Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective

Author(s): Mark R. Thompson

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jan., 1996), pp. 179-205
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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 Off the Endangered List
Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective

Mark R. Thompson

The Philippineshas long been on the "most endangeredlist" of new democracies.

There have been more coup attempts(eight) in the Philippines than in any other
"thirdwave" democratizer.'1 It is one of only a few states to still face a Communist
insurgency. Moreover, many civilian, noncommunist politicians were openly
disloyal to the government of Corazon C. Aquino, including her vice president,
Salvador H. Laurel. These political problems are compoundedby socioeconomic
difficulties. The Philippines is plagued by extreme poverty and inequality, high
debt, and low growth, as well as by ethnic conflict (not to mention the series of
naturaldisastersthat has aggravatedmany of these factors), leading it to be ranked
as one of the four new democracies outside of Africa facing the worst structural
woes.2 FormerPresidentAquino made little progressin remedyingthese problems:
the economy lagged ever further behind its fast growing neighbors in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and only very limited social,
particularlyland, reform was undertaken.Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and
John Higley in their comparative study of democratization described the
Philippines as "a graphic instance of a democracythat remains unconsolidated."3
Yet something peculiar happened on the way to what appeared to be the
inevitable breakdownof democracy in the Philippines. Since the failed December
1989 coup there have been no significant armed challenges to the democratic
regime. Instead, a dwindling New People's Army, a largely inactive Muslim
separatist movement, and a few isolated military rebels were self-destructing
throughinternalfactional struggles while negotiating from a position of weakness
with the government.Fidel V. Ramos's election as presidentin May 1992 was also
a clear sign of growing political stability. Although he won with the tiniest of
pluralities(23.6 percent), five of his six majoropponents conceded defeat, which
is quite unusual in a country where cries of electoral fraud are a long established
ritual. Ramos, whose Lakas-NationalUnion of ChristianDemocratspartywon less
thana fourthof the seats in the house of representativesand placed only thirdin the
number of senators elected, was nonetheless able to establish a working
relationshipwith both houses of congress.
The recent successes of Philippine democracy can be understood only in the
context of its previous difficulties. Relatively little has been written about the

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

Philippinetransitionthat puts it into comparativepolitical perspective.4One reason

for this neglect is that the Philippines is a problem child of the literature on
democratization. FerdinandE. Marcos was one of only very few "standpatter
dictators"in a wave of worldwide democratizationin which authoritarian-initiated
transition(often called regime extrication)was the dominantpath to democracy.5
As opposition to Marcos's regime mounted, he refused to begin the process of
democratization, and "the military as institution" did not force him to do so.
Marcos clung to power as long as he could because, unlike more institutionalized
dictatorships, the personal characterof his rule meant there were no collective
interests that could be saved once he relinquishedoffice. He had to be brought
down because he would never step down. Thus, democratizationin the Philippines
had a revolutionarylogic more similar to the fall of Duvalier in Haiti, the shah of
Iran, and Somoza in Nicaraguathanto most successful democratizations.For much
of the dictatorship it appeared that Marcos would be defeated by the armed
opposition and not the moderates. Democratization did not begin with
regime-opposition negotiations leading to founding elections but rather with the
"people power" revolt after rigged polls. Democratic legitimacy took longer to
establish and battles among oppositiongroups were bloodier in the Philippinesthan
in most other recent transitions.The legacy of the overthrow of Marcos explains
the troubled nature of Philippine democratization compared to authoritarian-
initiatedtransitions.
Philippine democracy was consolidated after the May 1992 elections, even if it
remainsrisk-prone.6Democratictransition,which is commonly distinguishedfrom
consolidation, had been completed earlier. A new constitution, overwhelmingly
approvedin February1987, establisheddemocraticproceduresand spelled out civil
liberties, while after the May 1987 congressional and January1988 local elections
all major politicians in the country were popularly elected (with Aquino herself
being widely seen to have been the winner of the February 1986 presidential
balloting). But continued armed challenges to the regime meant that democratic
consolidation, defined as strongpopularsupportfor democraticinstitutionsand the
absence of major disloyal opposition to the regime, had not yet been achieved.
While there is much evidence that Philippine democracy enjoyed popular
legitimacy after the success of "people power," the "overthrow"characterof the
Philippine transitionmade the establishmentof elite consensus difficult. Military
opponents continued to seek power, not just defend institutional interests. A
number of "moderate" politicians supported coup attempts against the regime.
Communistsremained revolutionaries,ratherthan adopting electoral means. But
concessions to the military hierarchy and limits on socioeconomic reform gave
Aquino's governmentthe time it needed to hold a series of elections that gradually
undermineddisloyal opposition and restoredthe pre-martial-lawrules of the game.
Dangers to the Philippine's currentstate of relative political tranquilityremain,

180
 Mark R. Thompson

however. While there is presently no major disloyal opposition, a large gap

between legitimacy and efficacy, or, to put it more simply, between democratic
government and good government, can allow the growth of antisystem forces,
particularlywhen poor performance comes to be perceived as political crisis.
Whether Filipino democracy can be sustained if the country does not progress
(particularlyeconomically) is the majorquestion facing Philippinepolitical leaders
today.
transitionstypical of democrati-
This article first contrastsauthoritarian-initiated
zation in institutionalizeddictatorshipswith the overthrowtransitionsnecessitated
by personalizednondemocraticrule. I then suggest that a standpatterdictatorship
advantagesarmedopposition and that in the PhilippinesCommunistinsurgentsand
military rebels often appearedto be Marcos's most importantenemies. Why the
moderate opposition could take power despite the overthrow character of the
transitionwill then be briefly discussed. The third and fourth sections concern the
transitionitself, the formerconcentratingon the challenges to and the latteron the
survival of the Aquino government. The conclusion discusses democratic
consolidation and potential threatsto democracy in the future.

Authoritarian-Initiated Transitions and Standpatter Dictators

While popularprotest against dictatorshipis usually the most spectacularaspect of

democratization,in most recent transitionsauthoritarianrulers themselves, though
often reactingto strongoppositionpressure,actually initiatedthe process of regime
change before being forced to do so. Many nondemocraticregimes decided that the
risks of holding on to power for too long were greaterthan the disadvantagesof
democracy. This calculation derived from the collective interests at stake in the
highly institutionalizedauthoritarianregimes of southernEurope, Latin America,
easternEurope, and East Asia, regardlessof whetherthey were militaryor civilian,
Communist or anticommunistin character.7"Overstaying"in power involved a
numberof dangersfor authoritarianrulers, from factionalizationwithin the regime
(that could eventually prompta coup attempt)to popular alienation (which could
ultimatelylead to an insurrection).By initiatinga transition,such hazardscould be
avoided, while hopes were high that at least some key interestscould be protected
under a democracy. Ex-authoritariansoften tried to win free elections (and when
defeated on their first try sometimes succeeded on the second, as in Lithuaniaand
Poland), to maintainthe status of a key state institution(for example, the "military
as institution"), to keep as many of their bureaucraticposts as possible, to avoid
prosecutionby the new regime, and/or to convert political power into economic
wealth. It was consideredbetter to give in and salvage something than to fight on
and perhapslose all.

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

The wisdom of an authoritarian-initiated transitionwas shown by the dangersof

overthrow. In the first transition of the current wave of democratization, in
Portugal in 1974, the Salazar-Caetanoregime clung to office despite its growing
unpopularityin and outside of government. It was toppled by a nonhierarchical
coup (the leaders of which were popularlycalled "the captains") that led to two
years of political instabilityas junior and senior officers, the militaryand civilians,
and radicals and moderates all clashed with each other. Portugal's difficulties
served as an admonition to dictators not to miss the chance of insuring an
institutionalized transition and influenced the development of the regime-
negotiated transition model in Spain, many Latin American countries, Poland,
Hungary,and much of French-speakingAfrica.8
But in the Philippines, as well as in Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, and Romania,
warningsto initiate a transitionbefore it was too late were ignored because of the
personalisticnatureof their regimes. Personal rule means there are few collective
interests that can be protected once power has been relinquished. Because they
serve no class, institutional, or other major social interests, personalistic
dictatorshipsenjoy little or no legitimacy outside of a small ruling circle of family
and friends. The politicizationof the economy favors the nouveauxriches in power
and antagonizes the "old wealth" which lacks political connections. Dictators are
little concerned about the professional standing of key state institutions because
they are organized on the basis of loyalty more than on competence. This
patrimonializationof the state makes the orderly removal of the dictator by the
militaryhierarchyor rulingpartyorganizationunlikely. Since authoritarian"family
affairs" alienate so many social groups, there is little hope the regime can win
competitive elections or retain an importantplace in society after the transition.
Once they leave office, personalisticdictatorsusually must go into exile (if they are
not killed before they can flee).
Marcos's dictatorship was one of only a handful of highly personalistic
dictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century.9 Although initially
enjoying considerablelegitimacy due to promisesof reform after the declarationof
martiallaw in 1972, supportfor the Marcosregime declined as corruptionmounted
and the circle of beneficiariesnarrowed.'0While the distributionof patronagehad
dominated politics before martial law, it had been tempered by democratic
constraints. With the advent of authoritarianism, restraints on personal
accumulationin high political office were removed.
Marcos's rule was centered aroundhis family and friends, who patrimonialized
state institutions and extorted wealth from society. After declaring martial law,
Marcos seized a number of his enemies' assets. Foreign investors (and several
Filipino firms) had to give 10-25 percentof their equity gratis et amore to Marcos
or one of his associates in order to receive necessary government permits.'1
Billions of dollars in foreign aid and loans to the Philippines ended up in private

182
 Mark R. Thompson

bank accounts, a majorcause of the country's debt crisis.'12Governmentfinancial

institutionswere looted, and the country's gold reserves mysteriously declined.'3
The first lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the second most powerful person in
government(controllingamong other things a majorministryand the governorship
of Metro Manila), was notorious for her extortive business behavior and
extravagantspending habits. Other Marcos-Romualdezfamily members also held
high state positions in the government or state-controlled corporations (which
increased in numberfrom sixty-five in 1970 to 303 in 1985), which they used for
personalprofit.'14The financialreach of the Marcoseswas furtherextendedthrough
a kind of subcontractingof corruptionto their close friends known as "crony
capitalism."'15
Armed forces chief of staff FabiranVer was not a military professional but a
"political" general whose fortunes were tied to Marcos's (Ver had once served as
his chauffeur).16 Thus, an internalmove by the militaryhierarchyagainst Marcos,
similarto the army's removalof the authoritariangovernmentin Argentinaafterthe
Falklands/Malvinasdebacle, was ruled out after the assassination of Aquino
destroyedthe Philippinepresident'scredibility. Personalismprecludeda transition
initiated from within authoritarianstructures, making the overthrow of Marcos
necessary for democratization.
Marcos did liberalize his rule somewhat in the face of crisis. He allowed more
press freedom and often tolerateddemonstrationsafter the lifting of maritallaw in
1981 and particularlyafter Aquino's killing in 1983. Elections were again held
regularlybeginning in 1978, and the 1984 legislative polls were more competitive
than previous ones. But unlike the Uruguayan military regime, which yielded
office after losing a constitutionalreferendumand presidentialelection, Marcos
had no intentionof letting himself be voted from power.17 He continuedto rig the
balloting to insure his hold on the presidency, and there were indications he was
planning a dynastic succession to perpetuatefamilial power.
When reformers win the upper hand against hardliners in institutionalized
dictatorships, they often begin by liberalizing authoritarianrule and, if social
pressureincreases, proceed to democratizethe regime. Reformerstake these steps
because they have interests that can be better protected under democratic
government than with repression of popular protest.18 However, due to the
personalistic nature of the Marcos regime, a move from liberalization to
democratizationin the Philippineswas blocked. Marcos lessened repression,not as
part of a reform effort, but as a strategic move in the face of mounting protest.
When demonstrationscontinued to grow, he did not initiate democratictransition
but instead planned a military crackdown because his "family business" was
dependent upon a continued monopoly on political power.'9 Personalistic rulers
like Marcos have usually remained standpatterdictators even after a political
opening has taken place.

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

Radical and Moderate Opposition in an Overthrow Transition

A growing literaturesuggests that highly personalisticdictatorshipsare particularly

vulnerable to revolutions led by the most radical elements in the opposition.20
Initiationof transitionsby reformerswithin institutionalizedauthoritarianregimes
usually privileges moderateoppositionistswilling to negotiate with the regime and
marginalizesradicals who insist upon its overthrow. But under personal rule the
probabilitiesare reversed. Standpatterdictatorsmust be toppled, and radicals, often
armed, seem in the best position to topple them.21
Armed revolutionary oppositions did not prosper under bureaucratic-
authoritarianregimes in South America in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Philippines
was the only country in Southeast Asia outside of Indochina with a major
Communist guerrilla insurgency during this period. In better institutionalized
authoritarian regimes, the military is sufficiently professional to subdue
revolutionarymilitias. The patrimonializationof the Philippine military undercut
its fighting effectiveness, antagonized much of the populace through arbitrary
repression, and thus helped transforma small Communistmovement into a major
revolutionarythreat. The New People's Army (NPA) grew from several hundred
fighters before martiallaw to 8,000 in 1980 and 20,000 in 1983 despite the near
tripling of the size of the armed forces during this same period.22Aside from
corrupting institutional military structures, General Veer concentrated the
military's elite battalions in Manila to protect Marcos, thereby sapping the
antiinsurgencyeffort in the countryside. Socioeconomic decay under Marcos-
declining real wages, rising rural poverty, growing landlessness, and rampant
corruption-also provided fertile ground for guerrilla growth. The Communists
capitalized on this explosive situation; their recruiting proved particularly
successful in coconut and sugar growing regions where "crony" monopolies kept
wages low.23 Impressedby the NPA's armed strengthand its allied "mass-based"
organizations, politicians opposed to Marcos began to work closely with the
Communists in "united front" activities, particularlyaround the boycott of the
fraudulent 1981 presidentialelections.24 In the early 1980s it appeared that the
Philippines was heading down a via revolucionaria much like Nicaragua's.
In reactionto the patrimonializationof the militaryand the rise of a revolutionary
challenge, dissidents within the armed forces are likely to conspire against the
regime.25Unable to achieve changes throughthe military hierarchy,they instead
plot a coup from the lower ranks. In the Philippines, defense ministerJuan Ponce
Enrile, whose authorityhad been underminedby General Ver, found a base of
supportamong junior officers upset by massive corruptionin the armed forces.26
Armed forces vice chief of staff Ramos, who had also been supplantedby Ver, was
well aware of the activities of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM).27

184
 Mark R. Thompson

RAM began to plot a coup in the early 1980s and planned to establish a junta, as
in Haiti after Duvalier's overthrow.
It has been suggestedthatthe key variablethatkept the Philippinesfrom succumb-
ing to a revolutionor coup was its democratictradition.'8It is truethat, comparedto
Haiti, Iran, and Nicaragua,where the topplingof personalisticdictatorshipsdid not
lead (at least directly) to the establishmentof democracy, the Philippines had a
relativelylong historyof politicalpluralismgoing back to the "colonialdemocracy"
of the Americanera.29But how did this political tradition,which was far from the
ideal type of democracy,prove useful in the antidictatorshipstruggle?
Theorists of political clientelism have stressed that a largely landed oligarchy
dominatedthe two major-ideologically identical and socially interchangeable-
parties that regularly alternated in power in post-World War II Philippine
democracy.30Both the Liberals and the Nacionalistas were based on patron-client
pyramids that stretched from national politicians to local leaders, who in turn
mobilized the poor peasantry. Characterizedby observers as "raw democracy,"
elections were expensive (they were based on material incentives, not ideological
debates) and violent (the economic stakes of holding political power were high).3'
Yet there were clearly defined rules of the game: the militarywas to stay neutral,
allowing a "balance of terror"between regime and opposition at the local level,
and the use of government patronage was limited by the state's small fiscal
capacity, giving the opposition a chance to compete through its own clientelist
networks. "Structural"explanations of the collapse of Philippine democracy,
stressingeither the country's worsening socioeconomic problemsor the rising costs
of clientelism, overlook the sturdinessof the Philippine political system until the
mid 1960s.32 As long as the incumbent president did not go too far in seeking
reelection and the opposition partyhad a good chance to win the country's highest
office (as it did in 1946, 1953, 1961, and 1965), Philippinedemocracydespite all
its weaknesses remainedstable. Democracybroke down when Marcos violated the
rules of the game during his legal presidency through unprecedentedelectoral
spending and election related violence. Marcos,used the ensuing polarizationof
Philippinepolitics to justify the declarationof martiallaw.33 Dictatorshipchanged
the rules altogether, as patronage-hungrylocal politicians henceforth had to
compete for presidentialfavor.
Although the restorationof elections in 1978 (however fraudulent)reactivated
the national political enemies of Marcos who had no chance to benefit from his
largess, the outrageafter the assassinationof Aquino in 1983 providedthe popular
supportthat old-guardpoliticians needed to offset Marcos's clientelist advantage.
This electoral road has seldom been taken against personalistic authoritarian
regimes. Unlike elite oppositionists in Nicaragua, who moved closer to the
Sandinistasafter the killing of Pedro JoaquinChamorro,opposition politicians in
the Philippinesbroketheircontacts with the radicalleft to participatein elections.34

185
ComparativePolitics January 1996

While Nicaraguan opposition politicians remained doubtful about the utility of

elections, Filipino oppositionists were confident they could build an antidictator-
ship movement aroundthe ballot box. This "moralist"side of Philippine politics
has been neglected in many studies of clientelism and "warlordism"in electoral
campaigns.35When oppositionists were widely outspent and violently intimidated
by incumbentsbefore martiallaw, they utilized their underdogposition to make
direct moral appeals to the electorate. Drawing on U.S. models of urbanreform
movements, they advocated, not populist politics against a corruptelite, but rather
a multiclass struggle "to save democracy" from abusive incumbents.36Such
campaigns drew on popular beliefs about good government and could even
overridethe greatermaterialrewardsoffered the electorateby the party in power.37
Similar to Ramon Magsaysay's Manicheancampaignrhetoricagainst incumbent
president Elpidio Quirino in 1953, Corazon Aquino portrayed her presidential
battle with Marcos as good versus evil.38 Seen from the perspective of clientelist
theory, Aquino had little electoral hope against her well funded (and armed)
opponent, what Filipinos call the "goons, guns, and gold" factor. But through
moral appeals she actually won the election, even if Marcos rigged the counting.39
The U.S. government's role was also important:it learned some valuable lessons
from the Nicaraguandebacle and skilfully encouragedthe traditionalopposition to
take part in elections held by Marcos.40Further,Marcos's dependenceon the U.S.
meant he had to take into account its sensibilities, which may have deterredhim
from dealing more harshlywith protestors. "People power" in February1986 was
not inevitable:the Enrile-RAMmilitarycoup could have succeeded, or, had it been
quickly crushed, a revolutionary alliance between politicians and Communists
might have been formed. But Aquino's massive campaign mobilization made her
supportcrucial in every opposition scenario. When the RAM coup was discovered,
the crowds thatformedto protectthe militaryrebels were pro-Aquino,insuringthat
she would be the victor of the anti-Marcosstruggle.

The Troubled Transition to Democracy

In most authoritarian-initiatedtransitionsa freely elected presidentor parliamentis
sworn in at a late stage of the democratizationprocess, after elections held under
new constitutional arrangements often negotiated between the regime and
opposition. Conflicts of legitimacy in the new order are often resolved or at least
significantly moderatedby election results. While there is sometimes a falling out
among former allies within the opposition after the end of authoritarianism,the
rules of the game are clear, and the winners at the polls have the undisputedright
to lead the new democraticsystem.
In the Philippines, however, Aquino's inaugurationon the last day of "people
power" on February25, 1986, was only the beginning of democratic transition.

186
 MarkR. Thompson

Marcos rigged the elections, the "results' of which his puppet parliament, the
Batasang Pambansa, duly ratified. The balloting was held in accordance with a
constitutionthat had been hand-tailoredto his dictatorship.Because Marcos would
not initiatethe transition,it had to be made againsthim, markinga legal breakwith
his regime. As Aquino said in a proclamationissued on March 26, 1986:

[T]he new governmentwas installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. .. .the
heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
constitution.... the directmandateof the people as manifestedby theirextraordinary
action demandsthe complete reorganizationof the government. ...4'

Such claims of revolutionarylegitimacy aroused opposition from "loyalists" to

Marcos who had enjoyed patronageand other privileges under the old political
order. Claiming that Aquino's cancellation of the constitution, abolition of
parliament, and replacementof local officials "elected" under the authoritarian
regime were illegal, pro-Marcos politicians and military officers led five coup
attempts timed to block each stage of development of the new electoral-
constitutionalorder.42Defense minister Enrile backed the "loyalist" claims and
secretly supportedtheir coup attempts in an effort to turn the followers of the
dictator he had helped topple into part of his new political base. Vice President
Laurel also behaved disloyally to the regime after he was denied much of the
political power promised when he withdrew his candidacy for the presidency in
favor of Aquino. Given the revolutionarynature of "people power," Aquino no
longer felt agreementsmade underthe old orderwere binding. Because it followed
the fall of Marcos and did not result from a negotiated settlement with the old
regime, Aquino's inauguration led to fierce battles, not only between her
government and the Marcos "loyalists," but also between former allies in the
opposition over the new rules of the political game.
The most serious challenge faced by Aquino came from her erstwhile
revolutionarypartners, the military rebels. The Enrile-RAM faction was not a
"normalcase" of a discontentedmilitary, if comparedwith Latin America, where
attemptsto punish military wrongs carriedout under dictatorshipoften threatened
the survivalof a new democracy.Several RAM memberswere reportedlynotorious
torturersand feared prosecution. The newly formed presidentialcommission on
humanrights was the most serious attemptunderthe Aquino regime to investigate
military abuses. Enrile and RAM not only tried to fend off government
investigationsof militarytortureand murderof civilians, but also continuedto plot
to seize political power. Reappointedas defense ministerinsteadof head of a junta,
as he had hoped, Enrile claimed that he and RAM were the rightful victors of the
anti-Marcos struggle.43 After RAM supported the "loyalist" coup plot in

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

November 1986, Enrile was fired as defense minister. But he remaineddangerous

because his "boys" in the militarystill threatenedthe regime. The bloody August
1987 and December 1989 RAM-led coup attempts were variations on the failed
February 1986 effort, showing not only the personal but also tactical continuity
between the anti-Marcosmilitaryrebellion and the RAM effort to topple Aquino.44
The two coup attemptscaused not just political chaos but severe economic harmas
well. A sturdypost-Marcoseconomic recovery was slowed by the first and stopped
by the second major RAM rebellion. The Philippines missed a major wave of
Japanesecapital investmentin SoutheastAsia because of the anti-Marcosunrestin
1985 and a second wave in 1987 due to coup attemptsas well as the kidnappingof
a Japanesebusinessman.45
Aquino released Communistprisonersupon assuming office as a repaymentof a
political debt after years of "united front" activity with the radical left against
Marcos. She also opened negotiations with the Communists in late 1986 despite
bitter opposition from the military. Nonetheless, Communist-ledguerrilla attacks
resumedtwo weeks afterAquino took power. Accordingto the party'sofficial line,
her regime representedno basic change from Marcos's, and after the break-off of
negotiations in early 1987 it became clear that the insurgentshad no intention of
ending their armed opposition.46Unlike in Spain, where a negotiatedtransitionto
democracy allowed the inclusion of Communists into the political system in
exchange for pledges of loyalty, Communists and moderate politicians who had
been allies in the anti-Marcosstruggle were now competitors for power after his
overthrow. The Communists, who had initially been the major group in the
anti-Marcos struggle, felt cheated by "people power" and redoubled their
countryside-basedinsurgency at a time when Aquino's hold on office seemed
tenuous.
Similar to Portugalafter the coup against Caetano, conservatives in the military
and radicals in the Communist party preyed on each other's extremist tactics in
order to underminethe electorally oriented center.47Marcos's rule had worsened
problemsof social injustice:landlessnesshad grown while workers'real wages had
declined. Seizing on these issues, the radical Kilusang Magbubukidng Pilipinas
(KMP, Philippine Peasant Movement) launched land seizures that angered local
landlordsand militarycommanders.48A KMP marchon the presidentialpalace to
press for agrarianreform in January 1987 was fired on by government soldiers
(later criticized by a presidentialcommission), killing over a dozen demonstra-
tors.49The laborunion closest to the Communists,the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU,
May First Movement), organized a series of strikes under the more liberal labor
laws established in Aquino's first year in power. Several RAM leaders were later
arrestedin connection with the killing of KMU leaderRolando Olalia in November
1986. RAM even used the massive left demonstrationprotestingOlalia's murderas
the fitting moment to back a "loyalist" coup attempt also timed to block

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 Mark R. Thompson

government-Communistpeace negotiations.50Later RAM tried to take advantage

of the polarizationcaused by the KMU supportedwelgang bayan (national strike)
in August 1987 by launchingits own first majorcoup attempt.The radical left, in
turn, refused to take sides during the military uprising, which it dismissed as a
contest between reactionaries.

How the Aquino Government Survived

The chief failure of the Aquino government,the lack of socioeconomic reform, is

related to its major success, the restorationof key democraticinstitutionsable to
survive several violent challenges. The 1991 coup against Haitian president
Jean-BertrandAristide showed the danger of trying to undertaketoo much reform
in the midst of political instability following an overthrow transition.51Aquino's
great popularitywould probablynot have been enough to save her governmentif
she had been opposed by a united militarybacked by the economic oligarchy. Her
governmentneeded enough allies among soldiers, businessmen, and landlordsto
fend off repeatedpower-grabsby militaryrebels. The compromises Aquino made
adversely affected the quality of the democracy being restoredin the Philippines,
but it gave her the breathingspace needed to seek democraticconsolidationslowly
throughelectoral means.
When the mortal danger posed by the Enrile-RAMfaction became clear to the
Aquino governmentin mid 1986, it began to reverse its critical stance towardsthe
military hierarchydeveloped during the anti-Marcosstruggle. While Ramos was
happy to be promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces by Aquino, he was
antagonizedby her release of Communistprisoners, rejection of his counterinsur-
gency plan, investigationsof humanrights violations by the armedforces, and cuts
in the defense budget. The distinction commonly made between "professional"
and "politicized" soldiers overlooks Ramos's own (recently fulfilled) political
ambitions,but it neverthelessdistinguishesbetween those who defend the "military
as institution" and those who plot to establish a military government. Aquino
yielded to Ramos's demandsjust in time, increasingthe defense budget in October
1986 only a month before a RAM-supported"loyalist" coup attemptnearly closed
militaryranks against her.52After negotiations with the Communistswere broken
off in early 1987, Ramos's proposal to launch an offensive against the insurgents
was implemented. Aquino's political courtship of Ramos also undercut the
effectiveness of the presidential commission on human rights: two years after
"people power," Amnesty Internationalreportedthatnot a single militaryor police
officer had been convicted of an offense committed during or after the Marcos
years.53In the aftermathof the November 1986 and August 1987 coup attempts,
Aquino dismissed several cabinet members considered "leftist" by the military.

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Ramos, then defense minister, was Aquino's key ally in the highly unstableperiod
between 1987 and 1990. Her endorsementof his (successful) presidentialbid in
1992 was a final act of gratitude.54
Calls for sweeping social change were lacking in Aquino's presidentialcampaign
againstMarcos. She concentratedher attacksinsteadon his personalcorruptionand
the need for political democracy. While Aquino and her inner circle showed little
interest in land redistributionduring her first year in office, the shooting of
demonstratorsprotesting for such change in front of the presidential palace in
January1987 led to a debate in the government. In May 1987 the cabinet action
committee issued a draftproposalof what would have been a majorreformeffort.55
But the plan aroused fierce opposition among conservative members of the
administrationand landowners(including Aquino's brother,Jose Cojuangco, Jr.).
Enrile allied himself with militant landlords, who were issuing threats and
establishing so-called private armies.56Aquino issued a watered down proclama-
tion on reform in mid 1987, which was furtherdiluted by congress in a bill passed
a year later. She had been strongly influenced by her executive secretary, Joker
Arroyo, who opposed reform in part because he was himself a landowner but
largely because he believed "that strong action on reform would create too many
enemies among the powerful in society."57One expert has arguedthat the Aquino
administrationfeared that "a more radical reform programmecould have driven
landownersto supportthe coup plotters."58
Under authoritarianrule, state-grantedmonopolies had come to dominate many
industries, a number of bankrupt "crony" firms had been taken over by the
government, and the domestic market had been heavily protected from foreign
goods. After Aquino's ascension to power, conditions seemed ideal to breakup the
monopolies, privatize "nonperforminggovernment assets," and open the country
to internationalcompetition. But it did not take long for resistance to develop
againstthe reforms. Privatizationwas slowed by managersappointedby the regime
to state firms, who began to enjoy the advantagesof public ownership.59The sale
of government-ownedbusinesses was also slowed by protractedlawsuits and weak
institutionalimplementation.While the dismantlingof monopolies established by
Marcos was generally popular, trade liberalization endangered the inefficient
import substitutionindustries of independent and "crony" businessmen alike.60
Not wanting to alienate the powerful industrialelite, Aquino allowed economic
reformto be repeatedlydelayed.61This lack of social and economic reformby the
Aquino governmentwas consistent with pre-martial-lawpatterns:land reform and
economic liberalizationwere thwartedby the oligarchy's resistance. Aquino and
her advisors apparentlyreasoned that large landownersand domestic industrialists
had again to be placated if political democracy was to be successfully restored.
Although Aquino had committed herself to removing U.S. militarybases in the
Philippinesat one point duringthe anti-Marcosstruggle, once in office she assured

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 Mark R. Thompson

the Americangovernmentthatthe currenttreatywould be honoredand negotiations

opened for a new one. Had Aquino called for the immediateremoval of the bases,
opposition to her regime within the Americangovernment(which mounted during
her administration'stalks with the Communists) might have reached the boiling
point.62Her "open options" strategyon the militaryinstallationsand the break-off
of talks with the Communists insured solid U.S. support during a period of
unstable democracy. After verbal backing for the governmentduring earlier coup
attempts, the U.S. governmentdirectly intervened in the midst of the December
1989 putsch (Americanjets flew over Manila, groundingrebel planes) and proved
decisive in the survival of the government. By the time the Philippine senate
rejected the base renewal treaty in 1991 against Aquino's by then openly probase
stance, she no longer needed U.S. supportto stay in power.63In fact, it could be
arguedthatthe Americanmilitarywithdrawalaided democraticconsolidationin the
Philippinesby removing a highly charged issue from the political agenda.
By delaying a decision on the U.S. bases, compromisingwith militaryhierarchy,
and yielding to elite pressures on socioeconomic reforms, Aquino won enough
internationaland domestic supportto withstandthe military challenge of the rebel
soldiers. Her political survival fell short of democratic consolidation, however,
until results at the ballot box replaced the rule of the gun.

A Risk-Prone Consolidation

In an overthrowtransition,the new administrationis not formed by winners of fair

elections afternegotiationswith the outgoing dictatorshipbut by the loose coalition
of forces that toppled the ancien regime. Not only does a provisional government
lack a legal basis, it often enjoys no democraticlegitimacy as it usually comes to
power through the bullet and not the ballot.64 When rulers continue to display
revolutionarycredentialslong after the fall of the dictator, democracy is doomed.
The claim is made that the people have spoken and therefore elections are
unnecessary(as in Cuba underCastro)or can be postponed(as in Nicaraguaunder
the Sandinistas). In Portugal, democratization was achieved only after the
acceptance of the voters' will by most of the political elite superseded the
revolutionaryrole claimed by some elements in the military and the Communist
party.
The Philippines was an unusual overthrowtransitionbecause revolutionaryand
electoral legitimacy went hand in hand. Aquino was (accurately)perceived as the
real victor of a fraudulentpresidentialelection, and the "people power" uprising
was seen as carrying out this expression of popular will. Nonetheless, Aquino's
official justification for her rule was based on revolutionaryclaims derived from
the popularinsurrectionagainstMarcos, not from the election he had held. But her

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

commitment to the restoration of electoral institutions finally prevailed as her

popularity forced even her disloyal opponents into the electoral arena and each
round of balloting peeled off anotherlayer of the antisystemopposition. After the
military rebels were finally defeated and the Communist insurgency weakened,
elections remainedthe only political game in town.
Thatpublic acceptanceof Aquino duringher first year in power was greatereven
than the outpouringof supportshe received during the election campaign against
Marcos is shown by the fact thatthe numberof Filipinos who expressed supportfor
her in late 1986 (87 percent) was higher than her estimated vote count in the
February 1986 presidential elections.65 Seventy-six percent of the twenty-two
million voters (with a turnoutof nearly90 percentof those registered)approvedthe
new constitution on February 2, 1987. Aquino and her foes agreed that the
constitutional referendumwas a vote on her presidency. While her slogan was
"Yes to Cory! Yes to Democracy! Yes to the Constitution!," her opponents'
rallying cry was "No to Cory! No to Communism!No to the Constitution!"66The
constitution'sratificationput an end to open attackson her democraticlegitimacy.
Even Enrile felt compelled to proclaim: "We accept the will of the people."67
With Aquino's right to rule no longer questioned, Enrile, Laurel, and the Marcos
"loyalists" returnedto the electoral arena. Activists close to the Communistparty,
wishing to take advantage of the "democratic space" created by Aquino and
fearing political isolation if they again opted for boycott, formed the Alliance for
New Politics, the first leftist political party to participatein elections since 1946.
Pro-Aquino candidates swept the May 1987 legislative polls. Of the twenty-four
senatorselected at large nationally,twenty-twoof her hand-pickedcandidateswon.
(Enrilewas one of the two oppositionwinners, finishing twenty-fourth.)The Lakas
ng Bansa alliance and several other parties closely identified with her
administration took 149 seats, or nearly three-fourths of the house of
representatives, with most of the rest going to her rightist opponents in the
pro-MarcosKBL and the pro-EnrileGrandAlliance for Democracy (see Table 1).
Although the commitment of Enrile, Laurel, the Marcos "loyalists," and the
Communists to democratic means proved to be temporary,their election battles
with Aquino showed they could not match her level of voter support. After
criticizing her provisional government's "dictatorial"actions, they were badly
defeated when they confrontedher on democraticterrain.When coup making and
guerrilla insurgencyresumed, there could no longer be any doubt about who was
the democratand who the would-be dictators.
Elections not only exposed disloyal opposition as a minorityposition; they also
led to the gradualreductionof its ranks. Disputes over patronagedistributionhad
been at the heartof much of the political controversyduringAquino's first year in
power. The abolition of parliamentand the replacementof local officials createda
sizable and powerful group of disgruntledpoliticians. Congressionalelections in

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 Mark R. Thompson

Table 1 Results of the May 1987 CongressionalElections by Political Affiliation and Party

PoliticalAffiliation Party SeatsWon

Pro-Aquino Lakasng Bansa 53

PDP-LABAN 37
UNlDO 26
LiberalParty 19
RegionalParties 9
Independent 5
Total 149
RightistOpposition Independent 17
NacionalistaParty 12
KBL 10
RegionalParties 5
GAD 3
Total 47
LeftistOpposition ANP 2

Key: PDP-LABAN(Partidong Demokratikong ng Bayan),UNIDO (United

Pilipino-Lakas
NationalistDemocraticOrganization), KBL(KilusangBagongLipunan),GAD (GrandAlliance
for Democracy),ANP (Alliancefor New Politics).
Note: Only95 of the winningcongressionalcandidatesregisteredunderone partylabel. 83
wereregisteredundermorethanone and22 wereindependent.Butcandidatesgenerallychose
thepartytheywere closest to as theirfirstpartylabelon the ballotwhichis thereforeused to
identifypartyaffiliation. The partyaffiliationof two candidateswerenot classifiedby the source
usedfor this table.
Source: AdaptedfromInstitutefor PopularDemocracy,Political ClansandElectoralPolitics
(Manila:IPD, 1987).

1987 and particularlylocal elections in 1988 allowed many pro-Marcospoliticians

who had been thrown out of power to get back in through elections. Aquino's
enemies had some chance to win office on their own (the rightest opposition won
nearly a fourth of congressional seats, as shown in Table 1), but there were also
good prospectsfor reconcilingwith the rulingcamp. In 1987, twenty-fourformerly
pro-Marcospoliticians won legislative seats in parties allied with the administra-
tion.68In the January1988 local elections, Aquino went so far as to endorse many
of the governorsand mayors she had replaced upon taking power, including some
unsavory "warlords."69Party switching or "turncoatism,"a prominentfeature of
the weakly institutionalizedpartiesof pre-martial-lawpolitics, returnedin full force
in the post-Marcosperiod.
The revival of old style electoral politics in the Philippineswas demonstratedby
a report which classified over 80 percent of congressmen elected in 1987 as
belonging to "traditionalclans."70 Elections, never inexpensive or peaceful in

193
ComparativePolitics January 1996

postwar Philippine history, remained expensive, blood-stained affairs under

Aquino, though less than duringthe Marcos period.7' While one study claims that
some of the "flawed electoral arrangements"of the Marcos period were employed
by Aquino's camp, the military remained largely neutral, and fraud, when it
occurred, was carried out at lower levels of government.72Electoral protests
received little media attention or public support. The Alliance for New Politics
faced substantialintimidationin the 1987 election, but it was probablynot the chief
reason for its overwhelming defeat. Left politicians, lacking experience, poorly
funded, and often badly organized, received only half-heartedsupport from the
Communist party, which remained committed to armed struggle.73 Elections
returned to the pre-marital-lawpattern of localized violence and decentralized
cheating, sure signs of intense competitionamong so-called traditionalpoliticians.
The May 1992 elections were a highpoint of elite consensus on participation.
Almost all major pro- and anti-Aquino political factions participated in the
elections at one level or another (nearly all elected offices in the country,
presidential,congressional, and local, were on the ballot). By deciding not to run,
Aquino surrenderedthe many advantages of incumbency. Although she used
government resources to help her presidential candidate, Ramos, two other
candidates were also identified with her administration:house speaker Ramon
Mitra, a long-time ally, and senate president Jovito Salonga, who supported
Aquino in 1986 but distanced himself from her administrationlater. Aquino's
bitterestrivals were also well-represented:Vice PresidentLaurel (who had openly
supportedthe 1989 coup), Marcos crony EduardoCojuangco (who had reportedly
helped finance it), and Imelda Marcos (who, along with her husband, was behind
several "loyalist" putsch attempts). (Enrile, the greatest coup-makerof all, won a
seat in the lower house of congress). The list of majorpresidentialcandidateswas
roundedoff by political newcomer MiriamDefensor-Santiago(see Table 2).
The multipartysystem developed in the post-Marcos era greatly split the vote.
Ramos received less than a quarterof the ballots cast. This fragmentationwas one
of the most notable differences from the pre-martial-lawpolitical system, although
its importanceshould not be exaggerated.74The inefficient electoral apparatuswas
overloaded by the number of contested offices and candidates vying for them,
delaying the official results until a month after the balloting. Despite the slow vote
count and tight finish, Ramos faced no major disloyal opposition upon assuming
the presidency. Though his party was in the minority in both houses, free flowing
patronagehelped elect a pro-Ramos speaker of the house, Jose de Venecia, Jr.
Ramos also struck deals with the president of the senate, Edgardo Angara, who
headed a rival political party, although recently conflicts between the two have
mounted.75Traditionalpolitical accommodationwas revived.76
Elite consensus aroundelections was formed at a time when armedopposition to
the regime declined sharply. Muslim secessionists, already substantiallyweakened

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 Mark R. Thompson

Table 2 Results of the 1992 Philippine Presidential Election and the Success of Each
Candidate'sParty in the CongressionalElections

Candidate Vote Senate House

Percentage Seats Seats

Fidel V. Ramos,Lakas-NUCD 23.58 2 44

MiriamDefensor-Santiago 19.72 - -
EduardoCojuangco,NPC 18.17 5 36
RamonMitra,LDP 14.64 16 87
ImeldaMarcos,KBL 10.32 - 4
JovitoSalonga,LP-PDP 10.16 1 8
SalvadorLaurel,NP 3.40 - 4

Key: Lakas-NUCD(Lakas-National Unionof Democrats),NPC (NationalistPeople's Coalition),

LDP (Labanng Demokratikong Pilipino),KBL(KilusangBagongLipunan),LP-PDP(Liberal
ng Demokratikong
Party-Partido Pilpino), NP (Nacionalista
Party).
Source: EckhardHofer, "Wahlenin den Philippinenam 11. Mai 1992, KASAislands
8 (1992).!,pp. 13-22.
Infonnrmation,

by the time Marcos fell, posed no major military threateven though negotiations
with the government in 1986-1987 collapsed; they were later revived with
Indonesia serving as mediator.77While Communist guerrillas could still harass
governmenttroops in the country's peripheryat the end of Aquino's presidency,
they lost considerableterritorialcontrol, and their armedstrengthdeclined from an
estimated25,800 fighters in 1988 to 13,500 in 1992.78A majorthreatin the early
1980s, the Communistsbecame merely a militarynuisance. Improvedgovernment
tactics (particularlythe redeploymentof crack governmenttroops used to protect
Marcos during the last years of his presidency) and arrests of several top
Communist leaders due to improved intelligence contributedto the contraction.
The Communistleadershipwounded itself throughhardlinetactics, bloody purges,
and splits between exile leaders and Philippine-based commanders. While the
internationaldecline of Communismhurtthe movement, the fall of Marcos and the
reestablishmentof democracywere also crucial variables. HistorianAlfred McCoy
arguesthat the Communists'"gains were the productof a short-termprotestagainst
a particularregime, Marcos," and not the result of structuralfactors in Philippine
society.79
While the Communistthreatgraduallyfaded, dissidents within the militarywere
swiftly defeated after the failed December 1989 coup. A series of arreststhinned
the rebel leadership, while the coup's ferocity undercutsupportin the military for
anothersuch fratricidalundertaking.Too weak to attackAquino directlyin Manila,
oppositionists in the military staged one more minor rebellion in Mindanao in
October 1990 that quickly collapsed.80After Ramos's victory in the presidential
election, the remainingrebels agreed to surrenderin exchange for amnesty.8l

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

Armed threats declined, and elite consensus began to form in the Philippines,
ironically at a time when CorazonAquino's popularityfell after a sharpdrop in the
regime's performancebeginning in 1987-1988. Although she continuedto enjoy a
plurality of public support, opinion polls showed mounting public dissatisfaction
with governmentcorruptionand the decline of public safety from 1987 to 1991.82
Most important, however, the economy performed poorly, reversing the steady
growth and low inflation during the early Aquino period. While GNP grew by
nearly 5 percent annuallybetween 1986 and 1988, it slowed to just over 2 percent
in 1990, then declined by almost 1 percent in 1991.83 Inflation surged from less
than 1 percent in 1986 to over 6 percent in 1988 to 18.7 percent in 1991.84Thus,
poverty, as measuredin absolute and self-ratedterms, stayed at high levels during
the Aquino years; a plurality of respondents said that the quality of their lives
deterioratedduring the Aquino administration.85
However, Aquino's legitimacy was based less on government performanceor
personal popularity than on the reestablishment of democratic institutions. A
crowd of over 100,000 demonstrated against those who would "destroy our
democracy" after the December 1989 coup attempt.86 The importance of
democracy was demonstratedby an opinion poll that showed that Filipinos were
opposed to her seeking a second presidential term, which many legal experts
believed unconstitutional, by a two to one margin.87 Persons and institutions
which behaved democratically, notably Aquino and congress, enjoyed public
support, while disloyal oppositionists, like Laurel, Imelda Marcos, Gregorio
Honasan (the RAM leader), and Jose Maria Sison (head of the Communistparty)
received consistently negative ratings.88Ramos's initial popularity ratings after
assuming the presidency were almost as high as Aquino's during her first year in
power. Rigoberto Tiglao argues that democracy has "taken root in the
Philippines . . . despite a perception among many Filipinos that the quality of
their lives has deteriorated."High satisfaction ratings are best explained not by
the actual performanceof congress or the presidentbut by "the democraticethos
they represent."89
Precisely this gap between efficacy and legitimacy makes democracy in the
Philippinesrisk-pronein the futureeven if it is stable at present. Poor performance
provides opportunities for nondemocratic political entrepreneurs.None of the
currentactors on the political stage in the Philippines seems capable of mobilizing
discontent at the moment. But the Philippines has the geographical "bad luck" of
being in the region with the world's highest growth rates, where development is
often valued above democracy.90The speech of former Singapore prime minister
Lee Kuan Yew to Manila businessmen in December 1992, which many observers
interpretedas a veiled call for a more authoritarianpolitical orderin the Philippines
modeled on its economically successful Southeast Asian neighbors, won the
supportof 70 percent of Filipino businessmen polled at the conference.9'

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 Mark R. Thompson

Conclusion

In comparativeperspective, the Philippines stands out in a number of respects.

The "Spanish model" of authoritarian-initiated transition, so influential in Latin
America and eastern Europe, was ignored by Marcos and his family-based
regime. Democracy offers little to personalisticrulers who have no interests that
can be protected outside of office. Rather, the Philippine experience was most
similar to countries where a revolution or a coup led to the replacementof one
form of authoritarianismby another. The Phillipines owed its entry into the club
of new democracies to the victory of "moderate" politicians over armed
opponents in the race to bring Marcos down. The transition in the Philippines
was "backwards"when comparedwith most recent cases. Instead of presidential
elections coming near the end of an institutionalized process of regime
transformation, the "revolutionary" aftermath of the February 1986 election
representedonly a (shaky) beginning of democratizationin the Philippines. The
outcome of "people power" did not settle the question of the type of government
and regime that would dominate the post-Marcos era. A political "state of
nature" prevailed until 1990: military rebels did not just protect institutional
prerogatives but sought political power, and Communist guerrillas did not lay
down arms but continued revolutionarystruggle. Aquino only narrowly escaped
being toppled, like Aristide in Haiti, by compromising with "professionals" in
the military, foregoing social reform, and placating the U.S. Democratic
consolidation was achieved as armed threats declined and elite consensus
emerged around elections.
The analysis of the Philippine's democratictransitionand recent consolidation
should be distinguishedfrom the problemsof democracy.A free press, competitive
elections, and power exercised by elected politicians are clear improvementsover
the Marcos dictatorship.But continuing human rights violations by the Philippine
military are undoubtedly the worst aspect of the country's current political
system.92 Unfortunately, such crimes committed by an otherwise democratic
government in the context of a civil conflict are not exceptional. Another major
failing of Philippine democracy is its coexistence with a highly oligarchic social
structure.A democraticpolitical system does not ensure greaterequality in society,
or "socialization" in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's terms.93
Substantialland and other kinds of socioeconomic reform, however necessary they
may be, have been rejectedby an elected congress. Although public opinion polls
reveal only limited popular concern about social inequality, widespread injustice
could lead to a resurgence of rebellion and insurgency, as has happened
periodicallythroughoutthis century,particularlyif political polarizationwithin the
elite reemerges.94At present, however, governmentcorruptionand weak economic
growthrankhighest among citizen complaints.95In short, the Philippinesmeets the

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

minimal criteriagenerally used to define democracy without achieving what most

observers would consider good government.
A key to stable democracyis the extent to which weak performance,particularly
in the economy, leads to system blame. Recent democratictransitionsin Portugal
and Spain occurred under poor economic conditions, but the people of neither
country attributed them to democracy.96 In the Philippines, the record of
democratic commitment is mixed. Since the fall of Marcos, the high opinion
ratings given democratic politicians despite declining living standardsspeaks for
stability. Although at the midpoint of the Ramos presidency the Philippine
economy is improving(with a growth rate of 5.1 percent in 1994, projectedat 6.5
percentin 1995), it has a long way to go to matchthe "miracle"economies of most
of its SoutheastAsian neighbors.97In the pre-martial-lawPhilippines, government
corruption and economic problems contributed to growing elite criticism of
democracy.98Political leadership has made the decisive difference between then
and now: Aquino's (and thus far Ramos's) commitment to democracy contrasts
with Marcos's destruction of it. However, if the Philippines does not achieve
sustaineddevelopment, the temptationto exploit this failure could again endanger
the country's democracy.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was presented at the EuropeanConference on Philippine Studies,
School of Orientaland AfricanStudies, London, April 13-15, 1994. I would like to thankJames Putzel,
Thomas Saalfeld, and three anonymousreviewers for helpful comments.
1. There are various "counts" of how many coup attempts there were, or more specifically what
should count as a militaryrebellion. I rely on the tally of a Philippinegovernmenttask force report,The
Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) (Makati: Bookmark, 1990),
adding to it a later putsch effort in October 1990. Greece experienced seven coup attemptsafter it
democratized, Argentina five, and Spain three. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratizationin the Late TwentiethCentury(Norman:Universityof OklahomaPress, 1991), p. 233.
2. Huntington, pp. 253-254. The other countries are Brazil, India, and Peru. In discussing the
Philippines' "contextual"problems, Huntingtonoverlooks the ethnic conflicts between Christiansand
Muslims and between lowlandersand mountaindwelling peoples.
3. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Elite Transformationsand Democratic
Regimes," in John Higley and RichardGunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin
America and SouthernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992), p. 5.
4. Two essays on the Philippines have been included in multicountrystudies of democratization:
David Wurfel, "Transitionto Political Democracyin the Philippines:1978-1988," in Diane Ethier, ed.,
Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia
(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 110-136; and Karl D. Jackson, "The Philippines:The Search for a
Suitable Democratic Solution, 1946-1986," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin
Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp.
231-265.
5. The term "standpatterdictator"is drawn from Huntington.On authoritarian-initiated transitions,

198
 Mark R. Thompson

see paths four through six in the typology of Alfred Stepan, "Paths toward Redemocratization:
Theoretical and ComparativeConsiderations," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and
LaurenceWhitehead,eds., Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule: ComparativePerspectivles(Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 64-84. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C.
Schmitter, Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule: TentativeConclusions about Uncertain Democracies
(Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), offers a theoretical model of extrication to
explain transitions in southern Europe and Latin America, where this type of democratizationwas
dominant. Huntington,pp. 113-114, chartsdemocratizationsup to 1990, showing how what he terms
transformationwas the most common form of democratization.There is to my knowledge no systematic
study of transitionssince then, but it appearsthat many of the democratizationsin sub-SaharanAfrica
have been regime-initiated;by late 1993 seventeen postdictatorshipelections had been held in Africa,
although some, as in Kenya, were probablyrigged. See "Democracy in Africa: A Lull in the Wind,"
Economist, Sept. 4, 1993, pp. 46-49.
6. I draw on the phrase "risk-prone configuration" developed by Luis E. Gonzalez, Political
Structuresand Democracy in Uruguay(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 161.
His argument that enduring problems in consolidated democracies can lead to the rise of disloyal
opposition is worthy of broaderapplication.
7. On types of authoritarianismsee Linz, "Totalitarianand AuthoritarianRegimes," in Nelson
Polsby and Fred Greenstein, eds., Handbookof Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading: Addison-Wesley,
1975), pp. 175-411.
8. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Democratic Transitionsand Consolidation:Eastern Europe
and Latin America (forthcoming),ch. 7.
9. Mark R. Thompson, "From 'Raw Democracy' to 'Conjugal Dictatorship':The Sultanizationof
Politics underMarcos," in JuanJ. Linz and H. E. Chehabi, eds., SultanisticRegimes (forthcoming).A
similar argument,using different Weberianterminology, is made by Paul Hutchcroft, "Oligarchsand
Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of PatrimonialPlunder," WorldPolitics, 43 (April 1991),
429-434. In the second half of the twentieth century, only the rule of perhaps a half dozen highly
personalistic regimes in sub-SaharanAfrica, the Shah in Iran, Trujillos in the Dominican Republic,
Duvalier in Haiti, and to some extent Batista in Cuba and Stroessner in Paraguaycould be termed
"sultanistic."
10. On the Marcos regime in the 1970s see David A. Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial Law
(Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress, 1979); also, Belinda A. Aquino, Politics of Plunder: The Philippines
under Marcos (Manila:Great Books Trading, 1987).
11. See Rigoberto Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," in Aurora Javate-de Dios,
Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's
Power (Manila:Conspectus, 1988), p. 41. Also see Aquino, pp. 57-62.
12. StephanHaggard, "The Political Economy of the PhilippineDebt Crisis," in JoanM. Nelson, ed.,
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustmentin the ThirdWorld(Princeton:Princeton
University Press, 1990), pp. 215-55; and Aquino, pp. 63-69.
13. Aquino, pp. 69-74; and Mark R. Thompson and Gregory Slayton, "An Essay of Credit
Arrangementsbetween the IMF and the Republicof the Philippines:1970-1983," Philippine Review of
Economics and Business, 22 (March-June 1985), 75-76. The central bank began to "dress up" its
statisticsin the early 1980s to cover the looming debt crisis as well as "anomalies"in its own ranks. See
EmmanuelS. De Dios, "The Erosion of the Dictatorship,"in Javate-deDios et al., eds. pp. 109-111.
14. Aquino, p. 28.
15. On "crony capitalism" see EmmanualS. de Dios, ed., An Analysis of the Philippine Economic
Crisis: A WorkshopReport (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, School of Economics, 1984);
Walden Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson, eds., DevelopmentDebacle: The WorldBank in the
Philippines(San Francisco:Institutefor Food and DevelopmentPolicy, 1982); Hutchcroft;and Aquino.

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ComparativePolitics January 1996

16. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), p. 107.
17. Charles Guy Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991). In a numberof other cases (Brazil, Chile, Hungary,
Poland, Benin, and Zambia)institutionalizednondemocraticregimes accepteddefeat in elections andlor
plebiscites. Although regularelections and referendumsduring the Marcos dictatorshipdistinguish it
from personalisticrule in Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, and Romania, where they were held less frequently,
the Philippinetransitionremaineduninstitutionalizedbecause Marcosroutinelyrigged ballotingand did
not accept election results when cheating failed.
18. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991), ch. 2.
19. Marcos's plannedrepressionis a forgottenchapterof "people power." Before the February1986
presidentialelection, GeneralVer, in a plan dubbed "OperationEverlasting"(referringto the hoped-for
durationof the Marcosdictatorship),drew up lists of oppositioniststo be arrestedand arrangedfor them
to be imprisonedon an island near Corregidor.See Bryan Johnson, The Four Days of Courage: The
Untold Story of the People WhoBroughtMarcos Down (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 26-27;
Cecillo T. Arillo, Breakaway:The Inside Story of the Four-Day Revolutionin the Philippines, February
22-25, 1986 (Manila:CTA Publishers, 1986), p. 8; IsabeloT. Crisostomo, Cory:Profile of a President
(Quezon City: J. Kriz, 1986), p. 202; and Lucy Komisar, Corazon Aquino: The Story of a Revolution
(New York: George Braziller, 1987), p. 109.
20. See RichardSnyder, "ExplainingTransitionsfrom NeopatrimonialDictatorships," Comparative
Politics, 24 (July 1992), 379-400.
21. ODonnell and Schmitter, pp. 32-33.
22. On rebel strengthsee James Clad, "Betting on Violence,' Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec.
17, 1987, p. 35. The Philippine military grew from 54,100 troops in 1972 to 156,300 in 1980. See
Kessler, pp. 108-109. On the growth of the Communists, see Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution:Inside
the Philippine Guerrilla Movement(Boulder:Westview Press, 1989).
23. See Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export (Ithaca:
Cornell UniversityPress, 1987), p. 82, 100-101; and Gary Hawes, "Theoriesof PeasantRevolution:A
Critiqueand Contributionfrom the Philippines," WorldPolitics, 42 (January1990), 277.
24. See Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic
Transitionin the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), ch. 6.
25. Snyder, pp. 379-383.
26. On the development of military opposition, see The Final Fact Finding Report; Johnson, pp.
36-44; and Sandra Burton, Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished
Revolution (New York: Warner Books, 1989), ch. 12. Two interesting "inside" accounts are Col.
Hector M. Tarrazon,After Edsa . . ., vol. 1 (Manila:Hector Tarrazona,1989); and Arillo.
27. One of the puzzles of "peoplepower" was why GeneralRamos "spontaneously"acceptedEnrile's
invitationto join the RAM rebels in a Quezon City militarycamp after the discovery of the putsch plan.
In an interview with the author in Quezon City on August 1, 1989, RAM advisor and close Ramos
confidantGen. Jose Almonte spoke of Ramos's knowledge and supportof the rebel group's activities.
28. Barry Rubin, ModernDictators (New York: New American Library, 1987), p. 79.
29. This term is drawn from Ruby Paredes, ed., Philippine Colonial Democracy (Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989).
30. See Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippines Politics (New
Haven: SoutheastAsian Studies, Yale University, 1965).
31. StanleyKarnow, In Our Image: America's Empirein the Philippines(New York:RandomHouse,
1989), p. 360.
32. For a helpful summary,see David A. Rosenberg, "Introduction:Creatinga 'New Society,' " in

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Rosenberg, ed. See Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder, "Clientelist Politics in the Philippines,"
American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974), 1147-1170, on the flaws of Philippine
clientelism as responsiblefor the collapse of democracy.
33. Thompson, The Anti-MarcosStruggle, ch. 2.
34. Shirley Christian,Nicaragua: Revolutionin the Family (New York: Vantage, 1986), pp. 54-58.
35. An exception is ArthurAlan Shantz, "Political Parties:The ChangingFoundationsof Philippine
Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1972), p. 98.
36. Nearly fifty years of colonialism led to a transplanatationof much of U.S. political culture in the
Philippines.While one side of Filipino politics was modeled on reformism,anothermirroredits corrupt
features. As PhilippinesenatorClaro M. Recto remarkedin 1951: "We seem to find our models, which
we have already surpassed, in those American political machines, with their Tweeds, Hagues,
Pendergasts,and Huey Longs. ..." Quoted in Teodoro M. Locsin, "JudgmentDay," Philippines Free
Press, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 3. Two years later Recto was involved in Magsaysay's campaign, which
resembledAmericanurbanreform.
37. Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton, The Matrix of Policy in the
Philippines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 36, showed that the most important
criteria in casting votes was "honesty of a candidate," which ranked substantiallyabove "help given
your area."
38. See Mark R. Thompson, "Cory and 'the Guy': Reformist Politics in the Philippines," UFSI
Reports, 16 (Indianapolis:Universities Field Service International,1988-1989).
39. Raul P. de Guzman and Luzviminda G. Tancangco, An Assessment of the 1986 Special
Presidential Elections: A Study of Political Change through People Power, Vols. 1-2 (Manila:
University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration,1986).
40. Raymond Bonner, Waltzingwith a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of AmericanPolicy
(New York:Times Books, 1987), pp. 355-440. Despite Bonner's critical tone, his account makes clear
that "people power" was a success from the vantage point of U.S. policymakers.
41. PresidentCorazon C. Aquino, ProclamationNo. 3, "Declaring a National Policy to Implement
Reforms Mandatedby the People ProtectingTheir Basic Rights" (Manila:March 25, 1986), reprinted
in Javate-deDios, et al., eds., pp. 764-765.
42. Putsches were attemptedin July 1986, shortly after Aquino's appointmentof commissioners to
write a new constitution;in November 1986, to preemptgovernmentnegotiationswith the Communists
and to reconvene the abolished parliament;in January1987, to stop the constitutionalreferendum;in
April 1987, to preemptcongressional elections a month later; and in July 1987, to pave the way for
Marcos's returnto the Philippinesbefore local elections at the beginning of the following year.
43. This claim explains why Enrile blocked the filming of a television film, "A Dangerous Life,"
about "people power" in Manila, forcing the moviemakers to go to Sri Lanka to finish production.
Rodney Tasker, "Historyby Docu-drama,"Far Eastern EconomicReview, Feb. 16, 1989, pp. 38-39.
44. The Final Reportof the Fact-FindingCommission,pp. 475-492. The October 1990 coup attempt
in Mindanao was also linked to RAM. John McBeth, "Suspect Loyalties," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Oct. 25, 1990, pp. 15-16.
45. RigobertoTiglao, "Seeing the Light: After Years of Instabilityan Era of GrowthBeckons," Far
Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 3, 1992, pp. 33, 35.
46. Gareth Porter, "The Politics of Counterinsurgencyin the Philippines: Military and Political
Options," PhilippineStudies Occasional Paper, 9 (Honolulu:Centerfor PhilippineStudies, Centersfor
Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987), pp. 42-9.
47. KennethMaxwell, "Regime Overthrowand the Prospectsfor DemocraticTransitionin Portugal,"
in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitionsfrom
AuthoritarianRule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.
109-137. Of course, a major difference between Portugaland the Philippines was that in Portugalthe

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Communistscooperatedwith the radicalwing of the military,whereas in the latterthe armedforces and

guerrillarebels remainedenemies (largely due to the bloody insurgency). Only after the failure of the
December 1989 coup did a RAM-linkedgroup, the Young Officers Union (YOU), proclaimsympathy
with several ideas close to the Communist program, particularlyopposition to U.S. bases, largely
because of the role of U.S. jets in the Aquino regime's victory over the military dissidents.
48. Accordingto the KMP, 50,000 hectaresof abandoned,sequestered,and idle lands were seized by
landless farmersin 1986-1987. Landlordand governmentbitternessabout these seizures was evident in
agrarianreform legislation which disqualified all farmerswho had illegally occupied land. See James
Putzel, A Captive Land:The Politics of AgrarianReformin the Philippines (London:Catholic Institute
for InternationalRelations, 1992), p. 250, n. 8; and "FarmersHit DisqualificationBid," Manila Times,
July 10, 1987, p. 2.
49. Office of the President, Report of the Citizens' Mendiola Commission, February 27, 1987,
reprintedin Javate-de Dios, et al., eds., pp. 789-793. It is still unclear what exactly happened at
Mendiola, but there was obviously little effort at moderationon the part of either the military or the
peasantmarchers.The consequencesof the massacrewere one-sided, however, in terms of casualties as
well as legal consequences. While the commandingmilitaryofficers were merely reprimanded,KMP
leader Jaime Tadeo was chargedwith sedition and later imprisonedon an ostensibly unrelatedcharge.
50. For former National Bureau of Investigationdirector Antonio Carpio's sworn testimony on the
RAM link to the Olalia killing, see The Final Reportof the Fact-Finding Commission,p. 151. Also see
"Enrile Ex-aides Held for Murder,"Philippine News, Mar. 2-8, 1988, pp. 1-2; and " 'Gringo' Also
Held in Olalia Case," Philippine News, Mar. 9-15, 1988, pp. 1, 15.
51. Aquino and Aristidehardlycould have been more differentin termsof their social backgroundand
political views: the former was a leading member of the Philippine "oligarchy" with a generally
conservative socioeconomic outlook; the latter was a provincial priest who promised major social
change. But both took power in a volatile political environmentwhere even the possibility of substantial
reform strengtheneddisloyal opposition to the government.
52. The Final Reportof the Fact-Finding Commission, pp. 146-158.
53. Cited in John Andrews. "The Philippines:A Question of Faith," The Economist, May 7, 1988,
p. 12.
54. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Payment in Full: Aquino Backs Ramos as Candidate for President," Far
Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 6, 1992, pp. 11-13.
55. On the Aquino government'sinitially hesitantstance on land reform, see Putzel, ch. 6; and on the
cabinet debate and the May 1987 draft, ch. 7. Also see James Clad, "Rhetoric and Reality," Far
Eastern Economic Review, Mar. 5, 1987, pp. 32-34.
56. Putzel, pp. 228-234; Jose Galang, "Resistanceto Reform," Far Eastern Economic Review, June
25, 1987, p. 31.
57. Putzel, p. 248.
58. RigobertoTiglao, "Window Dressing," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 5, 1991, p. 20.
59. Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Debt Crisis," p. 255; Stephan Haggard, "The
Philippines:Picking Up after Marcos," in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Promise of Privatization(New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 91-121.
60. Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Debt Crisis," pp. 245-255.
61. See RigobertoTiglao, "Failureto Meet the Need for Change," Far Eastern Economic Review,
June 13, 1991, pp. 40-41. A March 1992 World Bank reportarguedthat this failed liberalizationleft
"deep underlyinginefficiencies" in the structureof the economy, which was one of the chief causes of
the country's poor overall economic performanceduring Aquino's presidency. Quoted in Alfredo P.
Hernandez, "Fight againstPoverty as Failure-World Bank," Philippine Daily Globe, Mar. 30, 1992,
p. 21.

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62. Jones, pp. 166-167, reportsthat, while Aquino was negotiating with the Communists, the CIA
prepareda contingency plan to supporta coup against her.
63. American-Philippinerelationscooled after the Philippine senate refused to ratify the bases treaty,
but the pain of militarywithdrawalwas eased somewhatby the end of the cold war and the eruptionof
Mount Pinatubo, which renderedone of the two major American installationsunusable. In the former
Subic naval base, a joint venture with the Taiwan governmentfor a 300 ha. industrialpark for light
manufacturingis being set up to attractforeign investmentto help offset the heavy financial losses after
the Americanwithdrawal.
64. See Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, eds., BetwveenStates: Interim Governments in Democratic
Transitions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995); Mark R. Thompson, "Democracy after
Sultanism:The TroubledTransitionin the Philippines," in H. E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, Politics,
Society, and Democracy: ComparativeStudies (Boulder:Westview Press, 1995), pp. 333-336.
65. MaharMangahas,"People's Evaluationthe Bottom Line," The Manila Chronicle, June 29, 1992,
p. 4.
66. James Clad, "Cory's ConstitutionalGamble," Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 29, 1987,
p. 21.
67. James Clad, "Vote for Stability," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 12, 1987, p. 10.
68. Eric U. Gutierrez,Ildefonso C. Torrente,and Noli G. Narca, All in the Family: A Studyof Elites
and Power Relations in the Philippines(Quezon City: Institutefor PopularDemocracy, 1992), p. 25. In
addition, two relatives of prominent (ex-) pro-Marcospoliticians were elected in alliance with the
Aquino administration.
69. Matt Miller, "PhilippineLocal Vote Greases the Wheels for 1992 PresidentialRace," The Asian
Wall Street Journal Weekly,Jan. 25, 1988, p. 23.
70. Gutierrezet al., p. 25.
71. Only forty-eight election related killings were reported in the 1987 congressional elections,
comparedto 348 in 1984. Raul P. De Guzman and LuzvimindaG. Tancangco, An Assessment of the
May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections: A Summary of Findings (Manila: University of the
Philippines, Public School of Administration,1985); James Clad, "On Cory's Coat-tail," Far Eastern
Economic Review, May 21, 1987, pp. 12-13.
72. Luzviminda G. Tancangco, The Anatomy of Electoral Fraud: Concrete Bases for Electoral
Reforms (Manila: Matrix, 1992). For a critical review see Armando Doronila, "Matterof Fact, Not
Motive," The Manila Chronicle, Mar. 14, 1991, pp. 1, 9.
73. ANP senatorialcandidateand former NPA leader BernarbeBuscayno claimed that the "national
democrats'" full potentialwas not mobilized in supportof the candidatesor democraticpolitics and that
patronage, of which the left was short, proved crucial during the campaign. Olle Tornquist,
"Communists and Democracy in the Philippines," paper presented at the EuropeanConference on
Philippine Studies 1991, Amsterdam,April 22-25, 1991.
74. Philippine politics has always been highly factionalized, and third parties have been common.
Primarilythe electoral law penalized all but the Nacionalistasand Liberalsby preventingother parties
from overseeing the vote counting, an essential safeguardin Philippinepolitics, and kept other parties
from becoming well-established. In the post-MarcosPhilippines, by contrast, all partiescan participate
in poll-watching. See Masataka Kimura, "Philippine Political Parties and the Party System in
Transition:Leaders, Factions and Blocs," Pilipinas, 18 (Spring 1992), 43-65. Elections weed out
weaker factions, which may lead to a gradual reduction in the number of significant parties. For
example, the Marcos "loyalist" (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) and the pro-Laurel(Nacionalista) parties
lost political importancebetween 1987 and 1992.
75: The senate is (and was before martiallaw) the major stumbling block for Philippine presidents.
Elected nationwide, senatorscan not be as easily satisfied by pork-barrelprojectsas constituent-bound

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congressmen. In addition, senators "share" the nationalelectorate with the presidentand many (if not
a majority)of the currenttwenty-foursenatorshave presidentialambitions.
76. For the May 1995 congressional elections, many former opposition politicians, including even
former senatorand now representativeEnrile, are trying to jump on Ramos's bandwagon,as the ruling
LiberalDemocraticPartyis expected to sweep the elections. Rodney Taskeer, "All Aboard:Opposition
PoliticiansFlock to the Ramos Bandwagon,"Far EasternEconomicReview, Feb. 16, 1995, pp. 18-19.
77. 'The TortuousTrek for Peace," The PhilippineStar, Sept. 7, 1994, p. 7. While the government
negotiates with the Moro National LiberationFront (MNLF), it continues to fight breakawayMuslim
groups, such as the Moro Islamic LiberationFront(MILF)and the Abu Sayyaf group, whose campaign
of murderand kidnappingled to a small-scale war in June 1994.
78. Far EasternEconomic Review, Asia Yearbook1993 (Hong Kong: Review PublishingCo., 1992),
p. 192.
79. Alfred McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution: Filipino Elite Factions and the Struggle for
Power," in Peter Krinks, ed., The Philippines under Aquino (Canberra:AustralianStudies Network,
1987), p. 32.
80. McBeth, pp. 15-16.
81. Joaquin G. Bernas, S. J., "Reading the Pact with the Rightist Rebels," The Manila Chronicle,
Dec. 29, 1992, p. 5. Among the new democracies, it is highly unusualto have a formergeneral as the
elected leader of the country. However, whereas in Latin America democratization involved an
institutionalizedtransitionfrom a military regime, in the Philippines it followed the overthrow of a
civilian, and General Ramos's rise to power was directly related to the popularityhis "professional"
faction in the armedforces gained by defeating several militarycoups.
82. Aquino's net approval rating (those satisfied minus those dissatisfied) in the Social Weather
Survey declined from 71 percent in October 1986, to 35 percent in October 1987, to 29 percent in
September 1989, and 7 percentin April 1992. MaharMangahas, "Scanningthe Social Environment,"
The Manila Chronicle, Nov. 25, 1991, p. 4.
83. Computedfrom RobertS. Dohner, "Aquino and the Economy: An Assessment of the First Three
Years," Pilipinas, 11 (Fall 1988), 26; Far EasternEconomic Review, Asia Yearbook1992 (Hong Kong:
Review Publications, 1991), pp. 6-7; and Asia Yearbook1993, pp. 6-7.
84. Dohner, p. 26; Asia Yearbook1993, pp. 6-7.
85. MaharMangahas, "Warvs. Poverty Flying Blind," The Manila Chronicle, June 22, 1992, p. 4;
RedemptoAnda, "Survey Shows Life HarderunderAquino," The Manila Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1992,
pp. 1, 6.
86. Associated Press, "CrowdsCheerCory," The News-Times(Danbury,Connecticut),Dec. 9, 1989,
pp. 1, 20.
87. MaharMangahas, "Who Wants a Cory Reelection?," The New Chronicle, Oct. 28, 1991, p. 4.
The 1987 constitution establishes a six year presidentialterm without reelection, but it was unclear
whetherthis provision applied to Aquino, who assumed office before the constitutionwas approved.
88. MaharMangahas, "Veritably,a Honeymoon," The Manila Chronicle, Oct. 7, 1992, pp. 27, 36;
MaharMangahas,"Surveyson the Peace Process," The Manila Chronicle, Apr. 19, 1993, p. 5; Mahar,
Mangahas, "ImeldaNot Yet Forgiven," The Manila Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1991, p. 4.
89. Tiglao, "Poorerbut Free," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 5, 1991, p. 18.
90. See MarkR. Thompson, "The Limits of Democratisationin ASEAN," ThirdWorldQuarterly, 14
(1993), 469-484.
91. Alex Magno, "A Signal of Great Despair," The Manila Chronicle, Dec. 5, 1992.
92. Some commentatorsargue that the protectionof civil liberties is slowly improving, in large part
because of the decline of the Communistinsurgency. See Conradode Quiros, "HumanRights Day,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer,Dec. 11, 1993, p. 5.
93. O'Donnell and Schmitter, TentativeConclusions about Uncertain Democracies, pp. 11-14.

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94. The Sakdalistasin the 1930s, the Huks in the 1940s and early 1950s, the Moro NationalLiberation
Front in the 1970s, and the NPA beginning in the late 1960s all emerged during periods of intense
contestationbetween leadingpolitical factions and parties. Anti-Marcospoliticianshad close ties to both
the Muslim and Communistrebels.
95. Pollutionand criminalityare also majorconcerns, but the Communistrebellion and militarycoups
have diminished substantially.D. Villadolid, "ChurchSurvey Shows Ecology, Graft, Weak Economy
Concern Filipinos Most," Veritas, July 16, 1990.
96. Linz and Stepan, chs. 6, 7.
97. Tasker, "All Aboard,"p. 18. In addition, Ramos has implementedseveral key economic reforms,
including privatization of several government-owned corporations, new taxes (for a chronically
underfundedstate), and infrastructureprojects (particularlyfor much needed additionalelectric power
generation).
98. The initial legitimacy of Marcos's authoritarianismwas based on its promise of greater
technocraticefficiency. It is unclear whether its failure discredited dictatorshipor only the Marcos
regime. As one prominent Philippine economist/businessman told me in a discussion about
authoritarianism among the newly industrializedcountriesof SoutheastAsia: "It's not dictatorshipthat's
the problem, it's that we had the wrong dictator."

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