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Belvidere, Illinois - 2007

A TECHNICAL REPORT
by
VITOR GONCALVES

Presented to Dr. Douglas Ludlow of the Department

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING
CHEM ENG 5140 INTERMEDIATE CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY
in
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
21/11/2014

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Abstract
Nihon Dempa Kogyo (NDK) CO., LTD. was founded in 1948 in Tokio, Japan. NDK started
producing synthetic crystal products and then enlarged its production by manufacturing crystalrelated products. The NDK Crystal facility in Belvidere, Illinois, was responsible for a explosion
of a 50-foot pressure vessel used to produce synthetic crystals. The explosion happened due to a
stress corrosion cracking on the interior of a vessel. The main consequences were one fatality
and one injury to members of the public. Also, the public facility was significantly damaged. The
company NDK was aware that inside the vessel could be occurring corrosion, but they did not
performed any examination inside the vessels.
Introduction
Nihon Dempa Kogyo (NDK) CO., LTD. was founded in 1948 in Tokio, Japan. NDK started
producing synthetic crystal products and then enlarged its production by manufacturing crystalrelated products (oscillators, ultrasonic transducers, and synthetic quartz) on the United States,
Europe, and Asia.
The NDK Crystal facility was located in an area adjacent to Interstate 90, sharing the property
with NDK America, Inc., which was the sales and marketing section of the company. The NKD
Crystal building stored eight pressure vessels named autoclaves. The vessels were designed for
crystal growing operations, which requires a vessel material and thickness resistant enough to
high operating pressures. Also, they were of cylindrical shape, 48-foot long, 2-foot thickness
closure on top, and 8.1inches thickness of cylindrical wall.
The vessels were designed and engineered by Engineered Pressure Systems, Inc. (EPSI) and
forged by Sheffield Forgemasters. Sheffield constructed the vessels from alloy metal so that the
vessels were according to the specifications of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC). The material of the first three vessels
manufactured by Sheffield did not meet the required mechanical properties and because of that
Sheffield did not certify that they were condescending with the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. However, NDK request the Illinois Boiler and Pressure Vessel Safety Division to
concede special authorization to use the vessels. However, the vessels failed on the Charpy test
according to the ASME Code requirements, but they showed reasonable material toughness at
the operating temperature of 700 F. In order to meet the code requirements, Sheffield stated that
the vessel material toughness was adequate and that the vessels succeed on the Charpy test at the
temperature of 212 F. After that, the State of Illinois approved the use of vessels No. 1, 2, and 3.
They were classified as State Special pressure vessels. The other vessels (No. 4 to 8) were
produced from a different material with mechanical properties that passed on the Charpy test at
70 F.

Process Description
The process of growing crystal inside the vessel begin with raw mined quartz (lasca) loaded in
baskets into the bottom of the vessel. Then added 800 gallons of a solution of 4% sodium
hydroxide and a small amount of lithium nitrate. The iron inside the steel vessel reacts with the
caustic sodium hydroxide solution to form a coating named acmite, which helps to prevent the
vessel from corrosion and to avoid iron contamination in the quartz produced. On the top of the
vessel, operators add ultra-thin pure quartz crystals. The vessel is heated by electric heaters that
increase the temperature to 700 F, boiling the caustic liquid and, consequently, increasing the
pressure inside the vessel to 29,000 psig. The maximum working pressure and operating
temperature are respectively 30,000 psig and 750 F.
The natural quartz crystal dissolves in the solution and the supersaturated solution rises to the top
of the vessel where the temperature is lower. For a period of 100 to 150 days the high purity
quartz crystals are formed on the seed crystals. The first run performed on the vessel is to form
the coating inside the vessel wall. When the vessel run is completed, operators clean the interior
of the vessels with a pressure washer and then remove the water. The excess caustic and water
solution is transferred to a tank, treated and neutralized in order to be discarded.

Accident Timeline
After 120 days of operating cycle, on December 7, 2009, the superheated liquid caused the
rupture of the vessel No. 2. The Belvidere Fire Department arrived on scene 11 minutes after the
explosion. They evacuated the buildings and escorted everyone involved in the explosion to the
northwest parking lot. NDK shutdown all companys operations after the accident. The CSB set
a team of three investigators and they arrived at the scene two days later the accident. The CSB
interviewed employees, photo-documented the area affected and preserved any other evidence
for better investigation.
The CSB joined the OSHA, NDK, and the insurance company in order to find out what was the
causes of the accident. An 8,600-pound vessel fragment was taken to perform some destructive
tests on it. Engineers and metallurgists from several agencies were consulted and they took
various samples from the vessel for microscopic examination and testing. Also, metallurgists
from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Materials Reliability Division were
authorized by CSB to review the data resulted from the test.
The Illinois State Fire Marshals Office suspended the operations at the facility on January 29,
2010. Since then, the NDK Crystal facility is inoperable.
Ultimate Results
The explosion throw fragments of the vessel to 435 feet away from the NDK building. A
business office near the NDK facility had its wall damaged and one person working near the wall

was injured. Also, one piece of structural steel from the base of the vessel hit and killed a truck
driver at the gas station near to the NDK building. At the time of the incident there were six
NDK employees near the area of explosion, but they were not injured. The NDK facility got the
main damage. The explosion and the force of the displaced vessel destroyed steel framing,
stairwells, floor grating near vessel No. 2. A huge amount of the final product and the exterior
insulating panels were blown. Also, fragments of the explosion traveled through the Interstate 90
and several automobiles in a public facility were damaged.

Root Causes
Several factors can be considered causes of the incident. The explosion was explained by the
data obtained from metallurgical tests, the CSB found evidence of cracking on the inner diameter
of the vessel fragment. The cracks reduced the toughness of the vessel resulting in the failure.
The sodium hydroxide and water solution damaged the steel inside the vessel leading to a
formation of cracks and a corrosive environment, which is called Stress Corrosion Cracking
(SCC).
The material of the first three vessels manufactured by Sheffield did not meet the required
mechanical properties. Sheffield did not certify that they were condescending with the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The vessels failed on the Charpy test according to the ASME
Code requirements. However, the company insisted in using those vessels.
The first run performed on the vessel is to form the coating inside the vessel wall. The NDK
performed this run and relied on the fact that acmite could prevent the process from corroding.
However, the alloy steel vessel material was susceptible to corrosion. By performing several
tests on fragments of the vessel, the CSB found variation on materials toughness in different
regions of the vessel, suggesting that SCC was reducing the vessels ability to absorb energy
before failing. In other words, making the vessel weaker.
When NDK got the authorization to operate vessels (No. 1, 2, and 3), the EPSI recommended
annual inspections on the interior of the vessels. However, there is no documentation of any
internal inspection of Vessel No. 2.
The last root cause of the accident is the fact that the company had ignored recommendations
from a consultant hired after an incident that happened in 2007. A leak of the 400 F caustic
sodium hydroxide solution that expelled through a pressure sensor connection at the top of the
vessel. The consultant found small cracks on the vessel lids, recommended an interior
examination of the vessels in order to identify the cracks. NDK ignored the advices, did not
perform any examination inside the vessels. The only concern of the company was redesigning
the lids without examining the origin of SCC.

Lessons Learned
Instead of just rely on the fact that acmite could prevent the process from corroding, the
company should perform examinations on the interior of the vessels in order to determine
whether the coating was well proper or not.
Do not ignore the advices of a consultant. According to the metallurgists commissioned by CSB,
NDK could have found cracks inside the vessel if the company had performed examinations
inside the vessels.
In order to maintain the safety of a chemical process, the company should perform annual
internal inspections as recommended by the vessel designer when the vessels were initially
constructed.

References
Chemical Safety Board. (2013). NDK Crystal, Inc., Belvidere, IL High-Pressure Vessel Rupture.
Case Study. Retrieved from http://www.csb.gov/ndk-crystal-inc-explosion-with-offsite-fatality-/
NDK - NIHON DEMPA KOGYO CO., LTD. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ndk.com/en/
Ladokun, T., Nabhani, F., & Zarei, S. (2010). Accidents in Pressure Vessels: Hazard Awareness.
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering. Retrieved from
http://www.iaeng.org/publication/WCE2010/WCE2010_pp1120-1123.pdf