DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

[GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]
En Banc, Fernandez (J) : 4 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any person
not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in
any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an
employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968.
The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City of Manila without the
requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions
of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government
and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or
both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition,
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the
ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge
Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17
September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the
preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review
the decision of the CFI.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure
working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable.
Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who
are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be
employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means
of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The
amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation
among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-and-file
or executive.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Ermita Malate v City of Manila

20 SCRA 849 (1967)
J. Fernando
FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of
the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose fees per annum for motels; that the provision in the same
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a
hotel (OMKA) , motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex,
the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence
certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of OMKA
That the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the OMKA of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of
the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
In the answer, after setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.
The trial court ruled based on evidence or the lack of it, on the authority of the City of Manila to
regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: The validity of the ordinance must be upheld.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; VALIDITY, PRESUMPTION OF. An ordinance, having been
enacted by councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
their particular municipality or city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should not be set aside
unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of police regulation.
Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its
validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
Ord. No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is
not the case here. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity
must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside
POLICE POWER; MANIFESTATION OF. Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is a
manifestation of a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such
it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers extending as it does to all the great public needs.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note included as annex to the
stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
LICENSES INCIDENTAL TO. Municipal license fees can be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations
are incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in taking the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a wide discretion in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is,
of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license
fee. (Cu Unjieng v. Patstone [1922], 42 Phil,, 818, 828).
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the
latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels,
P4,500 yearly. this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the states police power.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; PROHIBITIONS IN. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila making it unlawful for OMKA of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with
a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as transgression
against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

[GR 14078, 7 March 1919]
En Banc, Malcolm (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a
reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads
on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously recommended by
the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25.
On 4 December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which
directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans
east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917,
and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not
exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi
and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao
and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand,
Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles
2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the
Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on
their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code
Held: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The
meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due
process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a
hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to
the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due
process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law"
means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers
of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class." What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification
must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold
that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Deloso vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS
This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) from his
position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.
Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November
1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint with
the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law
(Republic Act 3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the Municipality
of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at
reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by
the latter, thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.
Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.
HELD
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest
provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with
the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term.
The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of
Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential
Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an
automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension limited to only
ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of
Zambales.