Constitutional Law 1

Ass. Jan 11, 2014

1. Code: Memorize Sections 5, 6 and 7

2. Read in the texts/references the pages corresponding to the Code assigned.
3. Read and make digests of the following cases:
1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz 64 Phil 201
2.Garces vs. Estenzo 104 S 510
3. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila 101 Phil 386
4. Gerona vs. Sec. of Educ. 106 Phil 2
5. Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent 219 S 256
6. Centeno vs. Villalon 236 S 197
7. German vs. Barangan 135 S 514
8. Pamil vs. Teleron 86 S 413
9. Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz GR 144801, Mar 10, 2005
10. Estrada vs. Escitor AM No. P-02. 1651 and its Final Resolution dated June 22, 2006
11. Caunca vs. Salazar 82 Phil 851
12.Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660
13. Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil 778
14.Manotoc vs. CA 142 S 149
15. Silverio vs. CA 195 S 761
16. Yap vs. CA GR 141529, June 6, 2001
17. Legaspi vs. CSC. 150 S 530
18. Valmonte vs. Belmonte 170 S 256
19. Aquino vs. Morato 203 S 515
20. Chavez vs. PCGG 299 S 744
21. Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI GR 133250,Jul 9, 2002

1.

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]

Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc.
This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the
state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as
would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not
authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a
Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of
that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church,
any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or purpose of the Government

2. GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that
the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the
Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar
of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the
barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the
image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8
Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution is violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with
the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of
the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition) is not illegal.
Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property.
Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the
Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which
has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.

3. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957

a.
b.

Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in
the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898
City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No.
409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for operating without the
necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q
1945-2Q 1953
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a
refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:
They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax
it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question
Trial Court dismissed the complaint
American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals
Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles

a.
b.

Ruling: NO
Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, trades or
occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys
business is not among those enumerated
However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except those
upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or
occupation.
2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix the
license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except
those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall
be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be
classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous
articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same
establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax
prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per
annum
As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of
Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as
a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax
levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press
and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this
flat license tax.

Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.
Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for
its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those
who do not have a full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,Corporations or associations organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever
kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be taxed
The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same
but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing
defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5, 891.45 unduly collected from it

4. Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the
anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the
manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate
their children. This was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain
them from implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a
certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a
religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for
there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects
or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the
petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag
salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not
to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the
regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of
sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession
of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance
of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about
freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and
school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and
refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.

5. Ebranilag, et. al. v. The Division Supt. of Schools

March 1, 1993

FACTS:
1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District
Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they
are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.
2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions
3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners
are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses.
Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or
idol representing the State . They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against
official control
5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses,
and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and
recite the patriotic pledge.
6. The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public
respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to
freedom of speech, religion and worship
7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their
respective classes until further orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid
NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious
beliefs. Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. It
reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the
right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution.
Although the Court upholds in this decision nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order
for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

6. G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS
236 SCRA 197

Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng
Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno,
the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or
the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.
Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?
Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration,
whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.
However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore
acquitted.

7. German v. Barangan
G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
Facts:

1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees
converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacaang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they started to march down with raised clenched
fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. The marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his
superiors and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel
was located within the Malacaang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed in the church.
2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter
the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.
3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the
hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never
restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners'
intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a
place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic.
4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of [1]

a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P.
Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into
and praying in said church.
ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom to
religious worship
NO.
1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national security.
Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the
manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the
pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.
2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise
thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code
admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and
good faith."

8.Pamil v. Teleron
G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
Facts:

1. In 1971, Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected and duly proclaimed as mayor of Alburquerque,
Bohol. Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto, to disqualify respondent based on Section 2175 of the Administrative Code provision:
"In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries
or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."
2. The suit did not prosper, with the lower court held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The
matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full
force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ecclesiastic was eligible to an elective municipal position
NO. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and
application. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The
presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances,certiorari lies.

Pamil vs. Teleron

Facts: The novel question in this case concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private
respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.
Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification
based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public
works of the municipality."
Issue: Is the prohibition imposed on ecclesiastics from holding appointive or elective municipal offices a religious test?
Held: No. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven
does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as
ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the
circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare
ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members,
led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted.
It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain
operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision,
certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.
Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an
incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is
not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a
prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to
answer that no question was raised as to its validity.

9. Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz
before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating

their right to due process of law.

Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?
Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of
the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property
rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted
claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

10. Estrada vs. Escritor

Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor,
court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Issue: What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality
consistent with the free exercise clause?
Held: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives
to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not
been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is
remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state
interest. It is the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope
of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause,
the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take
a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The
government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the
states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.

11. CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has
already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer
to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense

from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance
payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely
no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of
the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from
one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not
blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim
is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
physical coercion.

12. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes)
will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of
the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised AdministrativeCode, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall
refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.
Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus,
WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with
said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2)
the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in
which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the generalgood of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

13. G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET
AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women
whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were
already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal
damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and
that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if
the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ
is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.

14. Manotoc v CA 142 SCRA 149 (1986)

Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed
but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De
Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking
that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the

release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail
does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesThe Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines explained
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series) A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in
the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to
damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

15. Silverio v. CA
Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death,
her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting
the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio,
Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of
the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order
on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12,
2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private
respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected
within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order
dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the
assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
Issue: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory
Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Held: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file
an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12,
2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of
an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the
wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court instead.
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court,
while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to
be decided upon.
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally
cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On
that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the
heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real

interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus,
private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for
employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private
respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

16. Yap vs. CA

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the
Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and
two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for
each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal,
and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?
Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we
find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the
combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of
his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the
setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

17. Legaspi vs. CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil action
for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General
of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of
petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting
policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to
information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt
certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All
appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public
trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the
government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the
public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has
the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.

20. Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as
other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to
take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security,
diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

21. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ

vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then ongoing renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."
ISSUE: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to
information?
HELD: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern:
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not
immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official
acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there
arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 178933

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) Promulgated:

and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,

Respondents.
September 16, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007 Resolution [1] and July 6, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitled Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
(impleaded as necessary party) v. Reinato G. Quilala, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S.
Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.
[2]

The assailed resolution granted private respondents prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against public
respondent Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed decision set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice
to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 while directing the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein private
respondent.
The Facts
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving
spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO.
M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC).
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the
removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the
estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as
all other related orders.
On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use
Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. [3]
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order [4] affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private
respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the
order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005[5] of the Omnibus Order. This
was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005[6] also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with
letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate
of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the properties
authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.[7]

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006 [8] from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20, 2006[9] was filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution[10] against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the
reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order [11] denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the
reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private
respondent to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later
issued on April 17, 2007[12] and a Notice to Vacate[13] was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the premises of
the subject property within ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) dated May 2, 2007[14]with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the
CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the fresh rule
period enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.[16]
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private respondent. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE.
Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate,
dated April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby directed to give due
course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues
-AThe Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;
-BThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are
fraudulent documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;
-CThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4,
2007 (Annex A-1);
-DThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the
Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent Silverio-Dees occupancy of the Intestate property
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City (Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the
Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes due which are now high and rapidly
increasing payment of which must not be enjoined.[17]

The Courts Ruling

This petition is meritorious.
The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is
an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property
located at No. 3, Intsia Road, ForbesPark, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a
Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22,
2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2, 2007, ruled:
Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated December 12,
2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the
motion for reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f),
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated
May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirtyday period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due course.
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against Nelia Silverio-Dee requiring
her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an
order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia
Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man
who is not her husband, for more than twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is
the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract
or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not

evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo
that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her
right to freedom of religion.