice Velasco:
Would you know if the father of respondent visit and inspect and investigate the
ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I was told that he visited the property because the father of the Barques used to work
for Mr. Antonio Florendo. I think he was the manager of one of the businesses of Mr.
Florendo in Davao City having to do with accessory parts of cars and trucks and he
was at one time also the operator of a public transportation company.
Justice Velasco:
Okay. Did the father of Mr. Barque find any building or structures on the land now
subject of this dispute?
Atty. Flaminiano:
We would not know because Mr. Barque died already, Your Honor.99

xxxx
Justice Carpio:
Now, when did they take possession of the property since Mr. Homer L. Barque
purchased it in 1975, when did he take possession of the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The reason why they could not take really possession of the property because they
were trying to get some papers from an Aunt of Mr. Barque to whom the property was
mortgaged before he died. I understand that the property was mortgaged for
something like One Million to Two Million Pesos.
Justice Carpio:
So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There were attempts to take possession, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
What kind of attempts, did they file ejectment suit?
Atty. Flaminiano:
In fact Your Honor I understand that some of the Barque girls even went around the
property.
Justice Carpio:
Went around the property (interrupted)
Atty. Flaminiano:
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after that they left for the
United States and for one reason or another they have not been able to take the
proper steps (interrupted)
Justice Carpio:
So, they never filed any suit to recover possession of the property, is that right?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:

Did they send any demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property since they
were the owners?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Clearly, the Barques have never set foot on the property from 1975 up to the present. The Barques
merely "went around" the fully fenced property. The Barques never sent a demand letter to the
Manotoks to vacate the property. The Barques never filed an ejectment or any action to recover
possession of the property.
Eleventh: The Barques Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace their Torrens title to the purchase by their predecessors-in-interest
of the property from the Government in 1919. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the
Manotoks state:
9.5 The Manotok chain of titles began with the purchase by Zacarias Modesto, Regina
Geronimo and Feliciano Villanueva of Lot 823 from the Philippine government on March 10,
1919. Attached hereto as Annex E is a Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copy of
Sale Certificate No. 1054 issued by the Friar Lands Division, Bureau of Lands, to Modesto,
Geronimo and Villanueva. Ownership over Lot 823 was later consolidated in Modesto, who
in 1920 assigned his interests thereon to M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok. Attached hereto
as Annexes F and G are Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copies of Assignments of
Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 and June 7, 1920.
9.6 In 1923, M. Teodoro assigned his share and interests over Lot 823 to Severino Manotok,
making him the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 823. A certified xerox copy of Assignment of
Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 is attached hereto as Annex H.
9.7 Through a series of transfers within the Manotok family and the Manotok Realty, Inc., a
company owned by petitioners, Lot 823 was titled under TCT No. 372302 on October 16,
1987 in the names of all of the Manotoks. The Manotoks chain of titles to the property, with
deeds of conveyances, are attached hereto as Annex I, with sub-annexes.
9.8 Fire gutted the Quezon City ROD on June 11, 1988, and shortly thereafter (i.e., on
August 31, 1988) the Manotoks filed reconstitution proceedings before the LRA, and were
issued a reconstituted certificate of title, TCT No. RT-22841 (372302), by the ROD of Quezon
city in 1991. A xerox copy of the petition for reconstitution filed by the Manotoks with the
ROD, with attachments, is attached hereto as Annex J, while a certified true copy of TCT No.
372302 (the title sought to be reconstituted in this petition) is attached hereto as Annex J-1.
On the other hand, the Barques can trace their chain of title only up to 1975 when Homer Barque,
Sr. purchased the property from Emiliano Setosta, who the Barques claim bought the property
directly from the Government in the 1940s. The Barques have not presented the deed of
conveyance by the Government to Setosta. The claim of the Barques that Setosta purchased the
property directly from the Government in the 1940s is belied by the 1927 Annual Report of the
Director of Lands, stating that:

With the exception of the estates of Calamba, Imus, Isabela, Lolomboy, Naic, San Francisco
de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Santa Maria de Pandi, and Talisay-Minglanilla, where
there are still some vacant lands, all the others of the 23 Friar land estates had already
been entirely disposed of. x x x.100(Emphasis supplied)
At the end of 1927, the Government had already sold all of the Piedad Estate, a Friar land. Thus,
the Government could not have sold directly to Setosta the disputed property in the 1940s.
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey Shows Barques Property Located 5.6
Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have submitted a relocation survey made
by the Lands Management Bureau NCR Regional Office of the Barques plan Fls-3168-D showing
that the Barques property is located "some 5.6 kilometers away from Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate, outside of Quezon City."101 The relocation survey plan is signed by Ludivina L. Aromin,
Chief of the Technical Services Division, and Engineer III Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum
dated 22 August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex "M" a copy of the Lands Management
Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D.
A DULY ISSUED TORRENS TITLE IS ONE ISSUED
BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS IN THE REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES
This Court ruled in Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.102 that courts
have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of title involving a property already covered by an
existing Torrens title in the name of another person. The dissenting opinion claims that the Barques
title was already existing at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks title in 1991. This is an
egregious error. When the Manotoks title was reconstituted in 1991, the Barques title had not been
reconstituted, and even up to now the reconstitution of the Barques title is still pending resolution in
the instant case. In contrast, when the Barques filed their reconstitution in 1996, the Manotoks title
had already been finally reconstituted and existing. Clearly, it is the Barques still pending
reconstitution that can no longer proceed because of the existing title of the Manotoks.
In Alabang, the Court held that a "duly issued existing Torrens title x x x cannot be the subject
of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles by third parties without first
securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles." The phrase "duly issued
existing Torrens title" simply means a title verifiably issued by the proper Register of Deeds. The
validity or invalidity of the title is not material at that point. What is material is whether the Register of
Deeds actually issued the title as part of his regular functions.
Clearly, at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks title, the Barques had no "duly issued
existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the
reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only "duly issued
existing Torrens title" over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The
Manotoks title could be verified against the reconstituted original title on file with the Register of
Deeds. In fact, the LRA Administrator has admitted that the Manotoks title "is existing as a
reconstituted title at the Office of the Register of Deeds." 103
The Barques could not produce even up to now a "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Barques owners duplicate certificate of title could not be
verified with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because the Barques title has no corresponding
original title, whether reconstituted or not, on file with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the reconstitution
of the Barques title, which is still pending in this case, can no longer proceed.

Once the reconstituting court or officer establishes that the Register of Deeds has in fact issued an
existing title in the name of another person, the proper step is to file an action before the Regional
Trial Court to annul such title.It is in such proceeding before the regional trial court that the
validity or invalidity of the title is determined. In such proceeding, any party may introduce in
evidence the LRA Administrator or the NBIs findings. In the meantime, no reconstitution
proceeding can prosper until after the cancellation by final judgment of such existing title.
The Alabang ruling necessarily involves a situation where there is an existing title issued by the
Register of Deeds at the time of filing of a petition to reconstitute another title over the same
property in the name of another person. The Alabang ruling states that in such a situation the
reconstituting authority has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reconstitution until a final judgment
cancels the other title. This is clear from the Courts ruling inAlabang:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens titles(which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their
issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first
securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court
reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of annulment and/or
reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of
evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is
his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration
rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to
two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual
notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and
void. Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental
principles will be held duly accountable therefor.104 (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision of the First Division misapplies the Alabang ruling by holding that the LRA
Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title by a finding that the title was not "duly
issued." Even the Register of Deeds, who physically issues a Torrens title as part of his regular
functions, cannot adjudicate on the validity of a title. The Decision states that the "function of the
(LRA) is adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for
reconstitution." This is grave error.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not
confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property.105 Reconstitution merely restores a missing
certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the
original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part
of the public forest,106 the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director
of Lands v. Gan Tan:107
But the lower court claims that petitioner, even if he complied with all the requirements of the
law, is not entitled to have his title reconstituted for the reason that, being an alien, he
is not qualified to acquire the land covered by said title under our Constitution.
However, we find this claim untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title
cannot be collaterally attacked. The rule on this matter is that this issue can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil.,
590). Moreover, it is a well known doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and

indefeasible (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Kane, 61 Phil., 504), and our duty is to see to it that
this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding.
To our mind, the only issue here is whether there is a title to be reconstituted. That is the only
purpose of the law (Rep. Act No. 26). If there is, then it is the duty of the court to comply with
its mandate. Whether the petitioner has the right to acquire the land or not, is beyond
the province of this proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. The
two proceedings are distinct and should not be confused.108 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
The fallacy in the dissenting opinions argument is that it assumes that the LRA Administrator can
adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title. The original jurisdiction to adjudicate or to decide the
validity of a Torrens title is vested by law exclusively in the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in the Regional Trial
Court the "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide factual and legal issues "which involve the
title to x x x real property." This means the Regional Trial Court first decides the validity of the
Torrens title, and this power to first decide is to the exclusion of all other organs of the State. Not
even the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court can usurp this exclusive original power of the
Regional Trial Court. Any judgment resulting from such usurpation is void.
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) can
issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory findings on whether a Torrens title is spurious or
authentic. These findings are mere evidences that must be submitted to the Regional Trial
Court, which alone has the power to adjudicate whether the title is void. Findings by the LRA
or the NBI that a title is spurious are merely administrative opinions, not a judicial
determination that settles rights and obligations between parties over a disputed property.
These findings are merely evidences, not the judgment itself of validity or invalidity which
can only come from the Regional Trial Court. These findings do not become res judicata,
while the judgment of the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an adjudication of the titles validity. The
Barques received an undeserved windfall when the First Division declared their reconstituted title
valid when the only relief they sought in the administrative reconstitution was the restoration of their
title in its condition at the time of the alleged loss or destruction. This Court has ruled in Alonso v.
Cebu Country Club, Inc.:109
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution
of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original
form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate
of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered
thereby.110 (Emphasis in original)
Thus, the LRA has no jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which
between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two claimants over the same
property is the lawful owner. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in courts of justice the "exclusive
original jurisdiction" to decide factual and legal issues involving "the title to x x x real property."
EQUITY JURISDICTION DOES NOT APPLY

The dissenting opinion further argues that the Manotoks are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the LRA Administrator or the LRA reconstituting officer. The dissenting opinion asserts
that the Manotoks failed to question in the proceedings before these LRA officials their jurisdiction to
reconstitute administratively the Barques title. This invocation of equity jurisdiction in favor of the
LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer for the benefit of the Barques - is grossly
erroneous.
First, the settled doctrine is "he who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands."111 The
Barques have submitted patently forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer. In the
development of equity jurisdiction through the ages, the constant principle from which there was no
deviation was that equity could never be used to reward those who commit fraud. This Court should
not depart from the noble intention that motivated the development and use of equity jurisdiction. As
this Court aptly stated in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.:112
Pagasa cannot rely on equity because he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one seeking its active
interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in the matter with
relation to which he seeks relief113 (30 C.J.S. 1009). (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel applies only to those who have sought affirmative
relief in the wrong court, lost there, and then assail the adverse decision of that court. This estoppel
applies against a party "who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse
decision."114 However, it was the Barques, not the Manotoks, who sought the affirmative relief of a
reconstituted title. In their Opposition115 before the LRA reconstituting officer, the Manotoks sought a
defensive, negative relief - that the Barques petition "be dismissed for lack of merit." It was also the
Barques, not the Manotoks, who invoked the jurisdiction of the LRA, which had no jurisdiction over
the Barques petition because of the pre-existing title of the Manotoks. Moreover, it was the Barques,
not the Manotoks, who lost before the LRA reconstituting officer and who assailed the adverse
decision before the LRA Administrator. The Barques even lost before the LRA Administrator who
refused to reconstitute the Barques title without the intervention of a "court of competent
jurisdiction." Clearly, jurisdiction by estoppel cannot apply to the Manotoks.
Third, the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer refused to assume jurisdiction to
reconstitute administratively the Barques title. The LRA Administrator denied the Barques petition
because of the existence of the Manotoks title, which in the words of the LRA Administrator must
first be cancelled by "a court of competent jurisdiction" before the Barques petition may be given
due course. The LRA reconstituting officer also denied the Barques petition because of the
existence of the Manotoks title which the LRA had already reconstituted. In short, these LRA
officials admitted that they had no jurisdiction over the Barques petition. Since these LRA
officials refused to assume jurisdiction, there was no assumption of equity jurisdiction that the
Manotoks could have questioned. For the same reason, there is no assumption of jurisdiction that
this Court can now recognize and validate through equity principles.
Fourth, the principle of equity jurisdiction arising from estoppel or any other reason applies only
to courts of justice. The jurisdiction of courts of justice arises from either statute or equity, or both.
In legal systems which recognize equity jurisdiction, equity is an inherent power of courts by
virtue of their duty to dispense justice to the full extent possible. Equity jurisdiction is a judicial
power. Administrative agencies or officers exercising administrative, executive, or ministerial
functions cannot assume equity jurisdiction because they do not exercise judicial functions. Thus, it
is gross error to invest on the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer equity jurisdiction

because these LRA officers perform administrative or executive functions in petitions

foradministrative reconstitution of titles.
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrators jurisdiction in relation to the
LRA Administrators opinion that the Manotoks title was "sham and spurious." In their Motion for
Reconsideration dated 27 August 1998 before the LRA Administrator,116 the Manotoks stated:
Moreover, it is not disputed that herein oppositors are the holder of an existing valid and
effective TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covering the same land embraced by TCT No. 210177
in question found which, as stated, is non-existing and spurious. Given said fact, no
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 should proceed. As held by the
Supreme Court, to wit:
So too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered by duly issued
existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from their issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be
the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of
such existing titles." (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234
SCRA 458 [1994])117 (Emphasis supplied)
Sixth, the principle of estoppel applies only if the LRA had in fact jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks, so as to bar the Manotoks, who previously claimed that
the LRA had no jurisdiction, from later taking a contrary position. Thus, the Court declared in People
v. Casiano:118
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,
and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. x x x119 (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA never had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Jurisdiction,
as ruled inPeople v. Casiano, "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel." It is axiomatic that only the law can confer jurisdiction. No
amount of estoppel can vest jurisdiction on an officer or court that the law has not conferred
jurisdiction.
The LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper Regional Trial Court has the
jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Only the Barques insist that the LRA has
jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title of a third party in an administrative reconstitution proceedings
filed by another party, a contention that is patently baseless.
Seventh, and most important of all, equity jurisdiction can never be used to violate the law. Equity
jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to render judgment
to meet the special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its statutory
jurisdiction.120 However, equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must

still apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law.121 Where the law prescribes a
particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity
jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.122 Thus, this Court has ruled:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, this is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial
rules of procedure.Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being
present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity.123 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has expressly
reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity
jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or
before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly
prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles.
This rule has special application to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, enacted
specifically to foreclose any possible collateral attack on a Torrens title, as well as any
possible cancellation or modification of a Torrens title without a proceeding in the Regional
Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the title. Strict compliance with Section 48 is what
gives Torrens titles enduring stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land ownership. To extend
equity jurisdiction to LRA officers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks on a Torrens title is a
gross and blatant violation of the clear and express command of a positive law. Any extension of
equity jurisdiction that operates to negate Section 48 will destroy the most basic safeguard in the
Property Registration Decree. Certainly, equity jurisdiction cannot be used for this purpose.
WHETHER ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR NOT, A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY
BE CANCELLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION
DECREE
In cancelling the Manotoks Torrens title without any trial before any court, the First Division of this
Court completely disregarded Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the
Judiciary Act. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a Torrens title "cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
That law is Section 19 of the Judiciary Act which states that the "Regional Trial Court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to x x x
real property." These two provisions mandate that no Torrens title can be cancelled unless there is
a proceeding in the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it ordered the cancellation of the Torrens title of the
Manotoks without a prior proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the
validity of the Manotoks title. Likewise, the First Division of this Court committed the same violation
totally disregarding Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary
Act, and in the process overturning well-entrenched doctrines of this Court.
The validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be assailed only in a direct
proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court in accordance with Section 48. In Ladignon v.
Court of Appeals,124 the Court declared:

What is worse, in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383675,
respondent Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction. After all, it is hornbook law that a
torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether
fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul
it. Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law. x x x.125 (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA Administrator has admitted that the Torrens title of the Manotoks "is thus presumed
valid."126 The law recognizes that the Manotoks Torrens title is "evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein."127 Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the prior title of the Manotoks is spurious, still under Ladignon v. Court of
Appeals,128 such title can only cancelled by the proper Regional Trial Court in a direct proceeding
assailing its validity.
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.129 as authority that
the Court of Appeals and this Court "have jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed
case was not originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title" under Section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree. Theponente has obviously misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon
Realty was a petition filed with the Court of Appeals forannulment of judgment of the Regional
Trial Court on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost
owners duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David. Rexlon Realty proved that the titles were not
lost but were in its possession as the first buyer of the properties from Alex David who had later sold
again the properties to Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon Realty also proved that Alex
David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the sale.
Rexlon Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same property, which is the situation in
the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the opposing parties agreed that there was only one set of titles
covering the same properties. The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were lost, and
if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of the titles; but if the titles were not
lost, then the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which covered properties that
Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David. Rexlon Realtys obvious interest was to maintain
the validity of the titles to the properties it had purchased, the titles to which were in Rexlon
Realtys possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree, the law requiring a direct proceeding in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing
the validity of a Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at issue in direct
proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and distinct issue from the propriety of a
reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in issuing replacement titles to
the properties in the name of Alex David who claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the
trial courts judgment, Rexlon Realty invoked, as stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides "the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower
court x x x [based on] fraud and lack of jurisdiction." Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
x x x In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous
to those involved in this case, we held that if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of
title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired

jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. In the case at bar, the
authenticity and genuineness of the owners duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in
the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have not been
disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owners duplicate copies of
said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in
replacement thereof are void.
xxx
In this case at bar, we simply annulled the decision of the RTC, acting as a land registration
court in L.R.C. Record No. 8843, to issue new owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537
and T-52538, for lack of jurisdiction. The dispute between petitioner Rexlon and
respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of land will have to be
threshed out or determined in a more appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one
allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to
pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owners
duplicate copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owners duplicate copy of
a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by
it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of
title over a particular property. 130 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, Rexlon Realty supports the Manotoks contention that once it is shown that there is a preexisting title duly issued by the Register of Deeds over the same property which is the subject of
reconstitution proceedings, the reconstitution cannot proceed for either of two reasons. First, the
reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to reconstitute a title that has never been lost or
destroyed. Second, the reconstituting officer or court has no authority to decide which of two
conflicting titles is valid. Thus, Rexlon Realty categorically ruled that in reconstitution proceedings,
whether administrative or judicial, the reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction "to pass upon
the question of actual ownership of the land" covered by the lost title because the "certificate of
title, by itself, does not vest ownership."
GUARANTY OF STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree is the cornerstone of our land registration system
providing stability to land titles. Without Section 48, our land registration system will crumble. Section
48 guarantees every landowner with a Torrens title that his title can never be cancelled unless the
validity of his title is first directly assailed in court where he can adduce evidence in his favor. The
Decision of the First Division erases this guarantee. In one stroke, the Decision of the First Division
has overturned over a century of jurisprudence fortifying a guarantee essential to the stability of our
land registration system.
In 1915, after the introduction in 1903131 of the Torrens system in this country, this Court waxed poetic
inLegarda and Prieto v. Saleeby132 in describing the cornerstone of the then new system of land
registration. Declared the Court:
x x x The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration,
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it
would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa,"
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x x

x x x The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost.
x x x133 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
This Court has reiterated the doctrine in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, now embodied in Section 48
of the Property Registration Decree, in innumerable decisions. In the 2003 case of Heirs of Santiago
v. Heirs of Santiago,134 a decision penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, this Court
declared:
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled
except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action
is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set
aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.135 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Decision of the First Division cancels a Torrens title without any proceeding in a trial court
directly attacking the title as required by law. What this Court warned against in Legarda and Prieto
v. Saleeby is now before us a situation where "all security in registered titles [is] lost." Every
landowner holding a Torrens title will now have to camp in the corridors of the courts, or constantly
watch in the balcony of his house, just to avoid losing his titled land. The Decision of the First
Division, by destroying the stability of land titles, will usher in an era of land disputes, which before
the advent of the Torrens system were often violent and bloody.
The Decision of the First Division denies to the Manotoks a basic guarantee under the Constitution
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.136 The Decision deprives
the Manotoks of their P1.7 billion property without any trial in any court contrary to the clear and
express mandate of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. This Court should never
allow such blatant, gross and shocking violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
A FINAL WORD ON RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
This Court has often warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles, which have resulted in innocent
landowners losing their titled lands to crime syndicates specializing in forged titles and documents.
The patently forged documents presented in these cases remind us of what this Court stated
in Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay:137
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings
for reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding
has many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his
property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to
discover that his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted
title in someone elses name.138 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT petitioners letter motion for reconsideration dated 19 July 2006,
(2) REVERSEthe Courts First Division Decision dated 12 December 2005 and Resolution dated 19
April 2006, (3) RECALL the Entry of Judgment dated 2 May 2006, and (4) DENY the petition for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 filed by respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNGANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW
VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P.
HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO
O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA
SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM
MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO
SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD
M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,

EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
THE SECRETARY OF THE
G.R. No. 167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,
QUISUMBING,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL
CARPIO,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO,
CORONA,*

AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS,

DIRECTOR OF LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF
PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY,
Petitioners,

CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,**
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

- versus MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and
Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents.
October 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,
- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL

G.R. No. 173775

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is
G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white
sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the boneshaped islands three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap,
Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTCin Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessorsin-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on
them.[10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since
the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their
names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the petition for declaratory relief. The OSGcountered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,
[11]
as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels

of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely
legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to
the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land
in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of
Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed
before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondentsclaimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to
their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the
manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands

titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular
No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.
[19]
The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for

acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a
forest reserve.

[25]

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.

Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 [26] classifying Boracay
Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo
Gelito,[28] and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
[30]
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over

portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective

lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos
in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts
on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral
nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive
department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classification
of Boracay Island.[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19,
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY
TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANSFOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF

THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? [35] (Underscoring

supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondentsclaimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have
a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other
pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in
relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA
No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c)
Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the
following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.
[42]
Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with
one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
[44]
Prior
to
Proclamation
No.
1064
of May
22,
2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified

under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree. [54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in

the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse
of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or
until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo
real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion
con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in
the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.
[60]
By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified
into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It
also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public
lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used

in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spainwhich
are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations

regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or

purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the
next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,
otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive
law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueosince time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.
2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands
which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD
No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February
16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various

laws relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under

the Torrenssystem as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,[80]declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [85] The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or
portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already

an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the

Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).
[89]
These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These
cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions
of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not
be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron
v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was
no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with

implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the

evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it
was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved
the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines,
except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian
doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically
those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed
to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained
unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the
State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was
proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts

could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron,

this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere
fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value
of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral
lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that
it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than
it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient
to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some
mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter
of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands
are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral
land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or
the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for
itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land,
unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened,
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may

decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry,supra)[95] (Emphasis
ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private
lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA
No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued
their title in 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private
claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain
was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,
[101]
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were
included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an
alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko
was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which

included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public
domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned

in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases
cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create
a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court
of Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed
in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that
the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term public land referred to all

lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the

government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of
the government and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
[108]
(Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR[109] and
the
National
Mapping
and
Resource
Information
[110]
Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands
of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed
for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the
island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a
forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso
beach resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest

cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
[113]
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is
particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
bykaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[115]
(Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and

forest or timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as
appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. [116] At any rate, the Court
is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that

Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay,
among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular
which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 382 to private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does
not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared
forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant
to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale
behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and

private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard
for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is
aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does
not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island,
but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as
Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to
name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable
and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of
Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and
7 of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation
of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public
lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office
of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification,
the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise
provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular,
much
less
unconstitutional,
about
the
classification

of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was
within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates
the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
devoted
to
or
suitable
for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations,
shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not

categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence
of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.
[125]
(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a

reclassification of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in
the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian
law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition
in Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest
reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a
prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as
public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been
previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. [127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of

imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the
occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation
No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Islandinto an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on
the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail
because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable
land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. [129] Where the land is
not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element
of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory
relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent
dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period
of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants

do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the
laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are
ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat
umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right
to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed
by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to
acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of

Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be
sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover
and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about
the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover
on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so
will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed
away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods
that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses,
and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans
decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish
said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch
of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw
the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down
by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in
this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we
have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to
avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal
only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should
not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and
the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever,
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the
new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the
registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not

by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while
this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow
interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences
that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken
full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never
come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to
uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey
the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case
may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the
Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days
and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental
policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification

existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural
lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been
followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593;
Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil.,
10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor
timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining
or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural
land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act
of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect
to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is
not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those
lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1
Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning
in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in
a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E,
581.)

Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires
that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which
they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning
of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision
is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations
controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning,
as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land
Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes,
but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in
answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII

(now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial
lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands'
and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends
to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became
the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the
late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration,
and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and
executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under
section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a
word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference
between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But
such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No
reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced
for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an
integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this
so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would
become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed,
the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will
come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost
all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used
and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for
no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first
draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands,
and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the
same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with
section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and
mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural

lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than
"private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to
make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that
could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit
of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and
other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity."
(2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the
Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the
privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who
said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural
resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we
shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the
Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and
nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros.
And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a
small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of
land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner
and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to
do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the
countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements
thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the
extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter:Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor
to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes:Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred
by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire
the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,

except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens,
grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public
domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage
of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural
and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have

been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible
under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by
the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify
that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it
even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes
and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.