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Indian Ocean: China-India-US Jostling for

Power; cases of Sri Lanka and Maldives

by D. S. Rajan
( February 25, 2015, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The strategic
importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), providing major sea routes for
world commerce, connecting East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and
Africa, with Europe and Americas is growing day by day.
Author Robert Kaplan is right in pointing out in his book (Monsoon- the
Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, 21 November 2010), that

in this region, the interests and influence of China, India, and the United
States are beginning to overlap and intersect and that therefore the IOR is
bound to become a centre of 21st century international conflicts and power
dynamics.
2. Taking the position with regard to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
first, it has to be admitted that till now its focus continues to be on the
Pacific and not on the IOR. It would however be a folly to ignore the
gradually unfolding changes in the perceptions of Beijing on the IOR.
Beijings principal interest at this juncture seems to lie in the need to
protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCS) along the Indian Ocean,
vital for the countrys energy imports. While this is being so, the PRCs
official-level articulations on IOR are gradually gaining intensity; the day
may not be far off when Beijing comes out with a comprehensive Indian
Ocean doctrine for implementation. In the present scenario, suffice to note
that China, through its aggressive soft power diplomacy, has begun to
shape the IOR strategic environment. By providing large loans on generous
repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the
building of roads, dams, ports, power plants, and railways, and offering
military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through
its veto power, China has been able to secure considerable goodwill and
influence among countries in the IOR.
3. It is not difficult to trace the connection between Chinas increasing
maritime security interests and its fast changing perceptions on the IOR. To
help achieving the declared goal of turning the country as a fully
modernized one by middle of the century, the PRC has evolved an overall
strategic approach towards procuring much needed resources from all over
the world; it has set demands on China to ensure security of supply routes,
both land and maritime. The IOR has thus become vital for China. As
corollary, the PRCs naval objectives have undergone a shift from that of
conducting coastal defence activities to offshore defence and ultimately to
far sea defence. A case in point is the stress noticed in Chinas Defence
White Paper (2013) on protecting national maritime rights and interests
and armed forces providing reliable support for Chinas interests
overseas.
4. The allotted responsibilities for the PLA Navy (PLAN) now include defeat
invasion from sea, defend territorial sovereignty and protect maritime
rights. For fulfilling them, the PRC is making naval modernization efforts
aimed at equipping the Navy with capabilities to operate in waters far
beyond its borders. Such efforts encompass[1] a broad array of weapon

acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship


cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines both nuclear and conventional, surface
ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
systems. Chinas naval modernization has following main orientationaddressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or
defending Chinas territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China
Sea; regulating foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive
economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and
asserting Chinas status as a leading regional power and major world power.
China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting
maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese
nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and conducting
humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
5. The first official signal that China has begun paying attention to the IOR,
came through a statement (Galle, Sri Lanka, 13 December 2012) made by
Vice Admiral Su Zhiqian, Commander of the East China Sea Fleet of the
Chinese Navy. It laid stress on the freedom and safety of the navigation in
the Indian Ocean acting as a crucial factor in global economy and declared
that the Chinese navy will actively maintain the peace and stability of the
Indian Ocean through carrying out maritime security cooperation with the
navies of various countries, especially seeking to establish a maritime
security code of conduct between them under the premise of respect for
each countrys sovereignty and maritime interests[2]
6. Next clue was seen in the Blue Book of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) released in June 2013. It had chapters on Indias Look East
Policy and the U.S-India axis of relation in Indian Ocean region. As a
document of an authoritative Chinese think tank, it appears as policy
indicators. The Blue Book observed that In the past, Chinas Indian Ocean
strategy was based on moderation and maintaining the status quo, but
the changing dynamics of international relations necessitates China play a
more proactive role in affairs of the region. It frankly admitted that Beijing
presently is not having any Indian Ocean strategy unlike U.S. and India who
were following a well-defined Look East policy and the pivot or
rebalancing strategy respectively. Adding that in absence of a strategy,
Chinas development prospects would severely be hit, it observed, With
changes in the relations among countries in the Indian Ocean Region and in
the international situation, Chinas diplomacy should also change, but
Beijings interests will be driven only by commercial, and not military,
objectives. The document asked China to deepen economic ties with the

nations in the IOR while cautioning that if China, United States and India do
not constructively engage each other, the Indian Ocean can end up as an
ocean of conflict and trouble. As the CASS publication predicted, no single
or regional power including Russia, China, Australia and India, can control
the Indian Ocean by itself in the future and after jostling among powers, a
fragile balance of power might be reached in the region. It acknowledged
that the rise of China was worrying the littoral states of IOR, particularly
India.
7. Among subsequent commentaries on the IOR made by influential
Chinese academicians, an article of a leading state-controlled Chinese think
tank[3], look very significant. The write-up declared that Chinas strategic
focus is the Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean and the PRC lags far behind
the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy Indias geographic
advantages. It asserted that China follows a naval strategy aimed at
ensuring a harmonious sea through capacity building and international
cooperation, viewing the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital
energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power struggle. Chinas
seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its
open economy is becoming more interdependent with the outside world,
particularly the IOR.
8.The article added that Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in
the Indian Ocean region littorals is part of the PRCs economy-oriented
Going Global strategy. Interpreting Indias views on the Indian Ocean
region as a sum-up of senses of crisis and destiny, it says that as for crisis,
Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages
between Indian Ocean and Indias national security and as for destiny,
Indias unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of Indias
aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or even to transform Indian Ocean into
Indias Ocean. Contrasting Indias position with that of the US , the article
found that the US seeks to be a hegemonic maritime power that is not only
dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it
stresses the importance of a cooperative maritime strategy, it finds an
unfavorable condition in that regard, i.e the US is still trying to maintain its
status as a pre-eminent maritime power and seeking to sustain its strong
presence in the Indian Ocean.
9. In conclusion, the article said that although confrontations and conflicts
between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly
with the rise of Chinas maritime power, their different strategic goals may
lead to different results. It added that given the Chinas policy aims, intent

and capability, the PRC cannot afford to challenge either the United States
or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India
is likely to adopt a more assertive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.
Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an
IndiaUS potential power struggle in the Indian Ocean is more likely to
characterize the Indian Ocean region landscape than the China threat
10. Significant have been the remarks of the spokesperson of Chinas
ministry of National Defense admitting [4] on 29.1.2015 that China has
plans to conduct escort missions of the naval ships in the Indian Ocean. The
PRC in this way seems to justify its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, after being asked a question on the PLAN
submarine movements in the Indian Ocean, tried to downplay Chinese
naval activities in the region, characterizing them as normal and
emphasizing that there is no need to read too much into them. He added,
China has sent various kinds of naval ships to the Gulf of Aden and the
waters off the Somali coast to conduct escort missions since 2008. And in
the process, we have notified relevant countries of the escort missions of
the PLA naval ships, including the PLA naval submarines. In future, the
Chinese military will send different kinds of naval ships to take part in the
naval escort missions in accordance with the situation and the requirement
to fulfill the task.
11. Close to Chinas admission of its plans to dispatch of naval escort ships
to the IOR, unconfirmed reports appeared that the PRC will soon be adding
one additional fleet to the three existing ones (the North Sea, East Sea, and
South Sea Fleets) it currently operates. This new fleet could be
headquartered in Sanya on Hainan Island and project Chinese naval power
into the Indian Ocean.[5] If true, this development is bound to have security
implications for the IOR.
12. Taking Indias case next, more than 70 percent of Indias liquefied
energy supplies travel through the Indian Ocean, making it vital to the
countrys energy security. It is therefore natural that for that purpose, India
is stepping up efforts to improve bilateral ties with Indian Ocean littorals.
They include Indian External Affairs Ministers recent visits to Maldives and
the UAE, the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the new Sri
Lankan President in New Delhi and the Indian Prime Ministers impending
visits to Sri Lanka and Maldives in March 2015. Also, India and Sri Lanka
under President Sirisena have of late agreed in New Delhi to expand their
cooperation on defense and security issues. Getting focus now is their
maritime security cooperation, including in the trilateral format with

Maldives. India is keen to strengthen the Indian Ocean Rim Association


(IORA). Apparently to counter the likely Chinese challenges in the Indian
Ocean, India is considering plans to build seven frigates equipped with
stealth features and six nuclear-powered submarines. [6]
13. Washingtons interest in the IOR centers round three imperatives for the
US- Securing Indian Ocean for international commerce, avoiding regional
conflict on issues of strategic choke points in the IOR- Strait of Hormuz and
the Malacca strait, and dealing with Sino-Indian competition in the IOR. [7]
The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010 of the US Department of
Defense had the goals of ensuring open access to the IOR to be achieved
through a more integrated approach across civil and military organizations.
The Departments document Strategic Choices and Management Review
( July 2013) stressed the need for US to develop an Indian Ocean policy on
the basis of building coalitions with regional allies like Australia, Japan and
the Philippines and partners like Vietnam and India. The QDR for 2014 has
said that the US will support Indias rise as an increasingly capable actor in
the region, and deepen strategic partnership with it including through the
Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. It added that the US will continue
efforts to help stabilize Central and Southwest Asia and deepen its
engagement in the Indian Ocean region to bolster US rebalance to Asia.
14. The US follows an Indo-Pacific concept as part of its approach towards
the IOR; it aims to achieve through implementing the concept, the freedom
of navigation and reassurance to allies and partners in the region. But this
means differently to India and China. New Delhi views the concept in the
background of Indias geographical, historical and political necessity. It
displays wariness to Chinas expanding engagement in the region. For
China, the concept marks creation of a highway connecting Indian and
Pacific Oceans which can play a role in transporting much-needed
resources. But it is suspicious of US intentions to use the concept for
containing China[8].
10. The data given above, give enough hints to the likely shape of future
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) scenario. The following conclusions can be
drawn:
(a) Chinas priority will continue to be on protecting its energy security
interests, by way of securing the Sea Lanes of Communications, spreading
from the Gulf to the South China Sea. In the short and middle terms,
realizing its existing inferior position compared to US maritime power and
Indias strategic advantage in the IOR, China may persist with its
harmonious sea approach. It will shun a military approach and push for

constructive engagement in the IOR between three powers the US,


China and India, and concentrate on achieving greater space in the IOR by
way of promoting maritime security cooperation with the Indian Ocean
littorals. Chinas wish for a maritime code of conduct in the IOR is notable in
this context. In strategic terms, China, under perceived conditions of
continuance of Indias domination and the US strong presence in the IOR,
may intend to project its own power into the region to bring about a
balance in its favour to the situation.
(b) Chinas current fears that the US is trying to contain the PRC by roping
in Indian Ocean littorals, under an Indo-Pacific framework, might motivate
it to woo these littorals through economic and other means so as to keep
them away from the US influence. Its drive to build infrastructure in IOR
littorals as part of its going global strategy, is setting the trend in this
regard.
(c) Important is the Chinese analyses that India, with its regional economic
and political power rising, may become more assertive in the IOR. At the
same time, China tends to believe that India will always maintain its
strategic autonomy vis--vis other nations and will not gang up with the
latter, particularly the US, against the PRCs interests. Wooing India will
therefore be Chinas long term endeavor; the PRCs Look West strategy
accords primacy to and rebalance ties with India (this idea is being
publicized through highly placed Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi).
(d) Indias understanding with President Sirisena led Sri Lanka on defence
cooperation and the trilateral format with Maldives, along with its initiatives
towards other littorals, could mean the countrys intentions to increase its
strategic influence over the IOR, as a counter balance to rise of Chinas
clout there.
(e) The US links its Indian Ocean policy with its rebalancing approach in
Asia, revealing its overall current outlook aimed at securing its strategic
interests at a time when China is asserting itself in the region.
11. Of specific interest to the situation in the IOR, are the developing
scenario in Sri Lanka and Maldives as the three parties- China, India and the
US, jostle for power there. There is no doubt that the PRCs courting of Sri
Lanka will continue during President Sirisenas rule. The reason is the
demand on China arising from its Indian Ocean strategy. The strategy is
indeed related to Chinas global requirement it needs access to raw
material from resource-rich regions to facilitate the countrys domestic
modernization. To facilitate that, it visualizes in particular the necessity to
link the country with Europe via Indian Ocean , Central Asia and Middle East
and has accordingly announced two grand schemes New Silk Road and

21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the first providing new road and rail links
through land route and the second aimed at building a network of
commercial port facilities in the Indian Ocean. It is natural that China would
like to increase its physical presence both along land and sea routes net
work in order to ensure safety of energy imports. The countries concerned
especially the Indian Ocean littorals on their part have reasons to worry
about the strategic component of Chinas schemes, which on the surface
look only economic.
12. It is natural for China, in the circumstances above, to follow a proactive
policy in Sri Lanka. The approach to that policy is two pronged commercial
and strategic. The first aspect is compelling China to woo Sri Lanka
economically, The PRC is the biggest creditor to Sri Lanka and has invested
heavily in the latters infrastructure projects, besides supporting it on
human rights issues. Its development loans to Sri Lanka with respect to
latters projects are very substantial. The Chinese-aided projects in Sri
Lanka include US$ 361 million Hambantota port project (first phase over
now, 85% Chinese loan), US$ 1.4 billion Colombo port terminal project, first
four-lane expressway and National theatre. Sri Lanka has granted Chinese
state-owned companies operating rights to four berths at the Hambantota
Port once they are completed in 2016. The new President of Sri Lanka has
given go ahead to the Colombo port project, though in his election
campaign it was told that the project could be abandoned. Colombo says
that as per stipulation, the project needs parliaments approval within three
months, which has elapsed now. This is putting a question mark on the
projects implementation. China is Sri Lankas biggest source of foreign
direct investment (FDI). China-Sri Lanka bilateral trade exceeded US$ 3
billion in 2013. The latter at the same time has trade deficit with China (US$
2.4 billion in 2012). China is the destination for less than 2 percent of total
Sri Lankan exports. It is Sri Lankas second largest source of imports behind
India. The two nations are now working towards concluding a Free Trade
Agreement between them.
13. Strategically, China considers ties with Sri Lanka as key to the success
of its Indian Ocean policy. It realizes that Sri Lanka is the gateway to
resource rich regions of Middle East and Central Asia, especially Iran, a vital
exporter of oil to China. The commitment of Sri Lanka to join the Chinese
Maritime Silk Road initiative indicates the proximity of the strategic
aspirations of the two countries and is a reflection of the assimilation of
national interests. President Sirisena had indicated prior to his election that
his government would review some of the Chinese projects. In such a
situation, the PRC may fear that with a new regime in charge in Colombo,

its erstwhile influence over Sri Lanka might diminish. Beijings efforts to fill
this gap are therefore likely to intensify from now on. Much would depend
on what happens during President Sirisnas proposed visit to China in March
2015.
14. Indias overwhelming influence over Sri Lanka vis--vis China cannot be
denied. It comes from Indias huge geographic size, economic strength and
global political influence from times immemorial. Strategically important
from Indias point of view is the question whether Chinas port facilities in
Sri Lanka can cater to the needs of the PLA Navy. In 2014, Chinese
submarines have made port visits to Sri Lanka twice, raising Indias
concerns. China on its part explains that the submarnies port call is part of
its escort mission undertaken with the permission of Sri Lanka (para 8
above). But Indias concerns seem to be justified as potentials for dual use
of ports that service Chinese cargo ships cannot be ignored. President
Sirisenas visit to New Delhi, first foreign destination since he assumed
office, saw the two sides signing civil nuclear and defence cooperation
agreements. Sri Lanka under President Sirisena, appears to be intent on
resetting its ties with India and China, to make them more balanced.
15. Notable are the emerging fresh US perceptions on Sri Lanka under
President Sirisena. Welcoming Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Samaraweera to
Washington DC, Secretary Kerry has hailed the new directions of Colombo
after the elections. He has expressed support for a Sri Lanka that is
peaceful, democratic, prosperous, inclusive and unified and to the
Governments 100-day programme, The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal has said in Colombo that
the US hopes for brighter reality for all Sri Lankans, an indication of US
unhappiness with the earlier regime. Sri Lanka has been included as part of
a 2015 US National Security Strategy where the US Government will assist
countries in transition, as pointed out by US National Security Advisor Susan
Rice. The Deputy US State Department Spokesperson Marie Harf has
praised the commendable steps taken by the new Sri Lankan Government
to address reconciliation and other long-standing issues.
16. In Maldives also, the three powers- China, the US and India, are
engaged in a power play. In a development signifying success of Chinas
regional aspirations, Maldives has given its support to the formers 21st
century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) initiative. China- Maldives economic
cooperation is gaining momentum. The decision to sign the countrys firstever free trade agreement was made during the first Maldives-China Joint
Commission meeting held in Beijing in December 2014. Beijing has also

signed a deal to modernize the Ibrahim Nasir International Airport (INIA) in


Maldives and an agreement to build Male-Hulhule Bridge which will connect
Male with the citys international airport. Talks are on between Male and
Beijing on oil exploration. China-Malidives defence cooperation is
progressing. The two countries signed a military aid agreement in 2012.
According to reports, China may seek a naval presence in Maldives as part
of its strategic stretch in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has denied such reports.
[9]President Xi JInpings visit to Maldives in September 2014 has symbolized
the emerging closeness in Beijing-Male ties.
17. India has not lagged behind China in offering assistance to Maldives.
India has expressed willingness to cooperate with Maldives in the field of oil
exploration. In 2012, India offered to help the Maldives government in its
surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends for 200 nautical
miles (370 km) from its shores. This will allow Maldives to safeguard its
economic and strategic maritime assets. India has also agreed to supply
Maldives a state-of-the-art 260-ton fast-attack craft to aid in guarding
coastal waters, in addition to providing other defense equipment and
setting up of radar systems on all 26 Maldivian atolls. Indias Prime Minister
may visit Maldives in March 2015 which could take relations between the
two nations further forward.
18. Concerning US role in Maldives, reports suggested [10] that Maldives
government is in the process of signing a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with the United States which will allow the country to establish a
military base in the atoll nation. President Yameen of Maldives has denied
such reports.[11]
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China
Studies, Chennai, India. Email: dsrajan@gmail.com)
________________________________________
[1] Ronald ORourke China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf
[2] Chinese Navy to Actively Maintain Peace and Stability of Indian Ocean,
China Military Online, 15 December 2012.
[3] Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: Dont Exaggerate the China Threat,
24 October 2013, Chun Hao Lou, Assistant Director at the Institute of
Maritime Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CICIR, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-theindian-oce.
[4] Franz Stefan Gady, Chinas Navy to Send More Ships to the Indian
Ocean, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-navy-to-send-more-ships-

to-the-indian-ocean/
[5] Franz- Stefan Gady, Chinas Ghost Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the
Diplomat, 7.2.2015,http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-ghost-fleet-inthe-indian-ocean/
[6] Sanjeev Miglani, India clears $8 billion warships project to counter
Chinese navy, Times of India, 18.2.2015
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/18/india-defence-navyidINKBN0LM1A
[7] Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy, Washington Quarterly, Spring
2012 issue, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf
[8] Different Visions of the Indo-Pacific, dated 9.1.2014,
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/09/Different-visions-of-the-
[9] PRC Embassy, Maldives denial of former President Nasheeds claims
over Chinas plans to build a military facility at laamu atoll. Minivan News,
Mhammad Saif Fathih, 26.1.2015
[10] Naseem, Editor of Maldivian blog Dhivehi Sitee
[http://www.dhivehisitee.com], 24.1.2013
[11] AFP dispatch on President Yameens statement , The Maldives will not
participate in a proposed military cooperation pact with the United States,
22.1.2015

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