Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
by D. S. Rajan
( February 25, 2015, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The strategic
importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), providing major sea routes for
world commerce, connecting East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and
Africa, with Europe and Americas is growing day by day.
Author Robert Kaplan is right in pointing out in his book (Monsoon- the
Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, 21 November 2010), that
in this region, the interests and influence of China, India, and the United
States are beginning to overlap and intersect and that therefore the IOR is
bound to become a centre of 21st century international conflicts and power
dynamics.
2. Taking the position with regard to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
first, it has to be admitted that till now its focus continues to be on the
Pacific and not on the IOR. It would however be a folly to ignore the
gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR.
Beijings principal interest at this juncture seems to lie in the need to
protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean,
vital for the countrys energy imports. While this is being so, the PRCs
official-level articulations on IOR are gradually gaining intensity; the day
may not be far off when Beijing comes out with a comprehensive Indian
Ocean doctrine for implementation. In the present scenario, suffice to note
that China, through its aggressive soft power diplomacy, has begun to
shape the IOR strategic environment. By providing large loans on generous
repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the
building of roads, dams, ports, power plants, and railways, and offering
military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through
its veto power, China has been able to secure considerable goodwill and
influence among countries in the IOR.
3. It is not difficult to trace the connection between Chinas increasing
maritime security interests and its fast changing perceptions on the IOR. To
help achieving the declared goal of turning the country as a fully
modernized one by middle of the century, the PRC has evolved an overall
strategic approach towards procuring much needed resources from all over
the world; it has set demands on China to ensure security of supply routes,
both land and maritime. The IOR has thus become vital for China. As
corollary, the PRCs naval objectives have undergone a shift from that of
conducting coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately to
far sea defence. A case in point is the stress noticed in Chinas Defence
White Paper (2013) on protecting national maritime rights and interests
and armed forces providing reliable support for Chinas interests
overseas.
4. The allotted responsibilities for the PLA Navy (PLAN) now include defeat
invasion from sea, defend territorial sovereignty and protect maritime
rights. For fulfilling them, the PRC is making naval modernization efforts
aimed at equipping the Navy with capabilities to operate in waters far
beyond its borders. Such efforts encompass[1] a broad array of weapon
nations in the IOR while cautioning that if China, United States and India do
not constructively engage each other, the Indian Ocean can end up as an
ocean of conflict and trouble. As the CASS publication predicted, no single
or regional power including Russia, China, Australia and India, can control
the Indian Ocean by itself in the future and after jostling among powers, a
fragile balance of power might be reached in the region. It acknowledged
that the rise of China was worrying the littoral states of IOR, particularly
India.
7. Among subsequent commentaries on the IOR made by influential
Chinese academicians, an article of a leading state-controlled Chinese think
tank[3], look very significant. The write-up declared that Chinas strategic
focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean and the PRC lags far behind
the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy Indias geographic
advantages. It asserted that China follows a naval strategy aimed at
ensuring a harmonious sea through capacity building and international
cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital
energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle. Chinas
seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its
open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world,
particularly the IOR.
8.The article added that Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in
the Indian Ocean region littorals is part of the PRCs economy-oriented
Going Global strategy. Interpreting Indias views on the Indian Ocean
region as a sum-up of senses of crisis and destiny, it says that as for crisis,
Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages
between Indian Ocean and Indias national security and as for destiny,
Indias unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of Indias
aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into
Indias Ocean. Contrasting Indias position with that of the US , the article
found that the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only
dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it
stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, it finds an
unfavorable condition in that regard, i.e the US is still trying to maintain its
status as a pre-eminent maritime power and seeking to sustain its strong
presence in the Indian Ocean.
9. In conclusion, the article said that although confrontations and conflicts
between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly
with the rise of Chinas maritime power, their different strategic goals may
lead to different results. It added that given the Chinas policy aims, intent
and capability, the PRC cannot afford to challenge either the United States
or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India
is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an
IndiaUS potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to
characterize the Indian Ocean region landscape than the China threat
10. Significant have been the remarks of the spokesperson of Chinas
ministry of National Defense admitting [4] on 29.1.2015 that China has
plans to conduct escort missions of the naval ships in the Indian Ocean. The
PRC in this way seems to justify its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, after being asked a question on the PLAN
submarine movements in the Indian Ocean, tried to downplay Chinese
naval activities in the region, characterizing them as normal and
emphasizing that there is no need to read too much into them. He added,
China has sent various kinds of naval ships to the Gulf of Aden and the
waters off the Somali coast to conduct escort missions since 2008. And in
the process, we have notified relevant countries of the escort missions of
the PLA naval ships, including the PLA naval submarines. In future, the
Chinese military will send different kinds of naval ships to take part in the
naval escort missions in accordance with the situation and the requirement
to fulfill the task.
11. Close to Chinas admission of its plans to dispatch of naval escort ships
to the IOR, unconfirmed reports appeared that the PRC will soon be adding
one additional fleet to the three existing ones (the North Sea, East Sea, and
South Sea Fleets) it currently operates. This new fleet could be
headquartered in Sanya on Hainan Island and project Chinese naval power
into the Indian Ocean.[5] If true, this development is bound to have security
implications for the IOR.
12. Taking Indias case next, more than 70 percent of Indias liquefied
energy supplies travel through the Indian Ocean, making it vital to the
countrys energy security. It is therefore natural that for that purpose, India
is stepping up efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals.
They include Indian External Affairs Ministers recent visits to Maldives and
the UAE, the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the new Sri
Lankan President in New Delhi and the Indian Prime Ministers impending
visits to Sri Lanka and Maldives in March 2015. Also, India and Sri Lanka
under President Sirisena have of late agreed in New Delhi to expand their
cooperation on defense and security issues. Getting focus now is their
maritime security cooperation, including in the trilateral format with
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the first providing new road and rail links
through land route and the second aimed at building a network of
commercial port facilities in the Indian Ocean. It is natural that China would
like to increase its physical presence both along land and sea routes net
work in order to ensure safety of energy imports. The countries concerned
especially the Indian Ocean littorals on their part have reasons to worry
about the strategic component of Chinas schemes, which on the surface
look only economic.
12. It is natural for China, in the circumstances above, to follow a proactive
policy in Sri Lanka. The approach to that policy is two pronged commercial
and strategic. The first aspect is compelling China to woo Sri Lanka
economically, The PRC is the biggest creditor to Sri Lanka and has invested
heavily in the latters infrastructure projects, besides supporting it on
human rights issues. Its development loans to Sri Lanka with respect to
latters projects are very substantial. The Chinese-aided projects in Sri
Lanka include US$ 361 million Hambantota port project (first phase over
now, 85% Chinese loan), US$ 1.4 billion Colombo port terminal project, first
four-lane expressway and National theatre. Sri Lanka has granted Chinese
state-owned companies operating rights to four berths at the Hambantota
Port once they are completed in 2016. The new President of Sri Lanka has
given go ahead to the Colombo port project, though in his election
campaign it was told that the project could be abandoned. Colombo says
that as per stipulation, the project needs parliaments approval within three
months, which has elapsed now. This is putting a question mark on the
projects implementation. China is Sri Lankas biggest source of foreign
direct investment (FDI). China-Sri Lanka bilateral trade exceeded US$ 3
billion in 2013. The latter at the same time has trade deficit with China (US$
2.4 billion in 2012). China is the destination for less than 2 percent of total
Sri Lankan exports. It is Sri Lankas second largest source of imports behind
India. The two nations are now working towards concluding a Free Trade
Agreement between them.
13. Strategically, China considers ties with Sri Lanka as key to the success
of its Indian Ocean policy. It realizes that Sri Lanka is the gateway to
resource rich regions of Middle East and Central Asia, especially Iran, a vital
exporter of oil to China. The commitment of Sri Lanka to join the Chinese
Maritime Silk Road initiative indicates the proximity of the strategic
aspirations of the two countries and is a reflection of the assimilation of
national interests. President Sirisena had indicated prior to his election that
his government would review some of the Chinese projects. In such a
situation, the PRC may fear that with a new regime in charge in Colombo,
its erstwhile influence over Sri Lanka might diminish. Beijings efforts to fill
this gap are therefore likely to intensify from now on. Much would depend
on what happens during President Sirisnas proposed visit to China in March
2015.
14. Indias overwhelming influence over Sri Lanka vis--vis China cannot be
denied. It comes from Indias huge geographic size, economic strength and
global political influence from times immemorial. Strategically important
from Indias point of view is the question whether Chinas port facilities in
Sri Lanka can cater to the needs of the PLA Navy. In 2014, Chinese
submarines have made port visits to Sri Lanka twice, raising Indias
concerns. China on its part explains that the submarnies port call is part of
its escort mission undertaken with the permission of Sri Lanka (para 8
above). But Indias concerns seem to be justified as potentials for dual use
of ports that service Chinese cargo ships cannot be ignored. President
Sirisenas visit to New Delhi, first foreign destination since he assumed
office, saw the two sides signing civil nuclear and defence cooperation
agreements. Sri Lanka under President Sirisena, appears to be intent on
resetting its ties with India and China, to make them more balanced.
15. Notable are the emerging fresh US perceptions on Sri Lanka under
President Sirisena. Welcoming Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Samaraweera to
Washington DC, Secretary Kerry has hailed the new directions of Colombo
after the elections. He has expressed support for a Sri Lanka that is
peaceful, democratic, prosperous, inclusive and unified and to the
Governments 100-day programme, The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal has said in Colombo that
the US hopes for brighter reality for all Sri Lankans, an indication of US
unhappiness with the earlier regime. Sri Lanka has been included as part of
a 2015 US National Security Strategy where the US Government will assist
countries in transition, as pointed out by US National Security Advisor Susan
Rice. The Deputy US State Department Spokesperson Marie Harf has
praised the commendable steps taken by the new Sri Lankan Government
to address reconciliation and other long-standing issues.
16. In Maldives also, the three powers- China, the US and India, are
engaged in a power play. In a development signifying success of Chinas
regional aspirations, Maldives has given its support to the formers 21st
century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) initiative. China- Maldives economic
cooperation is gaining momentum. The decision to sign the countrys firstever free trade agreement was made during the first Maldives-China Joint
Commission meeting held in Beijing in December 2014. Beijing has also
to-the-indian-ocean/
[5] Franz- Stefan Gady, Chinas Ghost Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the
Diplomat, 7.2.2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-ghost-fleet-inthe-indian-ocean/
[6] Sanjeev Miglani, India clears $8 billion warships project to counter
Chinese navy, Times of India, 18.2.2015
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/18/india-defence-navyidINKBN0LM1A
[7] Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy, Washington Quarterly, Spring
2012 issue, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf
[8] Different Visions of the Indo-Pacific, dated 9.1.2014,
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/09/Different-visions-of-the-
[9] PRC Embassy, Maldives denial of former President Nasheeds claims
over Chinas plans to build a military facility at laamu atoll. Minivan News,
Mhammad Saif Fathih, 26.1.2015
[10] Naseem, Editor of Maldivian blog Dhivehi Sitee
[http://www.dhivehisitee.com], 24.1.2013
[11] AFP dispatch on President Yameens statement , The Maldives will not
participate in a proposed military cooperation pact with the United States,
22.1.2015