The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

The Nature of Philosophical Problems and Their Roots in Science

Author(s): K. R. Popper
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, No. 10 (Aug., 1952), pp. 124
-156
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of
Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/685553
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THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

AND THEIR ROOTS IN SCIENCE*
K. R. POPPER
I

IT was aftersome hesitationthat I decidedto take as my point of

departurethe present position of English philosophy. For I believe

that the function of a scientistor of a philosopheris to solve scientific
or philosophicalproblems, ratherthan to talk about what he or other
philosophersare doing or might do. Even an unsuccessfulattempt
to solve a scientific or philosophicalproblem, if it is an honest and
devoted attempt, appearsto me more significantthan any discussion
of a question such as ' What is science ? ' or ' What is philosophy ? '.
And even if we put this latter question,as we should,in the somewhat
improved form 'What is the characterof philosophicalproblems ?',
I for one should not bother much about it; I should feel that it has
little weight if comparedwith even such a minor problem of philosophy, as, say, the question whether every discussionmust always
proceed from 'assumptions' or 'suppositions' which themselves
are beyond argument.1
When describing'What is the characterof philosophicalproblems?'
as a somewhat improved form of 'What is philosophy ? ', I wished
to hint at one of the reasonsfor the futility of the currentcontroversy
concerningthe natureof philosophy-the naive belief that there is an
entity such as 'philosophy', or perhaps 'philosophical activity',
and that it has a certaincharacteror ' nature'. The belief that there
is such a thing as physics, or biology, or archaeology,and that these
'studies' or ' disciplines' are distinguishableby the subject matter
which they investigate, appearsto me to be a residuefrom the time
when one believed that a theory had to proceedfrom a definitionof its
own subjectmatter.2 But subjectmatter,or kinds of things, or classes
* The Chairman's address, delivered at the meeting of 28 April I952, to the
Philosophy of Science Group of the British Society for the History of Science.
1 I call this a minor
problem because I believe that it can easily be solved, by
relativistic
the
') doctrine indicated in the text.
refuting
('
2 This view is
of
part what I have called 'essentialism'. Cf. for example my
N.S., 1944, II,
Open Society,ch. II, or 'The Poverty of Historicism I' (Economica
No. 42).
I24

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

of things, do not, I hold, constitutea basisfor the distinctionof

disciplines. Disciplines are distinguishedpartly for historical
reasonsand reasonsof administrative
convenience(suchas the organisationof teachingandof appointments),
partlybecausethetheories
whichwe constructto solve our problemshave a tendency1 to grow
and distinctionis a
into unifiedsystems. But all this classification
and
Wearenotstudents
affair.
comparatively
unimportant superficial
of subjectmatterbut studentsof problems. And problemsmay cut
right acrossthe bordersof any subjectmatteror discipline.
Obviousas thisfactmay appearto somepeople,it is so important
for our presentdiscussionthatit is worth while to illustrateit by an
example. It hardlyneeds mentioningthat a problemposed to a
of the chancesof findingdepositsof
geologistsuchas the assessment
oil or of uraniumin a certaindistrictneedsfor its solutionthe help of
theoriesand techniquesusuallyclassifiedas mathematical,
physical,
and chemical. It is, however,less obviousthateven a more 'basic'
sciencesuchas atomicphysicsmay have to makeuse of a geological
survey,andof geologicaltheoriesandtechniques,if it wishesto solve
a problemarisingin one of its mostabstractandfundamental
theories;
for example,the problemof testingpredictions
the
concerning relative
or
of
of
an
or
odd
even
atomicnumber.
stability instability atoms
I amquitereadyto admitthatmanyproblems,evenif theirsolution
involvesthe most diversedisciplines,nevertheless' belong', in some
sense,to one or anotherof the traditionaldisciplines;for example,
the two problemsmentioned'belong' clearlyto geologyandphysics
respectively. Thisis due to the factthateachof them arisesout of a
discussionwhich is characteristic
of the traditionof the disciplinein
It
arises
out
of
discussion
of some theory,or out of
the
question.
tests
a
and
theories,as opposedto
empirical
bearingupon theory;
a
constitute
subjectmatter,may
discipline(whichmightbe described
asa somewhatlooseclusterof theoriesundergoing
aprocessof challenge,
and
But
this
does
not
alter
the
view thatthe classichange, growth).
ficationinto disciplines
is comparatively
andthatwe are
unimportant,
not
of
but
of
students,
disciplines,
problems.
But are therephilosophical
? The presentposition of
problems
Englishphilosophy,which I shall take as my point of departure,
originates,I believe,from the late ProfessorLudwigWittgenstein's
1 This
tendency can be explained by the principle that theoretical explanations
are the more satisfactorythe better they can be supported by independent
evidence.
(This somewhat cryptic remarkcannot, I fear, be amplified in the present context.)
I
125

K.

R.

POPPER

influentialdoctrinethat there are none; that all genuine problems are

scientific problems; that the alleged problems of philosophy are
pseudo-problems; that the alleged propositionsor theories of philosophy are pseudo-propositionsor pseudo-theories; that they are not
false (if false,1their negationswould be true propositionsor theories)
but strictly meaninglesscombinationsof words, no more meaningful
than the incoherent babbling of a child who has not yet learned to
speakproperly.2
As a consequence, philosophy cannot contain any theories. Its
true nature, according to Wittgenstein, is not that of a theory, but
that of an activity. The task of all genuine philosophy is that of
unmasking philosophical nonsense, and of teaching people to talk
sense.
My plan is to take this doctrine3 of Wittgenstein'sas my starting
1 It is of
particularimportance in this connection to realise that Wittgenstein's

use of the term 'meaningless'is notthe usualand somewhatvagueone according

to which an absurdlyfalseassertion(suchas ' 2 + 3 = 5.427' or 'I can play Bach
on the addingmachine')may be called'meaningless'. He calleda statement-like
expression'meaningless'only if it is not a properlyconstructedstatementat all,
and thereforeneithertrue nor false. Wittgensteinhimself gave the example:
'Socratesis identical'.
2 SinceWittgenstein
hisown Tractatus
described
asmeaningless(seealsothe next
at leastby implication,betweenrevealingand unimfootnote),he distinguished,
portantnonsense. But thisdoesnot affecthis maindoctrinewhichI am discussing,
the non-existenceof philosophicalproblems. (A discussionof otherdoctrinesof
canbe foundin the Notes to my OpenSociety,esp.notes26, 46, 51,
Wittgenstein's
and 52 to ch. II.)
3 It is easyto detectat onceoneflawin thisdoctrine: thedoctrine,it maybe said,
is itself a philosophictheory,claimingto be true,andnot to be meaningless.This
criticism,however,is a littletoo cheap. It mightbe counteredin at leasttwo ways.
(I) One mightsaythatthe doctrineis indeedmeaningless
quadoctrine,butnot qua
is
the
view
of
who
said
at
the end of his Tractatus
activity. (This
Wittgenstein,
that
must
realiseat the end that
whoever
understood
the
book
Logico-Philosophicus
it was itself meaningless,and mustdiscardit like a ladder,afterhavingusedit to
reachthe desiredheight.) (2) Onemightsaythatthe doctrineis not a philosophical
but an empiricalone, that it statesthe historicalfact that all 'theories' proposed
arein factungrammatical;thattheydo not, in fact,conformto the
by philosophers
rulesinherentin thoselanguagesin which they appearto be formulated,that this
defectturnsout to be impossibleto remedy; and that every attemptto express
them properlyhas lead to the loss of their philosophiccharacter(and revealed
them,for example,as empiricaltruisms,or asfalsestatements).Thesetwo counter
rescue,I believe,the threatened
arguments
consistencyof the doctrine,whichin this
indeed
becomes
as
'unassailable
',
way
Wittgensteinputsit by the kindof criticism
referredto in thisnote. (Seealsothenextnotebutone.)
I26

THE

NATURE

point (section 2).

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

I shall try (in section 3) to explain it; to defend it,

to some extent; and to criticiseit. And I shall support all this (in
sections4 to 6) by some examples from the history of scientific ideas.
But before proceeding to carry out this plan, I wish to reaffirm
my conviction that a philosophershould philosophise,that is, try to
solve philosophic problems, rather than talk about philosophy. If
Wittgenstein'sdoctrineis true, then nobody can, in this sense,philosophise. If this were my opinion, I would give up philosophy.
But it so happens that I am not only deeply interested in certain
philosophicalproblems (I do not much carewhether they are' rightly'
called 'philosophical problems'), but possessed by the belief that I
may even contribute-if only a little, and only by hardwork-to their
solution. And my only excuse for talking here about philosophyinsteadof philosophising-is, in the lastresort,my hope that,in carrying
out my programme for this address,an opportunity will offer itself
of doing a little philosophising,after all.
2

Ever since the rise of Hegelianismthere has existed a dangerous

gulf between science and philosophy. Philosopherswere accused'
rightly, I believe-of philosophising without knowledge of fact',
and their philosophieswere describedas 'mere fancies,even imbecile
fancies'.1 Although Hegelianismwas the leadinginfluencein England
and on the Continent, opposition to it, and contempt of its pretentiousness,never died out completely. Its downfallwas brought about
by a philosopherwho, like Leibniz,Kant,andJ. S. Mill beforehim, had
a sound knowledge of science,especiallymathematics. I am speaking
of BertrandRussell.
Russellis also the author of the classification(closely relatedto his
famous theoryof types) which is the basis ofWittgenstein's view of
philosophy, the classificationof the expressionsof a languageinto
(I) True statements
(2) False statements

(3) Meaninglessexpressions,among which there are statement-like

sequencesof words, which may be called 'pseudo-statements'.
Russelloperatedwith this distinctionin connectionwith the solution
1Thetwo quotationsarenot thewordsof a scientificcritic,but,ironicallyenough,
of thephilosophyof hisfriendandforerunner
Hegel'sown characterisation
Schelling.
Cf. my Open Society,note 4 (and text) to ch.
127

I2.

K. R. POPPER

of the logical paradoxeswhich he discovered. It was essential,for

this solution,to distinguish,more especially,between (2) and (3).
We mightsay,in ordinaryspeech,thata falsestatement,like ' 3 times

4 equals173 ' or' All catsarecows ', is meaningless. Russell,however,

reserved this characterisationfor expressionssuch as ' 3 times 4 are
cows or ' All cats equal 173 ', that is, for expressions which are better
not describedas false statements (as can easily be seen from the fact
that theirprimafacienegations, for example, ' Some cats do not equal
173' are no more satisfactorythan the original expressions)but as
pseudo-statements.
Russell used this distinction mainly for the elimination of the
paradoxes(which, he indicated,were meaninglesspseudo-statements).
Wittgenstein went further. Led, perhaps,by the feeling that what
philosophers, especially Hegelian philosophers, were saying was
somewhatsimilarto the paradoxesof logic, he usedRussell'sdistinction
in order to denounce all philosophy as meaningless.
As a consequence,therecould be no genuinephilosophicalproblems.
All allegedphilosophicalproblemscould be classifiedinto four classes:1
(I) those which are purely logical or mathematical,to be answeredby
logical or mathematicalpropositions,and thereforenot philosophical;
(2) those which are factual,to be answeredby some statementof the
empirical sciences, and therefore again not philosophical; (3) those
which are combinations of (i) and (2), and therefore, again, not

philosophical; and (4) meaningless pseudo-problems such as 'Do

all cows equal 173 ?' or 'Is Socratesidentical?' or ' Does an invisible,
untouchable,and apparentlyaltogether unknowable Socratesexist ?'
Wittgenstein'sidea of eradicatingphilosophy (and theology) with
the help of an adaptionof Russell'stheory of types was ingenious and
original (and more radical even than Comte's positivism which it
resemblesclosely).2 This idea became the inspirationof the powerful
modern school of language analysts who have inherited his belief
that there are no genuine philosophical problems, and that all a
1 Wittgensteinstill upheldthe doctrineof the non-existenceof philosophical
whenI sawhim last(in I946,whenhe presided
problemsin the formheredescribed
over a stormymeetingof the MoralScienceClubin Cambridge,on the occasionof
Problems? '). SinceI hadnever
my readinga paperon 'Are therePhilosophical
which
were
seenany of his unpublished
privatelycirculated
by someof
manuscripts
his pupils,I had been wonderingwhetherhe had modifiedwhat I here call his
andinfluentialpointof
'doctrine'; but I foundhis viewson thismostfundamental
his teachingunchanged.
2 Cf. note 52 (2) to ch. i of my OpenSociety.
I28

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

philosophercan do is to unmaskand dissolvethe linguisticpuzzles

which have been proposedby traditionalphilosophy.
My own view of the matteris thatonly as long as I have genuine
philosophical
problemsto solve shallI continueto takean interestin
philosophy. I fail to understandthe attractionof a philosophy
without problems. I know, of course,that many people talk nonsense; and it is conceivablethat it should become one's task (an
unpleasantone) to unmasksomebody'snonsense,for it may be
nonsense. But I believethatsomepeoplehavesaidthings
dangerous
whichwerenotverygoodsense,andcertainlynot verygoodgrammar,
but which are at the sametime highly interestingand exciting,and
perhapsmore worth listeningto than the good senseof others. I
may mentionthe differentialand integralcalculuswhich, especially
in its earlyforms,was, no doubt,completelyparadoxicaland nonsensicalby Wittgenstein's(and other) standards; which became,
however, reasonablywell foundedas the result of some hundred
efforts; butwhosefoundations
evenatthis
yearsof greatmathematical
of
in
in
moment
still
and
the
are
clarification.1
need,
very
process,
We mightremember,in thiscontext,thatit was the contrastbetween
andthe vaguenessand
the apparentabsoluteprecisionof mathematics
inprecisionof philosophicallanguagewhich deeply impressedthe
earlierfollowersof Wittgenstein. But hadtherebeena Wittgenstein
to use his weaponsagainstthe pioneersof the calculus,and had he
succeededin the eradicationof theirnonsense,where their contemporary critics (such as Berkeleywho was, fundamentally,right)
failed,then he would have strangledone of the most fascinatingand
philosophicallyimportantdevelopmentsin the historyof thought.
Wittgensteinonce wrote: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof
onemustbe silent.' Itwas,if I rememberrightly,ErwinSchroedinger
who replied: 'But it is only herethatspeakingbecomesinteresting.'
The historyof the calculus-andperhapsof his own theory2-bears
him out.
No doubt, we shouldall trainourselvesto speakas clearly,as
1 am alluding to G. Kreisel's recent construction of a monotone bounded
sequenceof rationalsevery term of which can be actually computed, but which does
not possessa computablelimit-in contradictionto what appearsto be the primafacie
interpretationof the classicaltheorem of Bolzano and Weierstrass,but in agreement
with Brouwer's doubts about this theorem. Cf. Journalof SymbolicLogic, 1952, 17,
57.

Before Max Born proposed his famous probability interpretation, Schroedinger's wave equation was, some might contend, meaningless.
2

|~~~~1

129

K. R. POPPER

precisely,as simply,and as directlyas we can. But I believethat

or indeeda book
thereis not a classicof science,or of mathematics,
worth readingthatcouldnot be shown,by a skilfulapplicationof
the techniqueof languageanalysis,to be full of meaninglesspseudopropositionsandwhat somepeople mightcall ' tautologies'.
3

But I havepromisedto saysomethingin defenceof Wittgenstein's

views. What I wish to say is, first,thatthereis muchphilosophical
in theHegelianschool)whichmayjustlybecriticised
writing(especially
as meaninglessverbiage; secondly,that this kind of irresponsible
writingwaschecked,fora timeatleast,by theinfluenceof Wittgenstein
andthelanguageanalysts(althoughit is likelythatthemostwholesome
influencein this respectwas the exampleof Russellwho, by the inthe fact
comparablecharmandthe clarityof his writings,established
that subtletyof contentwas compatiblewith lucidityandunpretentiousnessof style).
But I am preparedto admit more. In partial defence of
to defendthefollowingtwo theses.
view, I amprepared
Wittgenstein's
first
thesis
is
that
My
every philosophy,and especiallyevery
is
to degeneratein sucha way thatits
liable
philosophical'school',
become
frompseudo-problems,
problems
practically
indistinguishable
andits cant,accordingly,
frommeaningless
practically
indistinguishable
babble. This,I shalltry to show, is a consequenceof philosophical
inbreeding. The degenerationof philosophicalschoolsis the conwithoutbeing
sequenceof themistakenbeliefthatonecanphilosophise
to
whichariseoutside
compelled turnto philosophybyproblems
philofor example,or in cosmology,or in politics,
sophy-in mathematics,
or in religion,or in sociallife. To putit in otherwords,my firstthesis
is this. Genuinephilosophical
problemsare alwaysrootedin urgent
outside
and
problems
philosophy, theydie if theserootsdecay. In their
effortsto solve them, philosophersare liable to pursuewhat looks
likea philosophical
methodorlikea techniqueor like an unfailingkey
to philosophicalsuccess.' But no suchmethodsor techniquesexist;
methodsareunimportant,
andany methodis legitimate
philosophical
1It is very
interestingthatthe imitatorswerealwaysinclinedto believethatthe
'master' did his work with the help of a secretmethodor a trick. It is reported
thatin J. S. Bach'sdayssome musiciansbelievedthathe possesseda secretformula
for the construction
of fuguethemes.
I30

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

if it leadsto resultscapableof beingrationallydiscussed. Whatmatters

is neithermethodsnor techniques-nothingbut a sensitivenessto
problems,anda consumingpassionfor them; or as the Greekssaid,
the gift of wonder.
Thereare thosewho feel the urge to solve a problem,thosefor
whomtheproblembecomesreal,likea disorderwhichtheyhaveto get
evenif they use
out of theirsystem.1 They will makea contribution
a method or a technique. But there are otherswho do not feel
this urge,who haveno seriousandpressingproblembut who neverthelessproduce exercisesin fashionablemethods,and for whom
philosophyis application
(of whateverinsightor techniqueyou like)
ratherthansearch. Theyareluringphilosophyintothebog of pseudoproblemsandverbalpuzzles; eitherby offeringus pseudo-problems
for realones (thedangerwhichWittgensteinsaw), or by persuading
us to concentrateupon the endlessand pointlesstask of unmasking
whatthey rightlyor wronglytakefor pseudo-problems
(thetrapinto
whichWittgensteinfell).
method
My secondthesisis thatwhatappearsto be theprimafacie
of teachingphilosophyis liableto producea philosophywhichanswers
Wittgenstein'sdescription.What I mean by 'primafacie method
of teachingphilosophy', andwhatwouldseemto be theonly method,
is that of giving the beginner(whomwe taketo be unawareof the
historyof mathematical,
cosmological,and otherideasof scienceas
well asof politics)theworksof the greatphilosophers
to read; say,of
Plato and Aristotle,Descartesand Leibniz,Locke,Berkeley,Hume,
Kant, and Mill. What is the effect of such a courseof reading?
A new world of astonishingly
subtleandvast abstractions
opensitself
to the reader,abstractions
of an extremelyhigh and difficultlevel.
Thoughtsand argumentsare put beforehis mind which sometimes
arenot only hardto understand,
but whoserelevanceremainsobscure
since he cannotfind out what they may be relevantto. Yet the
studentknowsthatthesearethe greatphilosophers,
thatthisis theway
of philosophy. Thushe will makeaneffortto adjusthismindto what
he believes(mistakenly,
as we shallsee) to be theirway of thinking.
He will attemptto speaktheirqueerlanguage,to matchthe torturous
andperhapseventie himselfup in their
spiralsof theirargumentation,
curiousknots. Some may learn these tricksin a superficialway,
1 am alluding to a remarkby ProfessorGilbert Ryle, who says on page 9 of his
Conceptof Mind: 'Primarily I am trying to get some disorders out of my own
system.
I3I

K. R. POPPER

others may begin to become genuinely fascinated addicts. Yet I

feel that we ought to respect the man who, having made his effort,
comes ultimately to what may be describedas Wittgenstein's conclusion : 'I have learned the jargon as well as anybody. It is very
clever and captivating. In fact, it is dangerously captivating; for
the simple truthabout the matteris that it is much ado about nothing
-just a lot of nonsense.'
Now I believe such a conclusion to be grossly mistaken; it is,
however, the almost inescapableresult, I contend, of the primafacie
method of teaching philosophy here described. (I do not deny, of
course, that some particularlygifted students may find very much
more in the works of the greatphilosophersthan this story indicatesand without deceiving themselves.) For the chance of finding out
the extra-philosophicalproblems (the mathematical,scientific, moral
and political problems) which inspired these great philosophers is
very small indeed. These problems can be discovered, as a rule,
only by studying the history of, for example, scientificideas, and especially the problem-situationin mathematicsand the sciencesof the
period in question; and this, in turn, presupposesa considerableacquaintancewith mathematicsand science. Only an understandingof
the contemporary problem-situationin the sciences can enable the
student of the great philosophers to understandthat they tried to
solve urgent and concrete problems; problems which, they found,
could not be dismissed. And only after understandingthis fact can a
student attaina differentpictureof the great philosophies-one which
makes full sense of the apparentnonsense.
I shall try to establishmy two theses with the help of examples;
but before turning to these examples,I wish to summarisemy theses,
and to balancemy account with Wittgenstein.
My two thesesamount to the contention that philosophyis deeply
rooted in non-philosophicalproblems; that Wittengstein'snegative
judgment is correct,by and large, as far as philosophiesare concerned
which have forgotten their extra-philosophicalroots; and that these
roots are easily forgotten by philosopherswho 'study' philosophy,
instead of being forced into philosophy by the pressure of nonphilosophicalproblems.
My view of Wittgenstein'sdoctrinemay be summedup as follows.
It is true, by and large, that pure philosophicalproblemsdo not exist;
for indeed, the purer a philosophicalproblem becomes, the more is
lost of its original sense, significance,or meaning, and the more liable
132

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

is its discussionto degenerateinto empty verbalism. On the other

hand, there exist not only genuine scientific problems, but genuine
philosophicalproblems. Even if, upon analysis,these problems turn
out to-havefactualcomponents,they need not be classifiedas belonging
to science. And even if they should be soluble by, say, purely logical
means, they need not be classifiedas purely logical or tautological.
Analogoussituationsarisein physics. For example, the explanationor
prediction of certain spectral terms (with the help of a hypothesis
concerning the structure of atoms) may turn out to be soluble by
purely mathematicalcalculations. But this, again, does not imply
that the problem belonged to pure mathematics rather than to
physics. We are perfectlyjustified in calling a problem 'physical'
if it is connected with problems and theories which have been
traditionally discussed by physicists (such as the problems of the
constitution of matter), even if the means used for its solution turn
out to be purely mathematical. As we have seen, the solution of
problemsmay cut through the boundaryof many sciences. Similarly,
a problem may be rightly called 'philosophical' if we find that,
although originally it may have arisen in connection with, say,
atomic theory, it is more closely connected with the problems and
theories which have been discussed by philosophers than with
theoriesnowadaystreatedby physicists. And again,it does not matter
in the least what kind of methods we use in solving such a problem.
Cosmology, for example,will alwaysbe of greatphilosophicalinterest,
even though by some of its methodsit hasbecome closely alliedto what
is perhaps better called 'physics'. To say that, since it deals with
factual issues, it must belong to science ratherthan to philosophy, is
not only pedanticbut clearlythe resultof an epistemological,and thus
of a philosophical, dogma. Similarly, there is no reason why a
problem soluble by logical means should be denied the attribute
' philosophical'. It may well be typically philosophical,or physical,
or biological. For example, logical analysis played a considerable
part in Einstein's special theory of relativity; and it was,
partly, this fact which made this theory philosophically interesting,
and which gave rise to a wide range of philosophical problems
connectedwith it.
Wittgenstein's doctrine turns out to be the result of the thesis
that all genuine statements (and therefore all genuine problems) can
be classified into one of two exclusive classes: factual statements
(synthetica posteriori), and logical statements (analytic a priori). This
133

K. R. POPPER

simple dichotomy, although extremely valuable for the purposes of a

rough survey, turns out to be for many purposes too simple.1 But
although it is, as it were, specially designed to exclude the existence of
philosophical problems, it is very far from achieving even this aim;
for even if we accept the dichotomy, we can still claim that factual
or logical or mixed problems may turn out, in certain circumstances,
to be philosophical.

4
I now turn to my first example : Plato and the Crisis in Early Greek
Atomism.
My thesis here is that Plato's central philosophical doctrine, the
so-called Theory of Forms or Ideas, cannot be properly understood
except in an extra-philosophical context 2 ; more expecially in the
context of the critical problem situation in Greek science 3 (mainly
1 Alreadyin my Logicder
(Vienna,1935),I pointedout that a theory
Forschung
such as Newton's may be interpreted
eitheras factualor as consistingof implicit
which
definitions(inthesenseof PoincareandEddington),andthattheinterpretation
a physicistadoptsexhibitsitselfin hisattitude
towardstestswhichgo againsthistheory
ratherthanin whathe says. The dogmaof the simpledichotomyhasbeenrecently
attacked,on verydifferentlines,by F. H. Heinemann(Proc.of theXthIntern.Congress
of Philosophy (Amsterdam, I949),

Fasc. 2, 629, Amsterdam, 1949), by W. van 0.

Quine, and by Morton G. White. It may be remarked,againfrom a different

point of view, that the dichotomyapplies,in a precisesense,only to a formalised
language,and thereforeis liable to breakdown for those languagesin which
we must speakpriorto any formalisation,
i.e. in those languagesin which all
the traditionalproblemswere conceived. Some membersof the school of the
languageanalysts,however,still believeit a soundmethodto unmaska theory as
'tautological'.
2 In
I havetriedto explainin somedetailanother
my OpenSocietyandItsEnemies,
root of the samedoctrine,viz. a politicalroot. I alsodiscussed
extra-philosophical
there(in note 9 to ch. 6 of the revised4th edition,1952) the problemwith whichI
am concernedin the presentsection,but from a somewhatdifferentangle. The
note referredto andthe presentsectionpartlyoverlap; but they arelargelysupplementaryto each other. Relevantreferences(esp. to Plato) omittedhere will be
found there.
3 Therearehistorians
who denythatthe term'science' canbe properlyapplied
to anydevelopment
whichis olderthanthesixteenthor eventheseventeenth
century.
But quiteapartfromthe factthatcontroversies
aboutlabelsshouldbe avoided,there
can, I believe,no longer be a doubt nowadaysaboutthe astonishingsimilarity,
not to sayidentity,of the aims,interests,activities,arguments,
andmethods,of, say,
Galileoand Archimedes,or Copernicusand Plato,or Keplerand Aristarchus
(the
of antiquity'). Andanydoubtconcerningtheextremeageof scientific
Copernicus
I34

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

in the theory of matter)which developedas a consequenceof the

discoveryof the irrationality
of the squarerootof two. If my thesis
is correct,then Plato'stheoryhas not so far been fully understood.
can ever be achievedis, of course,
(Whethera 'full' understanding
most questionable.)But the moreimportantconsequence
would be
thatit can neverbe understoodby philosophers
trainedin accordance
with theprimafacie
methoddescribedin the foregoingsection-unless,
of course,they arespeciallyandadhocinformedof the relevantfacts
(whichthey may have to accepton authority).
It is well known1 thatPlato'sTheoryof Formsis historicallyas
well as in its contentcloselyconnectedwith the Pythagoreantheory
thatall thingsare,in essence,numbers.The detailsof thisconnection,
and the connectionbetween Atomism and Pythagoreanism,are
perhapsnot so well known. I shall thereforetell the whole story
in brief,as I seeit at present.
It appearsthat the founderof the Pythagoreanorderor sectwas
deeplyimpressedby two discoveries. The first discoverywas that
a prima
faciepurelyqualitativephenomenonsuchas musicalharmony
was, in essence, based upon the purely numericalratios I:

2;

2: 3;

3 : 4. The secondwasthatthe ' right' or ' straight'angle(obtainable

for exampleby foldinga leaftwice,so thatthe two foldsforma cross)

was connectedwith the purely numericalratios 3: 4: 5, or 5:

I2 :

13

it appears,
(thesidesof rectangular
triangles). Thesetwo discoveries,
led Pythagorasto the somewhatfantasticgeneralisation
thatall things
are, in essence,numbers,or ratiosof numbers; or thatnumberwas
the ratio (logos= reason), the rationalessence of things, or their real
nature.
Fantastic as this idea was, it proved in many ways fruitful. One
of its most successful applications was to simple geometrical figures,
observation,and of careful computationsbased upon observation,has been dispelled
nowadays by the discovery of new evidence concerning the history of ancient
astronomy. We can now draw not only a parallelbetween Tycho and Hipparchus,
but even one between Hansen (1857) and Cidenas the Chaldean(3I4 B.C.), whose
computations of the 'constants for the motion of Sun and Moon' are without exception comparablein precisionto those of the best nineteenth-centuryastronomers,
'Cidenas' value for the motion of the Sun from the Node (o'"5 to great), although
inferiorto Brown's, is superiorto at leastone of the most widely used modem values ',
wrote J. K. Fotheringhamin 1928, in his most admirablearticle 'The Indebtedness
of Greekto ChaldeanAstronomy' (The Observatory,
I928, 51, No. 653), upon which
my contention concerning the age of astronomy is based.
1 From Aristotle's
Metaphysics
I35

K. R. POPPER

suchas squares,rectangular
andisoscelestriangles,andalso to certain
such
as
solids,
simple
pyramids. The treatmentof some of these
was
geometricalproblems baseduponthe so-calledgnomon.
Thiscanbe explainedas follows. If we indicatea squareby four
dots,

we may interpretthis as the resultof addingthreedots to the one

dot on the upperleft corner. Thesethreedots arethe firstgnomon;
we mayindicateit thus:

By addinga secondgnomon,consistingof five moredots,we obtain

Oneseesatoncethateverynumberof thesequenceof theoddnumbers,

I, 3, 5, 7 .? . , eachformsa gnomonof a square,and thatthe sums
I, I + 3, I + 3 + 5, I + 3 + 5 + 7, ? ? . are the square numbers,

and that, if n is the (number of dots in the) side of a square,its area

(total number of dots = n2) will be equal to the sum of the first n

odd numbers.
As with the treatmentof squares,so with the treatmentof isosceles
triangles.

Here each gnomonis a last horizontalline of points, and each element

of the sequence I,

2,

are the sums I+2;

3, 4,

. . .

is agnomon. The' triangular numbers'

I+2+3+4,

I+2+3;
136

etc., that is, the

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

sumsof the firstn naturalnumbers. By puttingtwo suchtriangles

side by side
. \ .
.

we obtaintheparallelogram
withthehorizontal
siden + I andtheother
side n, containingn(n + I) dots. Sinceit consistsof two isosceles
triangles,its number is 2(I + 2 +

. .

. + n), so that we obtain the

equation
(3)

I +2

. . . +

n =n(n

+ I)

and
(4)

d(I

+ n) = -n(n +
2

).

From this it is easy to obtain the general formula for the sum of
an arithmeticalseries.
We also obtain ' oblong numbers', that is the numbersof oblong
rectangularfigures, of which the simplest is

with the oblong numbers 2 + 4 + 6 . . .,

i.e. the gnomon of an

oblong is an even number,and the oblong numbersare the sums of the

even number.
These considerations were extended to solids; for example,
by summing the first triangular number, pyramid numbers were
obtained. But the main applicationwas to plain figures, or shapes,or
' Forms'. These, it was believed, are characterised the
by
appropriate
sequence of numbers, and thus by the numerical ratios of the consecutive numbers of the sequence. In other words, 'Forms' are
numbersor ratiosof numbers. On the other hand, not only shapes
I37

K. R. POPPER

of things,but alsoabstractproperties,suchasharmony,and' straightness' are numbers. In this way, the generaltheory that numbers
aretherationalessencesof allthings,is arrivedatwithsomeplausibility.
It is veryprobablethatthe developmentof thisview wasinfluenced
the
withthediagramof a constellation
by similarityof thedot-diagrams
suchastheLion,or the Scorpion,or theVirgo. If a Lionis anarrangementof dots,it musthavea number. In thisway the beliefseemsto
have arisenthat the numbers,or 'Forms', are heavenlyshapesof
things.
One of the mainelementsof this earlytheorywas the so-called
distinction
between
Tableof Opposites', baseduponthefundamental
odd andeven numbers. It containssuchthingsas
ONE
ODD
MALE
REST (BEING)
DETERMINATE
SQUARE
STRAIGHT
RIGHT
LIGHT
GOOD

MANY
EVEN
FEMALE
CHANGE (BECOMING)
INDETERMINATE
OBLONG
CROOKED
LEFT
DARKNESS
BAD

In readingthroughthis strangetableone gets some idea of the

workingof the Pythagoreanmind, and why not only the 'Forms'
or shapesof geometricalfigureswere consideredto be numbers,in
ideas,suchasJusticeand,of course,Harmony,
essence,butalsoabstract
and Health,Beauty and Knowledge. The table is interestingalso
becauseit wastakenover,withverylittlealteration,
by Plato. Plato's
famous theory of 'Forms' or 'Ideas' may indeed be described,
somewhatroughly,as the doctrinethatthe ' Good' sideof the Table
of Oppositesconstitutesan (invisible)Universe,a Universeof Higher
Reality,of the Unchangingand Determinate'Forms' of all things,
and that True and Certain Knowledge (episteme= scientia= science)

can be of this UnchangingandRealUniverseonly, while the visible

world of changeand flux in which we live and die, the world of
the worldof experience,is only a kindof
generationanddestruction,
World. Itis onlya worldof appearance,
Real
of
that
or
reflection copy
of which no True and CertainKnowledgecan be obtained. What
can be obtainedin the place of Knowledge(episteme)are only the
138

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

plausible but uncertain and prejudiced opinions (doxa) of fallible

mortals.1 In his interpretationof the Table of Opposites, Plato was
influencedby Parmenides,the man who stimulatedthe development
of Democritus' atomic theory.
Returning now to the original Pythagorean view, there is one
thing in it which is of decisive importancefor our story. It will have
been observed that the Pythagorean emphasis upon Number was
fruitful from the point of view of the development of scientific
ideas. This is often but somewhat loosely expressedby saying that
the Pythagoreans encouraged numerical scientific measurements.
Now the point which we must realiseis that, for the Pythagoreans,all
this was countingratherthanmeasuring.It was the counting of numbers,
of invisible essencesor 'Natures' which were Numbers of little dots
or stigmata. Admittedly, we cannot count these little dots directly,
since they are invisible. What we actually do is not to count
the Numbers or Natural Units, but to measure,i.e. to count arbitrary
visible units. But the significanceof measurementswas interpreted
as revealing, indirectly, the true Ratios of the Natural Units or of the
NaturalNumbers.
Thus Euclid's methods of proving the so-called 'Theorem of
Pythagoras' (Euclid'sI, 47) according to which, if a is the side of a
triangleopposite to its right angle between b and c,
(I)

a2 = b2 + 2,

was completely foreign to the spirit of Pythagorean mathematics.

In spite of the fact that the theorem was known to the Babylonians
and geometrically proved by them, neither Pythagoras nor Plato
appearto have known the generalgeometrical
proof; for the problem
for which they offered solutions, the arithmetical
one of finding the
integral solutions for the sides of rectangulartriangles, can be easily
1Plato's distinction (epistemevs. doxa) derives, I think, from Parmenides (truth
vs. seeming). Plato clearly realised that all knowledge of the visible world, the
changing world of appearance,consists of doxa; that it is tainted by uncertainty
even if it utilisesthe episteme,the knowledge of the unchanging ' Forms' and of pure
mathematics,to the utmost, and even if it interpretsthe visible world with the help
of a theory of the invisible world. Cf. COatylus,439b f., Rep. 476d if.; and
especially Timaeus,29b if., where the distinctionis appliedto those partsof Plato'sown
theory which we should nowadayscall ' physics' or 'cosmology ', or, more generally,
'natural science '. They belong, Plato says, to the realm of doxa (in spite of the fact
that science= scientia= episteme;cf. my remarkson this problem in ThePhilosophical
Quarterly,April I952, p. I68). For a different view concerning Plato's relation to
Parmenides,see Sir David Ross, Plato's Theoryof Ideas,Oxford, I95I, p. 164.
I39

K. R. POPPER

solved,if (i) is knownby the formula(mandn arenaturalnumbers,

and m > n)

a=

(2)

m2n2
+

b=

2mn

; c=

m2-

n2.

But formula (2) was unknown to Pythagorasand even to Plato. This

emerges from the tradition according to which Pythagorasproposed
the formula
(3)

a= 2m(m +- I) + I; b = 2m(m + I);

c= 2m + I

which can be read off the gnomonof the squarenumbers,but which is

less general than (2), since it fails, for example, for 8 I5: 17.

To

Plato, who is reportedto have improved Pythagoras'formula (3), is

attributed another formula which still falls short of the general
solution (2).

We now come to the discovery of the irrationality

of thesquareroot

of two. According to tradition, this discovery was made within the

Pythagoreanorder,but was kept secret. (This is suggestedby the old

term for ' irrational', 'arrhetos',that is, ' unspeakable, which might
well have meant 'the unspeakable mystery'.) This discovery
struckat the root of Pythagoreanism; for it meant that such a simple
geometrical entity as the diagonal d of the square with the side a
could demonstrably not be characterisedby any ratio of natural
numbers; d: a was no ratio. The traditionhas it that the member of
the school who gave away the secret was killed for his treachery.
However this may be, thereis little doubt that the realisationof the fact
that irrationalmagnitudes (they were, of course, not recognised as
numbers) existed, and that their existencecould be proved, led to the
downfall of the Pythagoreanorder.
The Pythagorean theory, with its dot-diagrams, contains, no
doubt, the suggestion of a very primitive atomism. How far the
atomic theory of Democritus was influenced by Pythagoreanismis
difficultto assess. Its main influencescame, one can say for certain,
from the Eleatic School: from Parmenidesand from Zeno. The
basic problem of this school, and of Democritus, was that of the
rationalunderstandingof change. (I differ here from the interpretations of Cornford and others.) I think that this problem derives
from Ionian rather than from Pythagorean thought, and that it has
remainedthe fundamentalproblem of Natural Philosophy.
Although Parmenideshimself was not a physicist (as opposed to
his great Ionian predecessors),he may be described, I believe, as
having fathered theoreticalphysics. He produced an anti-physical
140

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

system.
theorywhich, however,was the firsthypothetical-deductive
And it was the beginningof a long seriesof suchsystemsof physical

theories each of which was an improvement on its predecessor. As a

rule the improvementwas found necessaryby the realisationthat the
earlier system was falsified by certain facts of experience. Such an
empiricalrefutationof the consequencesof a deductivesystemleadsto
efforts at its reconstruction,and thus to a new and improved theory
which, as a rule, clearly bears the mark of its ancestry, of the older
theory as well as of the refuting experience.
These experiencesor observationswere, we shall see, very crude
at first, but they became more and more subtle as the theoriesbecame
more and more capableof accountingfor the cruderobservations. In
the case of Parmenides'theory, the clash with observation was so
obvious that it would seem perhapsfanciful to describethe theory as
the first hypothetical-deductivesystem of physics. We may, therefore, describe it as the last pre-physical deductive system, whose
falsificationgave rise to the first truly physical theory, the atomistic
theory of Democritus.
Parmenides'theory is simple. He finds it impossible to understand change or movement rationally, and concludes that there is
really no change-or that change is only apparent. But before we
indulge in feelings of superiority, in the face of such a hopelessly
unrealistictheory, we shouldfirst realisethat thereis a seriousproblem
here. If a thing X changes, then clearly it is no longer the same
thing X. On the other hand, we cannot say that X changeswithout
implying that X persistsduring the change; that it is the same thing
X, at the beginning and at the end of the change. Thus, it appears
that we arrive at a contradiction,and that the idea of a thing that
changes, and thereforethe idea of change, is impossible.
All this sounds very philosophicaland abstract,and so it is. But
it is a fact that the difficultyhere indicatedhas never ceased to make
itself felt in the development of physics.1 And a deterministicsystem
such as that of Einstein'sfield theory might even be describedas a
four-dimensionalversionof Parmenides'unchangingthree-dimensional
universe. For, in a sense, no change occurs in Einstein's fourdimensionalblock-universe. Everything is there just as it is, in its
four-dimensional locus; change becomes a kind of 'apparent'
change; it is 'only' the observerwho, as it were, glides along his
1 This
may be seen from Emile Meyerson's IdentityandReality,one of the most
interestingphilosophicalstudies of the development of physical theories.
K

I4I

K. R. POPPER

world-lineand becomessuccessivelyconsciousof the differentloci

alongthisworld-line,thatis, of his spatio-temporal
surrounding...
To leturnfromthisnew Parmenides
to the olderfatherof theoretical physics,we maypresenthis deductivetheoryroughlyas follows.
(I) Only whatis, is.
(2)

What is not does not exist.

(3) Non-being,thatis, the void, doesnot exist.

(4) The worldis full.
(5) The world has no parts; it is one huge block (because

it is full).
Motion
is impossible (sincethere is no empty spaceinto which
(6)
anything could move).
The conclusions (5) and (6) were obviously contradictedby facts.
Thus Democritus argued from the falsity of the conclusion to that
of the premises:
(6') There is motion (thusmotion is possible).
(5') The world has parts; it is not one, but many.
(4') Thus the world cannot be full.'
(3') The void or (non-being) exist.
So far the theory had to be altered. With regardto being, or to
the many existing things (asopposedto the void), Democritusadopted
Parmenides'theory that they had no parts. They were indivisible
(atoms), because they were full, because they had no void inside.
The centralpoint of this theory is that it gives a rationalaccount
of change. The world consistsof empty space (the void) with atoms
in it. The atoms do not change; they are Parmenideanindivisible
block universesin miniature.2 All changeis due to rearrangementof
atoms in space. Accordingly, all changeis movement. Since the only
kind of novelty possibleis novelty of arrangement,it is, in principle,
possible to predictallfuture changesin the world,provided we manage
to predict the motion of mass-points.

1 The inferencefromthe existenceof motionto thatof a void doesnot follow,

inferencefrom the fullnessof the world to the impossibility
becauseParmenides'
of motiondoesnot follow. Platoseemsto havebeenthe firstto see,if only dimly,
thatin a fullworldcircularor vortex-likemotionis possible,providedthatthereis a
liquid-likemediumin the world. (Peascan move with the vorticesof pea-soup.)
in the Timaeus,
becomesthe basisof
Thisidea,firstofferedsomewhathalf-heartedly
Cartesianismand of the light-ether theory as it was held down to I905.

2 Democritus'theoryadmittedalso largeblock-atoms,
but the vast majorityof
his atomswereinvisiblysmall.
142

THE

NATURE

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PROBLEMS

Democritus'theoryof changewas of tremendousimportancefor

the developmentof physicalscience. It waspartlyacceptedby Plato,
who retainedmuch of atomismbut explainedchangenot only by
unchangingyet movingatoms,but alsoby the ' Forms'whichwere
subjectneitherto changenor to motion. But it was condemnedby
Aristotlewho taughtin itssteadthatallchangewastheunfoldingof the
inherentpotentialitiesof essentiallyunchangingsubstances.But alasthesubjectsof changebecame
thoughAristotle'stheoryof substances
dominant,it proved barren; 1 and Democritus'theory that all change

must be explainedby movementbecamethe tacitlyacceptedofficial

programmeof physicsdown to our own day. It is still partof the
philosophyof physics,in spite of the fact that physics itself has
outgrownit (to say nothing of the biologicaland socialsciences).
Forwith Newton,in additionto movingmass-points,forces
of changing
enter
the
scene.
these
True,
intensity(anddirection)
changescanbe
or
that
as
due
is upon the
to,
dependentupon, motion,
explained
not identical
changingpositionof particles,but they arenevertheless
with thechangesin position; owingto thesquarelaw, thedependence
is not even a linearone. And with FaradayandMaxwell,changing
fieldsof forcesbecomeasimportantasmaterialatomicparticles.That
our modernatomsturnout to be compositeis a minormatter; from
Democritus'pointof view, not our atomsbut ratherour elementary
wouldberealatoms-exceptthatthesetoo turnoutto beliable
particles
to change. Thuswe havea mostinterestingsituation. A philosophy
of change,designedto meet the difficultyof understanding
change
rationally,servessciencesfor thousandsof years,but is ultimately
superseded
by the developmentof scienceitself; and this fact passes
practicallyunnoticedby philosopherswho are busily denying the
existenceof philosophicalproblems.
Democritus'theorywas a marvellousachievement. It provideda
theoreticalframeworkfor the explanationof most of the empirically
known propertiesof matter(discussedalreadyby the lonians),such
as compressibility,
and
degreesof hardnessand resilience,rarefaction
and
others.
condensation,
coherence,disintegration,
combustion, many
1 The barrennessof the 'essentialist'
(cf. note 2 above) theory of substanceis
connected with its anthropomorphism; for substances(as Locke saw) take their
plausibility from the experience of a self-identicalbut changing and unfolding self.
But although we may welcome the fact that Aristotle'ssubstanceshave disappeared
from physics,there is nothing wrong, as ProfessorHayek says,in thinking anthropomorphically about man; and there is no reason why they should disappearfrom
psychology.
I43

K. R. POPPER

But apartfrom beingimportantas an explanationof the phenomena

of experience,the theory was importantin other ways. First,it
establishedthe methodologicalprinciplethat a deductivetheoryor
must' savethephenomena', thatis, mustbe in agreement
explanation
with experience. Secondly,it showedthat a theorymay be speculative,andbasedupon the fundamental(Parmenidean)
principlethat
the world as it mustbe understoodby argumentative
thoughtturns
out to be differentfromthe worldof primafacieexperience,from the
world as seen, heard,smelled,tasted,touched;1 and that such a
acceptthe empiricist' criterion'
speculativetheorymay nevertheless
or rejectionof a theory
thatit is the visiblethatdecidesthe acceptance
2
of the invisible (suchas the atoms). Thisphilosophyhasremained
to the whole developmentof physics,andhascontinued
fundamental
' and 'positivistic' 4 tendencies.
to conflictwith all ' relativistic
Democritus'
Furthermore,
theoryled to the firstsuccessesof the
of
forerunner
of the calculusof integration),
exhaustion
method
(the
himselfacknowledged
thatDemocrituswas the first
sinceArchimedes
to formulatethe theory of the volumes of cones and pyramids.5
But perhapsthe most fascinatingelementin Democritus'theory is
of spaceand time. I have in mind
his doctrineof the quantisation
thatthereis a shortestdistance
the doctrine,now extensivelydiscussed,6
anda smallesttimeinterval,thatis to say,distancesin spaceandtime
7in contradistinction
(elementsof lengthandtime,Democritus'ameres
to his atoms)suchthatno smalleronesaremeasurable.
1 Cf. Democritus, Diels,
fragm. ii (cf. Anaxagoras,Dield fragm. 21 ; see also

fragm.7).

2 Cf. Sextus
Empiricus,Adv. mathem.(Bekker) vii. 140, p. 221, 23B.
3'Relativistic' in the sense of philosophical relativism, e.g. of Protagoras'
homomensuradoctrine. It is, unfortunately,still necessaryto emphasisethat Einstein's
theory has nothing in common with philosophicalrelativism.
4 Such as those of
Bacon; the theory (but fortunately not the practice) of the
in our time, of Mach (who opposed atomic theory); and
and
early Royal Society;
of the sense-datatheorists.
5 Cf. Diels,
fragm. 155, which must be interpretedin the light of Archimedes
(ed. Heiberg) II2,p. 428 f. Cf. S. Luria'smost importantarticle 'Die Infinitesimalmethode der antikenAtomisten ' (Quellen& Studienzur Gesch.d. Math.Abt. B. Bd. 2,

Heft 2 (1932),

p. 142).

Cf. A. March, Natur undErkenntnis,Vienna, 1948, p. 193 f.

7 Cf. S. Luria, op. cit., esp. pp. I48 if., I72 if.

I44

THE NATURE

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PROBLEMS

5
Democritus' atomism was developed and expounded as a point
for point reply 1 to the detailed arguments of his Eleatic predecessors,
of Parmenides and of his pupil, Zeno. Especially Democritus' theory
of atomic distances and time intervals is the direct result of Zeno's
arguments, or more precisely, of the rejection of Zeno's conclusions.
But nowhere in Zeno is there an allusion to the discovery of irrationals.
We do not know the date of the proof of the irrationality of the
square root of two, or the date when the discovery became publicly
known. Although there existed a tradition ascribing it to Pythagoras
(sixth century B.C.), and although some authors 2 call it the 'theorem
of Pythagoras ', there can be little doubt that the discovery was not
made, and certainly not publicly known, before 450 B.C., and probably
not before 420. Whether Democritus knew about it is uncertain.
I now feel inclined to believe that he did not; and that the title of
Democritus' two lost books, Peri alogon grammon kai kaston, should
be translated On Illogical Lines and Full Bodies (Atoms),3 and that
1This
in Aristotle'sOnGeneration
andCorruption,
pointforpointreplyis preserved
3I6aI4 if., a very importantpassagefirstidentifiedas Democriteanby I. Hammer
by Luriawho says(op.cit.135)of theParmenides
Jensenin 191oandcarefullydiscussed
and Zeno: 'Democritusborrowstheirdeductivearguments,but he arrivesat the
oppositeconclusion.'
2 Cf. G. H. HardyandH. M. Wright,Introduction
totheTheory
ofNumbers
(I938),
where
a
historical
remark
on
Theodorus'
39,
42,
proof,asreported
veryinteresting
pp.
will be found.
in Plato'sTheaeteteus,
3 Ratherthan On Irrational
Linesand Atoms,as I translatedin note 9 to ch. 6
of my OpenSociety(reviseded.). Whatis probablymeantby the title (considering
Plato'spassagementionedin the next note) might,I think,be bestrenderedby ' On
Crazy DistancesandAtoms'. Cf. H. Vogt, Bibl. Math., 191o, 10, 147, and S. Luria,

op. cit. pp. i68 f., where it is convincinglysuggestedthat (Arist.)De insec.lin.

968b17 andPlutarch,De comm.notit.,38, 2, p. 1078f., containtracesof Democritus'
work. Accordingto these sources,Democritus'argumentwas this. If linesare
then they are composedof an infinityof ultimateunitsand are
infinitelydivisible,
' (there
thereforeall relatedlikeco: co, thatis to say,they areall 'non-comparable
is no proportion). Indeed,if linesareconsideredas classesof points,the 'number'
(potency)of the pointsof a line is, accordingto modemviews,equalfor all lines,
whetherthe linesarefiniteor infinite. Thisfacthasbeendescribedas' paradoxical'
(for example,by Bolzano)and might well have been describedas 'crazy' by
Democritus. It maybe notedthat,accordingto Brouwer,even the classicaltheory
of themeasure
of a continuumleadsto fundamentally
the sameresults;sincehe asserts
thatall classicalcontinuahavezero measure,the absenceof a ratiois hereexpressed
as
by o: o. Democritus'result(andhis theoryof ameres)
appearsto be inescapable
arithmetical
i.e. on the counting
method,
long asgeometryis basedon the Pythagorean
of dots.
145

K. R. POPPER

these two books do not containany referenceto the problemof

irrationality.1

is
My belief that Democritusdid not know aboutirrationalities
basedon the fact that thereare no tracesof a defenceof his theory
againstthe fatalblow whichit receivedfrom thisdiscovery. Forthe
blow was as fatalto Atomismas it was to Pythagoreanism.Both
theorieswerebasedon the doctrinethatallmeasurement
is, ultimately,
of
natural
so
that
measurement
must
be reducible
units,
every
counting
to purenumbers. The distancebetweenanytwo atomicpointsmust,
therefore,consistof a certainnumberof atomicdistances; thus all
mustbe commensurable.But thisturnsout to be impossible
distances
evenin thesimplecaseof thedistances
betweenthecorers of a square,
of its diagonalwith its side.
becauseof the incommensurability
It was Platowho realisedthisfact, andwho in the Lawsstressed
its importancein the strongestpossibleterms,denouncinghis compatriotsfor theirfailureto realisewhatit meant. It is my contention
that his whole philosophy,and especiallyhis theory of' Forms' or
'Ideas', was influencedby it.
Platowas very closeto the Pythagoreans
as well as to the Eleatic
to DemoSchools; andalthoughhe appearsto havefelt antipathetic
critus, he was himself an atomist of a kind. (Atomistteaching
remainedas one of the schooltraditionsof the Academy.2) This is
and
not surprising
in view of the closerelationbetweenPythagorean
atomisticideas. But all this was threatenedby the discoveryof the
irrational. I suggestthatPlato'smaincontributionto sciencesprang
from his realisationof the problemof the irrational,and from the
and atomismwhich he undertook
modificationof Pythagoreanism
situation.
in orderto rescuesciencefroma catastrophic
He realisedthatthe purelyarithmetical
theoryof naturewas defeated, and that a new mathematicalmethod for descriptionand
explanationof the world was needed. Thus he encouragedthe
developmentof an autonomousgeometricalmethodwhichfoundits
fulfilmentin the 'Elements' of the PlatonistEuclid.
What are the facts? I shall try to put themall brieflytogether.
andatomismin Democritus'formwere both
(i) Pythagoreanism
on
based
arithmetic,thatis on counting.
fundamentally
1 This would be in
keeping with the fact mentioned in the note cited from the
term 'alogos' is only much later known to be used for
the
that
Open Society,
'irrational', and that Plato who (Repub.534d) alludesto Democritus' title, nevertheless never uses ' alogos' as a synonym for ' arrhetos'.
2 See S. Luria, esp. on Plutarch, loc. cit.
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(2) Plato emphasisedthe catastrophiccharacterof the discovery

of the irrationals.

(3) He inscribed over the door of the Academy: 'Nobody untrained in geometry may enter my house'. But geometry, according
to Plato's immediate pupil Aristotle as well as to Euclid, treats of
incommensurables or irrationals, in contradistinction to arithmetic
which treats of' the odd and the even '.
(4) Within a short time after Plato's death, his school produced,
in Euclid's Elements, a work whose main point was that it freed
mathematics from the' arithmetical' assumption of commensurability
or rationality.
(5) Plato himself contributed to this development, and especially
to the development of solid geometry.
(6) More especially, he gave in the Timaeus a specifically geometrical version of the formerly purely arithmetical atomic theory,
that is, a version which constructed the elementary particles (the famous
Platonic bodies) out of triangles which incorporated the irrational
square roots of two and of three. (See below.) In most other
respects, he preserved both Pythagorean ideas as well as some of the
most important ideas of Democritus.1 At the same time, he tried
to eliminate Democritus' void; for he realised that motion remains
possible even in a ' full' world, provided motion is conceived as of the
character of vortices in a liquid. Thus he retained some of the most
fundamental ideas of Parmenides.2
(7) Plato encouraged the construction of geometrical models of
the world, and especially models explaining the planetary movements.
Euclid's geometry was not intended as an exercise in pure geometry
(as now usually assumed), but as a theory of the world. Ever since 3
1 Platotook over,more
especially,Democritus'theoryof vortices(Diels,fragm.
Diels9; and12, 13) ; see alsothe nextfootnote,andhis
167,I64; cf. Anaxagoras,
theory of what we nowadayswould call gravitationalphenomena(Diels, I64;
I2, 13, I5, and2)-a theorywhich,slightlymodifiedby Aristotle,was
Anaxagoras,
discarded
by Galileo.
ultimately
2 Plato'sreconciliation
of atomismandthe theoryof theplenum('natureabhors
for the historyof physicsdownto our
the void') becameof the greatestimportance
own day. For it influencedDescartesstrongly,becamethe basisof the theoryof
etherandlight,andthusultimately,viaHuyghensandMaxwell,of de Broglie'sandof
wave mechanics.
Schroedinger's
3 The
of arithmetical
methodsin the
only exceptionis the partialreappearance
New QuantumTheory,e.g. in the electronshelltheoryof the periodicsystembased
upon Pauli'sexclusionprinciple.
I47

K. R. POPPER

Plato and Euclid, but not before, it has been taken for granted that

instrumentof all
is the fundamental
geometry(ratherthanarithmetic)
anddescriptions,
of the theoryof matteras well
physicalexplanations
as of cosmology.1
These are the historicalfacts. They go a long way, I believe,
as theprima
to establishmy contentionthatwhatI havedescribed
facie
methodof philosophycannotleadto anunderstanding
of theproblems
whichinspiredPlato. Nor canit leadto anappreciation
of whatmay
be justly claimedto be his greatestphilosophicalachievement,the
geometricaltheoryof the worldwhichbecamethe basisof the works
of Euclid, Aristarchus,Archimedes,Copernicus,Kepler, Galileo,
Descartes,Newton, Maxwell,and Einstein.
But is this achievementproperly describedas philosophical
?
Does it not ratherbelongto physics-a factualscience-and to pure
mathematics-a branch, Wittgenstein's school would contend, of
tautologicallogic ?

I believethat we can at this stagesee fairlyclearlywhy Plato's

achievement(althoughit has no doubt its physical,its logical, its
achievemixed,andits nonsensicalcomponents)was a philosophical
at
least
of
of
and
of
his
nature
ment; why
part
physicshas
philosophy

lasted and, I believe, will last.

What we find in Plato and his predecessorsis the conscious

construction
andinventionof a new approachtowardsthe worldand
towardsthe knowledgeof the world. This approachtransformsa
thevisibleworld
fundamentallytheologicalidea, the ideaof explaining
a
invisible
into
the
instrumentof
fundamental
world,2
postulated
by
theoreticalscience. The idea was explicitlyformulatedby Anaxaintothenature
gorasandDemocritus3astheprincipleof investigations
of matteror body; visiblematterwas to be explainedby hypotheses
Concerning the modem tendency towards what is sometimescalled ' arithmetisation of geometry ' (a tendency which is hardly characteristicof all modern work
on geometry), it should be noted that there is little similaritywith the Pythagorean
ofnaturalnumbersare its main instrumentratherthan
approachsince infinitesequences
the naturalnumbers themselves.
1 For a similarview of Plato'sand Euclid'sinfluence,see G. F. Hemens, Proc.of the
Xth Intern.Congressof Philosophy(AmsterdamI949), Fasc. 2, 847.
2 Cf. Homer's
explanationof the visible world before Troy with the help of the
invisible world of the Olympus. The idea loses, with Democritus, some of its
theological character(which is still strong in Parmenides,although less so in Anaxagoras) but regainsit with Plato, only to lose it soon afterwards.
3 See the references
given above.
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PROBLEMS

aboutinvisibles,aboutan invisible
structure
whichis toosmallto beseen.
With Plato, this ideas is consciously accepted and generalised; the
visible world of change is ultimately to be explained by an invisible
world of unchanging' Forms' (or substancesor essences,or 'natures'
-as we shall see, geometricalshapesor figures).
Is this idea about the invisible structureof matter a physical or a
philosophicalidea ? If a physicistactsupon this theory, that is to say,
if he accepts it, perhapseven without becoming conscious of it, by
accepting the traditionalproblems of his subject, as presentedby the
problem-situationwith which he is confronted; and if he, so acting,
producesa new specifictheory of the structureof matter; thenI should
not call him a philosopher. But if he reflectsupon it, and,for example,
rejects it (like Berkeley or Mach), preferring a phenomenological
or positivistic physics to the theoretical and somewhat theological
approach,then he may be called a philosopher. Similarly,those who
consciouslysearchedfor the theoreticalapproach,who constructedit,
andwho explicitly formulatedit, and thus transferredthe hypotheticaldeductive method from the field of theology to that of physics, were
philosophers,even though they were physicistsin so far as they acted
upon their own precepts and tried to produce actual theories of the
invisible structureof matter.
But I shall not pursue the question as to the proper applicationof
the label 'philosophy' any further; for this problem, which is
Wittgenstein's problem, clearly turns out to be one of linguistic
usage, a pseudo-problemwhich by now must be rapidly developing
into a bore to my audience. But I wish to add a few more words on
Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas, or more precisely, on point (6) of
the list of historicalfacts given above.
Plato's theory of the structure of matter can be found in the
Timaeus. It has at least a superficialsimilaritywith the modern theory
of solids which interpretsthem as crystals. His physical bodies are
composed of invisible elementary particles of various shapes, the
shapes being responsible for the macroscopic properties of visible
matter. The shapes of the elementary particles, in their turn, are
determinedby the shapesof the plane figures which form their sides.
And these plane figures, in their turn, are ultimately all composed of
two elementary triangles,viz. the half-square(or isoscelesrectangular)
trianglewhich incorporatesthe squarerootoftwo,andthe half-equilateral
rectangulartriangle which incorporatesthe square-root
of three,both
of them irrationals.
149

K. R. POPPER

Thesetriangles,in theirturn,are describedas the copies1 of unchanging 'Forms' or 'Ideas', which means that specificallygeo' Forms' are admittedinto the
metrical
companyof the Pythagorean
arithmetical
Form-Numbers.
Thereis little doubt that the motive of this constructionis the
the irrationals
attemptto solvethe crisisof atomismby incorporating
into thelastelementsof whichthe worldis built. Oncethishasbeen
is overcome.
done,the difficultyof the existenceof irrationaldistances
But why did Plato choose just these two triangles? I have
elsewhere2 expressedthe view, as a conjecture,that Plato believed
thatall otherirrationals
mightbe obtainedby addingto the rationals
multiplesof the squareroots of two and three. I now feel quite
confidentthat the crucialpassagein the Timaeusclearlyimpliesthis
doctrine(whichwas mistaken,as Euclidlatershowed). For in the
passagein question,Plato says quite clearlythat 'All trianglesare
derivedfrom two, eachhavinga right angle', going on to specify
thesetwo as the half-squareand half-equilateral.But this can only
mean,in the context,thatall trianglescanbe composedby combining
thesetwo, a view which is equivalentto the mistakentheoryof the
of all irrationals
with sumsof rationalsand
relativecommensurability
the squarerootsof two andthree.3
But Plato did not pretendthat he had a proof of the theoryin
question. On the contrary,he saysthathe assumesthe two triangles
asprinciples'in accordance
with an accountwhichcombinesprobable
'.
conjecturewith necessity And a littlelater,afterexplainingthathe
takesthe half-equilateral
triangleas the secondof his principles,he
'The
reason
too
is
says,
long a story; butif anybodyshouldtestthis
and
has this property' (I supposethe property
that
it
matter,
prove
thatall othertrianglescanbe composedof thesetwo) ' thenthe prize
is his, with all our good will'.4

The language is somewhat obscure,

andno doubtthe reasonis thatPlatolackeda proofof his conjecture

1 For the
processby which the trianglesare stampedout of space (the 'mother')
the
ideas
by
(the 'father'), cf. my Open Society,note I5 to ch. 3, and the references
there given, as well as note 9 to ch. 6.
2 In the last
quoted note
3 In the note referredto I also conjectured that it was the close approximation
of the sum of these two squareroots to 7Twhich encouragedPlato in his mistaken
theory. Although I have no new evidence, I believe that this conjecture is much
strengthenedby the view that Plato in fact believed in the mistakentheory described
here.
4 The two
quotationsare from the Timaeus,53c/d and 54a/b

I50

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NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

concerning these two triangles, and felt it should be supplied by

somebody.
The obscurity of the passage had the strange effect that Plato's
quite clearly stated choice of triangles introduce irrationalsinto his
world of Forms seems to have escaped notice, in spite of Plato's
emphasisupon the problem in other places. And this fact, in turn,
may perhapsexplain why Plato's Theory of Forms could appearto
Aristotle to be fundamentallythe same as the Pythagoreantheory of
form-numbers,land why Plato'satomismappearedto Aristotlemerely
1

I believe that our considerationmay throw some light on the problem of Plato's
famous' two principles'-' The One 'and' The IndeterminateDyad '. The followvan
ing interpretationdevelops a suggestion made by van der Wielen (De Ideegetallen
van
Wielen's
criticism
and
defended
der
own
Plato, 194I, p. 132 f.)
brilliantly
against
by Ross (Plato's Theoryof Ideas,p. 20I). We assumethat the 'IndeterminateDyad '
is a straightline or distance,not to be interpretedas a unit distance,or as having yet
been measured at all. We assume that a point (limit, monas, 'One') is placed
successively in such positions that it divides the Dyad according to the ratio I: n,
for any naturalnumber n. Then we can describethe ' generation' of the numbers
as follows. For n= I, the Dyad is divided into two parts whose ratio is I :I.
This may be interpretedas the' generation' of Twoness out of Onenessand the Dyad,
since we have divided the Dyad into two equal parts. Having thus 'generated'
the number 2, we can divide the Dyad according to the ratio I :2 (and the larger
section, as before, according to the ratio I: I), thus generating threeequal partsand
the number 3 ; generally, the 'generation' of a number n gives rise to a division
of the Dyad in the ratio i : n, and with this, to the ' generation' of the number n + I.
(And in each stage intervenesthe' One ', the point which introducesa limit or form
or measureinto the otherwise' indeterminate' Dyad, afresh,to createthe newnumber;
this remarkis intended to strengthenRoss' case againstvan der Wielen's.)
Now it should be noted that this procedure,although it 'generates' (in the first
instance, at least) only the series of natural numbers, nevertheless contains a geometricalelement-the division of a line, first into two equal parts,and then into two
parts according to a certain proportion : n. Both kinds of division are in need of
geometrical methods, and the second, more especially, needs a method such as
Eudoxus' Theory of Proportions. Now I suggest that Plato began to ask himself
why he should not divide the Dyad also in the proportionof I : V and of i : /3.
This, he must have felt, was a departure from the method by which the natural
numbers are generated; it is less 'arithmetical' still, and it needs more specifically
' geometrical' methods. But it would 'generate ', in the place of natural numbers,
linearelements in the proportioni : /2 and i: V3, which may be identicalwith the
'atomic lines ' (Metaphysics,
992aI9) from which the atomic trianglesare constructed.
At the same time, the characterisationof the Dyad as ' indeterminate'would become
highly appropriate,in view of the Pythagoreanattitude (cf. Philolaos, Diels fragm. 2
and 3) towards the irrational. (Perhapsthe name 'The Greatand the Small' began
to be replaced by 'The Indeterminate Dyad' when irrational proportions were
generated in addition to rationalones.)

151

K. R. POPPER

as a comparatively minor variation of that of Democritus. Aristotle,

in spite of his association of arithmetic with the odd and even, and of
geometry with the irrational, does not appear to have taken the
problem of the irrationals seriously. It appears that he took Plato's
reform programme for geometry for granted; it had been partly
carried out by Eudoxus before Aristotle entered the Academy, and
Aristotle was only superficially interested in mathematics. He never
alludes to the inscription on the Academy.
To sum up, it seems probable that Plato's theory of Forms was,
like his theory of matter, a re-statement of the theories of his predecessors, the Pythagoreans and Democritus respectively, in the light
of his realisation that the existence of irrationals demanded the emancipation of geometry from arithmetic. By encouraging this emancipation, Plato contributed to the development of Euclid's system, the
most important and influential deductive theory ever constructed.
By his adoption of geometry as the theory of the world, he provided
Aristarchus, Newton, and Einstein with their intellectual toolbox.
The calamity of Greek atomism was thus transformed into a momentous achievement. But Plato's scientific interests are partly forgotten.
The problem-situation in science which gave rise to his philosophical
problems is little understood. And his greatest achievement, the
geometrical theory of the world, has influenced our world-picture
to such an extent that we unconsciously take it for granted.
6
One example never suffices. As my second example, out of a
great many interesting possibilities, I choose Kant. His CritiqueofPure
Reason is one of the most difficult books ever written. Kant wrote in
undue haste, and about a problem which, I shall try to show, was
insoluble. Nevertheless it was not a pseudo-problem, but an inAssumingthis view to be correct,we might conjecturethat Platoapproached
slowly (beginningin theHippiasMajor,andthuslongbeforetheRepublic-asopposed
to a remarkmadeby Rossop.cit.,top of page56) to the view thattheirrationals
are
since both the naturalnumbersand the irrationalsare 'generated' by
numbers,
similarandessentially
geometricprocesses. Butoncethisview is reached(andit was
firstreached,it appears,in the Epinomis
99od-e,whetheror not thisworkis Plato's),
theneventheirrational
the
of
Timaeus
become'numbers' (i.e.characterised
triangles
by numerical,if irrational,propositions).But with this, the peculiarcontribution
of Plato,andthedifference
betweenhisandthePythagorean
theory,isliableto become
indiscernible;andthismayexplainwhy it hasbeenlost sightof, evenby Aristotle.
152

THE

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PROBLEMS

situationof
escapableproblemwhich aroseout of the contemporary
physicaltheory.
His book was written for people who knew some Newtonian
stellardynamicsand who had at least some idea of its history-of
Copernicus,Tycho,Brahe,Kepler,andGalileo.
of our own day,spoiltandblase
It is perhapshardfor intellectuals
aswe areby thespectacleof scientificsuccess,to realisewhatNewton's
theory meant, not just for Kant, but for any eighteenthcentury
thinker. After the unmatcheddaringwith which the Ancientshad
tackledthe riddleof the Universe,therehad come a periodof long
decay,recovery,andthena staggeringsuccess.Newtonhaddiscovered
thelong soughtsecret. Hisgeometrical
theory,basedon andmodelled
afterEuclid,hadbeenat firstreceivedwith greatmisgivings,even by
force of
its own originator.1The reasonwas that the gravitational
attractionwas felt to be ' occult', or at leastsomethingwhichneeded
wasfound(and
anexplanation. Butalthoughno plausibleexplanation
Newton scornedrecourseto ad-hochypotheses),all misgivingshad
long beforeKantmadehis own importantcontribution
disappeared
to Newtoniantheory, 78 years after the Principia.2No qualified
judge 3 of the situationcould doubtany longerthat the theorywas
true. It hasbeentestedby the mostprecisemeasurements,
andit had
had
It
led
to
the
of
been
deviations
minute
always
right.
prediction
fromKepler'slaws,andto new discoveries. In a timelike ours,when
theoriescomeandgo likethebusesin Piccadilly,
andwheneveryschoolhas
heard
that
has
Newton
been
boy
long
superseded
by Einstein,it is
hard to recapturethe sense of convictionwhich Newton's theory
inspired,or the senseof elation,andof liberation. A uniqueeventhad
happenedin thehistoryof thought,onewhichcouldneverbe repeated:
the firstandfinaldiscoveryof the absolutetruthaboutthe universe.
An age-olddreamhadcome true. Mankindhadobtainedknowledge,
real, certain, indubitable,and demonstrableknowledge-divine
andnot merelydoxa,humanopinion.
scientiaor episteme,
Thus for Kant,Newton'stheorywas simplytrue,and the belief
in its truthremainedunshakenfor a centuryafterKant'sdeath. Kant
1 See Newton's letter to Bentley, I693.
The so-called Kant-LaplaceanHypothesis published by Kant in I755.
3 There had been some
very pertinentcriticism(especiallyby Leibnizand Berkeley)
but in view of the successof the theory it was-I believe rightly-felt that the critics
had somehow missed the point of the theory. We must not forget that even today
the theory still stands,with only minor modifications,as an excellent first (or, in view
of Kepler, perhapsas a second) approximation.
I53
2

K. R. POPPER

to the end acceptedwhat he andeverybodyelse took for a fact, the

attainmentof scientiaor episteme.At first he acceptedit without
question. This state he called his 'dogmatic slumber'. He was
rousedfromit by Hume.
Hume had taughtthat there could be no such thing as certain
knowledgeof universallaws, or episteme;that all we knew was
obtainedwith the help of observationwhich could be only of particulars,so that our knowledgewas uncertain. His argumentswere
convincing(andhe was, of course,right). But herewas the fact,or
what appearedas a fact-Newton's attainmentof episteme.
of the nearabsurdityof what
HumerousedKantto the realisation
he neverdoubtedto be a fact. Herewas a problemwhichcouldnot
be dismissed. How coulda manhave got hold of suchknowledge?
demonstrable,
Knowledgewhich was general,precise,mathematical,
indubitable,andyet explanatoryof observedfacts?
: 'How is pure
Thus arosethe centralproblemof the Critique
natural science possible?'. By 'pure natural science'-scientia,
episteme-Kantmeans,simply, Newton's theory.
is badlywritten,and althoughit abounds
Althoughthe Critique
in bad grammar,thisproblemwas not a linguisticpuzzle. Herewas
knowledge. How could we ever attain it ? The questionwas
inescapable.But it was alsoinsoluble. For the apparentfact of the
was no fact. As we now know, or believe,
attainmentof episteme
Newton's theory is no more than a marvelloushypothesis,an astonishinglygood approximation;uniqueindeed,but not as divine
but
truth,only asa uniqueinventionof a humangenius; not episteme,
is
'
How
Kant's
With
of
doxa.
realm
the
to
this,
problem,
belonging
and
most
the
disturbing
pure naturalsciencepossible', collapses,
of his perplexitiesdisappear.
Kant'sproposedsolutionof his insolubleproblemconsistedof
what he proudlycalledhis ' CopernicanRevolution'of the problem
of knowledge. Knowledge-episteme-was
possiblebecausewe arenot
active
digestors. By digesting
passivereceptorsof sensedata,buttheir
and assimilating
them, we form and organisethem into a Universe.
In this process,we imposeupon the materialpresentedto our senses
lawswhich arepartof our digestiveandorganising
the mathematical
mechanism. Thus our intellect does not discoveruniversallaws
in nature,but it prescribesits own laws and imposesthem upon
natures.
This theory is a strangemixtureof absurdityand truth. It is
154

THE

NATURE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL

PROBLEMS

as absurdas the mistakenproblemit attemptsto solve; for it proves

too much,being designedto provetoo much. Accordingto Kant's
theory,'pure naturalscience'is not onlypossible;althoughhe does
resultof our mentaloutfit.
not realisethis, it becomesthe necessary
For if the fact of our attainmentof episteme
can be explainedat all
by the fact that our intellectlegislatesfor andimposesits own laws
upon nature,then the first of these two factscannotbe contingent
anymorethanthesecond.Thustheproblemis no longerhow Newton
could makehis discoverybut how everybodyelse couldhave failed
to makeit. How is it that our digestivemechanismdid not work
muchearlier?
This is a patentlyabsurdconsequenceof Kant'sidea. But to
dismissit offhand,and to dismisshis problemas a pseudo-problem
is not good enough. Forwe canfindan elementof truthin hisidea
(anda muchneededcorrectionof someHumeanviews),afterreducing
his problemto its properdimensions. His question,we now know,
or believewe know, shouldhave been: 'How aresuccessfulhypothesespossible?' And our answer,in the spiritof his Copernican
Revolution,might, I suggest,be somethinglike this: Because,as
of sensedata,butactiveorganisms.
you said,we arenotpassivereceptors
Becausewe reactto our environmentnot alwaysmerelyinstinctively,
but sometimesconsciouslyandfreely. Becausewe caninventmyths,
stories,theories; becausewe have a thirstfor explanation,an insatiablecuriosity,a wish to know. Becausewe not only invent
storiesand theories,but try themout andsee whethertheywork and
how theywork. Becauseby a greateffort,by tryinghardanderring
often,we may sometimes,if we arelucky,succeedin hittingupona
story, an explanation,which 'saves the phenomena'; perhapsby
makingup a myth about'invisibles', suchas atomsor gravitational
forces,whichexplainthe visible. Becauseknowledgeis an adventure
of ideas. Theseideas,it is true,areproducedby us, andnot by the
worldaroundus; theyarenot merelythetracesof repeatedsensations
or stimulior whatnot; hereyou wereright. Butwe aremoreactive
and free thaneven you believed; for similarobservations
or similar
environmentalsituationsdo not, as your theory implied,produce
similarexplanations
in differentmen. Nor is thefactthatwe originate
ourtheories,andthatwe attemptto imposethemuponthe world,an
explanationof theirsuccess,as you believed. Forthe overwhelming
majorityof ourtheories,of ourfreelyinventedideas,areunsuccessful;
asfalsifiedby
they do not standup to searchingtests,andarediscarded
I55

K. R. POPPER

experience. Only a very few of them succeed,for a time, in the

competitivestrugglefor survival.1
7

Few of Kant'ssuccessorsappearever to have clearlyunderstood

thepreciseproblem-situation
whichgaveriseto hiswork. Therewere
two suchproblemsfor him, Newton'sdynamicsof the heavens,and
the absolutestandards
of humanbrotherhoodandjusticeto whichthe
'
Frenchrevolutionaries
appealed,or, asKantputsit, thestarryheavens
aboveme, andthe morallaw withinme'. But Kant'sstarryheavens
areseldomidentifiedasanallusionto Newton.2 FromFichteonward,3
many have copied Kant's'method' and the dreadfulstyle of his
Critique.But most of theseimitatorshave forgottenKant'soriginal
interestsandproblems,busilytryingeitherto tighten,or elseto explain
away,the Gordianknot in whichKant,throughno faultof his own,
had tied himselfup.
We mustbewareof mistakingthe well-nighsenselessandpointless
subtletiesof the imitatorsfor thepressingandgenuineproblemsof the
pioneer. We shouldrememberthat his problem,althoughnot an
empiricalone in the ordinarysense,neverthelessturnedout, unexpectedly,to be in some sensefactual(Kantcalledsuchfacts'transcendental'), sinceit arosefrom an apparentbut non-existentinstance
of a scientiaor episteme.Andwe should,I submit,seriouslyconsider
the suggestionthat Kant'sanswer,in spite of its partialabsurdity,
containedthe nucleusof a philosophyof science.
1The ideasof this 'answer' were elaboratedin my LogikderForschung
(I935).
2 That this identification
is correctedmay be seenfrom the last ten linesof the
of the Critique
Reason.
penultimateparagraph
of Practical
3 Cf.

my Open Society,note 58 to ch. I2

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