The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification

Author(s): Amelie Oksenberg Rorty

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 152-166
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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THE HIDDEN POLITICS

OF CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION

AMELIEOKSENBERGRORTY
HarvardGraduateSchool of Educationand Mt. Holyoke College

IN Multiculturalismand the "Politics of Recognition,"Charles Taylor

attempts to justify culture-protective-and indeed culture-promotlnglegislation withina diverseliberalstate.'He is surelyrightthateven the most
austerelyvalue-neutralliberalstatesdo in fact activelypreserveat least some
culturalvalues,andtheypromotethe virtuesspecificto them,going farbeyond
the republicancivic virtuesnecessaryfor any liberalstate.Indeed,they cannot
do otherwise:virtuallyall social practicesimplicitlyexpressand reinforce a
wide rangeof culturaldirectionsand styles.2After the conditionsof constitutionalityandprecedentare satisfied,legislativeandjudicial decisions also
of establishedcustomagainstthebenefitsof changing
weighthepreponderance
it. It is not solely because such considerationsaffect enforcementthat the
expectationsset by existing practicesare measuredagainst the predictable
utilityof theirreplacement.Taylorprovidesa justificationfor the inevitable,
but in defendingpracticesthatliberalshave not always acknowledged,he is
also able to arguefor theirextension to minorityas well as dormnantcultural
groups.His essay is an eloquentdefense of the politics of culturalsurvival.
But it is a curiouslyironicfeatureof manyrecentargumentsin the politics
of entitlement-Taylor's amongthem-that they often appealto the poetics
of idealized cultural identity without fully acknowledging the ways that
characterzingthe "identity"of a cultureis itself a politically and ideologically charged issue. Because individuals are, at least in part, essentially
constitutedand sustainedby theirculturalidentities-so Taylor'sargument
goes-their basic protectionextends to the protectionof their cultures. A
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am grateful to Byron Good, Jean Jackson, Daniel Little, Michel
Oksenberg,MindaRaeAmiran,and David Wongfor helpful discussions and bibliographical
counsel.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 22 No. 1, February1994 152-166

? 1994 Sage Publications,Inc.

152

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

153

liberal state is not only charged with protecting individuals, it must also
secure the basic conditions for their self-determination,as engaged in the
activities that constitute their conceptions of the good. The citizens of a
complex, diverse liberal democracy-so Taylor'sargumentcontinues-are
entitled to the kind of cultural recognition that goes beyond the nghts of
association,speech, andtoleration.The claim to the rightof culturalsurvival
and of cultural self-determination-as it might extend beyond protection
againstunwarrantedinterference-appears to derive fromthe rightaccorded
to the citizens in a liberalstateactively to pursuetheirconceptionsof a good
life. If the state legitimately promotes the self-defining activities of
individuals-centrally, for instance, assuringtheir basic education-it also
is charged with promoting the self-defimng activities of its constitutive
cultural groups. On this view, it is appropriatefor indigenous cultural
groups-Mexican-Americans, for instance,or the Navaho-to claim public
supportto promotetheirculturalsurvival.
Of course, there are other argumentsfor the public supportof cultures
whose existence is threatened.The grounds for those argumentsare extremely diverse. Taylor might, for instance, have defended his position on
more familiar liberal grounds: protecting and promoting the varety of
culturesis a way of assuringthe diversityof opinionthatrobustcriticalpublic
deliberation requires. Following this line would have enabled Taylor to
extend the benefits of protectivelegislationto a varietyof associations-on
a continuum from the voluntaryto the involuntary-without resting those
protections on their roles in forming individual identity.And there are yet
otherarguments:some derivefromconsiderationsof compensatoryremedies
for past inJustices;others from the view that cultural vanety, like that of
naturalspecies, is intrinsicallyvaluableand ought to be preserved.
But Taylor's position on multiculturalismis a direct expression of the
exceptional continuity-we might fashionably call it a tightly closed
narrative-of the central motifs that mark his intellectual history. That
historybegins with his analysisof the themeof the mutualrecognitionof the
interdependenceof power and subservience-in the "master-slaverelation"
passages-as the key to ThePhenomenologyof Splrit.Taylor'sbook on Hegel
naturallyled him to writea set of essays on the diverlstyof incommensurable
goods and the moralconflicts they engender.3Focusing on the problematics
of choice brought Taylor to the second theme of his oeuvre: the tension
between (and within) the multiplesocial constructionsof individualidentity
on the one hand, and what we might call the romantic KierkegaardianRilkean religion-friendly motif of radical individual choice. Against the
backgroundof his Hegelian historicism, Taylor's recognition of the deep
tensions within his conception of the constitutionof the individualnaturally

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POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

led him to a historyof the idea of the self. The conclusionof TheSources of
the Self can be seen as a shifting double-imagegestalt picture.Focusing on
historncsm,Taylorconcludes that because modernconceptions of the self
inhent every layer of theirarchaeologicalhistory,our self-understandingis
inevitablyconflicted.Any choice would be equivalentto a frontallobotomy.
Focusingon the choices thatsuch conflictsforceon us, Taylorconcludesthat
unless individualsreceive the grace of a particularself-understanding,they
must engage in a radicalchoice of a substantiveidentity.In the two monographs that form the coda of The Sources of the Self, Taylor separatesits
tensed strands. The Ethics of Authenticityargues that engaged authentic
individualscan and must neverthelessform a genuine interactivecommunity.4Multiculturalismand the "Politics of Recognition" argues that the
protectionof individualnghts requiresprotectingthe culturesthat hlstorically constituteat least partof theiridentity.
So much for Taylor'splot. Let us now turnto our counterplots.

CULTURE,SOCIETY,ECONOMICS,AND POLITICS
We mightwell questionTaylor'sstrongemphasison the culturalconstruction of identity.An individual'sculturalidentityis by no means the sole or
even the dominantinfluence on his or her conceptionof a good life. Many
othergroupsand associationsalso shape the habits-the framesof interpretation and categonzation,the pnmary practices,interests,and motivational
preoccupations-that express, actualize,and define an individual'sidentity.
Many of these are as comrmttedto perpetuatingtheirvalues and practicesas
are cultures.5Every political system can be regardedas a palimpsestcomposed of networksof distinctiveand sometimesopposed groupsand associations. An individual's identificationby some of these classifications (nationality, for example) is demographicallyfixed; others (occupations and
membershipin religious communities, for example) involve a margin of
individual choice. Some (like race) are stable; others (like age) are not.
Because some socioeconomic classes are themselves identified by distinctive, and often contested crteria (income, social status,occupation,access
to political power), an individual'sclass identity can be markedin several
(and sometimes opposed) patterns,receiving respect by some of his class
identifications,not by others.6Some (like villages and extended families)
attemptto promotea hlstoricallymarkedsense of solidarity'others(like sex)
neitherpresupposenorattemptto formorganizedassociations.The role that
any of these groupsor associationsplays in an individual'sidentity-its role

/ HIDDEN
POLITICS155
Rorty
in formingand sustainingherpursuitof (herconceptionof) a good life-varies contextually.Although it is certainlypossible to resist their influence,
identificationin one groupoften affects an individual'splace in others.Even
when they do not form a cohesive association with a distinctive history,
virtually all of these diverse classifications not only affect respect and
self-respect but interestsand alliances.
Identifyinga culturalgroup,presumablyin contrastto an economic or a
social group, presents senous theoretical and practical problems for the
"politicsof recognition."The distinctionbetween"culture"andeconomic or
sociopolitical structures is a theory-bound distinction, one which once
markeddifferences between academic disciplines-between anthropology,
sociology, and economics-rather than differences in the practicesor texts
they analyze. Many culturalanthropologistsdeal with these problems in a
single stroke: treatingculture as a comprehensiveway of life, they see all
these classifications-"race," "gender,""class,""age,"indeedthe categorial
distinctionsbetween "nature,""polis,"and "culture"-as culturalcategories
that define the significanceof all activity and production.7
Influenced by their interpretationof Wittgenstein,anthropologistshave
also discreditedthe kindof cultural"essentialism"thatcharacterizedcultures
by a set of relativelyfixed ideasor styles, by "themeaning"of folklore(food,
festivals, and fairytales), cosmology, andsocial organization.8Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishingcultureswhose economic practices-and
economic motivations-are interlocked,anthropologistsanalyzethe dynamics of internaltensions,interpretingthe significance andrationaleof realignments in sociopoliticalnetworks.The separationof culturefrompoliticaland
economic activity is seen as artificialand mlsleading. The significance of
political and econormcpracticesis culturallydefined, and culturalmeaning
is articulatedand expressed in political and economic practices.On the one
hand, culture cannot be understoodin abstractionfrom the dynamics of
political organization.On the other hand,economic exchange,judicial processes, medical procedures,or patternsof kinship and friendshipcannot be
understoodindependentlyof theirculturalsignificance.
Multiculturalthough they may be, the citizens of most Europeanand
American states-certainly those of Canada and the Unted States-are
significantlymotivatedby similareconomic practices.Because theircultures
strongly influence one another, because they share a political-economic
culture,individualsof multiculturalnationsare in a sense themselves lntraTypically,theirsharedidentity-definingmotivespsychicallymulticultural.9
and the vast rangeof interpretivehabitsthey carrywith them-permeate and
often outweigh theirculturaldifferences.It is not only economic protectionism that moves opponents of the European Community they are also

156

POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

convinced that culturalhomogeneityfollows directly upon a unified economy. They fear thattheircultures-understood comprehensivelyas dynamically tensed and politicized articulationsof way of life-will turninto the
lifeless folklore of a museum diorama. The mutual permeabilityof the
variousdimensionsof cultureis surely also one of the reasons that at least
some Quebecols would not be satisfied with culturalrecognition within a
unifiedfederalsystem:separatistsbelieve thateconomic,political,andlegal
self-determinationis a preconditionfor the kindof genuineculturalsurvival
that goes beyond remainingFrancophomc.Specific legislation controlling
Quebecois language(s)is, for them, a means for a far more comprehensive
movement.Althoughseparatistsdifferamongthemselvesaboutthe prmary
advantagesand rationalefor separation,they agree that cultural survival
cannot be assured by respectful recognition:it also requiresfar-reaching
political and econormcself-determination.'?
WhereasTaylorsometimesbroadlyrefersto cultureas "away of life" that
includes political-economic practices and organzations, his argumentrequires a narrowerusage. The question that frames his book-whether a
liberal state can legitimately legislate the preservationof its indigenous
cultures-presupposes a relatively sharpdistinctioncultureand politics: it
suggests thatdistinctiveculturescan sharea political-economicsystem. For
the most part, Taylor's use of the term "culture"is closer to the German
Bildung-a community's intellectual and spiritualachievements,as these
might include its language as well as its literatureand art. In his usage,
"language"-like "culture"-has botha broadanda narrowsense. Narrowly,
it refersto the set of naturallanguages:French,Spanish,Portuguese.In this
sense, several cultures(those of Quebec, Geneva, Lyons, and Monte Carlo,
for example)rmghthave virtuallythe same language.But one of the reasons
why Taylorjoins many Quebecois in focusing on protectiveFrancophonic
legislation is thathe thinksof languagesmore broadly the preservationof a
languageis centralto the preservationof a way of life. It shapesthe prmary
interpretativecategones and concepts thatin turnfocus patternsof salience
that themselves in turn profoundlyaffect motivationalstructures."Since
Taylorsometimesslips fromone usage to another,his argumentoccasionally
exploits the ambiguityof his usage.

DIFFERENTIATION
CULTURAL
But even if we charitablyallow Taylorthe accordionmovement,expanding andcontractinghis definitionsof cultureand of language,he owes us an

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

157

account of cultural differentiation.Because he focuses on cultures as the

immediate and proper objects of "the politics of recognition," he needs
cnteria for distinguishingthem that are narrowerthan the demarcationof
naturallanguagesand moreprecise thanthe differentiationof "waysof life."
If cultures differ from other identity-defining groups by virtue of their
solidarityand historicalcontinuity,we need critera for cohesive identityand
continuity.
Therearefew philosopherswho aremore sensitive to the political dimension of apparently neutral philosophic issues than Charles Taylor. It is
thereforeall the more surprsing that in taking Quebecols culturalsurvival
as his prmary example he has made his case easier for himself thanit should
be. As Taylor presents them, the issues over Quebecols recogmtion have
focused almostexclusively on the preservationof a specific languageand on
the policies and institutionsrequiredfor-and legitimatedby-that presercharactenzation
of theconstituents
vation.Withsucha simplifiedandabstracted
of culture,it is nottoo difficultto arguethatliberalismcan,withoutjeopardizing
its prmary commtments, extend certain rights of self-preservationto the
dominantcultureand to subculturesas long as the basic rightsof individual
citizens remain protected.But when cultures are more fully described, as
including economic and political practices and attitudes, the politics of
culturaldefinitionand recognitionbecomes entangledin determiningpublic
policy on a vast rangeof substantiveissues. For instance,how far might the
preservationof Irish-Americanculture commit us to subsidizing the parochial schools of the Catholic population,recognizing that Catholic schools
typicallyattemptto develop specific attitudesto manymorallyandpolitically
charged divisive issues (publicly supportedabortion,euthanasia,etc.)9 In
fundingparochialschools, does the statebecome an activepartyin determining not only their curricularstandards,but also the directionof teaching?Is
it duty boundto assurethatthe hinng practicesof such schools follow general
antidiscriminationpractices?(Considerwhat this would do to the faculty of
Catholic institutions.)
Given the historyof culturaldispersionand influence,differentiatingone
culture from anotheris-in every sense of the term-contested territory.12
(Does Islam forma single culturethatencompassesBosnia, Turkey,Nigeria,
Afghanistan, and Indonesia?) Moreover, because the relatively arbitrary
boundariesof moder nation-statesby no meansdistinguishculturalor even
linguisticgroups,manyculturalgroups-like thatof the Kurds,for exampleare cross-national. For the Kurds, and for Turkey and Iraq, the issue of
cultural recognition threatensthe geopolitical boundariesof nation-states,
whetheror not they are committedto a liberalpolitical structure.13

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POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

DEFININGCULTURAL
IDENTITY
A liberalstateattemptingto preservea culturemust,of course,specify the
identityof thatculture.But culturaldescriptionsarepolitically and ideologically laden. Even an individual'sclaim to recognitionas a person or as a
human being carries a political agendum,implicitly contrastedwith those
markedby other designations:landowner,woman, Inuit,Bosnian, Muslim,
or AfricanAmerican.14The implicit culturalessentialismof a good deal of
politics of
celebratorymulticulturalismdisguises the powerfulIntracultural
of such
As
a
deal
the
of
authoritative
description.15
good
determining right
characterzationis dynarmcallyand dialectically responsive to politically
charged external stereotyping, intraculturalself-definition often changes
with extraculturalperceptions(and vice versa).Changesin the terminology
for characterizingNegroes, colored people, blacks, Afro-Amercans, and
African Americansin the past ten years amply demonstratethe politically
chargeddynamismof claims for the primacyof racialand culturalidentity.
Booker T. Washington,W.E.B.Du Bois, MartinLutherKing, and Malcolm
X each presented us all-the dominant and the subdormnantpopulation
alike-with radicallydifferenttermsfor our mutualrecognition.
Manymulticulturalistsattemptto bypassthe formidableconceptualproblems of definingthe identityof a cultureby focusingon a sharedinheritance.
But how finely differentiatedis that history to be understood? Shared
histores often separatedramatically,therecenthistoryof Afncan Americans
who have been living in the ghettosof the urbanNorthfor threegenerations
is significantlydifferentfromthatof AfricanAmericansliving in the agraran
South. Do Inuit and Hasldic women have the same historyas their fathers
and husbands? Moreover, claims to a history of shared experience are
typicallymost vigorouslyassertedwhen culturalunityis threatened."Weare
all the descendantsof slavery"becomes a centralculturaltheme when the
African Americanelite is chargedwith being co-opted away from serving
the interestsof the disempowered.
The ever-presentquestions "Fromwhose perspective9"and "In whose
interests?"permeatethe politics of thstoricallybased culturalcharacterization.'6Dramaticshifts in recentChinesehlstorographydemonstratethe role
of power politics in selecting and interpretinga presumptivelysharedinheritance.The Boxer Rebellion is seen as progressiveor regressive;yesterday's
heroes become today'svillains andtomorrow'sexemplarsas the ideology of
the rulingelite changes. Even highly theoreticaldebatesaboutthe shape of
history-is it cyclical, as Chinese historianslong claimed, or is it progressively linear,as Maolsts argued?-are manifestlypoliticallychargedissues.
Any form of culturalessentialisminvites intraculturalRealpolitik.17

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

159

Even culturesthatdefine a significantpartof their sharedinheritanceby

a canonc text (as well as by theirclaim to a historyof sharedexperiences)
are frequentlypolitically dividedby theirdifferencesover the interpretations
of those texts. They even disagree about which parts of the text are to be
treated as canonical.18The continuity of Jewish history featured in the
Passover seder becomes most marked when (the many varieties of) the
diaspora threatensthe central role of Judaism in structuringthe lives of
contemporaryJews. Both secular and religious groups are engaged in the
politics of defining the demographyand the shared inhertance of Jewish
identityas it affects the structureof the Israelilegal andpolitical systems. On
the one hand, interpretationsof the Torahand the Talmudare introducedin
argumentsover public policy Who-by virtue of being a Jew-is entitled
to automaticcitizenshipunderthe law of return?On the otherhand,contending positions on public policy offer opposing interpretationsof the canonic
of culturalidentity'as
texts. Even economic factorsaffectthe characterization
many Israeliscomplain,the directionsof Israeli-Jewishidentityare affected
by the exlgencles of self-presentationin theirfund-raisingactivities abroad.
The politics of cultural essentialism is, if not coercive, as least often
oppressive,even when individualrightsarestrictlypreserved.Althoughthey
disagree among themselves about their primarydirections, many Jewish
Americanand AfricanAmericancommunitiespress theirmembersto define
themselves as primarilyJews or blacks ratherthanas philosophers,women,
or Red Sox fans. Such identificationsinvolve a good deal more thandisplaying Israelior Africancraftsat home and at work.They carrythe presumption
of active participationin promotingspecific policies: voting (this ratherthan
that) black interestsin departmentalpolitics and pressing (this ratherthan
that) specific Israeli intereststo their congressmen.To be sure, individuals
can decide to join theirvoices to the clamorover culturaldefinition,or they
can attemptto ignoreit andturnto cultivatingtheirgardens.Both alternatives
carry costly personal consequences in losses of alliances and frendship.
Ironically,attemptsto bypassculturalidentificationoften retainthe negative
imprnt of theirorigins.19

THEPOLITICSOF CULTURAL
DEFINITIONIN A LIBERALSTATE
Legitimatingthe politics of culturalsurvivalhas the advantageof openly
acknowledging the inevitable. It has the further merit of introducingintraculturalinterest groups to work throughtheir differences in the public

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POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

sphere.20The good news is thatas the power strugglesinvolved in defining

culturalidentitybecome more visible we are in a betterposition to evaluate
the ideological issues that lie behind them. The bad news is that those
struggles tend to engage furtherdivisions among existing interests.Longstandingcross-culturalhostilities are likely to become inflamed as various
groupscompete for public funds and public attention,all withinthe bounds
of what passes for mutualrespect.
Having gone beyond toleranceto celebration,many of those who favor
the politics of multlculturalrecognitionare neverthelessstill concerned to
avoid condoning injustices, wherever they occur.21They argue that crossculturalcriticism is appropriate:
justice and integritymay requirea culture
to abandonsome of its practices, however long-standing they may be. But
because such criticism is typically presented in universalistic terms, it
implicitly-and most effectively-appeals to values and principlesthat are
On theotherhand,the mostseanng
presumedto be latentm thetargetculture.22
criticismsareoften internal,directedto whatis seen as the core of the culture;
dissentersbecome suspect, markedas marginalor alien. When criticism is
voiced by the stronglyempowered,it is interpretedas the continuityof the
Closely examined,the distinction
interpretationof fundamentalprinciples.23
becomes blurred.
criticism
and
cross-cultural
between lntracultural
without
to
How is criticism proceed
degeneratinginto the kindsof power
are
settled
that
by charsma, influence peddling, or rhetorical
struggles
brilliance9Taylorrmghthope that in a liberal state the politics of cultural
definition could, in principle, follow the proceduralrules for deliberation
about public policy, conformingto a model of conflict resolutionrecently
Richardsonsuggests that moralconflicts
proposed by Henry Richardson.24
can be resolved by using the method of reflective equilibriumto specify
interpretationsof indeterminategeneral moral norms (values, ends, and
principles). Conflicts about characterizinga culture might be resolved by
deliberatinghow best to specify andsometimesmodifysharedhighly general
norms.Richardsonproposesto carryRawls's "wide reflective equilibrium"
to the level of concrete cases, avoiding arbitrarydecisions by a coherence
standardfor rationality.25
Although Richardson'sstrategiesfor resolving moralconflicts could, in
principle, sometimes successfully arbitratecontested characterizationsof
culturalidentity,their utility is severely limited. Culturesare not identified
by a set of beliefs or principles:they cannotbe characterizedby an overlapping credal consensus.26(Imagine trying to characterizethe cultureof the
Pieds Nolrs of Parisby articulatingtheirconsensuson generalnorms,not to
mentionthe cultureof Israelby articulatingIsraeli consensus on anything.)
Profounddisagreementsabout culturalidentity reappearin the attemptto

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

161

formulatepresumptivelysharednorms, even when they are acknowledged

to remainpartiallyindetermnate.Even communitieswhose membersagree
on centralproceduralpnnclples can only use those pnnclples as constraints:
they are unlikely to provide a basis for specifying other substantiveends or
values. Moreover,culturalcohesion andcontinuityaresometimesbestserved
by allowing ends and normsto remainvague andambiguousso thatcontending groups can interpretthem in their own ways without pressing for a
consensus on their specification.
Amy GutmannandDennis Thompsonhave recentlyproposedan analysis
of conditions that would justify introducingserious moral disagreementsin
discussions of public policy. They argue that a liberal state "must permit
greatermoraldisagreementaboutpolicy andgreatermoralagreementon how
and mutual
to disagree about policy.
Pnnclples of accommodation
govern the conductof moraldisagreementon issues that should
respect
reach the public agenda."27
Taylormight hope thatthe Gutmann-Thompson
conditions could be used to govern disagreementsabout contested cultural
definition.Aside fromthe problemof reducingor translatingculturalidentity
into a set of beliefs and principles, there is sure to be disagreementabout
whether culturaldefinrtionshould be broughtinto the public sphere at all:
isn't it the proper domain of intraculturaldebate, even when prudence
suggests sensitivity to externalperceptions?Further,when the membersof a
culturedisagree abouthow to specify its moralnorms,they are also likely to
disagree about second-orderprinclplesof accommodationand about what
constitutesmutualrespect.For instance,immigrantgroupsfrequentlysuffer
from sharpintergenerationaldisagreementsabout the conditions for proper
mutualrespect. What-and who-defines the limits of the authorityof the
elders of the community?When they disagree, as often they do, about the
norms that should define their culturalidentity,they typically also disagree
aboutthe second-orderpnnclples of accommodationand respectthatshould
govern their discussion.

THEPOLITICSOF MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION
One of great merits of Taylor's discussion is his focus on educational
institutionsand practicesas the primaryterrainof multiculturalrecognition.
Here as before, Taylor's position on the politics of multiculturaleducation
bearthe marksof its Hegelianorgins.28The politics of mutualrecognitionthe role of "the look of the other" in forming the kind of self-respecting
self-consciousness that he thinks is a preconditionfor civic agency-is the

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POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

liberal grandchild of Hegel's analysis of the master-slave relation. But

however liberating self-consciousness and self-respect may be, they are
neithernecessarynor sufficientfor genuine,enlightenedcivic participation.
Although they sometimesprovidean importantenablingcontribution,selfregardingattitudesareonly as good as the competence-the knowledgeand
skills essential to empowerment-on which they depend.
Consideringhow ignorantwe are of Asian and African history,of the
literatureand the geopolitics of Latin Amernca-how unable we are to
commumcate in Spanish, Chinese, or German-no one could reasonably
object to a policy mandatinglanguagerequirementsand culturalstudies in
the curriculaof public schools. But the best argumentfor extending our
linguistic repertoireand expandingthe curriculumis not that those studies
will conduce to culturalor individual self-respect. A liberal state should
promote serious cross-culturalstudies in the public schools because ignorance is politically dangerousand being monolingualis only one step away
from being mute. Culturalhistory sometimes enhances respect and selfrespect,andsometimesit does not;self-respectsometimesenhancesmorally
sensitive political activity,and sometimesit does not. The historyof Western
Europeis, as we are often rightlyreminded,unlikely to promotethe respect
or self-respectof Americansof Europeandescent: it would be surprisingif
African,Asian, and LatinAmericanhistorywere radicallydifferent.
None of the complexitiesof Taylor'sanalysisof culturalrecognition-and
none of the reservationswe might have about it-argue againstthe general
directionof his position as it affectseducationalpolicy. The questionis, how
should we expand the curriculum?Although the kind of appreciativesampling of multiculturalfolklore, sacred texts, and majorliteraryworks now
favored in most kindergartensand many universities hardly qualifies as
genuineculturalstudy,it providesa beginningthatcould be used to promote
genuine geopolitical and culturalexploration.Because folklore and sacred
texts typicallyencode referencesto highly divisive sociopoliticalcontroversies, a seriousattemptto understandthemleads directlyto anthropologyand
to political history.
I would like to close by touching on thatdrearilyfashionable topic, the
extension of the canon: the modernversion of Swift's battle of the books.
Both the critics and the defendersof the existing core canon of educational
classics are guilty of an odd formof idolatry'they treatbooks as if they were
powerful icons, to be eitherreveredor defaced.29Defendersarguethatthose
works representourbestandmostestimableachievements:the hopeof civility
them.Criticswanteitherto widenthe
restsin ourpreservingandappropriating
icons of the Westernclassics are
that
the
to
show
or
saints
of
representation
worm-eaten.

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

163

Thebattleof booksextendsto thewayswe recogmze"otherness."

Interpretive
reading-of events, architecture,and persons as well as books-does not
consist of ever more finely discriminating appreciation; it does not involve treating books and events as engraved texts and intertexts.30When
we are lost in the admiration-or the exposure-of a perfectlypolished text,
reading does not enlarge and empower us. Adding LuXun, Borges, and
Achebe to the pantheon of heroic literaryachievement does not by itself
promote either the sense or the skills of civic participationthat public
education should develop. Chinese Americanand Chicano Americanchildren will not become self-respecting active citizens by beconmngpassive
consumersof theirculturalachievements.They must,rather,become actively
engagedin the work-the uncertaintiesand struggles-of interpretingwriting
as a form of action. Even scientific works like Galileo's TwoNew Sciences
or philosophical works like Descartes'sMeditations-let alone The Federalist Papers, LuXun's stories, or Borges's fantasticconstructions-are best
understoodas attemptsto integratenovel (as yet barelyunderstood)intuitions
with inherited (barely recognized) assumptions.Learningto read well is a
sound preparationfor participationin the melee of political and cultural
activity,notprimarilybecauseit informsor inspiresbutbecausethe searching
activities of interpretivereadingare, at their best, also exercised in political
life. Reading does not separatea stage of appreciativeempathicimmersion
followed by a stage of externalized objective judgment: it merges tact,
resourcefulimprovisation,andcriticismin the detective workof deciphering
unstated questions and preoccupations.It locates uncertaintiesand unresolved tensions, tracing strategies of inventive reconciliation among the
varied directions of authorial(agent) purposes;it understandswhere-and
why-negotiated resolutionsfail; it projectsthe inheritanceof problemsthat
authorspose for theirsuccessors.As his own political activity and historical
studies attest, Taylor,unlike many other proponentsof celebratorymulticulturalism,clearly knows that respectfulrecognition involves reconstructive and politically chargedcritical interpretation.31
But unlike many politiliberal
active
of
multiculturalism
defense
remains
cally
pluralists,Taylor's
rooted in the premisesof Hegelian idealism.

NOTES
1. Charles Taylor, Multiculturalismand the "Politics of Recognition" (Pnnceton, NJ:
Prnceton University Press, 1992) is a closely related sequel to his The Ethics of Authenticity
(Cambridge,MA. HarvardUniversityPress, 1992).

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POLITICALTHEORY/ February1994

2. Cf. WilliamGalston,LiberalPurposes:Goods, Virtuesand Diversityin the LiberalState

(Cambrdge:CambridgeUmversityPress, 1991).
3. Hegel (CambridgeUmnversity
Press, 1975); PhilosophicalPapers, vols. 1 and 2 (CambridgeUmversityPress, 1985 and 1986).
4. Ethicsof Authenticity(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1992).
5. See S. Wolf, "Comments,"in Taylor,Multiculturalism,esp. 76-78; A. Rorty,"Varieties
of Pluralismin a PolyphonicSociety,"Reviewof Metaphysics,1990;andA. RortyandD. Wong,
"Aspectsof Identityand Agency,"in 0. Flanaganand A. Rorty,eds., Identity,Characterand
Morality(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1990).
6. See Ralf Dahrendorf,Class and Class Conflict in Industral Society (Stanford,CA.
StanfordUmversityPress, 1959); The Logic of Social Hierarchies,edited by EdwardLauman,
PaulSiegel, andRobertHodge(Chlcago:Markham,1970);andHansGerthandC. Wrght Mills,
Characterand Social Structure:The Psychology of Social Institutions(New York:Harcourt
Brace & World, 1953).
7. See, e.g., CliffordGeertz, The Interpretationof Cultures(New York, 1973) and Local
Knowledge(New York, 1983) for analyses of cultureas pervadingall forms of political and
socioculturalorgamzation.
8. Fora fascinatingtransitionfromanessentialistanalysisto a dynarmcaccountof symbolic
oppositions, see James Peacock, Rites of Modernization:Symbolic and Social Aspects of
IndonesianProletarianDrama(Universityof Chicago Press, 1987). But the argumentcan also
go in the other direction:CliffordGeertz's early work, AgriculturalInvolution(Universityof
Chicago Press, 1963) and Peddlers and Princes (University of Chicago Press, 1963), begins
with the dynamicinteractionbetweensocial distinctionsandeconomic change,whereashis later
work is largelyfocused on the significanceof culturalstyle and categories.
9. See Amy Gutmann,in Taylor, Multiculturalism,3-24, and her "The Challenge of
Multiculturalismin Political Ethics,"Philosophyand Public Affairs,Fall 1993.
10. See RichardHandler,Nationalismand the Politics of Culturein Quebec (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). Many separatists,believing that the dominantAnglophomccommunityhas structuredtheeconomyto its own advantage,basetheirargumentslargely
on economic grounds.
11. See Taylor,"LanguageandHumanNature"and"Theoriesof Meaning"in HumanAgency
and Language, vol. 1 (Cambridge:CambridgeUmversity Press, 1985). But even linguistic
preservationcan readily become a contested ideological issue: would Canadianschools teach
standardParisianFrenchor the markedlydifferentworking-classQuebecois?
12. See FredrikBarth,ed., Ethnic Groupsand Boundaries(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969);
James Clifford, "Sites of Crossing:Bordersand Diasporasin Late 20th-CenturyExpressive
Culture,"CulturalCurrents,January1993; and William Roseberry,"Multiculturalismand the
Challengeof Anthropology,"Social Research59 (1992).
13. See EricHobsbawn,Nationsand Nationalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1992); and Eric Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism(Oxford:Blackwell, 1983).
14. See "Personsand Personae,"in Amelie Rorty,Mind in Action (Boston: Beacon, 1988),
esp. 30-41.
15. See the essays by RobertLeVine,Roy D'Andrade,CliffordGeertz,andHowardGardner
in CultureTheory,edited by RichardSchweder and RobertLeVine (Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1984); the essays by JamesCliffordand GeorgeMarcusin JamesCliffordand
GeorgeMarcus,WritingCulture:ThePoetics and Politics of Ethnography(Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress,1986);andJeanJackson,"IsThereaWayto TalkaboutMakingCulturewithout
Making Enemies?"Dialectical Anthropology14 (1989): 12744; and Jean Jackson,"Culture,

Rorty/ HIDDEN POLITICS

165

Genuine and Spurious: The Politics of Indianness in the Vaup6s, Colombia" (American
Ethnology, forthcoming).
16. Inuit women are, for example, far less enthusiasticabout recovering/preservig their
traditionalcustoms thanare the men of the tribe.See also Michael M.J. Fischer,"Ethnicityand
the Post-Moder Arts of Memory,"in James Clifford and George Marcus, WritingCulture,
194-233; Richard Handler, "On Dialogue and Destructive Analysis: Problems in Narrating
Nationalism an Ethnicity,"Journal of AnthropologicalResearch 41 (1985): 171-82; Erc
Hobsbawn, "InventingTraditions,"in E. Hobsbawmand T. Rangner,eds., The Inventionof
Tradition(Cambridge:CambridgeUnverslty Press, 1983), 1-14; and JoanneRappaport,The
Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretationin the ColombianAndes (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990).
17. I am gratefulto Michel Oksenbergfor many illurmnatingdiscussions and for guiding
my readingon these topics. See Paul Cohen, "TheContestedPast:The Boxers as Historyand
Myth,"JournalofAsian Studies, 1992:82-113;AlbertFeuerwerker,Historyin CommunistChina
(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1968); and Andrew March,The Idea of China: Myth and Theoryin
GeographicalThought(New York:Praeger,1974).
18. For a fascinatingdiscussion of textuallydefined culturalidentity,see Moshe Halbertal
and Avishal Margalit,Idolatry(Cambridge,MA. HarvardUniversityPress, 1992), and Moshe
Halbertal'sessay on defining the canon (manuscript).
19. See Fischer,"Ethnicityand the Post-ModemArts of Memory."
20. The psychoanalytic expression "working through"-which involves the continuous
process of resolving of identity-definingconflicts-provides a helpful model for the politics of
culturalidentity.Among other things, "workingthrough"acknowledges internaltensions that
are often denied by essentializingself-characterizations.
21. See LawrenceBlum, "Liberalismand Multiculturalism,"
TheBostonReview,September/
Racial Justiceand Community,"in L. Foster
October, 1992: 30-31, and his "Multiculturalism,
and P. Herzog, eds., Pluralism and Multiculturalism:Conflictsand Controversies(University
of MassachusettsPress,forthcoming);andSusanWolf,"Comment,"in Taylor,Multiculturalism,
75-86. Remnantsof essentialism linger in these arguments.While recognizing that our own
perspectives may be parochial or ideologically slanted-the argument runs-"we" should
evaluate at least some of the practicesof the culturesthatwe affirmandvalidateas though"we"
and "theirculture"were fixed points.
22. See MichaelWalzer,"MinimalMoralism,"in WilliamShea andAntonioSpadafora,eds.,
From the Twilightof Probability(Canton,MA. Science HistoryPublications,1992), Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1987), and The
Companyof Critics:Social Criticismand Political Commitmentin the 20th Century(New York:
Basic Books, 1988).
23. Cf. Michael Walzer, Interpretationand Social Criticism (Cambridge,MA. Harvard
University Press, 1987).
24. See Henry Richardson, "Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical
Problems,"Philosophyand PublicAffairs, 1990,esp. 290 if. Usinga somewhatdifferentterminolandPracticalReason"(manuscript).
ogy, Taylorseems to move in thatdirectionin his "Explanation
25. Richardson,"SpecifyingNorms,"302.
26. For an excellent critiqueof the use of the conceptof "belief' in anthropologicalanalysis,
see Byron Good, Medicine, Rationality and Experience (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1993), chap. 1.
27. Amy GutmannandDenms Thompson,"MoralConflictandPoliticalConsensus,"Ethics,
1991: 64-65.

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28. CharlesTaylor,The Ethicsof Authenticity(Cambridge,MA. HarvardUniversityPress,

1992). For a trenchantassessmentof Taylor'srecent work, see ArthurDanto's review in The
TimesLiterarySupplement,January1993.
29. Swift's "TheBattleof the Books betweenthe Ancientsandthe Moders" providesa nice
analogueof currentcontroversiesaboutthe multiculturalexpansionof the canon.See also David
Bromwich,Politics by OtherMeans: HigherEducationand GroupThinking(New Haven,CT:
Yale University Press, 1992) and thoughtful,provocativereviews of that book by Alan Ryan,
TheNew YorkReviewof Books,February1993,andJeremyWaldron,TimesLiterarySupplement,
January1993.
30. See JohnSearle, TheNew YorkReviewof Books, December6, 1990.
31. See Taylor,TheSourcesof the Self(Cambrdge, MA. HarvardUniversityPress, 1989).

Amelie OksenbergRortyteachesphilosophyat the HarvardGraduateSchool of Education andat Mt.HolyokeCollege. She is authorofMindin Action (Boston:Beacon, 1988)
and numerousarticles on the historyof ethics and moralpsychology.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Poznan Studies in the Philosophyof the Sciences and the Humanities,a book series
published by Ropodi Press, Amsterdamand partly sponsoredby Adam Micklewlcz
University,Poznan,Poland,invitedarticlesfor considerationin its forthcormngvolume
on "TheNatureof PoliticalDialogue."Articlescan addressa wide rangeof topics under
this generalheading.Analyses of conceptssuch as compromise,consensus,andcooperof notionslike dialogicaltheoryor the dialogicalself. Applications
ation. Interpretations
such as gender, religious, and racial conflict. Examinationsof concrete historcal
problems and the obstacles and/or possibilities for political dialogue in these cases.
Comparisonsof the meaningof and prospectsfor political dialogue in establishedand
new democracies. Manuscriptsshould be submittedin duplicate, typed, and double
spaced on one side of the page. The author'sname and affiliationshould appearon a
separate sheet at the end of the manuscriptafter the endnotes. Send manuscriptsto
StephenL. Esquith,Departmentof Philosophy,503 SouthKedzie Hall, MichiganState
University,East Lansing,MI 48824.
Deadline for submissionis December 1, 1994.