No.L37007.July20,1987.

*
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C.
SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan(BranchIV),andJUANTUVERA,SR.,respondents.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Arbitrary Detention; Concept of and
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.Arbitrary Detention is
committedbyapublicofficerwho,withoutlegalgrounds,detainsaperson.
Theelementsofthiscrimearethefollowing:1.Thattheoffenderisapublic
officeroremployee.2.Thathedetainsaperson.3.Thatthedetentionis
withoutlegalgrounds.
Same; Same; Same; Public officers liable for arbitrary detention
mustbevestedwithauthoritytodetainororderthedetentionofpersons
accusedofacrime.ThepublicofficersliableforArbitraryDetentionmust
bevestedwithauthoritytodetainororderthedetentionofpersonsaccused
ofacrime.Suchpublicofficersarethepolicemenandotheragentsofthe
law,thejudgesormayors.
Same; Same; Same; Barangay captains recognized as persons
inauthority.Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law,
barriolieutenants,(whowerelaternamedbarriocaptainsandnowbarangay
captains) were recognized as persons inauthority. In various cases, this
Courtdeemedthemaspersonsinauthority,andconvictedthemofArbitrary
Detention.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Oneneednotbeapoliceofficertobe
chargeablewitharbitrarydetention;Abarriocaptainhavingthesameduty
asthemayorofmaintainingpeaceandorder,hecanbeliableforarbitrary
detention;Caseatbar.Oneneednotbeapoliceofficertobechargeable
withArbitraryDetention.Itisacceptedthatotherpublicofficerslikejudges
andmayors,whoactwithabuseoftheirfunctions,maybeguiltyofthis
crime.Aperusalofthepowersandfunctionvestedinmayorswouldshow
thattheyaresimilartothoseofabarriocaptainexceptthatinthecaseofthe
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintainingpeaceandorder,bothmustbeandaregiventheauthorityto
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondentTuverahimselfadmittedthatwiththeaidofhisruralpolice,he

asabarriocaptain,couldhaveledthearrestofpetitionerValdez.Fromthe
foregoing.thereisnodoubtthatabarriocaptain,likeprivaterespondent
Tuvera,Sr.,canbeheldliableforArbitraryDetention.
Same;Same;Same;CriminalProcedure;Motiontoquash;Courts
in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
informationbecausesaidmotionisahypotheticaladmissionofthefacts
allegedintheinformation;Exception.Next,privaterespondentTuvera,
Sr.contendsthatthemotiontoquashwasvalidlygrantedasthefactsand
evidenceonrecordshowthattherewasnocrimeofArbitraryDetention;
thatheonlysoughttheaidandassistanceoftheManaoagPoliceForce;and
thatheonlyaccompaniedpetitionerValdeztotownforthelatter'spersonal
safety.Sufficeittosaythattheaboveallegationscanonlyberaisedasa
defenseatthetrialastheytraversewhatisallegedintheInformation.We
haverepeatedlyheldthatCourts,inresolvingamotiontoquash,cannot
considerfactscontrarytothoseallegedintheinformationorwhichdonot
appearonthefaceoftheinformation.Thisisbecauseamotiontoquashisa
hypotheticaladmissionofthefactsallegedintheinformation.Mattersof
defensecannotbeprovedduringthehearingofsuchamotion,exceptwhere
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription,andformerjeopardy.InthecaseofU.S.vs.Perez,thisCourt
heldthatamotiontoquashonthegroundthatthefactschargeddonot
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but
diametricallyopposedtothoseallegedinthecomplaint.Thisruleadmitsof
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Anordergrantingamotionto
quash is a final order, not merely interlocutory, and is immediately
appealable; Double jeopardy cannot be claimed by the accused as the
dismissal of the case was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a
motiontoquash,unlikeoneof denial,isafinal order. It isnot merely
interlocutoryandisthereforeimmediatelyappealable.Theaccusedcannot
claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his
consentbutathisinstance.

PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewtheorderoftheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Pangasinan,Br.IV.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
GANCAYCO,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariofanorderoftheCourtofFirst
InstanceofPangasinan,ThirdJudicialDistrict,inCriminalCaseNo.D529
entitled 'The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
grantingthemotiontoquashtheinformationfiledbyaccusedJuanTuvera,
Sr.,hereinrespondent.Theissueiswhetherabarriocaptaincanbecharged
ofarbitrarydetention.
Thefactsareasfollows:
OnOctober12,1972,aninformationforArbitraryDetentionwasfiled
against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the
CourtofFirstInstanceofPangasinan,whichreadsasfollows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:
Thatonoraboutthe21stdayofApril,1973,ataround10:00o'clockin
the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and
withinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,accusedJuanTuvera,Sr.,a
barrio captain, withthe aid of someother private persons, namely Juan
Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando
Valdezbyhittingwithbuttsoftheirgunsandfistsblowsandimmediately
thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said
ArmandoValdezofhisconstitutionalliberty,accusedBarriocaptainJuan
Tuvera,Sr.,Cpl.TomasMendozaandPat.RodolfoMangsat,membersof
the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan,conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously,lodgeandlocksaidArmandoValdezinsidethemunicipaljail
ofManaoag,Pangasinanforabouteleven(11)hours.(Italicssupplied.)
CONTRARYTOARTICLE124oftheR.P.C.

DagupanCity,October12,1972.
(SGD.)VICENTEC.CALDONAAssistantProvincialFiscal"
Alltheaccused,includingrespondentJuanTuvera,Sr.,werearraignedand
pleadednotguilty.
OnApril4,1973,Tuverafiledamotiontoquashtheinformationon
thegroundthatthefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffenseandthatthe
proofsadducedattheinvestigationarenotsufficienttosupportthefilingof
theinformation.PetitionerAssistantProvincialFiscalRamonS.Milofiled
anoppositionthereto.
FindingthatrespondentJuanTuvera,Sr.wasnotapublicofficerwho
can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C.
SalangagrantedthemotiontoquashinanorderdatedApril25,1973.
Hence,thispetition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without
legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1.Thattheoffenderisapublicofficeroremployee.
2.Thathedetainsaperson.
_________________
1 Art.124,RevisedPenalCode. 3.Thatthedetentioniswithoutlegal
grounds.2
The ground relied upon byprivate respondent Tuvera for hismotionto
quashtheinformationwhichwassustainedbyrespondentJudge,isthatthe
factschargeddonotconstituteanoffense,3thatis,thatthefactsallegedin
theinformationdonotconstitutetheelementsofArbitraryDetention.
TheInformationchargesTuvera,abarriocaptain,tohaveconspired
withCpl.MendozaandPat.Mangsat,whoaremembersofthepoliceforce
of Manaoag, Pangasinan indetaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven
(11)hoursinthemunicipaljailwithoutlegalground.Nodoubtthelasttwo
elementsofthecrimearepresent.
TheonlyquestioniswhetherornotTuvera,Sr.,abarriocaptain,isa
publicofficerwhocanbeliableforthecrimeofArbitraryDetention.
ThepublicofficersliableforArbitraryDetentionmustbevestedwith

authoritytodetainororderthedetentionofpersonsaccusedofacrime.
Suchpublicofficersarethepolicemenand otheragents ofthelaw, the
judgesormayors.4
RespondentJudgeSalangadidnotconsiderprivaterespondentTuvera
assuchpublicofficerwhentheformermadethisfindinginthequestioned
order:
"Apparently,ifArmandoValdezwaseverjailedanddetainedmorethansix
(6)hours,JuanTuvera,Sr.,hasnothingtodowiththesamebecauseheis
notinanywayconnectedwiththePoliceForceofManaoag,Pangasinan.
GrantingthatitwasTuvera,Sr.,whoorderedValdezarrested,itwasnothe
whodetainedandjailedhimbecausehehasnosuchauthorityvestedinhim
asamereBarrioCaptainofBarrioBaguinay,Manaoag,Pangasinan."5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private
respondentTuveraassertsthatthemotiontoquashwasproperlysustained
forthefollowingreasons:(1)Thathedidnothavetheauthoritytomake
arrest,norjailanddetainpetitionerValdezasamerebarriocaptain;6 (2)
Thatheisneitherapeaceofficernorapoliceman,7(3)Thathewasnota
public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of
petitionerValdez;9(5)Thatheisnotconnecteddirectlyorindirectlyinthe
administrationoftheManaoagPoliceForce;10(6)Thatbarriocaptainson
April21,1972werenotyetconsideredaspersonsinauthorityandthatit
wasonlyuponthepromulgationofPresidentialDecreeNo.299thatBarrio
Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are
personsinauthority;11andthattheproperchargewasIllegalDetentionand
NotArbitraryDetention.12
Wedisagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons inauthority. In various cases, this
Courtdeemedthemaspersonsinauthority,andconvictedthemofArbitrary
Detention.
InU.S.vs.Braganza,13MartinSalibio,abarriolieutenant,andHilario
Braganza,amunicipalcouncilor,arrestedFatherFelicianoGomezwhilehe
wasinhischurch.Theymadehimpassthroughthedoorofthevestryand
afterwardstookhimtothemunicipalbuilding.There,theytoldhimthathe

wasunderarrest.Thepriesthadnotcommittedanycrime.Thetwopublic
officialswereconvictedofArbitraryDetention.14
InU.S.vs.Gellada,15GeronimoGellada,abarriolieutenant,withthe
helpofFiloteoSoliman,boundandtiedhishouseboySixtoGentugaswitha
ropeataround6:00p.m.anddeliveredhimtothejusticeofthepeace.Sixto
wasdetainedduringthewholenightanduntil9:00a.m.ofthenextday
whenhewasorderedreleasedbythejusticeofthepeacebecausehehadnot
committedanycrime,GelladawasconvictedofArbitraryDetention.16
UnderRepublicActNo.3590,otherwiseknownasTheRevisedBarrio
Charter,thepowersanddutiesofabarriocaptainincludethefollowing:to
lookafterthemaintenanceofpublicorderinthebarrioandtoassistthe
municipalmayorandthemunicipalcouncilorinchargeofthedistrictinthe
performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general
welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are
operativewithinthebarrio;19andtoorganizeandleadanemergencygroup
wheneverthesamemaybenecessaryforthemaintenanceofpeaceand
orderwithinthebarrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration,
ProfessorJoseM.Aruegohasthistosayabouttheabovementionedpowers
anddutiesofaBarrioCaptain,towit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of
publicorderinthe barrio.Forpublicdisordertherein,inevitablypeople
blamehim.
"Intheeventthattherebeadisturbingacttosaidpublicorderora
threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and
persuadingthem,wherepossible,tobehavewell,butwhennecessary,he
maysubjectthemtothefullforceoflaw.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a
personinauthority.Assuch,hemaymakearrestanddetainpersonswithin
legallimits."21(Italicssupplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention.Itisacceptedthatotherpublicofficerslikejudgesandmayors,
whoactwithabuseoftheirfunctions,maybeguiltyofthiscrime. 22 A

perusalofthepowersandfunctionvestedinmayorswouldshowthatthey
aresimilartothoseofabarriocaptain23exceptthatinthecaseofthelatter,
histerritorialjurisdictionissmaller.Havingthesamedutyofmaintaining
peaceandorder,bothmustbeandaregiventheauthoritytodetainororder
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera
himselfadmittedthatwiththeaidofhisruralpolice,heasabarriocaptain,
couldhaveledthearrestofpetitionerValdez.24
From theforegoing,thereisnodoubt that abarriocaptain,likeprivate
respondentTuvera,Sr.,canbeheldliableforArbitraryDetention.
Next,privaterespondentTuvera,Sr.contendsthatthemotiontoquash
wasvalidlygrantedasthefactsandevidenceonrecordshowthattherewas
no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and
assistanceoftheManaoagPoliceForce;26 andthatheonlyaccompanied
petitionerValdeztotownforthelatter'spersonalsafety.27
Sufficeittosaythattheaboveallegationscanonlyberaisedasa
defenseatthetrialastheytraversewhatisallegedintheInformation.We
haverepeatedlyheldthatCourts,inresolvingamotiontoquash,cannot
considerfactscontrarytothoseallegedintheinformationorwhichdonot
appearonthefaceoftheinformation.Thisisbecauseamotiontoquashisa
hypotheticaladmissionofthefactsallegedintheinformation.28Mattersof
defensecannotbeprovedduringthehearingofsuchamotion,exceptwhere
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription,andformerjeopardy.29 Inthecaseof U.S.vs.Perez,30 this
Courtheldthatamotiontoquashonthegroundthatthefactschargeddo
not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but
diametricallyopposedtothoseallegedinthecomplaint.Thisruleadmitsof
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31
Lastly,privaterespondentclaimsthatbythelowercourt'sgrantingof
themotiontoquashjeopardyhasalreadyattachedinhisfavor32 onthe
groundthathere,thecasewasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithout
hisexpressconsent.
Respondent'scontentionholdsnowater.Anordergrantingamotionto
quash,unlikeoneofdenial,isafinalorder.Itisnotmerelyinterlocutory

andisthereforeimmediatelyappealable.Theaccusedcannotclaimdouble
jeopardyasthedismissalwassecurednotonlywithhisconsentbutathis
instance.33
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thePetitionforcertiorariis
GRANTED.ThequestionedOrderofApril25,1973inCriminalCaseNo.
D529isherebysetaside.Letthiscaseberemandedtotheappropriatetrial
courtforfurtherproceedings.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee(C.J.),Narvasa,CruzandParas,JJ.,concur.
Petitiongranted.Caseremandedtotrialcourtforfurtherproceedings.
Notes.Thereisnocriminaldelayinthedeliveryoftheaccusedto
thecourt,wherethetwodaysfollowinghisarrest,wereholidays.(Medina
vs.Orosco,18SCRA1169.)
A public officer or employee who detains a person without legal
groundsisguiltyofarbitrarydetention,butthepersonsodetainedwillnot
bereleasedifafterwardsheisdetainedunderavalidinformation.(Medina
vs.Orosco,18SCRA1169.)
o0o

G.R.No.112235.November29,1995.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ELIAS
LOVEDIOROyCASTRO,defendantappellant.
CriminalLaw;Rebellion;Byitsverynature,rebellionisessentially
acrimeofmassesormultitudesinvolvingcrowdactionwhichcannotbe
confined a priori within predetermined bounds.The gravamen of the
crimeofrebellionisanarmedpublicuprisingagainstthegovernment.By
its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes
involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of
rebellionisthatotheractscommittedinitspursuanceare,bylaw,absorbed
inthecrimeitselfbecausetheyrequireapoliticalcharacter.
Same;Same;Indecidingifthecrimecommittedisrebellion,not
murder,itbecomesimperativeforourcourtstoascertainwhetherornot
theactwasdoneinfurtheranceofapoliticalend.Divestedofitscommon
complexiontherefore,anyordinaryact,howevergrave,assumesadifferent
colorbybeingabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellion,whichcarriesalighter
penaltythanthecrimeofmurder.Indecidingifthecrimecommittedis
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The

politicalmotiveoftheactshouldbeconclusivelydemonstrated.
Same;Same;Theburdenofdemonstratingpoliticalmotivefallson
thedefense.Insuchcases,theburdenofdemonstratingpoliticalmotive
fallsonthedefense,motive,beingastateofmindwhichtheaccused,better
thananyindividual,knows.Thus,inPeoplev.Gempes,thiscourtstressed
that: Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accuseds)
knowledgeandsincemoreoverthisisanaffirmativedefense,theburdenis
onthemtoprove,oratleasttostate,whichtheycouldeasilydopersonally
orthroughwitnesses,that theykilledthedeceasedinfurtheranceofthe
resistancemovement.
Same;Same;Itisnotenoughthattheovertactsofrebellionareduly
proven.Fromtheforegoing,itisplainlyobviousthatitisnotenoughthat
theovertactsofrebellionaredulyproven.Bothpurposeandovertactsare
essentialcomponentsofthecrime.Witheitheroftheseelementswanting,
thecrimeofrebellionlegallydoesnotexist.Infact,evenincaseswherethe
actcomplainedofwerecommittedsimultaneouslywithorinthecourseof
therebellion,ifthekilling,robbing,oretc.,wereaccomplishedforprivate
purposesorprofit,withoutanypoliticalmotivation,ithasbeenheldthatthe
crimewouldbeseparatelypunishableasacommoncrimeandwouldnotbe
absorbedbythecrimerebellion.
Same;Same;Ifnopoliticalmotiveisestablishedandproved,the
accusedshouldbeconvictedofthecommoncrimeandnotofrebellion.It
follows,therefore,thatifnopoliticalmotiveisestablishedandproved,the
accusedshouldbeconvictedofthecommoncrimeandnotofrebellion.In
casesofrebellion,motiverelatestotheact,andmeremembershipinan
organizationdedicatedtothefurtheranceofrebellionwouldnot,byandof
itself,suffice.
Same; Same; The burden of proof that the act committed was
impelledbyapoliticalmotiveliesontheaccused.Asstatedhereinabove,
the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political
motive lies on the Accused. Political motive must be alleged in the
information.Itmustbeestablishedbyclearandsatisfactoryevidence.
Same;Evidence;Lackorabsenceofmotiveforcommittingacrime
doesnotprecludeconvictiontherebeingareliableeyewitnesswhofully
andsatisfactorilyidentifiedappellantastheperpetratorofthefelony.

Againstappellantsclaimsthatheactedmerelyasalookout,thetestimony
ofonewitness,hisbloodrelative,freefromanysignsofimproprietyor
falsehood, was sufficient toconvict the accused. Moreover, neither may
lackofmotivebeavailingtoexculpatetheappellant.Lackorabsenceof
motiveforcommittingacrimedoesnotprecludeconviction,therebeinga
reliableeyewitnesswhofullyandsatisfactorilyidentifiedappellantasthe
perpetratorofthefelony.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofLegazpiCity,Br.
1.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
RicafortLawOfficeforaccusedappellant.
KAPUNAN,J.:
OffdutypolicemanSPO3JesusLucilowaswalkingalongBurgosSt.,away
fromtheDaraga,AlbayPublicMarketwhenamansuddenlywalkedbeside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policemansrightearandfired.ThemanwhoshotLucilohadthreeother
companionswithhim,oneofwhomshotthefallenpolicemanfourtimesas
he lay on the ground. After taking the latters gun, the man and his
companionsboardedatricycleandfled.1
Theincidentwaswitnessedfromadistanceofaboutninemetersby
NestorArmenta,a25yearoldwelderfromPilar,Sorsogon,whoclaimed
thatheknewboththevictimandthemanwhofiredthefatalshot.Armenta
identifiedthemanwhofiredatthedeceasedasEliasLovedioroyCastro,
hisnephew(appellantsfatherwashisfirstcousin)andallegedthatheknew
thevictimfromthefactthatthelatterwasaresidentofBagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshotwoundsontheface,thechest,andotherpartsofthebody.2 On
autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as
hypovolemicshock.3
Asaresultofthekilling,theofficeoftheprovincialprosecutorof
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused
appellantEliasLovedioroyCastroofthecrimeofMurderunderArticle

248oftheRevisedPenalCode.TheInformationreads:
Thatonoraboutthe27thdayofJuly,1992,atmoreorless5:30oclockin
theafternoon,atBurgosStreet,MunicipalityofDaraga,ProvinceofAlbay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already
chargedinCrim.CaseNo.5931beforeRTC,Branch1,andthree(3)others
whosetrueidentitiesareatpresentunknownandremainatlarge,conniving,
conspiring,confederatingandhelpingoneanotherforacommonpurpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyfire
and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police
Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his
death,tothedamageandprejudiceofhislegalheirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accusedappellant guilty beyond
reasonabledoubtofthecrimeofMurder.Thedispositiveportionofsaid
decision,datedSeptember24,1993states:
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoingconsiderations,thisCourtfinds
the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal,actinginconspiracywithhiscoaccusedwhoarestillatlarge,of
thecrimeofmurder,definedandpenalizedunderArticle248oftheRevised
PenalCode,andherebysentenceshimtosufferthepenaltyofReclusion
Perpetuawithalltheaccessoriesprovidedbylaw;topaytheheirsofthe
deceasedSPO3JesusLucilothroughthewidow,Mrs.RemelineLucilo,the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil
indemnityfordeath;topaythesaidwidowthesumofThirtyThousand
(P30,000.00)Pesosrepresentingreasonablemoraldamages;andtopaythe
said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred EightyEight
(P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said
accused.
Withcostsagainsttheaccused.
SOORDERED.
Hence,theinstantappeal,inwhichthesoleissueinterposedisthatportion
oftrialcourtdecisionfindinghimguiltyofthecrimeofmurderandnot
rebellion.

Appellantcitesthetestimonyoftheprosecutionsprincipalwitness,
NestorArmenta,assupportinghisclaimthatheshouldhavebeencharged
withthecrimeofrebellion,notmurder.InhisBrief,heasseveratesthat
Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
PeoplesArmy.Additionally,hecontendsthatbecausethekillingofLucilo
was a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,4 (said killing)
shouldhavebeendeemedabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellionunderArts.
134and135oftheRevisedPenalCode.Finally,claimingthathedidnot
firethefatalshotbutmerelyactedasalookoutintheliquidationofLucilo,
heaversthatheshouldhavebeenchargedmerelyasaparticipantinthe
commissionofthecrimeofrebellionunderparagraph2ofArticle135of
theRevisedPenal Codeandshouldthereforehavebeenmetedonlythe
penaltyofprisionmayorbythelowercourt.
Assertingthatthetrialcourtcorrectlyconvictedappellantofthecrime
ofmurder,theSolicitorGeneralaversthatthecrimecommittedbyappellant
maybeconsideredasrebelliononlyifthedefenseitselfhadconclusively
proventhatthemotiveorintentforthekillingofthepolicemanwasfor
politicalandsubversiveends.5Moreover,theSolicitorGeneralcontends
thatevenifappellantweretobeconvictedofrebellion,andevenifthetrial
courthadfoundappellantguiltymerelyofbeingaparticipantinarebellion,
theproperimposablepenaltyisnotprisionmayorasappellantcontends,but
reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup Detat Law, prescribes reclusion
temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as
participantsinarebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was
murderandnotrebellion.
UnderArt.134oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRepublic
ActNo.6968,rebellioniscommittedinthefollowingmanner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purposeofremovingfromtheallegiancetosaidGovernmentoritslaws,the
territoryoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesoranypartthereof,ofanybody
ofland,navalorotherarmedforces,ordeprivingtheChiefExecutiveorthe
Legislature,whollyorpartially,ofanyoftheirpowersorprerogatives.6
Thegravamenofthecrimeofrebellionisanarmedpublicuprisingagainst

the government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of

massesormultitudesinvolvingcrowdaction,whichcannotbeconfineda
priori within predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the
commissionofrebellionisthatotheractscommittedinitspursuanceare,by
law,absorbedinthecrimeitselfbecausetheyrequireapoliticalcharacter.
ThispeculiaritywasunderscoredinthecaseofPeoplev.Hernandez,9thus:
Inshort,politicalcrimesarethosedirectlyaimedagainstthepoliticalorder,
aswellassuchcommoncrimesasmaybecommittedtoachieveapolitical
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually
regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it becomes stripped of its
commoncomplexion,inasmuchas,beingpartandparcelofthecrimeof
rebellion,theformeracquiresthepoliticalcharacterofthelatter.
Divestedofitscommoncomplexiontherefore,anyordinaryact,however
grave,assumesadifferentcolorbybeingabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellion,
whichcarriesalighterpenaltythanthecrimeofmurder.Indecidingifthe
crimecommittedisrebellion,notmurder,itbecomesimperativeforour
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
Insuchcases,theburdenofdemonstratingpoliticalmotivefallsonthe
defense,motive,beingastateofmindwhichtheaccused,betterthanany
individual,knows.Thus,inPeoplev.Gempes,10thisCourtstressedthat:
Sincethisisamatterthatliespeculiarlywith(theaccuseds)knowledgeand
since moreover thisis anaffirmative defense, the burden is onthem to
prove,oratleasttostate,whichtheycouldeasilydopersonallyorthrough
witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance
movement.
Fromtheforegoing,itisplainlyobviousthatitisnotenoughthattheovert
actsofrebellionaredulyproven.Bothpurposeandovertactsareessential
componentsofthecrime.Witheitheroftheseelementswanting,thecrime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complainedofwerecommittedsimultaneouslywithorinthecourseofthe
rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private

purposesorprofit,withoutanypoliticalmotivation,ithasbeenheldthatthe
crimewouldbeseparatelypunishableasacommoncrimeandwouldnotbe
absorbedbythecrimerebellion.11
Clearly,politicalmotiveshouldbeestablishedbeforeapersoncharged
withacommoncrimeallegingrebellioninorderto lessenthepossible
imposablepenaltycouldbenefitfromthelawsrelativelybenignattitude
towardspoliticalcrimes.Instructiveinthisregardisthecaseof Enrilev.
Amin,12wheretheprosecutionsoughttochargeSenatorJuanPonceEnrile
withviolationofP.D.No.1829,13forallegedlyharboringorconcealingin
hishomeCol.GregorioHonasaninspiteofthesenatorsknowledgethat
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the
prosecutionscontention,thatrebellionandviolationofP.D.1829couldbe
triedseparately14 (ontheprinciplethatrebellionisbasedontheRevised
PenalCodewhileP.D.1829isaspeciallaw),thattheactforwhichthe
senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbedinthecrimeofrebellionbeingmotivatedby,andrelatedtothe
actsforwhichhewaschargedinEnrilevs.Salazar(G.R.Nos.92163and
92164)acasedecidedonJune5,1990.RulinginfavorofSenatorEnrile
and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot
prosperbecauseaseparateprosecutionforrebellionhadalreadybeenfiled
andinfactdecided,theCourtsaid:
Theattendantcircumstancesintheinstantcase,howeverconstrainustorule
thatthetheoryofabsorptioninrebellioncasesmustnotconfineitselfto
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetratedinfurtheranceofthepoliticaloffense.15
NotingtheimportanceofpurposeincasesofrebellionthecourtinEnrile
vs.Aminfurtherunderscoredthat:
[I]ntentormotiveisadecisivefactor.IfSenatorPonceEnrileisnotcharged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
becausethelatterisafriendandformerassociate,themotivefortheactis
completelydifferent.Butiftheactiscommittedwithpolitical orsocial
motives,thatisinfurtheranceofrebellion,thenbeingpunishedseparately.
Itfollows,therefore,thatifnopoliticalmotiveisestablishedandproved,
theaccusedshouldbeconvictedofthecommoncrimeandnotofrebellion.
Incasesofrebellion,motiverelatestotheact,andmeremembershipinan

organizationdedicatedtothefurtheranceofrebellionwouldnot,byandof
itself,suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v.
Ompad,Jr.,16 totheinstantcaseisstriking.Twowitnesses,bothformer
NPArecruitsidentifiedtheaccusedOmpad,aliasCommanderBrando,a
knownhitmanoftheNPA,ashavingledthreeothermembersoftheNPA
intheliquidationofDioniloBarlaan,amilitaryinformer,alsoinarebel
infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was
merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
politicalmotivewasneitherallegednorproved.
Asstatedhereinabove,theburdenofproofthattheactcommittedwas
impelledbyapoliticalmotiveliesontheaccused.Politicalmotivemustbe
allegedintheinformation.17Itmustbeestablishedbyclearandsatisfactory
evidence.InPeoplev.PazandTicaweheld:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of
mitigationordefensethattheaccusedhastheburdenofprovingclearlyand
satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his
superiorstoldhimofDayritbeinganinformer,andhissuspicionthathe,
was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the
motivation for the killing was political, considering appellants obvious
interestintestifyingtothateffect.18

Similarly, in People v.
Courtfavorablyquoted,notedthat:
[T]he sparrow
Buco,19 the Court
Q Whatwasthatincidentifany,pleasenarrate?
stressed that accused in

service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) unit is the
liquidation squad
that case failed to A July27,1992atmoreorless12:00noon.Iamathome,threemalepersonacertainaliasALWIN,
companionscommandedatricyclethenwefleduntilwereachedahillwhereinthereisasmall
establishthatthereason
ALIASSAMUELandtheotheroneunknowntome,fetchedmeandtoldmetogowiththem,soI
bridge,thereafterKaSamueltookthehandgunthatwashandedtomebythematPilar,Sorsogon. of the New
Peoples Army
for the killing of their
askedthemwhere,Alwinhandedmeahandgunandsamehestopped/callapassengerjeepneyand
(sic)
withtheobjective
victimwastofurtheror
toldmeboardonsaidjeepney.(sic)
Q
Doyouknowthepolicemanthatwaskilledbyyourcompanion?
of overthrowing
carryout rebellion.The
Pleasecontinue.

duly
evidenceadducedbythe Q A
IjustcametoknowhisnamewhenIreachedhomeandhearditradio,thatheisJESUSLUCILO. the
constituted
defense therein simply A UponreachingDaraga,AlbayfrontingPetronGasolineStation,wealightedonsaidjeep,sowewalk
(sic)
government. It is
showed that appellant
towardsDaragaBakerywestoppedwalkingduetoitisraining,whentherainstoppedwecontinue
Q
Whatisyourparticipationinthegroup?
thereforenothard
Francisco Buco was
walkingbyusingtheroadnearthebakery.(sic)
to comprehend
ordered by Tomas
A
Lookoutsir.
Q
WhenyoureachedDaragabakery,asyouhavesaidinQ.7youusedtheroadnearthebakerywhere
thatthekillingof
Calma,

alias
didyouproceed?
Pfc.Manatadwas
CommanderSoltokill
Q
Ihavenothingmoretoaskedyouwhatelse,ifthereisany?(sic)
committed as a
municipal

mayor
AA
Iamnotfamiliarwiththatplace,butIandmycompanioncontinuewalking,atmoreorless4:30
Nomoresir.25
means to or in
Conrado G. Dizon.
P.M.July27,1992oneofmycompaniontoldusastoquoteinBicoldialect,towit:AMONA
furtherance of the
However, the evidence
YADIANTINAMPOPALUWAS(Thisistheplacetowardsthepoblacion),so,Iplacedmyself
subversive ends of the
likewise showed that
justaheadofasmallstore,mythree(3)companionscontinuewalkingtowardspoblacion,laterona
NPA.22
Calma was induced by
policeman sporting white Tshirt and a Khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said
Bycontrast,theSolicitor
an acquaintance, a
policemanisnearlyapproachingme,ALWINshotthesaidpolicemaninfrontofthesmallstore,
General vigorously
civilian, to order the
whenthesaidpolicemanfellontheasphaltedroad,ALWINtookthe
argues for a different
killing on account of
resultinthecaseatbench.Hestatesthataccusedappellantsbelatedclaims
private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court
to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
attributednopoliticalmotiveforthekilling,thoughcommittedbyknown
serving,23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the
membersoftheHukbalahapmovement.20
circumstancesofthecase,wefullyagree.Hestates:
Peoplev.Dasig 21 hasafactualmilieualmostsimilartotheinstant
[Inthecasecited]theappellants,admittedlymembersoftheNPA,clearly
case.There,theCourtheldthattheactofkillingapoliceofficer,knowing
overcametheburdenofprovingmotiveorintent.Itwasshownthat the
toowellthatthevictimisapersoninauthorityisamerecomponentor
politicalmotivationforthekillingofthevictimwasthefactthatRagaul
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion. In
wassuspectedasaninformerforthePC.Theperpetratorsevenleftaletter
Dasig theCourthowevernotedthattheaccused,whowaschargedwith
card,adrawingonthebodyofRagaulasawarningtoothersnottofollow
murder,notonlyadmittedhismembershipwiththeNPAbutalsoexecuted
hisexample.Itisentirelydifferentinthecaseatbarwheretheevidencefor
anextrajudicialconfessiontotheeffectthathewasamemberofanNPA
the appellant merely contains selfserving assertions and denials not
sparrow unit, a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief
substantial enough as anindicia of political motivation inthe killing of
thereinwasinagreement.TheSolicitorGeneralsbriefinDasigwhichthis

victimSPO3JesusLucilo.24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his
extrajudicialconfessiontohavingparticipatedinthekillingofLuciloas
follows:
It bearsemphasisthatnowhereinhisentire extrajudicial confession did
appellantevermentionthathewasamemberoftheNewPeoplesArmy.A
thoroughreadingofthesamerevealsnothingwhichwouldsuggestthatthe
killinginwhichhewasaparticipantwasmotivatedbyapoliticalpurpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn
statements,didnotcontainanymentionorallusionastotheinvolvementof
the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness
Nestor Armenta did not mention that NPA in his sworn statement of
October19,1992.27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellants
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought,
somethingwhichthedefensemerelypickedupandfollowedthroughupon
prosecutioneyewitnessArmentastestimonyoncrossexaminationthathe
knewappellanttobeamemberoftheNPA.Interestingly,however,inthe
same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was forced to pinpoint
appellantasanNPAmember.28Thelogicalresult,ofcourse,wasthatthe
trialcourtdidnotgiveanyweightandcredencetosaidtestimony.Thetrial
court,afterall,hadtheprerogativeofrejectingonlyapartofawitness
testimonywhileupholdingtherestofit.29Whiledisbelievingtheportionof
ArmentastestimonyonappellantsallegedmembershipintheNPA,the
trialcourtcorrectlygavecredencetohisunflawednarrationabouthowthe
crimewascommitted.30Suchnarrationisevencorroboratedinitspertinent
portions,exceptastotheidentityofthegunwielder,bythetestimonyofthe
appellanthimself.
Inanycase,appellantsclaimregardingthepoliticalcolorattending
thecommissionofthecrimebeingamatterofdefense,itsviabilitydepends
onhissoleandunsupportedtestimony.Hetestifiedthat,upontheprodding
of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organizationsgoals.31 HeclaimedthathistwocompanionsshotLucilo
because he had offended our organization,32 without, however,
specifyingwhattheoffensewas.Appellantclaimedthathehadbeena

memberoftheNPAforfivemonthsbeforetheshootingincident.33
AscorrectlyobservedbytheSolicitorGeneral,appellantscontentions
are couched in terms so general and nonspecific34 that they offer no
explanationastowhatcontributionthekillingwouldhavemadetowards
theachievementoftheNPAssubversiveaims.SPO3JesusLucilo,amere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were
specificallyshowntohaveoffendedtheNPA.Againstappellantsattempts
toshadehisparticipationinthekillingwithapoliticalcolor,theevidence
on record leaves the impression that appellants bare allegations of
membershipintheNPAwasconvenientlyinfusedtomitigatethepenalty
imposable upon him. It is ofjudicial notice that inmany NPAinfested
areas,crimeshavebeenalltooquicklyattributedtothefurtheranceofan
ideologyorunderthecloakofpoliticalcolorforthepurposeofmitigating
theimposablepenaltywheninfacttheyarenomorethanordinarycrimes
perpetratedbycommoncriminals.InBaylosisv.Chavez,Jr.,ChiefJustice
Narvasaaptlyobserved:
Theexistenceofrebelliousgroupsinoursocietytoday,andofnumerous
bandits,orirresponsibleorderangedindividuals,isarealitythatcannotbe
ignoredorbelittled.Theiractivities,thekillingsandactsofdestructionand
terrorismthattheyperpetrate,unfortunatelycontinueunabateddespitethe
besteffortsthattheGovernmentauthoritiesareexerting,althoughitmaybe
truethattheinsurrectionistgroupsoftherightortheleftnolongerposea
genuinethreattothesecurityofthestate.Theneedformorestringentlaws
andmorerigorouslawenforcement,cannotbegainsaid.35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motiveforthekillingofSPO3JesusLucilo,wearesatisfiedthatthetrial
courtcorrectlyconvictedappellantofthecrimeofmurder.36 Itisofno
momentthatasingleeyewitness,NestorArmenta,sealedhisfate,foritis
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is
sufficienttoconvict.37Againstappellantsclaimsthatheactedmerelyasa
lookout,thetestimonyofonewitness,hisbloodrelative,freefromany
signsofimproprietyorfalsehood,wassufficienttoconvicttheaccused.38
Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not
preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and

satisfactorilyidentifiedappellantastheperpetratorofthefelony.39Inthe
case at bench, the strength of the prosecutions case was furthermore
bolsteredbyaccusedappellantsadmissioninopencourtthatheandthe
eyewitness,hisownuncle,borenogrudgesagainsteachother.40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The
attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any
kind.41Thekillinghavingbeenqualifiedbytreachery,thecrimecommitted
ismurderunderArt.248oftheRevisedPenalCode.Intheabsenceofany
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in
imposingthepenaltyofreclusionperpetua,togetherwithalltheaccessories
providedbylaw.
WHEREFORE,PREMISESCONSIDERED,thetrialcourtsdecision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED,intoto.
SOORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima,
Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmedintoto.
Note.The qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtheranceofrebellionunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1866isdistinctfrom
thecrimeofrebellionprovidedunderArticles134and135oftheRevised
PenalCode.(Peoplevs.DeGracia,233SCRA716[1994])

VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
G.R.No.93335.September13,1990.*
JUANPONCEENRILE,petitioner,vs.HON.OMARU.AMIN,Presiding
JudgeofRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,Branch135,HON.IGNACIOM.
CAPULONG,PresidingJudgeofRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.
CriminalLaw;Rebellion;Pres.Decree1829;Rebellioncannotbe
complexedwithanyotheroffensecommittedontheoccasionthereofeither
asameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintendedeffectofan
activitythatconstitutesrebellion.Theresolutionoftheaboveissuebrings
usanewtothecaseofPeoplev.Hernandez(99Phil.515[1956])therulings
ofwhichwererecentlyrepeatedinthepetitionforhabeascorpusof Juan
PonceEnrilev.JudgeSalazar,(G.R.Nos.92163and92164,June5,1990).
TheEnrilecasegavethisCourttheoccasiontoreiteratethelongstanding
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared: The rejection of both
optionsshapesanddeterminestheprimaryrulingoftheCourt,whichisthat
Hernandez remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibitthecomplexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintendedeffectof
anactivitythatconstitutesrebellion.(Emphasissupplied)Thisdoctrineis
applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the
complexcrimeofrebellionforthegreaterpenaltytobeapplied,neithercan
he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutiveorcomponentelementorcommittedinfurtheranceofrebellion.
Same;Same;Same;Same; Political Crimes; Political crimesare
thosedirectlyaimedagainstthepoliticalorder,aswellassuchcom
_______________
*ENBANC.
574
574

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
mon crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.The
petitionerisnowfacingchargesofrebellioninconspiracywiththefugitive
Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan,
petitionersallegedactofharboringorconcealingwasfornootherpurpose

butinfurtheranceofthecrimeofrebellionthusconstitutingacomponent
thereof.Itwasmotivatedbythesingleintentorresolutiontocommitthe
crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez,supra: In short,
politicalcrimesarethosedirectlyaimedagainstthepoliticalorder,aswell
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose.Thedecisivefactoristheintentormotive.
Same;Same;Same;Same;TheactofharboringorconcealingCol.
Honasanisamerecomponentofrebellionoranactdoneinfurtheranceof
therebellion,itcannotthereforebemadethebasisofaseparatecharge.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan[CA]O.G.1932).Jurisprudencetellsusthatactscommittedin
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbedintheonesinglecrimeofrebellion.(Peoplev.Geronimo,100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez,107Phil.659[1960];Peoplev.Lava,28SCRA72[1969]).In
thiscase,theactofharboringorconcealingCol.Honasanisclearlyamere
componentoringredientofrebellionoranactdoneinfurtheranceofthe
rebellion.Itcannotthereforebemadethebasisofaseparatecharge.The
caseofPeoplev.Prieto(80Phil.,138[1948])isinstructive:Inthenature
ofthings,thegivingofaidandcomfortcanonlybeaccomplishedbysome
kindofaction.Itsverynaturepartakesofadeedorphysicalactivityas
opposedtoamentaloperation.(Cramerv.U.S.,ante)Thisdeedorphysical
activitymaybe,andoftenis,initselfacriminaloffenseunderanotherpenal
statuteorprovision.Evenso,whenthedeedischargedasanelementof
treasonitbecomesidentifiedwiththelattercrimeandcannotbethesubject
ofaseparatepunishment,orusedincombinationwithtreasontoincrease
thepenaltyasarticle48oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovides.Justasonecan
not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
identicaldrug,andarobbercannotbeheldguiltyofcoercionortrespassto
adwellinginaprosecutionforrobbery,becausepossessionofopiumand
forceandtrespassareinherentinsmokingandinrobberyrespectively,so
maynotadefendantbemadeliableformurderasaseparatecrimeorin
conjunctionwithanotheroffensewhere,asinthiscase,itisaverredasa
constitutiveingredientoftreason.

575

GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:

VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
Same;Same;Same;Same;Allcrimes,whetherpunishableundera
speciallaworgenerallaw,whicharemerecomponentsoringredients,or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves.The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that
harboringorconcealingafugitiveispunishableunderaspeciallawwhile
therebellioncaseisbasedontheRevisedPenalCode;hence,prosecution
underonelawwillnotbaraprosecutionundertheother.Thisargumentis
specious in rebellion cases. In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecutionstheorymustfail.Therationaleremainsthesame.Allcrimes,
whetherpunishable under aspecial lawor general law,which aremere
components oringredients, orcommittedinfurtherancethereof, become
absorbedinthecrimeofrebellionandcannotbeisolatedandchargedas
separatecrimesinthemselves.Thus:Thisdoesnotdetract,however,from
therulethattheingredientsofacrimeformpartandparcelthereof,and
hence,areabsorbedbythesameandcannotbepunishedeitherseparately
therefromorbytheapplicationofArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode.
xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528) The Hernandez and other
relatedcasesmentioncommoncrimesasabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellion.
Thesecommoncrimesrefertoallactsofviolencesuchasmurder,arson,
robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The
attendantcircumstancesintheinstantcase,however,constrainustorule
thatthetheoryofabsorptioninrebellioncasesmustnotconfineitselfto
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetratedinfurtheranceofthepoliticaloffense.
PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofMakati,MetroManila,Br.135and134.
4.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for
petitioner.

5.

Togetherwiththefilingof aninformationchargingSenatorJuanPonce
Enrileashavingcommittedrebellioncomplexedwithmurder1 with the Regional
TrialCourtofQuezonCity,

576
576

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violationofPresidentialDecreeNo.1829withtheRegionalTrialCourtof
Makati.Thesecondinformationreads:
ThatonoraboutthelstdayofDecember1989,atDasmariasVillage,
Makati,MetroManilaandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,
theabovenamedaccused,havingreasonablegroundtobelieveorsuspect
thatExCol.GregorioGringoHonasanhascommittedacrime,didthen
andthereunlawfully,feloniously,willfullyandknowinglyobstruct,impede,
frustrateordelaytheapprehensionofsaidEx.Lt.Col.GregorioGringo
Honasanbyharboringorconcealinghiminhishouse.
OnMarch2,1990,thepetitionerfiledanOmnibusMotion(a)toholdin
abeyancetheissuanceofawarrantofarrestpendingpersonaldetermination
bythecourtofprobablecause,and(b)todismissthecaseandexpungethe
informationfromtherecord.
OnMarch16,1990,respondentJudgeIgnacioCapulong,aspairing
judgeofrespondentJudgeOmarAmin,deniedSenatorEnrilesOmnibus
motiononthebasisofafindingthatthere(was)probablecausetoholdthe
accusedJuanPonceEnrileliableforviolationofPDNo.1829.
OnMarch21,1990,thepetitionerfiledaMotionforReconsideration
andtoQuash/DismisstheInformationonthegroundsthat:
3.
(a)Thefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffense;
(b)Therespondentcourtsfindingofprobablecausewasdevoidoffactual
andlegalbasis;and
(c)Thependingchargeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderandfrustrated
murderagainstSenatorEnrileasallegedcoconspiratorofCol.Honasan,on
thebasisoftheirallegedmeetingonDecember1,1989precludethe

prosecutionoftheSenatorforharboringorconcealingtheColonelonthe
sameoccasionunderPD1829.
OnMay10,1990,therespondentcourtissuedanorderdenyingthemotion
forreconsiderationforallegedlackofmeritandsettingSenatorEnriles
arraignmenttoMay30,1990.
ThepetitionercomestothisCourtonCertiorariimputinggraveabuse
ofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjuris
577
VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
dictioncommittedbytherespondentcourtinrefusingtoquash/dismissthe
informationonthefollowinggrounds,towit:
1.
I.Thefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffense;
2.
II.TheallegedharboringorconcealingbySen.EnrileofCol.Honasanina
supposedmeetingon1December1989isabsorbedin,orisacomponent
elementof,thecomplexedrebellionpresentlychargedagainstSen.Enrile
asallegedcoconspiratorofCol.Honasanonthebasisofthesamemeeting
on1December1989;
3.
III.TheorderlyadministrationofJusticerequiresthattherebeonlyone
prosecutionforallthecomponentactsofrebellion;
4.
IV.ThereisnoprobablecausetoholdSen.Enrilefortrialforalleged
violationofPresidentialDecreeNo.1829;
5.
V.Nopreliminaryinvestigationwasconductedforallegedviolationof
PresidentialDecreeNo.1829.Thepreliminaryinvestigation,heldonlyfor
rebellion,wasmarredbypatentirregularitiesresultingindenialofdue
process.
OnMay20,1990weissuedatemporaryrestrainingorderenjoiningthe
respondentsfromconductingfurtherproceedingsinCriminalCaseNo.90
777untilotherwisedirectedbythisCourt.
Thepivotalissueinthiscaseiswhetherornotthepetitionercouldbe
separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellioncaseearlierfiledagainsthim.
RespondentJudgeAminsustainedthechargeofviolationofPDNo.
1829notwithstandingtherebellioncasefiledagainstthepetitioneronthe
theorythattheformerinvolvesaspeciallawwhilethelatterisbasedonthe

RevisedPenalCodeoragenerallaw.
TheresolutionoftheaboveissuebringsusanewtothecaseofPeople
v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeatedinthepetitionforhabeascorpusof JuanPonceEnrilev.Judge
Salazar,(G.R.Nos.92163and92164,June5,1990).TheEnrilecasegave
thisCourttheoccasiontoreiteratethelongstandingproscriptionagainst
splittingthecomponentoffensesofrebellionandsubjectingthemtoseparate
prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court
recentlydeclared:
578
578

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
Therejectionofbothoptionsshapesanddeterminestheprimaryrulingof
theCourt,whichisthat Hernandez remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingto
prohibitthecomplexingofrebellion withanyotheroffensecommittedon
theoccasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionoras
anunintendedeffectofanactivitythatconstitutesrebellion. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thisdoctrineisapplicableinthecaseatbar.Ifapersoncannotbecharged
withthecomplexcrimeofrebellionforthegreaterpenaltytobeapplied,
neithercanhebechargedseparatelyfortwo(2)differentoffenseswhere
oneisaconstitutiveorcomponentelementorcommittedinfurtheranceof
rebellion.
ThepetitionerispresentlychargedwithhavingviolatedPDNo.1829
particularlySection1(c)whichstates:
SECTION1.Thepenaltyofprisoncorreccionalinitsmaximumperiod,or
afinerangingfrom1,000to6,000pesos,orboth,shallbeimposedupon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delaystheapprehensionofsuspectsandtheinvestigationandprosecutionof
criminalcasesbycommittinganyofthefollowingacts:
xxxxxxxxx
(c)harboringorconcealing,orfacilitatingtheescapeof,anypersonhe
knows,orhasreasonablegroundtobelieveorsuspect,hascommittedany
offenseunderexistingpenallawsinordertopreventhisarrest,prosecution
andconviction.

xxxxxxxxx
TheprosecutioninthisMakaticaseallegesthatthepetitionerentertained
and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December1,1989inhishouse.KnowingthatColonelHonasanisafugitive
from justice,Sen.EnrileallegedlydidnotdoanythingtohaveHonasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner
preventedCol.HonasansarrestandconvictioninviolationofSection1(c)
ofPDNo.1829.
TherebellionchargesfiledagainstthepetitionerinQuezonCitywere
based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio Gringo
Honasanandsome100rebelsoldiersattendedthemassandbirthdayparty
heldattheresidenceofthepetitionerintheeveningofDecember1,1989.
579
VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
Theinformation(AnnexC,p.3)particularlyreadsthatonorabout6:30
p.m.,1December,1989,Col.GregorioGringoHonasanconferredwith
accusedSenatorJuanPonceEnrileaccompaniedbyabout100fullyarmed
rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches. The prosecution thereby
concludedthat:
Insuchasituation,Sen.EnrilestalkingwithrebelleaderCol.Gregorio
GringoHonasaninhishouseinthepresenceofabout 100uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co
conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65;
Emphasissupplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion
chargeconstituteorincludetheveryincidentwhichgaverisetothecharge
oftheviolationunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1829.UndertheDepartment
ofJusticeresolution(AnnexA,Rollo,p.49)thereisonlyonecrimeof
rebellioncomplexedwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurderbutthere
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and
concealingHonasanand100otherarmedrebelsunderPDNo.1829.The
splittingofcomponentelementsisreadilyapparent.
Thepetitionerisnowfacingchargesofrebellioninconspiracywiththe

fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with

Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
otherpurposebutinfurtheranceofthecrimeofrebellionthusconstitutinga
componentthereof.Itwasmotivatedbythesingleintentorresolutionto
committhecrimeofrebellion.AsheldinPeoplev.Hernandez,supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order,aswellassuchcommoncrimesasmaybecommittedtoachievea
politicalpurpose.Thedecisivefactoristheintentormotive.(p.535)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan[CA]O.G.1932).Jurisprudencetellsusthatactscommittedin
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbedintheonesinglecrimeofrebellion.(Peoplev.Geronimo,100
Phil.90[1956];
580
580

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
Peoplev.Santos,104Phil.551[1958];Peoplev.Rodriguez,107Phil.659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellionor an act done in furtherance ofthe rebellion.It
cannotthereforebemadethebasisofaseparatecharge.ThecaseofPeople
v.Prieto2(80Phil.,138[1948])isinstructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplishedbysomekindofaction.Itsverynaturepartakesofadeedor
physicalactivityasopposedtoamentaloperation.(Cramerv.U.S.,ante)
Thisdeed orphysical activitymaybe, andoften is,initselfa criminal
offenseunderanotherpenalstatuteorprovision.Evenso,whenthedeedis
chargedasanelementoftreasonitbecomesidentifiedwiththelattercrime
andcannotbethesubjectofaseparatepunishment,orusedincombination
withtreasontoincreasethepenaltyasarticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecutionforsmokingtheidenticaldrug,andarobbercannotbeheld
guiltyofcoercionortrespasstoadwellinginaprosecutionforrobbery,
becausepossessionofopiumandforceandtrespassareinherentinsmoking

and inrobbery respectively,somaynot adefendant bemade liablefor

murderasaseparatecrimeorinconjunctionwithanotheroffensewhere,as
inthiscase,itisaverredasaconstitutiveingredientoftreason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or
concealingafugitiveispunishableunderaspeciallawwhiletherebellion
caseisbasedontheRevisedPenalCode;hence,prosecutionunderonelaw
willnotbaraprosecutionundertheother.Thisargumentisspeciousin
rebellioncases.
Inthelightofthe Hernandez doctrinetheprosecutionstheorymust
fail.Therationaleremainsthesame.Allcrimes,whetherpunishableundera
speciallaworgenerallaw,whicharemerecomponentsoringredients,or
committedinfurtherancethereof,becomeabsorbedinthecrimeofrebellion
andcannotbe
_______________
2 The doctrine relied upon was set down in treason cases but is
applicabletorebellioncases.AsJusticeMcDonoughopined,rebellionis
treasonoflessmagnitude(U.S.v.Lagnoasan,3Phil.472,484,1904).
581
VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
isolatedandchargedasseparatecrimesinthemselves.Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crimeformpartandparcelthereof,andhence,areabsorbedbythesameand
cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article48oftheRevisedPenalCode.xxx(Peoplev.Hernandez,supra,at
p.528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as
absorbedinthecrimeofrebellion.Thesecommoncrimesrefertoallactsof
violencesuchasmurder,arson,robbery,kidnappingetc.asprovidedinthe
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case,
however,constrainustorulethatthetheoryofabsorptioninrebellioncases
mustnotconfineitselftocommoncrimesbutalsotooffensesunderspecial
lawswhichareperpetratedinfurtheranceofthepoliticaloffense.
Theconversationand,therefore,allegedconspiringofSenatorPonce

EnrilewithColonelHonasanistoointimatelytiedupwithhisallegedly
harboringandconcealingHonasanforpracticallythesameacttoformtwo
separatecrimesofrebellionandviolationofPDNo.1829.
Clearly,thepetitionersallegedactofharboringorconcealingwhich
was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connectionwithorinfurtheranceofrebellionandmustnowbedeemedas
absorbedby,mergedin,andidentifiedwiththecrimeofrebellionpunished
inArticles134and135oftheRPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelminglyfavorthepropositionthatcommoncrimes,perpetratedin
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
commonoffenses,andassumethepoliticalcomplexionofthemaincrime
ofwhichtheyaremereingredients,andconsequently,cannotbepunished
separatelyfromtheprincipaloffense,orcomplexedwiththesame,tojustify
theimpositionofagraverpenalty.(Peoplev.Hernandez,supra,p.541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after
having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independentprosecutionforillegalposses
582
582

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
sionoffirearms.TheCourtruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with
whichtheaccusedischargedinthepresentcasewhichisthatofillegal
possessionoffirearmandammunitionisalreadyabsorbedasanecessary
elementoringredientinthecrimeofrebellionwithwhichthesameaccused
ischargedwithotherpersonsinaseparatecaseandwhereinhepleaded
guiltyandwasconvicted.(atpage662)
xxxxxxxxx
xxx [T]he conclusion isinescapable that the crime withwhich the
accusedischargedinthepresentcaseisalreadyabsorbedintherebellion
case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double
jeopardy.(atpage663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341,
January30,1990)wheretheCourthadtheoccasiontopassuponanearly

similarissue.Inthiscase,thepetitionerMisolas,anallegedmemberofthe
NewPeoplesArmy(NPA),waschargedwithillegalpossessionoffirearms
andammunitionsinfurtheranceofsubversionunderSection1ofPD1866.
Inhismotiontoquashtheinformation,thepetitionerbasedhisarguments
onthe Hernandez and Geronimo rulingsonthedoctrineofabsorptionof
commoncrimesinrebellion.TheCourt,however,clarified,towit:
xxxinthepresentcase,petitionerisbeingchargedspecificallyforthe
qualifiedoffenseofillegalpossessionoffirearmsandammunitionunderPD
1866.HEISNOTBEINGCHARGEDWITHTHECOMPLEXCRIME
OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus,therulingsoftheCourtinHernandez,GeronimoandRodriguezfind
noapplicationinthiscase.
TheCourtintheabovecaseupheldtheprosecutionforillegalpossessionof
firearmsunderPD1866becausenoseparateprosecutionforsubversionor
rebellionhadbeenfiled.3Theprosecutionmustmakeupitsmindwhether
tochargeSenator
_______________
3JusticesIsaganiA.CruzandAbrahamF.SarmientobelievethatPD
1866isunconstitutionalandshouldbestruckdownasillegal
583
VOL.189,SEPTEMBER13,1990
PonceEnrilevs.Amin
PonceEnrilewithrebellionaloneortodroptherebellioncaseandcharge
himwithmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurderandalsoviolationofP.D.
1829.Itcannotcomplextherebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and
violationofP.D1829inMakati.Itshouldbenotedthatthereisinfacta
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial
CourtofQuezonCity.Insuchacase,theindependentprosecutionunderPD
1829cannotprosper.
Aswehaveearliermentioned,theintentormotiveisadecisivefactor.
IfSenatorPonceEnrileisnotchargedwithrebellionandheharboredor

concealedColonelHonasansimplybecausethelatterisafriendandformer
associate,themotivefortheactiscompletelydifferent.Butiftheactis
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion,thenitshouldbedeemedtoformpartofthecrimeofrebellion
insteadofbeingpunishedseparately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately
underPD1829inadditiontohisbeingprosecutedintherebellioncase.
Withthisruling,thereisnoneedfortheCourttopassupontheotherissues
raisedbythepetitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 90777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary
injunction,enjoiningrespondent Judgesand their successorsinCriminal
Case No. 90777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the
arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedingsthereinismadepermanent.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla,Bidin,Sarmiento,Corts,GrioAquinoandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
Fernan(C.J.),Onofficialleave.
Paras,J.,Onleave.
_______________
perse.JusticeSarmientostatedinhisseparatedissentthatPD1866is
abillofattainder,vagueandviolativeofthedoublejeopardyclause,andan
instrumentofrepression.
584
584

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Arizalavs.CourtofAppeals
Medialdea,J.,Nopart.
Petitiongranted.
Note.The criminal liability of an accessory under Art. 19, Par. 3 is
directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal. (Vino vs.
People:dissentingopinion,178SCRA626.)

218
218

VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
G.R.No.92163.June5,1990.*
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUS.JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULATORRES(SuperintendentoftheNorthernPoliceDistrict)AND/OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY
OVERTHEPERSONOFJUANPONCEENRILE,respondents.
G.R.No.92164.June5,1990.*
SPS.REBECCOE.PANLILIOANDERLINDAE.PANLILIO,petitioners,
vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FERDINANDR.ABESAMIS,ANDEU
_______________
*ENBANC.

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
LOGIOC.MANANQUIL,andHON.JAIMEN.SALAZAR,JR.,inhis
capacity asPresidingJudge,Regional Trial Court,Quezon City,Branch
103,respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.The rejection of both
optionsshapesanddeterminestheprimaryrulingoftheCourt,whichisthat
Hernandez remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibitthecomplexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintendedeffectof
anactivitythatconstitutesrebellion.
Same;Same;ConstitutionalLaw;Personalevaluationofreportand
supportingdocumentssubmittedbytheprosecutor,sufficienttodetermine
probablecause.ItisalsocontendedthattherespondentJudgeissuedthe
warrant for petitioners arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examiningunder oathor affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the
unavoidabledutyofthejudgetomakesuchapersonalexamination,itbeing
sufficientthathefollowsestablishedprocedurebypersonallyevaluatingthe
reportandthesupportingdocumentssubmittedbytheprosecutor.Petitioner
claimsthatthewarrantofarrestissuedbarelyonehourandtwentyminutes
afterthecasewasraffledofftotherespondentJudge,whichhardlygavethe
lattersufficienttimetopersonallygooverthevoluminousrecordsofthe
preliminaryinvestigation.Merelybecausesaidrespondenthadwhatsome
mightconsideronlyarelativelybriefperiodwithinwhichtocomplywith
thatduty,givesnoreasontoassumethathehadnot,orcouldnothave,so
complied;nordoesthatsinglecircumstancesufficetoovercomethelegal
presumptionthatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformed.
Same;Same;Same;Bail;Courts;RespondentCourthasjurisdiction
to deny or grant bail to petitioner.The criminal case before the
respondentJudgewasthenormalvenueforinvokingthepetitionersright
to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original

jurisdictiontograntordenybailrestedwithsaidrespondent.Thecorrect
coursewasforpetitionertoinvokethatjurisdictionbyfilingapetitiontobe
admittedtobail,claimingarighttobailperseorbyreasonoftheweakness
oftheevidenceagainsthim.Onlyafterthatremedywasdeniedbythetrial
courtshouldthereviewjurisdictionofthisCourthavebeeninvoked,and
eventhen,notwithoutfirstapply
219
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
ingtotheCourtofAppealsifappropriatereliefwasalsoavailablethere.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Incumbentontheaccused,towhomno
bailisrecommended,toclaimtherighttobailhearingtoprovethereason
or weakness of evidence against him.There was and is no reason to
assumethattheresolutionofanyofthesequestionswasbeyondtheability
orcompetenceoftherespondentJudgeindeedsuchanassumptionwould
bedemeaningandlessthanfairtoourtrialcourts;nonewhatevertohold
themtobeofsuchcomplexityortranscendentalimportanceastodisqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that
wouldjustifybypassingestablishedjudicialprocessesdesignedtoorderly
movelitigationthroughthehierarchyofourcourts.Parenthetically,thisis
thereasonbehindthevoteoffourMembersoftheCourtagainstthegrantof
bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be
precipitatelyoustedofitsoriginaljurisdictiontograntordenybailand,ifit
erredinthatmatter,deniedanopportunitytocorrectitserror.Itmakesno
differencethattherespondentJudgehereissuedawarrantofarrestfixing
nobail.Immemorialpracticesanctionssimplyfollowingtheprosecutors
recommendationregardingbail,thoughitmaybeperceivedasthebetter
course for the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where a capital
offenseischarged.Itis,inanyevent,incumbentontheaccusedastowhom
nobailhasbeenrecommendedorfixedtoclaimtherighttoabailhearing
andtherebyputtoproofthestrengthorweaknessoftheevidenceagainst
him.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Courthasnopowertochange,but
onlytointerpretthelawasitstandsatanygiventime.Itisenoughtogive

anyonepauseandtheCourtisnoexceptionthatnoteventhecrowded
streetsofourcapitalCityseemsafefromsuchunsettlingviolencethatis
disruptiveofthepublicpeaceandstymieseveryeffortatnationaleconomic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
eithertoraisethepenaltythereforortoclearlydefineanddelimittheother
offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertakeninitsname.TheCourthasnopowertoeffectsuchchange,forit
canonlyinterpretthelawasitstandsatanygiventime,andwhatisneeded
liesbeyondinterpretation.Hopefully,Congresswillperceivetheneedfor
promptlytheinitiativeinthismatter,whichisproperlywithinitsprovince.
220
220

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
FERNAN,C.J.,DissentingandConcurring:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be
interpreted as an all embracing authority; Reasons.To my mind, the
Hernandezdoctrineshouldnotbeinterpretedasanallembracingauthority
for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in
furtheranceof,orinconnectionwith,rebellionareabsorbedbythelatter.
Tothatextent,Icannotgoalongwiththeviewofthemajorityintheinstant
case that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffensecommittedontheoccasion
thereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasanunintended
effectofanactivitythatconstitutesrebellion.
MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,SeparateOpinion:
Rebellion;ComplexCrime;HabeasCorpus;Statutes;Theruleson
habeascorpusaretobeliberallyconstrued.Whilelitigants,should,asa
rule,ascendthestepsofthejudicialladder,nothingshouldstopthisCourt
from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent
constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on
habeascorpus aretobeliberallyconstrued(Ganawayv.Quilen,42Phil.

805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguardingindividualfreedomagainstarbitraryandlawlessstateaction.
Thescopeandflexibilityofthewrititscapacitytoreachallmannerof
illegaldetentionitsabilitytocutthroughbarriersofformandprocedural
mazeshavealwaysbeenemphasizedandjealouslyguardedbycourtsand
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420)
[italicsours].
FELICIANO,J.,ConcurringOpinion:
Rebellion;ComplexCrime;Statutes;Nonretroactivityruleapplies
to statutes principally; Expost facto law.The nonretroactivity rule
appliestostatutesprincipally.But,statutesdonotexistintheabstractbut
ratherbearuponthelivesofpeoplewiththespecificformgiventhemby
judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing
statutorynormsgivespecificshapeandcontenttosuchnorms.Intime,the
statutorynormsbecomeencrustedwiththeglossesplaceduponthembythe
courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial
interpretationofastatutebecomespartofthelawasofthedatethatthelaw
wasoriginally
221
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
enacted,Ibelievethistheoryisnottobeappliedrigorouslywhereanew
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous
existingdoctrineoflongstanding(here,36years)andmostspeciallynot
wherethestatuteconstruediscriminalinnatureandthenewdoctrineis
moreonerousfortheaccusedthanthepreexistingone(Peoplev.Jabinal,
55SCRA607[19741;Peoplev.Licera,65SCRA270[1975];Gumabonv.
DirectorofPrisons,37SCRA420[1971]).Moreover,thenonretroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has
constitutionalimplications.TheprevailingruleintheUnitedStatesisthata
judicialdecisionthatretroactivelyrendersanactcriminalorenhancesthe

severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to

constitutionalchallengebasedupontheruleagainstexpostfactolawsand
thedueprocessclause(Bouiev.CityofColumbia,378US347,12L.Ed.
2d894[1964];Marksv.U.S.,43US188,51L.Ed.2d260[1977];Devine
v.NewMexicoDepartmentofCorrections,866F.2d339[1989]).
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.,ConcurringOpinion:
Rebellion;ComplexCrime;Rebellionconsistsofmanyacts;Caseat
bar.Thecrimeofrebellionconsistsofmanyacts.Thedroppingofone
bombcannotbeisolatedasaseparatecrimeofrebellion.Neithershouldthe
droppingofonehundredbombsorthefiringofthousandsofmachinegun
bulletsbebrokenupintoahundredorthousandsofseparateoffenses,if
eachbomboreachbullethappenstoresultinthedestructionoflifeand
property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties
dependingonwhat strikesthefancyofprosecutorspunishment forthe
killingofsoldiersorretributionforthedeathsofcivilians.Theprosecution
alsolosessightoftheregrettablefactthatintotalwarandinrebellionthe
killingofcivilians,thelayingwasteofcivilianeconomies,themassacreof
innocentpeople,theblowingupofpassengerairplanes,andotheractsof
terrorismareallusedbythoseengagedinrebellion.Wecannotandshould
nottrytoascertaintheintentofrebelsforeachsingleactunlesstheactis
plainly not connected tothe rebellion.We cannot use Article 48of the
RevisedPenalCodeinlieuofstilltobeenactedlegislation.Thekillingof
civiliansduringarebelattackonmilitaryfacilitiesfurtherstherebellionand
ispartoftherebellion.
PADILLA,J.,SeparateOpinion:
Rebellion; Complex yCrime; Crime of Rebellion complexed with
murder,andmultiplefrustratedmurderdoesnotexist.Furthermore,the
SupremeCourt,intheHernandezcase,wasgroundbreakingon
222
222

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar

the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson,

robbery,etc.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,theprosecutionandthe
lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but
ExecutiveOrder No.187ofPresident CorazonC.Aquinodated 5June
1987(asstatutorylaw)tobindthemtothelegalpropositionthatthecrime
ofrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,andmultiplefrustratedmurderdoes
notexist.
Same;Same;Same;Caseatbar;Thereformationisclearlyanullity
andplainlyvoidabinitio.Andyet,notwithstandingthese unmistakable
and controlling beacon lightsabsent when this Court laid down the
Hernandez doctrinetheprosecutionhasinsistedinfiling,andthelower
courthaspersistedinhearing,aninformationchargingthepetitionerswith
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder. That
informationisclearlyanullityandplainlyvoidabinitio. Itsheadshould
not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges
nothing;ithasgivenrisetonothing.Thewarrantsofarrestissuedpursuant
theretoareasnullandvoidastheinformationonwhichtheyareanchored.
And,sincetheentirequestionoftheinformationsvalidityisbeforethe
Courtinthesehabeascorpuscases,Iventuretosaythattheinformationis
fatallydefective, evenunderprocedurallaw,becauseitchargesmorethan
one(1)offense(Sec.13,Rule110,RulesofCourt).
BIDIN,J.,ConcurringandDissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper
remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.I submit that the
proceedingsneednotberemandedtotherespondentjudgeforthepurpose
offixingbailsincewehaveconstruedtheindictmenthereinascharging
simplerebellion,anoffensewhichisbailable.Consequently,habeascorpus
istheproperremedyavailabletopetitionerasanaccusedwhohadbeen
chargedwithsimplerebellion,abailableoffensebutwhohadbeendenied
his right tobail bythe respondent judge in violation of the petitioners
constitutionalrighttobail.Inviewthereof,theresponsibilityoffixingthe
amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if
completereliefistobeaccordedtopetitionerintheinstantproceedings.
SARMIENTO,J.,Concurringinpartanddissentinginpart:

Rebellion;ComplexCrime;HabeasCorpus;Bail;Nousefulpurpose
tohavethetrialcourtheartheincidentagainwhentheSupremeCourthas
beensatisfiedthatpetitionerisentitledtotemporary
223
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
freedom.Idissent,however,insofarasthemajorityorderstheremandof
the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our
ResolutionofMarch6,1990,grantedthepetitionerprovisionalliberty
uponthefilingofabondofP100,000.00,wegrantedhimbail.Thefactthat
wegavehimprovisionallibertyisinmyview,ofnomoment,because
bailmeansprovisionalliberty.Itwillservenousefulpurposetohavethe
trialcourtheartheincidentagainwhenweourselveshavebeensatisfied
thatthepetitionerisentitledtotemporaryfreedom.
PETITIONforHabeasCorpus.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
NARVASA,J.:
Thirtyfour years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence,
People vs. Hernandez1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontationatlawthatwouldreexamine,ifnotthevalidityofitsdoctrine,
the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a
numberofsimilarcases2thattookissuewiththerulingallwithamarked
lackofsuccessbutnone,itwouldseem,whereseasonandcircumstance
hadmoreeffectivelyconspiredtoattractwidepublicattentionandexcite
impassioneddebate,evenamonglaymen;none,certainly,whichhasseen
quitethekindandrangeofargumentsthatarenowbroughttobearonthe
samequestion.
Thefactsarenotindispute.IntheafternoonofFebruary27,1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcementofficersledbyDirectorAlfredoLimoftheNationalBureauof
InvestigationonthestrengthofawarrantissuedbyHon.JaimeSalazarof

theRegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCityBranch103,inCriminalCaseNo.
9010941.Thewarranthadissuedonaninformationsignedandearlierthat
dayfiledbyapanelofprosecutorscomposedof
_______________
199Phil.515(1956).
2Peoplevs.Lava,28SCRA72(1956);Peoplevs.Geronimo,100Phil.
90 (1956); People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs.
Rodriguez,107Phil.659(1960).
224
224

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
SeniorStateProsecutorAurelioC.Trampe,StateProsecutorFerdinandR.
AbesamisandAssistantCityProsecutorEulogioMananquil,Jr.,charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasanwiththecrimeofrebellionwithmurderandmultiplefrustrated
murderallegedlycommittedduringtheperiodofthefailedcoupattempt
fromNovember29toDecember10,1990.SenatorEnrilewastakentoand
heldovernightattheNBIheadquartersonTaftAvenue,Manila,without
bail,nonehavingbeenrecommendedintheinformationandnonefixedin
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
broughttoCampTomasKaringalinQuezonCitywherehewasgivenover
tothecustodyoftheSuperintendentoftheNorthernPoliceDistrict,Brig.
Gen.EdgardoDulaTorres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel,filedthepetitionforhabeascorpusherein(whichwasfollowedby
a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprivedofhisconstitutionalrightsinbeing,orhavingbeen:
6.
(a)heldtoanswerforcriminaloffensewhichdoesnotexistinthestatute
books;
7.
(b)chargedwithacriminaloffenseinaninformationforwhichno
complaintwasinitiallyfiledorpreliminaryinvestigationwasconducted,
hencewasdenieddueprocess;
8.
(c)deniedhisrighttobail;and
9.
(d)arrestedanddetainedonthestrengthofawarrantissuedwithoutthe

judgewhoissueditfirsthavingpersonallydeterminedtheexistenceof
probablecause.4
TheCourtissuedthewritprayedfor,returnableMarch5,1990andsetthe
plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor
Generalfiledaconsolidatedreturn6fortherespondentsinthiscaseandin
G.R.No.92164,7whichhadbeen
_______________
3Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.3234.
4Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.34etseq.
5Rollo,G.R.No.92163,p.26.
6Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.305359.
7 Originallyapetitionfor certiorari andprohibitionwhichtheCourt,
uponmotionofthepetitioners,resolvedtotreatasapetition
225
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enriles co
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions.Saidreturnurgedthatthepetitionerscasedoesnotfallwithin
the Hernandez ruling becauseand this is putting it very simplythe
information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committedasanecessarymeansforthecommissionofrebellion,whereas
the information against Sen.Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime (delito complejo) arising from an offense being a
necessarymeansforcommittinganother,whichisreferredtointhesecond
clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the
Hernandez ruling,andthecompoundcrime(delitocompuesto)arising
from a single act constituting twoor more grave or lessgrave offenses
referredtointhefirstclauseofthesameparagraph,withwhichHernandez
wasnotconcernedandtowhich,therefore,itshouldnotapply.
Thepartieswereheardinoralargument,asscheduled,onMarch6,
1990,afterwhichtheCourtissueditsResolutionofthesamedate8granting

SenatorEnrileandthePanliliospousesprovisionallibertyconditionedupon
their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
respectively.TheResolutionstatedthatitwasissuedwithoutprejudicetoa
more extended resolutiononthematterofthe provisional libertyofthe
petitionersandstressedthatitwasnotpassinguponthelegalissuesraised
inbothcases.FourMembersoftheCourt9 votedagainstgrantingbailto
SenatorEnrile,andtwo10againstgrantingbailtothePanlilios.
TheCourtnowaddressesthoseissuesinsofarastheyareraisedand
litigatedinSenatorEnrilespetition,G.R.No.92163.
The parties oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
followingoptions:
_______________
forhabeascorpus;Rollo,G.R.No.92164,pp.128129.
8Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.407411.
9Fernan,C.J.,andNarvasa,CortsandGrioAquino,JJ.
10Fernan,C.J.andNarvasa,J.
226
226

6.

7.

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
(a)abandonHernandezandadopttheminorityviewexpressedinthemain
dissentofJusticeMontemayorinsaidcasethatrebellioncannotabsorb
moreseriouscrimes,andthatunderArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode
rebellionmayproperlybecomplexedwithcommonoffenses,socalled;this
optionwassuggestedbytheSolicitorGeneralinoralargumentalthoughit
isnotofferedinMswrittenpleadings;
(b)holdHernandezapplicableonlytooffensescommittedinfurtherance,or
asanecessarymeansforthecommission,ofrebellion,butnottoacts
committedinthecourseofarebellionwhichalsoconstitutecommon
crimesofgraveorlessgravecharacter;
8.
(c)maintainHernandezasapplyingtomakerebellionabsorballother
offensescommittedinitscourse,whetherornotnecessarytoits
commissionorinfurtherancethereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against

abandoning Hernandez. Two(2)Membersfeltthatthedoctrineshouldbe

reexainined.10aIntheviewofthemajority,therulingremainsgoodlaw,
itssubstantiveandlogicalbaseshavewithstoodallsubsequentchallenges
and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
completereversal.Thisviewisreinforcedbythefactthatnottoolongago,
theincumbentPresident,exercisingherpowersunderthe1986Freedom
Constitution,sawfittorepeal,amongothers,PresidentialDecreeNo.942
of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize
Hernandezbyenactinganewprovision(Art.142A)intotheRevisedPenal
Codetotheeffectthat(w)henbyreason,orontheoccasion,ofanyofthe
crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes
rebellion),actswhichconstituteoffensesuponwhichgraverpenaltiesare
imposedbylawarecommitted,thepenaltyforthemostseriousoffensein
itsmaximumperiodshallbeimposedupontheoffender.11Inthusacting,
thePresidentineffectbylegislativefiatreinstated Hernandez asbinding
doctrinewiththeeffectoflaw.TheCourtcandonolessthanaccorditthe
samerecognition,absentanysufficientlypowerfulreasonagainstsodoing.
Onthesecondoption,theCourtunanimouslyvotedtoreject
________________
10aTwoMembersareonleave.
11ExecutiveOrderNo.187issuedJune5,1987.
227
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offensescommittedasanecessarymeansforthecommissionofrebellion
andthattherulingshouldnotbeinterpretedasprohibitingthecomplexing
ofrebellionwithothercommoncrimescommittedontheoccasion,butnot
in furtherance, thereof While four Members of the Court felt that the
proponentsargumentswerenotentirelydevoidofmerit,theconsensuswas
thattheywerenotsufficienttoovercomewhatappearstobetherealthrust
ofHernandeztoruleoutthecomplexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffense
committedinitscourseundereitheroftheaforecitedclausesofArticle48,
asismadeclearbythefollowingexcerptfromthemajorityopinioninthat

case:
ThereisoneotherreasonandafundamentaloneatthatwhyArticle48
ofourPenalCodecannotbeappliedinthecaseatbar.Ifmurderwerenot
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposableuponthemovant,namely:(1)forthecrimeofrebellion,afine
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
dependinguponthemodifyingcircumstancespresent,butneverexceeding
12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal initsmaximumperiodtodeath,dependinguponthemodifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However,underArticle48saidpenaltywouldhavetobemetedouttohim,
even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision,ifconstruedinconformitywiththetheoryoftheprosecution,
wouldbeunfavorabletothemovant.
Upontheotherhand,saidArticle48wasenactedforthepurposeof
favoring theculprit,notofsentencinghimtoapenalty moresevere than
that whichwouldbeproperiftheseveral actsperformedtoyMm were
punishedseparately.InthewordsofRodriguezNavarro:
Launificaciondepenasenloscasosdeeoncmrsodedelitosaquehace
referendaestearticulo(75delCodigode1932),estabasadofraneamenteen
elprincipioproreo.(IIDoctrinaPenaldelTribunalSupremodeEspana,p.
2168.)
WeareawareofthefactthatthisobservationreferstoArticle71(later
75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amendedin1908andthenin1932,reading:
228
228

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
Lasdisposicionesdelarticuloanteriornosonaplicablesenelcasodeque
unsolohechoconstituyadosomasdelitos,ocuandoelunodeellossea
medionecesarioparacometerelotro.
Enestoscasossoloseimpondralapenacorrespondientealdelitomas
graveensugradomaximo,hastaellimitequerepresentelasumadelasque

pudieranimponerse,penandoseparadamentelosdelitos.
Cuandolapenaasicomputadaexcedadeestelimite,sesancionaranlos
delitos por sparado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo,Vol.II,p.2163)
andthatourArticle48doesnotcontainthequalificationinsertedinsaid
amendment,restrictingtheimpositionofthepenaltyforthegraveroffense
initsmaximumperiodtothecasewhenitdoesnotexceedthesumtotalof
thepenaltiesimposableiftheactschargedweredealtwithseparately.The
absenceofsaidlimitationinourPenalCodedoesnot,toourmind,affect
substantiallythespiritofsaidArticle48.Indeed,ifoneactconstitutestwo
ormoreoffenses,therecanbenoreasontoinflictapunishmentgraverthan
thatprescribedforeachoneofsaidoffensesputtogether.Indirectingthat
thepenaltyforthegraveroffensebe,insuchcase,imposedinitsmaximum
period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if
imposedseparately.ThereasonforthisbenevolentspiritofArticle48is
readilydiscernible.Whentwoormorecrimesaretheresultofasingleact,
theoffenderisdeemedlessperversethanwhenhecommitssaidcrimesthru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independentlyfromtheother,hemustsufferthemaximumofthepenalty
forthemoreseriousone,ontheassumptionthatitislessgravethanthesum
totaloftheseparatepenaltiesforeachoffense.12
Therejectionofbothoptionsshapesanddeterminestheprimaryrulingof
theCourt,whichisthat Hernandez remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingto
prohibitthecomplexingofrebellionwithanyotheroffensecommittedon
theoccasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasan
unintendedeffectofanactivitythatconstitutesrebellion.
This,however,doesnotwrite finis tothecase.Petitionersguiltor
innocenceisnothereinquiredinto,muchlessadjudged.Thatisforthetrial
courttodoatthepropertime.TheCourtsrulingmerelyprovidesatakeoff
pointforthedispositionof
________________
12Peoplevs.Hernandez,supraat541543.
229

VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
otherquestionsrelevanttothepetitionerscomplaintsaboutthedenialof
hisrightsandtotheproprietyoftherecoursehehastaken.
TheCourtrulesfurther(byavoteof11to3)thattheinformationfiled
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiplefrustratedmurder,thatindictmentistobereadaschargingsimple
rebellion.Thus,inHernandez,theCourtsaid:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
informationagainstdefendantappellantAmadoV.Hernandez,themurders,
arsonsandrobberiesdescribedthereinaremereingredientsofthecrimeof
rebellionallegedlycommittedbysaiddefendants,asmeansnecessary(4)
fortheperpetrationofsaidoffenseofrebellion;thatthecrime chargedin
theaforementionedamendedinformationis,therefore,simplerebellion,not
thecomplexcrimeofrebellionwithmultiplemurder,arsonsandrobberies;
that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in
conformitywiththepolicyofthiscourtindealingwithaccusedpersons
amenabletoasimilarpunishment,saiddefendantmaybeallowedbail.13
Theplaintofpetitionerscounselthatheischargedwithacrimethatdoes
notexistinthestatutebooks,whiletechnicallycorrectsofarastheCourt
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committedontheoccasionthereof,mustthereforebedismissedasamere
flightofrhetoric.Readinthecontextof Hernandez, theinformationdoes
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
RevisedPenalCode:simplerebellion.
Wasthepetitionerchargedwithoutacomplainthavingbeeninitially
filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise,thatacomplaintagainstpetitionerforsimplerebellionwasfiled
bytheDirectoroftheNationalBureauofInvestigation,andthatonthe
strengthofsaidcomplaintapreliminaryinvestigationwasconductedbythe
respondentprosecutors,culminatinginthefilingoftheques
_______________

13Id.,at551.
230
230

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
tionedinformation.14 Thereisnothinginherentlyirregularorcontraryto
lawinfilingagainstarespondent anindictment foranoffensedifferent
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the
evidencedevelopedduringthepreliminaryinvestigation.
ItisalsocontendedthattherespondentJudgeissuedthewarrantfor
petitioners arrest without first personally determining the existence of
probablecausebyexaminingunderoathoraffirmationthecomplainantand
hiswitnesses,inviolationofArt.III,sec.2,oftheConstitution.15 This
Courthasalreadyruled,however,thatitisnottheunavoidabledutyofthe
judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he
followsestablishedprocedureby personally evaluatingthereportandthe
supportingdocumentssubmittedbytheprosecutor.16Petitionerclaimsthat
thewarrantofarrestissuedbarelyonehourandtwentyminutesafterthe
casewasraffledofftotherespondentJudge,whichhardlygavethelatter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation.17 Merely because said respondent had what
somemightconsideronlyarelativelybriefperiodwithinwhichtocomply
withthatduty,givesnoreasontoassumethathehadnot,orcouldnothave,
socomplied;nordoesthatsinglecircumstancesufficetoovercomethelegal
presumptionthatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformed.
Petitionerfinallyclaimsthathewasdeniedtherighttobail.Inthelight
oftheCourtsreaffirmationofHernandezasapplicabletopetitionerscase,
andofthelogicalan.dnecessarycorollarythattheinformationagainsthim
shouldbeconsideredaschargingonlythecrimeofsimplerebellion,which
is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition.Butthequestionremains:Giventhefactsfromwhichthiscase
arose,wasapetitionforhabeascorpusinthisCourttheappropriatevehicle
forassertingarighttobailorvindicatingitsdenial?
_______________
14Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp,7879and7376.

15Supra,footnote4.
16Solivenvs.Makasiar,167SCRA394.
17Rollo,G.R.No.92163,pp.4647.
231
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
ThecriminalcasebeforetherespondentJudgewasthenormalvenuefor
invokingthepetitionersrighttohaveprovisionallibertypendingtrialand
judgment.Theoriginaljurisdictiontograntordenybailrestedwithsaid
respondent.Thecorrectcoursewasforpetitionertoinvokethatjurisdiction
byfilingapetitiontobeadmittedtobail,claimingarighttobailperseby
reasonoftheweaknessoftheevidenceagainsthim.Onlyafterthatremedy
wasdeniedbythetrialcourtshouldthereviewjurisdictionofthisCourt
havebeeninvoked,andeventhen,notwithoutfirstapplyingtotheCourtof
Appealsifappropriatereliefwasalsoavailablethere.
Evenacceptanceofpetitionerspremisethatgoingbythe Hernandez
ruling, the information charges a nonexistent crime or, contrarily,
theorizingonthesamebasisthatitchargesmorethanoneoffense,would
not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
broughtinthecriminalactionbeforetherespondentJudge.18
Therethusseemstobenoquestionthatallthegroundsuponwhich
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or
omissiononthepartoftheprosecutingpaneloroftherespondentJudgein
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there
insteadofdirectlytothisCourt.
Therewasandisnoreasontoassumethattheresolutionofanyof
thesequestionswasbeyondtheabilityorcompetenceoftherespondent
Judgeindeedsuchanassumptionwouldbedemeaningandlessthanfair
toourtrialcourts;nonewhatevertoholdthemtobeofsuchcomplexityor
transcendentalimportanceastodisqualifyeverycourt,exceptthisCourt,
iromdecidingthem;none,inshortthatwouldjustifybypassingestablished
judicialprocessesdesignedtoorderlymovelitigationthroughthehierarchy

of ourcourts.Parenthetically, thisisthereasonbehind the voteoffour

MembersoftheCourtagainstthegrantofbailtopetitioner:theviewthat
thetrial
_______________
18Sec.2,Rule117,RulesofCourt.
232

232

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
courtshouldnotthusbeprecipitatelyoustedofitsoriginaljurisdictionto
grantordenybail,andifiterredinthatmatter,deniedanopportunityto
correctitserror.Itmakesnodiffer*encethattherespondentJudgehere
issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions
simplyfollowingtheprosecutorsrecommendationregardingbail,thoughit
maybeperceivedasthebettercourseforthejudge motuproprio toseta
bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
incumbentontheaccusedastowhomnobailhasbeenrecommendedor
fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the
strengthorweaknessoftheevidenceagainsthim.
Itisapropostopointoutthatthepresentpetitionhastriggeredarushto
thisCourtofotherpartiesinasimilarsituation,allapparentlytakingtheir
cuefromit,distrustfulorcontemptuousoftheefficacyofseekingrecourse
intheregularmannerjustoutlined.Theproliferationofsuchpleashasonly
contributedtothedelaythatthepetitionermayhavehopedtoavoidby
comingdirectlytothisCourt.
Notonlybecausepopularinterestseemsfocusedontheoutcomeofthe
present petition, but also because to wash the Courts hand off it on
jurisdictionalgroundswouldonlycompoundthedelaythatithasalready
gonethrough,theCourtnowdecidesthesameonthemerits.Butinso
doing, the Court cannot expresstoo strongly the view that said petition
interdictedtheorderedandorderlyprogressionofproceedingsthatshould
havestartedwiththetrialcourtandreachedthisCourtonlyiftherelief
appliedforwasdeniedbytheformerand,inapropercase,bytheCourtof
Appealsonreview.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer

countenance,butwillgiveshortshriftto,pleaslikethepresent,thatclearly
shortcircuitthejudicialprocessandburdenitwiththeresolutionofissues
properlywithintheoriginalcompetenceofthelowercourts.
Whathasthusfarbeenstatedisequallyapplicabletoanddecisiveof
the petitionof the Panlilio spouses(G.R. No. 92164) whichis virtually
identicaltothatofpetitionerEnrileinfactual
_______________
19Ocampovs.Bernabe,77Phil.55.
233
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set
forth.Saidspouseshaveuncontestedlypleaded20 thatwarrantsofarrest
issuedagainstthemascoaccusedofpetitionerEnrileinCriminalCaseNo.
9010941,thatwhentheyappearedbeforeNBIDirectorAlfredoLiminthe
afternoon of March 1,1990, they were taken intocustody and detained
withoutbailonthestrengthofsaidwarrantsinviolationtheyclaimof
theirconstitutionalrights.
Itmaybethatinthelightofcontemporaryevents,theactofrebellion
has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniencywithwhichitisregardedandpunishedbylaw,thatpresentday
rebelsarelessimpelledbyloveofcountrythanbylustforpowerandhave
become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctityofhumanlife,isallowedtostandinthewayoftheirambitions.
Nothingsounderscoresthisaberrationastherashofseeminglysenseless
killings,bombings,kidnappingsandassortedmayhemsomuchinthenews
these days,as oftenperpetratedagainst innocent civiliansasagainst the
military,butbyandlargeattributableto,orevenclaimedbysocalledrebels
tobepartof,anongoingrebellion.
ItisenoughtogiveanyonepauseandtheCourtisnoexception
thatnoteventhecrowdedstreetsofourcapitalCityseemsafefromsuch
unsettlingviolencethatisdisruptiveofthepublicpeaceandstymiesevery
effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to
restructurethelawonrebellion,eithertoraisethepenaltytherefororto

clearlydefineanddelimittheotheroffensestobeconsideredasabsorbed
thereby,sothatitcannotbeconvenientlyutilizedastheumbrellaforevery
sortofillegalactivityundertakeninitsname.TheCourthasnopowerto
effectsuchchange,foritcanonlyinterpretthelawasitstandsatanygiven
time,andwhatisneededliesbeyondinterpretation.Hopefully,Congress
will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter,
whichisproperlywithinitsprovince.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
againstpetitionersJuanPonceEnrileandthe
_______________
20Rollo,G.R.No.92164,pp.124125.
234
234

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Courts earlier grant of bail to
petitionersbeingmerelyprovisionalincharacter,theproceedingsinboth
casesareorderedREMANDEDtotherespondentJudgetofixtheamount
ofbailtobepostedbythepetitioners.Oncebailisfixedbysaidrespondent
foranyofthepetitioners,thecorrespondingbailbondfiledwiththisCourt
shallbecomefunctusoficio.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED,
Cruz,GancaycoandRegalado,JJ.,concur.
Fernan,C.J.,Seeseparatedissentingandconcurringopinion.
MelencioHerreraandFeliciano,JJ.,Seeseparateopinion.
Gutierrez,Jr.,J.,Seeconcurringopinion.
Paras,J.,IconcurwiththeseparateopinionofJusticePadilla.
Padilla,J.,Seedissent.
Bidin,J.,Seeconcurringanddissentingopinion.
Sarmiento,J.,Seeconcurringanddissentinginpart.

CortsandGrioAquino,JJ.,Onleave.
Medialdea,J., ConcurringinG.R.No.92164;NopartinG.R.
No.92163.
FERNAN,C.J.,DissentingandConcurring:
Iamconstrainedtowritethisseparateopiniononwhatseemstobearigid
adherencetothe1956rulingoftheCourt.Thenumerouschallengestothe
doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
(1956)shouldatoncedemonstratetheneedtoredefinetheapplicabilityof
saiddoctrinesoastomakeitconformablewithacceptedandwellsettled
principlesofcriminallawandjurisprudence.
Tomymind,theHernandezdoctrineshouldnotbeinterpretedasan
allembracingauthorityfortherulethatallcommoncrimescommittedon
the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are
absorbedbythelatter.Tothatextent,Icannotgoalongwiththeviewofthe
majorityinthe
235
VOL.186JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
instantcasethatHernandezremainsbindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasan
unintendedeffectofanactivitythatconstitutesrebellion(p.9,Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was
appliedbytheCourtin1956duringthecommunistinspiredrebellionofthe
Huks.Thechangesinoursocietyinthespanof34yearssincethenhave
farreaching effects on the allembracing applicability of the doctrine
consideringtheemergenceofalternativemodesofseizingthepowersofthe
dulyconstitutedGovernmentnotcontemplatedinArticles134and135of
theRevisedPenalCodeandtheirconsequenteffectsonthelivesofour
people.Thedoctrinewasgoodlawthen,butIbelievethatthereisacertain
aspectoftheHernandezdoctrinethatneedsclarification.
WithallduerespecttotheviewsofmybrethrenintheCourt,Ibelieve
that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that

distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the

commissionofrebellion,ontheonehand,andthoseactsoroffensesthatare
merelynecessarybutnotindispensableinthecommissionofrebellion,on
theother.ThemajorityoftheCourtiscorrectinadopting,albeitimpliedly,
theviewinHernandezcasethatwhenanoffenseperpetratedasanecessary
meansofcommittinganother,whichisanelementofthelatter,theresulting
interlockingcrimesshouldbeconsideredasonlyonesimpleoffenseand
must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision
(Article48)oftheRevisedPenalCode.AsinthecaseofHernandez,the
Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is
indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an
offense,resultingthusintherulethatcommoncrimeslikemurder,arson,
robbery,etc.committedinthecourseorontheoccasionofrebellionare
absorbedorincludedinthelatteraselementsthereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if
applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically,acrimewhichisindispensableinthecommissionofanother
must necessarilybe anelement ofthe latter; but acrimethat ismerely
necessarybutnotindis
236
236

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
pensableinthecommissionofanotherisnotanelementofthelatter,andif
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the
operationofthecomplexcrimeprovision(Art.48)oftheRevisedPenal
Code.Withthatdistinction,commoncrimescommittedagainstGovernment
forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as
virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed
againstthecivilianpopulationinthecourseorontheoccasionofrebellion
and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committingthelatter,andmay,therefore,notbeconsideredaselementsof
thesaidcrimeofrebellion.Toillustrate,thedeathsoccurringduringarmed
confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are
absorbedintherebellion,andwouldbethoseresultingfromthebombingof

militarycampsandinstallations,astheseactsareindispensableincarrying
out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent
civiliantoinstillfearorcreatechaosamongthepeople,althoughdonein
thefurtheranceoftherebellion,shouldnotbeabsorbedinthecrimeof
rebellionasthefeloniousactismerelynecessary,butnotindispensable,In
thelattercase,Article48oftheRevisedPenalCodeshouldapply.
Theoccurrenceofacoupdetatinourcountryasamodeofseizingthe
powersofthedulyconstitutedgovernmentbystagingsurpriseattacksor
occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial
notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code.
Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted
government,itfallswithinthecontemplationofrebellionundertheRevised
PenalCode,but,strictlyconstrued,acoupdetatperseisaclassbyitself.
Themannerofitsexecutionandtheextentandmagnitudeofitseffectson
the lives of the people distinguish a coup detat from the traditional
definitionandmodesofcommissionattachedbytheRevisedPenalCodeto
thecrimeofrebellionasappliedbytheCourttothecommunistinspired
rebellionofthe1950s.Acoupdetatmaybeexecutedsuccessfullywithout
itsperpetratorsresortingtothecommissionofotherseriouscrimessuchas
murder,arson,kidnapping,robbery,etc.becauseofthe
237
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
elementofsurpriseandtheprecisetimingofitsexecution.Inextremecases
wheremurder,arson,robbery,andothercommoncrimesarecommittedon
theoccasionofacoupdetat,thedistinctionreferredtoaboveonwhatis
necessaryandwhatisindispensableinthecommissionofthecoupdetat
shouldbepainstakinglyconsideredastheCourtshouldhavedoneinthe
caseofhereinpetitioners.
Iconcurintheresultinsofarastheotherissuesareresolvedbythe
Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad
applicationoftheHernandezdoctrine.
MELENCIOHERRERA,J.,SeparateOpinion:

IjoinmycolleaguesinholdingthattheHernandezdoctrine,whichhasbeen
with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should
remainundisturbed,despiteperiodicchallengestoitthat,ironically,have
onlyservedtostrengthenitspronouncements.
Itakeexceptiontotheview,however,thathabeascorpuswasnotthe
properremedy.
HadtheInformationfiledbelowchargedmerelythesimplecrimeof
Rebellion,thatpropositioncouldhavebeenplausible.ButthatInformation
chargedRebellioncomplexedwithMurderandMultipleFrustratedMurder,
acrimewhichdoesnotexistinourstatutebooks.Thechargewasobviously
intendedtomakethepenaltyforthemostseriousoffenseinitsmaximum
periodimposableupontheoffenderpursuanttoArticle48oftheRevised
PenalCode.Thus,nobailwasrecommendedintheInformationnorwas
anyprescribedintheWarrantofArrestissuedbytheTrialCourt.
Undertheattendantcircumstances,therefore,tohavefiledaMotionto
QuashbeforethelowerCourtwouldnothavebroughtaboutthespeedy
relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the
pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continuedtolanguishindetention.Besides,theWritofHabeasCorpusmay
stillissueevenifanotherremedy,whichislesseffective,maybeavailedof
(Chavezvs.CourtofAppeals,24SCRA663).
Itistruethathabeascorpuswouldordinarilynotliewhenapersonis
undercustodybyvirtueofaprocessissuedbyaCourt.
238
238

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
TheCourt,however,must havejurisdictiontoissuetheprocess.Inthis
case,theCourtbelowmustbedeemedtohavebeenoustedofjurisdiction
when it illegally curtailed petitioners liberty. Habeas corpus is thus
available.
Thewrit ofhabeascorpusisavailabletorelievepersonsfrom unlawful
restraint.Butwherethedetentionorconfinementistheresultofaprocess
issuedbythecourtorjudgeorbyvirtueofajudgmentorsentence,thewrit
ordinarilycannotbeavailedof.Itmaystillbeinvokedthoughiftheprocess,
judgmentorsentenceproceededfromacourtortribunalthejurisdictionof

whichmaybeassailed.Evenifithadauthoritytoactattheoutset,itisnow
theprevailingdoctrinethatadeprivationofconstitutionalright,ifshownto
exist,wouldoustitofjurisdiction.Insuchacase,habeascorpuscouldbe
relied upon to regain ones liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391)
[Italicsours].
ThePetitionforhabeascorpuswaspreciselypremisedontheviolationof
petitioners constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the
present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which
petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non
existentinlaw.Whilelitigantsshould,asarule,ascendthestepsofthe
judicialladder,nothingshouldstopthisCourtfromtakingcognizanceof
petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
proceduralflawnotwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v.
Quilen, 42 Phil.805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and
lawlessstateaction.Thescopeandflexibilityofthewrititscapacityto
reachallmannerofillegaldetentionitsabilitytocutthroughbarriersof
formandproceduralmazeshavealwaysbeenemphasizedandjealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of
Prisons,37SCRA420)[italicsours].
TheproliferationofcasesinthisCourt,whichfollowedinthewakeofthis
Petition,wasbroughtaboutbytheinsistenceoftheprosecutiontocharge
the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses
notwithstandingthefactthatthisCourthadnotyetruledonthevalidityof
thatchargeandhadgrantedprovisionallibertytopetitioner,
239
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
If,indeed,itisdesiredtomakethecrimeofRebellionacapitaloffense
(nowpunishablebyreclusionperpetua),theremedyliesinlegislation.But
Article142A1oftheRevisedPenalCode,alongwithP.DNo.942,were
repealed,forbeingrepressive,feyEONo.187on5June1987.EO187
furtherexplicitlyprovidedthatArticle134(andothersenumerated)ofthe
RevisedPenalCodewasrestoredtoitsfullforceandeffectasitexisted

beforesaidamendatorydecrees.Havingbeensorepealed,thisCourtis
bereftofpowertolegislateintoexistence,undertheguiseofreexamininga
settled doctrine, a creature unknown in lawthe complex crime of
RebellionwithMurder.
TheremandofthecasetothelowerCourtforfurtherproceedingsisin
order.TheWritofHabeasCorpushasserveditspurpose.
FELICIANO,J.,Concurring
IconcurintheresultreachedbythemajorityoftheCourt.
IbelievethattherearecertainaspectsoftheHernandezdoctrinethat,
asanabstractquestionoflaw,couldstandreexaminationorclarification.I
have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate
relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code.Thisisamatterwhichrelatestothelegalconceptofrebellioninour
legal system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled:
RebellionorInsurrectionHowCommitted),itwouldappearthat this
Articlespecifiesboththeovertactsandthecriminalpurposewhich,when
puttogether,wouldconstitutetheoffenseofrebellion.Thus,Article134
statesthatthecrimeofrebellioniscommittedbyrisingpubliclyandtaking
armsagainsttheGovernment(i.e.,theovertactscomprisingrebellion),
forthepurposeof(i.e.,thespecificcriminalintentorpoliticalobjective)
removingfromtheallegiancetosaidgovernmentoritslawstheterritoryof
theRepublicofthePhilippines
_______________
1ART.142A.Caseswhereotheroffensesarecommitted.Whenby
reasonorontheoccasionofanyofthecrimespenalizedinthisChapter,
actswhichconstituteoffensesuponwhichgraverpenaltiesareimposedby
lawarecommitted,thepenaltyforthemostseriousoffenseinitsmaximum
periodshallbeimposedupontheoffender.
240
240

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
oranypartthereof,oranybodyofland,navalorotherarmedforces,or

deprivingtheChiefExecutiveor the Legislature, whollyorpartially, of

their powers or prerogatives. At the same time, Article 135 (entitled:
Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.) sets out a listing of acts or
particularmeasureswhichappeartofallundertherubricofrebellionor
insurrection: engaging in war against the forces of the Government,
destroyingpropertyorcommittingseriousviolence,exactingcontributions
ordivertingpublicfundsfromthelawfulpurposeforwhichtheyhavebeen
appropriated. Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they
particularmodesbywhichthosewhopromote[],maintain[]orhead[]
a rebellion or insurrection commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participationinarebellion bypublicofficersoremployees? Clearly,the
scopeofthelegalconceptofrebellionrelatestothedistinctionbetween,on
theonehand,theindispensableactsoringredientsofthecrimeofrebellion
undertheRevisedPenalCodeand,ontheotherhand,differingoptional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the
rebellionorinsurrection.
Thedifficultythatisatonceraisedbyanyefforttoexamineoncemore
eventheabovethresholdquestionsisthattheresultsofsuchreexamination
maywellbethatactswhichundertheHernandezdoctrineareabsorbedinto
rebellion,maybecharacterizedasseparateordiscreteoffenseswhich,asa
matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or
prosecutedundertheprovisionsofArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCode,
which(bothClause1andClause2thereof)clearlyenvisagetheexistenceof
atleasttwo(2)distinctoffenses.Toreachsuchaconclusioninthecaseat
bar,would,asfarasIcansee,resultincollidingwiththefundamentalnon
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal
Code;bothinrelationtoArticle8,CivilCode).
Thenonretroactivityruleappliestostatutesprincipally.But,statutes
donotexistintheabstractbutratherbearuponthelivesofpeoplewiththe
specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms.
Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
contenttosuchnorms.Intime,thestatutorynormsbecomeencrustedwith
theglossesplaceduponthembythecourtsandtheglossesbecomeintegral
withthenorms(Cf.Caltexv.Palomar,18SCRA247
241

VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
[1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute
becomespartofthelawasofthedatethatthelawwasoriginallyenacted,I
believe this theory isnot to be applied rigorouslywhere a new judicial
doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing
doctrineoflongstanding(here,36years)andmostspeciallynotwherethe
statuteconstruediscriminalinnatureandthenewdoctrineismoreonerous
fortheaccusedthanthepreexistingone(Peoplev.Jabinal,55SCRA607
[1974];Peoplev.Licera,65SCRA270[1975];Gumabonv.Directorof
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the nonretroactivity rule
whetherinrespectoflegislativeactsorjudicialdecisionshasconstitutional
implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial
decisionthatretroactivelyrendersanactcriminalorenhancestheseverity
of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional
challengebasedupontheruleagainstexpostfactolawsandthedueprocess
clause(Bouiev.CityofColumbia,378US347,12L.Ed.2d894[1964];
Marksv.U.S.,43US188,51L.Ed.2d260[1977];Devinev.NewMexico
DepartmentofCorrections,866F.2d339[1989]).
ItisurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralthatthenonretroactivityprinciple
does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez
doctrinewasbaseduponArticle48,secondclause,oftheRevisedPenal
Codeandnotuponthefirstclausethereof,whileitispreciselythefirst
clauseofArticle48thattheGovernmenthereinvokes.Itis,however,open
to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and
sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be so
characterized,subsequent casesrefertothe Hernandez doctrineinterms
whichdonotdistinguishclearlybetweenthefirstclauseandthesecond
clauseofArticle48(e.g.,Peoplev.Geronimo,100Phil.90[1956];People
v.Rodriguez,107Phil.659[1960]).Thus,itappearstomethatthecritical
question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring
exclusivelytoArticle48,secondclause.Putinslightlydifferentterms,the
importantquestionwouldbewhetherthenewdoctrinehereproposedbythe
Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average

intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an

examinationofArticles134and
242
242

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
135oftheRevisedPenalCodeasinterpretedbytheCourtintheHernandez
and subsequent cases. To formulate the question in these terms would
almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the
conclusionsreachedbytheCourtanditsseveralMemberstoday.
Finally,thereappearstobenoquestionthatthenewdoctrinethatthe
Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgationoftheRevisedPenalCodein1932,wouldbemoreonerous
fortherespondentaccusedthanthesimpleapplicationofthe Hernandez
doctrinethatmurderswhichhavebeencommittedontheoccasionofandin
furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the
offenseofsimplerebellion
Iagreethereforethattheinformationinthiscasemustbeviewedas
chargingonlythecrimeofsimplerebellion.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.,ConcurringOpinion
IjointheCourtsdecisiontograntthepetition.Inreiteratingtherulethat
underexistinglawrebellionmaynotbecomplexedwithmurder,theCourt
emphasizesthatitcannotlegislateanewcrimeintoexistencenorprescribe
apenaltyforitscommission.ThatfunctionisexclusivelyforCongress.
IwritethisseparateopiniontomakeclearhowIviewcertainissues
arisingfromthesecases,especiallyonhowthedefectiveinformationsfiled
bytheprosecutorsshouldhavebeentreated.
Iagreewiththeponentethatapetitionforhabeascorpusisordinarily
not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail Under the special
circumstancesofthiscase,however,thepetitionershadnootherrecourse.
Theyhadtocometous.
First,thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofthedecisioninPeoplev.
Hernandez,99Phil.515(1956)thatthereisnetsuchcrimeinourstatute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in

connectionwitharebellionisabsorbedbythecrimeofrebellion,andthata
resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life orproperty constitutes
neithertwoormoreoffensesnoracomplexcrimebutonecrimerebellion
pureandsimple.
Second,Hernandezhasbeenthelawfor34years.Ithasbeenreiterated
inequallysensationalcases.Alllawyersandeven
243
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
lawstudentsareawareofthedoctrine.Attemptstohavethedoctrinere
examinedhavebeenconsistentlyrejectedbythisCourt
Third,PresidentMarcosthroughtheuseofhisthenlegislativepowers,
issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexedwithoffenseslikemurderwheregraverpenaltiesareimposedby
law.However,PresidentAquinousingherthenlegislativepowersexpressly
repealedPD942byissuingExec.Order187.Shetherebyerasedthecrime
ofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderandmadeitclearthatthe Hernandez
doctrineremainsthecontrollingrule.Theprosecutionhasnot explained
why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the
President.Theprosecution,ineffect,questionstheactionofthePresidentin
repealingarepressivedecree,adecreewhich,accordingtotherepealorder,
isviolativeofhumanrights.
Fourth,anyreexaminationoftheHernandezdoctrinebringstheex
postfactoprincipleintothepicture.DecisionsofthisCourtformpartofour
legal system. Even ifwe declare that rebellion maybe complexed with
murder,ourdeclarationcannotbemaderetroactivewheretheeffectisto
imprisonapersonforacrimewhichdidnotexistuntiltheSupremeCourt
reverseditself.
Andfifth,theattemptstodistinguishthiscasefrom the Hernandez
case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were
committed on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commissionofrebellionresultinoutlandishconsequencesandignorethe
basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb
dropped on PTV4 which kills government troopers results in simple
rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion

succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood,thedroppingofthebombbecomesrebellioncomplexedwith
murderbecausethekillingofciviliansisnotnecessaryforthesuccessofa
rebellionand,therefore,thekillingsareonlyontheoccasionofbutnota
necessarymeansforthecommissionofrebellion.
Thisargumentispuerile.
Thecrimeofrebellionconsistsofmanyacts.Thedroppingofone
bombcannotbeisolatedasaseparatecrimeofrebellion.
244
244

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousandsofmachinegunbulletsbebrokenupintoahundredorthousands
ofseparateoffenses,ifeachbomboreachbullethappenstoresultinthe
destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by
separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of
civilians.Theprosecutionalsolosessightoftheregrettablefactthatintotal
warandinrebellionthekillingofcivilians,thelayingwasteofcivilian
economies,themassacreofinnocentpeople,theblowingupofpassenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in
rebellion.Wecannotandshouldnottrytoascertaintheintentofrebelsfor
eachsingleactunlesstheactisplainlynotconnectedtotherebellion.We
cannotuseArticle48oftheRevisedPenalCodeinlieuofstilltobeenacted
legislation.Thekillingofciviliansduringarebelattackonmilitaryfacilities
furtherstherebellionandispartoftherebellion.
Thetrialcourtwascertainlyawareofalltheaboveconsiderations.I
cannotunderstandwhythetrialJudgeissuedthewarrantofarrestwhich
categoricallystatesthereinthattheaccused wasnotentitledtobail. The
petitionerwascompelledtocometoussohewouldnotbearrestedwithout
bailforanonexistentcrime.Thetrialcourtforgottoapplyanestablished
doctrineoftheSupremeCourt.Worse,itissuedawarrantwhichreversed
34yearsofestablishedprocedurebasedonawellknownSupremeCourt
ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent

judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court

shouldneverplayintothehandsoftheprosecutionandblindlycomplywith
its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a
manifestlynonexistentcrime,thedutyofatrialcourtistothrowitout.Or,
attheveryleastandwherepossible,makeitconformtothelaw.
A lower court cannot reexamine and reverse a decision of the
Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years.
WhereaJudgedisagreeswithaSupremeCourtruling,heisfreetoexpress
hisreservationsinthebodyofhisdecision,order,orresolution.However,
anyjudgmentherenders,anyorderheprescribes,andanyprocesseshe
issuesmust
245
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
followtheSupremeCourtprecedent. Atrial court hasnojurisdictionto
reverseorignoreprecedentsoftheSupremeCourt.Inthisparticularcase,it
shouldhavebeentheSolicitorGeneralcomingtothisCourttoquestionthe
lowercourtsrejectionoftheapplicationforawarrantofarrestwithoutbail.
It should have been the SolicitorGeneral provoking the issue of re
examinationinsteadofthepetitionersaskingtobefreedfromtheirarrestfor
anonexistentcrime.
Theprinciplebearsrepeating:
RespondentCourtofAppealsreallywasdevoidofanychoiceatall.It
couldnothaveruledinanyotherwayonthelegalquestionraised.This
Tribunalhavingspoken,itsdutywastoobey.Itisassimpleasthat.Thereis
relevancetothisexcerptfromBarrerav.Barrera.(L31589,July31,1970,
34SCRA98)Thedelicatetaskofascertainingthesignificancethatattaches
toaconstitutionalorstatutoryprovision,anexecutiveorder,aprocedural
norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus
discharges arole nolesscrucial thanthat appertainingtotheother two
departmentsinthemaintenanceoftheruleoflaw.Toassurestabilityin
legalrelationsandavoidconfusion,ithastospeakwithonevoice.Itdoes
sowithfinality,logicallyandrightly,throughthehighestjudicialorgan,this
Court.Whatitsaysthenshouldbedefinitiveandauthoritative,bindingon
thoseoccupyingthelowerranksinthejudicial hierarchy.Theyhaveto

deferandtosubmit.(Ibid,107.TheopinionofJusticeLaurelinPeoplev.
Vera,65Phil.56[1937]wascited).Theensuingparagraphoftheopinionin
Barrerafurtheremphasizesthepoint:Suchathoughtwasreiteratedinan
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words:
JudgeGaudencioCloribelneednotberemindedthattheSupremeCourt,
bytraditionandinoursystemofjudicialadministration,hasthelastword
onwhatthelawis;itisthefinalarbiterofanyjustifiablecontroversy.There
isonlyoneSupremeCourtfromwhosedecisionsallothercourtsshould
taketheirbearings.(Ibid.JusticeJ.B.L.ReyesspokethusinAlbertv.
Court ofFirst Instanceof Manila(Br.VI),L26364,May29,1968,23
SCRA948,961.(Tugadev.CourtofAppeals,85SCRA226[1978].See
alsoAlbertv.CourtofFirstInstance,23SCRA948[1968]andVirJen
ShippingandMarineServices,Inc.v.NLRC,125SCRA577[1983])
IfindthesituationinSpousesPanliliov.ProsecutorsFernandodeLeon,et
al.evenmoreinexplicable.InthecaseofthePanlilios,anyprobablecause
tocommitthenonexistentcrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurderexists
onlyinthemindsof
246
246

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
theprosecutors,notintherecordsofthecase.
Ihavegoneovertherecordsandpleadingsfurnishedtothemembers
oftheSupremeCourt.Ilistenedintentlytotheoralargumentsduringthe
hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of
probablecausewasnotsatisfied.Infact,inanswertomyqueryforany
otherproofstosupporttheissuanceofawarrantofarrest,theanswer was
thattheevidencewouldbesubmittedinduetimetothetrialcourt.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant
businessfordecades.Undertherecordsofthesepetitions,anyrestaurant
ownerorhotelmanagerwhoservesfoodtorebelsisacoconspiratorinthe
rebellion.Theabsurdityofthispropositionisapparentifwebearinmind
that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when
mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other
parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church
servicesandotherwisemixwithpeopleinvariousgatherings.Evenifthe

hostsrecognizethemtoberebelsandfailtoshoothemaway,itdoesnot
necessarilyfollowthattheformerarecoconspiratorsinarebellion.
TheonlybasisforprobablecauseshownbytherecordsofthePanlilio
caseistheallegedfactthatthepetitionersservedfoodtorebelsattheEnrile
household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters,
without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger
showingofprobablecausemustbeshown.
InSalongav.CruzPao,134SCRA438(1985),thenSenatorSalonga
waschargedasaconspiratorintheheinousbombingofinnocentcivilians
becausethemanwhoplantedthebombhad,sometimeearlier,appearedina
groupphotographtakenduringabirthdaypartyintheUnitedStateswiththe
Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a
grouppicture.Here,itisacaseofconspiracysoughttoprovedthroughthe
cateringoffood.
TheCourtinSalongastressed:
Thepurposeofapreliminaryinvestigationistosecuretheinnocentagainst
hasty,maliciousandoppressiveprosecution,andtoprotecthimfroman
openandpublicaccusationofcrime,fromthetrouble,expenseandanxiety
ofapublictrial,andalsotoprotectthestatefromuselessandexpensive
trials.(Trociov.Manta,118SCRA
247
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
241;citingHashimnv.Boncan,71Phil.216).Therighttoapreliminary
investigationisastatutorygrant,andtowithholditwouldbetotransgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 2S SCRA 277)
However,inordertosatisfythedueprocessclauseitisnotenoughthatthe
preliminaryinvestigationisconductedinthesenseofmakingsurethata
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
servesnotonlythepurposesoftheState.Moreimportant,itisapartofthe
guaranteesoffreedomandfairplaywhicharebirthrightsofallwholivein
ourcountry.Itis,therefore,imperativeuponthefiscalorthejudgeasthe
casemaybe,torelievetheaccusedfromthepainofgoingthroughatrial
onceitisascertainedthat theevidenceisinsufficienttosustainaprima
faciecaseorthatnoprobablecauseexiststoformasufficientbeliefasto

theguiltoftheaccused.Althoughthereisnogeneralformulaorfixedrule
forthedeterminationofprobablecausesincethesamemustbedecidedin
thelightoftheconditionsobtainingingivensituationsanditsexistence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conductingtheexamination,suchafindingshouldnotdisregardthefacts
beforethejudgenorruncountertothecleardictatesofreason(SeeLa
ChemiseLacoste,S.A.v.Fernandez,129SCRA391).Thejudgeorfiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credibleevidencemightlaterturnupduringtrialforthiswouldbeaflagrant
violationofabasicrightwhichthecourtsarecreatedtouphold.Itbears
repeating that the judiciary lives uptoitsmissionbyvitalizingand not
denigratingconstitutionalrights.Soithasbeenbefore.Itshouldcontinueto
beso.(id.,pp.461462)
Becauseoftheforegoing,Itakeexceptiontothatpartoftheponenciawhich
willreadtheinformationsaschargingsimplerebellion.Thiscasedidnot
arisefrominnocenterror.Ifaninformationchargesmurderbutitscontents
showonlytheingredientsofhomicide,theJudgemayrightlyreaditas
charginghomicide.Inthesecases,however,thereisadeliberateattemptto
chargethepetitionersforanoffensewhichthisCourthasruledasnon
existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the
prosecutionhasfiledinformationsforacrimewhich,underourrulings,
doesnotexist,thoseinformationsshouldbetreatedasnullandvoid.New
informationschargingthecorrectoffenseshouldbefiled.AndinG.R,No,
92164anextraeffortshouldbemadetoseewhetherornottheprinciplein
Salongav.CruzPao,etal.(supra)hasbeenviolated.
248
248

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Enrilevs.Salazar
TheCourtisnot,inanyway,preventingtheGovernmentfromusingmore
effectiveweaponstosuppressrebellion.IftheGovernmentfeelsthatthe
currentsituationcallsfortheimpositionofmoreseverepenaltieslikedeath
orthecreationofnewcrimeslikerebellioncomplexedwithmurder,the
remedyiswithCongress,notthecourts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the
respondentcourttoDISMISSthevoidinformationsforanonexistentcrime.

PADILLA,J.,SeparateOpinion
IconcurinthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthattherulinginPeople
vs.Hernandez,99Phil.515remainsbindingdoctrineoperatingtoprohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasionthereof,eitherasameansnecessarytoitscommissionorasan
unintendedeffectofanactivitythatconstitutesrebellion.
Idissent,however,fromthemajorityopinioninsofarasitholdsthat
theinformationinquestion,whilechargingthecomplexcrimeofrebellion
withmurderandmultiplefrustratedmurder, istobereadascharging
simplerebellion.
ThepresentcasesaretobedistinguishedfromtheHernandezcaseinat
least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was
confrontedwithan appealedcase, i.e.,Hernandezhadbeenconvictedby
thetrialcourtofthecomplexcrimeofrebellionwithmurder,arsonand
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court,
pendingappeal,gavebirthtothenowcelebrated Hernandez doctrinethat
thecrimeofrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,arsonandrobberydoesnot
exist.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,theCourtisconfrontedwith
an originalcase, i.e.,whereaninformationhasbeenrecentlyfiledinthe
trialcourtandthepetitionershavenotevenpleadedthereto.
Furthermore,theSupremeCourt,intheHernandezcase,wasground
breakingontheissueofwhetherrebellioncanbecomplexedwithmurder,
arson,robbery,etc.Inthepresentcases,ontheotherhand,theprosecution
andthelowercourt,notonlyhadtheHernandezdoctrine(ascaselaw),but
ExecutiveOrderNo.187ofPresidentCorazonC.Aquinodated5June
249
VOL.186,JUNE5,1990
Enrilevs.Salazar
1987(asstatutorylaw)tobindthemtothelegalpropositionthatthecrime
ofrebellioncomplexedwithmurder,andmultiplefrustratedmurderdoes
notexist
Andyet,notwithstandingthese unmistakable and controlling beacon
lightsabsent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrinethe

prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in
hearing,aninformationchargingthepetitionerswithrebellioncomplexed
withmurderanmultiplefrustratedmurder. Thatinformationisclearlya
nullityandplainlyvoidabinitio.Itsheadshouldnotbeallowedtosurface.
As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to
nothing.Thewarrantsofarrestissuedpursuanttheretoareasnullandvoid
as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire
questionoftheinformationsvalidityisbeforetheCourtinthesehabeas
corpuscases,Iventuretosaythattheinformationisfatallydefective,even
underprocedurallaw,becauseitchargesmorethanone(1)offense(Sec.
13,Rule110,RulesofCourt}.
IsubmitthenthatitisnotforthisCourttoenergizeadeadand,atbest,
fatallydecrepitinformationbylabellingorbaptizingitdifferentlyfrom
whatitannouncesitselftobe.Theprosecutionmustfile anentirelynew
and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious
considerationofthecourts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the
warrantsofarrest,andORDER theinformationforrebellioncomplexed
with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90
10941,RTCofQuezonCity,DISMISSED.
Consequently,thepetitionersshouldbeorderedpermanentlyreleased
andtheirbailscancelled.
BIDIN,J.,ConcurringandDissenting:
Iconcurwiththemajorityopinionexceptasregardsthedispositiveportion
thereofwhichorderstheremandofthecasetotherespondentjudgefor
furtherproceedingstofixtheamountofbailtobepostedbythepetitioner.
Isubmitthattheproceedingsneednotberemandedtotherespondent
judgeforthepurposeoffixingbailsincewehaveconstruedtheindictment
herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable.
Consequently,habeascorpusisthe
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250

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Enrilevs.Salazar

properremedyavailabletopetitionerasanaccusedwhohadfeeencharged
withsimplerebellion,abailableoffensebutwhohadbeendeniedhisright
tobailbytherespondentjudgeinviolationofpetitionersconstitutional
righttobail.Inviewthereof,theresponsibilityoffixingtheamountofbail
andapprovalthereofwhenfiled,devolvesuponus,ifcompletereliefisto
beaccordedtopetitionerintheinstantproceedings.
Itisindubitablethatbeforeconviction,admissiontobailisamatterof
righttothedefendant,accusedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofanoffense
lessthancapital(Section13ArticleIII,ConstitutionandSection3,Rule
114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying,
amongothers,forhisprovisionalreleaseonbail.Sincetheoffensecharged
(construedassimplerebellion)admitsofbail,itisincumbentuponusinthe
exerciseofourjurisdictionoverthepetitionfor habeascorpus (Section5
(1),ArticleVIII,Constitution;Section2,Rule102),tograntpetitionerhis
righttobailandhavingadmittedhimtobail,tofixtheamountthereofin
suchsumsasthecourtdeemsreasonable.Thereafter,therulesrequirethat
theproceedingstogetherwiththebondshallforthwithbecertifiedtothe
respondenttrialcourt(Section14,Rule102).
Accordingly,thecashbondintheamountofP100,000.00postedby
petitionerforhisprovisionalreleasepursuanttoourresolutiondatedMarch
6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his
provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the
respondentjudge,withoutnecessityofaremandforfurtherproceedings,
conditionedforhis(petitioners)appearancebeforethetrialcourttoabide
itsorderorjudgmentinthesaidcase.
SARMIENTO,J.,Concurringinpartanddissentinginpart:
IagreethatPeoplev.Hernandez1 shouldabide.Morethanthreedecades
after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our
jurisprudenceascorrectdoctrine.
As Hernandez put it,rebellionmeans engaging inwar against the
forcesofthegovernment,2whichimpliesresorttoarms,
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199Phil.515(1956).

2Supra,520.
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Enrilevs.Salazar
requisitionofpropertyandservices,collectionoftaxesandcontributions,
restraintofliberty,damagetoproperty,physicalinjuriesandlossoflife,
andthehunger,illnessandunhappinessthatwarleavesinitswake....3
whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission,orinthecourse,ofrebellion.Tosaythatrebellionmaybe
completedwithanyotheroffense,inthiscasemurder,istoplayintoa
contradictionintermsbecauseexactly,rebellionincludesmurder,among
otherpossiblecrimes.
Ialsoagreethattheinformationmaystandasanaccusationforsimple
rebellion.Sincetheactscomplainedofasconstitutingrebellionhavebeen
embodiedintheinformation,mentionthereinofmurderasacomplexing
offenseisasurplusage,becauseinanycase,thecrimeofrebellionisleft

fullydescribed.4
Atanyrate,thegovernmentneedonlyamendtheinformationbya
clericalcorrection,sinceanamendmentwillnotalteritssubstance.
Idissent,however,insofarasthemajorityorderstheremandofthe
matterofbailtothelowercourt.Itakeitthatwhenwe,inourResolutionof
March6,1990,grantedthepetitionerprovisionallibertyuponthefiling
ofabondofP100,000.00,wegrantedhimbail.Thefactthatwegavehim
provisional liberty is in my view, of no moment, because bail means
provisionalliberty.Itwillservenousefulpurposetohavethetrialcourt
hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the
petitionerisentitledtotemporaryfreedom.
Proceedingsinbothcasesremandedtorespondentjudgetofixthe
amountofbail.
Note.Amnesty granted by former President Marcos covers crimes for
violationofsubversionlawsorthosedefinedundercrimesagainstpublic
order.(Macagaanvs.People,152SCRA480.)