Croatian Studies of Zagreb University

Department of Philosophy
Borongajska 86/d

Berkeley's attack on doctrine of abstract ideas

Course: Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge

Prof. Dr. Sc. Pavel Gregori
Student: Mihovil Luki

Zagreb, 8. 02. 2013

1. Introduction

The main purpose of George Berkeley's work is anoted in its title (A Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge, Wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the
Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired into). His goal
is to deal with scepticism, atheism and irreligion. First step in that kind of enquiry is, as he
belives, to explain what are the causes of so much incomprehensibility and skepticism in
philosophy. Berkeley rejects, in his time commonly held, views that the cause of this is ()
the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understanding
(Berkeley, 2, 2008). He believes that the problem is in our wrong usage of our capabilities.
The main problem is the process of abstraction.
Although the concept of abstract ideas is a rather old one, Berkeley concentrates his attack on
John Lockes doctrine, so I will say something about it. Locke defines abstract ideas as
general representatives of the same sort (Locke, 1999). We have such ideas thanks to
process of abstraction. Abstraction is a process by which we transform particular ideas that we
get from particular objects to general abstract ideas, which equally stand for all the particular
objects of that sort. The process is mainly striping a particular idea of all concomitant ideas
(Locke, 1999), such as color or shape. So, to create a general abstract idea of man, you have
to imagine an idea of particular man, and strip it of all of its qualities that distinguish him
from other man, until all that is left is common to all man. Lockes doctrine of abstract ideas
is, of course, much more complicated and oblique, but this will be enough to understand what
Berkeley thinks is wrong with this concept.

2. Two kinds of abstraction

As noted before, Berkeley thinks that the main problem in philosophys lack of ability to
solve its problems is in our wrong usage of our mental capacities. This is the reason why he
deals with this in introduction, to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving
what follows (Berkeley, 6, 2008). For his idealistic imaterialism to be understood correctly
it is necessary to destroy the process of abstraction, and the very notion of the abstract
ideas.
Berkeley identifies two forms of abstraction. The first one, which Dancy, in his introduction
to PHK, calls singular abstraction, considers the qualities of things. Let us consider a green
ball, for example. We do not think that the roundness or the greenness of the ball could in
reality exist separated. In reality there is a ball, which is round and green. But, in our minds
we can consider the same ball being round, without it being green. We can also consider it
being green without being round. It is agreed on all hands (Berkeley,7, 2008) that this is a
process of abstraction, by which we construct abstract ideas. In the next paragraph Berkeley
tells us a story of how weve come to having the most abstract (Berkeley, 8, 2008) ideas.
His examples are extension, motion, and color, but there are number of ideas that fall under
that category. In our process of abstraction we have stopped at the point where we abstracted a
single quality that in reality could not exist separated from others. Next step is observing that
all objects are somehow alike, but also somehow different. For example, all objects have
color, but not the same color. All objects are extended, but in a different manner. We leave out
all that which is not common to all objects, and we construct an abstract idea of extension,
color or motion.
Second kind of abstraction, which Dancy calls compound abstraction, is basically the same
process, the only difference being that it includes more than one quality. Berkeleys example
is an abstract idea of man, but out of political correctness mine will be an abstract idea of
woman. We frame that idea by considering all the abstract ideas that construct a particular
woman, and which she shares with all other woman, and merge them to an abstract idea of
woman. In these kind of abstract ideas all particular qualities take equal part. In my example
of a woman, that idea includes all qualities that any woman has. All colors, all sizes, all
shapes, all intelligences.

Berkeley takes it a few steps further. When we have an abstract idea of a woman, we than
notice that there is something alike in all the creatures, and by the same process abstract an
idea of animal. After that, we realize there is something alike in all the bodies. Naturally, an
abstract idea of body is born. (Berkeley, 9, 2008) Although Berkeley does not say that here,
the next step in that process is obvious. We notice that all bodies are built of something, of
matter.

3. Is Berkeleys analysis of abstraction correct?

It is now clear why Berkeleys attack on doctrine of abstract ideas is placed in Introduction of
his main work. To even suggest any kind of immaterialism, he must have first explained why
we think that there is matter. Not only that we think that, but it is somehow evidently true that
there is matter, everything we experience is by matter. That is why he had to have a strong
weapon against the very notion of matter. He believed that his attack on the doctrine of
abstract ideas was as best as weapon that he could have. But was he right?
His argument could be called argument from imagination. Laconically said, he argues that
abstract ideas are impossible because we cannot imagine such ideas.(Berkeley, 10, 2008)
Can you imagine an idea of a woman that has a color, but its neither black, nor brown, nor
gray, that has a size but its neither big nor small? I think that the answer to that question
depends on what you mean by imagine. If by imagine you mean to have a visual image in
ones mind, than you have a problem with time. Berkeley probably thinks that you cannot
imagine all that qualities together in one moment in time. But what should be considered one
moment in time? Our mind works pretty fast, and we can imagine large number of pictures
very fast. Perhaps such an idea would resemble a video with flashing pictures of all the
qualities that make an abstract idea of a woman. But then again, we could argue that only one
of those pictures counts as a moment in time. In that case abstract ideas such as this are
impossible. But even if they are impossible that they exist in such a manner, that may turn out
to be trivial.
I do not think that visual imaging is the only possible way we can understand a phrase to
imagine something. Let us suppose that we cannot have a visual image of an abstract idea of
a woman. Even then we can construct sentences like: A woman is a human being. , and we

can understand them well. Although we dont have a visual image of a woman or a human
being we can understand and use those ides, as well as ones that we can visually imagine.
What is important is that not only we understand our own sentences of that type, but we
understand each others sentences of that type. I think that our, constantly improving,
understanding of each others sentences containing abstract ideas is a proof that there is a way
in which we imagine, or represent to ourselves abstract ideas. The first way that comes to
mind is by the means of logic. We can easily use abstract ideas, even including their
semantics. For example:

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

A human being is mortal

A woman is a human being
A woman is mortal

I think that logical use of abstract ideas is a proof of their existence, but I also believe there
are other ways in which such ideas are imaginable.
Berkeleys counter argument is laid out in 18. His idea is that names, or words do not have
precise and definite signification (Berkeley, 18, 2008). All word signifies large number of
ideas. So the word a woman signifies every particular idea of woman that we have, and not
an abstract idea. If this were true, I dont see a reason why we could not say that we can
imagine an abstract idea in aforesaid way, to imagine consecutive pictures of particular ideas
at the same moment.

4. Conclusion
Attack on the doctrine was an ingenious path to shatter our belief in matter. It is clever not to
attack a notion of such universal acceptance head on, but to take the side way, and try to
dismantle much more unstable doctrine of abstract ideas. It was very insightful of him to see
the path of abstraction by which we could have come to the notion of matter. But my personal
opinion is that it is a just so story. It could have happened that way, but someone could tell
us numerous stories with the same ending.
Arguments with which he supports his claims are, in my opinion, either false, either trivial.
They are false if there is a way in which we can visually imagine abstract ideas (continuous
flashing images). They are trivial if we can imagine them in some other way, e.g. logically.
I think that the problem with Berkeley is a problem shared by many classical and
contemporary philosophers. They often disregard obvious objections in purpose of
constructing an original and interesting theory.

Bibliography:
1. Berkeley, George, A treaties concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,
Philosophical Writings, Desmond M. Clark (ed.), 2009
2. Locke, John, The Pennsylvania state Univesity, 1999
3. Dancy, Johnatan, Berkeley: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987