Motion To Extend Time SC14-1637, Gillespie V The Florida Bar

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Petitioner pro se (nonlawyer),
CASE NO.: SC14-1637
VS.
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Respondent.
_________________________________ /
Petitioners Motion to Extend Time
1.
The Petitioner, Neil J. Gillespie, a nonlawyer person with disabilities reluctantly
appearing pro se, henceforth in the first person, moves to extend time under Fla. R. App. P.
9.300(a), and Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514, and states:
2.
This Courts ORDER entered January 27, 2015 (Exhibit A) held,

In reviewing our records, we note that your case is subject to dismissal for failure to
comply with this Court's direction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.410.
We have not received the proper petition for writ of mandamus in accordance with this
Court's order dated December 12,2014. Failure to file the above referenced documents
with this Court within fifteen days from the date of this order could result in the
imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the petition.
Please understand that once this case is dismissed, it may not be subject to reinstatement.
3.
Under Fla. R. App. P. 9.300(a), Motions, and Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514, Computing and
Extending Time, I respectfully request the Supreme Court extend time to file a proper petition
for writ of mandamus.
4.
In support of this motion to extend time, I have been reluctantly appearing pro se in the
wrongful foreclosure of my home in Marion County, Florida which has taken considerable time.

February 19, 2015
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Neil J. Gillespie, et al., Marion County Florida, Fifth
Judicial Circuit, No. 42-2013CA-000115-AXXX-XX, a.k.a. case no. 2013-CA-000115.
Wrongful home foreclosure on a HECM reverse mortgage.
5.
I emailed the Clerk of the Supreme Court about the following:

A.
Email February 6, 2015 to determine if the Order at Exhibit A was subject to Rule
2.514(b) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration adding 5 days time to respond.
B.
Email February 11, 2015, inter alia: (Exhibit B)
As a practical matter, I have been overwhelmed with work in my foreclosure case and
would not be able to submit anything today. Case SC14-1637 was opened on my inquery
letter about Florida Bar records. During the course of working on that issue, I found a
number of systemic problems with TFB. Separately the ADA Amendments Act 2008
issue came to my attention, along with Marion County/Fifth Judicial Circuit's refusal to
comply with the old ADA 1990, let alone the current ADA. The response of Mr. David
for OSCA, who I understand represents the interest of the Supreme Court, shows no
intention of willing compliance with the ADA as amended.
Notwithstanding the records I initially sought in SC14-1637, TFB has fatal systemic
issues, and the state of Florida does not acknowledge the ADA Amendments Act, or
comply with the ADAAA. So there are essentially two cases now, TFB and the ADAAA.
If SC14-1637 is still open Tuesday Feb-17-2015, I will submit a petition consolidating
the issues. Attached are two close-out letters I got from TFB yesterday for my complaint
against Ms. Parsons. Given the limited jurisdiction, inter alia, of the grievance system,
TFB does not provide any useful relief to a complainant. I do not see any benefit to
making a Florida Bar complaint. It takes considerable time that would be better spent on
my case.
Note: Mr. Paul Hill, General Counsel for The Florida Bar, provided the two close-out letters by
email February 10, 2015. (Exhibit C). I did not receive the letter by USPS purportedly sent by
Bar Counsel Patricia Savitz dated January 30, 2015.
Mr. Gillespie:
My apologies for overlooking your separate accommodation request relating to your
complaint against attorney Danielle Nicole Parsons.
Prior to finalizing my response to your accommodation request in this case, I checked its
status with the Bar's disciplinary staff.
Those personnel confirm that Case No. 2014-30,525 (9A) was closed on January 28,
2015, on a finding of no probable cause.
2

February 19, 2015
I enclose a pdf copy of correspondence advising of that outcome -- from Patricia Savitz,
two days later -- which, I am told, was directed to you via USPS to the address shown.
I do not know any other details regarding the postal history of this letter or envelope.
Nonetheless, based on the current status of Case No. 2014-30,525 (9A), I would consider
your December 15, 2014 accommodation request as moot.
I hope this information is helpful to you.
C.
Email February 18, 2015 @3:34 PM (Exhibit D), with attachments.

Exhibit D.1 Lethal Punishment, Chapter 5+front material 34p
Exhibit D.2 Lynchings in Florida, Ocala #1 - UF Professor Jack Davis
Exhibit D.3 31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability, etc. (2007)
Exhibit D.4 31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability-pocket part 1p. (2007)
Exhibit D.5 31 FlaJur2d sec 2191 Duty of insured to remove disability. (2007)
Exhibit D.6 SC11-1622 Appendix Vol 14, BRC & DVR 74p
Mr. Tomasino:
This is a letter motion to extend the time to file in Petition SC14-1637. I would have
preferred to file a formal motion, but time is of the essence in matters in my foreclosure.
Attached you will find Chapter 5 of the book Lethal Punishment, The End of Lynching In
Marion County, with front book material, 34 pages. Chapter 5 shows the prevalence of
white supremacy in Marion County, which I contend is prejudice against me for
disability.
Marion County leads Florida in the number of lynchings, according to UF Professor Jack
Davis.
Also attached are portions of 31 FlaJur2d on disability, which is related to my ADA Title
II requests, and Judge Stancils "drivers licensee" disability test. I testified that I
curtailed driving due to accidents, and will provide photographic evidence of the cars I
crashed, along with other supporting evidence, including a federal tax return, in a motion
being prepared. All of this is taking time that I could have used on Petition 14-1637. Also
attached is an Appendix from SC11-1622 related to vocational rehabilitation, which was
denied. Florida claimed I was too disabled to benefit from VR services.
Also, see this "Speech by Judge Hale Stancil on Sept. 1, 2008" given as keynote speaker
at the annual National Association of Forensic Counselors held in Las Vegas in
September 2008. http://www.stancilreunion.com/hale.html

February 19, 2015
D.
Email February 18, 2015 @4:05 PM (Exhibit E), with attachments.

Exhibit E.1 Judge Stancil news story Debra Lafave case 1p
Exhibit E.2 State v. LaFave 04.CF.2454 3.21.06 Order
Mr. Tomasino:
Thank you for your email message. I'll get a motion filed before 9:00 AM tomorrow.
I neglected to provide a news story about Judge Stancil in the Debra Lafave case, and the
Order entered in State v. LaFave 04.CF.2454 3.21.06.
The State of Florida dropped the case after Judge Stancil refused to believe a
psychological assessment that indicated there would be damage to a minor witness
should he be forced to testify, so the prosecutor dropped the charges. Judge Stancil also
refused a plea deal sought by all parties, and the prosecutor. The same plea was accepted
in Hillsborough County.
Thank you for your consideration.
6.
Letter of Barry Davidson March 10, 2014 for Respondent Ms. Parsons to Bar Counsel
Mr. Littlewood in The Florida Bar File No. 2014-30,525(9A), this part,
With respect to any other claims Mr. Gillespie may allege in the future, I note that Ms.
Parsons is protected from liability by the litigation privilege, which extends to all causes
of action, including both common-law torts and statutory causes of action. Levin,
Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. US. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d
606, 608 (Fla. 1994) (holding that any act occurring during the course of a judicial
proceeding enjoys "absolute immunity"); see also Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett
& Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the litigation privilege
extends to all causes of action, including statutory causes of action).
It appears Mr. Davidson is correct about the litigation privilege. This litigation privilege
essentially negates the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct within litigation, as well as the
Florida Supreme Court Verification Rule, SC09-1460, that amended Rule 1.110(b) to require
verification of mortgage foreclosure complaints involving residential real property. See In re
Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 So.3d 555, 556 (Fla. 2010). In my
residential homestead foreclosure, Ms. Parsons filed the case as a Commercial Foreclosure
which falsehood is supported by Judge Hale Stancil, and Curtis Wilson, a colleague of Ms.

February 19, 2015
Parsons at McCalla Raymer, LLC, a foreclosure mill. A letter of Congressman Elijah E.

Cummings February 25, 2011 to The Honorable Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, Federal
Housing Finance Agency, requested an investigation of foreclosure mills: (Exhibit G)
Dear Mr. Inspector General: I am writing to request that you initiate an investigation into
widespread allegations of abuse by private attorneys and law firms hired to process
foreclosures as part of the "Retained Attorney Network" established by Fannie Mae. I
also request that you examine allegations of abusive behavior on the part of default
management firms engaged by both mortgage servicers managing Fannie Mae-backed
loans and attorneys and firms that are part of the Retained Attorney Network. Finally, I
request that you examine efforts by Fannie Mae and the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) to investigate these allegations and implement corrective action.
Congressman Cummings referred to McCalla Raymer. LLC by name on page 3:
Another firm in the Retained Attorney Network, McCalla Raymer, L.L.C., is a defendant
in a federal lawsuit in which the plaintiffs allege that it engaged in fraud, racketeering,
and the manufacture of fraudulent foreclosure documents. Reportedly, this firm
established operations in Florida under the name Stone, McGehee & Silver and hired ten
former Stern law firm employees. [fn9] The firm Stone, McGehee and Silver, LLC, dba
McCalla Raymer currently appears as a "Designated Counsel/Trustee" in Florida for
Freddie Mac. [fn10]
There has been no investigation of McCalla Raymer, LLC that I know about. Congressman
Cummings is himself an attorney, and presumably knows the litigation privilege protects the
misconduct of attorneys and foreclosure mills complained about.
7.
The litigation privilege essentially negates the rights of self-represented persons
defending home foreclosure. Those constitutional rights include:

Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution, guarantees every person access to
justice for redress of any injury, where justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
SECTION 21. Access to courts.The courts shall be open to every person for redress of
any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
Article I, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution, guarantees every person due process:

February 19, 2015
SECTION 9. Due process.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.
Article I, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution, guarantees every person Basic Rights:
SECTION 2. Basic rights.All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before
the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life
and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and
protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of
real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law.
No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or
physical disability.
8.
Bar Counsel Ms. Savitz wrote in her amended letter February 10, 2015 in the matter of
Complaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Danielle Nicole Parsons
The Florida Bar File No. 2014-30,525 (9A)
...The allegations in your complaint involve the civil and federal cases regarding the
efforts to pursue a foreclosure on your home. The underlying litigation is ongoing and
vigorously contested. It is clear from your materials that it remains your position that Ms.
Parsons engaged in unethical conduct during her representation of foreclosure plaintiff,
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. However, the grievance committee has determined that
there insufficient basis for further disciplinary proceedings regarding the actions taken by
Ms. Parsons in the foreclosure case. Moreover, it would appear that the issues raised in
this matter are appropriate for review and determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction assigned to handle such cases. Accordingly, this case is now closed...
9.
The foregoing is conclusive evidence supporting a right to civil counsel appointment in
matters of shelter, sustenance and safety and/or health. The American Bar Association (ABA)
recently added a "Civil Right to Counsel" page, "Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in
State Civil Proceedings", with 50 research reports, one for each state detailing existing authority
for appointment of counsel in various types of civil proceedings. The ABA contends there is a
right to civil counsel, inter alia, under Fla. Stat. 29.007 Court-appointed counsel, ...in any
situation in which the court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights.
10.
I am continuing my efforts to obtain private counsel.

February 19, 2015
11.
In compliance with Rule 9.300(d)(10), I request the Supreme Court toll time. A separate
request to toll time accompanies this motion.

WHEREFORE, I respectfully move the Supreme Court to extend time to file a proper
petition for writ of mandamus.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED February 19, 2015.
Neil J. Gillespie, petitioner pro se

8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify Petitioners Motion to Extend Time, and Petitioners Separate Request to
Toll Time, were furnished on February 19, 2015 through the E-Filing Portal by email to:
Adria E. Quintela, Director of Lawyer Regulation
The Florida Bar, aquintel@flabar.org
John F. Harkness, Executive Director

The Florida Bar, jharkness@flabar.org
Neil J. Gillespie, petitioner pro se
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
~uprtmt
((ourt of jflortba
TUESDAY, JANUARY 27,2015

CASE NO.: SC 14-1637
NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Petitioner(s)
vs.
THE FLORIDA BAR

Respondent(s)
In reviewing our records, we note that YOllr case is subject to dismissal for
failure to comply with this Court's direction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.410.
We have not received the proper petition for writ of mandamus in accordance
with this Court's order dated December 12,2014. Failllre to file the above
referenced documents with this Court within fifteen days from the date of this order
could result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the petition.
Please understand that once this case is dismissed, it may not be subject to
reinstatement.
A True Copy
Test:
JohnA. Tomasino
Clerk, Supreme Court
ab
Served:
ADRIA E. QUINTELA
NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Page 1 of 1
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

Neil Gillespie
From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:
"Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>

"John Anthony Tomasino" <tomasino@flcourts.org>
"John F Harkness" <jharkness@flabar.org>; "Adria E Quintela" <aquintel@flabar.org>; "Neil
Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Wednesday, February 18, 2015 3:34 PM
31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability-pocket part 1p..pdf; 31 FlaJur2d sec 2191 Duty of
insured to remove disability..pdf; 31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability, etc..pdf; Lethal
Punishment, Chapter 5+front material 34p.pdf; Lynchings in Florida, Ocala #1 - UF Professor Jack
Davis.pdf; Appendix Vol 14, BRC & DVR, w exh.pdf
Extend time in Petition SC14-1637
VIA Email: tomasino@flcourts.org

John A. Tomasino, Clerk
Supreme Court of Florida
500 South Duval Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927
RE: Extend time in Petition SC14-1637
Mr. Tomasino:
This is a letter motion to extend the time to file in Petition SC14-1637. I would have preferred to file a
formal motion, but time is of the essence in matters in my foreclosure.
Attached you will find Chapter 5 of the book Lethal Punishment, The End of Lynching In Marion
County, with front book material, 34 pages. Chapter 5 shows the prevalence of white supremacy in
Marion County, which I contend is prejudice against me for disability.
Marion County leads Florida in the number of lynchings, according to UF Professor Jack Davis.
Also attached are portions of 31 FlaJur2d on disability, which is related to my ADA Title II requests,
and Judge Stancils "drivers licensee" disability test. I testified that I curtailed driving due to accidents,
and will provide photographic evidence of the cars I crashed, along with other supporting evidence,
including a federal tax return, in a motion being prepared. All of this is taking time that I could have
used on Petition 14-1637. Also attached is an Appendix from SC11-1622 related to vocational
rehabilitation, which was denied. Florida claimed I was too disabled to benefit from VR services.
Also, see this "Speech by Judge Hale Stancil on Sept. 1, 2008" given as keynote speaker at the annual
National Association of Forensic Counselors held in Las Vegas in September 2008.
http://www.stancilreunion.com/hale.html
Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
D
2/19/2015
Page 1 of 1
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

Neil Gillespie
From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:
"Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>

"John Anthony Tomasino" <tomasino@flcourts.org>
"John F Harkness" <jharkness@flabar.org>; "Adria E Quintela" <aquintel@flabar.org>; "Neil
Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
Wednesday, February 18, 2015 3:34 PM
31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability-pocket part 1p..pdf; 31 FlaJur2d sec 2191 Duty of
insured to remove disability..pdf; 31 FlaJur2d sec 2195 Total-Partial Disability, etc..pdf; Lethal
Punishment, Chapter 5+front material 34p.pdf; Lynchings in Florida, Ocala #1 - UF Professor Jack
Davis.pdf; Appendix Vol 14, BRC & DVR, w exh.pdf
Extend time in Petition SC14-1637
VIA Email: tomasino@flcourts.org

John A. Tomasino, Clerk
Supreme Court of Florida
500 South Duval Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1927
RE: Extend time in Petition SC14-1637
Mr. Tomasino:
This is a letter motion to extend the time to file in Petition SC14-1637. I would have preferred to file a
formal motion, but time is of the essence in matters in my foreclosure.
Attached you will find Chapter 5 of the book Lethal Punishment, The End of Lynching In Marion
County, with front book material, 34 pages. Chapter 5 shows the prevalence of white supremacy in
Marion County, which I contend is prejudice against me for disability.
Marion County leads Florida in the number of lynchings, according to UF Professor Jack Davis.
Also attached are portions of 31 FlaJur2d on disability, which is related to my ADA Title II requests,
and Judge Stancils "drivers licensee" disability test. I testified that I curtailed driving due to accidents,
and will provide photographic evidence of the cars I crashed, along with other supporting evidence,
including a federal tax return, in a motion being prepared. All of this is taking time that I could have
used on Petition 14-1637. Also attached is an Appendix from SC11-1622 related to vocational
rehabilitation, which was denied. Florida claimed I was too disabled to benefit from VR services.
Also, see this "Speech by Judge Hale Stancil on Sept. 1, 2008" given as keynote speaker at the annual
National Association of Forensic Counselors held in Las Vegas in September 2008.
http://www.stancilreunion.com/hale.html
Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
D
2/19/2015
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Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
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Lynchings in Florida? It was a problem here,

too
By CLAUDIA ADRIEN
Special to The Sun
Published: Saturday, September 3, 2005 at 6:01 a.m.
The shelves of Jack Davis' home office are

wall-to-wall, filled with books that depict
anything and everything about the states south
of the Mason-Dixon Line. Davis, a University of
Florida history professor, isn't just passionate
about the events that mark the Deep South.
Simply put: They're his life.
Feeding his passion, though, hasn't come
without a price.
"I just don't have it in me to do another
race-relations study," Davis says.
The study of race and the South, a never-ending
discussion among historians and laymen alike,
is a hot topic nowadays.
TRACY WILCOX/The Gainesville Sun

University of Florida professor Jack Davis is a
scholar of race relations in the South.
According to his and others' research, Alachua
County has the second highest number of
lynchings on record of any county in Florida,
right behind Marion County.
In June, a Mississippi jury convicted former Klansman Edgar Ray Killen of three
counts of manslaughter for the 1964 deaths of civil-rights activists James Chaney,
Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner. Also in June, the U.S. Senate officially
apologized for all lynchings that took place between 1882 and 1968 in this country.
Numerous attempts to pass anti-lynching legislation in the Senate had been
filibustered or blocked decades earlier.
For Davis, studying lynchings has meant interviewing hundreds of people living in
states like Mississippi and Georgia. And Florida.
"A black man had more risk of being lynched in Florida than any other place in the
country," Davis contends.
The NAACP defines lynchings as any murder that was/is conducted extra-legally or
beyond the rule of the court, under the pretense of upholding justice, Davis says.
The NAACP and other sources show that, per number of black people, Florida had
the highest lynching rate among any Southern state. Davis says about 36 percent of
these lynchings occured in what historians call Florida's Old Plantation Belt,
stretching from the Panhandle to the central part of the state. Between the 1880s to
the 1940s, there were more than 200 lynching deaths in the state, and 20 confirmed
deaths occured in Alachua County alone, according to University of Florida research.
Alachua County was the second most lynch-prone county behind Marion County.
NAACP numbers show 21 lynching deaths there.
Davis began serious research into Florida's lynching past about 15 years ago in
Madison County for his master's thesis at the University of South Florida. He
investigated the 1945 death of Jesse James Payne, a sharecropper who Davis says
had threatened to expose his employer, Levy Goodman, a local tobacco farmer,
because the farmer hadn't paid federal taxes on his crop.
Goodman, angered by the potential exposure, accused Payne of molesting the
farmer's 5-year-old daughter, historical accounts say. According to these accounts, a
lynch mob of 50 white men went after Payne. Davis says the mob was legally
organized. The tobacco farmer's brother-in-law, Lonnie T. Davis, was the Madison
County sheriff. Payne survived, with a single gunshot wound in an arm. State
D.2
Trooper Simeon Moore intervened and sent Payne to the state prison hospital.
Moore hoped Payne's injury and his brief hospital stay would calm the mob,
accounts say.
But Payne never made it into court after being transferred from the hospital to the
Madison County Jail. He was sprung from the jail and shot, his body riddled with
bullets, and found on a dirt road, according to Davis' research.
The Payne lynching was the only one on record in the U.S. in 1945, and it became a
national story. The lynching took place just after the Allied victory in World War II,
when optimism about the country's future reigned.
Florida Gov. Millard F. Caldwell condemned the Payne lynching, but Davis says that
was primarily because Caldwell worried the news would hurt Florida's lucrative
tourism industry.
"After the 1920s, state leadership generally condemned lynchings," he says, "mainly
because Florida was becoming a tourist state."
The nation's focus on Payne's lynching didn't help solve the murder, although Davis,
through his research decades later, gathered new evidence. Davis' thesis is part of
the UF libraries' collection.
The Payne lynching was only one of several that exposed Florida to nationwide
scrutiny. In 1934, Claude Neil was accused of raping a white woman, and many in
the town of Marianna were complicit in his lynching, Davis says. A majority of
victims were lynched on accusations of murder or theft, not rape, Davis says.
"(The Claude Neil case) really represented a turning point," he says. "It was a
lynching that outraged much of the American public outside the South."
The NAACP tried to use the Claude Neil incident to push the federal government
into passing anti-lynching legislation - legislation that was never passed.
Despite these high-profile cases, lynchings in Florida for decades received little
scholarly attention, Davis says.
"(Florida) doesn't tend to be studied as part of the South as a whole," says W.
Fitzhugh Brundage, a history professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel
Hill.
Brundage, a noted scholar of the South who has written several books about
lynchings, says there's no definitive book written about Florida lynchings, and many
historians fail to include Florida in their analysis of lynchings. As the former chair of
the UF history department, Brundage is keenly aware of Florida's unflattering
history, especially in Alachua County.
In 1998, Brundage encouraged a student of his, Susan Jean, to explore her interest
in Florida lynchings and especially those that took place around Gainesville. The 18
lynchings Jean verified in Alachua County is a significant number, as few counties in
Georgia had that high a figure, Brundage says.
"That is extremely high by any standards in the South," Brundage says.
A surge in interest Scholars didn't begin in-depth lynching studies until the 1990s.
That's because, after the civil-rights movement, scholarly concentration moved to
affirmative action and more forward-looking issues surrounding race, says
Brundage. Lynching, scholars reasoned, was part of the past.
That began to change earlier this summer when U.S. senators pushed a resolution
through the Senate apologizing for the long string of lynchings in U.S. history. The
vote was oral, so no record was kept of who agreed or disagreed with the resolution.
Many of the senators who initiated the legislation were inspired by a book of
lynching photographs. The material from "Without Sanctuary: Photographs and
Postcards of Lynching in America" was first on display in Atlanta in 2002, and has
toured the country since. The exhibit is currently on display at the Chicago Historical
Society.
Brundage says the resolution was also inspired by the political motives of a few.
Despite lawmakers' ambiguous motivations, Brundage says he's excited about the
recent attention placed on this country's lynchings. Renewed scholarship may shed
light on the darkest elements of human behavior. But, Brundage also hopes there's
continued emphasis on Florida's past lynchings.

Digging into the past Jean, Brundage's former student, brought much of this past to
light more than seven years ago.
"I got started on it by accident," she says of her honors thesis.
Originally, Jean's intentions were only to look into Alachua County lynchings. But,
she felt there wasn't enough information. Instead, Jean spent a summer digging
through hundreds of issues of Florida papers and summarily verified more than 200
recorded Florida lynchings between the 1880s and the 1940s.
"Susan has the best count," Brundage says.
History, though, is more than compiling evidence. Jean decided to analyze the ways
in which white Southern reporters covered lynchings in Florida, if the lynchings
were covered at all.
"I wanted to see if there was continued discussion in the papers," she says.
Jean discovered that some smaller papers would cover a small-town lynching in full
detail, whereas a nearby larger newspaper would give it no coverage. Sometimes
newspapers were unlikely to report a lynching that could embarrass the community,
Jean says.
"(Newspapers) were a product of their time, and they were shaping their time," Jean
says. "You're always at the mercy of your records."
Some residents of Newberry, just west of Gainesville, claim there were more
lynchings than the 20 that Jean was able to verify for Alachua County. Jean hopes to
donate her research to the Newberry Public Library.
Davis insists that renewed study of past lynchings serves a greater purpose than
contributing to a body of knowledge.
"It's important we don't forget the way things were," he says.
Copyright 2015 Gainesville.com All rights reserved. Restricted use only.
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
2195
INSURANCE
his or her disability, should be under the regular care of a

physician; however, minor deviations (such as one or two
d'ays) from such minimum intervals are not sufficient to
bar recovery.5
In the absence of a policy stipulation to the contrary, the

treatment of the physician need not be at the insured's
home. 6
c.
2195
Total and Partial Disability
Generally; what constitutes "total disability"
Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Insurance CS=>2557 to 2562
Disability or accident insurance policies, or disability

clauses in life insurance policies, may properly restrict their
coverage to disability that is "total."1
"Total disability" is a relative term, depending upon the
character of insured's occupation. the capabilities of the
insured, and the circumstances of the particular case, 2 and
which must be determined in the context of a liberal
construction of the disability provision in order to protect the
policyholder. 3 However, that term does not require that the
insured be bedridden or reduced to complete helplessness. 4
5Mutual Ben. Health & Ace.
Ass'n v. Bunting, 133 Fla. 646, 183
So. 321 (1938).
6Mutual Ben. Health & Ace.
Ass'n v. Bunting, 133 Fla. 646, 183
So. 321 (1938).
[Section 2195]
1Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance 1474.
2Groff v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 887 F. Supp. 1515 (S.D. Fla.
1993), related reference, 887 F.
Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1994), related
reference, 85 F.3d 642 (11th Cir.
1996) and related reference, 85
F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); Hazouri
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d
296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
1966).
3New England Mut. Life Ins.

Co. v. Huckins, 127 Fla. 540, 173
So. 696 (1937); Lorber v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).
4Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
the U.S. v. Neill, 243 F.2d 193 (5th
Cir. 1957); Groff v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 887 F. Supp. 1515
(S.D. Fla. 1993), related reference,
887 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1994),
related reference, 85 F.3d 642 (11th
Cir. 1996) and related reference, 85
F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird, 152 Fla.
532, 12 So. 2d 454 (1943); Grauer
v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of
California, 363 So. 2d 583 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).
355
D.3
2195
FLORIDA
JUR 2d
Whether one is totally disabled is ordinarily a question of

fact. 5
Disability provisions are generally of two types: an "oc
cupational disability" clause, which requires only that the
insured be unable to perform the duties of his or her partic
ular occupation in order to recover, and a "general disabili

ty" clause, which conditions the payment of benefits there
under on the insured's inability to perform the duties of any
occupation. 6
..
2196
Occupational disability
Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Insurance
~2543,
2561
A typical occupational disability provision requires that

the insured be unable to perform the duties pertaining to his
or her regular occupation. 1 In applying such a clause, the
court must look at the insured's occupation as a whole. 2 The
insured's disability will be considered total if it is such that
he or she is unable to do "substantially" all the "material"
acts which are usually required to be performed in the oc
5New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird,
152 Fla. 532, 12 So. 2d 454 (1943).
6For general discussion of such
clauses, see 19566, 2197.
[Section 2196]
1See, for example, Groff v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 887 F. Supp.
1515 (S.D. Fla. 1993), related
reference, 887 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.
Fla. 1994), related reference, 85
F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1996) and re
lated reference, 85 F.3d 643 (11th
Cir. 1996).
2Sun Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Evans, 340 So. 2d 957 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1976); Lorber v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 207 So. 2d 305
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1968).
Annotation References: What
constitutes total disability within
coverage of disability insurance
356
policy issued to lawyer, 6 A.L.R. 4th

422.
What constitutes permanent or
total disability within coverage of
insurance policy issued to physical
laborer or workman, 32 A.L.R. 3d
922.
What constitutes total or per
manent disability within the cover
age of disability insurance coverage
issued to farmer or agricultural
worker, 26 A.L.R. 3d 714.
disability insurance policy issued to
one engaged in retail merchandis
ing, 23 A.L.R. 3d 773.
manent disability within the mean
ing of insurance policy issued to
physician or dentist, 21 A.L.R. 3d
677.
INSURANCE
2196
cupation or profession or work in which he or she is engaged,3

in a customary and usual manner. 4 Thus, the "total disabili
ty" provisions were applicable to a physician who continued
his office practice by examining patients, supervising office
staff and making post-operative visits, but was unable to
perform unassisted major head and neck cancer surgery,
which previously constituted a major portion of his practice. 5
Total disability does not mean a state of helplessness 6 or
inability to do any part whatever of the occupation, or to
perform any work whatever for compensation,7 and the fact
that the insured performs, or is able to perform, some
inconsequential, trivial, or incidental duties connected with
his or her usual employment or occupation will not preclude
recovery.8 On the other hand, the mere inability to perform
one duty or operation required in the particular occupation
does not constitute total disability,9 unless the insured
obtained a modification of the policy entitling him to benefits
if he could not perform a specific aspect of his practice. 10
Co., 887 F. Supp. 1515 (S.D. Fla.
F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); Franklin
Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe, 130 Fla.
546, 178 So. 300 (1938), reh'g
denied, 131 Fla. 213, 179 So. 406
(1938); Grauer v. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. of California, 363 So. 2d
583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1978); Lorber v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 207 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 1968).
Co., 887 F. Supp. 1515 (S.D. Fla.
F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); Grauer
v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of
California, 363 So. 2d 583 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978); Sun
Life Ins. Co. of America v. Evans,

340 So. 2d 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1976).
Co., 887 F. Supp. 1515 (S.D. Fla.
F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996).
6 2195.
7New England Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Huckins, 127 Fla. 540, 173
So. 696 (1937).
8Lorber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
207 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1968).
9Danzig v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1551
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (postal worker).
1oRosenberg v. Guardian Life
fns. Co., 510 So. 2d 610, 12 Fla. L.
Weekly 1541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d
Dist. 1987) (ophthalmologist unable
to perform surgery).
357
2196
FLORIDA
J UR 2d
Under an occupational disability policy defining total dis

ability as "your inability to engage in your occupation," the
term "your occupation" referred to specific work done by
insured at the time of injury, not to work requiring similar
skills and producing comparable income. 11 So, under such a
provision, insured who, before suffering a disabling knee
injury, had been working as a yacht salesman, was engaged
in the activity or business of selling yachts, notwithstanding
that he had worked at other sales jobs during the life of the
policy and had obtained employment as a freight-space sales
man for a trucking company after he began receiving benefits
under the policy.12
Observation: An occupational disability clause may
provide further that recovery may be had only if the
insured is not engaged in any other gainful occupation or
employment. 13
2197
General disability
Research References
~2561(5)
A typical general disability clause requires that the

insured be unable to perform the material or substantial
duties of any occupation in which insured reasonably could
be expected to engage, 1 or prevented from engaging in any
occupation or performing any work for compensation of
financial value,2 or from performing any work, following any
occupation, or engaging in any business for remuneration or
11Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v.
Adelberg, 698 So. 2d 828, 22 Fla. L.
Weekly S513 (Fla. 1997); Strama v.
Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 793
So. 2d 1129, 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D2210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist.
2001).
12Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v.
Adelberg, 698 So. 2d 828, 22 Fla. L.
Weekly S513 (Fla. 1997).
13Grauer v. Occidental Life Ins.
Co. of California, 363 So. 2d 583
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1978).
358
Forms References: Defense

that plaintiff earned money during
period of alleged disability. Am.
Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms,
Insurance 1032.
[Section 2197]
1McCluney v. General American
Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1347
(M.D. Fla. 1998), aff'd, 162 F.3d
1178 (11th eire 1998).
2See, for example, Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. v. Neill,
243 F.2d 193 (5th eire 1957).
INSURANCE
2197
profit,3 or that the insured suffer any impairment of mind or

body that continuously renders it impossible for insured to
follow a gainful occupation. 4 Under such a clause, the insured
is totally disabled when his or her condition is such that he
or she is not able to perform the duties of any occupation for
which he or she is fitted or qualified by education, training,
or experience. 5 Thus, a travel and market consultant was
not totally disabled from an injury to his foot and back while
running, even though the injuries allegedly restricted his
travel and reduced his firm's income, where the consultant
continued to perform the duties of employment as owner of
the firm, continued to travel, and failed to show that his
business lost money due to his alleged disability, and the
policy defined "total disability" as an inability to perform
material and substantial duties of any occupation which
insured reasonably could be expected to engage in. 6
3See, for example, New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Bird, 152 Fla. 532,
12 So. 2d 454 (1943).
4See, for example, Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York v. Knight, 130
Fla. 733, 178 So. 898 (1937).
eire 1957); McCluney V. General
American Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp.
2d 1347 (M.D. Fla. 1998), aff'd, 162
F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 1998); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird, 152 Fla.
532, 12 So. 2d 454 (1943); Equita
ble Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v.
McKeithan, 119 Fla. 486, 160 So.
883 (1935).
Annotation References: What
constitutes total disability within
coverage of disability insurance
policy issued to lawyer, 6 A.L.R. 4th
422.
insurance policy issued to physical
laborer or workman, 32 A.L.R. 3d
922.

manent disability within the cover
age of disability insurance coverage
issued to farmer or agricultural
worker, 26 A.L.R. 3d 714.
disability insurance policy issued to
one engaged in retail merchandis
ing, 23 A.L.R. 3d 773.
manent disability within the mean
ing of insurance policy issued to
physician or dentist, 21 A.L.R. 3d
677.
Insurance: "total disability" or
the like as referring to inability to
work in usual occupation or in other
occupations, 21 A.L.R. 3d 1155.
Trial Strategy References:
Unemployability as total disability.
Unemployability Of Insured Under
Disability Policy, 18 Am. Jur. Proof
of Facts 2d 407.
6McCluney v. General American
Life Ins. Co., 1 F. SUppa 2d 1347
(M.D. Fla. 1998), aff'd, 162 F.3d
1178 (11th Cir. 1998).
359
2197
FLORIDA
J UR 2d
Generally, an insured who continues or resumes working

subsequent to the commencement of the disability is
precluded from receiving total or permanent disability
benefits whenever he or she substantially performs the
important and material duties of his or her occupation. 7
However this rule is subject to many important exceptions.
Thus, recovery will not be precluded where the insured
makes an unsuccessful attempt to works or returns to a
reduced or relaxed workload, or where he or she participates
in merely trivial or minor activities. 9 Thus, an elderly dentist
did not terminate his period of total disability because of his
activities as a partner in a firm dealing in automatic laundry
equipment where the insured came to the office frequently
when he felt like it and performed a variety of odd jobs, but
two business trips attempted by him had terminated en route
because of his physical condition, he signed many checks
while at home in bed, he drew no salary or other compensa
tion, and had no specific duties to perform. 10
Even though a person who becomes wholly disabled from
engaging in his or her occupation may nevertheless follow
some gainful occupation after years of preparatory study and
mental training, until that end is accomplished and the
insured is receiving profits or remuneration from his or her
new vocation, the insurer is not justified in refusing monthly
benefit payments. 11
2198 Specific injuries, loss, or a1llictions as total
disability
Research References
7S ee Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance
1479.
Annotation References: Con
tinuance or resumption of work as
affecting finding of total or perma
nent disability within insurance
coverage, 24 A.L.R. 3d 8.
sINA Life Ins. Co. of New York
v. Davis, 404 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1981).
360
~2561

Cir. 1957), stating that the insured
is not required to remain completely
idle by confining his activities to his
home or the recreational pursuits
of elderly retired persons.
Cir. 1957).
11New York Life Ins. Co. v ..
Leeks, 122 Fla. 127, 165 So. 50
(1935).
2199
INSURANCE
Generally, when the term "total disability" is used in a

contract of insurance without any limitation whatever, ei
ther as to the duration of the disability or as to the cause

from which it should arise, it may refer to temporary or per
manent total disability arising from various causes, includ
ing mental incapacity (which mayor may not render the
insured wholly or totally disabled) or disease,1 or physical
sickness or disorder 2 such as arthritis or diabetes, 3 loss or
impairment of vision4 or hearing,5 or a circulatory disorders
such as clotting of veins in the legs, diminished blood supply
in the lower extremities, phlebitis with production of emboli,
and blood clots, with danger of occlusions in the heart, lungs,
or extremities. 6
2199
Continuity and permanence
Research References
~2560
to 2562
A policy may include the element of continuity, and

undertake to insure only for loss resulting from bodily
injuries that wholly and "continuously" disable the insured.
In this context, the word "continuously" means regularly,
protracted, enduring, and without any substantial interrup
[Section 2198]
1Clarkson v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 4 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1933).
Annotation References: Men
tal incapacity or disease as consti
tuting total or permanent disability
within insurance coverage, 22
A.L.R. 3d 1000.
2Annotation
References:
Back injury or condition as consti

tuting total or permanent disability
within insurance coverage, 23
A.L.R. 3d 1108.
3Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
Cal. v. McCaskill, 126 Fla. 82, 170
So. 579 (1936).
4New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird,
152 Fla. 532, 12 So. 2d 454 (1943)
(insured who suffered from cata

racts in both eyes was totally dis
abled even though he was able to
use his vision to walk and to recog
nize members of his family and
friends, and to look at the headlines
in the newspaper and to use a type
writer for a few minutes).
5Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance 1483.
Cir. 1957).
Annotation
References:
Heart or vascular condition as con

stituting total or permanent dis
ability within insurance coverage,
21 A.L.R. 3d 1383.
361
2199
FLORIDA
J UR 2d
tion of sequence. 1 Where the policy language is unambigu

ous, a finding that there was a period following an employee's
injury during which he was not disabled precludes recovery
under a policy requiring continuity of injury.2
Where a policy provides for the payment of the compensa
tion for permanent disability, and then stipulates that such
payments will be made only during the continuance of the
disability, the insured is entitled to recover if the nature of
the injury renders it reasonable to suppose that he will be
permanently disabled. 3 If it turns out that, contrary to
expectation, the disablement was not permanent, then pay
ments cease. 4
Under a policy requiring that total disability must have
existed continuously for at least a specified period, the
presumption of permanency attaches to a proved total dis
ability after it has existed continuously for such time,5 even
if the cause of the disability is no longer the same as what it
was when first incurred. 6 But if the insured is totally dis
abled for a time but not totally disabled within the policy
definition following the lapse of the prescribed period, his
recovery is limited to whatever the contracts provides for in
the case of temporary total disability.7
[Section 2199]
lAm. Jur. 2d, Insurance 1487.
2Skinner v. Continental Cas.
Co., 268 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1972).
U.S. v. Wiggins, 115 Fla. 136, 155
So. 327 (1934); Cassens v. Metro

politan Life Ins. Co., 114 Fla. 659,
154 So. 522 (1934).
Where total disability was not
of such nature as to indicate or sug
gest that it was or would be perma
nent, insured was not entitled to
recover. Berry v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York, 163 So. 2d 339
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1964).
Forms References: Answer-
362
Defense that plaintiff is no longer

totally disabled. Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, Insurance
1031.
4Cassens v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 114 Fla. 659, 154 So. 522
(1934).
U.S. v. McKeithan, 119 Fla. 486,
160 So. 883 (1935).
6Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New

York v. Knight, 130 Fla. 733, 178
So. 898 (1937).
7S uggs v. Occidental Life Ins.
Co. of N. C., 256 So. 2d 243 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1972) (in
sured received indemnity for desig
nated 24-month period).
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
2290
INSURANCE
5.
Extent of Injury or Disability
Total and Partial Disability

2195 Generally; what
constitutes "total
disability"
c.
Cases
Under Florida law, letter from disabil
ity insurer's chief underwriting officer
to insure<;l physician clarifying, at in
sured's request, that insured's "regular
occupation" was invasive and interven
tional cardiology, not cardiolog.y as
insurer originally had stated, was
bargained-for modification of total dis
ability insurance policy, and thus was
controlling, for for purposes of policy's
definition of disability as "[inability] . . .
to engage in [insured's] regular occupa
tion or profession." Kraft v. Massachu
setts Cas. Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1234
(N.D. Fla. 2004).
I
2196 Occupational disability

Cases
Insured under a disability insurance
policy was regularly engaged in an oc
cupation at the time of his disability
and, thus, could fit the policy's ~efini
tion of total disability, even though
insured was not actively employed at
time of his disability, and had not
worked in over 18 months due to the
injury; policy language did not require
insured to be actively employed. McPhee
v. The Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 883 So.
2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
2004).
C.
COVERAGE AND
EXCLUSIONS REQUIRED,
PERMITrED, AND PROHIBITED

BY STATUTE
2.
a.
Health Insurance
Generally Applicable Provisions
(5) Other Conditions, Treatments

and Procedures
2238 Out-or-hospital benefits
. Laws and Rules
Fla. Stat. 456.053, as amended in
2002, redefines the term "referral" by
revising the list of practices that do not

constitute a referral by a health care
provider to include a provider whose
principal professional practice consists
of treating patients in their private
residences.
b. Group, Blanket, and Franchise

Health Insurance
(1) In General
2248 Applicability of
provisions governing
health insurance, in
general
Laws and Rules
Fla. Stat. 627.4302, as added in
2002, provides that any health insurer
or health maintenance organization and
all state and local government entities
entering into an agreement to provide
coverage for prescription drugs on an
outpatient basis shall provide a benefits
identification card containing specified
information.
(4) Other Conditions, Treatments

and Procedures
2275 Treatment of mental and
nervous disorders
Laws and Rules
627.6685, Fla. Stat. was repealed in
2005.
d. Policies Issued Under

Employee Health Care Access Act
(1) In General
2290 Generally
Laws and Rules
627.6699, Fla. Stat., as amended in
2005, provides that this section applies
to a health benefit plan for employees of
a small employer, unless the coverage is
marketed directly to the employee and
the employer does not directly or indi
rectly cOlltribute to premiums or facili
tate administration of the coverage. Ad
ditionally, an employer must offer a
high-deductible plan that meets the
requirements of a health savings ac
count plan or health reimbursement
account.
D.4
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
2190
FLORIDA
J UR 2d
that it does not cover "injuries of which there is no visible

contusion or wound on the exterior of the body of the insured
causing the death" where the body of the insureq is found
floating in water and there are no visible marks or abrasions
on the exterior of his body. 2
2191
Duty of insured to remove disability
Research References
~2564,
2565
An insured who is suffering from a disability is under a

duty to avail himself or herself of all reasonable means and
remedies to remove such disability.1 Thus, an osteopath with
a skin condition on his hands, diagnosed as infectious
eczematoid dermatitis, was denied benefits for total disabil
ity where he made no effort to have his condition treated by
a dermatologist until after filing his claim of disability, which
was several years after the onset of the condition, having
previously prescribed and administered his own treatment,
which consisted mostly of trying out free samples sent to
him by pharmaceutical companies; and where there was no
evidence that with a proper diagnosis and regimen the condi
tion would not yield to treatment. 2
If, however, there is a difference of opinion among doctors
about the cause of the disability, benefits may not be with
held because of the party's failure to follow the medical
advice of the insurer's doctor. 3
'lVoelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of
America, 73 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1954),
in which recovery was denied where
the insured's body was found float
ing in a canal near his wrecked
automobile.
Annotation References: Life
or accident insurance: Sufficiency of
showing that death from drowning
was due to accident or accidental
means, 43 A.L.R. 3d 1168.
[Section 2191]
1Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v.
Ellison, 223 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.

1955); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
So. 898 (1937).
2Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v.
Ellison, 223 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1955).
3Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
So. 898 (1937).
352
D.5
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Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
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In Judge Hale Stancil's court, no plea would be accepted. In December 2005, he set a court date,
but three months later the prosecutor dropped the charges, based on a psychological assessment
that indicated there would be damage to the boy should he be forced to testify. In addition, there
were ramifications for other children who considered telling on their wayward teachers. If they saw
a boy paraded through the court system and the press, they might choose instead to suffer in
silence.
Judge Stancil was not pleased. In March, he handed down a
six-page decision in which he stated that, while no one of any
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age looks forward to cross-examination, he did not think the

victim would have that much difficulty relating the crime in court.
He also decried the lack of victim advocacy in the case and
suggested that the psychiatric expert had not made a through
study before forming an opinion. As cited in the legal document,
Judge Stancil stated that accepting the plea agreement
Judge Hale Stancil
undermined the court's credibility. He added that it "would erode

public confidence in our schools...[and] send the message that if enough publicity is generated, and
the media's interest continues long enough, and because of that interest the victim does not wish
to testify, a defendant can avoid an appropriate sentence." That consequence disturbed him. So,
once again, he rejected the deal and ordered a trial to commence in April.
However, it was the prosecutor who made the final decision. He declined to proceed. In fact, he
was dropping the charges in Marion County. It was a surprise, but perfectly legal, and it left Debra
ADVERTISEMENT
Lafave with only the house arrest imposed in Hillsborough. Many people believed that the court
should have forced this case to trial, to teach her and other women like her a lesson, but there was
no going back now. She'd gotten off with a very light punishment.
By this time, Lafave had come to accept that she'd been influenced by a condition that had caused
1. The Seduction
mental instability. She called a press conference to reiterate this, in effect shucking her
2. The Sting
responsibility in the matter. By this time, she was also engaged to another man, and he stood by
her. She said, "I know that I'm a good woman," and affirmed her newfound Christian faith. She
offered no reason as to why she had done what she did and did not show remorse. But it wasn't
3. The Details Emerge

4. Her Defense
long before she was ready with an answer. With aspirations herself to become a journalist, she
5. The Teacher
agreed to do an interview with Matt Lauer for Dateline on NBC television, which aired on
6. The Boy
September 13, 2006. It was time, she thought, to tell her side.
7. Illegal Acts
PREVIOUS CHAPTER
3 ... 10 11 12
13
14
15
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8. Truth or Consequences
9. Legal Actions
10. Deal or No Deal?
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E.1
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFI'H JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. 04-2454-CF-A-Z
STATE OF FLORIDA
vs.
DEBRA BEASLEY LAFAVE,
Defendant.
------------------------~'
ORDER REJECTING PROPOSED BELOW GUIDELINES PLEA AGREEMENT
The Defendant in this case is charged with two counts oflewd and lascivious battery on a
child, in violation of section 800.04(4)(a) of Florida Statutes, and one count of lewd and
lascivious exhibition, in violation of section 800.04(7)(a) of Florida Statutes. Consent is not an
issue, because both alleged victims were less than 16 years old at the time of the alleged
offenses.
See 800.04(4)(a), 800.04(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005).
All three charged offenses
constitute second degree felonies, each punishable by up to 15 years in the Department of

Corrections. See 800.04(4), 800.04(7)(c), 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under the Florida
sentencing guidelines, the Defendant's lowest permissible prison sentence is 203.25 months or
16.9375 years. In order to sentence the Defendant to any lesser sentence, the Court must find
certain mitigating circumstances. See 921.00265, 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (2005).
The Defendant was charged with similar offenses in Hillsborough County, Florida, which
have been resolved by plea agreement. 1 The parties have presented to this Court a proposed plea
agreement with similar (if not identical) terms. The parties first presented the plea agreement at
the December 9, 2005 pre-trial/status conference, and the Court rejected it. Subsequently, the
Court set a hearing on March 8, 2006 to hear evidence regarding the rationale for the plea
agreement. The proposed plea agreement will require the Defendant to enter a plea of guilty as
The Hillsborough County plea agreement was apparently conditioned upon this Court's
acceptance of a similar plea agreement. In other words, if the proposed plea agreement were
rejected by this Court, the Defendant would have the right to withdraw her plea to the charges in
Hillsborough County and proceed to trial. However, this Court was not a party to plea
negotiations in Hillsborough County and was not apprised of the plea agreement in Hillsborough
County until the December 9, 2005 pre-triaVstatus conference.
computer 9
Page 1 of6
E.2
State vs. Lafave

charged for an adjudication of guilt.
04-2454-CF-A-Z
The Defendant would be sentenced to three years of
community control followed by seven years of probation (with a myriad of special conditions),
to run concurrently with her Hillsborough County sentence. For the reasons that follow, this
Court finds that the parties have failed to present sufficient justification to accept the below
guidelines plea agreement.
The charges in this case stem from allegations of sexual relations between a 23-year-old
female teacher (who is now 25 years old) and a 14-year-old boy (who is now 16 years old), one
instance of which was witnessed by the boy's 15-year-old cousin (who is now 17 years old). The
factual basis for the plea, as proffered by the State, is as follows:
On or about June 15, 2004, the Defendant transported the then-14-year-old victim M.M.
m her vehicle from Hillsborough County, Florida to Ocala, Marion County, Florida.
The
Defendant and the victim were previously acquainted, as the Defendant was a teacher at the
middle school M.M. had attended. Upon arriving in Ocala, the Defendant and M.M. picked up
M.M.'s then-15-year-old cousin B.B. With the Defendant's consent, B.B. drove her vehicle on
State Road 200 in Ocala, while the Defendant and M.M. engaged in sexual activity in the back of
the vehicle. B.B. was aware of the sexual activity taking place in the vehicle, and saw the sexual
activity in the rear-view mirror of the Defendant's vehicle. On or about June 17, 2004, the
Defendant again transported M.M. in her vehicle from Hillsborough County, Florida to Ocala,
Marion County, Florida. The Defendant and M.M. again picked up B.B., whereupon they drove
to Brick City Park in Ocala and parked the Defendant's vehicle. After B.B. exited the vehicle,
the Defendant and M.M. again engaged in sexual activity in the back of the vehicle. Shortly
thereafter, M.M. and B.B. disclosed these events to their mothers, who notified law enforcement.
On June 28, 2004, the Defendant was arrested and charged in Marion County with two counts of
lewd and lascivious battery on a child and one count of lewd and lascivious exhibition.
The parties have set forth several arguments for this Court to consider in determining
whether to accept the proposed plea agreement. The State has made it clear that the victim's
family wishes the case to be concluded without a trial, 2 and the Defendant has made it clear that
she will not agree to any sentence of imprisonment. The parties assert, as their main justification
for the proposed plea agreement, that the victim does not wish to testify at trial and that it would
2
The Court recognizes that there are actually two minor victims in this case, M.M. and
B.B. However, the majority of the testimony and argument relates only to victim M.M.
Page 2 of6
State vs. Lafave
04-2454-CF-A-Z
be detrimental to the victim to do so. The victim's family believes that he would be traumatized
by testifying at trial and receiving increased media attention. The family is also concerned that if
this case proceeds to trial their privacy will be compromised by the intense media attention this
case continues to receive.
The State called two witnesses at the March 8, 2006 hearing: Assistant State Attorney
Michael Sinacore, of the Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office, and Dr. Martin Lazoritz,
a licensed psychiatrist and associate chairman of the University of Florida Department of
Psychiatry.
Mr. Sinacore testified that he only agreed to a plea without any term of
imprisonment at the insistence of the victim's mother, who felt that her family's privacy was
being compromised by the media and that a trial would further traumatize her son. Mr. Sinacore
further testified about his negotiations with Court TV, which intended to broadcast the
Defendant's trial. The attorneys for Court TV would agree not to show the victim's face when
he testified, but would not agree not to show the victims' mothers when they testified and would
not agree to delay the broadcast in case the victims' names were inadvertently mentioned by one
of the 40-50 potential witnesses. Mr. Sinacore did not indicate whether he had interviewed the
victim M.M. regarding the incidents in question or his impressions of M.M's ability to testify
and withstand the rigors of cross-examination.
Dr. Lazoritz testified that he met with victim M.M. and his mother for approximately 90
minutes. Dr. Lazoritz testified that the victim is suffering from anxiety about his relationship
with the Defendant, which has been compounded by the media coverage the case has received,
and has an adjustment disorder, meaning simply that he is responding to a stressor. Dr. Lazoritz
also testified that the victim "had a very difficult time talking about things." He stated that the
victim wishes to go to the University ofF lorida, play basketball, and live in anonymity. He
further explained that the victim is afraid that if the case proceeded to trial he would always be
plagued by it. Dr. Lazoritz expressed his opinion that it would be detrimental to the victim's
emotional well-being to testify at trial. Dr. Lazoritz believes that if this case were concluded
without the victim having to testify at trial, he would continue to improve, but would likely
deteriorate if the case proceeded to trial.
The Court recognizes that it very well may be impossible for the State to proceed to trial
without presenting the testimony of the victim M.M. In order to establish the essential elements
of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, the State would be required to delve into the details of
Page 3 of6
\_/
State vs. Lafave
04-2454-CF-A-Z
the sexual relations between the Defendant and the alleged victim. Furthermore, the nature of
the defense raised by the Defendant would require the victim's actions to be put at issue before
the jury.
The Court also understands that the victim may be reluctant to testify at trial. Certainly,
no 16-year-old male wants to be examined and cross-examined in a public forum regarding every
minute detail of a sexual encounter, which very well may be viewed by some as entertainment.
He would not want to discuss it with his parents, doctor, counselor, victim/witness advocate, or
an attorney. In fact, this Court cannot comprehend any individual- whether he is 15, 45, or 75
years old - looking forward to discussing such an experience in public. Most likely no one who
reads this order would voluntarily discuss a sexual experience that took place when he or she was
14 years old, especially if his or her partner was a former teacher. Indeed it would be strange if
one were eager to discuss such an experience. Sex may sell books, movies, and magazines, but
no one looks forward to discussing private sexual encounters in public.
For most witnesses, especially victims of sexual offenses, testifying is an experience they
would like to avoid. Rarely does one find a witness who enjoys testifying in a courtroom before
a jury and being cross-examined by attorneys. The Court does not believe that the witnesses in
this case are different from most witnesses in any other case. Moreover, the victim in this case is
not a young child; he is now 16 years old. The effect a trial of this nature might have on young
children (less than 12 years old) therefore is not a factor in this case.
The Court is not convinced that the parties have presented sufficient justification to
accept the proposed plea agreement. The Court might have been more inclined to accept the
proposed plea agreement if the Hillsborough County charges did not exist and the Defendant was
facing charges only in Marion County. As it stands, the Court is unable to comprehend what is
to be gained by a plea and concurrent sentence in Marion County. Likewise, the Court might
have been more inclined to accept the proposed plea agreement had the parties presented
additional evidence. First, it certainly would have been beneficial if the State or the defense had
presented additional experts.
Second, either party could have presented the testimony of a
victim/witness advocate. There are victim/witness advocates available in the State Attorney's
Office, the Ocala Police Department, and the Marion County Sheriffs Office. However, there
has been no indication to this Court that any victim/witness advocate has worked with the
victims or their families to prepare them for a trial in this case. Third, the investigating officers
Page 4 of6
State vs. Lafave
04-2454-CF-A-Z
who interviewed the victim could have been called to testify regarding their impressions of his
ability to give testimony, as could have assistant state attorneys Mr. Ridgway or Ms. Youmans.
The Court has reviewed the probable cause affidavit and it does not appear that the victim had
any difficulty describing the incidents in question to the investigating officers. Fourth, either
party could have attempted to take the victim's deposition to demonstrate his difficulty in
testifying. It appears that no depositions of either victim have been taken. Finally, the parties
could have requested the Court meet with the victim in camera, as was done by the judge in
Eversole v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Moreover, with the exception of Dr. L azoritz (whose testimony is somewhat less than
convincing), neither party has presented any testimony about the victim's need for professional
counseling. When asked by the Court whether the victim M.M. needed counseling, Dr. Lazoritz
stated, "[U]nfortunately, he is not the kind ofyoung man who is a good candidate for verbal
counseling. He is not a very verbal, talk-about-your-feelings kind of kid .... I don't know that he
needs counseling right now. He needs to be able to play basketball in anonymity, and that's
helpful for him." The Court might have been convinced to accept the proposed plea agreement if
the State had offered the victim and his family professional counseling, in an effort to prepare
them for trial, and such counseling was unsuccessful. However, that does not appear to be the
case.
Dr. Lazoritz's meeting with the victim for 90 minutes or less seems to this Court
inadequate if the victim has in fact suffered mental damage as a result of the incidents in
question.
Furthermore, the Court is not convinced that the State has fully investigated its options in
regards to protecting the privacy of the victim and his family if the case were to proceed to trial.
The Court recognizes that the press and the general public have a constitutional right of access to
criminal trials. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-05 (1982);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 ( 1980). However, that right is not
absolute, and it may be appropriate to restrict access in order to safeguard the well-being of a
minor victim. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-09; see also Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 45-48 (1984). Specifically, it very well may be appropriate to exclude the electronic
media during the victim's testimony. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.170(a); Chavez v. State, 832
So.2d 730, 758-59 (Fla. 2002); State v. Palm Beach Newspapers, 395 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1981); In
rePetition of Post-Newsweek Stations, 370 So.2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979). Indeed it would be
Page 5 of6
State vs. Lafave
04-2454-CF-A-Z
necessary for the Court to take certain precautions to ensure that the Defendant receives her
constitutional right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 555; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
357-62 (1966).
But the Court is aware that the victim does not have a constitutionally
recognized right of privacy in the context of a judicial proceeding, which is a public event that by
its very nature denies certain aspects of privacy. In rePetition of Post-Newsweek Stations, 370
So.2d at 779.
It is the opinion of this Court that accepting the proposed plea agreement would
undermine the credibility of this Court, and the criminal justice system as a whole, and would
erode public confidence in our schools. Accepting the proposed plea agreement would likewise
send the message that if enough publicity is generated, and the media's interest continues long
enough, and because of that interest the victim does not wish to testify, a defendant can avoid an
appropriate sentence. Quite frankly, if the allegations against the Defendant are true, the agreedupon sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. It is, therefore,
ORDERED: The proposed below guidelines plea agreement is hereby rejected.
ORDERED this 21st day ofMarch, 2006 at Ocala, Marion County, Florida.
~t?.~~r
iH:AiERSTANciL:
Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing has been provided
by U.S. Mail/Inter-Office Mail this 21st day ofMarch, 2006 to the following:
John M. Fitzgibbons, Esquire
Attorney for the Defendant
Tampa Theatre Building, Suite 700
707 North Franklin Street
Tampa, Florida 33602-4441
Stacy M. Youmans, Esquire

Richard D. Ridgway, Esquire
Office of the State Attorney
(by Inter-Office Mail)
Page 6 of6
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM
HuNToN
i"
l\.j'
........)li;...
WILLIAMS
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP

111 J BRICKELL AVENUE
SUITE 2500
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131
TEL
305 810 2500
FAX
305 810 2460
BARRY R. DA V1DSON
DIRECT DIAL. 305 810 2539
EMAIL.bdavidson@hunton.com
March 10,2014
FILE NO:
Via Federal Express

Theodore P. Littlewood Jr., Bar Counsel
Attorney Consumer Assistance Program
The Florida Bar
651 East Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2300
Re:
Danielle Nicole Parsons, The Florida Bar File No. 2014-30,525(9A)
Dear Mr. Littlewood:

In response to your request of February 25, 2014, I write to respond to the new allegations
raised in Mr. Gillespie's February 24, 2014 correspondence.
Mr. Gillespie alleges that Ms. Parsons and McCalla Raymer LLC violated the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") by naming unknown persons as
defendants in the action to foreclose Mr. Gillespie's mortgage, and by submitting a waiver
[onn to the U.S. Supreme Court at a time when her firm McCalla Raymer LLC was inactive.
Mr. Gillespie's allegations are not supported by applicable law and wholly without merit.
Naming an unknown person as a defendant in an action is neither a deceptive nor unfair trade
practice - it is a common practice, sanctioned by Florida courts. Plaintiffs name unknown
defendants (or "John Does") as a matter of course "to identify the fact that the defendant's
real identity is unknown," or to "indicate that the plaintiff intends to add another party to the
action in the future." Grantham v. Blount, Inc., 683 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Challenges to the sufficiency of John Doe pleadings address only whether the pleading serves
to commence an action against the real party, or to toll the statute of limitations vis-a-vis that
party. See, e.g., Grantham, 683 So. 2d 538; Gilliam v. Smart, 809 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1st DCA
2009). These cases do not hold that unknown parties must be "stricken," or that the practice
is somehow inappropriate.
Mr. Gillespie has not demonstrated otherwise. The cases Mr. Gillespie cites to support his
contentions are inapposite. Hewitt vs. the Law Offices of David J Stern does not stand for the
proposition that naming unknown defendants in a complaint is a violation of FOUTPA. In
Hewitt, the alleged unfair and deceptive practice was charging n10rtgagors expenses and fees
ATLANTA AUSTIN BANGKOK BEIJING BRUSSELS CHARL01TE DALLAS HOUSTON LONDON LOS ANGELES
McLEAN MIAMI NEW YORK NORFOLK RALEIGH RICHMOND SAN FRANCISCO TOKYO WASHINGTON
www.hunton.com
"
March 10,2014
Page 2
that were not incurred, were unreasonable, excessive, were in excess of the amount incurred,
or were for services which were not performed. Stern CampI. at ~ 54.] The string of cases
cited by Mr. Gillespie are federal cases that analyze the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
are therefore inapplicable to the present case.
Ms. Parsons's submission to the U.S. Suprelne Court was not deceptive, unfair, unethical, or
impermissible. Indeed, she acted consistently with the rules of the Supreme Court which
required her to submit a waiver to indicate to the Court that she did not intend to file papers in
response to Mr. Gillespie's petition for a writ of certiorari. There is only one requirement for
an attorney to properly file a document in the Supreme Court - the attorney must be admitted
to practice before the Court. Sup. Ct. R. 9.1. An attorney is not required to be affiliated with
a law firm. Id. Should an attorney have an affiliation with a firm, the firm is not required to
be active or in good standing. Id. However, an attorney who is not admitted may submit a
waiver form provided that she indicate, by checking the appropriate box, that she is not
admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court. By indicating that she was "not presently a
member of the Bar," Ms. Parsons complied with all applicable rules and regulations for
submitting a waiver.
With respect to any other claims Mr. Gillespie may allege in the future, I note that Ms.
Parsons is protected from liability by the litigation privilege, which extends to all causes of
action, including both common-law torts and statutory causes of action. Levin, Middlebrooks,
Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. US. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994)
(holding that any act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding enjoys "absolute
immunity"); see also Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d
380, 384 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the litigation privilege extends to all causes of action,
including statutory causes of action).
We continue to assert that Mr. Gillespie's complaints are without merit and should be
dismissed.
Cordially yours,
{l~~~".
Barry R. Davidson
Enclosure
I
The relevant pages of the Stern Complaint are enclosed.
66390.0000 18 EMF_US 49841942v 1
Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 ONE

02:08:40
HUNDREDPM
TWELFTH CONGRESS
D A R R E L L E. I S S A , C A L I F O R N I A
CHAIRMAN
Congress of tfje ntteb States
D A N BURTON, INDIANA
J O H N L. M I C A , F L O R I D A
T O D D RUSSELL PLATTS, P E N N S Y L V A N I A
M I C H A E L R. T U R N E R , O H I O
PATRICK MCHENRY, NORTH CAROLINA
JIM JORDAN, OHIO
J A S O N CHAFFETZ, U T A H
C O N N I E MACK, FLORIDA
TIM WALBERG, MICHIGAN
J A M E S LANKFORD, O K L A H O M A
JUSTIN AMASH, MICHIGAN
A N N MARIE BUERKLE, N E W YORK
P A U L A. G O S A R , D.D.S., A R I Z O N A
Hcmae of
lUpretfentatfoe*
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT A N D GOVERNMENT REFORM

2 1 5 7 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
R A U L R, L A B R A D O R , I D A H O
PATRICK MEEHAN, PENNSYLVANIA
S C O T T DESJARLAIS, M.D., T E N N E S S E E
JOE WALSH, ILLINOIS
TREY GOWDY, SOUTH CAROLINA
D E N N I S A. R O S S , F L O R I D A
F R A N K C. G U I N T A , N E W H A M P S H I R E
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, TEXAS
M I K E KELLY, P E N N S Y L V A N I A
WASHINGTON, D C 2 0 5 1 5 - 6 1 4 3
MAJORITY
FACSIMILE
MINORITY
(202)225-5074
(202)225-3974
(202) 2 2 5 - 5 0 5 1
E L I J A H E. C U M M I N G S , M A R Y L A N D
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, N E W YORK
C A R O L Y N B. M A L O N E Y , N E W Y O R K
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DISTRICT OF C O L U M B I A
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, OHIO
J O H N F. T I E R N E Y , M A S S A C H U S E T T S
W M . LACY CLAY, MISSOURI
S T E P H E N F. L Y N C H , M A S S A C H U S E T T S
J I M COOPER, TENNESSEE
G E R A L D E. C O N N O L L Y , V I R G I N I A
MIKE QUIGLEY, ILLINOIS
D A N N Y K. D A V I S , I L L I N O I S
B R U C E L. B R A L E Y , I O W A
PETER W E L C H , V E R M O N T
J O H N A. Y A R M U T H , K E N T U C K Y
C H R I S T O P H E R S. M U R P H Y , C O N N E C T I C U T
J A C K I E SPEIER, C A L I F O R N I A
http://oversight.house.gov
February 25, 2011
LAWRENCE J. BRADY
STAFF DIRECTOR
The Honorable Steve A. Linick

Inspector General
Federal Housing Finance Agency
1625 Eye Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. Inspector General:
I am writing to request that you initiate an investigation into widespread allegations of
abuse by private attorneys and law firms hired to process foreclosures as part of the "Retained
Attorney Network" established by Fannie Mae. I also request that you examine allegations of
abusive behavior on the part of default management firms engaged by both mortgage servicers
managing Fannie Mae-backed loans and attorneys and firms that are part of the Retained
Attorney Network. Finally, I request that you examine efforts by Fannie Mae and the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to investigate these allegations and implement corrective
action.
Allegations of Abuse in the Retained Attorney Network
In August 2008, Fannie Mae created "a new mandatory network of retained attorneys to
handle all foreclosure and bankruptcy matters" relating to Fannie Mae mortgage loans, whether
held in portfolio or mortgage-backed securities. Fannie Mae required that only these retained
attorneys represent Fannie Mae mortgage servicers, and it established the maximum allowable
reimbursable fees for foreclosure-related work. In December 2010, Fannie Mae Executive Vice
President Terence Edwards announced that the Retained Attorney Network would be expanded
from 31 to 50 states.
1
Fannie Mae, New Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Attorney Network and Attorney's Fees
and Costs (Announcement 08-19) (Aug. 6, 2008) (online at https://www.efanniemae.com
/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2008/0819.pdf) (requiring also that "requests for approval of excess
fees by Fannie Mae must be submitted via email").
2
Testimony of Terence Edwards, Executive Vice President, Credit Portfolio

Management, Fannie Mae, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (Dec. 1, 2010) (online at www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/Edwards_
SenateBankingCommitteel 2-1-10.pdf).

Page 2
Recent reports indicate that many of the private attorneys, law firms, and other entities
participating in the Retained Attorney Network have been accused of practices that are fraught
with flaws, errors, conflicts of interest, and fraud, and these allegations have prompted numerous
state and federal investigations.
For example, on August 10, 2010, the Florida State Attorney General announced an
investigation into unfair and deceptive practices by the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P. A., the
Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A., and Shapiro & Fishman, L.L.P. The allegations
against the firms include creating and filing with Florida courts improper documentation to speed
foreclosures and establishing affiliated companies outside the United States to prepare false
documents. In announcing this investigation, the Attorney General stated:
3
On numerous occasions, allegedly fabricated documents have been presented to

the courts in foreclosure actions to obtain final judgments against homeowners.
Thousands of final judgments of foreclosure against Florida homeowners may
have been the result of allegedly improper actions of the law firms under
investigation.
4
Former employees of the Stern law firm also reportedly alleged that the firm engaged in
"robo-signing," a practice in which employees signed hundreds of foreclosure affidavits each
day, falsely swearing to have personal knowledge of the underlying documents. One employee
testified that the firm's chief operating officer "signed as many as 1,000 foreclosure affidavits a
day without reading a single word." The employees also reported that the firm backdated and
altered documents, and that it took steps to cover its misconduct by changing the dates on
hundreds of documents.
5
Last November, Fannie Mae issued a public notice stating that it had "terminated its
relationship with the Law Offices of David J. Stern" and informing servicers that they "may not
refer any future Fannie Mae matters to the Stern firm."
7
Separately, the U.S. Trustee Program (USTP) of the Department of Justice is

investigating another firm in the Retained Attorney Network, the firm of Steven J. Baum, P.C. of
Amherst, New York, for filing foreclosure documents that appear to be false or misleading;
3
Attorney General of Florida, Press Release: Florida Law Firms Subpoenaed Over
Foreclosure Filing Practices (Aug. 10, 2010) (online at www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/
newsreleases/2BAClAF2A61BBA398525777B0051BB30).
"id.
5
The Rise and Fall of a Foreclosure King, Associated Press (Feb. 6, 2011).
Questions Rising Over Fannie and Freddie's Oversight of Foreclosures, New York
Times (Oct. 19, 2010); The Foreclosure Machine, New York Times (Mar. 20, 2008).
Fannie Mae, Servicing Notice: Termination of Relationship with the Stern Law Firm
(Nov. 10, 2010) (online atwww.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/
pdf/2010/ntcel 11010.pdf).

Page 3
attempting to foreclose on borrowers after rejecting their attempts to make on-time payments;
and failing to prove ownership of mortgages as it seized homes. The firm has also been accused
of illegally charging for foreclosure-settlement conferences, overcharging on foreclosure fees,
and racketeering.
8
Another firm in the Retained Attorney Network, McCalla Raymer, L.L.C., is a defendant
in a federal lawsuit in which the plaintiffs allege that it engaged in fraud, racketeering, and the
manufacture of fraudulent foreclosure documents. Reportedly, this firm established operations
in Florida under the name Stone, McGehee & Silver and hired ten former Stern law firm
employees. The firm Stone, McGehee and Silver, LLC, dba McCalla Raymer currently appears
as a "Designated Counsel/Trustee" in Florida for Freddie Mac.
9
10
Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS), a $2.8 billion company headquartered in

Jacksonville, Floridaand the largest provider of default loan services in the nationis also
under investigation by the Florida Attorney General for producing apparently forged or
fabricated documents in foreclosure actions. LPS is also a defendant in a federal suit alleging
an illegal fee-sharing scheme. Filed in federal bankruptcy court in Mississippi, the suit alleges
that LPS and another company, Prommis Solutions Holding Company, illegally required
attorneys in their networks to turn over a portion of their fees for foreclosure services, and that
another large law firm, Johnson & Freedman, L.L.C., joined in this scheme. The Chapter 13
Trustee for the Northern District of Mississippi, a unit of the Department of Justice, has joined as
a plaintiff.
11
12
A special investigation by Reuters last December reported that LPS and its affiliated
companies also allegedly deployed low-skilled, non-lawyers to prepare foreclosure documents,
created invalid mortgage assignments to facilitate foreclosures, and rewarded attorneys for speed
rather than accuracy in filing court pleadings. Reuters reported:
* See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Raia, SP 002253/10, District Court of
Nassau County, New York (Hempstead); Campbell v. Baum, 10-cv-3800, U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn); Menashe v. Steven J. Baum P.C, 10-cv-5155, U.S.
District Court, Eastern District of New York (Central Islip); and Baum v. Lask, 2010- 012048,
New York Supreme Court, Erie County (Buffalo).
9
Novice Florida Lawyers Draw Suspicion in Foreclosure Mess, Palm Beach Post (Jan.
13, 2011) (online at www.palmbeachpost.com/money/real-estate/novice-florida-lawyers-drawsuspicion-in-foreclosure-mess-1146402.html).
10
Freddie Mac, Guide Exhibit 79: Designated Counsel/Trustee (Florida) (revised 2/8/11)
(online at www.freddiemac.com/service/msp/exh79_fl.html).
11
Office of the Attorney General of Florida, Case Number L10-3-1094 (online at

http://myfloridalegal.eom/__85256309005085AB.nsf/0/9B099A9DD32030BE8525771300426A
68?Open&Highlight=0,lps).
19
Thorne v. Prommis Solutions Holding Corp. et al.. Second Amended Class Action
Complaint, 10-01172 (BRN.D.M.S., Oct. 10, 2010).

Page 4
The law firms are on a stopwatch. [An LPS spokesman] confirmed that the LPS Desktop
system automatically times how long each firm takes to complete a task. It assigns firms
that turn out work the fastest a "green" rating; slower ones "yellow" and "red" for those
that take the longest. Court records show that green ratings go to firms that jump on
offered assignments from their LPS computer screens and almost instantly turn out readyto-file court pleadings, often using teams of low-skilled clerical workers with little
oversight from the lawyers.
13
Although Fannie Mae terminated its relationship with the Stern law firm last November,
it does not appear to have terminated its relationships with any of the other firms described
above.
14
Request for Investigation

These are serious allegations that may have affected thousands of homeowners. For these
reasons, I request that your office initiate a comprehensive investigation into allegations of abuse
by attorneys and law firms participating in the Retained Attorney Network, as well as servicers
and default loan service providers alleged to have participated in these abuses.
It is my understanding that the mission of your office is to "promote the economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of the FHFA's programs; to assist FHFA in the performance of its
mission; to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in FHFA's programs; and to seek
sanctions and prosecutions against those who are responsible for such fraud, waste, and abuse."
In 2008, FHFA replaced the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and became the
regulator and conservator for Fannie Mae. As such, the agency's duties include overseeing the
"prudential operations" of Fannie Mae and its contractors and ensuring that their activities and
operations "are consistent with the public interest."
15
16
With this background, I request that you address the following issues with respect to
attorneys and law firms participating in the Retained Attorney Network program and with
respect to other entities engaged by both mortgage servicers managing Fannie Mae-backed loans
and attorneys and firms that are part of the Retained Attorney Network:
1.
To what extent have homeowners lost their homes to improper, illegal, or otherwise
invalid foreclosures as a result of the types of abuses described above?
13
Id.
14
Fannie Mae, Retained Attorney List (effective February 10, 2011) (online at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/technology/servinvreport/amn7pdf/retainedattorneylist.pdf).
15
Website of the Federal Housing Finance Administration Office of Inspector General

(accessed on Feb. 3, 2011) (online at www.fhfaoig.gov/).
16
289).
Section 1313(a)(l)(A)-(B), Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-

Page 5
2.
To what extent have homeowners been charged improper, illegal, or otherwise invalid
fees during the foreclosure process?
3.
To what extent are attorneys, law firms, and other entities engaged in fee-splitting,
kickbacks, or other similar schemes?
4.
What is the total amount in "excess fees" that has been requested from Fannie Mae by
attorneys and law firms? Of this amount, how much has been reimbursed, and how much
has been determined to be inappropriate or unwarranted?
5.
Have FHFA or Fannie Mae conducted investigations into allegations of abuse by

attorneys, law firms, or other entities, and if so, what are the results? Were these
allegations considered before the recent expansion of the Retained Attorney Network to
all 50 states?
6.
What specific information has been collected regarding allegations against the following
firms and their affiliates?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
gh.
Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A.

Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A.
Shapiro & Fishman, L.L.P.
Steven J. Baum, P.C.
McCalla Raymer, L.L.C.
Johnson & Freedman, L.L.C.
Prommis Solutions Holding Company
Lender Processing Services, Inc. and LPS Default Solutions, L.L.C
7.
Have there been claims alleging that other attorneys or law firms participating in the
Retained Attorney Network program or any default management firms managing the
foreclosure of Fannie Mae-backed loans have engaged in similar conduct that violates the
rights of borrowers or investors, federal or state foreclosure mitigation program
guidelines, federal or state law, federal or state judicial requirements, state bar ethics
requirements, or other regulations, rules, guidelines, or laws?
8.
To what extent have the alleged abuses described above undermined loss and foreclosure
mitigation efforts and outcomes? What responsibilities do loan servicers have in
monitoring and overseeing the activities of attorneys and other third party companies?
What are the levels of cure rate and loss mitigation activities among retained attorneys?

Page 6
If you have any questions about this request, please have a member of your staff contact
Lucinda Lessley ofthe committee staff at 202-225-4290.
Thank you for your consideration, and please feel free to contact me or my staff with any
questions.
Sincerely,
cc:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, Chairman

Motion To Extend Time SC14-1637, Gillespie V The Florida Bar

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Motion To Extend Time SC14-1637, Gillespie V The Florida Bar

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Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

The Petitioner, Neil J. Gillespie, a nonlawyer person with disabilities reluctantly

This Courts ORDER entered January 27, 2015 (Exhibit A) held,

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

I emailed the Clerk of the Supreme Court about the following:

Email February 11, 2015, inter alia: (Exhibit B)

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

Email February 18, 2015 @3:34 PM (Exhibit D), with attachments.

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

Email February 18, 2015 @4:05 PM (Exhibit E), with attachments.

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

Parsons at McCalla Raymer, LLC, a foreclosure mill. A letter of Congressman Elijah E.

The litigation privilege essentially negates the rights of self-represented persons

defending home foreclosure. Those constitutional rights include:

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

SECTION 9. Due process.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

The foregoing is conclusive evidence supporting a right to civil counsel appointment in

I am continuing my efforts to obtain private counsel.

Petitioners Motion to Extend Time

request to toll time accompanies this motion.

Neil J. Gillespie, petitioner pro se

John F. Harkness, Executive Director

Neil J. Gillespie, petitioner pro se

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27,2015

THE FLORIDA BAR

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

"Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>

VIA Email: tomasino@flcourts.org

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

"Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>

VIA Email: tomasino@flcourts.org

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

Lynchings in Florida? It was a problem here,

The shelves of Jack Davis' home office are

TRACY WILCOX/The Gainesville Sun

continued emphasis on Florida's past lynchings.

Filing # 23964246 E-Filed 02/19/2015 02:08:40 PM

his or her disability, should be under the regular care of a

In the absence of a policy stipulation to the contrary, the

Total and Partial Disability

Generally; what constitutes "total disability"

Disability or accident insurance policies, or disability

3New England Mut. Life Ins.

Whether one is totally disabled is ordinarily a question of

ular occupation in order to recover, and a "general disabili

A typical occupational disability provision requires that

policy issued to lawyer, 6 A.L.R. 4th

cupation or profession or work in which he or she is engaged,3

Life Ins. Co. of America v. Evans,

Under an occupational disability policy defining total dis

provide further that recovery may be had only if the

insured is not engaged in any other gainful occupation or

West's Key Number Digest, Insurance

A typical general disability clause requires that the

Forms References: Defense

Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms,

profit,3 or that the insured suffer any impairment of mind or

What constitutes total or per

Generally, an insured who continues or resumes working

the U.S. v. Neill, 243 F.2d 193 (5th

Generally, when the term "total disability" is used in a