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The power industry across the globe is experiencing a radical change in its business as
well as in an operational model where, the vertically integrated utilities are being
unbundled and opened up for competition with private players. This enables an end to
the era of monopoly. Right from its inception, running the power system was supposed
to be a task of esoteric quality. The electric power was then looked upon as a service.
Control consisting of planning and operational tasks was administered by a single entity
or utility. The vertical integration of all tasks gave rise to the term vertically integrated
utility. The arrangement of the earlier setup of the power sector was characterized by
operation of a single utility generating, transmitting and distributing electrical energy
in its area of operation. Thus, these utilities enjoyed monopoly in their area of
operation. They were often termed as monopoly utilities.
Why were earlier utilities the monopolies'? The reason for monopoly can be traced
right back to the early days when electricity was comparatively a new technology. The
skeptical attitude of the government towards electricity led to investment by private
players into the power sector, who in turn, demanded for the monopoly in their area
of operation. This created a win-win situation for both- government and the electrical
technology promoters. However, the government would not let the private players
enjoy the monopoly and exploit the end consumer and hence introduced regulation in
the business. Thus, the power industries of initial era became regulated monopoly
utilities . The structure of a conventional vertically integrated utility is shown in Figure
1.1. As evident from the figure, there was only a single utility with whom the customer
dealt with. Thus, only two entities existed in the power business: a monopolist utility
and the customer.
Fig 1.1
What does regulation mean? The regulations are generally imposed by the
government or the government authority. These essentially represent a set of rules or
framework that the government has imposed so as to run the system smoothly and
with discipline, without undue advantage to any particular entity at the cost of end
consumer. All practical power systems of earlier days used to be regulated by the
government. This was obviously so. The old era power industries were vertically
integrated utilities and enjoyed monopoly in their area of operation. Whenever a
monopoly is sensed in any sector, it is natural for the government to step in and set up
a framework of way of doing business, in order to protect end consumer interests.
Some of the characteristics of monopoly utility are:
1. Single utility in one area of operation enjoying monopoly.
2. Regulated Framework: The utility should work under the business framework
setup by the government.
3. Universal Supply Obligation (USO): Utility should provide power to all those
customers who demand for it.
4. Regulated Costs: The return on the utility's investments is regulated by the
government.
In a nutshell, regulation is about checking the prices of the monopolist in the absence
of private players and market forces.
The deregulation of the industry has provided electrical energy with a new dimension
where it is being considered as a commodity. The commodity status given to electrical
power has attracted entry of private players in the sector. The private players make the
whole business challenging from the system operators point of view, as it now starts
dealing with many players which are not under its direct control. This calls for
introduction of fair and transparent set of rules for running the power business. The
market design structure plays an important role in successful deregulation of power
industry
4.
5.
6.
7.
customers. In many other cases, however, the Discom does not sell the power.
It only owns and operates the local distribution system, and obtains its revenue
by wheeling electric power through its network.
Resco (Retail Energy Service Company): It is the retailer of electric power. Many
of these will be the retail departments of the former vertically integrated
utilities. A Resco buys power from Gencos and sells it directly to the consumers.
Resco does not own any electricity network physical assets.
Market Operator: Market operator provides a platform for the buyers and
sellers to sell and buy the electricity. It runs a computer program that matches
bids and offers of sellers and buyers. The market settlement process is the
responsibility of the market operator. The market operator typically runs a dayahead market. The near-real-time market, if any, is administered by the system
operator.
System Operator (SO): The SO is an entity entrusted with the responsibility of
ensuring the reliability and security of the entire system. It is an independent
authority and does not participate in the electricity market trades. It usually
does not own generating resources, except for some reserve capacity in certain
cases. In order to maintain the system security and reliability, the SO procures
various services such as supply of emergency reserves, or reactive power from
other entities in the system. In some countries, SO also owns the transmission
network. The SO in these systems is generally called as Transmission System
Operator (TSO). In the case of a SO being completely neutral of every other
activity except coordinate, control and monitor the system, it is generally called
as Independent System Operator (ISO).
Customers: A customer is an entity, consuming electricity. In a completely
deregulated market where retail sector is also open for competition, the end
customer has several options for buying electricity. It may choose to buy
electricity from the spot market by bidding for purchase, or may buy directly
from a Genco or even from the local retailing service company. On the other
hand, in the markets where competition exists only at the wholesale level, only
the large customers have privilege of choosing their supplier.
Tackling network congestion is one of the challenging issues of the de-regulated era.
Transmission network provides the path through which transactions are made in a
power market. But each transmission network has its own physical and operating limits
like line flow limits, bus voltage magnitude limits and more. The power injection and
withdrawal configuration should be such that no limit gets violated. If the network is
operated beyond these limits, it may, even, result in the entire system blackout.
Therefore, any arbitrary set of transactions cant be organized on the power network.
This has given rise to a new problem under the restructured power system
environment, referred to as congestion management. There are many ways in which
congestion is formally defined but to explain in simple words, when some components
in a power network appear to be overloaded due to a trading arrangement, that
particular arrangement is said to create congestion on the network. The purpose of
congestion management is to make necessary corrections in order to relieve
congestion. It can be easily appreciated that under the vertically integrated structure,
network congestion, in fact, is not a challenging task. This is because all the resources
in the system are under the direct control of the monopolist. Thus, this is the sole
responsibility of the monopolist to maintain its transmission network.
Provision of ancillary services is another tough task carried out by the system operator
under the deregulated framework. Ancillary services are defined as all those activities
on the interconnected grid that are necessary to support the transmission of power
while maintaining reliable operation and ensuring the required degree of quality and
safety. Under the deregulated power system environment, the system operator
acquires a central coordination role and carries out the important responsibility of
providing for system reliability and security. It manages system operations like
scheduling and operating the transmission related services. The SO also has to ensure
a required degree of quality and safety and provide corrective measures under
contingent conditions. In this respect, certain services, such as scheduling and dispatch,
frequency regulation, voltage control, generation reserves, etc. are required by the
power system, apart from basic energy and power delivery services. Such services are
commonly referred to as ancillary services. In deregulated power systems, transmission
networks are available for third party access to allow power wheeling. In such an
environment, the ancillary services are no longer treated as an integral part of the
electric supply. They are unbundled and priced separately and system operators may
have to purchase ancillary services from ancillary service providers.
Then, there are certain issues like market design and market power which need
regulatory intervention. Issues pertaining to market design revolve around choice made
in the selection of dispatch philosophies, choice of various pricing schemes, choice
between number of markets with multiple gate closures, etc., from various alternatives.
The market architecture, which maps various markets on timeline, is also an important
sub-topic of market design process.
Existence of market power shows the signs of deviation from the prefect competition.
In general, market power is referred to as ability of market participants to profitably
maintain the market price above or below the competitive level for a significant period
of time. To tackle the situation, an indirect regulatory intervention in the form of
market design rules is needed. Thus, as mentioned earlier, deregulation does not mean
ceasing to have rules. It is the restructuring of the power business framework. More
rigorous treatment to these issues is given in further chapters.
Reasons and objectives of deregulation of various power systems across the world
Restructuring or deregulation is a broad term and can have different meanings in
different countries. This is because the changes essential for betterment of power
sector depend on the prevailing conditions in the power sector of respective countries.
Further, the word betterment can be looked upon subjectively. For example, well
developed, industrialized countries can expect price to go down and these countries
can treat the change in the prices as betterment. On the other hand, the developing
countries need to make radical changes in the policy and regulation such that barrier
to entry for private players is removed. The effective betterment can be looked upon
from this perspective for developing countries.
In this section we will see, in brief, the issues that led to restructuring of the power
industry for following regions / countries: US , UK , Nordic Pool and developing
countries.
The US
The US electric utilities, from the very beginning were privately owned and worked in a
vertically integrated fashion. The developed countries like US had well functioning and
efficient electricity systems. However for some systems, so long as consumers were
concerned, they were not satisfied with the rising costs of electricity. For some other
systems, utility management found that running the system was not viable due to low
tariff. In some systems, pressure from smaller players to open up the business for
competition played a major role. By and large, deregulation took place in developed
countries by pressure to reduce costs while simultaneously increasing competitiveness
in the market.
Existence of market power shows the signs of deviation from the prefect competition.
In general, market power is referred to as ability of market participants to profitably
maintain the market price above or below the competitive level for a significant period
of time. To tackle the situation, an the indirect regulatory intervention in the form of
market design rules is needed. Thus, as mentioned earlier, deregulation does not mean
ceasing to have rules. It is the restructuring of the power business framework. More
rigorous treatment to these issues is given in further chapters.
The UK
The transformation of the British power sector proceeded along three paths in 1990.
First, the traditional industry was unbundled both vertically and horizontally. Highvoltage transmission assets were transferred to a new National Grid Company (NGC).
Coal and oil fired units were divided among two companies National Power and
PowerGen. Nuclear Electric retained control of all nuclear units. At the outset, National
Power had 52 percent of total generating capacity, PowerGen had 33 percent, and
Nuclear Power had the remaining 15 percent. The second set of changes involved
ownership. Both National Power and PowerGen became private companies in 1991,
whereas the difficulties associated with nuclear power resulted in continued
government ownership of all nuclear units. Approximately 30 percent of shares in
National Power and PowerGen were sold to the public,an equal amount to foreign and
institutional investors. The remaining 40 percent was held by the government until
1995. The third set of changes sought to open the system to competition, wherever
possible, while continuing necessary regulations. Vertical and horizontal restructuring
of power generation was based on the assumption that generation had become
workably competitive and would become increasingly so with new market entrants.
A report on reform process was floated by the regulator in 2001 which stated that
wholesale electricity prices had not fallen in line with reductions in generators input
costs and that a lack of supply side pressure and demand side participation; and
inflexible governance arrangements had prevented reform of the arrangements.
The Nordic Pool
The reforms in Nordic countries were inspired by the electricity market reforms in
England and Wales in 1989, as well as by widely held beliefs that increased competition
would raise power industry efficiency to the benefit of consumers. Norway was first
amongst the Nordic countries to liberalize its electricity market in 1991, but without
privatization. The Norwegian electricity sector remains almost entirely in public hands.
Rather than implement national reforms, the other Nordic countries chose to reform
by merging with the existing Norwegian market, Sweden joining the expanded Nordic
pool in 1996, Finland in 1998 and Denmark in 1999.
The Developing Countries
The case of developing countries is different from that of other countries. In these
countries, the electricity supply is treated as a social service rather than a market
commodity. The ownership of the power sector in these countries is directly under the
governments of respective countries. These state owned-controlled systems have led
to the promotion of inefficient practices over a period. The power sectors of these
countries are marked by supply shortages. There has been an inability to add to the
generating capacity. The subsidies and high transmission and distribution losses are the
major concerns before these systems. Another consequence of state control over
electric utilities was the high level of overstaffing.
The inability to raise funds for capacity addition invited financial support from
international financial institutions like World Bank. These institutions mandated
opening of the power sector for private companies which were contracted under build,
own, operate and transfer (BOOT) scheme.
The classification of market models based on contractual agreements discussed in the previous
section can be applied to most of the commodities that are traded in the market, if we assume a
certain level of abstraction by presenting only the buyers and sellers. However, when it comes to
electricity' as a commodity, the same laws of economics or commercial trade arrangements may
not hold good. This is because, electricity as a commodity bears different characteristics from
other commodities, or rather, electricity is physically different from other commodities. This fact
complicates the procedure of electricity trading. In other words, the trade is not as simple as an
interaction between two entities: buyer and seller. The interdependencies of actions taken by
various participants (primarily generators and loads), mandate somebody to takeover the control
of real time activities. This somebody is the system operator, who makes sure that the whole
system runs reliably and thus kept in synchronism. Thus, it is worthwhile to understand the
distinguishing features of electricity as a commodity, which are presented next.
Distinguishing Features of Electricity as a Commodity
There are three basic distinguishing features of electricity. These are associated with electricity
due to its physical nature. These three basic features effectively lead to one distinguishing feature
of this commodity, the one that has commercial implications. Let us see these in details
Real Time Demand Supply Balance
Electricity can not be stored in bulk. Other commodities can be manufactured and kept in a
warehouse until the demand for the same is sensed. A manufacturer of other commodities gets
sufficient flexibility in planning the manufacturing activity and coordinating the dispatch. The
same is not true for electricity. The demand for electricity needs to be satisfied on real time basis.
The parties involved in electricity trade perhaps would like to do it through forward contracts .
These can be contracts for physical delivery or financial in nature. In many power markets, bulk
trade of electricity (> 80%) is done through forward contracts. Forward contracts can be done
years ahead. When a certain amount of electricity is bought in the forward contract, it is the
estimate of the buyer, how much it is likely to consume during actual delivery time. However, in
real time, the actual consumption may not match the predicted consumption that had been
forecasted at the time of doing forward trade. This difference is called as imbalance. Knowledge
about this imbalance is exposed only during real time operation or slightly before that. In this
case, the system operator or some other market mechanism stands ready to make up the
imbalances (either on positive or negative side).
Due to storage limitation, the supply-demand matching decision needs to be done on a
competitive basis by letting supply and demand interact with each other. The operator buys and
sells these imbalances through some commercial mechanism. Due to this feature of electricity,
an issue related to the speed of operation pitches in. The system operator, while making a
provision for imbalances, has to take into consideration various network interdependencies. The
system operator always has to communicate with the active participants to tell them which
generators should increase their output and which ones should decrease it. This activity is called
scheduling in advance and dispatch in real time. Since the system operator has to work with
seconds to spare, a delivery system to make up for imbalances has to be in place. In real time,
the only time available with system operator is what is allowed by the energy stored in rotating
masses of huge interconnected grid.
Thus, this exceptional feature of electricity leads to two issues related to power market design:
Imbalances and Scheduling and Dispatch. The question is how these difficult tasks get reflected
in the rules of marketplaces.
Power Flows Obey Laws of Physics
The electric power can not be told as to where and how it should travel, once the injection and
take-off points are decided. The electric power flow over transmission lines obey laws of physics.
Effectively, electric power can not be stopped from flowing on a transmission line that is already
hitting its power carrying capacity. The system operator has to ensure that none of the lines get
overloaded. To do this, only freedom left with it is the selection of pattern of nodal injections
(either generation or load).
Thus, any arbitrary set of forward contracts can not be scheduled by the system operator as this
may lead to exceeding of limits of physical parameters of some of the power system elements.
Allowing only the practically feasible set of transactions during scheduling and further making
corrections while dispatching so as to keep line loadings within limits is usually termed as
congestion management.
The concept of network congestion is shown by a simple lossless system in Figure 3.6. In this,
generator A is a cheaper generator than generator B and hence, it gets a contract of satisfying
the demand of load at bus 3 by generating 18 MW. The dispatch would be as shown in Figure
3.6(A). The power flow over all lines would be dictated by the reactance of parallel paths. In this
case, let us assume that reactance of all three lines are same. Thus, two parallel paths are
provided so as to transfer power of generator A to load at bus 3, with ratio of reactance 2:1.
Obviously, the power will flow in opposite ratio on these paths. The flows are shown in Figure
3.6(A). However, if the physical properties of the line connecting nodes 1 and 2 state that it can
carry only 3 MW, then the dispatch shown in Figure 3.6(A) left hand side is not practically feasible.
To correct it, generator B is asked to generate 4.5 MW and generator A is asked to step down by
4.5 MW, leading to dispatch shown in Figure 3.6(B). This rearrangement of nodal injections is one
of the means of congestion management, which is peculiar to electricity. We will discuss more
about this in a separate module on congestion management.
This complicates the matter because the single generator can be simultaneously needed to
produce multiple outputs, or to produce ancillary service rather than energy. This complication
is shown in Figure 3.7, where, a generator's capacity is divided into various products. The defining
question is how much of capacity should be allocated to each product? In centralized markets
(explained later), the system operator does a joint optimization, taking into account various
technical and commercial parameters of a generator to allocate it's full capacity to each of the
products. module 6 is devoted to ancillary service management where these issues will be
discussed more elaborately.
generation capability in a single market that makes provision for energy as well as reserves, or
should there be different markets for the same? Some subtle questions like these provide food
for thought when designing criteria of markets are to be determined.
Hunt in [1] has described the design issues arising out of characteristics of electricity as pillars of
market design. These are:
Imbalance
Scheduling and Dispatch
Congestion Management
Ancillary Services
Figure 3.8 shows four pillars of market design arising due to the basic characteristics of electricity.
The design of market revolves around the four pillars described above. It also depends on how
and where these issues are accommodated in the whole process of market mechanism. Some of
the pillars lead to creation of separate markets. Eventually, this gives rise to the issue of market
architecture, which is nothing but arrangement and classification of these markets. Finally, these
markets can be integrated into one efficient market or there can be cascaded markets. The
architectural aspects of market design are discussed next.
Monopoly model
Single buyer mode
Wholesale competition model
Retail competition model
Every model needs different amount of structural change and rearrangements of functions in
the industry. These models are discussed next.
Monopoly Model
In this model, a single entity takes care of all the businesses such as generation, transmission
and distribution of electric power to the end users. One of the versions of this model is shown
in Figure 3.1(A). In this, a single utility integrates the generation, transmission and distribution
of electricity. Usually (but not necessarily), in this kind of model, the monopoly lies with the
Government. It is quite natural that this kind of model should have strict regulation in order to
protect end consumers against monopoly. Most of the electric power systems followed this
model prior to deregulation.
Another version of the monopoly model is shown in Figure 3.1(B). In this model, generation and
transmission are integrated and operated by a single utility and it sells the energy to local
distribution companies, which themselves represent local monopolies.
In this model, as shown in Figure 3.2, there is competition in the wholesale sector, i.e.,
generation. Here, the single buyer agency buys power from Independent Power Producers
(IPPs) in addition to its own generation. The power purchasing agency in turn sells it to state
distribution utilities or distribution companies in the service area. All power generated by
generating companies (Gencos) must be sold only to a purchasing agency and not to any other
agency. Distribution companies (Discoms) are only able to purchase from the single buyer
agency. They do not have a choice of choosing their power supplier.
In this model, sales from power pool to retailers take place at a pre-set tariff price. The single
buyer or the existing utility makes a long term contract with IPPs. A contract is necessary
because, without it, a generator would be reluctant to invest large amounts of capital in a
generating plant. The contracts are generally of life-of-plant type, indicating sale of all capacity
of generating units for its lifetime.
Figure 3.3 shows another version of this model, which has further evolved from the original
single buyer model. In this model, the single buyer does not own any generation and buys all
the power from IPPs. The distribution and retail activities are also disaggregated. This model
has an advantage of introducing some competition between generators without the expense of
setting up a competitive market. The tariff set by the purchasing agency must be regulated
because it has monopoly over the Discos while monopsony over the IPPs. The single buyer
model is looked upon as a way of attracting private participation in the generation sector,
especially in the developing countries.
In this model, transmission and distribution network can be owned and operated by State and
Regional transmission utilities. Inter-state tie line should be sufficient to maintain a loose
regional power pool. Merits and demerits of this model are as follows:
Merits:
Demerits:
The end consumer still doesn't have a choice. It buys power from the affiliated Discom.
Rates for end consumers are regulated rather than competitive.
Discoms face competition at wholesale level, while their returns are regulated.
Structural and institutional changes required at wholesale level.
In this model, as shown in Figure 3.5, all customers have access to competing generators either
directly or through their choice of retailer. This would have complete separation of both
generation and retailing from the transport business at both transmission and distribution
levels. Both, transmission and distribution wires provide open access in this model. There
would also be free entry for retailers. In this model, retailing is a function that does not require
the ownership of distribution wires, although, the owner of distribution wires can also compete
as a retailer.
This model is a multi-buyer, multi-seller model and the power pool in this model acts like an
auctioneer. It behaves like a single transporter, moving power to facilitate bilateral trading and
this is achieved through an integrated network of wires. In this pooling arrangement, there is a
provision for bidding into a spot market to facilitate merit order dispatch. The pool matches the
supply and demand and determines the spot price for each hour of the day. It collects money
from purchasers and distributes it to producers.
The advantage of this model over monopoly utilities is that competition is introduced in both
wholesale and retail areas of the system. This model is supposed to be a truly deregulated
power market model. The retail price is no longer regulated because small consumers can
change their retailer for better price options. This model is economically efficient as the price is
set by interaction of demand and supply. In wholesale competition model, with relatively few
customers, all of them regulated Discoms, a spot market can be preferable but not essential.
However, in retail competition model, spot markets become essential, since contractual
arrangements between customers and producers are carried out over a network owned by a
third party. In retail competition model, metering becomes a major problem. If the number of
customers are increasing and metering capability for all the customers is not sufficient, it may
create logistical problem and provoke disputes.
Demerits:
Need constitutional and structural changes at both, wholesale and retail level.
Extremely complex settlement system due to large number of participants.
Requirement of additional infrastructural support.
models - wholesale competition and retail competition gets significance. It is then obvious that
the monopoly and single buyer models will emerge to be similar models when compared on the
chosen attributes.
Monopoly
Single
Buyer
Degree of
deregulation*
Number of
buyers
Many
Many
Number of
seller
Many
Many
Many
Everbody
including
small
consumers
Attribute
Wholesale
Retail
Competition Competition
Choice
available
No
No
Discoms and
big customers
Requirement
of spot
market
No
No
Preferable,
but not
essential
Essential
NA
NA
Transmission
network
Transmission
as well as
distribution
network
Everbody
Everbody
Small
consumers
None
Open access
Regulated
price to be
paid by
MARKET ARCHITECTURE
Stoft in [2] defines market architecture as a map of its component submarkets. This map includes the
type of each market and the linkage between them. Where does this concept of multiple markets come
from? The answer can be traced back to various peculiarities associated with electricity. Four pillars of
market design tend to cast the same electric energy into various products, which are characterized by
separate individual markets. Moreover, there are various modes of energy contracts depending upon
when energy trades are done. This again gives rise to market mechanisms based on timeline of trading.
The submarkets of a power market include the wholesale spot market, wholesale forward markets and
markets for ancillary services. Somewhere in between is embedded the market for transmission
capacity. This can be a separate market altogether or can be integrated with the energy market that
takes place near real time. Similar is the case with ancillary service market. The best way to categorize
alternative trading models is on the degree to which operational arrangements and commercial
arrangements for scheduling, imbalances, congestion and ancillary services are integrated with spot
markets. Two models are most common: integrated or centralized and decentralized.
In the rest of the module, we will give more stress on how various markets for energy and other products
are organized. For the sake of understanding, we will not go into the intricacies involved in various
modes of arrangement and levels of competition discussed in Section 3.2. We will just represent market
by a set of sellers and buyers. For this, we do the abstraction of the market as shown in Figure 3.9,
indicating sellers and buyers with some interaction facilitator. This abstraction gets rid of questions
about ownership of transmission network, power exchange, distribution network, as well as doesn't
bother about whom the buyer represents or buys for its own. The relevant details about the same will
be discussed at appropriate places. First, let us see how markets for energy are arranged.
Timeline for Various Energy Markets
There are many ways depending on the time of hand-shaking, where buyers and sellers can do the
transaction. Figure 3.10 shows various modes of trading based on the time-line.
Following are the common modes in which the electric energy can be traded:
1. Bilateral contracts
2. Spot market
a. Day ahead markets (Power Exchange or through pool)
b. Real time market (through pool)
Trading for power delivered in any particular minute begins years in advance and continues until real
time, the actual time at which the power flows out of a generator and into a load. This is accomplished
by a sequence of overlapping markets. The earliest amongst these are forward markets that trade nonstandard, long term, bilateral contracts. This generally represents energy trading between buyers and
sellers directly for the mutually agreed price. This type of trading stops about one day prior to real time.
At that point, the day-ahead market is held. The day-ahead market is often followed by a real-time
market.
The term - spot market is used with different interpretations associated with it. According to definitions
in some of the systems, the spot market includes day-ahead and real-time market, while in others; it
just includes the real-time market. Similarly, drawing line between spot and forward markets is not
clear. According to one definition, all the markets before the real-time market can be classified as
forward markets. This is because, in many forward markets, including day-ahead market, traders need
not own a generator to sell power. If power is not delivered in real time, then the supplier must purchase
replacement power at the real time rate and fulfill the contract. A customer who buys power in a forward
market will receive either electricity delivered by the seller or a financial compensation. Any power that
is sold in the day-ahead market, but not delivered in real time, is deemed to be purchased in real time
at the real time price of energy. The combination of day-ahead and real-time market is popularly known
as multi-settlement market system in USA.
Another way to distinguish between forward and spot markets is by considering day-ahead and realtime markets as spot markets, while all trades taking place before that are termed as forward or bilateral
trades. This segregation emerges because both, the day-ahead as well as real-time markets provide a
system price which holds for all the market trades done through it. On the other hand, in bilateral or
forward trades, there is no single market price as such. In the rest of the module, we prefer to define
the spot market as defined just above.
There is little doubt about what should be the nature of settlements based on timeline. Much ahead of
real time, i.e., more than a week, month or years ahead, bilateral contracts provide the best manner of
trading power. One is very unlikely to have bilateral contracts near real time. The reason is that the
settlements of bilateral contracts take place very slowly. Near real time, it is prudent to have a centrally
organized market as the security and reliability issues can be tackled centrally rather than bilaterally.
Even, the day-ahead market can be centrally organized. It can take the form of power exchange or the
pool. In other words, day-ahead market can be organized by a separate entity or it can be integrated
with the system operator activities. If the latter is adopted, it is popularly known as a pool structure.
In general, real time transactions require central coordination, while week-ahead trades do not require
the same. Somewhere in between are dividing lines that describe the system operator's diminishing role
in forward markets. Where to draw those lines is the central controversy of power market design. A
larger role for the system operator implies a smaller role for private, profit making entities.
Bilateral/Forward Contracts
Bilateral trading generally involves two parties interacting with each other: a buyer and a seller. The
characteristic of bilateral trades is that the price of a transaction is set independently by the parties
involved. There is no market clearing price as such. Since, electricity can not be stored, it creates a wide
fluctuation in the spot price. Forward contracts provide generators and loads with a means of hedging
their exposure to fluctuations in the spot price of electricity. The generators can negotiate a price for
their output prior to the moment of producing it. Similarly, properly structured forward contracts provide
buyers with the ability to lock in a fixed price for a fixed quantity of electricity well in advance of delivery
and consumption. Indeed, if a buyer's actual energy usage matches its forward market purchases, it
can achieve a benefit of complete price certainty in the face of real time price volatility.
Long Term Contracts: This type of trade generally includes contract for a large amount of
power for a long time period. These types of contracts are negotiated privately and the terms
and conditions are such that they suit both the parties involved in the transaction.
Trading Over The Counter: These transactions involve smaller amounts of energy to be
delivered. For example, the amount of energy to be delivered during different periods of the
hour, day, etc. This type of trading has much lower transaction costs and is used by producers
and consumers to refine their positions before real time.
Electronic Trading: In this, participants can enter offers to buy energy and bids to sell energy
directly in a computerized marketplace. The participants can observe the quantities and offers/
bids submitted by all participants, but do not know the party involved. The software in the
exchange couples the matching offers. It checks whether for a newly entered bid, if there is
matching offer whose price is greater than or equal to price of the bid. If no match is found, the
bid is added to the list of outstanding bids until a new offer matches it. Otherwise, it lapses after
the market is closed. The same process is repeated after a new bid is entered. There is no
market clearing price as such.
bid quantity is built, which is commonly known as supply curve. Supply curve is a plot with price
on y axis and quantity on x axis.
2. Similarly, demand curve is established by asking consumers to submit offers specifying quantity
and price and ranking these offers in decreasing order of price. If the load is willing to adjust its
consumption with price, the load is said to have demand elasticity. If the load is firm, the demand
curve will take the form of a vertical line with x axis intersection indicating total cumulative firm
demand.
3. The intersection of supply and demand curves represents the market equilibrium. At this point,
the supply matches the demand. This price is known as Market Clearing Price (MCP) or System
Marginal Price (SMP). All the bids submitted at a price lower than or equal to the market clearing
price are accepted and the generators are scheduled for that much amount of power for that
particular time period under consideration. Similarly, all the offers submitted at a price greater
than or equal to the market clearing price are accepted.
4. As for settlement, the generators are paid this MCP for every MWh they are scheduled for, while
loads pay the MCP for every MWh they are cleared for.
Bids
Company
Quantity
(MW)
Price
(INR)
S1
200
2400
S1
50
3000
S1
50
4000
S2
150
3200
S2
50
3400
S3
100
2600
S3
50
3600
D1
50
2600
D1
100
4600
D2
50
2200
D2
150
4400
D3
50
2000
D3
200
5000
offers
As the name suggests, the integrated model is integrated with strong linkages between various aspects
stated above. On the other hand, decentralized markets provide scattered efforts for various
arrangements in a power market.
One of the essential differences between integrated and decentralized markets is whether or not the
system operator administers a spot market integrated with the pricing of energy imbalances, congestion
management and ancillary services. The integrated model mandates the SO to run the spot market,
integrated with imbalances, and the others. On the other hand, the decentralized model attempts to
keep the spot market separate from the system operator, to be organized off-line by the traders.
Integrated or centralized markets are now being commonly employed in USA. In this, the system
operator schedules forward contracts at the request of traders, but also takes bids from traders to
modify scheduled contracts and to provide energy imbalances, congestion management and ancillary
services. The system operator runs the spot market using large computer optimization program, and by
doing so, the system operator minimizes the overall cost of these services.
The decentralized model was employed in earlier Californian market (now it has moved towards
integrated model) and also in UK after adopting NETA3. In this model also, the system operator
schedules traders' contracts. However, the spot market is held separately and the decisions of the same
are conveyed to the system operator. The system operator has to administer arrangements for
imbalances. As far as possible, the traders run the spot market and manage congestion, while separate
arrangements are set up for ancillary services. The decentralized model requires not only private
markets for regular energy to cater to imbalances of forward markets, but also markets for congestion
energy and markets for ancillary services. As mentioned in [1], in a liquid and efficient market, all these
separate products will be exchanged at the same price, time and place. However, the decentralized
model does not ensure that the prices of all these different products converge. This may be looked upon
as an inefficiency. The integrated model, on the other hand, integrates energy of imbalances,
congestion, reserves and spot sales together and sells at the spot price determined by the system
operator, achieving economical efficiency in the dispatch process.
In the following sections, we intend to provide more details on the concepts of centralized and
decentralized markets, particularly comparing them on the following aspects:
1. Imbalance energy
2. Congestion Management
3. Ancillary Services
zero MW! The effect of getting into a forward contract is then left only as a risk hedging tool by locking
in to some earlier decided prices. We will see more of this in the module on risk hedging.
Sometimes due to operational constraints, the generation units are required to be scheduled, rather
than shutting them down. In this case, the generators are said to do self scheduling. In other words,
the system operator, while running its least cost optimization program, must schedule the MWs offered
by this generator. This is also known as inflexible bidding. The system operator, while running its
optimization program, shows this generator as a zero priced bid, so that it gets selected. Similarly, for
load, it shows the self scheduled load as an infinitely priced offer.
What is the effect of offering either a flexible or inflexible bid on revenues to generators? Let us see the
generator's perspective in case of flexible and inflexible bid submission in the spot market. Suppose, a
generator has a bilateral contract for 100 MW and its marginal price is INR 3000/MW. Now, there are
two choices for this generator.
1. Submit an inflexible bid. It can specify that, regardless of price, the system operator should
schedule this generator to inject 100 MW.
2. Submit a flexible bid. It can specify that anything up to its maximum capacity can be dispatched
by the system operator, as long as spot price exceeds its marginal price, i.e., INR 3000/ MW.
The first option essentially replicates the decentralized model. In this, the operator is meant to schedule
the bilateral transactions physically. However, in case 2, if the spot price falls below INR 3000/MW, the
generator will not be dispatched by the system operator, as per the least cost dispatch criteria. However,
the requirement of load involved in the bilateral contract will still be satisfied. It is equivalent to meeting
the generator's contract by purchasing electricity (i.e., imbalances) in the spot market at a lower rate
than its running cost. Alternatively, if the spot price rises above INR 3000/MW, the system operator will
dispatch all MWs of this generator. It is easy to conclude that in either of the circumstances, the
generator is better off being flexible than being inflexible. Indeed, in practice, in the integrated markets
that are operating, much of the generation is offered as flexibly as its production characteristics allow.
When all market participants are flexible, willing to modify operations from their contracted levels if
profitable, the system operator's dispatch is fully separate from forward contracts. The forward contracts
then become financial in nature only. The system operator will only know about a contract if the traders
involved have chosen to be inflexible. In case of all generators opting for flexible bids, it is not relevant
also for the system operator to know about the contract schedules.
Congestion Management
The process of congestion management is implicit to market operation of the integrated system.
Congestion is solved as an integral part of the calculation of the least cost dispatch, where cost is defined
by generator bids. The system operator uses the information regarding the bids and network condition
to determine the most economical way to operate the system within the physical constraints using
optimization software.
Pricing for congestion (i.e., the price charged for transporting electricity over scarce transmission) is
also straightforward. Traders who schedule contracts across valuable transmission lines are charged for
transmission usage which is equal to the energy price difference between the two ends of a transaction.
As mentioned earlier, the energy price at each node is calculated by the system operator using central
optimization process. Congestion management and its pricing are thus integrated with energy pricing in
the integrated model.
Ancillary Services
Though as good as 40 ancillary services can be listed, when it comes to classification of market models
based on ancillary services procurement, they essentially refer to the capacity of generators to provide
reserve. The reserves are not a separate service from energy, they are options to buy energy if required.
They should be priced as options to call energy in the spot market. However, complicating factor is that
the same generating unit can provide energy in the spot market, as well as can act as a reserve. Hence,
the system operator's dilemma is about how much of it should be scheduled in the spot market and how
much should be kept idle as a reserve.
In the integrated or centralized markets, depending on various technical criteria, the system operator
does a joint optimization of energy and reserve market so that optimum scheduling is done with
minimum cost as well as appropriate amount is kept for reserve in the optimal fashion. More details on
this issue are provided in the module on ancillary services management.
Decentralized Model
The decentralized and integrated models are most clearly distinguished by the different roles of
forward/bilateral contracts in the procedures used to schedule and dispatch generation. While the
integrated model treats the contracts essentially as financial agreements, and dispatches generators to
minimize overall costs, the decentralized model requires the system operator to schedule the system
explicitly using the contracts. Thus, transaction is treated as a basic unit to be accommodated in real
time system operations.
In all trading models, market participants can make and trade contracts in diverse markets separate
from the system operator. The contracts could be one-to-one contracts or obtained through an organized
trade. At some predetermined moment prior to real time operations, however, the system operator has
to take over to deliver the contracts. The system operator is not intended to facilitate a spot market he simply schedules trades that have been arranged elsewhere. While transferring transactions to the
system operator for scheduling, the condition that the amount bought should be equal to sold should be
satisfied. Each seller must have a buyer and each buyer a seller. The aim of decentralized model is to
leave as much of the trading as possible to the traders, whereas, in the integrated model, on the day
ahead and in real time, the system operator makes the trades by following instructions incorporated in
the traders' bids.
The schematic of decentralized dispatch model is presented in Figure 3.14. As shown, the energy market
is not an integral part of system operator's activity and essentially depends on an external activity
exclusive from the system operator.
Congestion management in decentralized model can occur in one of the following ways:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The first two approaches are not essentially the market based solutions. They don't reflect the
willingness of a trader to pay for obtaining transmission rights. These methods do not take into account
the network element interdependencies. On the other hand, the third option, i.e., of auctioning of
capacity rights reflects traders' willingness to pay. The fourth option, i.e., special case of zonal pricing,
separates markets across the transmission bottleneck and imposes a congestion fee for a bilateral
transaction taking place across the transmission bottleneck. The last approach, i.e., curtailment, is more
of congestion alleviation technique invoked in real time.
For all these methods, a different solution needs to be worked out to manage the congestion in real
time. In the decentralized model, the system operator will only deviate from the final contract schedules
in the dispatch if he needs to do so in order to maintain security, and may not make efficient trades
even if the traders ask him to since there is no bidding mechanism for them to do so. It should be noted
that congestion management is not implicit with market clearing process. Transmission capacity
allocation needs to be done explicitly.
Ancillary Services
Unlike in the centralized model, the system operator procures all types of ancillary services generally
by making long term bilateral contracts with generator. It is obvious that this is not the best possible
way of obtaining reserves, though it gets rid of complexities associated with joint optimization of energy
and reserves market and lack of transparency associated with it. There is a possibility that the reserves
are procured on market basis. However, in decentralized system, it takes the form of cascaded markets.
In other words, after passing through forward contracts and spot market, the generators provide rest
of their capacity to reserves markets, subject to technical compatibility, with the needs. This
arrangement can take the other form in the sense, the generators get involved in long term contracts
for reserves and after subtracting for forward energy contracts, the rest is offered in the spot market
for balancing. There is no joint optimization as is done in the centralized dispatch market.
Comparison at a glance
The conclusion of the discussion on centralized dispatch and decentralized dispatch is provided in Table
3.3 by comparing the various aspects of two models.
ISO MODEL OR TSO MODEL
In section 3.2, we have seen how various trading arrangements take different forms depending on the
interaction between various entities of the market. In all the four models presented in section 3.2, the
issue of ownership of transmission and distribution network is not discussed. The restructured power
system models across the world can also be classified according to the ownership of transmission
network. Rather, more clear distinction would be based on whether the system operator itself is owner
of the transmission network or somebody else owns it. In ISO (Independent System Operator) model,
the owner of transmission network is different from the system operator. In TSO (Transmission System
Owner) model, system operator itself owns the infrastructural investments. This arrangement is seen in
most of the developing countries.
ISO Model
ISO model is practiced in those countries in which transmission companies are also providing the
generation and distribution services in their area of operation. Further, in these countries, sufficient
number of equal sized transmission companies exists in the market and it is not possible to club the
system operation function with any of these companies for commercial reasons. Therefore, separation
of ownership of the transmission assets from the system operation function is considered necessary to
avoid any preferential treatment for dispatching its own generation.
Centralized
Model
Dcentralized
Model
Central
Individual
Reservw
market
integrated
with spot
market
Separate
reserve
market or
obtained
through long
term
contracts
Basis for
scheduling
Bids abd
offers of
participants
Individual
schedules
arising out
of bilateral
transactions
Imbalances
Integrated
with spot
market
Generally
through dayahead
market
Involvement
of system
operator in Yes
day- ahead
market
Congestion
Implicit
Management
Significance
of forward
contracts
No
Atrribute
Unit
Commitment
Reserve
Risk hedging
No
Explicit
Physical
obligation
Example
SMD market
in USA like
PJM, ISONE
NETA in
UK Nordic
pool