This case involves the bitter quarrel of two brothers over two (2) parcels of land and its

improvements now worth a fortune. The bone of contention is the apparently conflicting
factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court, the resolution of which will
materially affect the result of the contest.
The following facts are not disputed.
Ishwar, Choithram and Navalrai, all surnamed Jethmal Ramnani, are brothers of the full
blood. Ishwar and his spouse Sonya had their main business based in New York.
Realizing the difficulty of managing their investments in the Philippines they executed a
general power of attorney on January 24, 1966 appointing Navalrai and Choithram as
attorneys-in-fact, empowering them to manage and conduct their business concern in
the Philippines. 1
On February 1, 1966 and on May 16, 1966, Choithram, in his capacity as aforesaid
attorney-in-fact of Ishwar, entered into two agreements for the purchase of two parcels
of land located in Barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, from Ortigas & Company, Ltd. Partnership
(Ortigas for short) with a total area of approximately 10,048 square meters. 2 Per
agreement, Choithram paid the down payment and installments on the lot with his
personal checks. A building was constructed thereon by Choithram in 1966 and this was
occupied and rented by Jethmal Industries and a wardrobe shop called Eppie's
Creation. Three other buildings were built thereon by Choithram through a loan of
P100,000.00 obtained from the Merchants Bank as well as the income derived from the
first building. The buildings were leased out by Choithram as attorney-in-fact of Ishwar.
Two of these buildings were later burned.
Sometime in 1970 Ishwar asked Choithram to account for the income and expenses
relative to these properties during the period 1967 to 1970. Choithram failed and
refused to render such accounting. As a consequence, on February 4, 1971, Ishwar
revoked the general power of attorney. Choithram and Ortigas were duly notified of such
revocation on April 1, 1971 and May 24, 1971, respectively. 3 Said notice was also
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 29, 1971 4 and was
published in the April 2, 1971 issue of The Manila Times for the information of the
general public. 5
Nevertheless, Choithram as such attorney-in-fact of Ishwar, transferred all rights and
interests of Ishwar and Sonya in favor of his daughter-in-law, Nirmla Ramnani, on
February 19, 1973. Her husband is Moti, son of Choithram. Upon complete payment of
the lots, Ortigas executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Nirmla. 6 Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 403150 and 403152 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal were
issued in her favor.

Thus, on October 6, 1982, Ishwar and Sonya (spouses Ishwar for short) filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Choithram and/or spouses
Nirmla and Moti (Choithram et al. for brevity) and Ortigas for reconveyance of said
properties or payment of its value and damages. An amended complaint for damages
was thereafter filed by said spouses.
After the issues were joined and the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the
trial court on December 3, 1985 dismissing the complaint and counterclaim. A motion for
reconsideration thereof filed by spouses Ishwar was denied on March 3, 1986.
An appeal therefrom was interposed by spouses Ishwar to the Court of Appeals wherein
in due course a decision was promulgated on March 14, 1988, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside
the appealed decision of the lower court dated December 3, 1985 and the
Order dated March 3, 1986 which denied plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration from aforesaid decision. A new decision is hereby
rendered sentencing defendants- appellees Choithram Jethmal Ramnani,
Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti C. Ramnani, and Ortigas and Company Limited
Partnership to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants the following:
1. Actual or compensatory damages to the extent of the fair market value
of the properties in question and all improvements thereon covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 403150 and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
403152 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, prevailing at the time of the
satisfaction of the judgment but in no case shall such damages be less
than the value of said properties as appraised by Asian Appraisal, Inc. in
its Appraisal Report dated August 1985 (Exhibits T to T-14, inclusive).
2. All rental incomes paid or ought to be paid for the use and occupancy of
the properties in question and all improvements thereon consisting of
buildings, and to be computed as follows:
a) On Building C occupied by Eppie's Creation and Jethmal
Industries from 1967 to 1973, inclusive, based on the 1967
to 1973 monthly rentals paid by Eppie's Creation;
b) Also on Building C above, occupied by Jethmal Industries
and Lavine from 1974 to 1978, the rental incomes based on
then rates prevailing as shown under Exhibit "P"; and from

1979 to 1981, based on then prevailing rates as indicated

under Exhibit "Q";
c) On Building A occupied by Transworld Knitting Mills from
1972 to 1978, the rental incomes based upon then prevailing
rates shown under Exhibit "P", and from 1979 to 1981,
based on prevailing rates per Exhibit "Q";
d) On the two Bays Buildings occupied by Sigma-Mariwasa
from 1972 to 1978, the rentals based on the Lease Contract,
Exhibit "P", and from 1979 to 1980, the rentals based on the
Lease Contract, Exhibit "Q",
and thereafter commencing 1982, to account for and turn over the rental
incomes paid or ought to be paid for the use and occupancy of the
properties and all improvements totalling 10,048 sq. m based on the rate
per square meter prevailing in 1981 as indicated annually cumulative up to
1984. Then, commencing 1985 and up to the satisfaction of the judgment,
rentals shall be computed at ten percent (10%) annually of the fair market
values of the properties as appraised by the Asian Appraisal, Inc. in
August 1985 (Exhibits T to T-14, inclusive.)
3. Moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00;
4. Exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00;
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award herein made;
6. Legal interest on the total amount awarded computed from first demand
in 1967 and until the full amount is paid and satisfied; and
7. The cost of suit. 7
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Choithram, et al. and Ortigas, the
appellate court promulgated an amended decision on October 17, 1988 granting the
motion for reconsideration of Ortigas by affirming the dismissal of the case by the lower
court as against Ortigas but denying the motion for reconsideration of Choithram, et al. 8
Choithram, et al. thereafter filed a petition for review of said judgment of the appellate
court alleging the following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in making a factual

finding not supported by and contrary, to the evidence presented at the
Trial Court.
2. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of jurisdiction in awarding
damages based on the value of the real properties in question where the
cause of action of private respondents is recovery of a sum of money.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS
DISCRETION IN MAKING A FACTUAL FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ISHWAR REMITTED THE AMOUNT OF US $150,000.00
TO PETITIONER CHOITHRAM IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF SUCH
REMITTANCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN DISREGARDING THE
TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS BASED ON THE DIRECT DOCUMENTARY
AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY CHOITHRAM IN THE
TRIAL COURT ESTABLISHING THAT THE PROPERTIES WERE
PURCHASED WITH PERSONAL FUNDS OF PETITIONER CHOITHRAM
AND NOT WITH MONEY ALLEGEDLY REMITTED BY RESPONDENT
ISHWAR.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES
AND THE FRUITS OF THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON. 9
Similarly, spouses Ishwar filed a petition for review of said amended decision of the
appellate court exculpating Ortigas of liability based on the following assigned errors
I
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ERROR AND HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE

NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS

OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
A) IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED AMENDED
DECISION (ANNEX "A") RELIEVING RESPONDENT
ORTIGAS
FROM
LIABILITY
AND
DISMISSING
PETITIONERS' AMENDED COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 534-P, AS AGAINST SAID RESPONDENT ORTIGAS;
B) IN HOLDING IN SAID AMENDED DECISION THAT AT
ANY RATE NO ONE EVER TESTIFIED THAT ORTIGAS
WAS A SUBSCRIBER TO THE MANILA TIMES
PUBLICATION OR THAT ANY OF ITS OFFICERS READ
THE NOTICE AS PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA TIMES,
THEREBY ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDING THAT FOR
RESPONDENT ORTIGAS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVELY
BOUND BY THE PUBLISHED NOTICE OF REVOCATION,
ORTIGAS AND/OR ANY OF ITS OFFICERS MUST BE A
SUBSCRIBER AND/OR THAT ANY OF ITS OFFICERS
SHOULD READ THE NOTICE AS ACTUALLY PUBLISHED;
C) IN HOLDING IN SAID AMENDED DECISION THAT
ORTIGAS COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY WITH THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
CHOITHRAM, MOTI AND NIRMLA RAMNANI, AS ORTIGAS
RELIED ON THE WORD OF CHOITHRAM THAT ALL
ALONG HE WAS ACTING FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HIS
BROTHER ISHWAR WHEN IT TRANSFERRED THE
RIGHTS OF THE LATTER TO NIRMLA V. RAMNANI;
D) IN IGNORING THE EVIDENCE DULY PRESENTED AND
ADMITTED DURING THE TRIAL THAT ORTIGAS WAS
PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF THE NOTICE OF REVOCATION
OF THE GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO
CHOITHRAM, EVIDENCED BY THE PUBLICATION IN THE
MANILA TIMES ISSUE OF APRIL 2, 1971 (EXH. F) WHICH
CONSTITUTES NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD; THE
RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE OF SUCH REVOCATION
WHICH WAS SENT TO ORTIGAS ON MAY 22, 1971 BY
ATTY. MARIANO P. MARCOS AND RECEIVED BY
ORTIGAS ON MAY 24, 1971 (EXH. G) AND THE FILING OF

THE NOTICE WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION ON MARCH 29,1971 (EXH. H);
E) IN DISCARDING ITS FINDINGS CONTAINED IN ITS
DECISION OF 14 MARCH 1988 (ANNEX B) THAT
ORTIGAS WAS DULY NOTIFIED OF THE REVOCATION
OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY OF CHOITHRAM, HENCE
ORTIGAS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE
DEED OF SALE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION IN
FAVOR OF NIRMLA V. RAMNANI;
F) IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT ORTIGAS VACUOUS
REHASHED ARGUMENTS IN ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THAT IT WOULD NOT GAIN ONE
CENTAVO MORE FROM CHOITHRAM FOR THE SALE OF
SAID LOTS AND THE SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER OF THE
SAME TO THE MATTER'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, AND THAT
IT WAS IN GOOD FAITH WHEN IT TRANSFERRED
ISHWAR'S RIGHTS TO THE LOTS IN QUESTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING WHEN IT HELD IN THE QUESTIONED
AMENDED DECISION OF 17 NOVEMBER 1988 (ANNEX A) THAT
RESPONDENT ORTIGAS & CO., LTD., IS NOT JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES CHOITHRAM,
MOTI AND NIRMLA RAMNANI IN SPITE OF ITS ORIGINAL DECISION
OF 14 MARCH 1988 THAT ORTIGAS WAS DULY NOTIFIED OF THE
REVOCATION OF THE POWER OF ATTORNEY OF CHOITHRAM
RAMNANI. 10
The center of controversy is the testimony of Ishwar that during the latter part of 1965,
he sent the amount of US $150,000.00 to Choithram in two bank drafts of
US$65,000.00 and US$85,000.00 for the purpose of investing the same in real estate in
the Philippines. The trial court considered this lone testimony unworthy of faith and
credit. On the other hand, the appellate court found that the trial court misapprehended
the facts in complete disregard of the evidence, documentary and testimonial.

Another crucial issue is the claim of Choithram that because he was then a British
citizen, as a temporary arrangement, he arranged the purchase of the properties in the
name of Ishwar who was an American citizen and who was then qualified to purchase
property in the Philippines under the then Parity Amendment. The trial court believed
this account but it was debunked by the appellate court.
As to the issue of whether of not spouses Ishwar actually sent US$150,000.00 to
Choithram precisely to be used in the real estate business, the trial court made the
following disquisition
After a careful, considered and conscientious examination of the evidence
adduced in the case at bar, plaintiff Ishwar Jethmal Ramanani's main
evidence, which centers on the alleged payment by sending through
registered mail from New York two (2) US$ drafts of $85,000.00 and
$65,000.00 in the latter part of 1965 (TSN 28 Feb. 1984, p. 10-11). The
sending of these moneys were before the execution of that General Power
of Attorney, which was dated in New York, on January 24, 1966. Because
of these alleged remittances of US $150,000.00 and the subsequent
acquisition of the properties in question, plaintiffs averred that they
constituted a trust in favor of defendant Choithram Jethmal Ramnani. This
Court can be in full agreement if the plaintiffs were only able to prove
preponderantly these remittances. The entire record of this case is bereft
of even a shred of proof to that effect. It is completely barren. His
uncorroborated testimony that he remitted these amounts in the "later part
of 1965" does not engender enough faith and credence. Inadequacy of
details of such remittance on the two (2) US dollar drafts in such big
amounts is completely not positive, credible, probable and entirely not in
accord with human experience. This is a classic situation, plaintiffs not
exhibiting any commercial document or any document and/or paper as
regard to these alleged remittances. Plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani is not an
ordinary businessman in the strict sense of the word. Remember his main
business is based in New York, and he should know better how to send
these alleged remittances. Worst, plaintiffs did not present even a scum of
proof, that defendant Choithram Ramnani received the alleged two US
dollar drafts. Significantly, he does not know even the bank where these
two (2) US dollar drafts were purchased. Indeed, plaintiff Ishwar
Ramnani's lone testimony is unworthy of faith and credit and, therefore,
deserves scant consideration, and since the plaintiffs' theory is built or
based on such testimony, their cause of action collapses or falls with it.

Further, the rate of exchange that time in 1966 was P4.00 to $1.00. The
alleged two US dollar drafts amounted to $150,000.00 or about
P600,000.00. Assuming the cash price of the two (2) lots was only
P530,000.00 (ALTHOUGH he said: "Based on my knowledge I have no
evidence," when asked if he even knows the cash price of the two lots). If
he were really the true and bonafide investor and purchaser for profit as
he asserted, he could have paid the price in full in cash directly and
obtained the title in his name and not thru "Contracts To Sell" in
installments paying interest and thru an attorney-in fact (TSN of May 2,
1984, pp. 10-11) and, again, plaintiff Ishwar Ramnani told this Courtthat
he does not know whether or not his late father-in-law borrowed the two
US dollar drafts from the Swiss Bank or whether or not his late father-inlaw had any debit memo from the Swiss Bank(TSN of May 2, 1984, pp. 910). 11
On the other hand, the appellate court, in giving credence to the version of Ishwar, had
this to say
While it is true, that generally the findings of fact of the trial court are
binding upon the appellate courts, said rule admits of exceptions such as
when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inferences made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
and when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 33; Philippine American
Life Assurance Co. vs. Santamaria, 31 SCRA 798; Aldaba vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 189).
The evidence on record shows that the t court acted under a
misapprehension of facts and the inferences made on the evidence
palpably a mistake.
The trial court's observation that "the entire records of the case is bereft of
even a shred of proof" that plaintiff-appellants have remitted to defendantappellee Choithram Ramnani the amount of US $ 150,000.00 for
investment in real estate in the Philippines, is not borne by the evidence
on record and shows the trial court's misapprehension of the facts if not a
complete disregard of the evidence,both documentary and testimonial.

Plaintiff-appellant Ishwar Jethmal Ramnani testifying in his own behalf,

declared that during the latter part of 1965, he sent the amount of US
$150,000.00 to his brother Choithram in two bank drafts of US $65,000.00
and US $85,000.00 for the purpose of investing the same in real estate in
the Philippines. His testimony is as follows:
ATTY. MARAPAO:
Mr. Witness, you said that your attorney-in-fact paid in your
behalf. Can you tell this Honorable Court where your
attorney-in-fact got the money to pay this property?
ATTY. CRUZ:
Wait. It is now clear it becomes incompetent or hearsay.
COURT:
Witness can answer.
A I paid through my attorney-in-fact. I am the one who gave
him the money.
ATTY. MARAPAO:
Q You gave him the money?
A That's right.
Q How much money did you give him?
A US $ 150,000.00.
Q How was it given then?
A Through Bank drafts. US $65,000.00 and US $85,000.00
bank drafts. The total amount which is $ 150,000.00 (TSN,
28 February 1984, p. 10; Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CRUZ:

Q The two bank drafts which you sent I assume you bought
that from some banks in New York?
A No, sir.
Q But there is no question those two bank drafts were for the
purpose of paying down payment and installment of the two
parcels of land?
A Down payment, installment and to put up the building.
Q I thought you said that the buildings were constructed . . .
subject to our continuing objection from rentals of first
building?
ATTY. MARAPAO:
Your Honor, that is misleading.
COURT;
Witness (may) answer.
A Yes, the first building was immediately put up after the
purchase of the two parcels of land that was in 1966 and the
finds were used for the construction of the building from the
US $150,000.00 (TSN, 7 March 1984, page 14; Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q These two bank drafts which you mentioned and the use
for it you sent them by registered mail, did you send them
from New Your?
A That is right.
Q And the two bank drafts which were put in the registered
mail, the registered mail was addressed to whom?
A Choithram Ramnani. (TSN, 7 March 1984, pp. 14-15).

On cross-examination, the witness reiterated the remittance of the money to his brother
Choithram, which was sent to him by his father-in-law, Rochiram L. Mulchandoni from
Switzerland, a man of immense wealth, which even defendants-appellees' witness
Navalrai Ramnani admits to be so (tsn., p. 16, S. Oct. 13, 1985). Thus, on crossexamination, Ishwar testified as follows:
Q How did you receive these two bank drafts from the bank
the name of which you cannot remember?
A I got it from my father-in-law.
Q From where did your father- in-law sent these two bank
drafts?
A From Switzerland.
Q He was in Switzerland.
A Probably, they sent out these two drafts from Switzerland.
(TSN, 7 March 1984, pp. 16-17; Emphasis supplied.)
This positive and affirmative testimony of plaintiff-appellant that he sent
the two (2) bank drafts totalling US $ 150,000.00 to his brother, is proof of
said remittance. Such positive testimony has greater probative force than
defendant-appellee's denial of receipt of said bank drafts, for a witness
who testifies affirmatively that something did happen should be believed
for it is unlikely that a witness will remember what never happened
(Underhill's Cr. Guidance, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 10-11).
That is not all. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff-appellant Ishwar Ramnani
executed a General Power of Attorney (Exhibit "A") dated January
24, 1966 appointing his brothers, defendants-appellees Navalrai and
Choithram as attorney-in-fact empowering the latter to conduct and
manage plaintiffs-appellants'business affairs in the Philippines and
specifically
No. 14. To acquire, purchase for us, real estates and
improvements for the purpose of real estate business
anywhere in the Philippines and to develop, subdivide,
improve and to resell to buying public (individual, firm or
corporation); to enter in any contract of sale in oar behalf

and to enter mortgages between the vendees and the herein

grantors that may be needed to finance the real estate
business being undertaken.
Pursuant thereto, on February 1, 1966 and May 16, 1966, Choithram
Jethmal Ramnani entered into Agreements (Exhibits "B' and "C") with the
other defendant. Ortigas and Company, Ltd., for the purchase of two (2)
parcels of land situated at Barrio Ugong, Pasig, Rizal, with said
defendant-appellee signing the Agreements in his capacity as Attorney-infact of Ishwar Jethmal Ramnani.
Again, on January 5, 1972, almost seven (7) years after Ishwar sent the
US $ 150,000.00 in 1965, Choithram Ramnani, as attorney-in fact of
Ishwar entered into a Contract of Lease with Sigma-Mariwasa (Exhibit "P")
thereby re-affirming the ownership of Ishwar over the disputed property
and the trust relationship between the latter as principal and Choithram as
attorney-in-fact of Ishwar.
All of these facts indicate that if plaintiff-appellant Ishwar had not earlier
sent the US $ 150,000.00 to his brother, Choithram, there would be no
purpose for him to execute a power of attorney appointing his brothers as
s attorney-in-fact in buying real estate in the Philippines.
As against Choithram's denial that he did not receive the US $150,000.00
remitted by Ishwar and that the Power of Attorney, as well as the
Agreements entered into with Ortigas & Co., were only temporary
arrangements, Ishwar's testimony that he did send the bank drafts to
Choithram and was received by the latter, is the more credible version
since it is natural, reasonable and probable. It is in accord with the
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men
(Gardner vs. Wentors 18 Iowa 533). And in determining where the
superior weight of the evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider the probability or improbability of the testimony of the witness
(Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
Contrary, therefore, to the trial court's sweeping observation that 'the entire
records of the case is bereft of even a shred of proof that Choithram
received the alleged bank drafts amounting to US $ 150,000.00, we have
not only testimonial evidence but also documentary and circumstantial
evidence proving said remittance of the money and the fiduciary
relationship between the former and Ishwar. 12

The Court agrees. The environmental circumstances of this case buttress the claim of
Ishwar that he did entrust the amount of US $ 150,000.00 to his brother, Choithram,
which the latter invested in the real property business subject of this litigation in his
capacity as attorney-in-fact of Ishwar.
True it is that there is no receipt whatever in the possession of Ishwar to evidence the
same, but it is not unusual among brothers and close family members to entrust money
and valuables to each other without any formalities or receipt due to the special
relationship of trust between them.
And another proof thereof is the fact that Ishwar, out of frustration when Choithram
failed to account for the realty business despite his demands, revoked the general
power of attorney he extended to Choithram and Navalrai. Thereafter, Choithram wrote
a letter to Ishwar pleading that the power of attorney be renewed or another authority to
the same effect be extended, which reads as follows:
June
25,19
71
MR.
NEW YORK

ISHWAR

JETHMAL

(1) Send power of Atty. immediately, because the case has been
postponed for two weeks. The same way as it has been send before in
favor of both names. Send it immediately otherwise everything will be lost
unnecessarily, and then it will take us in litigation. Now that we have gone
ahead with a case and would like to end it immediately otherwise
squatters will take the entire land. Therefore, send it immediately.
(2) Ortigas also has sued us because we are holding the installments,
because they have refused to give a rebate of P5.00 per meter which they
have to give us as per contract. They have filed the law suit that since we
have not paid the installment they should get back the land. The hearing
of this case is in the month of July. Therefore, please send the power
immediately. In one case DADA (Elder Brother) will represent and in
another one, I shall.
(3) In case if you do not want to give power then make one letter in favor
of Dada and the other one in my favor showing that in any litigation we
can represent you and your wife, and whatever the court decide it will be

acceptable by me. You can ask any lawyer, he will be able to prepare
these letters. After that you can have these letters ratify before P.I.
Consulate. It should be dated April 15, 1971.
(4) Try to send the power because it will be more useful. Make it in any
manner whatever way you have confident in it. But please send it
immediately.
You have cancelled the power. Therefore, you have lost your reputation
everywhere. What can I further write you about it. I have told everybody
that due to certain reasons I have written you to do this that is why you
have done this. This way your reputation have been kept intact. Otherwise
if I want to do something about it, I can show you that inspite of the power
you have cancelled you can not do anything. You can keep this letter
because my conscience is clear. I do not have anything in my mind.
I should not be writing you this, but because my conscience is clear do
you know that if I had predated papers what could you have done? Or do
you know that I have many paper signed by you and if had done anything
or do then what can you do about it? It is not necessary to write further
about this. It does not matter if you have cancelled the power. At that time
if I had predated and done something about it what could you have
done? You do not know me. I am not after money. I can earn money
anytime. It has been ten months since I have not received a single penny
for expenses from Dada (elder brother). Why there are no expenses? We
can not draw a single penny from knitting (factory). Well I am not going to
write you further, nor there is any need for it. This much I am writing you
because
of
the
way
you
have
conducted
yourself. But
remember, whenever I hale the money I will not keep it myself Right now I
have not got anything at all.
I am not going to write any further.
Keep your business clean with Naru. Otherwise he will discontinue
because he likes to keep his business very clean. 13
The said letter was in Sindhi language. It was translated to English by the First
Secretary of the Embassy of Pakistan, which translation was verified correct by the
Chairman, Department of Sindhi, University of Karachi. 14
From the foregoing letter what could be gleaned is that

1. Choithram asked for the issuance of another power of attorney in their favor so they
can continue to represent Ishwar as Ortigas has sued them for unpaid installments. It
also appears therefrom that Ortigas learned of the revocation of the power of attorney
so the request to issue another.
2. Choithram reassured Ishwar to have confidence in him as he was not after money,
and that he was not interested in Ishwar's money.
3. To demonstrate that he can be relied upon, he said that he could have ante-dated the
sales agreement of the Ortigas lots before the issuance of the powers of attorney and
acquired the same in his name, if he wanted to, but he did not do so.
4. He said he had not received a single penny for expenses from Dada (their elder
brother Navalrai). Thus, confirming that if he was not given money by Ishwar to buy the
Ortigas lots, he could not have consummated the sale.
5. It is important to note that in said letter Choithram never claimed ownership of the
property in question. He affirmed the fact that he bought the same as mere agent and in
behalf of Ishwar. Neither did he mention the alleged temporary arrangement whereby
Ishwar, being an American citizen, shall appear to be the buyer of the said property, but
that after Choithram acquires Philippine citizenship, its ownership shall be transferred to
Choithram.
This brings us to this temporary arrangement theory of Choithram.
The appellate court disposed of this matter in this wise
Choithram's claim that he purchased the two parcels of land for himself in
1966 but placed it in the name of his younger brother, Ishwar, who is an
American citizen, as a temporary arrangement,' because as a British
subject he is disqualified under the 1935 Constitution to acquire real
property in the Philippines, which is not so with respect to American
citizens in view of the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution granting
them parity rights, there is nothing in the records showing that Ishwar ever
agreed to such a temporary arrangement.
During the entire period from 1965, when the US $ 150,000. 00 was
transmitted to Choithram, and until Ishwar filed a complaint against him in
1982, or over 16 years, Choithram never mentioned of a temporary
arrangement nor can he present any memorandum or writing evidencing
such temporary arrangement, prompting plaintiff-appellant to observe:

The properties in question which are located in a prime

industrial site in Ugong, Pasig, Metro Manila have a present
fair market value of no less than P22,364,000.00 (Exhibits T
to T-14, inclusive), and yet for such valuable pieces of
property, Choithram who now belatedly that he purchased
the same for himself did not document in writing or in a
memorandum the alleged temporary arrangement with
Ishwar' (pp. 4-41, Appellant's Brief).
Such verbal allegation of a temporary arrangement is simply improbable
and inconsistent. It has repeatedly been held that important contracts
made without evidence are highly improbable.
The improbability of such temporary arrangement is brought to fore when
we consider that Choithram has a son (Haresh Jethmal Ramnani) who is
an American citizen under whose name the properties in question could
be registered, both during the time the contracts to sell were executed and
at the time absolute title over the same was to be delivered. At the time
the Agreements were entered into with defendant Ortigas & Co. in 1966,
Haresh, was already 18 years old and consequently, Choithram could
have executed the deeds in trust for his minor son. But, he did not do this.
Three (3) years, thereafter, or in 1968 after Haresh had attained the age of
21, Choithram should have terminated the temporary arrangement with
Ishwar, which according to him would be effective only pending the
acquisition of citizenship papers. Again, he did not do anything.
Evidence to be believed, said Vice Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itselfsuch as the
common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no
test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to
our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
of judicial cognizance. (Daggers vs. Van Dyek 37 M.J. Eq.
130, 132).
Another factor that can be counted against the temporary arrangement
excuse is that upon the revocation on February 4, 1971 of the Power of
attorney dated January 24, 1966 in favor of Navalrai and Choithram by
Ishwar, Choithram wrote (tsn, p. 21, S. July 19, 1985) a letter dated June

25, 1971 (Exhibits R, R-1, R-2 and R-3) imploring Ishwar to execute a
new power of attorney in their favor.That if he did not want to give
power, then Ishwar could make a letter in favor of Dada and another in his
favor so that in any litigation involving the properties in question, both of
them could represent Ishwar and his wife. Choithram tried to convince
Ishwar to issue the power of attorney in whatever manner he may want. In
said letter no mention was made at all of any temporary arrangement.
On the contrary, said letter recognize(s) the existence of principal and
attorney-in-fact relationship between Ishwar and himself. Choithram wrote:
. . . do you know that if I had predated papers what could you have done?
Or do you know that I have many papers signed by you and if I had done
anything or do then what can you do about it?' Choithram was saying that
he could have repudiated the trust and ran away with the properties of
Ishwar by predating documents and Ishwar would be entirely helpless. He
was bitter as a result of Ishwar's revocation of the power of attorney but no
mention was made of any temporary arrangement or a claim of ownership
over the properties in question nor was he able to present any
memorandum or document to prove the existence of such temporary
arrangement.
Choithram is also estopped in pais or by deed from claiming an interest
over the properties in question adverse to that of Ishwar. Section 3(a) of
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act, or omission intentionally and deliberately led another
to believe a particular thing true and act upon such belief, he cannot in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission be permitted to
falsify it.' While estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes a party to a
deed and his privies from asserting as against the other and his privies
any right of title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any
material fact asserted in it(31 C.J.S. 195; 19 Am. Jur. 603).
Thus, defendants-appellees are not permitted to repudiate their
admissions and representations or to assert any right or title in derogation
of the deeds or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in the
(1) power of attorney dated January 24, 1966 (Exhibit A); (2) the
Agreements of February 1, 1966 and May 16, 1966 (Exhibits B and
C); and (3) the Contract of Lease dated January 5, 1972 (Exhibit P).
. . . The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of
public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its

purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,

representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied
thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid
the law in the administration of justice where without its aid
injustice might result. It has been applied by court wherever
and whenever special circumstances of a case so demands'
(Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA
357, 368 [1979]).
It was only after the services of counsel has been obtained that Choithram
alleged for the first time in his Answer that the General Power of attorney
(Annex A) with the Contracts to Sell (Annexes B and C) were made only
for the sole purpose of assuring defendants' acquisition and ownership of
the lots described thereon in due time under the law; that said instruments
do not reflect the true intention of the parties (par. 2, Answer dated May
30, 1983), seventeen (17) long years from the time he received the money
transmitted to him by his brother, Ishwar.
Moreover, Choithram's 'temporary arrangement,' by which he claimed
purchasing the two (2) parcels in question in 1966 and placing them in the
name of Ishwar who is an American citizen, to circumvent the
disqualification provision of aliens acquiring real properties in the
Philippines under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as Choithram was then
a British subject, show a palpable disregard of the law of the land and to
sustain the supposed "temporary arrangement" with Ishwar would be
sanctioning the perpetration of an illegal act and culpable violation of the
Constitution.
Defendants-appellees
likewise
violated
the Anti-Dummy
Law
(Commonwealth Act 108, as amended),which provides in Section 1
thereof that:
In all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision
requires Philippine or any other specific citizenship as a
requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege, . . . any alien or foreigner profiting thereby, shall be
punished . . . by imprisonment . . . and of a fine of not less
than the value of the right, franchise or privileges, which is
enjoyed or acquired in violation of the provisions hereof . . .

Having come to court with unclean hands, Choithram must not be

permitted foist his 'temporary arrangement' scheme as a defense before
this court. Being in delicto, he does not have any right whatsoever being
shielded from his own wrong-doing, which is not so with respect to
Ishwar, who was not a party to such an arrangement.
The falsity of Choithram's defense is further aggravated by the material
inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony. While on January 23,
1985 he testified that he purchased the land in question on his own behalf
(tsn, p. 4, S. Jan. 23, 1985), in the July 18, 1985 hearing, forgetting
probably what he stated before, Choithram testified that he was only an
attorney-in-fact of Ishwar (tsn, p. 5, S. July 18, 1985). Also in the hearing
of January 23, 1985, Choithram declared that nobody rented the building
that was constructed on the parcels of land in question (tsn, pp. 5 and 6),
only to admit in the hearing of October 30, 1985, that he was in fact
renting the building for P12,000. 00 per annum (tsn, p. 3). Again, in the
hearing of July 19, 1985, Choithram testified that he had no knowledge of
the revocation of the Power of Attorney (tsn, pp. 20- 21), only to backtrack
when confronted with the letter of June 25, 1971 (Exhibits R to R-3), which
he admitted to be in "his own writing," indicating knowledge of the
revocation of the Power of Attorney.
These inconsistencies are not minor but go into the entire credibility of the
testimony of Choithram and the rule is that contradictions on a very crucial
point by a witness, renders s testimony incredible People vs. Rafallo, 80
Phil. 22). Not only this the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
fully applicable as far as the testimony of Choithram is concerned. The
cardinal rule, which has served in all ages, and has been applied to all
conditions of men, is that a witness willfully falsifying the truth in one
particular, when upon oath, ought never to be believed upon the strength
of his own testimony, whatever he may assert (U.S. vs. Osgood 27 Feb.
Case No. 15971-a, p. 364); Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 52 Phil, 728), for what
ground of judicial relief can there be left when the party has shown such
gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between
truth and falsehood? (The Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat, 283, 5 U.S. [L.
ed.] 454).
True, that Choithram's testimony finds corroboration from the testimony of
his brother, Navalrai, but the same would not be of much help to
Choithram. Not only is Navalrai an interested and biased witness, having
admitted his close relationship with Choithram and that whenever he or

Choithram had problems, they ran to each other (tsn, pp. 17-18, S. Sept.
20, 1985), Navalrai has a pecuniary interest in the success of Choithram
in the case in question. Both he and Choithram are business partners in
Jethmal and Sons and/or Jethmal Industries, wherein he owns 60% of the
company and Choithram, 40% (p. 62, Appellant's Brief). Since the
acquisition of the properties in question in 1966, Navalrai was occupying
1,200 square meters thereof as a factory site plus the fact that his son
(Navalrais) was occupying the apartment on top of the factory with his
family rent free except the amount of P l,000.00 a month to pay for taxes
on said properties (tsn, p. 17, S. Oct. 3, 1985).
Inherent contradictions also marked Navalrai testimony. "While the latter
was very meticulous in keeping a receipt for the P 10,000.00 that he paid
Ishwar as settlement in Jethmal Industries, yet in the alleged payment of P
100,000.00 to Ishwar, no receipt or voucher was ever issued by him (tsn,
p. 17, S. Oct. 3, 1983). 15
We concur.
The foregoing findings of facts of the Court of Appeals which are supported by the
evidence is conclusive on this Court. The Court finds that Ishwar entrusted
US$150,000.00 to Choithram in 1965 for investment in the realty business. Soon
thereafter, a general power of attorney was executed by Ishwar in favor of both Navalrai
and Choithram. If it is true that the purpose only is to enable Choithram to purchase
realty temporarily in the name of Ishwar, why the inclusion of their elder brother Navalrai
as an attorney-in-fact?
Then, acting as attorney-in-fact of Ishwar, Choithram purchased two parcels of land
located in Barrio Ugong Pasig, Rizal, from Ortigas in 1966. With the balance of the
money of Ishwar, Choithram erected a building on said lot. Subsequently, with a loan
obtained from a bank and the income of the said property, Choithram constructed three
other buildings thereon. He managed the business and collected the rentals. Due to
their relationship of confidence it was only in 1970 when Ishwar demanded for an
accounting from Choithram. And even as Ishwar revoked the general power of attorney
on February 4, 1971, of which Choithram was duly notified, Choithram wrote to Ishwar
on June 25, 1971 requesting that he execute a new power of attorney in their
favor. 16 When Ishwar did not respond thereto, Choithram nevertheless proceeded as
such attorney-in-fact to assign all the rights and interest of Ishwar to his daughter-in-law
Nirmla in 1973 without the knowledge and consent of Ishwar. Ortigas in turn executed
the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Nirmla after full payment of the purchase
accomplice of the lots.

In the prefatory statement of their petition, Choithram pictured Ishwar to be so motivated

by greed and ungratefulness, who squandered the family business in New York, who
had to turn to his wife for support, accustomed to living in ostentation and who resorted
to blackmail in filing several criminal and civil suits against them. These statements find
no support and should be stricken from the records. Indeed, they are irrelevant to the
proceeding.
Moreover, assuming Ishwar is of such a low character as Choithram proposes to make
this Court to believe, why is it that of all persons, under his temporary arrangement
theory, Choithram opted to entrust the purchase of valuable real estate and built four
buildings thereon all in the name of Ishwar? Is it not an unconscious emergence of the
truth that this otherwise wayward brother of theirs was on the contrary able to raise
enough capital through the generosity of his father-in-law for the purchase of the very
properties in question? As the appellate court aptly observed if truly this temporary
arrangement story is the only motivation, why Ishwar of all people? Why not the own
son of Choithram, Haresh who is also an American citizen and who was already 18
years old at the time of purchase in 1966? The Court agrees with the observation that
this theory is an afterthought which surfaced only when Choithram, Nirmla and Moti filed
their answer.
When Ishwar asked for an accounting in 1970 and revoked the general power of
attorney in 1971, Choithram had a total change of heart. He decided to claim the
property as his. He caused the transfer of the rights and interest of Ishwar to Nirmla. On
his representation, Ortigas executed the deeds of sale of the properties in favor of
Nirmla. Choithram obviously surmised Ishwar cannot stake a valid claim over the
property by so doing.
Clearly, this transfer to Nirmla is fictitious and, as admitted by Choithram, was intended
only to place the property in her name until Choithram acquires Philippine
citizenship. 17 What appears certain is that it appears to be a scheme of Choithram to
place the property beyond the reach of Ishwar should he successfully claim the same.
Thus, it must be struck down.
Worse still, on September 27, 1990 spouses Ishwar filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and to require Choithram, et al. to submit
certain documents, inviting the attention of this Court to the following:
a) Donation by Choithram of his 2,500 shares of stock in General
Garments Corporation in favor of his children on December 29, 1989; 18

b) Sale on August 2, 1990 by Choithram of his 100 shares in Biflex

(Phils.), Inc., in favor of his children; 19and
c) Mortgage on June 20, 1989 by Nirmla through her attorney-in-fact,
Choithram, of the properties subject of this litigation, for the amount of $3
Million in favor of Overseas Holding, Co. Ltd., (Overseas for brevity), a
corporation which appears to be organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of Cayman Islands, with a capital of only $100.00 divided
into 100 shares of $1.00 each, and with address at P.O. Box 1790, Grand
Cayman, Cayman Islands. 20
An opposition thereto was filed by Choithram, et al. but no documents were produced. A
manifestation and reply to the opposition was filed by spouses Ishwar.
All these acts of Choithram, et al. appear to be fraudulent attempts to remove these
properties to the detriment of spouses Ishwar should the latter prevail in this litigation.
On December 10, 1990 the court issued a resolution that substantially reads as follows:
Considering the allegations of petitioners Ishwar Jethmal Ramnani and
Sonya Ramnani that respondents Choithram Jethmal Ramnani, Nirmla
Ramnani and Moti G. Ramnani have fraudulently executed a simulated
mortgage of the properties subject of this litigation dated June 20, 1989, in
favor of Overseas Holding Co., Ltd. which appears to be a corporation
organized in Cayman Islands, for the amount of $ 3,000,000.00, which is
much more than the value of the properties in litigation; that said alleged
mortgagee appears to be a "shell" corporation with a capital of only
$100.00; and that this alleged transaction appears to be intended to
defraud petitioners Ishwar and Sonya Jethmal Ramnani of any favorable
judgment that this Court may render in this case;
Wherefore the Court Resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining and prohibiting said respondents Choithram Jethmal Ramnani,
Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti G. Ramnani and the Overseas Holding Co., Ltd.
from encumbering, selling or otherwise disposing of the properties and
improvements subject of this litigation until further orders of the Court.
Petitioners Ishwar and Sonya Jethmal Ramnani are hereby required to
post a bond of P 100,000.00 to answer for any damages d respondents
may suffer by way of this injunction if the Court finally decides the said
petitioners are not entitled thereto.

The Overseas Holding Co., Ltd. with address at P.O. Box 1790 Grand
Cayman, Cayman Islands, is hereby IMPLEADED as a respondent in
these cases, and is hereby required to SUBMIT its comment on the
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment and
Motion for Production of Documents, the Manifestation and the Reply to
the Opposition filed by said petitioners, within Sixty (60) days after service
by publication on it in accordance with the provisions of Section 17, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, at the expense of petitioners Ishwar and Sonya
Jethmal Ramnani.
Let copies of this resolution be served on the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Rizal, and the Provincial Assessor of Pasig, Rizal, both in Metro Manila,
for its annotation on the transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 403150 and
403152 registered in the name of respondent Nirmla V. Ramnani, and on
the tax declarations of the said properties and its improvements subject of
this litigation. 21
The required injunction bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 was filed by the spouses
Ishwar which was approved by the Court. The above resolution of the Court was
published in the Manila Bulletin issue of December 17, 1990 at the expense of said
spouses. 22 On December 19, 1990 the said resolution and petition for review with
annexes in G.R. Nos. 85494 and 85496 were transmitted to respondent Overseas,
Grand Cayman Islands at its address c/o Cayman Overseas Trust Co. Ltd., through the
United Parcel Services Bill of Lading 23 and it was actually delivered to said company on
January 23, 1991. 24
On January 22, 1991, Choithram, et al., filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction alleging that there is no basis therefor as in the amended complaint what is
sought is actual damages and not a reconveyance of the property, that there is no
reason for its issuance, and that acts already executed cannot be enjoined. They also
offered to file a counterbond to dissolve the writ.
A comment/opposition thereto was filed by spouses Ishwar that there is basis for the
injunction as the alleged mortgage of the property is simulated and the other donations
of the shares of Choithram to his children are fraudulent schemes to negate any
judgment the Court may render for petitioners.
No comment or answer was filed by Overseas despite due notice, thus it is and must be
considered to be in default and to have lost the right to contest the representations of
spouses Ishwar to declare the aforesaid alleged mortgage nun and void.

This purported mortgage of the subject properties in litigation appears to be fraudulent

and simulated. The stated amount of $3 Million for which it was mortgaged is much
more than the value of the mortgaged properties and its improvements. The alleged
mortgagee-company (Overseas) was organized only on June 26,1989 but the mortgage
was executed much earlier, on June 20, 1989, that is six (6) days before Overseas was
organized. Overseas is a "shelf" company worth only $100.00. 25 In the manifestation of
spouses Ishwar dated April 1, 1991, the Court was informed that this matter was
brought to the attention of the Central Bank (CB) for investigation, and that in a letter of
March 20, 1991, the CB informed counsel for spouses Ishwar that said alleged foreign
loan of Choithram, et al. from Overseas has not been previously approved/registered
with the CB. 26
Obviously, this is another ploy of Choithram, et al. to place these properties beyond the
reach of spouses Ishwar should they obtain a favorable judgment in this case. The
Court finds and so declares that this alleged mortgage should be as it is hereby
declared null and void.
All these contemporaneous and subsequent acts of Choithram, et al., betray the
weakness of their cause so they had to take an steps, even as the case was already
pending in Court, to render ineffective any judgment that may be rendered against
them.
The problem is compounded in that respondent Ortigas is caught in the web of this
bitter fight. It had all the time been dealing with Choithram as attorney-in-fact of Ishwar.
However, evidence had been adduced that notice in writing had been served not only
on Choithram, but also on Ortigas, of the revocation of Choithram's power of attorney by
Ishwar's lawyer, on May 24, 1971. 27 A publication of said notice was made in the April 2,
1971 issue ofThe Manila Times for the information of the general public. 28 Such notice
of revocation in a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient warning to third persons
including Ortigas. 29 A notice of revocation was also registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on March 29, 1 971. 30
Indeed in the letter of Choithram to Ishwar of June 25, 1971, Choithram was pleading
that Ishwar execute another power of attorney to be shown to Ortigas who apparently
learned of the revocation of Choithram's power of attorney. 31 Despite said notices,
Ortigas nevertheless acceded to the representation of Choithram, as alleged attorneyin-fact of Ishwar, to assign the rights of petitioner Ishwar to Nirmla. While the primary
blame should be laid at the doorstep of Choithram, Ortigas is not entirely without fault. It
should have required Choithram to secure another power of attorney from Ishwar. For
recklessly believing the pretension of Choithram that his power of attorney was still
good, it must, therefore, share in the latter's liability to Ishwar.

In the original complaint, the spouses Ishwar asked for a reconveyance of the properties
and/or payment of its present value and damages. 32 In the amended complaint they
asked, among others, for actual damages of not less than the present value of the real
properties in litigation, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, costs of the suit
and further prayed for "such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises . 33 The amended complaint contain the following positive allegations:
7. Defendant Choithram Ramnani, in evident bad faith and despite due
notice of the revocation of the General Power of Attorney, Annex 'D"
hereof, caused the transfer of the rights over the said parcels of land to his
daughter-in-law, defendant Nirmla Ramnani in connivance with defendant
Ortigas & Co., the latter having agreed to the said transfer despite
receiving a letter from plaintiffs' lawyer informing them of the said
revocation; copy of the letter is hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof as Annex "H";
8. Defendant Nirmla Ramnani having acquired the aforesaid property by
fraud is, by force of law,considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of plaintiff and is obliged to return the same to the latter:
9. Several efforts were made to settle the matter within the family but
defendants (Choithram Ramnani, Nirmla Ramnani and Moti Ramnani)
refused and up to now fail and still refuse to cooperate and respond to the
same; thus, the present case;
10. In addition to having been deprived of their rights over the properties
(described in par. 3 hereof), plaintiffs, by reason of defendants' fraudulent
act, suffered actual damages by way of lost rental on the property which
defendants (Choithram Ramnani, Nirmla Ramnani and Moti Ramnani
have collected for themselves; 34
In said amended complaint, spouses Ishwar, among others, pray for payment of actual
damages in an amount no less than the value of the properties in litigation instead of a
reconveyance as sought in the original complaint. Apparently they opted not to insist on
a reconveyance as they are American citizens as alleged in the amended complaint.
The allegations of the amended complaint above reproduced clearly spelled out that the
transfer of the property to Nirmla was fraudulent and that it should be considered to be
held in trust by Nirmla for spouses Ishwar. As above-discussed, this allegation is welltaken and the transfer of the property to Nirmla should be considered to have created
an implied trust by Nirmla as trustee of the property for the benefit of spouses Ishwar. 35

The motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction filed by Choithram, et al. should
be denied. Its issuance by this Court is proper and warranted under the circumstances
of the case. Under Section 3(c) Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a writ of preliminary
injunction may be granted at any time after commencement of the action and before
judgment when it is established:
(c) that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of plaintiffs's rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
As above extensively discussed, Choithram, et al. have committed and threaten to
commit further acts of disposition of the properties in litigation as well as the other
assets of Choithram, apparently designed to render ineffective any judgment the Court
may render favorable to spouses Ishwar.
The purpose of the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the litigation and to protect the rights of the spouses Ishwar
respecting the subject of the action during the pendency of the Suit 36 and not to
obstruct the administration of justice or prejudice the adverse party. 37 In this case for
damages, should Choithram, et al. continue to commit acts of disposition of the
properties subject of the litigation, an award of damages to spouses Ishwar would
thereby be rendered ineffectual and meaningless. 38
Consequently, if only to protect the interest of spouses Ishwar, the Court hereby finds
and holds that the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment filed by
spouses Ishwar should be granted covering the properties subject of this litigation.
Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides that at the commencement of an
action or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of
the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered, in, among others, the following cases:
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking,
detention or conversion of which the action is brought;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his
property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors; . . .

Verily, the acts of Choithram, et al. of disposing the properties subject of the litigation
disclose a scheme to defraud spouses Ishwar so they may not be able to recover at all
given a judgment in their favor, the requiring the issuance of the writ of attachment in
this instance.
Nevertheless, under the peculiar circumstances of this case and despite the fact that
Choithram, et al., have committed acts which demonstrate their bad faith and scheme to
defraud spouses Ishwar and Sonya of their rightful share in the properties in litigation,
the Court cannot ignore the fact that Choithram must have been motivated by a strong
conviction that as the industrial partner in the acquisition of said assets he has as much
claim to said properties as Ishwar, the capitalist partner in the joint venture.
The scenario is clear. Spouses Ishwar supplied the capital of $150,000.00 for the
business. They entrusted the money to Choithram to invest in a profitable business
venture in the Philippines. For this purpose they appointed Choithram as their attorneyin-fact.
Choithram in turn decided to invest in the real estate business. He bought the two (2)
parcels of land in question from Ortigas as attorney-in-fact of Ishwar- Instead of paying
for the lots in cash, he paid in installments and used the balance of the capital entrusted
to him, plus a loan, to build two buildings. Although the buildings were burned later,
Choithram was able to build two other buildings on the property. He rented them out and
collected the rentals. Through the industry and genius of Choithram, Ishwar's property
was developed and improved into what it is nowa valuable asset worth millions of
pesos. As of the last estimate in 1985, while the case was pending before the trial court,
the market value of the properties is no less than P22,304,000.00. 39 It should be worth
much more today.
We have a situation where two brothers engaged in a business venture. One furnished
the capital, the other contributed his industry and talent. Justice and equity dictate that
the two share equally the fruit of their joint investment and efforts. Perhaps this
Solomonic solution may pave the way towards their reconciliation. Both would stand to
gain. No one would end up the loser. After all, blood is thicker than water.
However, the Court cannot just close its eyes to the devious machinations and schemes
that Choithram employed in attempting to dispose of, if not dissipate, the properties to
deprive spouses Ishwar of any possible means to recover any award the Court may
grant in their favor. Since Choithram, et al. acted with evident bad faith and malice, they
should pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees to spouses Ishwar.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 85494 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No.
85496 is hereby given due course and GRANTED. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals dated October 18, 1988 is hereby modified as follows:
1. Dividing equally between respondents spouses Ishwar, on the one hand, and
petitioner Choithram Ramnani, on the other, (in G.R. No. 85494) the two parcels of land
subject of this litigation, including all the improvements thereon, presently covered by
transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 403150 and 403152 of the Registry of Deeds, as well
as the rental income of the property from 1967 to the present.
2. Petitioner Choithram Jethmal Ramnani, Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti C. Ramnani and
respondent Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership (in G.R. No. 85496) are ordered
solidarily to pay in cash the value of said one-half (1/2) share in the said land and
improvements pertaining to respondents spouses Ishwar and Sonya at their fair market
value at the time of the satisfaction of this judgment but in no case less than their value
as appraised by the Asian Appraisal, Inc. in its Appraisal Report dated August 1985
(Exhibits T to T-14, inclusive).
3. Petitioners Choithram, Nirmla and Moti Ramnani and respondent Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership shall also be jointly and severally liable to pay to said respondents spouses
Ishwar and Sonya Ramnani one-half (1/2) of the total rental income of said properties
and improvements from 1967 up to the date of satisfaction of the judgment to be
computed as follows:
a. On Building C occupied by Eppie's Creation and Jethmal
Industries from 1967 to 1973, inclusive, based on the 1967
to 1973 monthly rentals paid by Eppie's Creation;
b. Also on Building C above, occupied by Jethmal Industries
and Lavine from 1974 to 1978, the rental incomes based on
then rates prevailing as shown under Exhibit "P"; and from
1979 to 1981, based on then prevailing rates as indicated
under Exhibit "Q";
c. On Building A occupied by Transworld Knitting Mills from
1972 to 1978, the rental incomes based upon then prevailing
rates shown under Exhibit "P", and from 1979 to 1981,
based on prevailing rates per Exhibit "Q";
d. On the two Bays Buildings occupied by Sigma-Mariwasa
from 1972 to 1978, the rentals based on the Lease Contract,

Exhibit "P", and from 1979 to 1980, the rentals based on the
Lease Contract, Exhibit "Q".
and thereafter commencing 1982, to account for and turn over the rental
incomes paid or ought to be paid for the use and occupancy of the
properties and all improvements totalling 10,048 sq. m., based on the rate
per square meter prevailing in 1981 as indicated annually cumulative up to
1984. Then, commencing 1985 and up to the satisfaction of the judgment,
rentals shall be computed at ten percent (10%) annually of the fair market
values of the properties as appraised by the Asian Appraisals, Inc. in
August 1985. (Exhibits T to T-14, inclusive.)
4. To determine the market value of the properties at the time of the satisfaction of this
judgment and the total rental incomes thereof, the trial court is hereby directed to hold a
hearing with deliberate dispatch for this purpose only and to have the judgment
immediately executed after such determination.
5. Petitioners Choithram, Nirmla and Moti, all surnamed Ramnani, are also jointly and
severally liable to pay respondents Ishwar and Sonya Ramnani the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's
fees equal to 10% of the total award. to said respondents spouses.
6. The motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction dated December 10, 1990
filed by petitioners Choithram, Nirmla and Moti, all surnamed Ramnani, is hereby
DENIED and the said injunction is hereby made permanent. Let a writ of attachment be
issued and levied against the properties and improvements subject of this litigation to
secure the payment of the above awards to spouses Ishwar and Sonya.
7. The mortgage constituted on the subject property dated June 20, 1989 by petitioners
Choithram and Nirmla, both surnamed Ramnani in favor of respondent Overseas
Holding, Co. Ltd. (in G.R. No. 85496) for the amount of $3-M is hereby declared null
and void. The Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, is directed to cancel the annotation of d
mortgage on the titles of the properties in question.
8. Should respondent Ortigas Co., Ltd. Partnership pay the awards to Ishwar and Sonya
Ramnani under this judgment, it shall be entitled to reimbursement from petitioners
Choithram, Nirmla and Moti, all surnamed Ramnani.
9. The above awards shag bear legal rate of interest of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time this judgment becomes final until they are fully paid by petitioners
Choithram Ramnani, Nirmla V. Ramnani, Moti C. Ramnani and Ortigas, Co., Ltd.

Partnership. Said petitioners Choithram, et al. and respondent Ortigas shall also pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.