A.

POLICE POWER
Police Power is an inherent power of the State to promote the welfare of society by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
Scope:
(a) cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or contract (Stone v Mississippi)
(b) may use taxing power as its implement (Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board)
(c) may use eminent domain as its implement (Assoc. of Small Landowners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform)
(d) could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts (police power prevails over contract)
(e) dynamic, not static, and must move with the moving society it is supposed to regulate
Who may exercise Police Power?
(a) the Legislature (inherent)
(b) President (by delegation)
(c) administrative boards (by delegation)
(d) lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including barangay (by delegation)
(e) Municipal governments / LGU's (conferred by statute general welfare clause of RA 7160)
Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority it has no police power. (MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Assoc.)
Tests (Limitations):
(a) Lawful subject interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power
(b) Lawful means the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
Additional limitations (when exercised by delegate) [Nachura Reviewer]:
express grant by law (e.g. RA 7160)
within territorial limits (for LGU's)
must not be contrary to law (City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta)
for municipal ordinances 1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. must not be unfair and oppressive
3. must not be partial and discriminatory
4. must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade
5. must not be unreasonable
6. must be general in application and consistent with public policy
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.[3] The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to
local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.[4]
This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code which provides:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace,
order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.[5]
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
1983-06-24 | G.R. No. L-34915
a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void. In favor of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO INC.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than
six months from the date of approval of the application."
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to
stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the

required 6% space intended for paupers burial."

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken
for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under
its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
ISSUE:
Is is valid exercise of Police Power?
HELD:
NO
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of
the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This
has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain
areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development
of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on
any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal
interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating. The sequestration of
six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it
accepted the permits to commence operations.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INS., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its President Amado P. Macasaet
and its Executive Director Ermin
F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
1995-05-22 | G.R. No. 119694
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 issued
by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of news paper and magazine publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part: xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. - The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' from March 6, 1995 in the 1995 until May
12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. - 'Comelec Space' shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within
the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
'Comelec Space' shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. - (a) 'Comelec Space' shall be available to all candidates during the periods stated in Section 2
hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall be furnished a
copy of the allocation of 'Comelec Space' for their information, guidance and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of 'Comelec Space' from newspapers or publications based in the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee on Mass media of the Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail
himself of 'Comelec Space' in newspapers of publication based in the provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing,
to the Provincial Election Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment of 'Comelec Space' may be filed at any time from the
date of effectivity of this Resolution.
(c ) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors shall allocate available 'Comelec Space' among the
candidates concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be notified in advance, in writing, to be present personally or by
representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the result of the
lottery may appeal to the Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the
case may be, sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue and the newspaper or publication allocated to him, and the
time within which he must submit the written material for publication in the 'Comelec Space'.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. - No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or
published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly
favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party.
However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the
publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publication that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of
public interest."
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical
letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the
Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI. These letters read as follows:
"This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on Elections, you are directed to provide free print
space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as 'Comelec Space' or similar to the print support which you have extended
during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from
March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known to their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government.
We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to you their pictures, biographical data, stand on
key public issues and platforms of government, either as raw data or in the form of positives or camera-ready materials.
Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in your publications any day upon receipt of their
materials until may 6, 1995 which is the day for campaigning.
We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard."
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to declare
Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space"
and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the
provisions of Section 8 of Comelec resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the
press and of expression. 1
Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and
applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 is clearly
susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers
who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the
Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written
communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by government (here a
constitutional) agency and signed by member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a
coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition
of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such direction, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties inhering in the
present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional
objection.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely
what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as
an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purpose, or as an exhortion, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however,
provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide
free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 in its present from and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the
Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8
of resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a guidelines for implementation of the
above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club, an effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of resolution
No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of resolution No. 2772. The distinction
between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or
controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to
enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by
reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here
sought to be raised - whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's
power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to
"supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of - media of communication or information
- [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public-information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections -"

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., et al. v. DSWD, et al.

G.R. No. 166494, 29 June 2007, Azcuna, J. (En Banc)

Under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from net sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the tax due was computed based on the net taxable income. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso-for-peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes paid. Said treatment reduces the net income of the establishments concerned. On the other hand, under the tax credit scheme, the amount of
discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the
owner's loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such it would not meet the definition of just compensation. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioner must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. The right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of
the public good.
Republic Act 7432 (Old Senior Citizens Act) provides that the 20% discount from goods and services of establishments for the
exclusive use and enjoyment of the senior citizens may be claimed by the establishments as tax credit. With the passage of R.A. 9257
(Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003), said discount may now be claimed by the establishments as tax deduction based on the net cost
of the goods sold or services rendered, provided that the cost of the discount shall be allowed as a deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted. Under this new law, more establishments were added such as: establishments providing medical and dental
services, diagnostic and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators
of domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways and bus transport services.
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, who assail the constitutionality of the
said law, alleging that they are entitled to just compensation since the allowance of the discount as a tax deduction amounts to deprivation
of property.
ISSUES:
1)

Police Power?

HELD:
Petition DENIED.
Certain differences of tax deduction and tax credit can be derived from the two laws. The tax credit under R.A. 7432 is a peso-for-peso
deduction from a taxpayer's tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such establishment has granted to a
senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the government shoulders 100% of
the discounts granted. The tax deduction under R.A. 9257 is based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Effectively, the
government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the
government. Under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from net sales together with other deductions which
are considered as operating expenses before the tax due was computed based on the net taxable income. Being a tax deduction, the discount
does not reduce taxes owed on a peso-for-peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes paid. Said treatment reduces the net income of
the establishments concerned. On the other hand, under the tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was
deducted directly from the tax due amount.
Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 has constitutional basis.
R.A. 9257 is in accord with the State's policy to provide social justice in all phases of national development and to adopt an integrated
and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children.
No just compensation is due.
Petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount. As such it would not meet the definition of just compensation. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioner must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in
an impairment of property rights in the process. The right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of
the public good.

G.R. No. L-59791

Manila Electric Co. v. The Honorable Gregorio Pineda, et. Al
Facts:
A complaint for eminent domain was filed by the petitioner MERALCO against forty two (42) defendants. The said complaint alleges that
for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of
the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237, 321 square meters. Despite the petitioners offer to pay
compensation and attempt for negotiation with the respondents, the parties failed to reach an agreement. On December 27, 1974 private
respondents question in their motion the petitioners legal existence and the area sought to be appropriated which they find too excessive.
Despite the opposition of the private respondents the court issued an order dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner to take or enter
upon the possession of the property sought to be expropriated. On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit
claiming that they are entitled to be paid at forty pesos (40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of P 272,000.00 ad prayed that they
be allowed to withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from petitioners deposit account. However, the respondents motion was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1976.
The petitioners sold to the NAPOCOR the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing private
respondents property on October 30, 1979. Respondent court issued an order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to
make an appraisal of the properties. But the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests
over the transmission lines because of their sale to the Napocor. Another motion for payment was filed by the respondents on June 9, 1981
where the court granted the motion for payment. The plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of
6,800 sq m. at P3.00 per sq. m. An omnibus motion filed by the private respondents on December 15, 1981 praying that they be allowed to
withdraw an additional sum of P 90, 125.50 which the court granted leaving a balance of P161,475.00 still payable to the respondents. In
response to the motion made by the respondents, the petitioner filed an opposition alleging the private respondents are not entitled to
payment of just compensation because there is still no appraisal and valuation of the property. The court denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and motion for contempt filed against the respondents. The respondent court stressed in said order that at this stage, the
Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a credible real
estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as the value of the and in question. The
petitioner strongly maintains that the respondents courts act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private
respondents would formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of
petitioners constitutional right to due process. A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and
determine for itself the just compensation.
Held:
The court ruled that the Sections 5 and 8 of the Revised Rules of Court is applicable in the case at bar. The respondent judge arrived at the
amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as
landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, the petitioner has not been
given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The
appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases. The trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for
no reason at all. In such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from
competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence
of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation. Petition is GRANTED.
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON.
EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.
Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.
1991-09-11 | G.R. No. 92389 D E
CISION
PARAS, J.:
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati
is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads:
"A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO
BE TAKEN OUT OF UN APPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY." (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five
hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 41).
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.10) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary
findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation
thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", p. 44).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's
Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5,
ibid) social justice (Section 10, ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, ibid." (Comment, p. 12).
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good.